Universal Textile Mills, Inc.

UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 1045 It is further recommended that, unless on or before 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision the Respondent notifies the said Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing Recommended Order, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respondent to take the action aforesaid. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No 961, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All truckdrivers employed by us at our Denver, Colorado, terminal, but excluding all other employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. GROENDYKE TRANSPORT, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provi- sions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 609 Railway Exchange Building, 17th and Champa Streets, Denver, Colorado, Telephone No. 297-3551). Universal Textile Mills, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 24-CA-1989. September 8, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On June 21, 1965, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Deci- sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. He also found that Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision With a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria]. 154 NLRB No. 93. 1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings," conclusions, and reconnmen- dations. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner , and orders that the Respondent, Universal Textile Mills, Inc., its officers , agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Exam- iner's Recommended Order. 1 As no exceptions were filed with respect to the Trial Examiner ' s findings that the Respondent has not engaged in independent unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, we adopt these findings pro forma. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION The complaint herein (issued November 6, 1964; charge filed September 28, 1964), alleges that Universal Textile Mills, Inc., herein called the Company, has violated Section 8 (a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by discharging Perfecto Merced and Jose Luis Garcia on or about September 25, 1964, and failing to reinstate them, because of their union membership or support or because it believed that they engaged in such activities; and Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by said alleged acts and by asking an employee whether he had signed a union card, asking whether an employee had union cards in his possession and requiring him to surrender them, and interrogating and forbidding employees to engage in union activities. The answer denies the allegations of violation and avers that the Com- pany had acted lawfully throughout Of the four separate defenses set forth, the first, that the complaint is insufficient, is invalid; the other three stand or fall depend- ing on whether the General Counsel sustains his allegations , the issues being suffi- ciently raised with or without these defenses. A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan at Santurce, Puerto Rico, on January 18 and 19, 1965. Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and the Company, the time to do so having been extended. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) 1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It was admitted and I find that the Company, a Puerto Rico corporation , is engaged in the manufacture of elasticized textile at its plant in Cataiio, Puerto Rico ; that dur- ing the 12 months preceding issuance of the complaint it manufactured and shipped from its plant, to customers outside of Puerto Rico, textiles valued at more than $50,000; and that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. It was admitted and I find that United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES According to Merced, about August 20, 1964, he spoke to Oyala, union organizer, about organizing the men at the Company's plant. Merced received from Oyala approximately a dozen union cards, himself got employees to sign about half of them near but outside the plant, and gave the balance of the cards to Garcia. The latter, from the end of August into September, distributed cards to six other employees, all but one of whom, Navedo , signed and returned them to him . With perhaps a single UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 1047 exception these activities were conducted at employees' homes or elsewhere outside the plant. There is no direct evidence of company knowledge or basis for application of the small plant rule. Garcia later elaborated that it took him almost a month, until the date of his discharge, to distribute his cards, explain, and urge employees to sign. I can understand the slowness of the procedure from the testimony that every attempt was made to keep knowledge of these efforts from the Company. Both Garcia and Merced had been in the Company's employ a few years. When Garcia came to work on Friday afternoon, September 25, he found that his card was not in the rack He sought to ask his foreman about it but met Wessner, the supervisor of the duffing department, with Merced, and the three now went to the office. Merced had actually worked for a few minutes when Wessner summoned him to the office, and the two were on their way there when they met Garcia. In the office were now Wessner; Duca, the general manager; Frome, supervisor of the knitting department (these three are referred to as "the Americans," and they converse with employees through an interpreter, either Mrs. Hollis, the office secre- tary, or Mrs. Cabrera, the office clerk); the two ladies, Hollis and Cabrera; and Garcia and Merced. I have not overlooked the sometimes uncertain quality of the testi- mony by Garcia and Merced. But the Company's testimony is marked by serious omissions and, to the extent that it was given, was fanciful to an extreme. According to Garcia and Merced, after Hollis told them that they had been called into the office because they were thought to be connected with a union, they went to Duca's desk. He showed them a blank union card which he charged they had brought in, told them he did not want a union and would immediately fire anyone who tried to bring a union in, and directed Hollis to make out their checks. This testimony stands despite lengthly cross-examination of both Garcia and Merced. We shall note that it was not contradicted by Duca. (Hollis translated throughout although, as appeared at the hearing, Garcia has a limited ability to speak English and understands fairly well.) Hollis made out the checks and the two employees left with them. According to Duca, while on a trip to the States in July and August made necessary by personal problems, he was informed that the work at this plant was low in both quality and quantity. He now "started a campaign" with Supervisors Frome and Wessner and "cut it down to one particular shift"; after this had been checked with the foreman, Duca was informed that Garcia and Merced were to blame. With this detailed explanation, itself surprising in the fact that only after he got to the States did Duca allegedly become aware of production shortcomings, his testimony now shifted to the foreman's reference to insubordination by and arguments with Garcia and Merced, not to the deficiences in output. Duca did later return to the matter of production He testified that when the two asked why they were being fired, he cited incidents of insubordination during the last year or year and one-half, not the poor work about which he allegedly had been told by his superiors and which he testified had prompted investigation and the action taken. Aside from the fact that I do not credit Duca's explanation for the delay in acting on either of the two alleged reasons until after the union activities had commenced, Duca was not describing the two different types of reason in the conjunctive. He spoke of one to explain the alleged need to dis- charge poor workers, while being questioned about this, he digressed for alleged justi- fication because of the insubordinate behavior of these two employees, leaving the impression that this was a rehearsed sequence which he was intent on describing. Duca further testified that, on September 24, the day before these discharges, it was brought to Wessner's attention by the foreman, and then to Duca's, that either Garcia or Merced had been insubordinate, and that the other of these two had been a few days before, that the decision to discharge had been made by Wessner on Septem- ber 24; that Duca himself had not known that Garcia or Merced were campaigning for the Union; and that Cabrera, the office clerk, had handed him a union card and said that someone had given it to her that morning or the day before, he thought it was that morning. (According to Hollis, it was she who received the card from an employee that morning and gave it to Ducal) Duca allegedly was not interested in the card as he declared that, if Cabrera did say who had given her the card, this meant nothing to him since he does not know the employees. I find that the matter was and would have been of sufficient importance to Duca for him to have the employee pointed out to him even if he did not recognize him by name. We shall see that he admittedly did ask these two about union cards and their distribution. As for the necessity to rely on a foreman's estimate and recommendation concern- ing work proficiency or lack of it, Duca explained that production and quality rec- ords are maintained by shifts, not for individual employees. If the foreman could personally provide such information, he had not been asked about it before and had not volunteered it despite his knowledge and the seriousness of it (and further despite the longstanding insubordination by these same employees). 1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Further according to Duca, the Union was not mentioned until Garcia asked whether he had discharged them because of the Union; he countered with the evasion, What made Garcia think that? Only then, as Duca testified, did he produce the card which Cabrera had given him and ask whether the two had seen one like it, whether they had any, and whether they had distributed them. Both Garcia and Merced answered all three questions in the negative, and Duca directed Hollis to hand them the checks which Wessner had previously told her to draw. In his own version of what transpired in the office, Duca at no time specifically denied that he had made the statements attributed to him by Garcia and Merced. He testified that, when Garcia asked whether he was being fired because of the Union, his own reply was, "What makes you think that" What have you got to do with unions that you think you are being fired because of the Union?" Despite the alleged month-long investigation and the discharge decision on Septem- ber 24, the day before, Hollis' version had Duca asking Wessner, after the men had asked why they were fired, whether he really did not want them; the reply that Wess- ner was tired of them; and Duca explaining in detail to Wessner, his department supervisor, who "used to come" to Duca and complain about them: "You have to work with them, it is up to you, you are the superintendent, if you do not want them you can fire them." This scarcely harmonizes with the testimony that Duca had but recently investigated and learned about these two or that it had already been decided to discharge them. Hollis herself injected the statement that Wessner had complained to Garcia and Merced previously. She also testified that Duca told the two that they had bad rec- ords and that there were many complaints concerning them, As had Duca, she declared that not until the end did Duca take the union card from his desk and ask about it. Having referred to complaints and bad records, Hollis explained that, with respect to complaints, the problem involved and the date are marked on the time- cards and company records. Patently partisan and unreliable, Hollis alone testified that Garcia and Merced had worked from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m. on September 25 and had been brought into the office at the end of their workday even though the decision to discharge them had allegedly been made the day before. It is clear that the action was taken when they appeared for work that morning. No more do I credit Duca's denial of knowledge of union activities or that his references to the Union followed immediately after rather than that they preceded the discharges. Admittedly the investigation of the poor work which Duca had not noted until it was pointed out to him on his visit to the States, and the action taken on earlier and longstanding insubordination were most belated. There is no explanation' for Duca's interest, admitted but allegedly limited, as according to his testimony only after he had discharged them did he question Garcia and Merced concerning their possession and distribution of union cards. We need not credit fully Garcia's testimony that Duca in haec verba said to Garcia and Merced that he knew that they were involved in the Union, and that he knew that Garcia had brought the union card in; and that he clearly connected his opposition to the Union with the discharges as related. But the Union and the card were clearly in Duca's mind at the time, and the failure to support the pretexts now asserted for the discharges warrants the finding that they were effected discriminatorily. With the issue of credibility squarely presented as Garcia and Merced denied that they had been reprimanded and maintained that their work had been good, it is to be noted that Rivera, their foreman, was not called to testify concerning the shortcom- ings which he allegedly noted in the quality and quantity of their production, nor concerning the now frequently claimed insubordination. Nor was Wessner called although it was he who allegedly received some of these reports from Rivera and passed them on to Duca. Neither were the production and quality records submitted which allegedly constituted the basis for this triple play of hearsay from records to Rivera to Wessner to Duca, and from which Garcia and Merced were charged with the shift's deficiencies; nor the timecards on which notations were allegedly made. We could rely on Foreman Torres' possession of a union card, infra (a week or two before the discharge), for imputation to Duca of knowledge of union activities gen- erally despite the latter's denial of such knowledge. With Duca admittedly in pos- 1 "Where, as here, it is clear that the Trial Examiner's credibility finding is based on a statement of record ('what he viewed as an inherent inconsistency in the testimony') rather than on the demeanor of witnesses, the Board deems itself equally competent to resolve questions of credibility." R & R Screen Engraving, Inc., 151 NLRB 1597. This is indeed a modest expression since the Board , when it overrules the Trial Examiner as it did in the cited case, deems itself more than equally competent. UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 1049 session of a union card at the time of the discharges, and only one card unaccounted for, that being the one given to Navedo who gave it to Torres, we can wonder about Torres' testimony that he destroyed the card. But I do find that, Garcia and Merced alone having solicited support from other employees, Duca had knowledge thereof when on September 25 he made reference to their union activity. Whether we rely on Torres' knowledge of union activities or on Duca's possession of a union card, these support the direct evidence of Duca's knowledge of Garcia's and Merced's activi- ties as indicated without contradiction when he charged them with such activities and told them that he did not want a union; and the finding of such knowledge is further buttressed by the pretexts offered to justify he discharges. At the risk of repetition it may be in order to summarize certain aspects which are inconsistent with the defense offered or, as part of the defense, remain unexplained. With respect to the allegedly poor results which were emphasized to Duca in the States rather than at the plant before he left, there is not explanation for the delay of a month in pinpointing the two allegedly poor workers. One of these, Garcia, held a more responsible job than others in his crew (there is no evidence that he was responsible for the crew's output or results) and was paid more. We have already noted the complete absence of records to support the claim of poor work by this crew, which we are told formed the basis for the selection of Merced and Garcia for discharge; and that no records of those allegedly maintained were offered to support claims and much questioning concerning insubordination and other offenses about a year prior to the discharges, the fact being that a single earlier inci- dent, several times referred to, was admitted but quite remote; and finally that the only oral testimony concerning work shortcomings was at least double hearsay. A refusal by Merced to work overtime one Sunday about a year before, for which he lost 2 days' work, certainly was not nor was it claimed to be the reason for the action now taken against him After this incident, he was never even reprimanded. I find that, with knowledge of the union activity, Duca advanced pretexts and discriminatorily dis- charged these two sponsors and leaders of the union activity. The testimony received concerning the six foremen (it is not clear whether the winding department has an additional foreman or one of lower rank), there being two on each shift, indicates so clearly that they are supervisors within the meaning of the Act as to make frivolous the denials in the answer that Jiminez and Torres occupy such status. This reflects on the sincerity of the 8(a)(3) denials and could be considered were there even a reasonable doubt in the latter respect. To cite only some of the uncontradicted facts, while two rank-and-file employees on each crew received $1.20 an hour, the others getting $1 or $1.10,2 foremen are paid $1.75; the foremen assign men to work and to assist others as the foremen see need; the foremen permit time off and excuse lateness, sometimes with a reprimand; on the 3 to 11 p.m. and 11 p m. to 7 a m shifts the foremen are "in charge of the plant," those who are admittedly supervisors not being at the plant during those shifts; although Duca may overrule them, foremen discipline by reprimands and sometimes by suspension for a week; they attend supervisors' meetings; and a foreman apparently alone interviewed a job applicant, telling him later to report for work, and also ter- minated one man's employment. Proof of such authority is not contradicted by tes- timony that an assistant foreman who substituted for a foreman during the latter's 1-week illness was not invested with like authority. Duca testified that the foremen are the ones who know and inform top management of employee abilities, and we recall that it was a foreman who by his appraisal is alleged to have effectively recom- mended the discharges. The issue of foremen's status is thus disposed of both for its reflection on the allegations of discrimination and for consideration of reviewing authority should there appear to be basis for findings of independent interference. But we would be .,as one that beateth the air" to concern ourselves unduly with the details of the alleged independent violations of Section 8 (a)( I). Suffice it to say that the third of these allegations, charged to Duca, is found as merged in the violation of Section 8(a)(3) already found. In the absence of testimony of similar violation prior to the discharge discussion, the broad order to be recommended sufficiently covers the evidence received. As for the other two instances of interference alleged, I would no more rely on the testimony offered to support them than I would on the Company's with respect to the discriminatory discharges. Employee Rosario testified that about the middle of September Foreman Jimenez approached and asked him whether he had signed 2 We also were told of an assistant foreman, who receives $1.35 This man's authority was limited during a week when he substituted for a foreman who was i11. 1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a union card ; Rosario replied in the negative, and no more was said. Reluctant to respond to questions by counsel for the Company, Rosario maintained that he had told neither Merced, Garcia, nor anyone from the Union concerning this alleged conversation . Aside from the fact that the alleged question was minimal and without any other involvement of Rosario or Jimenez, the former failed to explain credibly how this first came to the attention of the Board's representatives. He testified that he had spoken to no one about it, not even a fellow employee or a union repre- sentative, except to the General Counsel about 3 days before the hearing; later that he had told the Board's representative in October. Although, aside from this con- tradiction, I indicated my own puzzlement as to how or why he came to mention it to the latter, this was at no time explained. It was when Rosario was questioned about his statement to the field representative that he declared that he first mentioned the incident to the General Counsel, it apparently was not included in his affidavit to the former, although this was not clearly shown. I do not credit Rosario. I credit Jimenez' denial of the alleged interrogation. Navedo testified that a week or two before the discharges, Foreman Torres told him he wanted to see Navedo's union card (not as alleged that he asked whether Navedo had cards, in the plural, and required him to surrender them). Again, from Navedo's testimony, it does not reliably appear how Torres learned that Navedo had a card. I credit Torres' testimony that Navedo told him about the card and gave it to him, and I find no violation here. Whether or not all of Torres' testimony be accepted, Navedo had admittedly forgotten and differently described the incident earlier. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company set forth in section II, above, occurring in connec- tion with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, commerce, and traffic among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Company has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Company, by discharging Merced and Garcia, discrim- inated against them in respect to their hire and tenure of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I shall recommend that the Company cease and desist therefrom and from infringing in any other manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act I shall further recommend that the Company offer Merced and Garcia immediate reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and priv- ileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of pay sustained by reason of the discrimination against them, with interest at 6 percent, computation to be made in the customary manners T shall further recommend that the Board order the Company to preserve and make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the checking of the amount of backpay due. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By discrimination in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Perfecto Merced and Jose Luis Garcia, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organiza- tion, the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act 3. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The Company has not engaged in independent unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 8 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rice, Branch, 65 NLRB 827; Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440; Republic Steel Corporation v. N.L.R B, 311 U S 7; F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294, his Plumbing & Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716. UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 1051 RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, I recommend that the Company, Universal Textile Mills, Inc., Cataiin, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging any of its employ- ees or discriminating in any other manner in respect to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Perfecto Merced and Jose Luis Garcia immediate and full reinstate- ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify Merced and Garcia if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel iecords and reports, and all other as set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Post at its plant in Catafio, Puerto Rico, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 24, shall, after being duly signed by the Company's representative, be posted by the Company immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 24, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.5 It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges independent violation of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act. In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order". 5In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discriminatorily discharging any of our employees or discriminating in any other manner in respect to their hire or tenure of employment , or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor orga- nizations, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any 1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Perfecto Merced and Jose Luis Garcia immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ- ment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify any of the above-named employees presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, P.O. Box 11007, Fernandez Juncos Station, Santurce, Puerto Rico, Telephone No. 724-7171. Norfolk Tallow Co., Inc. and United Packinghouse , Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO. Case No. 5-CA-2996. Septem- ber 8,1965 DECISION AND ORDER On May 18, 1965, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint be dismissed with respect to the latter allegations. The Respondent filed exceptions to that portion of the Trial Examiner's Decision in which it was found to have vio- lated the Act and filed a brief in support thereof. No exceptions were filed by the General Counsel or Charging Party. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its power in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The 154 NLRB No. 88.