Local 26, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers and Belsinger Signs, Inc. Case No. 5-CB-579. April 19, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On November 16, 1964, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain af- firmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a support- ing brief, the Charging Party filed an answering brief, and the Gen- eral Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom- mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. i As there is no evidence of Respondent Union's withdrawal from multiemployer bargain- ing, we conclude that The Evening News .4ssociatton et al., Cases Nos. 7-CA-4366, 7-CA- 4367, 7-CA-4595, and 7-CA-4596, presently before the Board, have no direct bearing on, the instant case. Accordingly, we deny Respondent Union's request that decision herein be stayed pending our decision in the aforesaid cases TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci in the above -entitled proceeding at Washington, D.C., on August 20, 21 , and 25, 1964, on complaint of the General Counsel against Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of 152 NLRB No. 1. 1 789-730-66-vol. 152-2 2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Electrical Workers, herein called the Respondent or the Union. The issue litigated was whether the Union had violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. All parties filed briefs with the Trial Examiner after the close of the hearing. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings: 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Belsinger Signs, Inc., herein called the Company or the Charging Party, is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia, having its office and place of business in the District of Columbia, where it is engaged in erection and servicing of illuminated signs. During the 12-month period ending July 31, 1964, a representative period, in the course and conduct of its business this Company had gross receipts in excess of $190,000. In addition, it received ship- ments of goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 at its place of business in the District of Columbia, directly from points located outside the District of Columbia. I find that Belsinger Signs, Inc., is, and has been at all times material herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.' II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES For months during 1963 and into early 1964 the Respondent Union bargained collectively with four electrical sign contractors of the Greater Washington, D.C., area. After the last negotiating session it signed identical contracts with each of three of these companies but, despite a request by the fourth employer-Belsinger Signs, Inc., herein called Belsinger, which filed the charge in this proceeding-refused to sign any agreement with it. The complaint alleges that the employees of the four companies together constitute a single multiemployer bargaining unit, that the bargaining that took place was based upon such multiemployer unit, that final agree- ment was reached, and that the Union's refusal to sign the contract with Belsinger was an illegal refusal to reduce to writing a final settlement regularly negotiated, and therefore constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. The Union contends that notwithstanding the joint action of the employer group, their unanimity of position vis-a-vis the Union, and the unvarying correspondence and contract language admissions of intent to act jointly as a single employer, in their minds each company was acting independently of all the others, that the separate contract documents signed with each of the three companies reflect un- related agreements reached with single employers, and that no agreement was ever reached with the Belsinger Company. In defense the Union also advanced one or two seemingly inconsistent contentions-such as no majority representative status for Belsinger's employees, or contract violations by Belsinger justifying the Union's refusal to deal with it. The principal issue presented, however, is whether or not there did exist a multiemployer bargaining unit, and if such was the case, whether negotiations had been completed. In that event the Union's refusal to sign with Belsinger, as it had done with the other members of the group, would appear to be a clear unfair labor practice. Evidence of Multiemployer Bargaining Most of the proof offered by the General Counsel to support the essential asser- tion that for some time bargaining was on a multiemployer basis consists of uncon- trovertible documents or undisputed testimony. There is no real issue over anything of importance that was said and done. There has long been an association of electrical sign contractors in Washington and vicinity; their work includes manu- facturing, erecting, servicing, and maintaining electrical signs. From time to time the name of the group has changed, but, as will appear, the precise words by which they referred to their group is of no moment to the real issue to be decided. Of the four association companies which engaged in the bargaining involved, three have been part of the total picture as association members for some years; 1 The commerce facts set out above are established by stipulation of all parties, and that stipulation is hereby made part of the record as a Trial Examiner's exhibit. LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 3 these are Jack Stone Company, herein called Stone, Service Neon, Inc., here called Service Neon, and Folks & Miller. In 1959 the Belsinger Company was organized and started to do business in this area; it bought out a fourth such contractor, called Royal Neon Signs, Inc., taking Royal's building, trucks, and equipment. Belsinger also took over and assumed Royal's contract with the Union. From that time on, and continuing into 1964, in compliance with the terms of the contract Belsinger contributed weekly to the local employees benefit board, a benefit fund administered jointly by the IBEW and the employers. The contract had been signed by Royal, but on its face reads as an agreement "between the undersigned Electrical Sign Companies of Washington, D.C., and Local Union No. 26, of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers." The agreement by its terms ran to May 20, 1960, and provided for automatic annual renewal thereafter. It also provided for a joint committee of union and employer representatives to resolve, under a precise grievance procedure, any questions that might arise. The contract finally contains the following clause: Should this committee [the joint grievance group] fail to agree, or to adjust any matter within the 60 calendar days after written notice had been given it shall be referred to the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Industry of the United States and Canada. Its decision shall be final and binding. In the spring of 1961 all four of these employers bargained for contract revisions with the Union. Mr. Donald Belsinger testified in conclusionary phrases that the negotiations were carried on by the four employer members "jointly." No agree- ment was reached and the dispute was submitted to the Council of Industrial Rela- tions for Electrical Industry, in accordance with the agreement still in effect. On February 20, 1962, that Council issued its decision, which on its face-as received in evidence-shows the disputants to be "Greater Washington Sign Association and Local 26, IBEW." Seven days later the Union sent a copy of this decision to the Belsinger Company, calking attention to the Council's decision that the wage increase decided in arbitration was to take effect on February 20, and that the contract was to continue to May 20, 1963. The Union also suggested in its letter to Belsinger that an amended contract be signed by the union members [contractors] "at a joint meeting" to be held at the union office. The parties did not bother to sign new agreements but considered the old one continuing in effect; all of them did after the conditions of employment to conform with the arbitration decision of the Council. On March 20, 1963, the Union advised all of the contractors of its desire to reopen the contract and negotiate; by this time Donald Belsinger had been chosen president of the Association. Local 26's letter to him stated that "the employees covered under the Sign Workers Agreement of Local Union Number 26 and Greater Sign Association of Washington, D.C.," wished to amend the contract. On August 9, 1963, the Association sent written proposals for a new agreement to the Union; the proposals were submitted by Belsinger, signed: "Greater Washington Sign Association, Donald K. Belsinger, Pres." By letter dated October 10, Local 26 rejected these proposals, received, as the Union's letter stated, from "the Greater Washington Sign Association," and asked that the dispute be submitted to the Council pursuant to the "working agreement " Its letter was sent to "The Greater Washington Sign Association, Donald K. Belsinger, President, G.W.S.A." Again Belsingei•, in the name of the Association, replied in writing that the group agreed to have the Council settle the dispute. In support of their economic demands the four contractors then submitted a single brief to the Council, and signed it "Greater Washington Sign Association," with each company then adding its own name and Belsinger's signature appearing as president. With the dispute pending, and the parties quarreling, there occurred a work stoppage by the employees of Belsinger and of the Jack Stone Company. A letter of protest was sent to the Union in consequence, and it was signed by all four of the contractors under the covering name "Greater Washington Sign Association." The Council's decision was issued on November 22; it gave a 10-cent per hour increase generally and modified the holiday provision of the existing agreement. The Council also directed the parties to continue meeting to resolve final matters, and to resubmit their dispute to the Council if final resolution was not achieved. There followed three or four bargaining sessions attended by representatives of all four companies and by Union officers; the last was on February 25, 1964. Be- fore this date the employer group submitted a contract draft to the Union, entitled 4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "Agreement between Electrical Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., herein called the Employer, and Local Union 26, of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers." Early in March the Union signed identical and separate contracts with the Stone Company, Service Neon, and Folks & Miller. Like the earlier contracts , this too is headed "Agreement entered into March 1 , 1964, between the undersigned Electri- cal Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington , D.C., hereinafter called the Em- ployer, and Local Union No . 26 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, herein called the Union." When Belsinger learned that the Union had signed up with the other members, of the Association he asked that a copy of the contract be given to him for signing also. His request letter of March 23 was ignored . Again on June 5 Belsinger de- manded that the Union sign the same contract with him. At the hearing the Union made clear it had no intention of signing that or any contract with this Company. Analysis and Concluding Findings There is persuasive proof in the evidence set out above that the bargaining from 1961 to the end of February 1964 proceeded on the basis of a four-company multi- employer unit basis. There is also strong indication that the bargaining which had led to execution of the 1959 contract, the one which Belsinger took over from Royal Signs, was also multiemployer in character, for the agreement literally reads as a settlement between the Union and the Electrical Sign Companies of Washington, D.C. For purpose of decision here, however, it suffices that from the time Belsinger joined the group to date, a period of at least 4 years, the parties dealt with one another on an association basis. Thus the negotiation meetings that took place, both in 1961 and in 1963-64, had all four employers participating jointly; resort in each instance to the Electrical Council was pursuant to the specific provisions of the As- sociation contract; the briefs submitted to the Council by the employers were always a joint effort by them and so recognized by the Union; the decisions of the arbitration board recognized the employer party as an association in each instance; and the very correspondence between the Association and the Union referred to the em- ployer's side of the table as a single multiemployer group. Indeed it was not until the very moment when the Union, for reasons only obliquely revealed in this record, decided to exclude the Belsinger Company from the bargaining relationship, that there came any individual, single employer activity by the Union. This was when, at the beginning of March, a matter of a week or so after the last joint negotiation session, it signed with three companies and refused to do the same with Belsinger. And finally, that even then the parties intended to continue in existence a multi- employer unit, albeit with Belsinger excluded , is clearly shown by the fact that each of the identical contracts signed reads : "Agreement between Electrical Sign Com- panies of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., hereinafter called the Employer, and Local Union No. 26 ...:. In contending that all this did not mean that a broad unit existed , the Respondent relies primarily upon the fact that there is no evidence of express authorization by each employer to the association to act as single spokesman for them all. This argument presuposes that the association must have a separate existence apart from its component members. The very case cited by the Respondent in support negates. that argument. The applicable rule of Board law does appear in Francis L. Bennett, et al. d/b/a Bennett Stone Company, 139 NLRB 1422, where the Board said: "Under established Board Rules such unit is held to exist only where the evidence establishes that the several employers expressly conferred upon their joint bargaining agent the power to bind them by its negotiations or that the Employers have by an established course of conduct unequivocally manifested a desire to be bound in future collective bargaining by group rather than individual action ." [Emphasis supplied.] The truly significant portion of this language, and that which determines the case at bar, is that which speaks of "an established course of conduct unequivocally manifest [ing] a decision to be bound . . . ." When the separate employers "ex- pressly" authorize an association to act for all, such literal authorization is the un- equivocal conduct which reveals the intent to be bound . But the same intent can• be revealed by other conduct as well, and it is for this reason that the rule speaks also of "an established course of conduct." The important question is not how the employers have shown their intent to bring a multiemployer unit into being, but whether they have done so.2 See Chicago Metropolitan Home Builders Association, 119 NLRB 1184. LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 5 In fact, as the General Counsel correctly points out in his brief, the testimony of the Respondent's own witnesses, rather than dispel the conclusion dictated by the objective, documentary proof, strengthens the inference and removes all doubt as to the intention of the employer group. Jack Stone, officer of one of the companies, said: "Over a period of years the union members [of the Association] have talked out some ,union difficulties . . it was always done on the part of our group, pretty well decided as to what the method of attack would be . . Speaking of the briefs submitted by the employers to the Council in arbitration: "It was something that we mutually agreed upon and we worked it up together as a group." He agreed that the Union members of the Association have dealt with the Union "as one body." Asked to explain what he meant by "one body," he said: "We always feel we have more strength as a group rather than individually because the Union has a tendency to take the weakest link in the chain." Richard Luxemberg, of Service Neon Sign, Inc., also agreed, from the witness stand, that union contractors of the Greater Washington Sign Association have met "as a body." Against all this, Mr. Stone, at the hearing, offered the statement that during the 1963-64 negotiations he was bargaining "individually," and Mr. Luxemberg added that for his company he bargained "personally." Frank Crosby, business representa- tive of Local 26, was present at all the bargaining meetings. His affidavit to the Board agent, dated May 1964, reads "At the end of the meeting [the last session ,on February 25] we were in agreement except for Belsinger's objection to the language in the checkoff clause. The other employers indicated we were silly to argue over the language but that they stood behind Belsinger because he was president of their Association." On the record in its entirety there can be no question but that the entire course of bargaining, from 1961 through the last meeting of February 25, at which there was virtual final agreement on the terms of a new contract, the parties were bargain- ing on the basis of a multiemployer unit of four employers, including the Belsinger Company, and I so find. In a matter of days the Respondent signed the resultant agreement with three of the companies; it refused to sign the contract with Belsinger. Absent any convincing reason to except this situation from the clear rule of law that the parties to a fully negotiated collective-bargaining agreement must reduce it to writing and sign it on request, it must be found that by its refusal to sign that agreement with the Belsinger Company the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.3 Apart from taking issue with the complaint assertion of a multiemployer bargain- ing unit, the Respondent advanced, either during the hearing or in its brief, a num- ber of defense contentions which are for the most part vague, indefinite, and over- lapping arguments. At one point it said there never was any employer association; inconsistently, however, it had one of its witnesses, Mr. Stone, testify that he ceased being a member 2 years ago. The Respondent then placed into evidence two letters-one from Stone and the other from Luxemberg, dated April 29 and May 1, respectively-addressed to Local No. 2 and disavowing Mr. Belsinger; the letter stated that the two companies were "in full accord with the present agreement," but that they were no longer members of The Great Washington Sign Association. In the total circumstances of this case any withdrawal from association membership by these two companies, after the contract resulting from the final bargaining had been executed, and after the charges had been filed, can have no meaningful bearing upon the principal issue .4 In November of 1963 Belsinger advised the officers of Local No. 26 that it planned to discontinue the manufacturing aspect of its business in the Washington area and to continue selling, erecting, servicing, and maintaining electrical signs there. Its letter offered to discuss the matter with the Union. By letter dated February 24, 1964, it told the Union that 4 days later it would in fact cease manufacturing, but in all other respects continue business as usual. On the effective date of the change-February 28-there were approximately 12 rank-and-file employees work- ing for Belsinger, virtually all members of Respondent's Local No. 26. On the 28th five were laid off; the others were kept. The laid-off employees were invited to remain with the Company if they cared to and if they could qualify for the type of work which remained. On the evening of that same day agents of the Re- spondent appeared at the plant and spoke to those of its members who were still at work. Forthwith all but one or two quit. There came a time a week or so later when Belsinger sent a newly hired electrician to the Union to request, pursuant to 3H.J.Heinz Coinpanyv.IV LRB,311US 514. 4 Retail Associates, Inc, 120 NLRB 388. 6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the established practice, a transfer card from a Baltimore local of the IBEW Inter- national. Local No. 26 refused to issue such a permit. By May I there were only five employees at work, two members of the Baltimore local, and only one produc- tion worker-a Mr. Long-a member of Local No. 26. During the hearing counsel for the Respondent said the Union did not represent a majority of Belsinger's employees; he was careful to avoid stating unequivocally whether this was the reason why the Union refused to sign any contract with that company. He repeats this plain statement in his brief, but now the asserted loss of majority status is made to appear as a consequence of the other three companies "withdrawing" from the joint bargaining after February 25. There is also a stipula- tion that the Respondent always represented a majority of the employees of each of the other three companies. The ambivalence appearing in the Respondent's statements throughout the record, the confused reasoning resulting from its vague and elusive positions, suggests that whatever the real reason may have been for its refusal to deal further with Belsinger is hidden somewhere behind the evasive testimony of its witnesses.5 This case does not require a definitive finding as to the underlying motivation which caused the Respondent, after the perfectly normal bargaining session of February 25, sud- denly to deny its established representative status for Belsinger's employees. That question stands apart from the issue of this proceeding, was not litigated, and, indeed, may bring into play other provisions of the statute. The change of heart apparently came about between February 25 and the time that the three contracts were signed; these bear a date of March 1, although Crosby said he brought them to these other employers for signature the second week in March. Clearly the Respondent represented a majority, if not all, of the employees of all four of the companies in the multiemployer unit throughout the bargaining period of several months and through February 28. In effect negotiations had been suc- cessfully completed 3 days earlier, and the contracts with the other companies are dated the very next day. With the five or six employees remaining even after Bel- singer reduced its operation almost all members of Local No. 26, with their sudden "resignation" following immediately upon their business agent's visit to the plant that day, and with the Union's refusal to issue work permits to IBEW electricians thereafter, it cannot be said that a defense based on a loss of a majority in the overall bargaining unit, sufficient to defeat this complaint, has been sustained. Both the conduct of the union agents at the time of the events and the half-spoken, in- consistent, and elusive arguments advanced now in justification, suggest bad faith, rather than the honest dealing which the statute commands. At bottom, all cases of refusal to bargain-including this one-turn on that fundamental question.6 A final argument, inferentially suggested, but not clearly articulated at the hear- ing, and not repeated in the Union's brief, is that the Respondent was not obligated to sign any agreement with Belsinger because that company had violated the exist- ing agreement. Belsinger violated the contract, in the view of the Union, when it first took positive steps to cease manufacturing signs in Washington. The record shows that Mr. Belsinger, under some company name or other, also manufactures signs in the Baltimore area, where he uses electrician members of IBEW Local 250 of that city, and planned to bring those signs to Washington to continue his business there. It is this fact that appears, between the lines of the record, as the irritant which caused the Union to refuse to sign the association contract with him. What is thus called a contract violation by Belsinger, is also advanced, in the Respondent's brief, as an attempt by that company to bargain with the Union as a single em- ployer, and thus in effect a withdrawal by Belsinger from the multiemployer bargain- ing unit. Recognizing that, under Board law, an employer may not appropriately In an attempt to achieve a better understanding of the Union's true position I asked Crosby, the union officer, why the separate contracts with each of the three employers identifies the "employer" as the Electrical Sign Companies of Metropolitan Washington, D C., if in fact each contract covered only a single employer unit. Crosby replied: Well, we have always dealt with and basically dealt with each individual company. When they come up for negotiations, and so forth, we have been dealing individually with them. They meet, they come down individually, they speak individually, they have no central spokesman or anybody authorized to speak for them. And this is- we have been recognizing these certain companies over the past 20 years and that is why they are named companies There has never been too much change in that agreement. This is the basic reason. E N L R B. v. American National Insurance Co, 343 U.S. 395; N.L R.B. v. Insurance Agent's International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.), 361 U.S. 477. LOCAL 26, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 7 separate himself from association bargaining after negotiations have been completed, the Union then adds that its own separate dealings, on or about March 1, with the three other companies must be viewed as indirect agreement, by the Union, with Belsinger's desire to break away from the association. From all this the Respondent reaches the conclusion that what really happened was that Belsinger and Local 26 mutually agreed to bargain separately from any other employer, an arrangement that can be of no concern to the Board at all. No convincing rationale was given, indeed no theory whatever is urged to support a rule of law excusing an otherwise illegal refusal to bargain in consequence of contract violations. Moreover, even assuming such a principle, the defense must fall in this instance because it was not shown that Belsinger's curtailment of the one aspect of its business in the territorial jurisdiction of Local 26 was in fact a contract violation. More important, no such reason was ever voiced by the Re- spondent when it refused to sign any contract with that one company, or even to talk with its representatives. The Respondent's complete indifference to all of Belsinger's appeals that it sign the association contract with that company also, or that it meet with the Com- pany's officers, precludes any possible finding that the two "agreed" to engage in separate, single employer bargaining. I find this total defense, however phrased, unpersuasive. On the record as a whole I find: 1. All employees employed by Jack Stone Company, Service Neon, Inc, Folks & Miller, and Belsinger Signs, Inc , all of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was in 1960, and at all times thereafter has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the above-described bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargain- ing within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 3. By refusing to sign the regularly negotiated association contract, as requested to do by the Belsinger Company, the Respondent Local 26 violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent, as set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the employer described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY As it has been found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and to take certain affirmative action designed to dissipate the effects thereof and to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent will therefore be ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with Belsinger Signs, Inc., on the basis of the multiemployer bargaining unit found appropriate above. It must also be ordered to sign, upon request of the Belsinger Company, the contract which the Union executed, early in March of 1964 and bearing date of March 1, with each of the three other companies included in the bargaining unit. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Belsinger Signs, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All employees employed by Jack Stone Company, Service Neon, Inc., Folks & Miller, and Belsinger Signs, Inc., of Metropolitan Washington, D C., excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9 (b) of the Act. 8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. At all times since 1960 and thereafter Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, has been and is the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain with Belsinger Signs, Inc., as one employer member of the appropriate multiemployer bargaining unit , and by refusing to sign and deliver to that company the contract regularly negotiated for said bargaining unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents , and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing, if requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc , to sign the agreement reached with the electrical sign companies of Washington, D C., and executed on about March 1, 1964, with the other employer members of the association , and refusing to bargain collectively with the Belsinger Signs, Inc., as a component member of the employer association. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find would effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) If requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc., forthwith sign the agreement reached with the electrical sign companies of Washington , D C., and executed on about March 1, 1964, with the other employer members of the association , and, upon request, bargain collectively with that company as a component member of the employer association. (b) Post at its offices and meeting halls in Washington, D C., copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 5, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representa- tives, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members of the Respondent are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 5 signed copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix," for posting at the premises of Belsinger Signs, Inc., the company willing, for 60 consecutive days, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.8 7In the event that this Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, En- forcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 8In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX To ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION No. 26 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we notify you that: WE WILL, if requested to do so by Belsinger Signs, Inc , sign and execute the agreement reached by us with the electrical sign companies of Washington, D.C., STRONG ROOFING & INSULATING CO. 9 and executed on or about March 1 , 1964, with all other employer-members of that association, and we will, upon request, bargain collectively with the afore- said company as a component member of the employer association. LOCAL UNION No. 26, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Labor Organization. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 707 North Calvert Street, Sixth Floor, Baltimore, Maryland, Telephone No. 752-8460, Extension 2100, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Joseph T. Strong d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating Co. and Roof- ers Local 36, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association. Case No. 21-CA-5978. April 19, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On January 8, 1965, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom- mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., its officers, agents, successors , and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 152 NLRB No. 2.