The Golub Corp.

THE GOLUB CORPORATION 355 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommended order of a trial examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership of our employees in Local 474, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Food Employees, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by laying off, refusing to reinstate, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, except as permitted by the proviso of Section 8 (a)(3). WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees and prospective employees in a coercive manner concerning their union activities or sympathies , create the impression among our employees that their union activities are under sur- veillance, promise benefits to our employees to induce them to reject the Union, solicit employees to withdraw their membership or support of the Union or to encourage other employees to do so, warn employees that we will close our plant if it is unionized , or threaten our employees with loss of employment or with harassment if they continue to support the Union. WE WILL offer to Edward Hook, Sr., and Edward Hook, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their rights and privileges, and will make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of their layoffs. All our employees have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or not to do so, and we will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of these rights. FRESKEETO FROZEN FOODS, INC, Employer. Dated-- -- -------- --- ---- BY----------------- ------------------ ------- (Representative ) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above -named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202, Tele- phone 842-3112. The Golub Corporation, Central Markets Operating Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO The Golub Corporation, Central Markets Operating Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO. Cases 3-CA-2567 and 2654. June 15,1966 DECISION AND ORDER On February 11, 1966, Trial Examiner Stanley Gilbert issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices 159 NLRB No. 34. 356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL- CIO, filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed on February 25, 1965, and amended on April 9, 1965, by Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the complaint in the instant case was issued on April 21, 1965.1 The complaint in the instant case, as amended during the course of the hearing,2 alleged that the Golub Corporation and Mechanicville Central, Inc., hereinafter referred to collec- tively as the Company or Respondents, violated 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as amended. In their answer, as amended during the course of the hearing,3 Respond- ents denied the alleged unfair labor practices, as well as the allegation of the appropriate bargaining unit and the allegation of the Union's majority status with respect to said unit. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Albany, New York, in the instant case on July 13, 15, and 16, 1965,4 before Trial Examiner Stanley Gilbert. All parties i By order of the Regional Director for Region 3 the instant case was consolidated with two other cases. The Respondents in both of the latter two cases were the Golub Corpo- ration and Central Markets Operating Company, Inc., its wholly owned subsidiary (Cases 3-CA-2567 and 2654). The Charging Party in both of said cases was the same as the Charging Party in the instant case. Each of the three cases involved a different store of a chain of 25 operated by The Golub Corporation. Shortly after the commencement of a hearing on the three cases, the instant case was severed from the other two upon motion of the Respondents (in the three cases) over the objection of General Counsel and the Charging Party. 2 The complaint was amended by adding allegations of additional violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act to paragraph 18 (a) and 8 (b). 8 The answer was amended by admitting the allegations in paragraph 7 of the complaint and by denying-the allegation in paragraph 9 of the complaint. Paragraph 9 contained a description of the collective bargaining unit and an allegation that it is an appro- priate unit. 4 After the above-mentioned severance of the instant case from the other two cases with which it had been consolidated, the hearing proceeded on July 13 in said other two cases. After the said two cases were closed for the receipt of evidence, the hearing in. the instant case was resumed on July 15 and was concluded on July 16. THE GOLUB CORPORATION 357 to the proceedings appeared and were given full opportunity to offer relevant and competent evidence . Briefs were received from General Counsel and Respondents within the time designated therefor. Upon the entire record 5 in this case and my observation of the witnesses as they testified, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENTS The Golub Corporation and Mechanicville Central, Inc., its "entirely owned and controlled subsidiary," admittedly have common ownership, officers, supervision, and labor policies. The Golub Corporation operates a chain of 25 retail food stores through subsidiary corporations including the above-named subsidiary corporation. The Golub Corporation maintains its principal offices, warehouse, and place of busi- ness in Schenectady, New York, and, through its above-named subsidiary, operates a store in Mechamcville, New York, the store involved in the instant case. The Respondent corporations are engaged in business at said locations in the sale and distribution of groceries, produce, and related products. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaints involved herein, Respondents in the course and con- duct of their business operations sold and distributed products of a gross value in excess of $500,000, and during the same period of time received goods valued in excess of $50,000, transported to their places of business in the State of New York directly from States of the United States other than the State of New York. As is admitted by Respondents, they are, and have been at all times material herein, "individually and collectively" an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED As is admitted by Respondents , Amalgamated Meat Cutters , Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. HI. THE UNFAIR LABOR-PRACTICES Background and Summary of Undisputed Facts On December 8, 1964, the Union sent a telegram to the Company in which it claimed to represent a majority of the employees in the store involved in this case, and it expressed its desire to start bargaining negotiations. It offered to submit their authorization cards to a disinterested person to check on its claim of majority and requested a meeting "on this matter as soon as possible." On the same day, Decem- ber 8, 1964, the Union filed a petition in Case 3-RC-3543 for certification as repre- sentative of a unit 6 of the employees in said store.? Within the period of the 30 days prior to December 8, the Union received author- ization cards from 22 employees in said unit.8 According to the stipulation of the parties, there were 31 employees as of December 8, 1964, within said unit. On January 18, the Regional Director for Region 3 directed an election be held in the following described unit which he found to be appropriate: All regular full-time and regular part-time employees including the meat and produce department managers, and the head cashier, employed by the Employer 5 General Counsel's motion, which was unopposed, to correct the transcript of the testi- mony is hereby granted. 9 Although the description of the unit in the petition varies in wording from the de- scription of the unit found to be appropriate in the representation proceeding and de- scribed in the complaint, It appears that there is no variance in substance between said descriptions 7 Although only Meehanicville Central, Inc., was named as the employer in the repre- sentation proceeding, as found hereinabove, both it and the Golub Corporation are a single employer. 8 The Respondents , however, attacked the validity of a number of said cards, contending that the Union did not have valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the said unit This Issue is considered hereinbelow 358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD [the Company] at its Mechanicville, New York, retail store, but excluding the store manager, assistant store managers, office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. Pursuant thereto an election by secret ballot was conducted under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director, on February 17, 1965, with the following results: Approximate number of eligible voters---------------------------- 28 Void ballots-------------------------------------------------- 0 Votes cast for the Union---------------------------------------- 4 Votes cast against the Union------------------------------------ 24 Challenged ballots--------------------------------------------- 0 On February 23, 1965, the Union filed timely objections to the conduct of the election. By Decision dated March 31, 1965, the Regional Director set aside the election and directed a new election. By an order dated April 30, 1965, the Regional Director approved the Union's request for permission to withdraw its petition in said representation proceeding. The Company sent three letters to their employees (dated February 2, 8, and 12, 1965) dealing with the forthcoming election. By letter dated February 11, it invited employees and their wives or husbands to attend a dinner meeting to be held on the evening of February 16 and advised the employees that they would be paid for their time spent at the said meeting. The dinner meeting was held on said date and William Golub, an officer of the Company, delivered a speech with respect to the forthcoming election (which was held the next day, less than 24 hours after said dinner meeting) .9 .- The Issues The following issues are raised by the pleadings in this case: 1. Whether Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by conduct alleged to have been engaged in by various admitted supervisors as follows: (a) By Vitale, the store manager, early in January, 1965. (b) By announcements of a general wage increase to employees as a group and individually. (c) By letters to employees from William Golub, an officer of the Company, and by a speech by Golub at a dinner meeting on February 16, 1965. (d) By promising and giving employees payment for their time spent at said din- ner meeting on February 16, 1965. (e) By John Moran, personnel director, and Roger Hoyt, a district manager, who allegedly engaged in unlawful surveillance of employees on February 1, 1965. 2. Whether the unit described in the complaint is an appropriate collective- bargaining unit. 3. Whether on December 8, 1964, the date the Union requested the Company to recognize and bargain with it, the Union represented a majority of employees in said unit. 4. Whether commencing on or about December 8, 1964, and at all times there- after, Respondents refused to bargain collectively with the Union in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. A. The allegations of violations of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act 1. Employee Lola Beigler testified that, in January of 1965, Store Manager Frank Vitale stopped her when she was on her way to her work area and made the state- ment to her that as long as she worked in the store he tried to treat her "right," that they were "always on friendly relations," and that the employees could come to him with any problems. She further testified that he said "if the Union should get in, it wouldn't be on a friendly basis, it.would be on a business basis and that we [the employees] would have to go to a shop steward." This testimony, which was uncontradicted, is credited. Nevertheless, it does not appear that his statement can reasonably be construded as a threat of economic reprisal for adherence to the Union. At most, it is an expression of opinion that, once the Union represents the employees, their grievances or problems concerning their working conditions would -B Insetting aside the election the Regional Director considered only the objection with respect to the breach of the 24-hour rule set forth in Peerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427. THE GOLUB CORPORATION 359 have to be handled through a union steward rather than directly between employees and management. It is concluded that this does not constitute interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section (a) (1) of the Act, but is protected under Section 8(c) of the Act. 2. Employee Fred Russon credibly testified that, at the end of November or the beginning of December 1964, Vitale and the district manager called about five of the employees together and told them there was going to be a pay increase the first of the year. The record reveals that at a Christmas party on December 13, 1964, at which employees of the store involved herein and of four other stores of the Company's chain were present, Golub announced that a general wage increase would be given to employees at all the 25 stores in the chain. This wage increase was made effective on January 4, 1965.10 Employee Eleanor Carbone testified that, late in December, Vitale, the store mananger, called her into his office and told her that "the Company agreed to give all the full-time employees a $5 raise starting the first of the year." She further testified that when he made this statement he said nothing which led her to believe it was conditioned upon giving up "any interest in the labor organization." Employee Marjorie Green testified that in the latter part of December, Vitale and John Moran, personnel director of, the Company, came up to her at her working station and spoke to her. Her testimony of what they stated is as follows: A. They said there was going to be a $5 increase for all full-time employees and a 10 cents an hour increase for the part-time employees. Q. Was anything else said? A. That the vote for the Troy store was not definite. Q. Was there any other conversation? A. Not that I could recall, no. It appears that the announcements, particularly on December 13, of a general wage increase were not specific as to the amount, and individual employees were given more specific information as to what.the amount was to be prior to the effective date of the increase, according to the above testimony which is credited. In a letter dated February 12, 1965, which was sent to the employees of the store involved herein, the following was stated, among other things: - False and -misleading- promises- are being made to you about potential benefits. We are proud of our total benefit package. This package was put together over the years without the need for outside pressure. We have never said that this package cannot be improved. It has been improved from time to time before the Union appeared. In fact, -we were still working on improvements when the Union suddenly took an interest in your dues. We are still working on this package for your personal benefit. Why, during this past year, among other improvements, we again increased the wage ceiling for each and every employee and it was not the Union that got this or. any time before. We also increased the benefits on your health insurance plan at a substantial cost to the company and at no increased cost to you and, again, voluntarily by the com- pany and not by the Union. In view of the facts that the general wage increase had been generally announced to the employees on December 13, 1964, it appears that the reference to the wage increase in said letter of February. 12 can only reasonably be construed as a reminder that the increase had been granted. It is assumed that the employees must have been aware of.the fact.that the wage increase had already been made effective in other stores in the chain; and that it had still not been effective in their store. However, there is nothing in the letter which would indicate that the wage increase would only be made applicable to them, if they rejected the Union as their bargaining representative. On the contrary, it would appear, from the letter, that they were assured of the wage increase in any event. Essentially the issue of whether the announcements of the wage increase (made to the employees as a group and to some of the employees individually) were viola- "The wage increase was withheld from the employees in the store involved in the instant case, as well as in another store, because of the pendency of representation pro- ceedings involving each of the two stores. However, the increases were subsequently granted to the employees retroactive to January 4, 1965. There is no contention in this case that-the withholding of the increase or the subsequent granting of the increase con- stituted a violation of the Act. 360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act must be resolved by a determination of the facts leading up to said announcements. John A. Moran, personnel director of the chain, who was called as a witness by General Counsel, testified to the action taken by the Company in deciding to grant the wage increase. He testified that, in July or August 1964, he made a study of the wage structure of competitive chains. He further testified that in September he met with members of top management at which time it was decided that a wage increase would be granted and would be announced at the Christmas parties at the end of the year. Moran also testified that one of the reasons for granting the wage increase was that competitive chains had increased, or were about to increase, their wages, "so we felt we had to do something or lose our people." Considerable testimony was elicited from Moran on cross-examination concerning the study he made of the wage structures of com- petitive chains and their wage differentials, which testimony was uncontradicted. The record does not answer the question which arises in my mind as to why there was a delay from September to December in the announcement by the Company of the wage increase if the wage differentials were an important factor in deciding to grant it. Nevertheless, the absence of such answer is not of sufficient weight to persuade me that Moran's testimony should be discredited. Moran was a convinc- ing witness and that portion of his testimony which could have been verified or contradicted by disinterested witnesses remained unchallenged." Based upon the credited testimony of Moran, it is concluded that the Respond- ents decided in September 1964, to grant a wage increase which was at a time prior to the advent of the Union, and, therefore, it could not have been intended or cal- culated to deter employees from adhering to the Union. Consequently it is further concluded that the subsequent announcements of the decision were not violative of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act. 3. It is alleged and General Counsel contends that by letters dated February 2 and 8, 1965, which Golub sent to the employees and by the speech he made at a dinner meeting of employees on February 16, 1965, the employees were threatened "with layoff and less favorable working conditions" in violation of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. It is also alleged and General Counsel further contends that said sec- tion of the Act was violated by "urging employees to deal or bargain directly with Respondent." The letters are quite lengthy, and Golub's testimony of what he said in his speech required approximately 25 pages of the transcript. Therefore, it does not appear practical to quote in this Decision the letters and speech in their entirety. Instead, there is quoted hereinbelow the excerpts therefrom upon which the General Counsel relies in support of his contentions. They are as follows: (from the letter of February 2) Companies that have been forced to meet excessive Union demands have been known to be forced out of business. The employees at the other local chain [Saveway] were not fooled by Union promises and flatly rejected them just a short time ago. Large chains which have been forced to sign up with the Unions have been known to increase the work load of all their individual employees by reducing the number of employees in order to offset the higher costs. They find that they have to get the same amount of work done by fewer people to remain competitive. From the letter of February 8, the following: 2. What does the choice of a union do to personal relationships? It means the end of a close relationship between you and your manager-or other management personnel . You certainly must recall that from time to time you may have asked the manager for some special personal arrangement or privilege which he probably gladly granted, such as time off when your chil- dren were sick, weddings, for haircuts, a school prom, emergencies at home, and to catch up on studies., If there were a union contract, such "personal privileges most likely could not be granted. Special privileges could be for- bidden under a contract and be in violation of the contract. In such cases, Moran testified that he had conversations with officials of two competitive chains with respect to their wage structures which revealed that substantial wage differentials existed between the two chains and the Company. THE GOLUB CORPORATION 361 we could not^deal directly with you, but only through your union representa- tive. You will not be able to solve problems directly as we have been doing. Do not be fooled by. those who tell you otherwise-especially those fellow employees who might try to frighten you into thinking that they can control your job. And from his testimony as to the speech, the following: We have never had tensions or misunderstanding. We have always been able to talk them out, and they are here. They bring in these tensions and these difficulties which you would be subject to under their regime. Now, don't forget also that if they were to come in that many of the human things that we are now doing as a matter of course would no longer be possible if they were here under contract. Many of the little human things like we do, like giving you privileges where you want to go out to dances or if you have to play in a basketball game; or a child is sick, or of a dozen reasons. We will always give you reasonable consideration. Under a contract we would be subject to the rules of that contract. If we did these things, we could be charged with favoritism, we would be violating our contract. These things could well go by the board as a result ... . In addition to the above, consider the following portion of Golub's speech to be pertinent: Now, they [Union organizers] come along and tell you of all the things they are going to do for you if they are in. They tell you you have many prob- lems, let me remind you again our business is one in which we operate on a very very tight margin or profit, we are happy if we can when all this is finished come out with a 1% profit net in our company-and believe me, up to this point we haven't even come to that due to a variety of circum- stances. We are happy when we reach. that point. Now, how much of a difference does that 1 cent allow for in leeway if you are faced with many additional unrealistic demands which add to your overhead and expenses. There isn't a great deal of leeway, it is much too tight we know where this has been the case, we hear in many cases where this has been the case, we hear in many cases where troubles have resulted in both larger chains and in smaller chains and in other businesses. There is one larger chain which got a contract, as we are informed by many of their unhappy people who have come to us filing applications for jobs, that they wanted to get out of the company and get into a company like ours where there is no union contract. They told us since this contract came into being, the company raised the prices in many directions and is not doing the business they use to do as a result of this, that the company has layed off its large number of people. I believe that the figures they have given us is around about 25% of their help both full time and part time and that the people who are left must do a tougher job because they have got to do the work those who were let out have to do. Their people tell many of ours around the store that they couldn't, and very often they can't, come to work at those times where a woman may have children that go to school and take a cut. This is one example we know of in a smaller concern known as the Bow Market. The owner told us that due to the union contract they were being forced out of business. They couldn't stand the gap and the owner told us because of union demands, he had to close up. There was a big discount store called Maxiums where we here [hear] because of union demands they were forced out of business. These are examples of what have happened. This is the kind of thing that can happen when unrealistic demands and a burden is put on a company. Don't ever forget that and keep that in mind. It is concluded from the above quoted excerpts, when considered in context with each other and in the context in which they appeared, that Golub clearly implied that the inevitable results of the employees electing to have the Union represent them would be a loss of personal privileges which the Company had formerly extended to them, and a layoff of some of the employees, a cut in their hours or a closing of the store. This exceeded the bounds of lawful expression of opinion within the meaning of Section 8(c) of the Act. The letters and speech, in my judgment, were calculated, to create and instill in the minds of the employees a fear of loss of privileges and economic suffering as a result of their adherence to the Union, and constituted interference , restraint, and coercion within the meaning 362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Bernardin, Inc., 153 NLRB 939; Louisiana Manu- facturing Company, 152 NLRB 1301; N.L.R.B. v. Miller-Charles and Company, 341 F.2d 870 (C.A. 2); Collins & Aikman Corp., 143 NLRB 15. With respect to the allegation and contention that the Company was violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by urging that the employees deal directly with the Company instead of through the Union, the General Counsel offers no explication in his brief. Of itself, the urging by an employer in the course of a preelection cam- paign that his employees deal directly with him instead of through a union is not violative of the Act. True, in urging that the employees do not deal through a union, Golub did violate the Act,, as found hereinabove. However, no purpose would be served in reiterating the above findings, since it was implicit therein that the statements found violative of the Act were in support of Golub's attempt to persuade the employees to deal directly with the Company rather than through the Union. 4. In the Company's letter of February, 11, 1965, inviting employees td attend the dinner meeting on February 16, the employees were advised that they would be paid for the time spent at said meeting. The record indicates that such payment was, in fact, made to them. In his brief the General Counsel contends that said payment was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, and, in support of this contention, cites U-Tell Corporation, 150 NLRB 1534. In the cited case the Board adopted the con- clusions of the Trial Examiner which included the following: In paying its employees for attendance at plant meetings when prior to the Union's organizing campaign it had not so paid them, Respondent granted them an economic benefit which, when taken in conjunction with Dumke's remarks on the following day to the cashiers that if the Union came in they would be deprived of certain specific benefits previously enjoyed suggests the "fist inside the velvet glove" as the Supreme Court described it in N L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405. This was violative of the Act. [Emphasis supplied.] From the above quotation it appears that an important factor in finding the payment to be a violation was the fact that prior thereto the Respondent in said case had not paid employees for attending plant metings. There is no showing in this case that the Company had not previously followed the practice of paying employees for their time spent at meetings similar to that of February 16. Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has not proved by a -preponderance of the evidence the allegation that the promise of such payment and the payment itself were violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act as alleged. 5. On the night of February 1, 1965, the Union held a meeting attended by six to eight employees in Joyce's Log Cabin, a restaurant and bar located in Mechanic- ville. The meeting was held in a backroom of the establishment. The meeting started about 8:30 p.m. and lasted about an hour. The record reveals that while the meeting was in progress, two supervisors of the Company, Moran, personnel director, and Roger Hoyt, a district manager, entered Joyce's Log Cabin and seated themselves at the bar. The record further reveals that persons at the bar cannot see into the backroom, where the meeting was being held, but can see anyone who leaves the backroom. Both Moran and Hoyt testified that they had had dinner in Hoyt's home in Mechanicville and that after dinner Hoyt proposed that they go to Joyce's Log Cabin "to have a beer." According to their testimony, shortly after they arrived the bartender informed Hoyt that "there was a union meeting taking place in the backroom " Each of them also testified that they had no knowledge prior thereto of said meeting. They arrived at some time between 8.30 and 9 p.m. and remained there for at least an hour to an hour and a half after the employees left the meet- ing.12 Richard Charmelo, one of the union organizers, testified that when the meet- ing terminated, Constance Foley, one of the'employees, went out of the room to get her coat and came back and announced that Moran and Hoyt "were at the bar." He further testified that, at the time she made the announcement, he turned his head toward the door and saw Hoyt standing in the doorway and looking into the room. Hoyt denied that he did so. None of the others present at the meeting testified to seeing Hoyt in the doorway, nor were they questioned with regard thereto. "The employees left the meeting about 9:30 pm. Moran testified that he and Hoyt left around 1 a.m., and Hoyt testified that they left about 10:30 or 11: 00 p in. No significance is attached to this variance in their testimony. THE GOLUB CORPORATION 363 The General Counsel in arguing that the Respondents engaged in surveillance points out that although Hoyt and Moran were informed by the bartender that there was a union meeting in the backroom, they nevertheless ordered drinks and stayed for the "remainder of the evening." General Counsel further argues in his brief, "While such conduct in itself may be questionable, the true motivation of their remaining is shown in Moran's statement that if he had known there was a union meeting, he'd have been 25 miles away and Hoyt's similar candid admission that he wished he didn't know about it because he wouldn't have been there." It appears from the uncontradicted testimony of Hoyt that he frequently visited Joyce's Log Cabin and had a "first name" relationship with the bartender. It also appears that the bartender was familiar with Hoyt's place of employment and position. Both Moran and Hoyt appeared to be convincing witnesses and there is nothing in the record on which an inference can be based that they had knowledge of the meeting prior to their arrival at the bar. Their testimony is credited as to why they were there and as to what occurred while they were there. There is no substantial conflict in the testimony of General Counsel's witnesses and that of Moran and Hoyt as to what occurred at the place except for the contradictory testimony of Charmelo that Hoyt stood in the doorway and looked into the backroom. Hoyt's denial of Charmelo's testimony is credited.13 It appears that Hoyt and Moran would have exercised better judgment to have left after learning of the meeting, instead of remaining, particularly in view of their admissions, to which General Counsel referred, that they were told by the bartender of the meeting while it was still in progress and that had they known of the meeting they would not have been there. However, these admissions do not, as General Counsel argues, indicate that they had come there with the intention of engaging in surveillance; nor do they indicate that they would not have remained, had they not had an unlawful purpose. It is con- cluded that they were innocent of any intention to engage in surveillance when they entered the bar, and there is nothing in the record from which it may be inferred that they would not have remained as late as 9:30 p.m. (the time the meeting termi- nated), had there not been a meeting, but did so in order to gain information as to who attended the meeting or to create the impression that they were engaging in surveillance. It appears they remained for at least an hour or more after the meet- ing ended, a considerable period beyond the time which would have been required to accomplish said purposes. Therefore, it is determined that the General Counsel has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they engaged in unlawful sur- veillance as alleged. B. The appropriate bargaining unit The complaint contains the following allegation: All regular full-time and regular part-time employees including the meat and produce department managers, and the head cashiers, employed by Respondent Mechanicville [the Company] at its Mechanicville, New York retail store, but excluding the store manager, assistant store managers, office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as 'defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. By their answer, as amended, Respondents denied the foregoing allegation. General Counsel offered no evidence in support of this allegation and in his brief relied on the finding in the representation proceeding of the appropriateness of the unit (which issue apparently was litigated therein). However, the petition in said representation proceeding was withdrawn prior to the hearing of this case which raises a possible question as to whether it is appropriate to rely on said finding therein. On the other hand, the Respondents offered no evidence in support of their denial of the appropriateness of the above described unit. In Clermont's, Inc., 154 NLRB 1397, the Board stated as follows:, In Sav-on Drugs,il the Board revised its appropriate unit criteria for retail chainstore operations and held that the same. unit policy factors would be applied to chainstore operations as are applicable to multiplant enterprises in 11138 NLRB 1032. "This is not only predicated on the demeanor of the witnesses but also on the fact that there was no testimony corroborating that of Charmelo . It would appear in the circumstances that had he stood in the doorway he, would have been seen by others present in the room as well as by Cbarmelo. 364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD general. In Frisch's Big Boy I11-Mar,12 the Board stated that "a single-plant unit is presumptively appropriate unless it be established that the single plant has been effectively merged into a more comprehensive unit so as to have lost its individual identity." 12147 NLRB 551, (Members Leedom and Jenkins dissenting) Even assuming that the finding in the representation proceeding may not be relied upon to establish the appropriateness of the unit, since it may be presumed that a single-store unit in a retail chain store operation is an appropriate bargaining unit, and, since Respondents have offered no evidence to rebut this presumption,14 it is concluded that the above-described unit is an appropriate unit for the purpose of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. C. The Union's majority representation It is alleged in the complaint that on or about December 7, 1964, a majority of the employees in the above-described unit "designated or selected the Union as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining" with the Company. The Respondents, in their answer, alleged that they had no knowledge with respect to said allegation. However, Respondents, in their answer, denied the further allega- tion in the complaint that "at all times since December 7, 1964, and continuing to date, the Union has been the representative for purposes of collective bargaining of the employees" in the above-described unit. In support of said denial Respondents attacked the validity of a number of the authorization cards upon which General Counsel relies as proof of the allegation of majority representation. The record discloses that the Union demanded recognition on December 8, 1964, and that on said date there were 31 employees in the unit which the Union claimed to represent. There were introduced into evidence authorization cards which were signed by 22 of the employees in said unit within a period of less than a month prior to December 8, 1964. There is no dispute as to the authenticity of the signa- tures or with respect to the dates on which the cards were signed. Respondents' contention with respect to the invalidity of a number of the cards is, in substance, that they were obtained upon misrepresentation and, therefore, cannot be relied upon in support of the Union's claim of majority representation. The cards clearly and unambiguously authorize the Union to represent the employees who signed them as their collective-bargaining representative, no refer- ence is made therein to an election, nor is there any wording from which some alter- native purpose may be inferred by the signing of said cards.15 14 It is noted that in a representation proceeding involving another store in the com- pany's chain (Case 3-RC-3531 ) the Board found , based upon a stipulation , that the employees in that store constituted an appropriate bargaining unit >a The cards read as follows on their face ( the back being blank) AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT Date-------------------- I, the undersigned, employee of ---------------------------------------------- Name of the Company Employed as --------------------------------------------------------------- Job Title Hereby authorize the Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen & Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO, to represent me and, in my behalf negotiate and conclude all agreements as to wages, hours and all other con- ditions of employment. The full power and authority to act for the undersigned as described herein super- sedes any power or authority heretofore given to any person or organization to represent me, and shall remain in full force and effect for one year from date and thereafter, subject to thirty ( 30) days' written notice of my desire to withdraw such power and authority to act for me in the matters referred to here. ------------------------------------ Signature of Employee Plant or Store ------------------------------------ Address THIS CARD CONFIDENTIAL THE GOLUB CORPORATION 365 In their brief Respondents contend that 8 of the 22 cards are "invalid" and another 8 are "doubtful." Since there were 31 employees in 'the unit, 16 valid cards would be required to support the Union's claim of majority. Respondents' argument as to the validity of the cards is as follows: The testimony of eight specific witnesses proved that they signed their cards after being given reason to believe that these cards did not constitute a choice of bargaining agent. Moreover, the contradiction of the testimony given by two of General Counsel's witnesses as to the validity of eight additional cards presented by these two witnesses combined casts a serious doubt on these addi- tional cards. In substance Respondents argue that the cards are not valid or are doubtful because of representations (made by the persons soliciting the signatures) with respect to the purpose of signing the cards, particularly with respect to statements about an elec- tion. It is well established that cards may not be counted towad a majority if they were signed upon representation that they were solely or only to obtain an election. The Shelby Manufacturing Company, 155 NLRB 464. The evidence upon which the Respondents rely in support of their contentions will be considered in light of the clear statement of the single purpose set forth on the card. With respect to the card of Eleanor Carbone, Respondents point out in their brief that she testified that when she was given the card "there was discussion about an opportunity to vote" and that the statement was made to her that "if they got enough people they would have a vote and the Union in." 16 Carbone also testified that she read the card before signing it and, further, that she did not recall whether anything was said about an election. It is concluded that her testimony does not establish that her signature was obtained upon the representation that it was solely or only for the purpose of obtaining an election. Therefore, her card is considered valid. With respect to the card of Mary Rose Beniati, Respondents point out in their brief that in soliciting her signature one of the union organizers, "Jack," apparently John Cominsky, stated to her "that the card meant merely nothing. That it just gave them the right to petition the store if they got enough signed and if I did get in the ballot box it would be my own decision." In view of this representation, it is con- cluded that her card is not valid authorization and cannot be relied upon for proof of majority representation. With respect to the card of Frank Marinello, considerable testimony was elicited from him in regard to the circumstances in which he signed. He apparently had a protracted conversation with Cominsky who solicited his signature at a union meet- ing which Marinello attended. Marinello testified that he told Cominsky that he thought if he signed the card that it meant he was in the Union and that Cominsky told him "it was merely to get enough signed or a certain percentage and to get a vote." In view of this representation, it is concluded that Marinello's card cannot be relied upon toward proof of majority representation. With reference to the card of Vincent Zielnicki, Respondents point out that he testified that a fellow employee solicited his signature and that "she said we are try- ing to get a union vote in the store and would I wish to sign a card, which I did." He further testified that she also stated that it "didn't mean I had to vote for the union, it meant it was bringing a vote to the store." On cross-examination, however, his testimony was as follows: A. The only thing she said, if we have enough cards signed we will have a vote in the store. Q. Did she say anything about an election? A. If we have a sufficient number of cards signed that we will have an elec- tion in the store. Q. When did you sign the card, before or after she said that? A. Before. It is concluded that the representations made to him about an election were not such as to reasonably have caused him to believe, particularly in veiw of the clear word- ing of the card, that the sole or only purpose for signing the card was to obtain an 19 Her signature was obtained by two union organizers , one of whom, "John," was ap- parently John Cominsky. 366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD election. Furthermore, it appears that he signed before the representation was made about an "election." Therefore, it is concluded that his card constitutes a valid authorization. With regard to the card of Marcella, McCarthy, Respondents point out that she testified that her signature was solicited by a fellow employee, Fred Russom, who asked her "if I would sign the union card to petition for a vote in the market; if we wanted a union or not, to have to bring a vote in the store." She further testified that he then handed her the card, that she read it, and signed it after she read it. It is concluded that the statement made to her cannot reasonably be construed as a representation that her signature was solicited only for the purpose of obtaining an election in view of the clear language of the card and her testimony that she read it before she signed it. Therefore, it is concluded that her card is a valid authorization. With respect to the cards of John Pepe and Mary Petregnani, the employees testi- fied to the conversations they had with Russom, who solicited their signatures, which testimony, if credited, might well furnish the basis for finding their cards to be invalid. Their testimony, however, was contradicted by Russom when called as a rebuttal witness. However, the resulting credibility issue need not be resolved: Even if these two cards were to be considered invalid, the Union would still have 18 valid cards and thus authorization from a majority of the employees in the unit which numbered 31. This is predicated on the above findings that, of the eight cards which Respondents characterized as "invalid," at least four are valid, and upon the conclusion that there is no merit in Respondents' contention that the eight cards which the Respondents characterize as "doubtful" cannot be considered valid authorizations. Respondents point out in their brief that four of the said "doubtful" cards were obtained by Cominsky and the other four by Russom. The gist of Respondents' argument seems to-be that the eight "doubtful" cards signed by employees who were not called to testify should be considered invalid because of the testimony given by other employ- ees, those whose cards were characterized by the Respondents as "invalid." The record fails to disclose that there was an invariable pattern of misrepresentation by Cominsky ahd Russom in soliciting the cards. It is deemed inappropriate to infer that because in two instances Cominsky represented that the cards were solely for the purpose of an election and in two other instances Russom may have made sim- ilar representations, they did the same thing in soliciting the signatures on the eight "doubtful" cards. Respondents offered no explanation as to why they did not call as witnesses the employees who signed said "doubtful" cards.17 Consequently, it is concluded that the so-called "doubtful" cards of Judith Nolan, Mary L. Thompson, Thomas Dunn, Edward Cowan, Matthew Crandall, Constance Mellon, Robert Kras- zewski, and Robert DeMarco are valid authorizations. The validity of the remain- ing six cards was not attacked by Respondents, and there is no evidence in the record upon which such an attack could be based.i$ It is concluded that the Union had a total of at least 18 valid authorization cards, and, therefore, represented a majority of the employees in the unit of 31. D. The refusal to bargain As stated hereinabove, on December 8, 1964, the Union sent a telegram to the Company claiming to represent a majority, expressing the desire to start bargaining negotiations, and offering to submit their authorization cards to a check by a dis- interested person. On the same day the Union filed a petition for certification in Case 3-RC-3453. The Company made no reply to the above telegram. On Janu- ary 18, 1965, the Regional Director for Region 3 directed an election be held in the unit found hereinabove to be appropriate. The election was held on February 17 which the Union lost by a substantial vote. On February 23 the Union filed timely objections and the Regional Director subsequently set aside the election and directed a new election be held. The complaint in the instant case was issued on April 21, 1965, and by an order dated April 30, 1965, the Regional Director approved the Union's request for permission to withdraw its petition in the aforesaid representa- --17 Respondents called a number of employees to testify with respect to most of the cards which Respondents characterized as "invalid " is One of said cards was signed by George Lane, a witness called by Respondent, whose testimony was that he gave ,the signed card to Russom , that Russom said nothing to him before he signed the card, and that he told Russom, "Whatever you guys do, that is what I want to do." THE GOLUB CORPORATION 367 tion proceedings . The General Counsel contends in his brief that he has proved that the Company refused to bargain with the Union despite its demand on Decem- ber 8, that at the time of its demand the Union represented a majority of the unit claimed, that in the circumstances of this case Respondents ' refusal to bargain was in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and that as an appropriate remedy the Company be required to bargain with the Union, since the aforesaid election was set aside based upon a timely filed objection which was sustained. In support of his position General Counsel cites Bernet Foam Products Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 1277, and Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 6270. It is well settled that an election is not the only method by which a union's repre- sentative status may be determined. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Floor- ing Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72. It is also well settled that where a union has authori- zation cards which were signed by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit the employer violates Section 8(a) (5)'and (1) of the Act if he refuses to bargain with the union, unless he is motivated by a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status. If, however, it is determined that the employer refuses to bargain because he rejects the collective-bargaining principle or desires to gain time in which to under- mine the union and dissipate its majority, he has violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. den. 341 U.S. 494; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 143 NLRB 848, enfd. 341 F.2d 750 (C.A. 6); Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, enfd. 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6). In making such a determination consideration must be given to all rele- vant facts in the case, including any' unlawful conduct of the employer. There is nothing in the record to, indicate the the Company responded orally or by written communication to the Union's telegram of December 8. The Company does not, in its brief, contend that its failure to respond was motivated by a good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Its defense appears to be that the Gen- eral Counsel has failed to prove that the. Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit at the time of its demand, and, also, that the General Counsel has failed to prove that the Company engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. It has been found hereinabove that the Union did represent a majority of the unit at the- time of its request for recognition and bargaining on December 8, 1964, and that the General Counsel did prove certain of the allegations of conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Therefore it remains to be determined from the circumstances in this case whether the Company's failure to respond affirma- tively to the Union's telegram of December 8 constituted a refusal to bargain viola- tive of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. In my opinion the Company's failure'to respond to the telegram was tantamount to a refusal to recognize and bargain with' the Union or to accept the offer of a card check as proof of the Union's majority status. ' It is concluded from the record that the Company ignored the telegram, not because it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, but in order to gain time in which to undermine the Union and dissipate its majority. There is nothing in the record which indicates that at the time it received'said telegram the Company had it reasonable basis for doubting the Union's claim of majority representation. The record discloses that commenc- ing on February 2, 1965, the Company embarked on a campaign to discourage its employees from adhering to the Union by letters dated February 2, 8, and 12 and by a speech at a dinner meeting of its employees on February 16, the night before the election. It was found hereinabove that through the medium of 'Golub's letters of February 2 and 8 and his speech on, February 16 the Company violated Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act by implying that, as an inevitable result of their electing to have the Union represent them, the employees would suffer a loss of personal privileges which the Company had formerly 'extended to them and there. would be a layoff of some of the employees, a cut in their hours, or, a closing of the store. In view of this finding and of the finding that at the time of the Comapny's receipt of the Union's request for recognition and bargaining there was no reasonable basis for doubt that the Union represented a majority of the employees, it is concluded that, commencing on December 8, 1964, the Company refused to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT UPON COMMERCE OF RESPONDENTS' UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The activities of the Respondents found to have been violative of the Act in sec- tion III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondents 368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD described in section I, above, have , a close, intimate , and substantial. relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis- putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondents engaged in certain unfair labor prac- tices, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and that they take certain affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondents refused to bargain in good faith with the Union, it will be recommended that Respondents bargain, upon request, with the Union and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement . Bernel Foam Products, Inc., 146 NLRB 1277; Irving Air Chute -Company, 149 NLRB 627. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondents are individually and collectively an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By letters to the employees dated February 2 and 8, 1965, and a speech to employees on February 16, 1965, Respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. All regular full-time and regular part -time employees, including "the meat and produce department managers and the head cashier, employed by Respondents [the Company] at their Mechanicville, New York, retail store, but excluding the store manager, assistant store managers , office clerical employees , professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropri- ate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. At all times material since December 7, 1964, the Union has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing to bargain with the Union on or about December 8, 1964, and thereafter, Respondents engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act alleged in the complaint except those allegations found hereinabove to have been sustained. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recommended that The Golub Corpo- ration and Mechanicville Central, Inc., their officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of the employees in the appropriate unit found herein. (b) Interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees by implying that as an inevitable result of selecting the Union as their bargaining representative they will suffer a loss of privileges and economic detriment. (c) In any other manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; to form, join or assist any labor organization ; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Bargain with the Union , upon request, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found appropriate herein with respect to wages, hours, and THE GOLUB CORPORATION 369 other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached embody such understanding in a-signed agreement. (b) Post at the store involved herein, in Mechanicville, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of said notice, to be-furnished, by the Regional Director for Region 3, shall, after being duly signed by Respondents or their representatives, be posted in said store by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith.20 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it relates to allegations of violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which were found not to have been sustained. 1 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." p In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Store Clerks of North America, District Union Local No. 1, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bar- gaining unit is; All regular full-time and regular part-time employees, including the meat and produce department managers, and the head cashier, employed in our Mechanicville, New York, retail store, but excluding the store manager, office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees by implying that if they select the aforesaid union as their collective-bargaining representative they will, as an inevitable result, suffer loss of privileges and economic detriment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to join or assist the aforesaid Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guar- anteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as author- ized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Repoiting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 243-084-67-vol. 159-25 370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as aforesaid. THE GOLUB CORPORATION, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) MECHANICVILLE CENTRAL, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro- visions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Fourth Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue , Buffalo, New York, Telephone 842-3112. Local Union No. 38, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (D. I. Chadbourne, Inc.) 1 and Phillip Havill. Case 2O-CB-1297. June 15,1966 DECISION AND ORDER On February 9, 1966, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer issued his Deci- sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Exam- iner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that these allegations be dismissed. The Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam- iner's Decision and a supporting brief. Thereafter, the General Council filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charg- ing Party and the Respondent filed reply briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Natonal Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the cross-exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, con- 1 The caption of this case is corrected to include the name of the Employer. 159 NLRB No. 36.