Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local No. 2797

388 DECISIONS OF- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT make any unilateral changes with respect to any health and welfare insurance or pension plan affecting employees in the aforesaid unit with- out prior consultation with the Union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL, if requested by the aforesaid Union, revert to the Teamsters' health and welfare plan and pension fund that was in effect immediately prior to August 6, 1964. WE WILL, if requested by the said Union, pay into the Teamsters' health and welfare fund and into the Teamsters' pension fund such sums as would have been contributed to said funds if such payments had not been unilaterally discon- tinued in August 1964. REUBEN R. MILLER, AND REUBEN R. MILLER AND PHILIP L. MILLER, TRUSTEES OF MORRIS MILLER, D/B/A SIOUX CITY BOTTLING WORKS, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro- visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 316 Federal Building, 110 South Fourth Street, Mineapolis, Minnesota, Telephone No. 334-2618. Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797 and Stoltze Land & Lumber Company. Case No. 19-CP-84. December 28, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On September 22, 1965, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam- iner's Decision and a supporting brief, and briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party. The Board ha,i reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclu- sions, and recommendations. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] 156 NLRB No. 47. LUMBER & SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 2797 389 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was heard before Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway at Kalispell, Montana, on May 25, 1965, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, issued on March 19, 1965, upon a charge and amended charge filed, respectively, on January 20 and Febru- ary 18, 1965, alleged in substance that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (7) (B) of the Act by picketing the Charging Party within 12 months after the date of a Board-conducted election, the result of which was certified by the Regional Director on December 17, 1964. By answer filed on April 20, 1965, the Respondent admitted the picketing up to March 19, 1965, but denied that the object of the picketing was to force or require the Charging Party to recognize or bargain with the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Charging Party.' From my observation of the witnesses and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: The Issues 1. Whether or not, after December 17, 1964, when election results were certified, Respondent's purpose in continued picketing was to force or require the Charging Party to recognize or bargain with Respondent. 2. Whether or not Respondent, after April 6, 1965, when it began handbilling, was still picketing. FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BASIS OP JURISDICTION Stoltze Land & Lumber Company, the Charging Party herein, hereinafter called the Company, is a Montana corporation engaged, near Columbia Falls, Montana, in the production of lumber and lumber products. It annually realizes from its business operations a gross income exceeding $500,000; annually purchases for importation into Montana goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000; and annually sells to cus- tomers located outside Montana goods valued in excess of $50,000. Jurisdiction is not disputed and I find that the Board has jurisdiction and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797, the Respondent herein, here- inafter called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The facts Between 1938 and 1964, the Union had been the recognized collective-bargaining representative of the production and maintenance employees of the Company. In August 1963 the contract between the Company and the Union came open for renego- tiation. Negotiations were subsequently carried on into November 1963, when an impasse was reached. On November 21, 1963, the Union served notice of its intention to strike. Operations at the plant ceased on November 22, 1963, and the Company from that time until March 1964 made no effort to operate. The Union began pick- eting on November 26, 1963,2 and admittedly thereafter picketed until April 6, 1965, with the exception of a short period, as hereinafter related. On March 19, 1964, the Company sent to each striking employee a letter which stated in substance that it was the intention of the Company to recommence operation of the plant on March 25, 1964. In this letter, striking employees were invited to return to work as of that date and were given notice that should they fail to do so by April 6,'1964, the Company would thereafter begin hiring permanent replace- 1 At the conclusion of the hearing, Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. Ruling was reserved. It is now denied for the reasons herein set forth. 2 It began on November 25, 1963, but withdrew for the day because of the death of President Kennedy. 390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ments. A number of the employees did return.3 The Company hired replacements for most of the other strikers . Picketing continued after the plant reopened. In May 1964 employees of the Company filed a petition for decertification of the Union (Case No . 19-RD-293). In the latter part of June 1964 the parties entered into a consent election agreement , setting the election for June 30, 1964 . The Union attempted at the last moment to withdraw its consent . However, the election went ahead as scheduled . On June 29, 1964, the day before the election, the Union filed a charge (Case No. 19-CA-2913 ) of refusal to bargain against the Company and, because of this, the ballots at the election were impounded , pending investigation. The Union filed a second charge on July 7, 1964 (Case No. 19-CA-2919). The Union also filed timely objections to the conduct of the election. On Septem- ber 21 , 1964, the Acting Regional Director dismissed the charges in the above- numbered cases (Cases Nos . 19-CA-2913 and 19-CA-2919 ), and the Union appealed this decision to the General Counsel , who on November 12, 1964, sustained the ruling dismissing the charges . On December 17, 1964, the Regional Director issued his report on objections to the election and his certification of the results of the election, overruling the objections and finding a unanimous vote against the Union.4 Throughout the time when the ballots of the election were impounded and until after the decision on the objection to the election, the Union continued to picket the Company with picket signs which declared that the Union was on strike . Picketing was temporarily discontinued on December 24, 1964, but with the expressed intent of resuming picketing on January 4, 1965. On January 4, 1965, when picketing was resumed, the pickets carried signs bearing, the legend: This Plant NON-UNION and Operated by STRIKE BREAKERS L&SW Local Union 2797 As previously stated, Stoltze filed charges alleging violations of Section 8(b) (7) of the Act in January and February 1965. As a result of proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Montana , an injunction was issued on March 16,, 1965, enjoining the Union from picketing Stoltze during the remainder of the 12 months succeeding the election of June 30 , 1964. Following the issuance of the injunction, picketing continued until notice was received thereof by the Union about March 19, 1965. On Monday , March 22, 1965 , the pickets continued picketing with the same signs as those used since January 4, 1965, with the exception that the word "strikebreakers" was masked over with tape. These signs were carried by the pickets until approxi- mately April 6, 1965. On the latter date, the Union discontinued carrying placards but posted members at the entrance to the Company 's premises with handbills reading as follows: To the General Public: We take this means of informing you that the F. H. Stoltze Land and Lumber Co. is no longer a Union operation and the wages and working conditions of its employees do not meet the area standards of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union. We find it necessary to so inform you because the Stoltze Company for more that 25 years bargained with Local 2797 and did meet the same wages and work- ing conditions as negotiated by the Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union with other employers throughout the Montana lumber area in particular, and the Pacific Northwest generally. In 1962, and again in 1963, the Stoltze Company began insisting upon conditions that did not meet our area standards on Health Insurance and on a Pension and Retirement program. Also, it fell 5 cents per hour below the wages of Union operations in the area and refused to increase wages up to the area standard. .31n the Regional Director's report on objections to election dated December 17, 1964, the finding was made that "approximately one-third of the employees returned to work, while the remaining two-thirds remained on strike " . * The tally showed 138 eligible voters, 79 votes cast , with 1 challenged ballot , 78 votes against the Union , and none for the Union The strikers were given an opportunity to vote but did not do so LUMBER & SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 2797 391 This lead [sic] to a strike on November 25, 1963, which the Company eventually broke. On May 15, 1964, the Company arbitrarily broke off a negotiating meeting in the presence of three (3) Federal Mediators and, there- after, refused to meet and bargain with Local 2797, which was the certified bar- gaining agent of its employees. The efforts of a "Citizens Committee" of Business and Professional Men, anxious to bring about some sort of settlement, was rudely rejected by Stoltze. The National Labor Relations Board refused to prosecute charges against Stoltze and in June, 1964, Stoltze succeeded in persuading NLRB to conduct an election in which strikebreakers, then employed by the Company, voted unani- mously "No Union", of course. Members of Local 2797 did not participate in the election. Meanwhile, the Stoltze Company eliminated most, if not all, Union conditions in its plant. Employees working behind picket lines did not receive paid holidays or paid vacations, provided by our contract. Elderly workers who had stayed with the Company behind picket lines for fear of losing an inferior pension were eventually discharged as "too old" with no pension at all. Wages remain sub- standard and have deteriorated further since the strike began. Is this an asset to the Community? Respectfully yours, LUMBER AND SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL 2797, Columbia Falls, Montana, 59937. P.S. In spite of the above agravations [sic] the National Labor Relations Board, under the Taft-Hartly Act, forbids us to picket Stoltze and we are forced to this method of informing the public of our grievances against Stoltze and its present employees. After April 6, 1965, members of the Union, some of whom were the same as the ones who had previously picketed, would park their cars off the road north of the Company's office and would then stand in front of the office, prepared to distribute leaflets to the occupants of any cars or trucks entering the premises in front of the office or on either the north or south thereof. No effort was made to stop cars passing on the public road in order to distribute leaflets to them. The Company's plant is located in a community known as Half Moon and having a population of about 60 persons. The company office is located on an oiled road about 4 miles from Columbia Falls and about 61/2 miles from Whitefish, Montana. Land on which the office and plant are situated lies to the north and west of the intersection of the aforesaid road with an east and west county road. There are access roads to the plant from both the east and west road (south of the plant) and from the north and south roads (running on the east side of the office), but anyone going to the office would normally use the north and south road. The employees normally enter by an access road leading from the north and south road. The employees normally enter by an access road leading from the north and south road to their parking lot, which lies to the southwest of the office. There is no fence between the office and the north and south road, and vehicles approaching the office may turn directly from the north and south road to the front of the office, but more usually they employ the access road running south of the office or the road entering to the north of the office. The Union's handbilling activities after April 6, 1965, took place in the area in front of the office between the access roads lying just to the north and south of the office. John Host, general manager of the Company, testified that on April 6, 1965, when the Union first began distributing handbills, he observed one of the handbills tacked on a piece of plywood which was standing in front of the car of one of the union members. He also testified that he saw handbills taped on the hood of one of the automobiles of a union man. There is no evidence that this occurred after the first day of the handbilling. During the period of the picketing in the fall of 1964, the pickets had engaged in the practice of writing down the license numbers of the vehicles entering the company r, The oiled road, which runs north and south , is on land owned by the Company. Al- though title to the right-of-way was never deeded to the county, the road has been used as a public road for more than 30 years. The main highway to Columbia Falls (Montana State Highway No. 40) lies to the south, and the paved route to Whitefish would be via Highway No. 40 to the Intersection of U.S. Highway No. 93 and thence north to White- fish However, the north and south oiled road can be and Is used by some people as the shortest route from Half Moon to Whitefish . Aside from the plant, the only buildings in Half Moon are houses , most of which are company owned. 392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD premises , and thereafter the Union posted a list in a tavern at Columbia Falls headed "Scab Workers at Stoltze Mill." Host testified that he saw license numbers being taken down by union agents as recently as the day before the hearing in May 1965. Ronald Pouzar testified that he is the Union's president and picket captain, that as picket captain he lines up the men, assigns pickets, and checks daily to see that they are present and that everything is going all right. Ori cross-examination, he testified that members of the Union were patrolling the site of the office on the day of the hearing and had been doing so regularly. On redirect examination by the Union's representative, Pouzar's attention was called to the use of the word "patrolling" and, when he was asked if that is what they were doing, he answered, "No, they are lust handbilling." But in testifying that he had never seen a handbill attached to a board or to a motor vehicle, Pouzar emphasized that he had checked "the line" every day. Pouzar found it somewhat difficult to guard against the use of such strike and picket- ing language . For example, when asked what instructions he gave the men who had been posted to distribute handbills, he answered, "All of the instructions that I give to them is when somebody comes up and stops, looking for employment or either to buy lumber, they hand them a handbill and tell them that we are still on picketing the place or-not picketing I should say-handbilling the place ...." The union men who were posted at the plant, Pouzar testified, sat in their cars and, when a car came into the grounds around the office and stopped, the union men would get out of their cars and hand the driver of the entering vehicle a handbill and talk to him.6 The people to whom handbills were offered would be either men looking for work or others having business transactions with the Company. No effort was made to distribute handbills to the drivers of vehicles passing by on the north and south road.? The north and south road apparently was not heavily traveled Host testified that, aside from employees' cars, only about 40 or 50 cars a day passed on that road and that this number would include the return trip of the same vehicles which had passed once already. Ever since April or May 1964 Pouzar has filed charges with the Union against any member "crossing the picket line against our by-laws" and those members were dropped. The latest expulsion occurred in January 1965, when a union man returned to work that month, but Pouzar testified that a member had crossed "the line" to return to work about 2 weeks before the hearing, that this was a violation of union rules, but nothing had yet been done about it. Ancil Conn, financial secretary of the Union, testified that he would not accept dues from the last man who crossed the line 2 weeks before the hearing. I conclude from all the evidence that it was the intention of the Union to drop this man because he had "crossed a picket line" in violation of the union rules. B. Conclusions 1. Object of picketing after December 17, 1964 Although the Union's witnesses testified that the Union had made no demand for bargaining since May 1964, it is undenied that the strike and picketing continued after that, that the Union, in June 1964, signed a consent election agreement, that it filed unfair labor practice charges of refusal to bargain in June and July 1964, and that it filed objections to the conduct of the election. Such evidence is consistent only with a design, after May 1964, as before, to claim representation and to bring the Company to the Union's contractual terms. The strike and picketing continued with- out change continuously until December 23, 1964, when picketing was temporarily discontinued . The object of the picketing before that date was made clear by the picket signs which proclaimed that the Union was on strike. A strike, in itself, is a device for bringing an employer to terms on some kind of demand for the settlement of differences. It carries with it implicitly a claim of right to effect such a settlement. I find no reason to doubt, therefore, that the Union had consistently pressed for recognition and bargaining throughout that time. Following the certification of the result of the June 30. 1964, election on Decem- ber 17, 1964, the Union had no longer any color of claim to represent any of the Company's employees in bargaining with the Company (even' those employees who had gone on strike and who had not been replaced. for they were clearly a minority of all the Company's employees). Because of this, the Company argues that the carrying of strike picketing signs between December 17 and 23, 1964 was, in itself, a 0 There is only hearsay testimony as to what the union representatives said to the drivers of the entering vehicles . This hearsay was to the effect that the plant was being operated by strikebreakers v Except for a short time when employees were obliged to enter by the south access road, that entrance was not picketed or handbilled. LUMBER & SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 2797 393 violation of the Act. The testimony of Robert Weller, the Union's business repre- sentative and its representative at the hearing, was that he had received the report on objections to the election on December 22 or 23 and that, after he had telephoned the Union's president of this, the president had removed the pickets the following morn- ing. Although I do not understand why the Union did not receive the report at least by Monday, December 21, there is no evidence thereof, so it may be conceded that the Respondent acted promptly enough upon receiving notice of the report on the result of the election in initially removing pickets and picket signs on December 24, 1964. If all picketing had then ceased and had not been resumed, there would be no case here. However, the evidence warrants a conclusion that the picketing was merely interrupted, presumably for a dual purpose-to give the pickets time off during the Christmas and New Year holidays and to provide time to prepare picket signs other than "on strike" signs-for when the pickets reappeared, they carried new union picket signs, previously described, which declared the plant to be nonunion and to be operated by strikebreakers. Literally, there could be no strikebreakers operating the plant unless the strike was still continuing. Legally, there could be no strike by the Union when it did not represent employees in the bargaining unit. Perhaps unreplaced employees could be said to be on strike still, but it would be they and not the Union that would be on strike, for the Union had no legal right to speak for them. Yet the signs, showing the name of the Union, gave, and I deduce that the Union intended them to give, the impression that the Union was continuing to strike. Weller testified that the State employment service telephoned the Union periodically to learn if the labor dispute had been settled, because that service could not refer workers while there was a labor dispute and, according to Weller, ". . . we found we have to keep the people informed against rumors that it [the labor dispute] is all settled." This was as of the date of the hearing. It is obvious then that the Union, by its picketing, at least until April 6, 1965, if not also thereafter, continued to put pressure on the Company to induce settlement of "the dispute," which necessarily involved a claim to representa- tion and to collective bargaining. The covering of the word "strikebreakers" on the picket signs after the date of the court's restraining order could scarcely be called a disclaimer of further interest by the Union in pressing its demands, especially since no other change was made at that time to notify the public that the Union had abandoned its efforts to bring the Company to terms. The obliteration of that one word was no more than a bare concession made necessary to make a surface showing of compliance with the restraining order. I find, therefore, that between January 4 and April 6, 1965, at least, the Union did, within 12 months after the date of a valid election,8 picket with an object of forcing the Company to recognize or bargain with it as the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(b) (7) (B) of the Act. 2. Whether the handbilling by the Union after April 6, 1965, was or was not picketing On April 6, 1965, the Union discontinued the use of picket signs and, instead, made use of handbills to publicize its position. The very tenor of the handbill, setting forth the history of the Union's dispute, discloses that the purpose of the Union-to enforce its demands-continued. Again, the Union was discontinuing the use of sticks and placards as a compulsory concession to the law, as is apparent from the postscript to the handbill. In that postscript, the Union discloses that it has not abandoned its grievances and is still pressing for a settlement. If, as the Union claims, its handbilling was merely to publicize the fact that the Company was nonunion and that its conditions of employment did not meet area standards, and if the handbilling was not an attempted continuation of the Union's strike demands, why should the Union, in January 1965, expel a member who returned to work for the Company on grounds that would be consistent only with the mainte- nance of a strike picket line? This same attitude prevailed toward a member who returned to work as late as May 1965. This is not to say that the Union is not privileged to discipline its own members, but to discipline them for crossing a picket line is an admission that there was a picket line, even in May 1965. The Union points to its expulsion of members for working behind the picket line as well as to the fact that it has not solicited membership from among the Company's current, employees as evidence that its object was not organization. But forcing or requiring employees to accept or select the Union is only one of the alternative proscriptions of Section 8(b) (7) of the Act. The Union's evidence does not negative 'The Union did not dispute the validity of the election in this case and, in view of its signing of the consent election agreement, the Union, following the Regional Director's, report on objections to the conduct of the election, is in no position to contest it any longer. 394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the fact that the Union was attempting to force its bargaining demands on the Com- pany, another proscription of Section 8(b) (7). As pointed out before, the Union is making every effort to let the all interested parties (including the employment service) Jknow that the strike has not been settled. This object is certainly one that is proscribed by Section 8(b) (7) of the Act. In addition to all other reasons for concluding that the Union is not merely pro- tecting area standards by its handbilling conduct in front of the Company's office (as the Union claims it is ) is the fact that the Union has not picketed any other nonunion plant to protect such area standards and has not circularized the public generally. Its dispute is with the Company, alone, which failed and refused to grant the Union's demands before or during a the strike. It may likewise be pointed out that hand- billing at the Company's office, exclusively, is not the best advised means of notifying the public of the fact that the Company (among others) is nonunion and is not observ- ing the Union's area standards in view of the comparatively isolated location of the Company's office and plant.lo Nor is the recording of license numbers of motor vehicles while they are parked at the Company's office, a practice still observed to be indulged in shortly before the hearing, customary in cases of mere publicity picketing. This is all the more particularly the case in view of the prior use by the Union of a list of such license numbers to identify and publish the identity of "scabs." There is nothing to indicate that the purpose of the Union in recording license numbers was any different in May 1965 from what it was in October 1964. Taking all of the aforesaid indicia of the Union's purpose along with the fact that the Union has never formally disclaimed recognitional and bargaining objectives,11 I conclude and find that the purpose of the Union has remained constant since April 6, 1965, as it did from November 1963 to gain recognitional and bargaining objectives. Although the objectives of the Union after April 6, 1965, remained the same as before, it is the Union's position that it was not, after that date, picketing Picketing, or causing to be picketed, or a threat thereof, is a vital element in a violation of Sec- tion 8 (b) (7) of the Act. The principal question remaining is, therefore, whether or not the Union's handbilling activity after April 6, 1965, was, in fact, picketing. Black's Law Dictionary defines "pickets" as "A relay of guards in front of a factory or place of business of an employer for the purpose of watching who enters or leaves it, or the establishment and maintenance of an organized espionage upon the works and upon those going to and from them." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary is found, under "Picketing": Picketing by members of a trade union or strikers, consists in posting members at all approaches to the works struck against for the purpose of reporting the workman going to or coming from the works; and to use such influence as may be in their power to prevent the workman from accepting work there." It will be noticed that neither definition mentions the use of the placard on a stick which is so familiar as an emblem of pickets. In N.L.R.B v. Local 182, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Woodward Motors), 314 F. 2d 53 (C.A. 2), the court quoted Webster's New International Dic- tionary (2d ed.) as defining the verb "picket" as meaning "to walk or stand in front of a place of employment as a picket" and the noun as "a person posted by a labor organization at an approach to the place of work ...... By none of these definitions is the patrolling or the carrying of placecards a concomitant element. The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor organization or by strikers of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from work or keeping customers away from the employer's business. In this sense, what the Union was doing after April 6, 1965, was just as much picketing as what it was doing when it carried signs. I have already concluded that the Union here was more concerned with keeping employees away from work and keeping customers from dealing with the Company than it was in advancing area standards by informing the public of the fact that the Company was nonunion , and I find that its purpose in posting its members in front of the office to confront both customers and employees or prospective employees rather than the public passing on the highway was to advance its 11/2-year-old dispute with the Company and was, therefore, picketing. This being the case, I find that the OI do not also say "after the strike" because to all intents and purposes the strike never was , factually, at an end , although legally it could not be continued. 10 See Hoisting and Portable Engineers Local Union 101, affiliated, with the Interna- tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Sherwood Construction Company, Inc.), 140 NLRB 1175; Local Union No. 542-A-B-C, International Union of Operating En- gineers, AFL-CIO (Kaminski Brothers, Inc.), 152 NLRB 553. "That many of the Company's customers ( not to mention the employment service), believe that a strike and picket line are still continuing is revealed by documentary evidence as well as by testimony. ' LUMBER & SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 2797 395 Union has at all times since January 4, 1965, picketed or caused the Company to be picketed where an object thereof was forcing or requiring the Company, an employer, to recognize and bargain with a labor organization as the representative of its employ- ees when a valid election (which the Union lost) had, within the preceding 12 months, been conducted under the Act and no charge had been filed alleging that the Com- pany had recognized or assisted any labor organization in violation of Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.12 IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Union set forth above, occurring in connection with the opera- tions of the Company, described above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY The Board has decided that, in remedying violations of Section 8(b) (7) (B), the remedial order shall require cessation of all recognitional or organizational post- election picketing for a period of 12 months, not merely from the date of the election or the date of certification of the result of the election, but from the date that the labor organization ceases its unlawful picketing, whether voluntary or involuntary.13 As of this time, the date of the cessation of picketing is not evident and will not be evident to me. However, since the Union has complete control over its operations and will be fully aware of the continuance or discontinuance of the picketing herein identified, it will be able to ascertain the period covered by this Recommended Order. I shall, accordingly, recommend an order that Respondent cease and desist from the picketing herein found to be unlawful for a period of 1 year from the date of the cessation of such picketing or from the date of written notification to the Regional Director in writing of such cessation, whichever is later, and also for 12 months from the date when any valid election under Section 9(c) of the Act has been conducted which Respondent did not win. Because the Union has disclosed a disposition to conform to its concept of the letter of law while avoiding the spirit of the law by shifting tactics, the likelihood is found to exist that the Union, if not expressly prohibited from its picketing activities for both the illegal objectives set forth in Section 8(b) (7) of the Act, might shift its objective from forcing or requiring the Company to recognize and bargain with it to forcing or requiring employees of the Company to accept or select the Union as their collective- bargaining representative. Inasmuch as both objectives are unlawful in the circum- stances of this case, I believe the case-and-desist order should be in the full language of that section of the Act and I shall so recommend. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Stoltze Land & Lumber Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Respondent herein, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing the Company from January 4, 1965, and (at least to the time of the hearing) thereafter, with an object of forcing or requiring the Company to recog- nize and bargain with Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the Company's employees, although Respondent is not currently certified as such repre- sentative, and a valid election under Section 9(c) of the Act had been held on June 30, 1964, the result of which had been certified on December 17, 1964 (within the preceding 12 months), Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (7) (B) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as 12 That no such charge had been filed was admitted by the Union' s answer. 12 Retail Store Employees' Union Local No. 692, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO ( Irvine, Inc.), 134 NLRB 686. 396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD amended, it is recommended that Respondent, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Picketing, or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket, Stoltze Land & Lumber Company, Columbia Falls, Montana, for a period of 1 year from the date of cessation of the picketing which has heretofore continued (with exception of 10 days) from December 17, 1964, to date, or for 1 year from the date upon which Respondent shall notify the Regional Director for Region 19 of the Board, in writing, that it has so ceased, whichever date is later, where an object of such picketing is to force or require Stoltze Land & Lumber Company to recognize or bargain collectively with Respondent or to force or require the employees of Stoltze Land & Lumber Company to accept or select the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative. (b) Picketing, or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket Stoitze Land & Lumber Company for any of the aforementioned objects where, within the preceding 12 months, a valid election under Section 9(c) of the Act has been conducted which Respondent did not win. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, I find, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post in conspicuous places in Respondent's business offices, meeting halls, and places where notices to its members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 19 of the Board, shall, after having been duly signed by an official representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail to the said Regional Director signed copies of the aforesaid notice to be used by Stoltze Land & Lumber Company for any lawful purpose, including posting, if willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of such notice, to be furnished the aforesaid Regional Director, shall, after having been signed by Respondent as aforesaid, be returned forthwith to said Regional Director for disposition by him. (c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15 "In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 15 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LUMBER AND SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL UNION No. 2797 AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF STOLTZE LAND & LUMBER COMPANY Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT, for a period of 1 year from the date of the cessation of picketing of Stoltze Land & Lumber Company or from the date of notification to the Board thereof, whichever is later, picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket, Stoltze Land & Lumber Company, where an object thereof is to force or require Stoltze Land & Lumber Company to recognize or bargain collectively with us or to force or require the employees of Stoltze Land & Lumber Company to accept or select us as their collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT picket, or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket Stoltze Land & Lumber Company, where an object thereof is to force or require Stoltze Land & Lumber Company to recognize or bargain collectively with us, or to force or require its employees to accept or select us as their collective-bargaining repre- INDIANA GEAR WORKS 397 sentative where a valid representation election , which we did not win, has been conducted by the National Labor Relations Board among the employees of Stoltze Land & Lumber Company within the preceding 12 months. LUMBER AND SAWMILL WORKERS LOCAL UNION No. 2797, Labor Organization. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provi- sions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 327 Logan Building, 500 Union Street, Seattle, Washington, Telephone No. 682-4553. Indiana Gear Works, a Division of the Buehler Corporation and Jerry W. Packard. Case No. 25-CA-2080. December 28, 1965 DECISION AND ORDER On August 9, 1965, Trial Examiner Phil Saunders issued his Deci- sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and finds merit in the exceptions. Accordingly, the Board adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The complaint alleges that employee Jerry W. Packard was dis- charged on November 14, 1964, for engaging in protected concerted activity. Briefly, the facts show that on or about November 9, 1964, the Respondent announced to its employees its annual wage package. This package provided for wage increases of 2 cents to 16.4 cents per hour. Subsequently, the employees of the Respondent's gear department, whose 2-cent-per-hour increase was much smaller than they had expected, expressed their displeasure during a number of meetings with 156 NLRB No. 40.