Fab's Famous Foods Co.

826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL offer to Dean Orr immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become and remain , or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named Union or any other union, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. JOSEPH ANTELL, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above- named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Boston Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street, Boston, Massachusetts, Tele- phone No. 523-8100, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Marbro Food Service, Inc., d/b/a Fab's Famous Foods Company and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Local No. 537. Case No. 07-CA-166. May 25,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On March 11, 1965, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Deci- sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. With respect to certain other unfair labor practice allegations, the Trial Examiner recommended they be dismissed. Thereafter, counsel for the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was colnmltted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the except ions and brief, and the entire record ui this case, and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. 152 NLRB No. 97. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 827 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, Marbro Food Service, Inc., d/b/a Fab's Famous Foods Company, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. DECISION OF THE TRIAL EXAMINER STATEMENT OF THE CASE The complaint alleges that the Respondent , Marbro Food Service, Inc., d/b/a Fab's Famous Foods Company, herein called the Company , has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.; also referred to herein as the Act ), by assigning employees to less desirable work shifts and by discharging five employees because they engaged in activities on behalf of a labor organization , International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Local No. 357, herein called the Union; and, by the foregoing conduct , by interrogating employees regarding their union activity and interest, and by warning employees of loss of employment and promis- ing them benefits, in order to influence their vote in a union representation election, has abridged rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act , thus violating Section 8 (a) (1) of the statute. The Respondent has filed an answer , in material substance, asserting that the National Labor Relations Board has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding , and denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to notice duly served upon each of the other parties by the General Counsel of the Board, a hearing upon the issues in this proceeding has been held before Trial Exammer Herman Marx at Denver , Colorado. The General Counsel and the Respondent appeared at the hearing through, and were represented there by, respective counsel . All parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard , examine and cross-examine witnesses , adduce evidence, file briefs, and submit oral argument. I have read and considered the respective briefs of the General Counsel and Respondent filed with me since the close of the hearing.' Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. NATURE OF THE COMPANY' S BUSINESS; JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD The Company is a Colorado corporation , maintains its principal office and place of business in Denver, Colorado, is there engaged in the business of producing, sell- ing, and distributing sandwiches and bakery products for resale , and is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint , the Company, in the course and conduct of its business operations , sold and delivered goods valued in excess of $50,000 to a commercial enterprise named Automatic Catering , Inc., trans- acting such business entirely within the State of Colorado. Each year, Automatic Catering, Inc., has gross receipts in excess of $500 ,000 from selling goods, including the products it purchases from the Company; and annually receives at its place of business in Colorado products valued in excess of $50,000, which are shipped directly to it from points outside the said State . By reason of the Company's sales to Auto- matic Catering, Inc., and the interstate shipments of products to that enterprise, the Company is, and has been at all times material to the issues, engaged in interstate commerce, and in operations affecting such commerce , within the meaning of Sec- i The complaint was issued on June 26 , 1964 , and is based upon a charge filed by the Union with the Board on May 4, 1964, and an amendment theieof filed on June 3, 1964. Copies of the charge, the amendment , and the complaint have been the Respondent duly served upon 828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. Hence, I find, contrary to the Respondent , that the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is, and has been at all times material to the issues , a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Prefatory statement The Company's production operations are subject to overall supervision by its general manager, Lucien Sebeo, who also has the title of controller. Its work force includes three route drivers who deliver its products to customers; bakery person- nel; and about a dozen sandwich department employees who prepare the sandwich products and work under the supervision of one Clementina Verdicchio. The latter and Sebeo, as the Respondent concedes in its answer, are, and have been at all mate- rial times, supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. The bakery and sandwich products made by the Company are sold by it, at whole- sale, to a variety of enterprises, including concessionaires, drugstores, cafes, and coin vending machine operators who sell the products by means of their machines. The Company's principal customer is Automatic Catering, Inc., an operator of such machines, which is, at least to some extent, under the same general management as the Respondent, for the latter's president, Gerald Marcove, is also vice president of Automatic Catering, Inc., and Sebeo is "business manager" of that concern. The sandwich crew works into the night, and approximately 50 percent of the sandwiches they make, and most of the Company's daily bakery output, are deliv- ered nightly by truck, driven by an employee of the Company to Automatic Catering's place of business in Denver. The products are deposited there at specified locations for subsequent handling and distribution shortly thereafter by Automatic Catering drivers, about nine in number, who begin work during the early morning hours, the starting time varying with the driver and his route requirements. Each driver serves a regular route, distributing pastries and sandwiches to coin vending machines at locations such as warehouses and factories. The time of departure varies with the driver's work and route schedule, one or more leaving as early as 12 30 or 1 a.m. and "probably two" as late as 4:30 a.m. In or about the early part of February 1964,3 there was some talk among some of the Respondent's employees about union affiliation, and one of its drivers, Stuart Greene, undertook to communicate with the Union about the matter. He did so, and as a result, a representative of the Union came to the loading dock at the rear of the plant one day about noon and secured from six or seven employees, including Greene, signed cards which, according to the sense of the evidence, authorized the Union to seek a representation election. During the early part of February, also, following Greene's initial contact with the Union, its representative called a member of the sandwich crew, Marie Vale, at her home and inquired whether the crew would be interested in union affiliation, and the upshot of the conversation was that Vale made inquiries about the matter among members of the crew, and that six of them, including Evelyn Boone, Frieda Hansen, Janice June Smith, and Vale, went to the Union's headquarters "around the middle of February" and signed cards there "to authorize an election." On February 14 the Union filed a representation petition (Case No. 27-RC-2587) with the Board's Denver Regional Office, and a hearing on the petition was set for March 6. Following the hearing, the Regional Director for Region 27 (Denver, Col- orado), on March 30, 1964, issued his decision and directed an election among all production and maintenance employees at the Company's Denver plant, "including 9 E g., N L R B v Reliance Fuel Oil Corporation, 371 U S 224. As the sales to Auto- matic Catering, Inc., are nonretall in character, the jurisdictional criteria laid down in Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, are applicable Also, contrary to the Respond- ent, I find no merit in a claim it makes to the effect that the Board lacks jurisdiction because the Union had previously filed and withdrawn charges covering substantially the same subject matter (except for the alleged discharge of one employee) as the charges upon which the complaint is based. See N L R.B. v. Zimnon Coal Co, 336 F. 2d 516 (C A 6). 'All dater, mentioned herein, unless otherwise indicated, occurred In 1964. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 829 route drivers and sandwich employees ." An election was held on April 30, 1964, with the result that a majority of the unchallenged ballots were cast against the Union.4 In essence , the General Counsel imputes to the Respondent a course of misconduct during the pendency of the representation proceeding, consisting of interrogation of employees, warnings of loss of employment, promises of benefit, a discriminatory change in the sandwich department's shift hours, and the discharge of Stuart Greene, and of four sandwich department employees, Marie Vale, Janice June Smith , Frieda Hansen, and Evelyn Boone, for the purpose of discouraging activity or interest in the Union, and of influencing the result of the election. At the close of the General Counsel's case at the hearing , the allegations that Hansen was unlawfully discharged were dismissed for insufficient evidence , upon the Respondent's motion.5 Findings regarding the remaining allegations of misconduct follow below. B. The discharge of Stuart Greene Stuart Greene has been a post office employee for about 17 years, and during much of that period has held a second lob such as the one with the Company, per- forming such work during hours when he was not on duty as a postal worker. He has worked for the Company during two periods, starting initially in September 1962; was laid off in February 1963 because of an economic reduction in force, and was reemployed by the Company in September 1963. His employment by the Com- pany came to an end on March 6, 1964, under circumstances to be described later. His work as a route driver entailed the delivery of bakery products and sandwiches to customers. His post office shift has been, at all times material here, from 2:30 p in. to 11 p.m., and his shift hours for the Company began at 5:30 a in. and lasted until the com- pletion of his delivery and related chores at about 12.30 or 1 p.m. The Company paid him a weekly salary of $65 for his work as a driver. Greene, as indicated above, took the initiative in interesting the Union to under- take organization of the employees, and, with about a half dozen other employees, met with a representative of the Union early in February on the plant loading dock and signed cards as previously described. Among those who signed were the two other drivers, Joe Reddinger and Charles Schmidt, who was also the supervisor of the other route drivers, giving them their orders in such matters, for example, as changes in routes.6 In February, apparently soon after the filing of the representation petition, the Company received a letter from the Union, " announcing the organization" (of employees, presumably), as Sebeo described it in his testimony, and during the course of the following week, Sebeo asked Greene at the plant whether he was "happy," and whether he "want(ed)" the Union. Greene replied that he had "signed an authorization card along with several others for an election," but did not "know how much it would benefit me." Reddinger appeared on the scene at that point and Sebeo asked him whether he had signed a card. Receiving an affirmative reply, Sebeo asked who had "called the union," but received no reply. Schmidt was pres- 4 The representation petition, notice of hearing thereon, decision and direction of election, and ballot tally were offered at the hearing by the Respondent in connection with its position that the withdrawal of charges pending at the time of the election constitutes a bar to this proceeding. As that contention lacks validity, the proffered documents were, upon the General Counsel's objection, excluded, together with the prior charges and some correspondence between the Respondent's counsel and the Regional Director However, upon my study of the record, I find that the relevant documents in the representation proceeding have some pertinence to the issues in this case, at least as part of the sequence of events and as background. Thus I vacate the exclusion of the representation petition, notice of hearing thereon, decision and direction of election, and tally of ballots (Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 10, 11, and 12) ; receive them in evidence; and also take official notice of Case No. 27-RC-2587 for the purpose of making findings pertinent to, and based upon, these documents. 5 The General Counsel's request, in his brief, that the ruling be reconsidered is denied. The General Counsel remarked at the hearing that he does not "allege that (Schmidt) Is a supervisor," but the record nevertheless establishes, without dispute, that Schmidt has a supervisory status. In fact, the Respondent contended in the representation pro- ceeding, and the Regional Director found in his decision and direction of election, that Schmidt is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 11, footnote 4 ) 830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ent during the conversation , but Sebeo did not speak to him about unionization in the presence of Greene and Reddinger . According to Sebeo's testimony, he had spoken to Schmidt about the letter previously , asking him if he knew anything about the matter, and Schmidt had "said he was surprised ," and "didn't know any- thing about it himself." 7 On March 6, upon Greene's return to the plant from his delivery route, Schmidt told him that he "was fired," and to call Marcove . It is undisputed that Greene thereupon telephoned Marcove, but there is conflict as to the course the conversation took. Greene's version is, in substance , that Marcove told him that the Company was "making some changes that were more of an economy move," offered him a "mid- night doughnut delivery route that paid $ 1.25 an hour (and) lasted approximately two hours ," and said that the Company "had better things" in store for him, and would let him know about that later; and that he replied that the offer was unac- ceptable. Marcove, on the other hand , testified that he ' told Greene that for reasons of economy the Company had decided to expand Greene's duties "to an 8-hour job," consisting of his "6-hour route" and 2 hours of work in the bakery (or, in other words, according to Marcove , a shift from 5:30 a.m. to 2 p.m.); that he also gave Greene the option of adding to the "8-hour job," if he so desired, "another couple of hours" making nightly deliveries of sandwiches and bakery products to Automatic Catering "between . the completion (of the sandwiches under a projected new production schedule for the sandwich crew) and the hour of midnight"; and that Greene rejected the proposals. Explaining the reason for his alleged proposals, Marcove gave testimony to the effect that the Company had customarily delivered sandwiches and bakery prod- ucts to Automatic Catering by truck during a period between some point after mid- night and 2 or 2:30 am , using a bakery employee named Carriger to make the deliveries; that Carriger, in addition to 2 "productive" hours in the bakery was given 4 additional "non-productive " hours there because it needed him for the deliveries and it was difficult to find a person to do only that work at so late an hour ; that there had been many instances of late delivery to Automatic Catering because sandwiches were not ready in time, thus delaying drivers of Automatic Catering in deliveries to their customers; that therefore the Company decided to start the work of the sand- wich crew 31/2 hours earlier ( 3:30 p .m. instead of 7 p .m.); that the management felt that it "needn't be concerned" about finding someone to meet the earlier delivery schedule, and thus decided to "lay off" the bakery employee who had been making the Automatic Catering deliveries and had 4 hours of "non-productive" work, and to add the 2 "productive" bakery hours to Greene 's route schedule . According to Marcove, also , having made these decisions , he instructed Schmidt, on March 6, to notify Greene of the "new arrangement " for him, and was informed by Schmidt later that day that that had been done , and that Greene "didn't want the additional two hours" (of bakery work). There is no doubt that Greene's employment ended on March 6 , nor that he was replaced as a route driver by Carriger, who also continued to work daily for 2 hours in the bakery, performing what Marcove terms "productive " work. The ultimate issue as regards Greene's termination is its cause , and on that question a determina- tion of what passed between Marcove and Greene is important , for the Respondent, resting obviously on Marcove 's account, claims, as it alleges in its answer, that 7 Sebeo admittedly interrogated Greene and Reddinger about unionization , quoting bim- self as asking Greene what he had heard "about the union," as inquiring in - similar vein of Reddinger, and as receiving information from both that they had signed cards. However, I have based findings as to the discussion on Greene 's testimony , as he appeared to me in both demeanor and text to be a more dependable witness than Sebeo or Red- dinger. Sebeo was evasive at various points, as , for example, when he was asked whether the employees had told him what kind of cards they had signed , and he gave the un- responsive reply that a "gentleman was there at the plant sometime , I think, a week or two weeks earlier to my visit " He then interrupted a question of similar purport as the prior one with a similarly evasive reply . Then , asked what "kind of card did (he) understand it was ," he stated , with a reluctant demeanor , that he "understood it was something connected to my question regarding union." Sebeo was a perceptive witness, with a calculating demeanor, and I am convinced that his unresponsiveness was not due to any lack of understanding but to a disposition to dodge a question which, in his view, could re"ult in evidence that he knew more about the course of union activity among the employees than would otherwise appear FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 831 Greene "voluntarily terminated " his employment , while the General Counsel, invok- ing Greene's version, contends, in substance , that the offer as described by Greene was tantamount to a discharge , and that it was motivated by Greene 's union activity As a preliminary to determining the nature of Marcove 's offer to Greene, I note my view, based on the record as a whole, that the "midnight doughnut delivery route" mentioned in Greene's version is his label for the nightly deliveries to Automatic Catering, to which Marcove referred. With that in mind, it is evident that both ver- sions quote Marcove, in substance, as offering the nightly Automatic Catering delivery work to Greene, the basic difference between the two accounts being that Greene depicts that as the only offer made him, whereas Marcove pictures himself as offering Greene the "8-hour job," with an option of adding to that work the task of making the deliveries to Automatic Catering. I am unable to accept Marcove's version , for he was not, in my judgment, as candid as he should have been. This is exemplified by testimony he gave in connec- tion with the alleged option. The Automatic Catering deliveries, according to his account of his offer, were to entail a "couple of hours" of work nightly between the completion of the sandwiches under the new production schedule and midnight, but at a subsequent point he testified that what he had in mind for Greene was that the latter was to make the deliveries "perhaps" from 11:30 p.m to 1:30 a.m. The dis- crepancy is far more meaningful than may appear on the surface The premidnight deliveries would obviously conflict with Greene's post office shift which ended at 11 p.m., and there would thus be reason to doubt that a proposal entailing such a conflict had been made in good faith. Soon after he described the alleged option, it became evident from testimony Marcove gave that he was aware, at least in a sub- stantial sense , of Greene's post office shift hours 8 From his testimony as a whole, particularly in the light of his demeanor when interrogation focused upon his knowl- edge of Greene's post office hours, it appears to me that at one point or another after describing his alleged offer he realized that he had committed a possible gaffe, and that this led him to the shift in the Automatic Catering delivery hours he claims he contemplated for Greene. This course evidences a disposition by Marcove to shape his testimony to his convenience , and reflects on his credibility. What caps the matter, in my view, is a consideration of both versions in the light of the undisputed evidence that Schmidt told Greene that he "was fired" shortly before the latter called Marcove, as suggested by Schmidt.° This evidence is in harmony with Greene's version of his conversation with Marcove, for one may clearly infer from his account that both he and Marcove were proceeding on the implied premise that he had already been informed of his discharge , and the thrust of Marcove's remarks was to offer Greene a 2-hour "midnight " route in place of what he had had, coupled with an intimation that he could or would be given a "better" 8 Although Marcove claims that he did not know Greene's post office hours "specifically," it is evident from other testimony he gave , somewhat grudgingly in demeanor , it appeared to me, that he was substantially aware of the shift hours. He described two successive post office shifts , the first beginning at 0.30 a in and the second beginning 8 hours later and lasting for 8 hours Using Marcove's figures, the second shift would end in the neighborhood of 11 p in , the actual time depending on how much time was allowed for a meal during each shift-a matter not developed in the record Marcove admittedly knew that Greene worked on the second shift 9 Greene quotes Schmidt at two points , under direct examination , as telling him that he was discharged . Following the first, the Respondent's counsel interrupted Greene's testimony to register an objection "on the grounds of hearsay," but did not move to strike what Greene had already said. At the second point, the testimony was given without objection . Assuming, for discussion purposes , that a timely objection to the evidence of Schmidt 's statement would have been well taken, in the absence of an appropriate objection or motion to strike, such hearsay "is to be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible ." Diaz v. U.S., 223 U.S. 442, 450. In any case, quite apart from that , Greene's testimony quoting Schmidt is clearly evidential in view of Schmidt's supervisory status, as found in the decision and direction of election , which notes , incidentally, that Schmidt , as supervisor of the drivers , has made "effective recommendations as to both hiring and firing " Moreover, it is evident from Marcove's own testimony that Schmidt spoke to Greene at Marcove's direction , albeit the latter claims that Schmidt 's instruction was to inform Greene of the "new arrange- ment." Taking into account Schmidt 's supervisory status , and the undisputed evidence of what he told Greene, one is not obliged to accept Marcove's version of his private instructions to Schmidt . In short, what Schmidt said to Greene is imputable to the Respondent. 832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD job at a later date. In contrast , the offer Marcove claims he made expressly con- templates that Greene retain his "6-hour route," and is thus in utter disharmony with the uncontroverted evidence that Schmidt told Greene that he had been discharged. The fact that Carriger has the "8-hour job" Marcove claims he offered Greene does not enhance the credibility of Marcove 's version, for taking into account the indica- tion that the discharge decision was actually made prior to Marcove 's conversation with Greene, and the earmarks of tailoring in Marcove 's testimony , previously men- tioned, there is at least as much reason to believe that Marcove has shaped his version of the offer he made to conform to the "8-hour job" Carriger now performs as there is to conclude that that was the offer actually made. In short, I credit Greene's ver- sion of his conversation with Marcove Putting aside for later discussion , the question whether the "midnight" route offer was made in good faith , it is obvious that Greene 's rejection of the offer did not con- stitute a voluntary termination . He was told by Schmidt that he had been discharged, and the fact of his dismissal from employment he had held was implicit in his conver- sation with Marcove. Thus, I find that the Company discharged him on March 6. As for the Company's motivation , Marcove disclaims any discriminatory purpose, stating that he had no knowledge of the identity of any members of the Union, of any card signatories , or of the "most active" among adherents of the organization, but these disclaimers are not decisive , especially in view of the lack of candor in his testimony, previously described . Discharge motivations are often concealed and necessarily determined on the basis of circumstantial evidence . Going beyond Marcove's self-serving disclaimers to the total record, one finds a set of circumstances that point to an unlawful motive for the dismissal. The starting point for that conclusion is that Greene was the initiator of the Union's effort to organize the employees . Significantly, in the course of Sebeo's interrogation of Greene and Reddinger, the general manager sought to find out who had "called the Union ." There is no indication that such a question was put by the management to any other employee , and bearing in mind that the very name of the Union suggests that it is in large measure an organization of drivers , the evidence of Sebeo's inter- rogation warrants an inference that he suspected that one of the drivers had instigated the Union 's interest . And it is a striking fact that Greene , the instigator , although the subject of "nice compliments " by customers , as Marcove testified, and regarded by the latter as having "done a fine job," was suddenly and without any prior notice discharged during the pendency of the representation petition (actually on the very day set for the hearing on the petition ), and little more than about a week after Sebeo had sought to find out from Greene and Reddinger who had set in motion the Union's interest. These factors point to a discriminatory motive in the absence of a plausible expla- nation by the Respondent of Greene 's discharge . But there is no such explanation, nor, for that matter, even a concession that Greene was discharged . Upon examina- tion of Marcove's relevant testimony, one finds a tenuous effort to relate Greene's termination to a decision to advance the sandwich crew's hours and the Automatic Catering delivery time , resulting in an alleged decision to lay off Carriger on the claimed assumption that someone else could readily be found to make the deliveries during the earlier period , and to offer Carriger's 2 "productive" bakery hours to Greene to add to his "6-hour route," leading, in turn, so Marcove claims in effect, to the offer and its rejection, and thus to Greene's voluntary termination . The alleged link between the time changes and Greene 's termination not only appears to me to be tortured, but the claim founders on the evidence that Greene did not quit , but was discharged , that the discharge decision was made before Marcove spoke to Greene, and that there was no offer of an "8-hour job," but only of the Automatic Catering delivery task, involving some 2 hours of work about or toward midnight. What is more , I am unable to escape the conclusion that that offer was made in bad faith and with no belief that it would be accepted , for apart from the fact that the weekly compensation at $1.25 an hour for about 2 hours of work nightly in making the Automatic Catering deliveries would be but a small fraction of the $65 per week Greene had been earning from his delivery route, the Automatic Catering work would very likely conflict with Greene 's post office shift, and I am persuaded that Marcove was aware of that and anticipated rejection of the offer for that reason. I am persuaded, too, that the offer was made to put a gloss of economic motivation upon Greene's termination and to place him in the position of rejecting an opportunity for continuing in the Company 's employ in order to provide it with color for a claim that Greene had "voluntarily terminated" his employment. The very fact that the Respondent's explanation of Greene 's termination does not weather scrutiny points not only to concealment of the real reason for the discharge, but supports a conclusion that the Respondent has sought to conceal its motive because it is unlawful. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 833 For the reasons stated , I find, in sum, that the Company discharged Greene because of his union activity ; and that it thereby discriminated against him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and abridged rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act, thus violating Section 8(a) (1) of the statute. C. The allegations of unlawful interrogation, warnings, and promises The coercive thrust in Sebeo's interrogation of Greene and Reddinger is manifest. This is especially true of the effort to find out who had "called the Union," in the light of the subsequent discharge of Greene, the employee who had done so. Thus I find that the Company interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thus violating Section 8(a) (1) of the statute, as a result of Sebeo's inquiry of Greene whether he "want(ed)" the Union; the former's question of Reddinger whether he had signed a card, and the inquiry of the two drivers as to who had "called the Union." Sebeo also spoke to members of the sandwich crew on the subject of unionization, doing so in April shortly after various of the sandwich makers had been to a union meeting, and not long before the date set for the election. On the occasion in ques- tion, Sebeo summoned three "new" members of the crew, Dolores Valdez, Julia Trujillo, and Betty Azel, to the office he uses when at the plant. Verdicchio was also present. Trujillo and Sebeo give materially differing versions of what took place. Trujillo's, in substance, is that Sebeo asked each of the three employees, in turn, whether she had gone to the union meeting, receiving an affirmative response from Valdez, and a negative one from the others, Trujillo telling him that she had planned to go, but did not have transportation; that he asked Valdez whether she had decided how to vote in the election, and she said she had not; that Sebeo then told her that he would not try to influence her vote, but that if the Union "did go through," the plant "probably ... would close down"; that Valdez then left the office, at Sebeo's direction, Trujillo and Azel remaining at his request; that he asked Azel whether she had decided how she would vote, and she replied in the negative; that he asked Trujillo why she had wanted to go to the meeting, and she replied that she had heard good and bad points about the Union, and wished to reach her own decision about the organization; that Sebeo then said he would not try to influence the employees in their vote, but that he did not care for the Union; and that "if the union did not go through," the employ- ees would continue to receive paychecks and would not "have to worry about having a job," but that "if the union did go through the place would probably close down for business," and if the closing did not take place, "the girls with seniority would be working there." Sebeo's version is, in substance, that he told the three employees that there would be an election; that they should "make their own decision" as to how to vote; that "if the union demands were too heavy and heavy enough that the company couldn't afford it financially, to stand that kind of demand, the employer might consider to reduce the operation ... and eventually close the operation , as he could at that time, maybe buy the same product cheaper from the outside." Trujillo's account is, in my view, the more credible of the two for a number of reasons. First, she is no longer in the Company 's employ, and there is no indication that she is affiliated with the Union or has any interest in the results in this proceeding. In contrast, Sebeo's interest is obvious. Second, the likelihood that he questioned the three women in the vein Trujillo describes is enhanced by the evidence that not long after the representation petition was filed he sought to find out from Greene and Reddinger who had initiated the Union's interest. Actually, his testimony contains no denial, in specific terms at least, that he interrogated the women as to their attend- ance at the meeting and whether they had reached a voting decision. Third, Sebeo's testimony is silent on the subject of Valdez' departure from the office before the others, and I have no doubt that he did send her from the room. Trujillo's description of that incident adds circumstantial detail to her account and contributes to its plausibility. It is fair to conclude that the reason he separated the three women was that Valdez had admitted attending the union meeting in response to Sebeo's question- ing in that regard , thus indicating a favorable disposition toward the Union, and Sebeo decided it would be easier to influence the voting attitudes of Trujillo and Azel, who had not been at the meeting, in Valdez' absence . Finally, Sebeo evidenced a disposi- tion to evade pertinent inquiry, as when he gave patently unresponsive replies to interrogation seeking to determine whether Greene and Reddinger had told him, on the occasion when he questioned them , what kind of card each had signed for the Union. I credit Trujillo 's account of the interview. 789-730-66-vol. 152-54 834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In appraising the legality of the interrogation of the three women , and of Sebeo's remarks on the subject of job retention and plant closing , I am unable to regard his remarks to the women to the effect that he did not wish to influence their votes as anything but a nominal , lip-serving profession of neutrality . The statements about continuing paychecks, job security, and plant closing were coercive warnings that employees would be denied employment in the event the Union won the election, and particularly in the context of these remarks, the inhibiting nature of the efforts by Sebeo to find out whether the women had attended the meeting, and had reached a voting decision, is evident. Thus I find that the Company abridged the Section 7 rights of employees, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as a result of each of Sebeo's questions on the subject of attendance at the union meeting , and whether the women had decided how they would vote; and his remarks to the effect that pay- checks would continue and there would be no "worry about having a job" in the event of rejection of the Union, but that if it were chosen as bargaining representative by the employees the plant would probably close, and if it did not, "the girls with seniority would be working there." There is evidence that Verdicchio, too, interrogated members of the sandwich crew on the subject of unionization , and made statements to some designed to influ- ence their choice in the election . One incident of interrogation occurred in Febru- ary, following Sebeo's receipt of the letter from the Union (and very likely close to the date when Sebeo questioned Greene and Reddinger). On the occasion in question, Verdicchio, in substance, asked the sandwich crew as a group, during their lunch period, if there had been any contract between any of them and the Union. None replied affirmatively, and some or all answered in the negative 10 Verdicchio, also like Sebeo, interrogated members of the sandwich crew about attendance at a union meeting in April (whether the one about which Sebeo inquired does not appear), asking one such employee, Irene Sanchez, as the latter testified with- out contradiction, whether she had been to such a meeting. Sanchez stated that she had attended, and Verdicchio inquired why she had not been informed about it, to which Sanchez replied that many employers discharge employees for mentioning unionization. Verdicchio retorted that Sanchez' failure to inform her of the meeting was "a pretty rotten deal." In addition, as Verdicchio herself testified, she asked the sandwich crew as a group on one occasion in April whether they had been to a union meeting held 2 days earlier. (It is evident, by the way, not only from Sanchez' testimony, but from Verdicchio's, that the latter resented the failure of sandwich makers to tell her about their attendance at a meeting . According to Verdicchio, the omission reflected a lack of confidence in her and hurt her feelings.) There is no dispute that Verdicchio spoke to members of the sandwich crew on various occasions on the subject of the consequences of union membership or repre- sentation, but the record reflects some question as to the course her remarks took. According to Vale, describing one such incident , one evening early in March, while the sandwich crew was at work, Verdicchio interrupted a telephone conversation she had been having, came over to Vale, told her that Sebeo had "just told me" (on the telephone , apparently ) that "after this union business was dropped ( Vale) was to get a raise"; and then returned to the telephone to resume the conversation. Hansen quotes Verdicchio in somewhat similar vein , testifying, in substance, that during the middle of March, Verdicchio told her that when "it (the unionization effort, from the context ) was discontinued one way or another" the senior sandwich makers might be given an increase. 10 Findings as to the interrogation are based on the testimony of Boone , Smith , Hansen, and Vale, who are in substantial accord as to the interrogation , although differing some- what in phrasing Vale and Hansen quote Verdicchio as inquiring whether any of the girls had gone to the Union , whereas Boone and Smith quote Verdicchio as asking whether the Union had been in contact with any of the girls. The differences are not significant. This, in my view , is also true of a version by Irene Sanchez , a sandwich maker, who describes Verdicchio as asking "if anyone had gone to the girls and spoken to them about trying to get a union in " Verdicehio admittedly interrogated the group , but quotes herself as asking if "they knew anything about any union." That difference , too, is not of great moment, but I think it likely that the interrogation was somewhat more pointed than a generalized inquiry about "any union" or "a union," and that she sought informa- tion about any contact between any of the girls and "the union" involved here, as one may infer from the versions of four of the five sandwich makers who described the in- cident Verdicchio , it may be noted in that connection , was aware that Sebeo had received a letter from the Union FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 835 Sanchez testified that about a week after Verdicchio asked her about the union meeting, Verdicchio told the sandwich crew as a group that the Company "would close the place down if the union got in"; and that she had spoken to Sebeo about a wage increase for the crew, but that because "of the union meeting we had attended," she did not know whether the increase would be granted. According to Hansen's testimony, during the latter part of April, about the time a notice of the election was posted in the plant, Verdicchio summoned her to the plant office for a private conversation, and disclaiming any intention to influence the employees' votes, told her that it would cost each employee $50 to join the Union; that if the plant were unionized, the Company "would go bankrupt and close the doors," and Hansen should "consider (her) job"; that she had sought for a long time to persuade Sebeo to increase the wages of the sandwich crew, but that "with this union coming up she didn't know whether he would still consider it or not." Sanchez, too, testified that Verdicchio summoned her to the office for a private talk during the latter part of April. According to Sanchez, Verdicchio told her that it would cost her "$50 to join the union plus $5 or $6 a month for dues," and that the Company "would close the place down if the union got in." Verdicchio entered a blanket denial that she had had any conversation with any of the employees about a wage increase during the period "when the union was cam- paigning in the plant," adding that she had done so "before this." The denial, how- ever, is entangled in substantial self-contradiction. At one point, she made the quite implausible claim that she knew "nothing about the union" before the election, and, subsequently, responding to a question whether she knew of "the union activity con- cerning the election" during the month preceding it, she testified: "I didn't know about the election. I knew that somebody was asking for the union when Lucien (Sebeo) told me, but I didn't mean-I didn't talk to the girls about anything at that time." But it is evident from other parts of her testimony that she was aware that an election was scheduled, for she admittedly saw the posted notice pertaining to it, and, indeed, giving her version of the office conversation she concedes she had with Sanchez she quotes herself as telling Sanchez that "T didn't have a right to vote"-an obvious reference to her preclusion as a supervisor from voting in the election. Moreover, she also testified that after she "found out they went to the (union) meet- ing" in April, she "told them (employees she does not identify, except Sanchez) that we weren't making $1.90 (an hour) and the Company would have to close if they expected those kind of wages." 11 Verdicchio admittedly had no knowledge of "what the union (wage) demand would be," but, passing that aspect and the question whether, if one assumes her credibility, even the terms in which she quotes herself were coercive and unlawful, it is evidence that her version of what she told employees, including Sanchez, is much at odds with her denial that she had any discussion with any employee during the organizational campaign, about either the subject of a wage increase or that of a plant shutdown, and with her claim that she "didn't know about the election." I have no doubt that she did make remarks to various employees on the subjects mentioned and that some of her statements, at least, were tied to the election; and her testimony looking in another direction does much, in my judgment, to impair her credibility. That is not to say, however, that this automatically invests all of the testimony on such subjects offered by the General Counsel with reliability. Specifically, I have much doubt, to say the least, about the reliability of disputed aspects of Sanchez' evidence. I have accepted her testimony that Verdicchio interrogated her in April about attendance at a union meeting because her relevant account is undisputed, and gains corroborative weight from the fact that Verdicchio herself testified that she asked the entire sandwich crew whether they had been at such a meeting. But under cross-examination, asked whether she had "something specific in mind" in the remark she made to the effect that employees were discharged for manifesting an interest in unionization, Sanchez testified that the Company had discharged an employee for that reason, and then identified Hansen as the individual. Hansen's termination, however, did not occur until about a month after the colloquy between Verdicchio and Sanchez, and it is thus evident that the latter could not have had it in mind in making the remark in question to Verdicchio. The use of Hansen's name and termi- nation were, I am convinced, a defensive improvisation by the witness. I note, also, that on the subject of a plant shutdown, under direct examination, she quotes Verdicchio as saying in identical language on two separate occasions that "they would close the plant down if the union got in." The sum of the matter is that although this 11 Verdicchio claims that she had heard Marcove say that the Company could "never pay [$]1.90 for making sandwiches and if the union went through they would have to close the place" If Marcove did in fact make such a remark, the basis for his as- sumption that such a rate would be sought by the Union does not appear. 836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony finds some corroborative support in the evidence that Verdicchio, as well as Sebeo, made statements of similar support to other employees, Sanchez' testimony imputing remarks to Verdicchio with respect to a wage increase and a plant shutdown is not, in my judgment, a more dependable basis for conclusions regarding these matters than Verdicchio's, and thus I base no findings respecting them on Sanchez' testimony. I take a different view, however, of the relevant testimony of Vale and Hansen. The version of each as to what Verdicchio told her is circumstantially detailed in contrast to Verdicchio's self-contradictions and her claim that she told "the girls," who, except for Sanchez, are unidentified, that the Company could not afford to pay an hourly rate of $1.90 to the sandwich crew and "would have to close if they expected those kind of wages." Moreover, the remarks Vale and Hansen separately impute to Verdicchio were of a piece with the statements made by her superior, Sebeo, to Valdez, Trujillo, and Azel, and were, like Sebeo's remarks, I am persuaded, the expression of a policy by the management of using the carrot of express or inti- mated promises of wage benefits, and the stick of warnings of loss of employment as a result of a plant shutdown or of a reduction in force, in order to wean the employees away from support of the Union. The sum of the matter is that I credit the relevant testimony of Vale and Hansen, and find that the Company abridged the Section 7 rights of employees, thus violating Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, as a result of each statement by Verdicchio on the subject of increased wages, as set forth in the credited testimony; and of the supervisor's statement to Hansen that in the event of unionization, the Company would go bank- rupt and shut the plant, and that Hansen should consider her job. I find, too, against background of the Company's other unfair labor practices, that it interfered with the free exercise of Section 7 rights by the employees, thereby violating Section 8(a)( I), as a result of Verdicchio's inquiry of the sandwich crew as to whether there had been any contact between any of them and the Union; and of the interrogation of Sanchez, and of the crew as a group, on the subject of attendance at a union meeting.122 D. The change in shift hours; the alleged discharge of Evelyn Boone, Marie Vale, and Janice June Smith For about a year prior to some point in March 1964, the sandwich crew's shift started at 7 p.m., and they customarily worked until the completion of their duties, usually at 2 or 3 a.m. From time to time during the period that these shift hours were in effect, members of the Company's management, including Marcove, discussed the subject of starting the sandwich crew's shift at an earlier time, and, in or about September 1963, Sebeo asked the crew as a group if they "would come in earlier." They declined and, so far as appears, the subject was not mentioned again to any of the employees until the second week in March 1964. During the course of the shift that began on March 10, Verdicchio informed the sandwich crew at the plant that effective with the next shift their starting time would be 3:30 p.m. The change went into effect on March 11, and was still in effect at the time of the hearing in this proceeding. Since the change, the deliveries to Auto- matic Catering's premises have been made about 9 or 9.30 p.m., leaving the Respond- ent's plant about a half hour earlier. Also, the change in the sandwich crew's starting time led, under circumstances that will presently appear, to the end of the employ- ment of Vale, Boone, and Smith. Vale, who entered the Company's employ in August 1962, requires a night shift such as that then in effect because she has a handicapped child who needs special care, and who she cannot feasibly leave until after an older child comes home from school about 4:30 p.m. and is available to attend the younger one. Verdicchio has been aware almost from the inception of Vale's employment that the latter has a handicapped child who requires special attention. Learning of the projected hours change on the night of March 10, Vale told Verdicchio that she would not be able to report for work at the new time because of her child's situation. 12 Hansen quotes Verdicchio on the occasion of the February interrogation as also telling the sandwich crew that the Company "would not have the union in ; before they could consider the union they would close the door." I deem it unnecessary to determine whether Verdicchio's account of what took place may be treated as a denial that she made the foregoing remarks, nor do I make any findings regarding them, noting, in that connection, that in view of the dates set forth in the complaint for alleged threats by Verdicchio of a plant shutdown, it does not appear that the complaint alleges that the claimed remarks violated Section 8(a) (1). Moreover, findings regarding them would neither add to, nor detract from, the remedy to be recommended below. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 837 About 1:30 p.m., on March 11, Verdicchio telephoned Vale at the latter's home and told her, in substance, that Sebeo had said that paychecks would be mailed to those that were not "there at 3 o'clock" (or, in other words, as I construe the state- ment, that members of the sandwich crew who did not report for work at the new scheduled starting time would be terminated). Vale replied that if she were to be laid off, Sebeo had "better have my check waiting for me when I come in." She then telephoned the plant to ask Sebeo whether an exception could be made in her case, but was told that he was not there. She telephoned again repeatedly during the next 2 hours, with the same result. She also made efforts, apparently that same afternoon, to secure a "baby sitter," telephoning about four or five prospects, but was unable to find anyone willing to attend a handicapped child. She did not call an agency; testifying in that regard that she could not afford agency rates. She spoke to Marcove on the telephone the next day and asked whether she would be allowed to report at 4:30 or 5 p.m., and Marcove replied that he could not make an exception because it would be unfair to the other sandwich employees, and they would also seek a change. Vale has not worked for the Company since. Boone and Smith are sisters. The former entered the Company's employ early in January 1964, and her sister during the following month. Boone is married and has young children. Her husband works during the day, and when she entered the Company's employ she told Verdicchio that she had to work on a night shift because she had no one at home with whom she could leave the chil- dren until her husband, who worked during the day, came home. Smith is 18 and unmarried, lives at some distance from her sister, and depended upon the latter, who drove to work, for her transportation there. There was no public transportation that Smith could take from the vicinity of her home to that of the plant, and what she usually did was to use an available bus as far as a given bus stop where her sister would meet her and then give her automobile transportation to the plant. Her sister usually drove her home in the early morning hours after completion of their work, although occasionally she would have a ride as far as Boone's house, and somebody else (not clearly identified in the record) would drive her home from there.13 According to Boone, as "several of the girls," including herself, were about to leave the plant following completion of their work in the early morning of March 11, Verdicchio told them that they were to report at 3.30 p.m. "from now on, at least until this union thing was over." Hansen testified to much the same effect, stating that as she was leaving Verdicchio told "us . . . that we were to report in at 3:30" under a new time schedule; that members of the crew asked Verdicchio how long the schedule would last; and that she replied that she did not know, and that she had received the order for the new starting time "from the head office . . . and it would continue until the union business was straightened out." According to Hansen, "there were several that said they couldn't report that early." Verdicchio does not expressly deny making the statements quoted by Boone and Hansen, but says that the told members of the sandwich crew that the hours were changed because "we were trying to get these sandwiches out." A determination whether Verdicchio expressed herself to the effect imputed to her by Boone and Hansen will be made at a later point. Boone and her sister worked under the new schedule on March I1 and 12, but Boone called Verdicchio early in the afternoon of March 13 and told the supervisor that she would not work under the new reporting time because one of her children usually came from from school about 3:30 p.m , using bus transportation, and she did not wish to permit the child to walk alone from the bus stop to the house. Verdicchio said that Boone's attitude was understandable, and that she "could not continue herself" under the new schedule. According to Boone, during the course of the conversation, Verdicchio remarked that "maybe it (the hours change) was his way of getting the older girls to quit," and that the "old hours" would not be resumed until the union thing was settled " In her testimony, Verdicchio denies, in substance, that she discussed the hours' change with Boone individually, or made the quoted remark about the "older girls." The credibility issue thus presented will be resolved at a later point. "According to Marcove, public bus transportation involving a change of buses is avail- able between the area where Smith resides and a point close to the plant, but it is evident from other testimony he gave that he does not in fact know about the availability of such service "after 7.18 p m." or, in other words, for the period late at night when Smith would be going home, whether under the new schedule or the old. I have based findings as to the unavailability of adequate transportation on Smith's testimony, which I credit. 838 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Neither Boone nor Smith has worked for. the Company since March _12, and there is no dispute that both discontinued their employment because of the change in hours. Several days later, Verdicchio asked Hansen, who is married and has children, whether she was going to quit also, and the latter replied in the negative, stating that she would not do so "as long as I could get someone to look after my boys." At the time of the decision to change the hours, Verdicchio was admittedly aware that "a lot of these girls had baby sitting problems and other problems with young children," her knowledge stemming, as she conceded, from disclosures made to her by such employees when they began their employment. Pointing to this evidence, the General Counsel maintains , in substance, that the Company was aware that various of the women would find it difficult because of domestic considerations to report for work at 3:30 p.m., and changed the reporting time with a view to compelling them to quit and thus thwart the Union's organiza- tional effort; and that Vale, Boone, and Smith did not quit voluntarily, but were compelled to quit and thus were "constructively discharged." The Company, on the other hand, disclaims any unlawful motive, contending, in effect, that Vale, Boone, and Smith quit voluntarily. Much like Marcove, Sebeo testified that a "problem" of late deliveries to Automatic Catering and the difficulty of finding someone available solely for "a 2 to 21/2 hour job" making deliveries to Automatic Catering in the vicinity of midnight or 1 a.m. led the management to advance the sandwich crew's starting time to 3:30 p.m. To this, Sebeo added a claim to the effect that the Company felt that "an early afternoon job" would make it easier to recruit help for the sandwich crew. Dealing first with the last of the alleged reasons, one may question the, accuracy of the term "early afternoon job" as a description for work that begins at 3:30 p.m. and ends about midnight, but, in any case, the claimed reason appears to me to be an afterthought. Marcove, who testified before Sebeo, said nothing about it, although describing at some length the management's alleged reasons for the hours' change. It is noteworthy, too, that there is no concrete evidence that the midafternoon starting time has in any way been a recruitment aid, and, what is more, it seems but common- sense to believe that a reporting time so close to the end of the conventional school- day would very likely be an impediment at least to the recruitment of women with children of school age, especially if one takes into account the time such a woman might need to travel from her home to work. Actually, there is not only a dearth of evidence pointing to the reasonableness of a belief that the new starting time would be an aid to recruitment, but the hard fact is that the hours' change had the effect of discouraging three of the crew from continuing in their employment. I am convinced, in sum, that the claim in question is nothing but a makeweight improvisation, and I do not credit it. As is evident from the Respondent's case, it places primary emphasis on the need for timely deliveries to Automatic Catering in justifying the change in the sandwich crew's hours, claiming in that regard, in substance, that late deliveries to Automatic Catering frequently delayed two of that firm's drivers, Marvin Smith and Roland Hodges, in starting on their routes and meeting their delivery schedules. Marcove testified, in effect, that prior to the hours' change, the Company's deliveries to Auto- matic Catering were made after midnight, "many times" between 2 and 2:30 a.m., resulting in a "problem" of delay for Smith and Hodges and in complaints from vending machine "locations" they served. Sebeo, claiming in effect that the deliveries to Automatic Catering were usually made between 1 and 1:30 am ,14 testified that he had "complaints from the drivers," and that he "would say" Smith was one and another was Hodges. The Respondent also presented testimony by Smith and Hodges regarding the deliveries to Automatic Catering. Smith stated that he usually reported for work between I and 1:30 a.m., and that he would have to wait for arrival of the products "probably once or twice a week . . anywhere from 20 minutes to an hour " Hodges gave testimony to the effect that reporting for work about 2 a.m. in the period before the sandwich crew's hours were changed, he would 'lave to wait for the arrival of the products on Monday and Friday in most weeks From the sense of the testimony of Marcove and Sebeo, it is apparent that they make no claim of knowledge of frequent untimely deliveries to Automatic Catering on the basis of personal observation there, but, rather, that the condition came to the attention of the management as a result of complaints by Smith and Hodges, and from vending machine "locations." The credibility of Smith and Hodges, and of the testimony bearing on complaints, is thus of obvious importance. 14 Sebeo testified that he "would say" the products were picked up at the Company's plant between 12.30 and 1 a.m. ; and that the driving time to Automatic Catering was about 30 minutes. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 839 With that as a background , I find substantial earmarks of implausibility and exaggeration, and much that does not hang together, in the testimony of the 'Respond- ent's witnesses. If one is to believe Sebeo, the products generally arrived at Auto- matic Catering between about 1 and 1:30 a.m., and Hodges was one of the most regular ones ( drivers ) who used to complain"; but this does not quite jibe with testi- mony by Hodges that his usual reporting time was approximtaely 3 a.m. until some point in the latter part of 1963 or early in January 1964 (or in March 1964, as Hodges also testified ) when it was changed to 2 a.m ., which has been his reporting time since. Significantly, too, Sebeo's portrayal of Hodges as a "regular" complainant to him is much at odds with Hodges' testimony that his complaints were made to "Bill Tiggert and Allan Marcove." (Tiggert was supervisor of Automatic Catering's drivers until his discharge in April 1964, and Allan Marcove is a brother of Gerald Marcove, and active in the management of Automatic Catering.) To compound the matter, Hodges' testimony contains such material self-contradic- tion as to demonstrate either a materially faulty recollection or simply a disregard for facts. The sense of his testimony is that with an accretion of business leading him to move up his reporting time from 3 to 2 a.m., he experienced frequent delays in his work because of late deliveries to Automatic Catering, but he all but swept the underpinning of this claim away at one point when he was asked "how long" he has been reporting at 2 a.m. and replied, "Since the change of sandwich deliveries was set up" or, in other words, since the point in March when the Company, with the change in the sandwich crew's hours, began to make the deliveries to Automatic Catering about 9 p.m. This, of course, is utterly at variance with the Respondent's claim that the change in the sandwich crew's hours was designed, in part, to eliminate the "problem" of late deliveries encountered by Hodges when he changed his report- ing time to 2 a.m. From my observation of Hodges' demeanor soon after he gave the testimony just described, I have little doubt that he realized the contradiction to which the testimony had led, for with some visible discomfort, in response to some interrogation, he shifted his estimate of when he began to report at 2 a.m., stating, "Oh, gee, it must must have been around January 1, 1964." Singularly, too, having testified that the deliveries would be late twice in most weeks, he subsequently proceeded to give testimony to the effect that the usual delivery time was "(a)nywhere from 10 to midnight, I reckon," but shortly thereafter he reverted to his prior claim, going so far as to say that the late deliveries would be made "around 3.00 " The conflict between Sebeo and Hodges regarding complaints is not all that is short in the Respondent's case on the subject. Tiggert, who was called by the General Counsel, gave testimony to the effect that he had had complaints from drivers regard- ing late deliveries on only three or four occasions over a period of several years preceding his termination in April 1964, and only one in the preceding 4 months; that on the latter occasion, he looked into the matter and learned that the Respondent's driver had been delayed because of illness; 15 and that two of the complaints came from Smith and one from Hodges. Both drivers, who testified after Tiggert, do not materially dispute the latter's testimony regarding complaints to him. Smith stated that he complained to Tiggert "probably two or three different times," adding "I found out it didn't do no good, so I just quit"; and testified at a subsequent point that he "probably complained about every time it (later delivery) happened' to Allan Marcove or Sebeo during "routine" calls to the Automatic Catering office while on his delivery route. Hodges testified that he complained to Tiggert "a couple of times, I think," but claims he told Allan Marcove "every time" the deliveries to Automatic Catering were late But Allan Marcove did not testify, and Hodges' claims of late deliveries are so heavily burdened with self-contradiction and implausibility as to lead me to dis- believe them. The obvious corollary of that is that his unsupported claim that he complained to Allan Marcove "every time" (twice in most weeks, according to Hodges) the deliveries were late is not a reliable basis for findings. Nor am I able to repose any greater confidence in the claims of Gerald Marcove, Sebeo, and Smith regarding late deliveries and complaints about them, although their testimony appears to have, in varying degree, a smoother and more plausible cast re In effect contradicting Gerald Dlarcove, who, as indicated earlier, testified that at the time of Greene's termination and for some time prior thereto it was Carriger who made the deliveries to Automatic Catering, Tiggert gave testimony to the effect that the deliveries were made during that period by one Ed Shield (who, it is undisputed, had been making them in a prior period, and has been doing so since the sandwich crew's hours were changed). The conflict is subsidiary, and as its resolution would not, in my judgment, materially aid a determination of any of the larger issues, I deem it unneces- sary to resolve it 840 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD than that of Hodges . As is evident, neither Smith nor Hodges ever complained to Gerald Marcove about late deliveries , and there is no claim that any other driver did. The sum of what there is in Marcove's testimony regarding complaints is a vague generalization that "the office would receive " complaints from drivers, and an affirmation, in response to a leading question , that "Automatic Catering had received (an) appreciable number of compliants from locations (not identified ) as to late service." These generalizations, as well as the claims made by Smith and Sebeo, break down in the light of a number of factors , apart from the clearly visible short- comings in Hodges' testimony , and its conflict with that of Sebeo, previously mentioned. For one thing , as Marcove admitted , Automatic Catering is obligated to pay its drivers for daily and weekly overtime hours, and there is no "appreciable difference" between their earnings prior to the advance in the time of deliveries to Automatic Catering, and what they have been since. The claims of frequent delays in Smith's departure for his route do not, in my view, credibly fit with the evidence that his earnings remained substantially constant . In that connection , I find quite uncon- vincing Marcove 's plainly speculative generalization that late deliveries to Automatic Catering would "not necessarily " delay Smith and Hodges in the completion of their routes, because they "work a little faster and perhaps less efficiently with this loss of starting time." For another matter, Tiggert's testimony that he received only one complaint about late deliveries in 1964 prior to his termination in April is undisputed , and taking into account the fact of his discharge and the possibility that he may harbor resentment against the Company , I nevertheless find credible, and accept, his testimony that over a period of several years he received only three or four such complaints , for his evi- dence in that regard finds substantial support in the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses, Smith and Hodges. It does not seem plausible that so relatively few com- plaints by drivers would be made to Tiggert if it were true, as Sebeo claims, that the "problem" of untimely deliveries to Automatic Catering existed as far back as "the first part . of 1963," although "minor" then , according to Sebeo; grew "bigger and bigger" as 1963 progressed , leading to frequent discussions about the matter during the year between Marcove and Sebeo; became serious in the fall of 1963; and remained so until the sandwich crew's hours were changed . Moreover, the very fact that the sandwich crew rejected Sebeo's request in September 1963 that they start at an earlier time (not specified in the record ), and that nothing was done to change their shift hours for some 6 or 7 months contributes weight to a conclusion that the "problem" was far less serious than the Respondent would lead one to believe. Summarizing the matter , a basic improbability runs through the Respondent's case on the subject of the hours' change, and that is that the common management of the Company and Automatic Catering would permit a material impediment to the latter's operations to exist for as long as 6 or 7 months , despite numerous and repeated com- plaints by the drivers affected, when all that was required was what Marcove himself termed the "relatively simple" correction of advancing the sandwich crew's hours. I do not believe that businessmen such as Marcove and Sebeo appeared to me to be would allow as serious a condition , such as they describe, to exist for long. On the other hand, I have no doubt that there were some instances of late delivery to Auto- matic Catering, as one may infer from the credible evidence that there were about three or four complaints to Tiggert, and that Sebeo suggested an earlier starting time in September 1963. The state of the record , reflecting as it does a lack of candor by the Company on the subject of its deliveries to Automatic Catering , a matter of which the Company obviously has special knowledge , precludes a reasonably sound approxi- mation here of the volume or frequency of late deliveries ,16 but the factors discussed above, including the shortcomings in the testimony of the Respondent 's witnesses on the subject, the Company's obvious acquiescence in the sandwich crew's rejection of the September 1963 suggestion that the starting time be advanced , the substantial constancy in the Automatic Catering drivers' earnings , and the small number of complaints made by Smith and Hodges to Tiggert, lead me to conclude, and I find, ie Tiggert testified that the deliveries were made about midnight, and "could vary as much as an hour , I would say, from 11 :30 to 12:30." However, it is evident that he has no first-hand knowledge that this was the usual practice , because, as he conceded, he "seldom" began work before 1 a.m., and he frequently did not report to Automatic Catering's premises , but "went directly into the field" to attend to problems of the route drivers under his supervision . I note , also, in passing, that Tiggert's estimate of the delivery time does not refer to a-period, not relevant here, when the sandwich crew began work at 8 p .m.; and that It may be inferred from the record as a whole that because of the nature and extent of Automatic Catering 's routes in that period , deliveries to its premises as late as 2:30 a.m., or perhaps 3 a.m., were timely. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 841 that the late deliveries were relatively few and sporadic compared to the Respondent's claims that its witnesses have greatly exaggerated the extent of untimely deliveries, and that the "problem" as Marcove and Sebeo describe it did not exist.11 I am persuaded, too, for reasons that follow below, that Marcove and Sebeo have resorted to the claimed "problem" in order to give a gloss of legality to a decision to advance the sandwich crew's reporting time for an unlawful end. To begin with, whatever the extent of the "problem" of late deliveries, it existed much before the Union came on the scene seeking an election; yet one may search the record in vain for a plausible explanation why the change was made in March, during the pendency of the representation proceeding, which could (and did) result in the election sought, rather than, say, September 1963 when the sandwich crew rejected the suggestion of an earlier start. The timing of the change gives support to the General Counsel's position that it was put into effect with a view to compelling some of the employees to quit in order to thwart the Union's organizational effort. Moreover, even if one assumes, as Marcove claims, that deliveries were made to Automatic Catering as late as 2:30 a.m., one may pertinently ask why the crew's hours were advanced to 3.30 p m., a time that by rational standards would be likely to create problems for women with children of school age, when a starting time of, say, 4.30 p.m. (as Vale, in fact, suggested for herself) would have been reasonably adequate to resolve the late delivery problem Marcove describes. The Respondent does not plausibly explain its choice of 3:30 p.m. Sebeo's excuse that the Company wished to convert the sandwich crew's work into an "early afternoon job" is not entitled to credence, for reasons previously noted. Nor am I able to place any greater reliance on his assertion that a factor in the decision to make the hours' change was the difficulty of finding someone to make the deliveries to Automatic Catering in the neighborhood of midnight or 1 a.m. Like so much of the Respond- ent's case, this claim is entangled in implausibility and contradiction It first appears in the case in Marcove's testimony, and, as described previously, is harnessed there to an attempt to make it appear that Greene quit voluntarily by rejecting both the "8-hour job" and the option of making the Automatic Catering deliveries, whereas the evidence impels a conclusion that the Company had already decided to discharge him, and that the offer of the task of making the deliveries was not made in good faith. Moreover, Marcove's testimony would lead one to believe that the decision to change the sandwich crew's hours had already been made at the time of his con- versation with Greene on March 6, and, according to Marcove and Sebeo, it was they who made the decision, but Verdicchio, on the other hand, testified that she and Sebeo, although discussing the matter previously, decided on the change on March 10, the day before it was put into effect. In short, the motives for the change Marcove and Sebeo ascribe to themselves are so enveloped in a lack of candor that I am unable to accept their descriptions of their motives or to find in them a credible explanation for the selection of 3:30 p.m. Bearing in mind Verdicchio's admitted knowledge of Vale's difficulty that "a lot" of the women in the crew had "baby sit- ting problems," the very fact that the Company chose 3.30 as the new starting time in the setting of the representation proceeding supports a conclusion, in the absence of a credible explanation of the choice by the Respondent, that its purpose was to induce some members of the crew to quit. The direction of that purpose emerges in the evidence that Verdicchio told mem- bers of the sandwich crew as they were about to leave the plant on the morning of March 11 that they were to report at 3:30 p.m. "at least until this union thing is over," to quote Boone, or as Hansen, probably referring to the same statement, described it, "until the union business was straightened out"; and that Verdicchio told Boone on March 13 that "maybe it (the new starting time) was his way of getting the older girls to quit," and that the "old hours" would not be resumed "until the union thing was settled." Needless to say, this evidence should be approached with caution because Boone and Hansen cannot be regarded as disinterested witnesses. More- over, upon surface consideration, there could well be reason to doubt, if no more, that a supervisor would blurt out the truth of a concealed motivation. However, upon my observation of the witnesses concerned, I conclude that Boone and Han- sen are telling the truth. Verdicchio appears to me to have an unusually naive conception of labor-management relations, as evidenced by her resentment that the crew did not confide in her regarding their attendance at a union meeting. It seems 17 Bearing in mind that the bakery products were prepared in the daytime, and that Automatic Catering took only about 50 percent of the sandwich output, I note, in addi- tion to what has been said, that the Respondent does not plausibly explain why the sandwich crew, working a shift between 7 p in. and 2 or 3 am, could not hare had the sandwiches intended for Automatic Catering ready in time for delivery there by midnight 842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to me, also, that she views herself as something of a protective shepherdess in rela- tion to the sandwich crew, manifesting the attitude , for example, when she prof- fered the explanation for interrogating the crew about unionization that she did so "after they [day-shift employees] started blaming my girls " My impression of her is that she would be quite capable of disclosing to her "girls ," in a somewhat maternal, reassuring vein, without a full awareness of the possible consequences , that the "union business" had caused a temporary change in hours. In addition , there is much in her testimony on other material subjects, as already indicated, that I am unable to credit . Taking all factors into account, I credit the relevant testimony of Boone and Hansen.18 The Respondent takes the position that there is no evidence that it was aware of any prounion activity or interest of any number of the sandwich crew at the time of the hours' change, and thus, so the argument runs, the record will not support a finding that the Company had an antiunion motive for the change or violated the Act as a consequence of the termination of the employment of Vale, Boone, and Smith It is true that the record does not establish that the Company had knowl- edge of the union activity or sentiment of any specific sandwich employee, but to say that that precludes a finding that the management had an unlawful motive for the change is to misconceive the direction of the evidence which, upon the basis of the findings made above, amply warrants an inference that the underlying purpose of the change in the crew 's starting time was to weight the Company's chances of pre- venting selection of the Union as bargaining representative As matters stood on March 11, the representation proceeding had been pending for almost a month, and there can be no doubt that the Company had good reason to visualize at least the possibility of an early election . The management , I am persuaded , believed or sus- pected that the "older girls ," or some of them, were a focus of prounion sentiment, and changed the starting time to 3:30 p.m. because it believed that that would incon- venience "older girls" and induce them to quit ; and that their replacement by new help would advance the Company's chances of preventing selection of the Union as the employees' bargaining representative . Verdicchio intimated as much to Boone on March 13 when the supervisor said that "maybe it [the new starting time] was his [Sebeo's, as I infer] way of getting the older girls to quit ." The conclusion that such was the Company's aim in no way hinges on proof of knowledge as to the union activity or sentiment of any particular employee ; nor does it matter that Vale, as it turned out, was the only "older girl" who was forced to quit. The Company must accept responsibility for the consequences of the change, whether it affected "older girls" or new ones such as Boone and Smith , and I have no doubt, and find, that the change had the effect of forcing them to quit, and that this was as much as to dis- charge them. I find, in sum , that by changing the starting time of the sandwich crew to 3:30 p.m , and by thus causing the termination of the employment of Evelyn Boone, Marie Vale, and Janice June Smith , the Company discriminated with respect to the terms, conditions, and tenure of employment of employees in order to discourage member- ship in the Union , thus violating Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act ; and interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Sec- tion 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8 (a)(1) of the statute. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the Act, I shall recommend below that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. Is Sanchez claims, and Verdicchio denies, that on the occn.ion of their private office conversation , previously described , the supervisor said that the hours of the sandwich crew "had been changed on account of the union " For reasons previously stated, I do not regard Sanchez' version of that conversation of preponderant weight and base no findings on it. FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY 843 Because of the nature , range, and scope of the unfair labor practices found above, and in order to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend an order below which will have the effect of requiring the Respondent to refrain in the future from abridging any of the rights guaranteed employees by said Section 7.19 Having found that the Respondent has unlawfully discharged Stuart Greene, Marie Vale, Janice June Smith , and Evelyn Boone in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer each of these individuals immediate and full reinstatement to his or her former or substantially equivalent position,20 without prejudice to his or her seniority and other rights and privileges, and make such individual whole for any loss of pay he or she may have suffered by reason of the said discharge by payment to such individual of a sum of money equal to the amount of wages he or she would have earned , but for the discharge , between the date thereof, as found above , and the date of a proper offer of reinstatement to such individual as aforesaid , together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum ; and that the loss of pay and interest be computed in accordance with the formula and method prescribed by the National Labor Relations Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing and Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716, to which the parties hereto are expressly referred. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I The said Company is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. The said Union is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging Stuart Greene , Marie Vale, Janice June Smith, and Evelyn Boone, and by changing the starting time of employees , as found above, the said Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act , as found above , the said Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 ( a) (1) of the Act. 5 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , I recommend that the Respondent , Marbro Food Service, Inc., d/b/a Fab's Famous Foods Company , its officers , agents, successors, and assigns , shall I Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership of any of its employees in International Brother- hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Local No. 537, or in any other labor organization , by discharging, or otherwise denying employ- ment to, any employee, or in any other manner discriminating against an employee in regard to his hire, tenure of employment , or any term or condition of employment. (b) Threatening, warning, or otherwise informing any employee that it will dis- continue any operation, go out of business , deny employment to any employee, or withhold any wage increase , if employees choose or support a labor organization as their bargaining representative , or engage in any union activity. 10 N LR B v Entwistle Mfg Co., 120 F. 2d 532 ( CA. 4); May Department Stores, d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v N.L R B ., 326 US 376; Bethlehem Steel Company v. A7.LRB , 120F 2d641 (CADC). n In accordance with the Board ' s past interpretation , the expression "former or a substantially equivalent position " is intended to mean "former position wherever possible, but if such position Is no longer in existence , then to it substantially equivalent position." The Chase National Bank of the City of New Poil, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827 844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Interrogating any employee as to any employee 's interest in, or activity in, with, or on behalf of, any labor organization, in a manner constituting interference, restraint , or coercion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. (d) Offering or promising any employee any wage increase , or any other benefit or reward, or any improvement in any term or condition of employment , in order to influence any employee in the choice or rejection of a bargaining representative. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist any labor organ- ization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid of protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2 Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the poli- cies of the Act: (a) Offer to Stuart Greene, Marie Vale , Janice June Smith , and Evelyn Boone immediate and full reinstatement to their respective former or substantially equiva- lent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole in the manner and according to the method set forth in section V, above, entitled "The Remedy." (b) Forthwith establish 7 p.m. as the starting time of all sandwich department employees who were in the Company 's employ on March 10, 1964. (c) Preserve , until compliance with any order for reinstatement or backpay made by the National Labor Relations Board in this proceeding is effectuated , and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records , social security payment records, timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant to a determination of the amount of backpay due, and to reinstatement and related rights provided in such Order (d) Post at its place of business in Denver, Colorado, copies of the said attached notice marked "Appendix A." 21 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director of Region 27 of the National Labor Relations Board, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized representative of the Company, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Company to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing , within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.22 (f) Notify each of the individuals required to be reinstated , as above, if such individual is now serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement, upon application , in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. -"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the said notice In the additional event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 22 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , paragraph 2(e) thereof shall be modified to read. "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith " APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership of any of our employees in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 537 , or in any other labor organization by discharging or otherwise denying employment to any employee, or in any other manner discriminating AETNA BEARING COMPANY, ETC. 845 against any employee in regard to his hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, except as authorized by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT threaten, warn, or otherwise inform any employee that we will discontinue any operation, go out of business, deny employment to any employee, or withhold any wage increase if employees choose or support a labor organiza- tion as their bargaining representative, or engage in any union activity. WE WILL NOT interrogate any employee as to any employee's interest in, or activity in, with, or on behalf of, any labor organization, in a manner constitut- ing interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT offer or promise any employee any wage increase, or any other benefit or reward, or any improvement in any term or condition of employment, in order to influence any employee in the choice or rejection of a bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ- ees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. THE starting time of all sandwich department employees who were in our employ on March 10, 1964, is 7 p.m. WE WILL offer Stuart Greene, Marie Vale, Janice June Smith, and Evelyn Boone immediate and full reinstatement to their respective former or substan- tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and reimburse each of them for any loss of pay such individual may have suffered by reason of the fact that we discriminated against such person. WE WILL notify any of the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Mili- tary Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. MARBRO FOOD SERVICE, INC., d/b/a FAB'S FAMOUS FOODS COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Information regarding the provisions of this notice and compliance with its provi- sions may be secured from the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Board, 17th and Champa Streets, 609 Railway Exchange Building, Denver, Colorado, Telephone No. 297-3551. Aetna Bearing Company, a Textron Division and Local 151, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). Case No.13-CA-6253. May 25,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On December 8, 1964, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- 152 NLRB No. 85.