Campbell Soup Co.

74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in the manner described in the Trial Examiner's Decision. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their union activities, affiliation, or sentiments in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, engage in surveillance of their union or concerted activities, threaten them with discharge or other reprisal because of such activities, or in any other, manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self- organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent permitted by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refiain from becoming or remaining, members of United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. CORNWELL COMPANY, INC. Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon appli- cation in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by an other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone 633-8921. Campbell Soup Company and United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-2354. June 10, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On January 25, 1966, Trial Examiner Herman Tocker issued his Decision in the aabove-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in <and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam- iner's Decision. He further found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with supporting briefs., Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fannilig, Brown, and Jenkins]. 1 The Respondent also filed with the Board a motion to strike the General ' Counsel's exceptions and brief. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed an opposition to the Re- spondent's motion to strike The Respondent's motion to strike ie denied as,'the General Counsel's exceptions and brief were filed in accordance with the Board's Rules and Regula- tions and Statements of Procedure, Series 8, as amended, revised January 1, 1965. 159 NLRB No. 18. CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 75 The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision 'and the entire record in this case, including the exceptions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was heard before Trial Examiner Herman Tocker in Paris, Texas, on September 15, 16, 17, 20 , and 21, 1965 , upon the second amended complaint of the General Counsel and the answer of the Respondent . In general it was alleged that the Respondent had violated Sections 8(a)(l) and ( 3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, in that (a) through its supervisors and agents it wrongfully interrogated and threatened certain employees in a manner which interfered with, restrained, or coerced them in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act ; (b) it wrongfully "laid off" or suspended one employee , Billy Joe Bowman, because he had engaged in union or concerted activity or had joined or assisted United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers , AFL-CIO ( the Union ) in its effort to organize Respondent's employees ; and (c) it had promulgated, maintained , and enforced improper rules governing the distribution of union literature , union solicitation , and the wearing of union identification . The Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations but neither admitted nor denied that the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and it denied all other allegations which might support the issuance of a remedial order. The Issues Although a formal issue was created by reason of the nature of the pleading with respect to the Union, not only would I have taken official notice of the fact that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act , but the Respondent, in connection with various offers of proof , established satisfactorily that it is such a labor organization . The issues remaining then are: (a) Was Billy Joe Bowman wrongfully suspended ? ( b) Did the Respondent's supervisors and agents wrongfully interrogate and threaten employees ? (c) Had the Respond- ent promulgated rules which unlawfully restricted union solicitation , distribution of union literature , and wearing of union identification? Respondent contends that Billy Joe Bowman was suspended properly because of insubordination . If Bowman was guilty of insubordination and that insubordi- nation was not seized upon as a pretext for imposing the sanction in retribution for union activity, this aspect of the complaint should be dismissed. Respondent offered little or no evidence to refute the evidence of interrogation and threats . It relied almost entirely on evidence calculated to establish that it had no union animus and did not authorize the alleged conduct . It sought, in addition, to present evidence to demonstrate that numerous employees (not those who testified in support of the complaint) neither were interrogated nor threatened. Its offers of proof encompassed proposed testimony both by employees and by supervisors other than those identified in the General Counsel 's case. After careful ieconsideration of all my rulings with respect to such offers, I adhere to them. The fact that other employees were not subjected to unlawful action or that other supervisors did not engage in unlawful conduct is irrelevant and immaterial and of no probative value on the issues of interrogation and threats by supervisors not called. Numerous contentions on the part of the Respondent as to denials of due process are not for me to decide . They, more properly, are to be addressed to reviewing authorities . Respondent has preserved carefully all of its positions in this respect. I . , As to the rules, governing solicitation , distribution of union materials, and the wearing or display of union materials or'identification , Respondent's position is that 76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD it did not interfere with any- union solicitation or distribution of union materials or wearing of union materials provided that such conduct did not result in the viola- tion of valid rules necessary and pioper for the maintenance of its strict standards of sanitation and the integrity of its products. In the resolution of all issues with respect to which credibility or oral testimony became a factor I have considered the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, their candor or lack of it, their objectively , bias, or prejudice, their understanding of the matters concerning which they testified, whether their testimony has been contra- dicted or sufficiently impeached , whether parts of testimony should be accepted when other parts are rejected, consistency , plausibility , and probability , and the effect which leading questions might have had on the answers elicited thereby. I have given careful consideration also to the numerous and excellent oral pres- entations on the part of the Respondent during the course of the hearing and to the posthearing briefs submitted by counsel for the General Counsel and by the Respondent. Now on the basis of the entire record, I hereby make the following: 1. FINDINGS OF FACT A. The business of Respondent and jurisdiction Campbell Soup Company is now and at all times material herein has been a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of New Jersey. It is en- gaged in the manufacture of various packaged and canned foods in numerous States of the United States. To the extent that this proceeding is concerned, it is engaged in the preparation and canning of various foods in a plant located at Paris, Texas. The Respondent, having , admitted the volume and interstate nature of its busi- ness, as alleged in the complaint , and also that it is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, I so find. B. Tice labor organization inrolved United Packinghouse , Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, heretofore referred to as the Union , is now, and at all material times has been , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. C. The suspension of Billy Joe Bowman I am convinced that Billy Joe Bowman was suspended properly for insubordi- nation, that his ultimate suspension of 5 days was reasonable and proper under all the circumstances, and that the Respondent did not violate the Act by so suspend- ing him. I do not regard, as material , the fact that, as the days of the calendar developed and because of Respondent's rule that a person had to be working on the day before a holiday in order to receive holiday pay, Bowman's suspension lasted until Memorial Day in 1965 and, as a consequence , he lost holiday pay. Whether or not he properly was denied holiday pay for that day is a matter involy- ing- interpretation of Respondent's employment 'rules. I am of the opinion that this is not to be considered by me in this proceeding. I believe, further, that Bowman deliberately provoked the situations that resulted in his suspension and that it was his intention that he be discharged in the hope that sufficient emotional appeal would be engendered thereby to increase the number of "yes" votes in the union election about to be held. (After his suspen- sion a rumor was circulated around the plant to the effect that he had been dis- charged for union activities . The Company was moved to squelch this rumor by informing its personnel that the sanction had been a suspension and that the sus- pension had been imposed for insubordination.) After petition duly filed, a National Labor Relations Board election was sched- uled for Friday, May 21, 1965, to determine whether the Union should be the collective-bargaining agent for Respondent's employees in'the Paris plant. Bow- man's union sympathy and activity were well known to the Respondent. . By a letter dated May 15, 1965, to the Company 's Paris plant manager, he and five other employees had been designated as union officials for the election . The letter requested that he be excused from 12 o'clock noon on Thursday, the 20th and all day Friday the 21st in connection with the election procedure. The- Company had extremely exacting standards and all sorts of mechanical and scientific devices to "assure the integrity and sanitation of its products : It had,` as CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 77 well, numerous rules with this end in view. One such rule provided for a warn- ing notice for "Unauthorized wearing of any objects, jewelry, or clothing that may find its way into the product." Another rule provided for a warning or suspen- sion or dismissal because of insubordination. The desirability of strict rules and the Company's desire for perfection hardly merit citation in this Decision. Discus- sion or evaluation thereof is clearly unnecessary. The factual recital following is Bowman's own version of the events leading up to the, 5-day suspension. He had been ill on May 19, 1965. Because of this, when he reported to work on May 20 he obtained his timecard from the nurse's office and then presented it to his supervisor, Clay Pinson, to be checked in. He was wearing a paper cap resembling what has come to be known as an "overseas cap." On it were printed the large letters UPWA, the letters AFL-CIO below the UPWA, and below both the familiar union printing label. He was wearing also a union button approximately the same size as the Company's employee identification button but different from it in that, instead of having a jeweler's safety clasp for the pin, it had a mere loop on its back frame under which the pin could be slipped. Pinson checked him in and said nothing about his wearing the union badge and the union cap. (This suggests immediately that Pinson had not objected to the propaganda presented thereby.) A little while later Pinson came over and told Bowman he would "have to take the union cap off ... ' Bowman refused to take it of?. Pinson took him to an assistant supervisor, Quaid, who said there were "Company regulations that (he) could not wear the union cap in that building." Quaid asked him to take it off and Bowman refused again. They went to the personnel office. Respondent's per- sonnel manager, Cameron, said "(I)t was against the rules and regulations of the Company to wear other than issued uniforms." Finally, at this point, Bowman took the cap off. I assume that Bowman's statement that Pinson and Quaid had described the cap as a "union cap" are relied on by the General Counsel for the purpose of demonstrating that the objection to the cap was not because of its being a proper cap but because it carried union propaganda. Assuming that Pinson and Quaid did use the words, "union cap," these are open equally to the interpretation that they were referring to the cap and used the word "union" merely as an adjective or descriptive term. After weighing the probabilities and considering the evidence in the record which demonstrated that the Company did permit the wearing of union insignia and that Pinson had not objected to the wearing of the cap and button when Bowman checked in in the morning, I find expressly that the order to remove the cap was not because of the union-propaganda on it but because it was a loose paper cap different from the close fitting cloth cap furnished by the Company, was in violation of the wearing apparel rule of the Company, and no authorization for wearing it has been obtained. The rule,, quoted above, was valid and reasonable considering the nature of Respon'dent's business all so clearly and' meticulously brought out in the testimony of Respondent's vice president of Technical Administration. For the purpose of showing a discriminatory application of the rule, the General Counsel points to the fact that visitors and office employees were permitted, on occasion, to travel through the plant wearing paper caps somewhat similar to that worn- by Bowman. I find however, that the caps differ materially in that the company paper cap, sometimes worn by visitors and some office- employees, is of an entirely different construction from that worn by Bowman. The nature of its inside construction makes it less slippery and more tight fitting than Bowman's union cap. More- over, the wearing of the Company hat by visitors and employees is under con- trolled conditions as opposed to the fact that an employee like Bowman could roam, about the plant almost at will. Thus, if it became a common practice, there would be a clear risk that such caps might fall into the food products at some stage of preparation or canning. The unrestrained wearing of the cap by Bowman could have started a mass wearing of such caps throughout the plant. This would have impaired seriously the uniform application and enforcement of Respondent's rule governing wearing apparel. If Bowman's objective was to test the validity of the rule, that could have been satisfied fully by his prompt obedience to the instruction to remove it. He was not satisfied with this but deliberately refused to remove it and was insubordinate by engaging in that conduct. The next incident was about an hour or an hour and a half later when Respond- ent's production superintendent, Shaw, asked Bowman to "let him see one of the union badges, (Bowman) pulled one of them off and showed it-to him." (The 78 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR -RELATIONS BOARD union badge superficially resembled the company badge.) Shaw said, "(It-) was against the rules and regulations-to wear unauthorized badges in the plant." Bow- man said, "Why, because it doesn't have a safety lock approved by the Company on -it?" (By this Bowman himself proved his awareness of the improper nature of the badge he was wearing.) Shaw said, "That's right." Then Bowman pulled one badge off (it seemed he had been wearing two) and asked Shaw if he wanted him to take the other off-as well. Obviously this was impudence and insubordination. It prompted Shaw to ask him if he was 'trying to be cute. Then Bowman- took the other off and put both in his pocket. A -loop projecting from the back rim of the union badge was placed there for the purpose of holding the pin after attachment to ones clothing. It offered little or no resistance to a dislodging of the pin in which event the badge easily could have fallen off the clothing and into some food. On the other hand, the Com- pany's badge, with a jeweler's clasp or safety lock, could not be dislodged because the safety lock first had to be twisted manually to release the pin. Although I sustained an objection to' a proposed demonstration of- the operation of the clasps on the ground that the badges were in evidence I, at the same time, casually exerted some slight sideward pressure on the face of the union badge and showed how easily it could be dislodged. Moreover, it was brought out conclusively in the evidence that the Company actually did permit and authorize the wearing of a union badge just like the one Bowman wore with the exception, however, that it had been rebuilt with a jeweler's clasp or safety lock on it. Bowman had no right to wear the badge in the form in which it was constructed. The Company, in requiring that he remove it, was not unreasonable nor was it enforcing, in a discriminatory manner, its unauthorized wearing-of-objects rule. The next incident involved a handwritten "sign" on a piece of paper (4 by 5t/z inches in size ) on which Bowman had written, "Vote Yes for UPWA." He had pinned this to his belt by piercing the Company's employee badge through its upper portion. The very smallness of the paper and the place where Bowman wore it mitigated against its effectiveness as union propaganda unless the novelty night have attracted attention giving it some such value. On the other hand, it was a loosely waving, flag sort of thing attached to Bowman's waist only by the pin portion of the Company's employee badge. It easily could have been torn off by brushing against something or even by the fans installed on the premises and then be wafted into some food or can. Probably within minutes after Bowman had attached this "flag" to his person by using the Company's employee button to pierce it through his belt loop, his super- visor, Pinson, came to him and asked him to remove it saying he "was not per- mitted to wear any handwritten sign in the building." Bowman refused to "pull it off." Pinson took him to Quaid and the following transpired : Quaid said, "Bill, what are you going to do next?" Bowman said, "I don't know." Quaid told him "that (he) could not wear it, that it might tear off and get into the soup." After an exchange of conversation about the wearing of a big sign on Bowman's back and about pencils which Quaid carried - in connection with his supervisory work both in sealed-food areas and unsealed-food areas, a common practice of super- visors, Bowman persisted in refusing to take the "flag" off. Quaid reminded him that this would be the second time he had been taken to the personnel office, but Bowman still refused to obey. Bowman says that when he was taken to Cameron , the personnel manager, Cameron said that he "could not wear the handwritten sign that (he) knew the rules of no solicitation and distributing of any kind." After some conversation about newspaper clippings posted in the break areas, Cameron told him that if he did not want to take the sign off, he should go home. Bowman then said, "Are you firing me or sending me home 2" to which Cameron replied, "I am sending you home for the day." (Emphasis supplied.) Except for the alleged remark by Cameron about the no-solicitation and no- distribution rule (about which I shall have more to say below ), there is nothing in Bowman's version of the events which suggests that he was anything but insub- ordinate in his persistent refusals to remove the fluttering paper from his belt. Shortly after this Pinson delivered to Bowman a warning notice citing his mis- conduct and bearing a notation that there would be a two-day suspension "for investigation ." The reasons given in the notice were Bowman 's refusal to remove the handprinted paper from his uniform and his refusal to remove the paper hat and replace it with a regulation, company issued hat. Bowman's testimony shows that the ultimate sanction imposed was not imposed hastily and that his misconduct was given careful consideration. He was called CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 79 to an interview with one Short, assistant personnel manager, and was given the opportunity to present his version of the facts. He did this and was directed to return at 2 o'clock. There was a 2 o'clock meeting with Short and Pinson. Bow- man was, informed-, that he,was suspended for 5 days and that he had a right of appeal. Bowman elected not to appeal. I now return to _ the testimony that Cameron, when directing Bowman to take the paper off his belt, had said that such a handwritten sign was in violation of the Company's no-solicitation and no-distribution rule. Such a remark could be regarded as a discriminatory application of the rule. Cameron's testimony as to the conversation at the time was that he had asked Bowman "to remove the paper, pointing out that this was, in effect a violation of the anticontamination rules that we have in the plant.", I regard Cameron's version of the conversation as truthful and reject Bowman's testimony that Cameron had described the conduct as a viola- tion of • the no-solicitation, no-distribution rule. Additionally, Cameron, in his testimony, not only acquiesces in Bowman's testimony that Bowman remonstrated about the fact that he was being suspended and not discharged but brings out also that Bowman was insistent that he should have been discharged. This insistance came after what appeared to be a telephone conversation between Bowman and someone else during the course of the interview. This fortifies my belief that Bow- man sought a discharge in the hope that he would be discharged and thus arouse the emotions of the other employees in favor of the Union at the forthcoming election. In coming to my conclusion that Bowman's suspension was justified and that he was insubordinate, I have not overlooked nor have I failed to consider the fact that supervisors had a common practice of carrying pencils and pens in a holster insect for their shirt pockets and that they carried as well cards or pads in their hands or such pockets. There is a difference between this practice of carrying necessary tools or implements which at all times are under the conscious control of the carriers and the wearing of objects by employees whose primary duties are not concerned with them and by reason of that fact they are not subject to constant and conscious control. I have given careful consideration to Fabri-Tek, Incor- porated, 148 NLRB 1623, cited by the General Counsel as authority for recognizing the propriety, under some circumstances, of resorting to novel, unusual, attention- seeking signs, wearing apparel, and attachments to clothing. Without regard to the fact that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside and denied enforce- ment of the Board's order in that case (352 2d 577), it is my opinion that the facts of this food processing case distinguish it from the general principles delineated in the Trial Examiner's Decision at 148 NLRB at 1628. It is, therefore, my conclusion that the suspension clearly was justified and rea- sonable under all the facts and circumstances and that paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the complaint, as amended, to the extent that they relate to Billy Joe Bow- man, should be dismissed. ' D. Interrogation and threats The complaint, as amended, lists a number of supervisors who are alleged to have interrogated certain employees concerning union membership, activities, and desires and some of the same and two more who are alleged to have threatened certain employees with loss of benefits if they became or remained members of the Union or gave support to it. In a separate paragraph preceding, not only are these supervisors named as such but a number of others are included without any allegation that such others engaged in any unlawful conduct. The General Counsel gave as his reason for listing these that he intended to bring out as background the evidence concerning their conduct. Upon all the evidence, after my observation of the witnesses called on behalf of the Respondent and those called in support of the complaint and, after taking into consideration numerous admissions made by the General Counsel's wit- nesses, I find preliminarily that the Company, while opposed to having its plant organized by the Union, has no official general policy to interfere with the rights granted to its employees under Section 7 of the Act and that much of the conduct attributed to it by the acts of supervisors, both those drawn into the case for back- ground purposes and those specifically identified as having engaged in unlawful conduct, did not exceed the limits contemplated by Section 8(c) of the Act, having in mind, of course, the fact that efforts were being made at the time to organize the Paris plant. Respondent did, however, fail to call as witnesses most of the supervisors alleged to have engaged in unlawful conduct. In fact, during the hearing, it intimated 80 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD its definite intention not to call them. It relies to a large extent on the contention that such remarks as were made by some supervisors were proper under Section 8(c) of the Act. Due consideration has been given to this contention. On the other hand, if the testimony is that some supervisors did make unlawful remarks constituting interference and threats and such testimony is of a nature that it may be believed , and it remains uncontradicted on the record , I must find that there was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and remedial action is in order. During the hearing I ruled repeatedly that the fact that some supervisors did not engage in improper conduct and the fact that particular employees who did not testify in support of the complaint were not interrogated or threatened by those supervisors who had been charged with interrogation and threats were irrelevant and immaterial . To the extent however, that company policy opposed to interference with union activities was sought to be brought out, evidence of this was received as relevant to the general question of union animus. The Respondent is responsible for and must take the consequences of the actions of supervisory employees . • A recent exposition of the law in this respect is found in Irving Air Chute Co. v. N.L.R.B., 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2). There the court said: "(D)eclarations made by `supervisory employees' will charge the ' employer [under the Act] [even] though they would not charge him under the doc- time, of respondent superior." NLRB v. Moenich Tanning Co., 121 F.2d 951, 953 [8 LRRM 528] (2d Cir. 1941). This broader rule places responsibility on an employer for acts of a supervisor when "employees would have just cause to believe that he was acting for and on behalf of the company." NLRB v. Texas Ind. Oil Co., 232 F.2d 447, 450 [38 LRRM 2005] (9th Cir. 1956). Evidence of the dissemination of the Company's threats or that they were part of an organized program of coercion is also not required. The Union's organizing drive began on April 5, 1963 and "any expressions of company attitudes even to small groups of individuals, were likely to be rapidly dis- seminated around a plant during the struggle of organization." Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 575, 576 [35 LRRM 2169] (2d Cir. 1954). The Company cannot claim its threats are de minimis as a mere isolated incident since they were reiterated and took place in a context where their effect was enhanced. Similarly, proof of the actual effect of the Company's threats is not required in view of their inherently coercive nature. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 371 [14 LRRM 639] (8th Cir. 1944). Thus it is enough in this case that these threats were made. There is considerable testimony with respect to conversations between super- visors and employees which, although offered in support of charges of unlawful interrogation and threats , are either clearly of a nature permissible under Section 8(c) of the Act or so borderline or indefinite as not to justify findings of viola- tion. I am disregarding all such testimony. There is, however, uncontradicted testimony which supports findings of unlawful interrogation, threats, or promises of benefits calculated to interfere with union activities. In.considering such testi- mony as justification for findings of violation , I do so , not only because it is uncontradicted on the record but because, in addition, it is, of a plausible nature, not inherently unbelievable. , . . Illustrations are: (1) Supervisor Clark's remark to Golden suggesting that there would be layoffs and that the work of the, Paris plant would be sent elsewhere if the Union won. (2) Supervisor McMichael's interrogation of Bennett, after calling him to his office, inquiring as to whether Bennett had ever belonged to a union and telling him, after Bennett said he did not know if he was interested in a union, - to vote against the Union. (3) Supervisor Metzger's remarks to , Christian that it'would be bad if the Union came in and that the plant always would be on strike as had been the case in Camden (where Respondent has another plant). (4) Metzger's intimation to Christian that, because of the latter's union activities as a watcher, he might lose his job and his further hint that additional rewards, such as Christian's prior promotion without regard to seniority, might be forthcoming. (5) Metzger's instruction to Christian that , he go to Supervisor Fields, who asked him how he thought he could get along without a job and observed how bad it would be if the Union got in. (6) Metzger's inquiry of Christian as to whether he intended to vote for the Union. (7) Super- CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 81 visor Maddox's inquiry of White as to how he-and the other employees felt about the Union, followed by the remark that, if the plant was unionized and there was a strike, the plant would be closed down until October, which was the usual time for a pay increase. (8) Maddox's additional request to White that he talk to the other employees against the Union and that he attend union meetings for the purpose of reporting back as to what employees had been there. (9) Super- visor McLay's advice to White to leave the Union alone or there would be a lot of people without jobs. (10) McLay's additional remarks that the Company would be able to infer what shift voted for the Union and, if White's shift (the third shift) did not vote for the Union, a raise in pay would be forthcoming while, on the other hand, if that shift did vote for the Union, Supervisor McLay would be laughed out of the personnel office if he tried to get an increase for it. (11) Supervisor McLay's additional conversation with White advising him that five employees had lost increases because of union activities and that his union activities also would cost him an advancement. (These remarks were accompanied with a warning that the third shift was not to present any grievances because of this.) (12) Supervisor Eastman took James Holland away from his machine and not only asked him how he felt about the Union but urged him as well to help the Company by talking for it .(i.e., presumably against the Union). (13) Supervisor Billings, after interrogating Loftin as to how he felt about the, Union, promised that he would receive an increase in pay in October. (14) About a month and a half later, Billings purported to quote Respondent's president as having said that people could be hurt by loss .of benefits if the Union won. (Although Respondent vehemently ,objected to the testimony about the last men- tioned remark as being hearsay on hearsay, the objection was overruled because the testimony was received not for the purpose,of ,proving that Murphy did say what Billings purported to say he did but rather for the reason that it was evi- dentiary of a threat by Billings, a supervisor, who may or may not have been truthful in quoting Murphy as he did.) None of these supervisors, with the exception of Maddox, was called to deny having made the remarks attributed to them. Supervisor Maddox was called. He denied that he ever had interrogated White about union membership, desires, or activities and that he ever had threatened White or any other employee with denial of benefits for voting in any particular manner at the union election. After considering all the testimony given by White, which includes as well that given on cross-examination, and taking into consideration also that Supervisor McLay, who also was the subject of this testimony, was not called, I do not accept Maddox's general denials in response to leading questions as being sufficient to overcome the specific and explicit testimony given by White. I conclude, therefore, in the light of all the foregoing, that Respondent did interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed by Section 7 of the Act by interrogating them as to their union activities and preferences and by threatening them with reprisals and loss of benefits in the event that they voted for the Union. E. The Company's rules There remains for consideration the allegation in paragraph 7(c) of the com- plaint, as amended, to the effect that the Respondent had "promulgated, main- tained and enforced rules prohibiting the distribution of union literature in non- work areas of the plant at any time and prohibiting the wearing of all union identification including badges, written or printed material." The Respondent promulgated a number of rules governing the conduct and wearing apparel or wearing of objects by its employees, which rules were printed in a handbook handed to each employee at the time of hiring. Among these were three for the violation of which warning notices could be given followed by dismissal after an accumulation of three within a single year. These were: 1. Distributing written or printed material of any kind without permis- sion at any time in the work areas of the Plant and at any time during employees' working time on Company property other than in the work areas of the Plant. 2. Unauthorized solicitation for contributions, memberships or sales dur- ing Company working hours. 3. Unauthorized wearing of any objects, jewelry or clothing that may fmd its way into the product. 243-084-67-vol. 159-7 82 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The first two of these rules, that restricting distribution of printed or written material and that restricting solicitation, are presumptively discriminatory and invalid inasmuch as they are so broad as to prohibit any distribution or solicitation during a particular employee's nonworking hours and in areas of the plant set aside as "break areas," lunchrooms, or restrooms. Respondent brought out that one or more particular employees had never requested permission to solicit for the Union or to distribute union literature and that there had been union solici- tions and distributions. I do not regard this as rebutting the presumption of invalidity because (1) the word "unauthorized" connotes unilateral action on the part of the employer and there is no suggestion that employees would be author- ized if they applied for "authorization" and (2): the right of employees to dis- tribute literature and solicit membership for a union in nonwork areas not on company, time is not dependent on permission from their employer. While I am convinced fully that the sanitation rules and needs of the Respondent justified many strict controls governing employee conduct and apparel and adornments in the operating areas of the plant, I nevertheless conclude; after hearing 'all Respondent's evidence in 'support of the rules and its expensive measures to assure the purity and sanitation of its products, that no case has been made out to justify a restriction on union solicitation or 'distributions in nonwork 'areas by employees, riot on working time. ' The adjective phrases " during employees' working time" and "during company working hours" are so' broad and indefinite as to embrace activities of nonworking employees during the times that others are working. Jas. -H. Matthews, & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8); N.L.R.B. v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 289 F.2d 177 (C.A. 5); Stoddard- Quirk. Manufacturing Co.; 138 NLRB 615; Republic Aviation' Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793; Pueblo Supermarkets, Inc., 156 NLRB 654. Despite the rules so promulgated,, the Respondent disregarded them when it engaged in its campaign against 'the Union but relied on them when an employee sought to sway support for the Union., It distributed to its employees on company property a card simulating a pay `distribution notice informing employees of the amount vrhereby,'their pay would be reduced by union dues if they became mem- bers, of the, union and another card -on which was printed eight "Vote No" impor- tunities followed by, -a large "Vote No" banner line under which' was a simulated ballot with a "No" box marked '!X." , Although a handwritten union slogan written upon a-shirt concededly would not `have prejudiced Respondent's no-contamination rule, an employee, Lamire, was required to change that shirt. Clearly, the only reason why he was so instructed was because of the union slogan. - , ' On the other hand, considering the nature of Respondent's business, the great efforts it made and the expenses it incurred to assure the purity of its products and the evidence (which I find credible) of its strict enforcement'thereof, it is my opinion that the third of the three rules quoted (which has been the subject also of discussion in the Bowman'section hereof) is not invalid'and is entirely proper. In 'addition to Respondent's affirmative evidence of its efforts to assure that foreign objects would not find their way into the products, witnesses called ' by the General Counsel gave strong evidence of the uniform enforcement of this rule. To the extent that there was some testimony as to occasional laxity, I have weighed that testimony against and together with all the other testimony and tangible evidence'. (including that brought out in connection with the Bowman suspension ) and have concluded'that the General Counsel has not met his burden to show either'invalidity of this rule or discriminatory application thereof.. For the purpose of„ supporting the validity of the rules, Respondent sought to demonstrate that, similar or identical rules were in effect in two other Campbell plants in which the Union was the recognized bargaining,- agent. This evidence was rejected. Employee' rights which the Union might have bargained away in other plants may not be disregarded or nullified in a plant in which the Union is not the bargaining agent. It is my 'finding and conclusion that the first two of the rules quoted do violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act but that the third is reasonable and necessary, was not discriminatorily enforced and does not violate the Act. H. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities and operations of the Respondent set forth in section I (A), (B), (D), and (E), above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor dis- putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY III. THE REMEDY 83 Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it should be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By promulgating and maintaining in effect rules prohibiting employees dur- ing nonworking time from engaging in union solicitation or distributing union literature anywhere on Respondents' premises, by coercively interrogating em- ployees concerning their union sympathies or attitudes, and by threatening employees with reprisals because of their union activities or in the event that they joined or voted for the Union, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thereby has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices by reason of its suspension of Billy Joe Bowman or its promulgation of the rule governing wear- ing of apparel, objects, and jewelry and, to the extent that the complaint contains allegations of violation arising therefrom, such allegations should be dismissed. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend that the complaint be dismissed to the extent set forth in paragraph 3 of Con- clusions of Law hereof but that Campbell Soup Company, in its plant at Paris, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating any employee with respect to any employee's activity, mem- bership, or interest in any labor organization in a manner constituting inter- ference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the said Act. (b) Threatening any employee with reprisals because of such activity, member- ship, or interest on the part of such or any other employee. (c) Promulgating, maintaining, enforcing, or applying any rule or regulation prohibiting its employees, when they are on nonworking time, from distributing materials in behalf of any labor organization in nonworking areas of its property. (d) Prohibiting its employees, during nonworking time, from otherwise soliciting their fellow employees to join or support United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Insofar as its rules governing distribution of materials and solicitations restrict the rights of its employees, as in the paragraphs preceding this paragraph provided, rescind them. 3. Take the following affirmative action, which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Paris, Texas, plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." i Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and shall be maintained 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to assure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith? 21n the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, paragraph 3(b) hereof shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate any employee with respect to any employee's activity, membership , or interest in any labor organization in a manner constituting interference , restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the said Act. WE WILL NOT threaten any employee with reprisals because of such activ- ity, membership , or interest on the part of such or any other employee. WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, enforce, or apply any rule or regula- tion prohibiting our employees, when they are on nonworking time, from distributing materials in behalf of any labor organization in nonworking areas of our property. WE WILL NOT prohibit our employees , during nonworking time, from otherwise soliciting their fellow employees to join or support United Pack- inghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE HEREBY rescind our rules governing distribution of materials and solicitations to the extent that they prohibit conduct described in the two paragraphs preceding this paragraph. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization , to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing , to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 335-2145. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ; Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 331, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America; Truck Drivers, Chauf- feurs and Helpers, Local 384, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, of Amer- ica; General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 470, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-