Robert Meyer Hotel

ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 521 that the new Joint Board will in the future render decisions which will result in settlement of these disputes acceptably to the parties. and thereby both promote industrial stability and lighten the work of this Board. This hope, however, relates to future submission of jurisdictional disputes and bears little relevance to a case which already has been fully litigated, submitted to this Board by the parties in its entirety (and not merely as to the particular job symp- tomizing the dispute) and is ripe for a decision from us which will terminate the entire dispute. My colleagues' hopes seem plainly to be misplaced in this case. Under the Act, our duty to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes is lifted only where all parties have agreed upon a voluntary method for adjustment of the dispute; e.g., bound or stipulated themselves to the jurisdiction of the Joint Board. 'Neither the Intervenor nor any of its members, including the struck employer, Don Cartage, has submitted itself to the Joint Board. Since no voluntary method for adjustment has been agreed to, this Board is required to make a determination. For the foregoing reasons, I would not approve the settlement agreement nor quash the notice of hearing. Instead, I would do what I believe'-the Act commands us to do. The hearing has been held, the record has been made, and I would proceed to determine the merits of the dispute on the basis of that record and make an award in accordance with that determination. Robert Meyer Hotel Company, Inc., d /b/a Robert Meyer-Hotel and Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Interna- ternational Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. 12-CA-3042. Au- gust 1 7, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On May 11, 1965, Trial Examiner Sidney Sherman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that those allegations be dismissed. Thereafter the Respondent and General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision with supporting briefs, and the Respond- ent filed an answering brief in opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions. 154 NLRB No. 38. 522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case.to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner with the modifications indicated below. As set forth in detail in the Trial Examiner's Decision, the facts show that the Union began organizing Respondent's employees in late August 1964.2 The organizational campaign consisted of the distribution of union cards, as well as meetings at the union hall.-' The drive was confined to Respondent's Negro employees, and during the relevant period about 135 signed union cards and some 150 attended the various organizational meetings.4 In either the third or fourth week of September, Marchant, Respondent's general man- ager, interrogated Ruth Grant, a maid who was subsequently dis- charged, concerning her knowledge of the Union. On September 26, Respondent discharged Parker, a maid who was the first of the 15 Negro employees terminated within a 5-day period. On Septem- ber 30, Ruth Grant and Edith Williams, another maid, were dis- charged. That same day, Respondent terminated all nine of the dining room busgirls then in its employ; Hoover, a room-service employee; and two kitchen porters, Durant and Jones. When Grant and Edith Williams were discharged, Supervisor Ruth Williams in- terrogated them individually concerning the union activities of them- selves and other employees, threatened Grant with discharge if she a Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's determinations with respect to issues of credibility, contending in support thereof that the Trial Examiner was biased and prejudiced . After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Trial Examiner's credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence, and, accordingly , we find no basis for disturbing his credibility findings in this case, and reject the charge of bias and prejudice. Standard Dry Wall Product8, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 3). Respondent also excepts to the Trial Examiner's order unilaterally correcting the transcript insofar as certain of these changes materially alter the meaning of testimony. As some of the Trial Examiner 's corrections are susceptible of a possible broader inter- pretation than the precise testimony in the transcript , we hereby overrule his order correcting the transcript at the places and in the manner specified in footnote 3 of his Decision. 2 Unless otherwise indicated , all dates refer to 1964. 3 The Jacksonville Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was located at the union hall where the organizational meetings were conducted. 4 In addition to its Negro employees , Respondent had some 80 to 90 white employees. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 523 did not furnish the requested information, and warned Grant that these employees would be discharged and replaced by white help before,the Respondent would recognize the Union. On October 1, the Union, by letter to Respondent, indicated that it represented a majority of the employees and demanded recogni- tion. The next day, Respondent replied that it doubted the Union's majority status and would not grant recognition without a Board election. On October 3, the bulk of Respondent's Negro employees, .and relatively few white employees, received paychecks reflecting a $$5 weekly wage increase. Enclosed in the same pay envelope was a notice, signed by Respondent's president and Marchant, captioned "DON'T SIGN ANYTHING," and stating that the Company had a "no-union policy"; that a union could not benefit Respondent or the employees; that Respondent, not the Union, pays wages; and coll- eluding with the instruction, "Don't sign union cards." Shortly after the discharges and wage increase, Marchant informed Boyd, a maid, that lie knew of the meetings, that he could fire her if he wanted to, and that before letting the Union come in "he'd fire the whole hotel" or replace the Negroes with white maids. Marchant then asked Boyd to go back and tell the others what he had said. Again, in early October, Marchant had a similar discussion with another maid, Brooks, in which he stated he had already fired some of the maids and would fire them all if necessary, but then indicated that he preferred Negro to white maids and requested Brooks to tell the others that he was not going to discharge any more of them. 1. On these facts and for the reasons fully stated by the Trial Examiner, we adopt his findings that Respondent independently violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by coercively interrogating em- ployees concerning the union activities of themselves and of other employees, by threatening reprisals against employees who joined the Union or if the organizational effort were successful, by creating the impression that union activities were under surveillance, by granting a wage increase for the purpose of discouraging union activ- ity, and by instructing employees not to sign union cards .5 2. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily dis- charging maids Parker, Edith Williams, and Grant. He further found, however, that the layoff of nine busgirls and the discharges 5 The instruction that employees not sign cards was part of a policy statement dis- tributed by Respondent to its employees . In adopting the Trial Examiner 's finding that the instruction violated 8(a)(1), we do not pass upon whether 8 ( c) protects the balance of this statement since the General Counsel neither alleged nor contended that the remaining portions of the statement are unlawful. 524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of Hoover and the two kitchen helpers, Willie Durant, Jr., and Samuel Jones, were not unlawfully motivated, and recommended dismissal of the 8(a) (3) allegations as to these individuals. The General Counsel excepts, contending that the Trial Examiner erred in failing to find that the termination of the busgirls and kitchen helpers was discriminatorily motivated. We find merit in the General Counsel's position. Like the maids, whose discharges were found by the Trial Ex- aminer to be discriminatory, the busgirls and kitchen helpers were terminated in a context of Respondent's open hostility to unionism and extensive 8(a) (1) conduct against its Negro employees and at the peak of the organizational effort., Respondent's knowledge of the effectiveness of the organization campaign among this group is demonstrated by the various references by Respondent's agents to the replacement of Negro employees with white employees, by the several instances of interrogation, and by Marchant's statements to Boyd indicating that the employee-union activities were under surveillance and that he knew of the meetings with the "preachers." The unlaw- ful wage increase, which was almost exclusively confined to Negroes, is not only corroborative of Respondent's having associated the organizational effort with that group of workers but further demon- strates Respondent's disposition to take measures leaving no doubt as to the lengths it would go to defeat their attempted organization of the hotel. The General Counsel's contention that the discharges were in fact discriminatorily motivated is substantiated further by their sus- picious timing and the absence of a plausible explanation for Re- spondent's action. Thus, Respondent contends and the Trial Ex- aminer found that the busgirls were terminated for economic reason; i.e., that their inability' to handle heavy bucket trays made them less efficient than the busboys they had previously replaced. The Trial Examiner, in sustaining this defense, concluded that Re- spondent's weekly base rate and gross pay figures for bus personnel in the periods before and after the layoff reflected substantial mone- tary savings in use of busboys. His conclusion is not supported by the record. As the General Counsel properly states, the Trial Ex- aminer's analysis' of the gross payroll figures took no account of fluctuations in volume and variant workload conditions in the dining room during the comparative periods and, hence, provides no basis for determining whether savings were in fact realized after the ter- mination of the girls. Indeed, when weekly hours worked, the most e The Trial Examiner's findings were based upon a joint exhibit showing the base rate, weekly gross earnings, and total weekly hours worked by bus personnel during representa- tive periods before and after the busgirls were laid off ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 525 revealing factor in cost computation available on this record, is con- sidered, it is apparent that the average hourly cost of dining room bus services was 7 cents per hour less in the period preceding the layoff. Moreover,,the immediate circumstances surrounding the lay- off are hardly consistent with an economically oriented decision to replace the girls whose inability to handle the large bucket trays was known to Respondent from the outset of their employment. Thus, the layoff occurred in the middle of a payroll week, without prior notice to the girls, and just 2 weeks before Respondent in- creased the base rate of bus personnel by 40 percent. We also note, in this connection, the contrast between the precipitate action which Respondent took in terminating the girls, and its delay, until the payroll week ending October 17, before hiring the first of their re- placements. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find no plausible explanation for their precipitous layoff but conclude that it was calculated to discourage their participation or interest in the union organizational activities. As for the kitchen helpers, Durant and Jones, the Trial Examiner first concluded that Durant was lawfully terminated because of his inability to correct his shortcomings as an employee. As was true of the busgirls and discriminatee Edith Williams, the asserted inade- quacy of Durant's job performance was known to Respondent for a considerable period of time prior to his discharge. The action taken against Durant, therefore, conformed with Respondent's pattern of seizing upon a longstanding dissatisfaction with an employee to justify a discharge at a time critical to success of the organizational campaign. Equally unsupported is the Trial Examiner's finding that Jones was lawfully terminated because of an unauthorized ab- sence from work. In weighing all the circumstances, including the timing of the discharge and the clear evidence of unlawful motiva- tion heretofore discussed, the conclusion is inescapable that, like the maids and the busgirls, the reasons assigned for the discharges of Jones, as well as Durant,' were pretexts to mask what in reality was part and parcel of an aggressive well-planned campaign to dissipate the Union's strength and create an atmosphere of fear among Re- spondent's Negro employees. For these reasons, and on the record as a whole, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that a preponderance of the evidence estab- lishes that Respondent's assigned reasons for terminating the nine busgirls and two kitchen helpers on September 30 were not the true 7 Member Fanning does not agree that the evidence is sufficient in this case to warrant the conclusion that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (3) in discharging Durant and Jones and therefore he would not reverse the Trial Examiner 's finding as to these two kitchen employees. 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reasons but were seized upon by Respondent to lend a color of legal- ity to its use of the mass discharge as a means of "chilling" the organizational interests of its Negro employees a Accordingly, we find, in addition to Parker, Edith Williams, and Grant, that Re- spondent violated 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging the busgirls and kitchen helpers to discourage union activities of its employees.9 THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in specific unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act, we shall adopt the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. However, in view of our finding that Respondent discriminatorily discharged and has not reinstated Willie Durant, Jr., Samuel Jones, and the busgirls dis- charged on September 30, including Easlyn Jackson, Edna John- son, and Eula Johnson, we shall also order that Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substan- tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges. It will further be ordered that the said employees be made whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reasons of the discrimination against them. In making such employees whole, Respondent shall pay to each of them a sum of money equal to that which they would have earned as wages from the date of such discrimination to the date of reinstatement or a proper offer of rein- statement, as the case may be, less their net earnings during such period. Such backpay, if any, is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 2'89, with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum calculated accord- ing to the formula set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Since the discriminatory discharges go "to the very heart of the Act" (N.L.R.P. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532 (C.A. 4) ), our Order safeguards employees from infringement, in any manner, of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its B As the record establishes that the discharges were designed to discourage union activities among the Negro employees in general , proof as to the union activity of each of the discriminatees and the Employer's knowledge thereof is not requisite to either the General Counsel's case or the unfair labor practices found herein. 9In the absence of an exception thereto, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's finding that room-service attendant Hoover was not discharged in violation of 8(a) (3) and (1). ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 527 Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and orders that Respondent Robert Meyer Hotel Company, Inc., d/b/a Robert Meyer Hotel, Jacksonville, Florida, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified : 1. Paragraphs 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) of the Recommended Order are redesignated 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e), respectively, and the following new paragraph 2 (a) is adopted : "(a) Offer Willie Durant, Jr., Samuel J. Jones, and the nine bus- girls terminated on September 30, 1964, including Easlyn Jackson, Edna Johnson, and Eula Johnson, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed by them. "Notify any of the above-named employees presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstate- ment upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces." 2. The newly designated paragraph 2(b) of the Recommended Order is amended by inserting "Willie Durant, Jr., Samuel J. Jones, and the nine busgirls terminated on September 30, 1964, including Easlyn Jackson, Edna Johnson, and Eula Johnson," following the name Edith Williams. 3. Amend the notice recommended by the Trial Examiner by : (a) Deleting the fourth indented paragraph thereof and substi- tuting the following therefor : WE WILL offer to Willie Durant, Jr., Samuel J. Jones, and the nine busgirls discharged on September 30, 1964, including Easlyn Jackson, Edna Johnson, and Eula Johnson, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equiva- lent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. (b) Adding the following as a new fifth indented paragraph : WE WILL make Ruby Parker, Rebecca Grant, Edith Williams, Willie Durant, Jr., Samuel J. Jones, and the nine busgirls dis- charged on September 30, 1964, including Easlyn Jackson, Edna Johnson, and Eula Johnson, whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. (c) Adding the following immediately below the signature line at the bottom of the notice : No7r.-We will notify any of the above-named employees serv- ing in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION The original cbarge herein was served upon Robert Meyer Hotel Company, Inc., d/b/a Robert'Meyer Hotel, herein called the Respondent, on or about October 6, 1964,1 the complaint issued on December 2, and the case was heard on February 8 and 9 and March 3, 1965, before Trial Examiner Sidney Sherman. The issues litigated were whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatory discharges, and Section 8(a) (1) by unlawful interrogation, threats of reprisal, and other coercive conduct. After the hearing a brief was filed by Respondent.2 Upon the basis of the entire record,3 and from my observation of the witnesses, I adopt the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS Robert Meyer Hotel Company, Inc., d/b/a Robert Meyer Hotel is a corpora- tion under Florida law and operates a hotel in Jacksonville; Florida, which is the one involved in the case at bar. The answer admits that during the 12 months prior to issuance of the complaint less than 75 percent of the guests of this hotel remained there for a month or more, and that during that period Respondent received gross revenues exceeding $500,000 from the operation of that hotel. It was further stipulated at the hearing that during the preceding year Respondent received goods valued in excess of $50,000 from out-of-State suppliers. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO; hereinafter called the Union, is a labor organization under the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint as amended at the hearing alleges that Respondent unlawfully interrogated employees about their union activities, indicated its awareness of such activities, threatened reprisals for such activities, directed employees to refrain therefrom, granted wage increases to discourage adherence to the Union, and dis- charged a number of employees because of their adherence to the Union. The answer denies all these allegations. A. Sequence of events The Union's campaign to organize Respondent's employees was launched late in August, and consisted of the distribution of union cards and of meetings at the union hall. A number of such meetings were held in September and October. Of Respondent's approximately 180 colored employees,4 about 135 signed union cards and about 150 attended the meetings. On September 26 and 30 Respondent discharged the 15 employees who are the subject of the instant complaint. On October 1, Respondent received a letter from the Union announcing that a ma- jority of its employees had signed union cards and requesting recognition. On October 2, Respondent replied that it doubted the Union's majority status and refused to recognize the Union without a Board election. The next day many of the employees received paychecks, which reflected a wage increase of $5 a week, 1 All events hereinafter related occurred In 19G4, unless otherwise stated. 2 There was also filed after the hearing a stipulation by the General Counsel and Re- spondent , consenting to the receipt into evidence of an exhibit attached to the stipulation. The stipulation and exhibit are hereby designated as Joint Exhibit No. 1 and received in evidence. 3 For corrections of the transcript of testimony taken herein , see pp. 278 and 279 of the transcript. 'Respondent , In addition, had 80 to 90 white employees, none of whom was, so far as the record shows, involved In the Union 's organizational campaign, ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 529 and enclosed in the same envelope with these checks was a notice signed by Mum- ford, Respondent's president, and Marchant, its general manager, which, under a caption reading "DON'T SIGN ANYTHING," advised the employees that Re- spondent had a "no-union policy," that a union could not benefit Respondent or the employees, and that Respondent, not the Union, "pays wages." The notice concluded with the admonition , "Don't sign union cards." B. Discussion 1. Respondent's "no-union policy"; the October 3 notice It is undisputed that Respondent was opposed to the organization of its employ- ees. President Mumford and General Manager Marchant so testified, and the October 3 notice to the employees contained an assertion that Respondent had a "no-union policy." While it may be that such assertion did not transcend the limits of free speech, the same cannot be said of the admonition in that letter not to sign union cards. This was not merely an expression of views, argument, or opinion such as was intended by Congress to be exempted from the strictures of the Act.5 Accordingly, I find, as alleged in the complaint, that by the foregoing admonition Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 2. The wage raise As already related, a large number of Respondent's employees received a $5 a week raise, which was first reflected in the paychcks distributed on October 3, together with the "Don't Sign" notice just described. The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that such increase was for the purpose of discouraging union activity, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. As to the genesis of the wage increase, the record contains (1) a memorandum dated September 23 from Mumford to Marchant, directing him to place a wage increase in effect on October 2 and reciting as the reasons for such increases the commendable performance of the employees during a recent hurricane, and a recent improvement in business, and (2) a memorandum dated September 28 from Marchant to various supervisors referring to the "raise that we were lucky enough to get through for your people this week." The increase covered the bulk of Respondent's colored employees and relatively few white employees. Both Marchant and Mumford insisted that they had no knowl- edge of any union activity among the employees until October 1, when Respondent received the Union's demand for recognition, and that the increase was granted for the reasons set forth in the September 23 memo. Accordingly, if one is to credit them, it would be necessary to find that management decided about Septem- ber 23, for legitimate, business reasons, to grant increases to certain categories of employees, and that such increase would first be reflected in the October 3 paychecks. In view of the documentary evidence cited above (the September 23 and 28 memos), I find that the decision to grant the raise was in fact made on or about September 23, and more than a week before Respondent received the Union's bar- gaining request. However, while precluding any inference that the increase was prompted by such request, this finding does not dispose of the question whether the increase was due to some other manifestation of union activity among the employees. As already noted, the Union began its organizational campaign among Respondent's colored employees late in August, and by mid-September had already held several meetings, attended by Respondent's colored employees. While Marchant professed ignorance of such activities, the General Counsel adduced testimony by an employee, Boyd, relative to a conversation she had with Marchant sometime after September 30, indicating that informants had been keeping him posted on all the union meetings. For reasons related below, I credit such testimony, notwith- standing Marchant's contradiction thereof, and find that he admitted to Boyd on that occasion that he had been receiving current information about all the union meetings, which would necessarily include the meetings held before the decision to grant the raise. Moreover, for reasons noted below, I credit employee Grant's 6 See Senator Taft's following statement in explanation of the provision of Section 8(c), as reported by the conferees: It should be noted that this subsection is limited to "views, arguments, or opinions" and does not cover "instructions, directions .. . . II Leg. Hist. 1541 ( published by NLRB). 206-446-66-vol. 154-35 530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony that a week or two before September 30 Marchant interrogated her about the Union. These circumstances, coupled with the timing of the raise, render suspect the denials of Mumford and Marchant that the employees' union activity entered into the decision to grant the raise. Further doubt is cast on such denials by the fact that Respondent took pains to link the raise with the distribution to the employees of the "Don't Sign" notices, which stressed the fact that Respond- ent, and not the Union, was the source of all employee benefits, and that they had nothing to gain from a union. I deem it significant, moreover, that the raise encompassed the bulk of the colored employees, who were alone actively involved in the Union's campaign. While he attempted to explain this on the ground that the employees covered by the raise had had no increase for 15 months, whereas other employees had received more recent increases, Mumford admitted that Respondent had no well-defined practice with regard to the timing of wage in- creases. It is thus clear that conformity with past practice did not require that the increase be granted on October 3 rather than some later date. To recapitulate, the alternatives here presented are to find that: (1) while Re- spondent knew of the employees' union activity on or about September 23, when it decided to grant the raise, its decision was not influenced by such knowledge, and the subsequent distribution of antiunion literature in the same envelope with the higher paychecks was purely fortuitous, or (2) Respondent's knowledge of the employees' union activities influenced its decision to raise wages, that Respondent hoped thereby to discourage such activities, and that the simultaneous distribution of the "Don't Sign" notices and the higher paychecks was not fortuitous but de- signed to reinforce the deterrent effect of the wage increase on concerted activities. As the latter alternative affords a more logical and cogent explanation for Respond- ent's conduct, and, unlike the former, does not require reliance on unlikely hap- penstances, I adopt such finding. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent granted the wage increase of October 3 for the purpose of demonstrating to the employees the truth of its simultaneous assertion that they did not need a union to improve their lot. I find further that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Interrogation and threats a. By Marchant Boyd, a maid, testified that General Manager accosted her while at work and stated: I know about the meetings you and the preachers have been having, every meeting they had. I know about it. My people tell me. . . . I can fire you if I want to... . I can fire the whole hotel. According to Boyd, Marchant then asserted that before he would "let a union come into the hotel he'd fire the whole hotel or put . white whores in it," and, after patting her on the shoulder, admonished her to be "sure and go back and tell them that." 6 Another maid, Brooks, testified that early in October 'r Marchant approached her while at work and that the following conversation ensued: He told me he was manager down there and he had a job to do and he had a family he had to take care of. He said, "Right?" And I said "Right." He said he heard who 8 all had signed a union card. He already fired some of the maids and would fires all of them if he have to. B Boyd identified the date of this incident only by reference to the fact that it occurred "after them girls got fired," which I take to denote the discharges, on September 26 and 30, of the other maids involved in this proceeding. Brooks successively identified this date as being (1) a Saturday about October 1, (2) the first Saturday in September, (3) a "week or more" after a union meeting she attended in mid-September, and (4) after the October 3 raise. It was obvious from her testimony that she was confused as to the sequence of events in September and October, but she finally professed certainty that the conversation occurred after the October 3 raise, which is consistent with her initial fixing of the date as about October 1. Moreover, her recollection of the date of the raise was likely to be more vivid and reliable that her recollection of the dates of various union meetings, or whether a par- ticular event took place in September or October, without relating it to any other event. 8 The transcript here erroneously reads "we" instead of "who " 8 The transcript here erroneously reads "fired" instead of "would fire." See p. -278 of the transcript for correction of this error. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 531 According to Brooks, Marchant concluded his remarks on a reassuring note, declaring that he preferred to employ colored maids because "he didn't want to run a whore house" with white maids, and requesting that Brooks tell the other maids that he was not going to discharge any more of them. Marchant gave the lie to the testimony of the two maids, asserting that he did not recall any conversation with any of Respondent's maids about the Union. Marchant was no longer in Respondent's employ at the time of the hearing, and his parting with Respondent does not appear to have been amicable.1° However, as the testimony of Boyd and Brooks was far from flattering to Marchant, his repudiation thereof cannot be regarded as entirely disinterested. As for Boyd and Brooks, they had signed union cards and were presumably still union adherents, which circumstances conceivably could have moved them to testify falsely in aid of the Union's cause, even though they were still in Respondent's employ and it was within its power to subject them to disciplinary action. However, I was favorably impressed by the sincerity of their demeanor as well as the apparent candor and circumstantiality of their testimony; 11 and these two young girls did not impress me as having either the imagination or the degree of sophistication required to invent the foregoing elaborate and colorful accounts of Marchant's remarks. Moreover, there are remarkable similarities between the two speeches ascribed by them to Marchant: namely, his avowal of a knowledge of employee union activity, the threat of discriminatory discharges, and the similar, disparaging reference to white maids.12 Accordingly, I credit Boyd and Brooks. I find therefore that early in October Marchant, in the context of an avowal that he knew which employees had signed cards, told Brooks that he had already dis- charged some of the maids and would discharge them all, if necessary, but subse- quently assured her there would be no more discharges. Whether this uncondi- tional assurance sufficed to neutralize the coercive effect of Marchant's preceding remarks is debatable. However, in view of the other violations found below, and, as the remedy would be the same, in any event, I do not deem it necessary to determine whether, by Marchant's foregoing disclosure of prior discriminatory dis- charges and warning of more such discharges in the future, considered in the con- text of his subsequent assurance to the contrary, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.13 I find, however, that, by Marchant's threat to Boyd to the effect that, rather than deal with a union, he would either close down the hotel or operate it with white maids instead of colored,14 Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I find further that, in the context of his threat of reprisals for union activities, Marchant's avowal to Boyd that through his informants he knew about all the meetings conducted by the "preachers" 15 was reasonably calculated to convey to Boyd the impression that he was maintaining surveillance of the union meetings, some of which she had in fact attended. I find that by thus creating or attempting to create an impression of surveillance of union meetings, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. "He manifested considerable reluctance to disclose all the circumstances surrounding his leaving of Respondent's employ. 11 They supplied details as to time of day, place, and other circumstances of the conversations. ' In view of Marchant's remarks to Brooks tending to equate white maids with ladies of easy virtue, I construe his threat to Boyd that he would put such persons into the hotel (as an alternative to closing it) as a threat to replace the colored maids with white 13 For like reason , I make no finding as to the coercive effect, in the context of a promise of no further reprisals, of Marchant's claim that he knew which employees had signed union cards. 14 See footnote 12, above. 15 While Boyd confessed that she was at a loss to understand Marchant's reference to meetings with preachers," or, as she elsewhere quoted Marchant, "colored preachers," it is apparent from the context of Marchant's remarks to her, particularly his threat of reprisals to combat the Union, that he had in mind the union meetings. (It is not clear why Marchant erroneously assumed that these meetings were conducted by clergymen. The record shows that the Union occupied the same premises as the local chapter of the, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and that, during the preceding summer, colored clergymen had taken a prominent part .in demonstrations against Respondent's then policy of segregation. (Mumford testified that during that summer 52 colored clergymen had attempted to register at the hotel.) Marchant , may have inferred from these circumstances that the NAACP and its "preachers" were sponsoring the union meetings held on the NAACP's premises.) 532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Another incident involving Marchant was alluded to by Grant, a maid, who was allegedly discharged for discriminatory reasons on September 30. She testified that 1 or 2 weeks before her discharge, Marchant asked her if she knew about the Union. Marchant denied this. I credit Grant, as I have already found Marchant not to be a trustworthy wltness.16 Accoidingly, I find that Marchant interrogated Grant, as she testified, in the latter part of September, and that's in the context of the other unfair labor practices found herein, such interrogation was unlawful. b. By Ruth Williams Grant testified that on September 30 her supervisor, Ruth Williams, asked Grant whether she had signed a union card and whether she knew who else had signed, threatened to discharge her if she did not furnish the foregoing information, and warned that all the employees would be discharged and replaced by white help before Respondent would recognize the Union. According to Grant, when she professed ignorance of any union activity, Williams discharged her. In like vein, Edith Williams, a maid, testified that on September 30 Ruth Wil- liams asked her if she had signed a union card or knew of any other employees who had done so, and that, when the witness answered both questions in the nega- tive, she was discharged. Ruth Williams denied the foregoing interrogation and threats. Respondent sought to impeach the testimony of Edith Williams by introducing in evidence a copy of a pretrial statement signed by her 5 days before the commencement of the instant hearing, in which she denied that Ruth Williams ever questioned her about union activities. Edith admitted signing the statement but repudiated it, claiming that she had signed it because she feared discharge.17 The statement was prepared by Respondent's counsel in the office of Respondent's manager and in the presence of Ruth Williams, Edith's supervisor. Such surroundings would seem to be less conducive to candor than the circumstances under which she testified, even if it be assumed, as Ruth Williams testified, that Respondent's counsel assured Edith and other employees there present that there would be no reprisals against them. In the one case, she was surrounded by representatives of management in a private office; in the other, she testified at a public hearing, with the moral sup- port of friendly counsel, and presumably informed of the protection afforded by the Act against reprisals for giving testimony in a Board proceeding. It is under- standable therefore that, if Ruth Williams had in fact interrogated her, Edith would be more reluctant so to assert in the pretrial interview than at the instant hearing. Accordingly, I do not regard the pretrial statement as requiring rejection of her testimony nor as preempting reliance on other factors in evaluating the witness' credibility. Since I was favorably impressed by Edith's demeanor, and, for reasons indicated below, find it necessary to reject Ruth Williams' testimony as to other matters, I credit Edith's version of her discharge interview.18 As for Grant, Respondent offered not only Ruth Williams' denial of any inter- rogation or threats, but also the latter's testimony that at the foregoing pretrial conference Grant was among those interviewed and, while refusing to sign any statement, orally admitted that she had not been interrogated or threatened by Ruth Williams. Grant, however, denied at the hearing that she had made any such pretrial admissions; and Owens, an employee of Respondent's counsel, who was present at the pretrial interview and who was called to testify by Respondent, was not asked, and did not testify, about any such admissions. In any case, even if it be assumed that she did, I would give them no more weight than I have 38 While , as related in more detail below, Respondent sought to impeach Grant's credibility by offering testimony that in a pretrial interview she made statements at variance with certain portions of her testimony , there is no evidence that this was true with respect to her claim of interrogation by Marchant. 17 She had by that time been rehired by Respondent. is In evaluating Edith Williams' credibility , I have taken note of an apparent self- contradiction in her testimony as to whether she notified Respondent of a change in her telephone number, when she returned to work in July 1964 after an absence of about 4 months, during which period she had moved to a new address. Her insistence that in July she gave Respondent her new telephone number might be deemed to conflict with her earlier negative answer when she was asked , in effect, whether she had changed her telephone number since she was hired . However, subsequent remarks of the witness appear to imply that she understood "hired" In the foregoing question to refer to the date of her return to work in July, rather than the date of her original hire. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 533 given to Edith Williams' pretrial statement,19 and, in view of the demonstrated unreliability of Ruth Williams as a witness (see below), I credit Grant and find that she was interrogated and threatened as testified by her. I find further, on the basis of the foregoing interrogation and threats, that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.20 4. The discharges a. The maids Respondent discharged 21 Parker, a maid, on September 26, and Grant and Edith Williams on September 30. All were rehired several months later. All had signed union cards and attended union meetings before their discharge. The General Counsel contended that they were discharged because of their involve- ment with the Union. In support of this contention, evidence was adduced, which I have credited above, that: (1) General Manager Marchant told Brooks, a maid, early in October that he knew which employees had signed union cards and that he had already discharged some of the maids; (2) Marchant told Boyd, some time after the foregoing discharges, that he was aware of the union meetings and would discharge all the employees rather than recognize the union; (3) Ruth Williams interrogated Grant immediately before her discharge and threatened to dismiss her if she did not supply information about her union activities and those of the other employees; and (4) Ruth Williams similarly interrogated Edith Williams on September 30 and announced, her discharge only after she feigned ignorance of any union activity. Moreover, all these events occurred against the background of Respondent's avowed "no-union" policy. Both Marchant and Ruth Williams denied that union activity was a factor in the foregoing discharges. As to Parker and Edith Williams, Ruth Williams assumed sole responsibility for the decision to discharge them. (1) Parker Parker had been continuously employed as a maid by Respondent since 1959 (except for two periods of maternity leave). Ruth Williams testified that, about 2 week before her termination, Parker was, at Marchant's request, relieved of her duties as Marchant's personal maid, and transferred successively to assignments in the linen room and the hotel lobby, but did not take kindly thereto, and on September 26, having determined that a reduction in staff was necessary, she selected Parker for layoff, recalling her 3 months later when she needed more maids. The thrust of Ruth Williams' testimony was, however, that if Parker had been content with the interim work to which she was assigned after she lost her regular station, she would have been retained at such work until an opening developed among the regular "floor maids"-that is, the maids who were assigned to servicing a particular floor of the hotel.22 It was further implicit in Ruth Williams' testimony that, since no such opening developed by September 26, and it became necessary to retrench, Parker became expendable. However, when pressed to explain why Parker was not assigned to fill various vacancies that developed either before or after her discharge, the witness' testimony left much to be desired. Thus, when asked why she did not assign Parker to replace Alexander, "a regular maid," who was terminated for cause on September 26, the witness was temporarily at a loss for an answer, finally asserting that, on the basis of a few days' trial assignment of Parker to one of the floors, she had determined that Parker was not dependable or competent as a floor maid. If so, it is not clear 19 Grant had also been rehired by Respondent and was in its employ at the time of the pretrial interview. In view of this finding, I deem it unnecessary to determine whether the alleged in- terrogation of Parker by Shelton , Ruth Williams' assistant, was also unlawful. 2' While the separation of Parker was in the main characterized by Ruth Williams as a layoff for lack of work , it is found below that this was not the case For this reason, and in the interest of convenience , the action with respect to Parker will be referred to throughout simply as a "discharge." 22 Thus, Ruth Williams testified that shortly before her discharge , she told Parker, "You don't like to work in areas where I put you. I can't pull a regular maid off her floor to put you in her place." And, at a later point she reiterated that had Parker not been so disgruntled she would have retained her "until something developed" in the nature of a permanent assignment. 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD why the witness earlier in the testimony indicated that she would not have laid Parker off on September 26, if she could have found a vacancy for her as a floor maid. Moreover, if Parker was as incompetent and uncooperative as Williams alleged, it is difficult to understand why she was recalled at all, or why, upon her recall, she was assigned to the linen room, which, according to Wil- liams, she had previously found so objectionable. At any rate, the coup de grace was delivered to Ruth Williams' credibility when she attempted to explain why Parker was not recalled to replace either Grant or Edith Williams on September 30, when they were both discharged. The witness asserted that she preferred to replace Grant with Hollis, notwithstanding that she had had no experience as a floor maid and had to be trained for that work, and to replace Edith Williams with Burkes who, while old and unfirm, was "more loyal" than Parker. There is no need to dwell on the relative merits of Parker, Hollis, and Burkes, since Respondent's own business records (see Joint Exhibit No. 1) show that Burkes ands Hollis were not even in Respondent's employ at any time here relevant. It is thus clear that Ruth Williams' testimony that they replaced Grant and Edith Williams had no factual basis, and that such testimony was merely an improvisation to justify the failure to recall Parker.23 Upon consideration of the evidence cited above, particularly Marchant's admis- sion to Brooks, in effect, that he knew which employees had signed union cards, that he had discharged some of the maids and would discharge all of them if necessary and his avowal to Boyd that he had the union meetings under sur- veillance,24 and the shifting, implausible, and demonstrably false reasons assigned by Ruth Williams for the layoff of Parker and the failure to use her as a replacement for Alexander, Edith Williams, or Grant, I find that Parker was laid off in reprisal for her union activity, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.25 (2) Grant With regard to Grant, the General Counsel's prima facie proof of discriminatory motivation is the same as in the case of Parker. In addition there is the testimony of Grant, which I have credited above, that her discharge was prefaced by Ruth Williams' interrogation of Grant, reinforced by a threat of discharge if she did not divulge the information sought concerning the union activity of Grant and others, and that, when Grant refused to comply with that demand, she was discharged. As Grant has been credited in this regard, it would seem to be established prima facie that her discharge was precipitated by her refusal to disclose the identity of other union adherents, if not by her own suspected or known union activity. In rebuttal, Respondent attempted to show that Grant was, in fact, discharged because of her incivility to a hotel guest. Ruth Williams testified that this incident occurred about September 21, that several days later the guest involved wrote a letter of complaint to Marchant, that on September 25 Marchant told the witness about the contents of the letter in a telephone conversation, and that on the 29th Marchant showed her the letter, itself, and ordered her to discharge Grant, which she did on the 30th. Grant was rehired on January 1. Williams admitted that Grant had been a good maid for 4 years and that she was reluctant to discharge her because, as she put it, "I have to go through 10 to 15 girls 2S In this connection, it may be noted that Respondent's records (Joint Exhibit No 1) show that at least 16 maids were hired before Ruth Williams, by her own admission, attempted (in December) to recall Parker, whom she initially professed to have laid off only because she could find no permanent assignment for her At the hearing, Ruth Williams attempted to explain this undue delay in recalling Parker by implying that the separation of Parker had some disciplinary aspect, but she soon abandoned this tact. reverting to her initial, albeit untenable, position that Parker's separation was "really because of lack of work." 24I deem the foregoing statements a sufficient basis for inferring that Respondent was aware of Parker's union activity, inasmuch as Parker, before her discharge, had not only signed a union card, but had also attended the union meetings. 25 In view of my findings above as to the discriminatory motivation for Parker's dis- charge, there appears to be no need to consider whether such motivation is further demon- strated by disputed testimony that Ruth Williams' assistant, Shelton, Interrogated Parker on September 26, or to resolve the issues of credibility and supervisory status raised by such testimony ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 535 before I can get one good maid." While Marchant testified to receiving the foregoing complaint letter, he at first asserted that it was received on the same day that he ordered Grant's discharge, but, when it was pointed out that this conflicted with Williams' chronology of the incident, he became vague about the sequence of events, admitting that he did not recall "the specific circumstances." Grant categorically denied that there was any such incident as that described by Ruth Williams. Respondent attempted to impeach her denial by adducing testimony by Ruth Williams and Owens that at the pretrial interview already alluded to Grant volunteered some reference to the incident. Grant denied this. I do not deem it necessary to resolve this conflict, since, even it be assumed that there was such an incident as was described by Ruth Williams, to find that it was the cause of Grant's discharge one would have to ignore, not only the cogent evidence of discriminatory motivation cited above, but also the ineptness of Marchant's efforts to corroborate Williams' testimony that it was that incident which led Marchant to order Grant's discharge. Accordingly, I find that Grant was discharged for discriminatory reasons, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. (3) Edith Williams Edith had been employed by Respondent as a maid for more than 4 years prior to her discharge on September 30. She was rehired early in January. Here, the General Counsel's claim of discriminatory motivation is supported by all the circumstances cited by him with respect to Grant, including Ruth Williams' almost identical interrogation of Edith, immediately before her discharge, concerning her union activity and that of other employees. According to Edith, Ruth Williams gave her no reason for her discharge, even after Edith pressed her for a reason, and she was not even allowed to finish her work shift. Ruth Williams testified that Edith was a good maid except for her tendency to wander off her assigned floor, that she had manifested this tendency during the 6 months before her discharge and had been repeatedly warned about it, and that the witness finally decided to discharge Edith after catching her off her floor twice on the same day, which date she variously fixed as September 29 or 30. While denying the alleged interrogation, Ruth Williams did not contradict Edith's testi- mony regarding the abruptness of her discharge or the refusal of Ruth Williams to explain the reason therefor 26 Accordingly, I credit such testimony. Ruth Williams' assistant, Shelton, testified that she had caught Edith off her floor "dozens and dozens" of times. Edith denied ever leaving her floor without permission. However, I do not deem it necessary to resolve the foregoing conflict between Edith, on the one hand, and Ruth Williams and Shelton, on the other, for, even if the two latter witnesses be credited, I would still find that any such longstanding failing of Edith was not the true reason for her discharge. I deem it significant that disciplinary action was withheld until a few weeks after Edith had signed a union card, and that, soon after Edith's discharge, Marchant professed to be aware of the identity of those who had signed union cards, and asserted, in that context, that he had already discharged some of the maids. The foregoing circumstances alone warrant the inference that, despite any shortcomings she may have had, Edith would not have been discharged had she not engaged in union activity.27 Accordingly, I find that by discharging Edith Williams, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 26 The pretrial statement referred to above contains an admission by Edith that Ruth Williams told her on September 30 that she was being discharged because she would not stay on her floor. Apart from the considerations cited above affecting the trustworthiness of the pretrial statement, it should be noted that the foregoing admission is proof at the most only of the reason assigned by Ruth Williams for Edith's discharge and is not necessarily inconsistent with her insistence that there was no factual basis for such assigned reason. Aforeover, even as proof that such a reason was assigned, it is negated by Ruth Williams' failure at the hearing to contradict Edith's testimony that Ruth Wil- liams ignored her request for an explanation of her discharge. W The predischarge interrogation of Edith and the fact that, although she had served Respondent for 4 years and was well regarded, she was discharged in the middle of her work shift, without assigning any reason therefor, all tend to reinforce the foregoing interference as to the discriminatory motivation for her discharge. 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD b. The busgirls On September 30, Respondent terminated all nine busgirls then in its employ 28 None has since been rehired. The General Counsel contends that all were dis- charged because of the union activity of some or all of them. Respondent insists that they were discharged solely for economic reasons. Of the nine girls, only three are identified in the complaint by name 29 and, of those three, only two, Jackson and Eula Mae Johnson, testified. While the record shows that the three busgirls named in the complaint signed union cards, the only evidence as to the union affiliation of the six unidentified girls was Jackson's testi- mony that she "understood" that some of the other busgirls signed union cards and that she saw "other girls" at a union meeting before September 30, without, however, specifying whether these were other busgirls or merely other female employees of Respondent. Respondent's defense is that up to March 1964 it had used busboys exclusively, but, because it was experiencing a high rate of turnover and absenteeism due to the unsettled racial situation in the community, decided to replace most of them with busgirls, in the hope that the latter would prove more dependable. Respond- ent's president, Mumford, testified that, initially, in addition to their other light duties, such as setting tables, the busgirls were expected to carry heavy buckets of soiled dishes into the kitchen, but that, when it developed that this was too strenuous for them, it became necessary to hire busboys to assist the girls in this task. As a result, according to Mumford, he decided that it was uneconomical to use busgirls and some time in September discussed the problem with Marchant, and authorized him to dispense with the girls and revert to the former all-male arrangement. Marchant, on the other hand, acknowledged that he had at no time expected that the busgirls would be able to carry heavy loads of dishes to the kitchen, and that he knew all along that the use of busgirls would increase Respondent's operating expense. However, he asserted that he had hoped they would become more efficient, as time went on, but, finally, in September, the local racial tensions having subsided, he decided it would be expedient to return to the more efficient and more economical practice of using only busboys, and he so recommended to Mumford, who agreed. While there is thus some discrepancy between Mumford and Marchant as to the precise circumstances that led them to abandon the use of busgirls, an exhibit prepared jointly by Respondent and the General Counsel, from Respondent's business records, and presumably reflecting their agreement (Joint Exhibit No. 1), shows that during the 9 weeks following the discharge of the busgirls Respondent effected a total saving of $864, or nearly $100 a week, and this despite a wage increase of $10 a week applicable to all busboys hired on and after October 11 30 Moreover, there are certain deficiencies in the General Counsel's proof regarding the extent to which the busgirls were involved in union activity. As already related, only three of the girls were clearly shown to have signed union cards. Of the three, only one, Jackson, attended a union meeting. As to the rest, there is only Jackson's ambiguous reference to attendance at union meetings by certain "girls," which may or may not have referred to busgirls, and her hearsay testimony as to the signing of union cards by other, unspecified busgirls. I conclude, in view of the vagueness of the exidence as to involvement of the bulk of the busgirls with the Union, and, in view of the showing in the foregoing joint exhibit of substantial savings effected by the elimination of the busgirls, that the evidence does not preponderate in favor of a finding that the busgirls were discharged for discriminatory reasons. c. Hoover Hoover worked as a room service waiter from May 1 to September 30, 1964, when he was discharged. He signed a union card about a week before his dis- ze See Joint Exhibit No. 1. The General Counsel professed to have no knowledge of the identity or whereabouts of the others ao While this computation is based on a comparison of the sum of "base rates" of all employees working during a particular week, even the use of a more precise formula, such as a comparison of gross earnings, shows substantial savings after the payroll week ending October 3. Thus, if one compares the average weekly gross earnings for the first 4 weeks of September with that for the last 4 weeks of October, there is a saving of about $70 a week. The comparison is even more favorable to Respondent if one looks only at total weekly hours. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 537 charge. He testified that on September 30 he reported for work about 2 p.m., before his scheduled starting time, and found that his timecard had been pulled, and that, when he asked his supervisor, Bumpas, why he was discharged, he was merely told to pick up his pay. Bumpas accepted responsibility for the discharge of Hoover, asserting that 1 or 2 weeks before September 30 he had reprimanded Hoover for leaving work early without permission and warned him of discharge if it happened again, and that on September 29 Hoover left work 4 hours early and did not report at all the next day, whereupon Bumpas decided to discharge him. Hoover denied that he had been warned of discharge for leaving early, and, while admitting his early departure on the 29th, insisted that it had been authorized by Darby, the room service clerk, who had authority to permit the room service waiters to leave early. However, Darby denied that she authorized Hoover's early departure on September 29, and her timecard shows that she was not even at work on that day. She also corroborated Bumpas' testimony that Hoover did not report at all on the 30th. There was no contradiction of Bumpas' testimony that during the past year he had discharged about 10 employees for erratic attendance. In view of all the foregoing circumstances, including my favorable impression of Bumpas' demeanor, I credit his testimony, and find that about 2 weeks before September 30 he warned Hoover of discharge if he left early without permission, that on September 29 Hoover did leave A hours early without permission and failed to report for work the next day, and was discharged for that reason. Accordingly, I will recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. d. The kitchen porters The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges the discriminatory discharge of two kitchen porters, Durant and Jones. Only Durant appeared at the hearing. The record shows that both he and Jones signed union cards before September 30, when they were discharged. Respondent adduced testimony by Ludemann, the supervisor of the kitchen help, that on several occasions he had reprimanded Durant for inattentiveness to his duties, that Ludemann's assistant, Lenge, was continually reporting unfavorably on Durant's work habits, and that, when Lenge expressed the opinion that there was no likelihood of improvement, Lude- mann decided to terminate Durant. While denying that he was lax in his work, and insisting that Ludemann frequently commended him, Durant admitted that Ludemann was in the habit of "raising sand" and of exhorting him to greater efforts. There thus seems to be no dispute that Ludemann had repeatedly urged Durant to put forth more effort, but only disagreement as to whether this was in the spirit of criticism or of pointing out the road to perfection. While I believe that Durant was sincere in placing the latter, more flattering, inter- pretation on Ludemann's remarks, I credit Ludemann's testimony that they were not so intended, as I was favorably impressed by his demeanor. For the same reason, and, notwithstanding the suspicious timing of Durant's discharge in rela- tion to his union activity, I also credit Ludemann's testimony that Durant's dis- charge was due solely to his apparent inability to correct his shortcomings, despite repeated reprimands. As to Jones, Ludemann testified that he was dis- charged a few days after he returned from an unauthorized absence, and because of such absence. Jones did not testify, and there was no contradiction of Lude- mann's testimony as to Jones' absenteeism. In view of this, as well as demeanor considerations, I credit Ludemann as to the reason for Jones' discharge. I will accordingly recommend dismissal of the complaint as to Durant and Jones 31 31 While normally the fact that Hoover, the 2 kitchen porters, the 9 busgirls , and 2 of the maids were all discharged on the same day (September 30) would be a suspicious circumstance, the force of this is mitigated here by the fact that among its 275-odd employees Respondent has a turnover of from 35 to 50 a month, about half of which is involuntary. Although afforded access to Respondent 's business records, the General Counsel produced no evidence that the total turnover for the month of September was greater than the normal monthly figure. In view of this, I cannot regard the simul- taneous discharge of 14 employees as so outlandish an event as to warrant the inference that all were discharged for the same reason. 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in section I, above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act by discriminating against Parker, Grant, and Edith Williams. It will accord- ingly be recommended that Respondent be required to reimburse them for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent 's discrimination against them, by paying to them a sum of money equal to the amount they would normally have earned as wages from the date of their discharge to the date of their reinstatement , less their net earnings during that period. Backpay shall be computed on the basis of calendar quarters, in accordance with the method prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to net backpay , in accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By interrogating employees about their union activities, by admonishing employees not to sign union cards , by creating an impression of surveillance of union activities , by warning of reprisals for union activities , and by granting a raise to induce employees to abandon such activities , Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , and has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. 2. By discriminating against employees because of their union activities, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in the case and the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , it is recommended that Respondent , Robert Meyer Hotel Company, Inc., d/b/a Robert Meyer Hotel , of Jacksonville , Florida, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bar- tenders International Union, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discriminating against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) Warning employees of reprisals because of their union activities , granting them a wage increase as an inducement to abandon such activities , coercively interrogating them about such activities , admonishing them not to engage therein, and creating the impression of surveillance of union activity. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join , or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act- (a) Make Ruby Parker, Rebecca Grant, and Edith Williams whole, in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner 's Decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against them. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL 539 (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (c) Post at its hotel in Jacksonville, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 32 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 12, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's rep- resentative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.33 si In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Oider of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order". as In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that- WE WILL NOT warn employees of reprisals for union activities, grant them wage increases as an inducement to abandon such activities, coercively interrogate them about such activities, admonish them not to sign union cards, or create an impression of surveillance of union activities. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion, by discriminating against employees with regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL make Ruby Parker, Rebecca Grant, and Edith Williams whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. ROBERT MEYER HOTEL COMPANY, INC., D/B/A ROBERT MEYER HOTEL, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 706, Federal Office Building, 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida, Telephone No. 228-7711, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.