Capitol Aviation, Inc.

CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 745 dictory claims for specific work, we would be unable, on the record before us, to make a statewide assignment of all the work set out in the notice of hearing, for that record shows only that in the State of Michi- gan both laborers and fitters have worked as helpers to welders doing distribution work. Further, as members of Respondents are appar- ently employed as helpers in at least some areas of the State, we are unconvinced from the state of this record that economics and experi- ence dictates that Laborers must be assigned the work statewide. As we have held that Sections 8 (b) (4) (D) and 10 (k) of the Act were intended to deal with competing claims for specific work,12 and as we are unable to find, on the entire record, that such a dispute here exists, we shall, therefore, quash the notice of hearing. [The Board quashed the notice of hearing.] 12lnternat,onal Typographical Union and Pueblo Typographical Union, Local No. 175,- AFL-CIO (Rocky Mountain Bank Note Company), 145 NLRB 921. Capitol Aviation, Inc. and International Association of Machin- ists, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 13-CA-5247, 13-CA-5645, and 13- CA-5761. May 21, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER Upon an original and amended charges (Case No. 13-CA-5247) duly filed on November 7 and 13 and December 7, 1962, by International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 13 (Chicago, Illinois), issued his com- plaint against Capitol Aviation, Inc., herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. This complaint was later withdrawn after the parties had entered into a settlement agreement on March 8, 1963. The settlement agreement provided for an offer of reinstatement and payment of back- pay to three alleged discriminatees. By this settlement, Respondent also agreed, in general terms, to bargain with the Union and, specifi- cally, not to grant unilateral wage increases without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain over such matters. Subsequently, on May 27,1963, the Union filed a charge (Case No. 13-CA-5645) alleging a violation of Section 8 (a) (5). After an investigation of this charge, the Regional Director for Region 13 notified the parties that he was withdrawing his approval to the settlement agreement. Thereafter, 152 NLRB No. 80. 746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on July 22, 1963, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating cases, a consolidated complaint, and notice of consolidated hearing. On July 23, 1963, the Union filed its charge in Case No. 13-CA-5761 alleg- ing violations of Section 8(a) (1), (3), and (5). On August 16, 1963, the Regional Director issued an amended order consolidating cases, amended consolidated complaint, and amended notice of consolidated hearing. Copies of the amended order consolidating cases, amended consolidated complaint, and amended notice of consolidated hearing were duly served upon the parties. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the amended consolidated complaint included the presettlement allegations and further alleged that the Respondent : (1) has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for all of the employees in the appropriate unit; (2) unilaterally changed exist- ing wage rates of the employees in the unit; and (3) failed and refused to reinstate Robert Brown to his former or substantially equivalent position of employment and thereafter laid off and/or discharged Robert Brown on July 19, 1963, for the reason that he had engaged in union and concerted activities protected by the Act. The Respondent filed its answer to the amended consolidated com- plaint on August 23, 1963, denying that it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Springfield, Illinois, on October 8 and 9, 1963, before Trial Examiner Sidney Sherman. The General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by counsel; the Union was represented by a special representative. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the hearing, the General Counsel asked leave to withdraw certain 8(a) (1) allegations of the complaint, which request was granted by the Trial Examiner. Also, at the hearing the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege general bad-faith bargaining by the Respondent on and after May 24, 1963. This motion was granted by the Trial Examiner. The Respondent denied the allegations of the amendments as made by the counsel for General Counsel. The Trial Examiner, being aware that a settlement agreement had been entered into which encompassed certain allegations in the amended complaint, ruled that the allegations arising after the settlement agree- ment would be litigated first. In accordance with this ruling, the fol- lowing were litigated : 1. Whether Respondent violated the requirement of good-faith bar- gaining by : a. The totality of its conduct. b. Its position on the subject of union security. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 747 c. Its insistence upon a contract terminating October 31, 1963, the end of the Union's certification year. d. Its act of granting wage increases to employees Hendershot, Rhoades, and Powell. 2. Whether Respondent discriminatorily reinstated Brown to some position other than that which he held prior to the strike. 3. Whether Respondent discriminatorily terminated Brown. At the conclusion of the litigation of these issues, the Respondent moved to dismiss the entire complaint. The Trial Examiner, in lieu of issuing a written decision, orally analyzed the evidence on the rec- ord and stated his findings of facts and conclusions of law and recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the counsel for the General Counsel and the Union each filed a request for review of the Trial Examiner's granting of the motion to dismiss and briefs in support thereof. The Union also filed exceptions. The Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire rec- ord in this case, including the Trial Examiner's findings of fact, con- clusions of law, and recommendation to dismiss the complaint, the General Counsel's and Union's requests for review and supporting briefs, the Union's exceptions, and the Respondent's answering brief, and makes its findings, conclusions, and Order, as follows: 1 FINDINGS OF FACTS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, Capitol Aviation, Inc., is an Illinois corporation, with its principal place of business at the Capitol Airport, North Wal- nut Street Road, Springfield, Illinois. It is engaged in the maintain- ing, servicing, purchasing, and selling of aircraft and related products at this location. The Respondent, during the past calendar year, in the course and conduct of its business operations, sold and distributed products and furnished services, the gross value of which exceeded $1,000,000. During the past year, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased, transferred, and deliv- ered to its plant products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from , Because the Trial Examiner orally dictated into the record of the hearing his reasons for dismissing the complaint , a complete and detailed written decision is necessary, as the Board cannot readily adopt or reject the findings , conclusions , and recommendations by attaching them hereto in the customary manner 748 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD States of the United States other than the State of Illinois. We find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization , admitting to membership employees of the Respondent. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The background On August 24, 1962, an election was conducted by the Board among Respondent's employees.2 The vote was 29 to 26 for the Union, and there were 6 challenged ballots. On October 31, 1962, the Regional Director issued his report sustaining four of the challenges. As the two remaining challenges could not affect the results of the election, the Union was certified. B. Contract negotiations on union security and termination date In November 1962, Respondent and the Union held their first of some 37 bargaining sessions . At the outset , the Union proposed a full union-security clause, and continued to press for such a provi- sion up to June 25, 1963 . At that time, the Union proposed a modi- fied union-security clause-one requiring present members to main- tain their membership and new hires to become members. Subse- quently, the Union proposed a straight maintenance -of-membership clause. Each of these proposals was resisted by the Respondent. Respondent's negotiator, Patton, testified : We stated repeatedly that we felt that union security in any form was inconsistent in the industry and that furthermore, that it did [not] give the employee the matter of free choice of mem- bership, or nonmembership in the union and that an employee should not be required to join the Union against his will to main- tain his employment. When the Union presented its maintenance-of-membership clause, Respondent objected on the ground that this did not give members freedom to resign if they so chose. At a meeting held on May 21, the Union suggested that the Illinois Department of Labor conduct on election among the employees on the question of union security. It was the Union's proposal that if a 2 Case No. 13-RC-8773. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 749 majority voted against union security the Union would withdraw its proposed contract clause, but if a majority voted for union security, Respondent would agree to such a provision. This was rejected by Respondent on the ground that union security was a matter to be decided by collective bargaining. With regard to Respondent's objection based on practices in the industry, Patton asserted that Respondent had made a survey of coin- panies engaged in a fixed base operation, as was Respondent, that to his knowledge none of them had "union security arrangements," that "one or two" might but that the majority did not. It does not appear that the Union asked for the names of these companies, but when asked about the fact that Butler Aviation, whose contract the Union was using as a guide in the instant negotiations, had a union-security provision, Patton replied that to a certain extent Butler was a "fixed base operation," but that it did not perform the same type of work as Respondent. When asked why Respondent resisted the union- security proposal when Respondent's parent corporation, Sangamo Electric, had contracts with union-security clauses, Patton replied that Sangamo had nothing to do with negotiations at Respondent. The only clause offered by Respondent in the nature of a counter- proposal was one providing for a checkoff revocable at will. With respect to contract duration, the record shows that, at the very first meeting, Respondent took the position that any contract agreed to should expire at the end of the certification year-October 31, 1963. Although, in sessions which followed, the Union proposed varying terminal dates, each of which went beyond the certification year.3 Respondent consistently insisted upon the October 31, 1963, date, and as late as September 12, 1963, sought this termination date even though this would have by that time meant a 7-week contract. At one point, Respondent told the Union that even if all other terms of a contract were agreed to it would still have to have the October 31, 1963, duration date. The reason advanced by Respondent's negotia- tor for this date vas: ... we felt that there had been a close vote, that our employees had never lived under a union situation and they should be given an opportunity a year from certification to again express them- selves as to whether or not they wanted union affiliation. Respondent also referred to events occurring after a number of bar- gaining sessions had been held which it asserted justified its position on contract duration. Thus, in March or April 1963, Respondent learned of a petition an employee had circulated repudiating the 8 May 9-A 2-year contract from the date of signing ; May 24-A 1-year contract from the date of signing ; June 6-August 1, 1964; July 1-October 31, 1964; July 2-1 year contract. 750 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union and expressing a desire for another election. This petition had been signed by 33 out of the 58 employees in the bargaining unit,, but it does not affirmatively appear in this record that Respondent knew of the number signing. Respondent also pointed to the fact that when the Union called a strike on June 6, 1963, not more than 25 out of the approximately 60 employees in the unit responded and only 12 employees remained on strike to its end-July 3. Respondent also asserted that various employees had notified it of their dissatis- faction with the Union. C. Rhoades and Hendershot Employee Rhoades, an unlicensed mechanic, received his mechanics license dated March 26, 1963, from the Federal Aviation Agency, wherein he was "found to be properly qualified to exercise the privi- leges of mechanic ... Power Plant." Possession of an FAA license, under FAA regulations, authorizes a licensed employee to certify performance of work tasks upon airplanes, and it is one governing factor in assignment of work tasks. Receipt of the license by Rhoades led to a change of duties and automatic reclassification from unlicensed to licensed mechanic. On April 4, Respondent notified the Union by letter of Rhoades' qualifications as licensed mechanic with a 10-cent raise. The Respond- ent had a practice for many years to reclassify unlicensed mechanics to licensed mechanics upon receipt of the appropriate FAA license and to grant a 10-cent-per-hour raise with such reclassification. Respondent did not talk to Rhoades about his reclassification until after its notification to the Union. The raise was first earned in the week beginning April 11, and first received by Rhoades on April 19, 1963. On April 16, Respondent wrote the Union a letter about Hender- shot's receipt of his second FAA license and his future 10-cent raise. The FAA license is dated April 5, 1963, and qualified Hendershot to. certify additional work. The increase was first earned in the week beginning April 18 and was first received on April 26. The 10-cent increase followed Respondent's practice which had been discussed as a job feature when Hendershot was hired. After the prospective raises to Rhoades and Hendershot had been announced and made effective, the Union first presented wage and job classification proposals in negotiations at the April 25 meeting; there is no evidence to show that the Union at any time proposed a. change in Respondent's practice of reclassifying mechanics as licensed mechanics with a 10-cent raise upon receipt of the requisite FAA license. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 751 D. Robert Brown Brown was hired as a temporary employee on April 29, 1963, to perform paint-stripping work. Due to a nasal obstruction, Brown had to breathe through his mouth, and the Respondent, believing that inhalation of fumes incident to paint stripping would be injurious to Brown, assigned him to work as a maintenance helper. Brown's duties were largely janitorial, consisting of trash removal and painting of walls at which he was a good worker. He was considered slow and unsatisfactory by the Respondent when assigned to do crude carpen- try work. The Union conducted a strike in June and, of some 60 employees in the unit, only 20 to 25 supported the strike at the beginning and only 12 employees remained on strike at the end. The Union announced termination of its strike at the July 2 meeting with the Respondent. Brown went out on strike and attended the strike settlement meet- ing. During the strike, the Respondent told Brown that work was available. After the strike settlement, Brown's return to work was delayed several days because of an operation which removed his nasal obstruction. Upon his return to work, Brown was assigned to paint stripping, the work for which he had originally been hired, at the same rate of pay. When the paint stripping work was completed, Respondent termi- nated two paint strippers on July 12 and two more, including Brown, on July 19 4 On July 19, the Respondent determined that Brown was not qualified to perform any available work including installation of a PA system performed by employee Randall Rust and line service work for which employee Fish had been recalled. When Brown was first hired, his performance of janitorial work relieved two full-time maintenance men to do other work; they absorbed Brown's work during the strike and thereafter. The Respondent found that there was no need for a maintenance helper after July 19, 1963. On August 6, Respondent hired Andrew Preer as a part-time main- tenance man to perform all the duties of "Maintenance Man." Unlike Brown's former job of maintenance helper, which, while calling for some crude carpentry work, was largely a janitorial one, this job of maintenance man required general maintenance experience, including electrical wiring experience, which Preer, but not Brown, had. In July and August, Respondent terminated 15 unit employees for lack of work. Of the 15 employees terminated , only Brown had participated in the strike. 752 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD E. James Powell's wage increase Powell was hired in April 1963 and worked for 1 week in mainte- nance. Thereafter he worked in the paint shop. On July 11, 1963, Good and Powell had a conversation concerning Powell's rate of pay. Powell was told that he would be reclassified from temporary employee to unlicensed mechanic and was to receive $1.56 per hour. Powell pointed out that another employee was getting $1.75 per hour, and Good said this was agreeable provided the Union would approve. Powell's raise went into effect on the following Monday, July 15, 1963. On July 11, 1963, Good had talked to Drennan, the Union's business agent, about Brown, and talked to him again on the telephone on July 12 about four terminations and also about Powell's reclassifi- cation and $1.75 rate. After Drennan first suggested that Edwards be promoted rather than Powell, he agreed to all the changes except Brown's termination. Good said he would write a letter in the fol- Jowing week about the changes. Later on July 12, Good told Powell about his talk with Drennan, and also on the same day Good reported Drennan's approval of Pow- ell's raise to Bennett. On July 16, Good wrote his letter confirming, inter alia, Powell's raise. At the hearing herein, Drennan denied talking with Good on July 12, and denied that he ever discussed a raise for Powell with Good. With respect to the conflict in testimony about Drennan's ap- proval of Powell's raise in the telephone talk with Good on July 12, the Trial Examiner credited Good, Powell, and Bennett as against Drennan. The Trial Examiner was satisfied this was a merit increase and credited Good's testimony that it was cleared orally with Dren- nan. In crediting Good, the Trial Examiner relied primarily on the corroboration of Good by Powell as well as Bennett. The Trial Examiner held, and correctly so, that although such testimony is hearsay, it was not objected to, and, since it corroborates primary testimony, it is competent testimony. Conclusions From the evidence discussed above, we find , contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Respondent , as evidenced by its positions on union security and contract duration , did not bargain in good faith with the Union. The record establishes that the Union endeavored to reach a compromise with Respondent , yet despite the Union's willingness to make concessions, Respondent steadfastly refused to agree to any form of union security or to agree to any contract termination date other than one coinciding with the end of the Union's certification year. Of course, the Act does not require an employer to agree to a union-secu- pity clause, nor does the Act forbid an employer to seek a contract CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 753 termination date like the one Respondent sought. But the Act does compel good-faith bargaining on these subjects, and we think this record clearly establishes Respondent took the adamant positions it did simply to frustrate bargaining. In regard to Respondent's position on union security, we note that while Respondent asserted it was relying in part upon "industry prac- tice," Respondent failed to name any employer in the industry which had no union-security arrangement. Moreover, as noted above, the contract Butler Aviation has covering its employees contains a union- security clause. Respondent's reliance upon "industry practice" does not have a convincing ring. Its position on this issue becomes even more questionable when viewed in light of other and shifting reasons it advanced for its stand. Thus, in opposing the Union's earlier union- security proposals, Respondent asserted its reason for opposition to be that employees should not be required to join the Union, but when the Union subsequently offered a maintenance-of-membership clause, Respondent then asserted that employees should not be required to maintain their membership. Finally, we note that while Respondent claims it was opposed to union security as a matter of principle, its own parent corporation had union-security contracts. With regard to contract duration, the record shows, as noted above, that from the very outset of negotiations Respondent insisted that any agreed-upon contract terminated on the anniversary date of the certifi- cation year-October 31, 1963. While, as stated, the Board has held that an employer's insistence upon a certification year contract is not unlawful if based upon a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status,6 it has found insistence upon such a termination date to have been in bad faith and therefore unlawful, in a context of unfair labor practices,e and when made simply to test the union's majority status at the earliest possible moment.T The record here is clear that Respond- ent insisted upon its termination date without having a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status. Patton, Respondent's nego- tiator, testified that his original position on contract duration was based only upon the closeness of the Board-conducted election. At that time neither Patton nor Respondent had, or could have had, a good-faith doubt as to the Union's status, but Respondent still insisted upon a cer- tification year contract in order to have the employees vote again on the question of representation. We might observe here that Respond- ent misplaces its reliance upon the petition circulated by employee Robert Terry repudiating the Union and seeking another election as creating a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. Respondent did 5 The Hinde & Dauch Paper Company, 104 NLRB 847. 9 International Furniture Company, 106 NLRB 127, 128-129; Henry Heide, Inc., 107 NLRB 1160; Solo Cup Company, 142 NLRB 1290, 1291, 1296. 7 Dixie Corporation, 105 NLRB 390 7 8 9-7 3 0-6 6 -v o f 15 2- 49 754 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not learn of the petition until March or April 1963, and, as noted, it took its position on the contract duration date at the beginning of nego- tiations in November 1962. This same observation applies to other events such as the strike, occuring long after negotiations began. In addition to these shifting and pretextual justifications for the Octo- ber 31 termination date, Respondent's assertion that because "our em- ployees had never lived under a union situation ... they should be given an opportunity a year from certification to again express themselves" on union affiliation is a plain admission that Respondent desired to prevent its employees from experiencing for a reasonable time the process and results of collective bargaining. Bargaining so motivated is the antithesis of the "good faith" required by the Act. Respondent's insistence upon the October 31, 1963, termination date was improper for a further reason. The Board has heretofore held that a reasonable time for bargaining following a settlement agreement is 1 year.8 Respondent's proposal-held steadfastly even as late as Sep- tember 12, 1963-to limit the duration of any agreed-upon contract to October 31,1963, clearly and effectively deprived the Union of its right to bargain for a reasonable time after the March 8 settlement agreements In all the circumstances herein, we find that by its insistence upon a contract terminating with the certification year, and by its position taken with respect to union security, particularly when considered in context with its contract-duration position, Respondent refused to bar- gain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent did not vio- late the Act by granting wage increases to Hendershot, Rhoades, and Powell. The raises were granted to Hendershot and Rhoades in April 1963. We find that these were not merit increases, but reflected the changes in classifications and duties, and there was no evidence that the new rates granted to these employees exceeded the existing rates for the classifications. Moreover, there was advance notice to the Union of these changes, and the Union had the opportunity to object thereto before they were placed in effect, and failed to do so. The raise to Powell was effected July 15, 1963. While a merit increase, the Trial Examiner, on the basis of the credited testimony, found that it was cleared orally with Drennan, the union agent. We find no sound reason on this record for disturbing the Trial Examiner's credibility resolution, and, as the raise was cleared with the Union, it cannot be found to have been unilaterally given in violation of the Act. 8 Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc, 136 NLRB 785. 9 Southern Coach & Body Company, Inc., 141 NLRB 80, 82. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 755 Also in agreement with the Trial Examiner we find that the Respondent did not discriminatorily reinstate Brown to some position other than that which he held prior to the strike, nor did the Respond- ent discriminatorily terminate Brown. Brown was hired on April 25 as a temporary paint shop employee, at $1.25 an hour, but when he reported for work on April 29, he was. assigned at that time or shortly thereafter to work as a maintenance helper, which involved primarily cleanup work with some incidental painting and simple carpentry work . He was so employed on June 6. when the strike began. He was rehired after the strike ended on July 8 as a paint stripper at $1.25 an hour and was discharged on July 19. The Trial Examiner found and we agree that Brown was entitled to be reinstated to his old job of maintenance helper only if the job were still in existence . But as indicated above, the record here shows that the work tasks of maintenance helper were absorbed by other employ- ees, thus eliminating this job. We also note that there were no main- tenance helpers during the strike, and none hire thereafter. Since his old job was not in existence, Brown was entitled only to a substantially equivalent job, and the paint stripping job was such a job. While the job was temporary, Brown was told at the time of his hire that he was being hired on a temporary basis, and there is no evi- dence that the Respondent at any time notified him that he was being reclassified to a permanent status. He was discharged on July 19 for lack of work, and he was not replaced in his job as paint stripper. Three other paint strippers in Brown's crew, all of them nonstrikers, were laid off at about the same time, two of them even before Brown. Of 15 employees terminated for lack of work since July 3, 1963, all but Brown were nonstrikers. There is no evidence in the record to show that the Respondent retained in the paint shop any employees who were less competent than Brown. While, as noted above, in early August the Respondent did hire a part-time employee for maintenance work, it is clear this employee was better qualified than Brown for the work of a regular maintenance employee as distinguished from maintenance helper. We therefore find that the Respondent did not violate the Act in regard to its treatment of Brown. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act. As noted above, the complaint alleged as unlawful conduct occurring both before and after March 8-the date of the settlement agreement. However, as also noted, litigation at the hearing was limited to post- settlement conduct.10 While we have considered Respondent's pre- settlement positions on union security and contract durations as back- ground, herein, our finding is that Respondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining on and after March 8, 1963. As the Union was certified on October 31, 1962, it is apparent that, at the very least, the Respond- ent for a period of approximately 8 months deprived the Union of its right of enjoyment of a status attaching to a labor organization during its certification year. To place both Respondent and the Union in the position they would have been in but for Respondent's unlawful con- duct, we shall direct that, upon the resumption of bargaining and for 8 months thereafter, the Union will be regarded as if the initial year of certification had not yet expired.". Although we ordinarily would not fractionalize the customary 1-year period of bargaining granted as a remedy, we do so here because no general bad-faith bargaining was alleged to have occurred until after the settlement agreement, and the Section 8(a) (5) violation covered by the settlement agreement, which was based on alleged unilateral wage increases, was not admitted as a violation by Respondent and was not litigated in this proceeding under the Trial Examiner's ruling limiting litigation to postsettlement allegations. It will be ordered that upon request the Respondent bargain with the Union concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, reduce it to writing and sign it. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, the Board makes the following: CONCLUSION OF LAW 1. Capitol Aviation, Inc., Springfield, Illinois, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 10 In the circumstances of this case , we find it unnecessary to remand this proceeding for litigation of those allegations pertaining to Respondent 's presettlement conduct. In our view, the purposes of the Act will best be effectuated by reinstatement of the settle- ment agreement and by an immediate direction that Respondent bargain in good faith with the Union. 11 lOin nett Constriction Company, 149 NLRB 1419. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC. 757 2. International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and is the exclusive representative of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit for purposes of bargaining. 3. All employees of the Employer's airplane hangars located on North Walnut Street Road, Springfield, Illinois, including line service- men, licensed mechanics, apprentice mechanics, equipment mainte- nance employees, radio technicians, inspectors, working foremen, line service shift leaders, and storekeepers, but excluding office clerical employees, pilots, salesmen, purchasing agents, pilots lodge employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act, as amended. 4. By refusing on and since March 8,1963, to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Capitol Aviation, Inc., Springfield, Illinois, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain with International Association of Machin- ists, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. (b) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the purposes of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive repre- sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit and, if an under- 758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD standing is reached, reduce it to writing and sign it. Regard the Union upon resumption of bargaining and for 8 months thereafter as if the initial year of the certification has not expired. (b) Post at its place of business at Springfield, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be posted and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the portions of the complaint alleging violations not found herein be, and they hereby are, dismissed, and that the settlement agreement in Case No. 13-CA-5247 be, and it hereby is, reinstated. "In the event that the Board's Order Is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, for the unit described below, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, to reduce it to writing and sign it. The bargaining unit is: All employees of the Employer's airplane hangars located at North Walnut Street Road, Springfield, Illinois, including line servicemen, licensed mechanics, apprentice mechanics, equipment maintenance employees, radio technicians, inspec- tors, working foremen, line service shift leaders, and store- pilots, sales keepers, but excluding office clerical employees, men, purchasing agents, pilots lodge employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, as amended. OKLAHOMA SHERATON CORPORATION 759 WE WILL NOT by refusing to bargain or in any like or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of col- lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as permitted by Sec- tion 8(a) (3) of the Act, as amended. CAPITOL AVIATION, INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building , 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, Telephone No. 828-7572, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Oklahoma Sheraton Corporation and Hotel & Restaurant Em- ployees and Bartenders International Union , Local 246, AFL- CIO. Case No. 16-CA-2049. May 21, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On March 8, 1965, Trial Examiner Samuel Ross issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that such allegation of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent and General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Exam- iner's Decision and supporting briefs and the Respondent filed cross- exceptions and a brief in support thereof. 152 NLRB No. 81.