Seamprufe, Inc.

SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 699 Seamprufe, Incorporated and Missouri-Kansas-Nebraska- Oklahoma District Council , International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. 16-CA-180. January 10, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On September 1, 1965, Trial Examiner Herbert Silberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that those allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Jenkins and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. 'ihe rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings," conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, except as modified below. 1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent on June 9, 1964, unlawfully threatened employees Wanda Lightle, Gertrude Moore, and Ada Phillips with discharge if they solicited for the Union on company premises, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) ; and that Respondent discriminatorily laid off employees Vicki Antonelli, Wanda Lightle, Pauline Winningham, Lola Benson, Betty Shropshire, and Ada Phillips on June 10, 1964, in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. We also agree with the Trial Examiner's dis- missal of the Section 8(a) (3) and (1) allegations of the complaint pertaining to Respondent's failure to recall employees Wanda Lightle and Elizabeth Ann Graber following the companywide 1-week vaca- tion which ended July 10, 1964. Although the issue is not free from doubt, we are not convinced that a preponderance of the evidence 'In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's dis- missal of all the Section 8(a) (1) allegations concerning employee Phyllis Willcutt, and the Section 8(a) (1) allegation concerning a threat to employee Mary Tomlinson on September 11, 1964. 156 NLRB No. 70. 700 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD establishes that Respondent, in failing to recall the two women until they inquired into their employment status 2 weeks later, was discrim- inatorily motivated.2 2. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not threat- ened Ada Phillips on July 24, 1964, or unlawfully questioned Mary Tomlinson on September 10, 1964, in violation of Section 8(a) (1). We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions to the recommended dismissal of both allegations. Ada Phillips solicited for the Union at the plant before beginning work on June 9, 1964. As we have found above, Respondent unlaw- fully threatened her with dismissal later that day as a result of her activity, and discriminatorily laid her off the next day for 6 weeks. When she reported back to work on July 24, she was told to see Plant Manager Dobbin first. During the ensuing conversation , Dobbin mentioned the Company's intention to combat the Union's organizing campaign by lawful means, and then said that "up until that time they had not dismissed anyone, but in the future, they would lay off or terminate those people to the best interests of the Company." Dobbin also commented that he did not believe the Company had done any- thing upon which the Union could file unfair labor practice charges. The Trial Examiner refused to find that Dobbin's statements to Phillips constituted a threat of reprisal against Phillips if she con- tinued her support of the Union, because Dobbin did not discuss Phillips' union activities or directly threaten her; his remark about future company layoffs or terminations was too vague to be construed as a veiled threat; and Dobbin indicated that the Company would use only lawful methods in opposing the Union. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions. In the first place, Dobbin had no reason to hold such a conversation with Phillips unless he wished to put her, a union adherent, on notice that unpleasant consequences would attend her continued support of the Union. Moreover, the threatening nature of Dobbin's remarks was emphasized by the timing of the conversation to coincide with Phillips' return to work after a discriminatory 6-week layoff. We cannot agree with the Trial Examiner that Dobbin's assurance that the Company's opposition to the Union would be limited to lawful methods neutralized the effect of his accompanying statement that the Company's future policy might include dismissal of employees. Indeed, the juxtaposition of the two comments would, under the cir- cumstances, impress on Phillips that Respondent was opposed to the Union for what it regarded as its own best interest, and that the same 'The Trial Examiner's statement in footnote 11 that neither Lightle nor Graber ex- plained her absence from work the week preceding vacation is incorrect as to Graber. She testified that she requested the week off for "personal reasons." SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 701 interest might require even more drastic steps in the future than the layoffs she had already suffered. Accordingly, we find that Respond- ent, by implicitly threatening Phillips with discharge if she continued her activities on behalf of the Union, violated Section 8 (a) (1). Mary Tomlinson obtained several union handbills at a union meet- ing on September 9, 1964, and distributed two of them the following morning as she was walking to her work station. A few minutes later, after she had begun work, she handed one to a third employee, who glanced at it, and placed it next to Tomlinson's purse on a small table near the latter's machine. Annie Watson, Tomlinson's supervisor, approached her, picked up the handbill, and inquired where Tomlin- son had obtained it. Tomlinson told her she had gotten it at a union meeting. Watson walked away, but later that morning returned and again asked Tomlinson where the handbill had come from. Tomlin- son again told her and was then asked how many people were present at the meeting. Tomlinson said that she didn't remember. She told Watson, in response to the latter's continued queries, that a union man had given her the handbill, and that she had attended most of the union meetings. Tomlinson testified that Watson asked her several other questions about the Union, but that she could only recall one con- cerning union dues. The Trial Examiner's refusal to find a violation was based upon his finding that Tomlinson's distribution of handbills in the plant had been an advertisement of her union sentiments which virtually invited Watson's questions, and that the interrogation was not directed at the union activities of other employees or accompanied by any threats of reprisal. The Trial Examiner attached little or no significance to the fact that Watson interrogated Tomlinson twice about the same subject. Without deciding whether or not Tomlinson's conduct invited Wat- son's initial, brief inquiry, we find that it cannot explain or justify Watson's second, more extensive interrogation. Respondent's inquiries about the number of people who had attended the recent union meet- ing; Tomlinson's personal attendance record at union meetings; and the identity of the person who gave Tomlinson the handbills served no legitimate purpose but instead were calculated to elicit information about the union activities, both of Tomlinson and other employees. This incident occurred, moreover, against a background of employer hostility to the Union. In the light of these factors, we find that Respondent, by interrogating Tomlinson on September 10, 1964, engaged in conduct which would tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees and thereby violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act." 8 Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc, 155 NLRB 185. 702 DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with the following modifications : [1. Amend paragraph 1(a) to read : ["(a) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals for participating in union activities or for soliciting membership on com- pany premises during nonworking time, on behalf of Missouri- Kansas-Nebraska-Oklahoma District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization." [2. Add the following as parapraph 1(b) and reletter the present paragraphs 1(b) and (c) as 1(c) and (d) : [" (b) Interrogating its employees about activities on behalf of the aforesaid Union, or any other labor organization , in a manner con- stituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act." [3. Amend paragraph 1(d) to read : ["In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion, or to refrain from any or all such activities." [4. Amend the first indented paragraph of the notice to read : [WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge or other reprisals for participating in union activities, or for soliciting membership on company premises during nonworking hours, on behalf of Missouri-Kansas-Nebraska-Oklahoma District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. [5. Insert the following immediately after the first indented para- graph of the notice : [WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees about activities on behalf of the aforesaid Union, or any other labor organization. [6. Delete the phrase "like or related" and insert in its place the word "other" from the last indented paragraph of the notice. [The Board dismissed the complaint insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein.] SEAMPRT FE, INCORPORATED 703 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was heard before Trial Examiner Herbert Silberman in McAlester, Oklahoma, on April 20 and 21, 1965. The complaint, dated February 23, 1965, as amended at the hearing, alleges that Seamprufe, Incorporated, herein called the Respondent, has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Respondent interposed an answer to the complaint denying generally that it had committed the alleged unfair labor practices. Each of the parties has duly filed a brief with me. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following - FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a New York corporation, operates a factory in McAlester, Oklahoma, where it manufactures ladies' lingerie. Its annual sales and shipments of finished products manufactured in its McAlester plant to customers located outside the State of Oklahoma is in excess of $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The issues During the times relevant hereto the Union was engaged in an effort to organize the employees at Respondent's McAlester plant, which the Company actively opposed.' In the morning of June 9, 1964, following a union meeting the previous evening, several employees, including Ada Phillips, Wanda Lightle, and Gertrude Moore, while on company premises, solicited other employees to sign union author- ization cards. Before noon on that day Phillips, Lightle, and Moore separately were summoned to the office where they were admonished for their conduct by Plant Manager Richard E. Dobbin. General Counsel contends that remarks made by Dobbin to each of the three women violated Section 8(a)(1). The next day, June 10, Lightle and four other women who worked with her in the burn lace section were temporarily laid off. The duration of these layoffs did not exceed 2 days. General Counsel contends that these layoffs were discriminatory and were effected in reprisal for the employees' union activities. On the same day, Ada Phillips also was laid off in circumstances which General Counsel asserts was discriminatory. Phillips was not recalled to work until July 24, 1964. The com- plaint further alleges discrimination against Wanda Lightle and Elizabeth Ann Graber by reason of Respondent's failure to recall them to work during the period from July 13 to 29, 1964, after the plant had resumed operations following its annual shutdown for vacations. Finally, there are three additional averments of violations of Section 8(a) (1) which allegedly occurred on July 24 and September 10 and 17, 1964. Respondent as its defense asserts that the complained-of layoffs were not for any reason related to the employees' union activities or sympathies but were economically motivated and denies that it had engaged in the conduct relied upon by General Counsel to support the alleged independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1). I The letters of Leonard Williams, manager of industrial relations for Respondent, to the employees, dated June 5, July 28, and September 16, 1964, reflect not only Respondent's vigorous resistance to the organizational campaign then in progress but also Its affirmative hostility to the Union 704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. The alleged discriminations 1. In the burn lace section Appendix A lists the employees in the burn lace section together with their respec- tive dates of hire and the hours worked during each of the weeks between the weeks ending May 29 and August 14, 1964. On June 9, 1964, Wanda Lightle, a burn lace operator, solicited several employees in her section to sign union cards.2 That same morning Lightle was reprimanded by Plant Manager Dobbin for her conduct. In the afternoon of Wednesday, June 10, Julia Holt, supervisor of the burn lace section, informed the women that except for Spruell and Graber they were laid off and advised them that the reason for the layoff was lack of work. At the same time Holt mentioned that "she was dis- appointed in us for signing those cards." Later that afternoon Graber called Supervisor Holt to her table and told Holt that she too had signed a union card 3 Holt responded, "Well, you can't work either, then, I will just let Jewell work." Holt then left the area walking in the direction of the office. In a few minutes Holt returned and told Graber that she was to continue at work. Affected by the layoff and alleged to have been discriminated against by being deprived of employ- ment during the remainder of the week to the extent of the number of hours set forth alongside their respective names were: Antonelli, 16 hours; Lightle, 16 hours; Winningham, 41/2 hours; Benson, 41/2 hours; and Shropshire, 8 hours .4 Plant Manager Dobbin testified that he made the decision to effect a layoff in the burn lace section and that he selected the women who were to be laid off. Accord- ing to Dobbin, "The reason that they were laid off was due to the workflow or work production, at that particular time-the working requirements," and that there was no need for their services in the burn lace operation. However, while the five women listed above were laid off for periods of from 41/2 to 16 hours on Thursday and Friday of the week ending June 12, 1964, Belvin, Lusk, and Eller, who had the least seniority in the section and who were in a layoff status on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of the same week, were called back to work and worked 8 hours on both Thursday and Friday of that week. Dobbin's testimony as to why the three women were called back to work simultaneously with the layoff of other women in the section is ambiguous. He first testified that Belvin, Lusk, and Eller were trained to separate lace by hand with a scissors as well as with the hot wire while the other women in the section had not been trained in the hand operation. His further testi- mony in regard to the matter was as follows: Q. Why was it, Dick, that these three ladies were called in to work in this so-called automatic department when other girls engaged in burn lace were on layoff? A. Well, these three girls that you mentioned had been called off and on several times, during, before and prior to the time you are speaking of. It was just in the common course of calling them in to work, that they were there.i To the extent that Dobbin's testimony is susceptible to the construction that Belvin, Lusk, and Eller were recalled because there was need for their services to perform hand operations, such testimony would be incorrect because the records of the 2 Lightle testified that on June 9 she solicited Jewell Spruell, Elizabeth Ann Giaber. and Lola Benson and that she and the last two named women signed cards, but Spruell refused to sign a card This testimony is erroneous to the limited extent that Llghtle named Graber instead of Pauline Winningham. Lightle did not solicit Graber, but did ask Winningham to sign a card and Winningham signed a union authorization card when Lightle did. Graber signed such card in the parking lot before reporting for work on June 9 Also, at the request of Lightle, on June 10 Vickie Antonelli signed an authoriza- tion card. n Pauline Winningham, who overheard the conversation, testified that Graber "asked Julia [Holt] if the reason for the rest of the girls being laid off was because they signed union cards," and she signed one too. ' Although in his brief General Counsel states that Lois Anderson also was discriminated against, at the opening of the hearing General Counsel made a motion, which was granted, to amend the complaint by striking the name of Anderson as one of the discrimieatees. 5 The above-quoted testimony alone does not establish that the Company observed a share-the-work policy when there was insufficient work to provide a full week's employ- ment for all the employees in a department. No other testimony was offered at the hear- ing tending to establish that any such policy or practice was observed in the automatic (burn lace) or any other department of the plant. SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 705 Company show that the said three women on Thursday and Friday, June 11 and 12, performed only burning operations which was the same type of work that was being performed by the women who were laid off. Thus, on the one hand, Dobbin's explanation that Antonelli, Lightle, Winningham, Benson, and Shropshire were laid off during the period in question because there was insufficient work available for them in the burn lace department is contrary to the facts and, on the other hand, he offered no acceptable reason for the recall of Belvin, Lusk, and Eller, who had less seniority than the employees who were laid off. The absence of a credible explanation for the layoffs when considered in the light of Respondent's hostility to the Union, the fact that the layoffs were announced on June 10, the day after Lightle was reprimanded for having solicited employees in her section on behalf of the Union,6 the fact that all the employees who were laid off with the possible exception of Shropshire had signed union authorization cards on June 9 or 10, the fact that three employees with less seniority were recalled to do the identical work which was being performed by the laid-off employees, the fact that Supervisor Julia Holt expressed her disappointment because women in the sec- tion had signed union cards, and the fact that Holt, at first, advised Graber that she too was laid off when Graber informed Holt that Graber also had signed a union card,7 leads to the conclusion that the layoff of Antonelli, Lightle, Winningham, Benson, and Shropshire during the week ending June 12, 1964, was discriminatorily motivated. Accordingly, I find that by such conduct Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and thereby also has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. With respect to Ada Phillips Ada Phillips began her employment with the Company on September 26, 1958. She then was an experienced machine operator in the garment industry having held the position of supervisor at her previous place of employment. Respondent con- cedes that Phillips is a versatile and competent operator. Phillips was laid off from June 10 until July 24, 1964, although for 3 years prior thereto she had not been sub- ject to any layoff. General Counsel contends that such layoff was unlawfully discriminatory. Phillips signed an authorization card at the union meeting held on June 8. The next day, in the restroom before work began, Phillips asked four or five other employees to sign union cards. About 9 o'clock that morning Phillips was summoned to the plant manager's office where she was admonished for soliciting.8 The follow- ing day Phillips was laid off. Respondent contends that Phillips was laid off for economic reasons. About 1960 the Company began the manufacture of robes in its McAlester plant. In connection with this work it required the services of blind stitch operators. Phillips, because of her prior experience, was transferred to the robe department to operate a blind stitch machine and to train other employees in the same operation. In early 1964, the Company decided to move its robe department to another of its plants and progres- sively reduced the production of robes in its McAlester plant. By June 10 the Company required the services of only one blind stitch operator with occasional help from time to time of an additional operator. A few months prior thereto Phillips was moved from robe production to the production of day wear. Thus, from March 30 to May 8 she worked exclusively on day wear. However, from May 8 until June 10 Phillips worked in both the robe and day wear departments with the greater part of her worktime during this period being devoted to the blind stitch operation in the robe department. She was performing this operation on June 10 when she was laid off. On that day Shirley Dungan, whose seniority with the Company dates from April 1963, was also assigned to the blind stitch operation in the robe department. 9 Plant Manager Dobbin testified that he admonished Wanda Lightle about soliciting after he had been advised by Supervisor Julia Holt that Lightle and others were not at their machines, and that Lightle had union cards and was talking with several other employees during working time 7 Holt's impulsive reaction to Graber's announcement reflects, in spite of the subsequent countermand of Gruber's layoff, that Supervisor Holt understood that the women in the burn lace section who were suspected of having signed union cards were the ones selected for layoff. 8 Plant Manager Dobbin testified that Phillips' supervisor had reported to him that Phillips was away from her machine talking union with a group of operators. 706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Plant Manager Dobbin testified that he made the decision to lay off Ada Phillips and to retain Shirley Dungan and that his decision was not influenced by Phillips' union activities because he did not know that she was engaged in such activities. However, this testimony is inconsistent with other testimony by Dobbin that the day before the layoff he had been informed by Phillips' supervisor that Phillips had been away from her machine talking union with other employees and with the fact that on June 9 he reprimanded her for soliciting. Dobbins further testified that on June 10 he did not require Phillips' services in the robe department and because work also was low in the other sections of the plant he did not assign her elsewhere. On his cross-examination Dobbin was asked to explain why he laid off Phillips instead of Dungan .9 His answer was that Phillips then "was on loan to the robe department . . . she . . . had been assigned to the day wear department, on the premise that robes were going to be phased out, and we could use her services to much more advantage in day wear than we could in the robe department." He further explained that Dungan was producing at a satisfactory rate "so I left Dungan there in the department that she had been in all the time, and took Ada off." This explanation is both illogical and contrary to the facts . If, as Dobbin explained, the Company had transferred Phillips from robe production to day wear because the former operation was being discontinued and he wanted to retain Phillips because "I would have need for her services in daywear and sleepwear , that she had so aptly demonstrated that she could do," it is illogical that , at a time when he might not have had any need for her services in the day wear department,1° he would not con- tinue her in the robe department in preference to Shirley Dungan who not only had considerably less seniority than Phillips but presumably was going to be terminated when robe production was finally discontinued . Dobbin's explanation that Phillips was transferred out of the robe department is inconsistent with the fact that between May 8 and June 10 most of Phillips' work was done in the robe department and the testimony of Leonard Williams, Respondent 's manager of industrial relations and personnel, that as of June 10, 1964, the plant manager had not requested the permanent transfer of Ada Phillips out of the robe department. Also reflecting adversely upon the validity of Respondent's explanation for Phillips' layoff is the fact that prior to the hearing Dobbin gave an entirely different reason for having laid off Phillips instead of Dungan . During the investigation of the charges herein Dobbin furnished to a Board field examiner an affidavit in which he assigned as the reason for retaining Dungan in preference to Phillips the fact that it would have taken Phillips 3 to 5 days before she could hem (blind stitch) both the sleeves and bottoms of robes with the desired degree of facility while Dungan did not require any such breakin period. However, the evidence shows that Dungan's work was largely limited to hemming sleeves and only seldom did she hem bottoms and that she did not have as much experience or versatility as Phillips . Presumably, because the pretrial explanation given to the field examiner could not be supported by the facts it was abandoned at the hearing. Thus, the explanation offered by Respondent for Phillips' layoff on June 10 was implausible, contrary to the facts , and inconsistent with the reason given prior to the hearing. This circumstance added to the fact that Phillips was laid off the day after Plant Manager Dobbin learned of her union activities and reprimanded her for soliciting on company premises , although for 3 years prior thereto she had not been laid off at any time, and the fact that Respondent was hostile to the Union leads to the conclusion that the motivating reason for Respondent's action was e Prior thereto on many occasions when Dungan and Phillips were both performing blind stitch work, Phillips was retained and Dungan was laid off . Moreover, during the 3 years prior to June 10 , 1964, whenever there was no blind stitch work available Phillips was not laid off but was assigned to other work 10 Dobbin 's assertion that the Company on June 10 was unable to use Phillips in the day wear department lacks the ring of truth . Specifically, he testified that "we were down in production. We had very capable operators in all other [ other than the robe department ] phases of the plant . And at that particular time, we had competent opera- tors laid off, as well as Ada. We had no need of Ada's services " However, If Phillips had been transferred to the day wear department , as Dobbin testified she was, Dobbin failed to explain why Phillips was laid off before employees who had less seniority. (Respondent did not offer any evidence as to the relative seniority of the employees in the day wear department . Absent evidence to the contrary , which it may be assumed Re- spondent would have adduced had it been favorable to its cause , it is a fair inference that Phillips who had been working for Respondent since September 1958 had more seniority than some other employees in the day wear department who continued to work between June 10 and July 24, 1964.) SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 707 Phillips' union activities. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act by laying off Phillips for the period from June 10 to July 24, 1964. 3. With respect to Wanda Lightle and Elizabeth Ann Graber General Counsel contends that the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Lightle and Graber by not recalling them to work following a companywide week- long vacation which ended July 10, 1964. Approximately a week thereafter Lightle and Graber visited the plant and spoke to Personnel Manager Williams about the matter. They were recalled the next week. General Counsel's position in regard to Lightle and Graber assumes that there was a practice on the part of the Company to inform the employees individually to return to work after the vacation period. No evidence of such practice was adduced. Furthermore, Lightle testified that she inquired of Gladys Andrews, who had replaced Julia Holt as supervisor, "why I had not been called back, and she (Andrews) said, `Julia had just left orders ... just to work those who were working unless she were given specific notice from the office.' " Neither Lightle nor Graber worked during the week preceding the vacation period.11 Thus it appears that Lightle and Graber were treated no differently than any other employee who was absent from work immediately before the vacation period. Consequently, I find that the Gen- eral Counsel has failed to prove any discrimination against Lightle and Graber by reason of Respondent's alleged failure to recall them to work following the 1964 vacation week. C. The alleged interference, restraint, and coercion On June 9, 1964, the day after a union meeting, employees at the plant were solicited to sign union authorization cards. Gertrude Moore testified that before work began at 7 a.m. she asked four employees to sign such cards. She spoke to two of the employees in the Company's parking lot and to the other two on the entrance steps to the plant building. Ada Phillips testified that she engaged in similar solicitation prior to 7 a.m. while in the restroom. Lastly, Wanda Lightle testified that she asked three employees to sign authorization cards about 8 a.m., approximately an hour after work began. The same morning the three women were called separately to Plant Manager Dobbin's office. The testimony of each of the women as to what was told them, to the extent material hereto, is substan- tially the same. Each testified that she was told by Dobbin that the Company had a no-solicitation rule in effect forbidding solicitation on company premises and that any violation of the rule will be cause for immediate dismissal . Their testimony is controverted by Dobbin who testified that the respective supervisors had informed him that each of the women had been talking union or soliciting union cards during working hours and that he advised each that the Company had in effect a rule for- bidding solicitation during working time and that persons violating the rule will be dismissed. The significant question raised by the conflict between the testimony of Dobbin and that of Lightle, Phillips, and Moore is whether the latter were warned against soliciting on company premises or merely against soliciting while at work. I do not credit Dobbin's versions of his conversations with Lightle, Phillips, and Moore. I am of the opinion that Dobbin was an unreliable witness who in his anxiety to aid the Respondent's cause shaped his testimony to fit the pattern of the Company's defenses. This is plainly revealed by his testimony concerning the lay- offs, discussed above, which in many respects was demonstrably erroneous. Further- more, Phillips and Moore testified that they had solicited union cards before work began on June 9. There would have been no reason to admonish them if Dobbin intended to prohibit solicitation only during working time. Dobbin's explanation is that their respective supervisors had reported that they had been soliciting on company time. However, the supervisors were not called by Respondent to corrob- orate Dobbin's testimony which gives rise to an inference that had they been called their testimony would have been unfavorable. Accordingly, I find that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees with discharge if they engage in union solicitation on company premises. Such threats constituted an unlawful infringement upon rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act.12 11 No explanation was offered as to why Lightle and Graber did not work the week ending July 3, 1964. '- Harold Miller, et at., d/b/a Miller Charles and Company , 148 NLRB 1579, enfd. 341 F. 2d 870 (C.A. 2). 217-919-66-vol. 156-46 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A second incident complained of also involved Ada Phillips. Upon her return to work on July 24, 1964, she was directed to report to Dobbin's office. According to Phillips, Dobbin told her that a union organizational campaign was in progress and the Company was going to do everything in its power lawfully to defeat the Union. Dobbin informed her that until then the Company had not dismissed any employees but in the future it will lay off or terminate employees in the best interests of the Company. He also told her that he did not believe the Company had done anything upon which the Union could file charges. General Counsel contends that these remarks were tantamount to advising Phillips that she had lost 6 weeks' employment because of her union activities, that the Respondent thought "that they could get away with that layoff," and that continued union activity on her part would result in her loss of employment. I believe General Counsel reads too much into Phillips' testimony. Dobbin did not discuss with Phillips her union activity nor did he directly threaten her with reprisals if she continued to support the Union. While he informed her that the Company intended to defeat the Union in its current organizational drive, he likewise advised her that the Company would employ only lawful means to achieve its objective. His remark concerning layoffs or terminations in the best interests of the Company is too vague in the context of the entire conversa- tion from which to construe a veiled threat that continued union activity on Phillips' part would result in her discharge. Accordingly, I find that the described incident does not constitute a violation of the Act. The next event upon which General Counsel relies to support the complaint con- cerns Mary Tomlinson. In the morning of September 10, 1964, Mary Tomlinson distributed a union leaflet to three female employees.13 Supervisor Annie Watson came by, picked up one of the leaflets which was in plain sight at the place of Tomlinson's work, and asked Tomlinson where she had obtained it. Tomlinson replied, "At a union meeting." During the morning rest period Watson returned and she and Tomlinson had a conversation about the Union. Tomlinson testified that she didn't recall their entire conversation. According to Tomlinson, Watson again asked where she had obtained the leaflets, and Tomlinson answered at a union meeting the night before. Watson asked how many were present at that meeting and how many meetings had Tomlinson attended. There was further general con- versation about the Union including the subject of union dues. Watson indicated to Tomlinson that she was grateful to the Company for having given her a job. Con- trary to the General Counsel, I do not find that the foregoing incident constituted unlawful interrogation . By distributing union leaflets in the working areas of the plant and leaving such leaflets in sight at her work station, Tomlinson virtually was inviting discussion about the Union. Thus, no incriminatory inference may be drawn from the fact that Watson engaged her in such conversation. As Tomlinson's conduct was a public advertisement of her union sympathies, it cannot be contended that Watson was seeking to interrogate Tomlinson about her sentiments. Although Watson inquired how many had attended the union meeting she did not press the point when Tomlinson said she did not remember. Watson did not ask the names of other union supporters so that no effort was made by Watson in this conversation to interrogate Tomlinson about the union sympathies of other employees. Watson voiced no threats nor intimated that Tomlinson might be subject to any reprisals because of her union activities. In these circumstances, I find that Tomlinson was not subject to any unlawful restraint by reason of the questions asked by Watson during their conversation. About 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day Tomlinson was called to the office where she was reprimanded by Personnel Manager Williams in the presence of Plant Manager Dobbin for distributing union bulletins during working hours. According to Tomlinson, the next day Dobbin spoke to her at her place of work and told her that Williams "had it in for me," that Williams was very antiunion; that Williams had called the Company's lawyers to get their permission to discharge Tomlinson but that Dobbin had "talked him out of it," and that Williams "was going to fire, or was wanting to fire a union woman or a union organizer, to make an example of all of them." Dobbin denied Tomlinson's testimony concerning their conversation on September 11. According to Dobbin, Tomlinson asked him if she was going to be blacklisted because of the episode on the preceding day. is Tomlinson 's uncontradicted testimony is that she gave leaflets to two employees as she was walking to her work station, after having punched her timecard , and to a third employee , Pauline Allen, while she was at work. SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 709 Dobbin replied no. She then inquired about references for another job in the event she left the Company and Dobbin told her that any reference given would be based upon her record and that the Company had no such things as a blacklist. I do not credit Tomlinson 's version of her conversation with Dobbin . It is implausible and out of character for Dobbin to have made the injudicious remarks attributed to him. Although I am of the opinion that Dobbin was not a wholly truthful witness, it does not follow that all his testimony was fabricated . Tomlinson, as one of the leading supporters of the Union among Respondent 's employees, also has an interest in the outcome of this proceeding . I am of the opinion that she tended to color her testimony to give a more favorable tint to the Union's case. In the circum- stances, despite Dobbin's general lack of credibility, I am unable to credit Tomlinson's version of her conversation with him. The final incident occurred on September 17, 1964, when Personnel Manager Williams reprimanded Phyllis Willcutt for littering the restroom by passing out union literature. I find nothing in the incident from which I can spell out a violation of the Act. In his brief General Counsel contends that the incident constitutes an example of unlawful interrogation because Williams baited Willcutt concerning the number of union supporters at Respondent 's plant. General Counsel argues that: Williams was not confronted with a recognitional demand which might have made such information pertinent ; however, he was in the midst of an anti-union campaign and could use this knowledge to further his own ends . Most certainly, under the circumstances Mrs. Willcutt was not reassured against reprisals. It is most obvious that the interrogation here, as with Mary Tomlinson , was one of Respondent's prime sources of information about the progress and activities of the organizational campaign.... The principal difficulty with this argument is that it is not supported by the record facts. In response to Williams' admonishment for littering Willcutt argued that she was being spoken to "because I am working for the Union " Their conversation, according to Willcutt's description, was acrimonious During the conversation, according to Willcutt , among other things that Williams said was that he did not believe the rumor that the Union had signed one-third of the people at the plant. This statement was made in reply to Willcutt's retgit that if all the union adherents at the plant were to resign not many employees would be left . There also was discussion as to why the Union had not filed a representation petition . However, this subject as well as the question concerning the proportion of employees who had signed union designations came into the conversation only as part of an exchange of arguments . I do not find from these circumstances that Williams was seeking to pry from Willcutt information about the Union or the Union 's strength among the employees. Accordingly, I find that General Counsel has not proved that Respond- ent had engaged in unlawful interrogation of employees IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act . For reasons which are stated in Consolidated Industries, Inc., 108 NLRB 60, 61, and cases there cited, I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order. I have found that Respondent unlawfully laid off Vicki Antonelli, Wanda Lightle, Pauline Winningham, Lola Benson , Betty Shropshire , and Ada Phillips on June 10, 1964, for periods of time varying from 41/2 hours to approximately 6 weeks. Accord- ingly, in order to remedy the discrimination against said employees , I shall recom- mend that Respondent pay to each of them a sum of money equal to that which she normally would have earned from June 10, 1964, to the date that she was recalled to work, less her net earnings during such period. The backpay provided herein shall be computed in accordance with the method prescribed in F. W . Woolworth 111 10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Company, 90 NLRB 289. Interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to such net backpay and shall be computed in the manner set forth in Isis, Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in, this case, I make the following• CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of Vicki Antonelli, Wanda Lightle, Pauline Winningham, Lola Benson, Betty Shropshire, and Ada Phillips to discourage membership in the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices by reason of conduct alleged in the complaint to have been in violation of the Act, except insofar as such conduct has been found hereinabove to have violated Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby recommend that Respondent, Seamprufe, Incorporated, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals should they solicit membership on behalf of Missouri-Kansas-Nebraska-Oklahoma District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor orga- nization, on company premises during nonworking time. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization , to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2 Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make whole Vicki Antonelli, Wanda Lightle, Pauline Winningham, Lola Benson, Betty Shropshire, and Ada Phillips in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of earnings they may have suf- fered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against them. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant to a determina- tion of the amounts of backpay due to said employees. (c) Post at its place of business in McAlester, Oklahoma, the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 14 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, shall , after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. is In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board 's order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." SEAMPRUFE, INCORPORATED 711 (d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15 zs In the event that this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read, "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX A Date of hire 5/29 6/5 6/12 6/19 6/26 7/3 7/10 7/17 7/24 7/31 8/7 8/14 Antonelli__ ___-_ 8/30/62 32 40 20 32 24 (1) ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ Lightle___ ___-__ 10/2/62 40 40 24 32 37 ______ ______ ______ ______ 32 40 37;5 Graber--------- 8/6/62 32 40 40 40 38 ------ ------ ------ ------ 32 40 37^6 9/17/62 Winningham --- 6/27/63 38 40 3535 39 38 14 ------ 40 36 - ----- ------ Anderson ______ 10/24/63 38 40 37 40 40 40 ------ 16 ------ 16 40 14 Benson--------- 6/24/63 38 39 35;5 39 38 14 ------ 40 40 40 40 331 Spruell _________ 8/6/63 40 40 40 40 38 14 ------ 40 36' 40 40 1 McAdoo ------- 9/11/63 40 24 16 40 40 40 ------ ___ 32 24 36344 14 Shropshire----- 2/17/64 40 40 32 40 40 40 ------ 40 32 24 ------ 14 Belvm_________ 2/18/0;4 40 24 16 40 40 40 ------ 40 32 16 8 14 Sue Lusk ______ 5/14/64 40 16 16 40 28 16 ------ 40 32 24 8 14 Eller ----- _-_- 5/ 18/64 40 16 16 40 40 40 ______ 40 32 24 8 321 Hamilton -__-__ 7/23/64 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 16 40 40 24 I Resigned 6/28 APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge or other reprisals should they solicit membership on behalf of Missouri-Kansas-Nebraska-Oklahoma Dis- trict Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, on company premises during nonworking time. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or assistance to said Union, or any other labor organization , by laying off or in any other manner discriminating against our employees in regard to their hire , tenure of employment, or any term or condition of their employment. WE WILL make whole Vicki Antonelli, Wanda Lightle, Pauline Winningham, Lola Benson , Betty Shropshire, and Ada Phillips for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of our discrimination against them. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist the above -named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities. SEAMPRUFE , INCORPORATED, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Sixth Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas, Telephone No. Edison 5-4211 , Extension 2131.