Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Retread Plant and Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union, Local 315, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-6328. June 21,1966 DECISION AND ORDER On March 8, 1966, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel.issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam- iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed., The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions,3 and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the modification noted hereafter. The General Counsel contends that the Trial Examiner erred in not recommending that discriminatee Eugene Carter be awarded rein- statement or backpay. The Trial Examiner based his recommenda- tion on a finding that Carter would have been discharged for a non- discriminatory reason on the same day. Carter started work for the Respondent on August 25, 1965, as a buffer. He was responsible for forming a union at the plant shop. On September 21, 1965, a meeting was held at his home at which seven employees attended and signed union authorization cards and Carter was elected chairman of the union committee. On Thursday, September 23, Plant Manager Lucas had a meeting of the employees in the plant concerning wages, hours, vacations, ' The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record in this proceeding, including the exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and posi- tions of the parties. 2 The Trial Examiner at one place in his Decision referred to the fact that Lucas decided on Saturday, July 25, to discharge Carter and also that the first union meeting was held at Carter' s home on July 21. The correct dates above should be September 25 and'Sep- tember 21 , respectively , and the Decision is corrected accordingly ' ' 11 1 3 Cf. N.L.R.B. v Boot-Ster Manufacturing Co., Inc., 361 F 2d 325 (C A. 6). 159 NLRB No. 61. GOODYEAR TIRE CO. RETREAD PLANT 835 and -overtime. During the meeting Lucas told the assembled employ- ees that if they had a union and Carter was the union steward, they would have to go through the union steward with their problems. Lucas made it apparent at the meeting that he disliked union stewards. ' On Friday, September 24, Lucas called Carter into his office and told Carter that he was a very good worker, the fastest buffer he knew, and Carter should have a very good future with the Company if he would stop some of this "foolishness." At that time, Carter told Lucas that he had signed a union card and had been elected chairman of the union committee. Lucas asked Carter if he wanted to continue working for Goodyear and Carter replied affirmatively. As Carter had four or five tires to buff, Lucas then told him that he could come in the next day, Saturday, if he wanted to, and make overtime pay. Carter stated that he would not be able to work because he was going to take his baby to the doctor the next day and Lucas voiced no objection. Accordingly, the next day, Saturday, September 25, Carter did not work. Robert King, an assistant district manager, who supervises Goodyear retail stores, telephoned Lucas and told him that the per- sonnel department had disapproved Carter as an employee and to discharge him. Lucas replied that he had already discharged him because Carter had not reported to work that morning. The personnel report on Carter, a normal personnel procedure on all new hires before they were accepted as permanent employees, was requested on September 3, and stamped "disapproved" on Septem- ber 21 by Ralph Donaldson, personnel manager for Goodyear's south- ern region. Donaldson rejected Carter for employment because of Carter's difficulties with previous employers. On Monday morning, September 27, Lucas telephoned his assistant, Fountain, and directed him to tell Carter that he was discharged for failure to report for work on Saturday. After being told why he was discharged, Carter replied that there must be a misunderstand- ing as Lucas knew he was not coming in that Saturday. The Trial Examiner found that Carter's failure to work on Satur- day was used as a pretext and that Lucas had made the decision to terminate Carter for discriminatory reasons. He further concluded that, inasmuch as Carter's personnel report had been returned dis- approved, his discharge would have also been effected at the same time for nondiscriminatory reasons. Thus, while finding that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated and violative of the Act, the Trial Examiner concluded that Carter was not entitled to either reinstate- ment or backpay. We disagree with the failure to recommend rein- statement and backpay. 836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The disapproval of Carter's personnel report was not tantamount to a discharge. Donaldson, personnel manager for Respondent's southern region, testified that some employees have remained in Respondent's employ despite disapprovals on personnel reports. It appears that such employees were given the opportunity to explain the basis for, the. disapproval and, if they showed that Respondent's information was incorrect, were retained. Carter was given no such opportunity for explanation. He was considered to be a capable worker with. a bright future and the indication is that, but for his union activity,, he too would have been afforded an opportunity to clarify his alleged difficulties with previous employers. In other words, it does not follow from the mere disapproval of his personnel report that Carter would have been discharged for that reason. All that is certain is that Carter was discharged for his union activity and we believe it would effectuate the policies of the Act to reinstate him with backpay.4 [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with the following modification : [1. Add the following as paragraphs 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) to the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, the present 2(b) and 2(c) being consecutively relettered 2(e) and 2(f) respectively : [" (b) Offer Eugene Carter immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, by payment of a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination against him to the date of his reinstatement, less his net earnings dur- ing said period, in the manner prescribed in F. TV. Woolworth Com- pany, 90 NLRB 289, with interest on the backpay due in accordance with Board policy as set forth in Isis Plumbing di Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716." [" (c) Notify Eugene Carter, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Uni- versal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after dis- charge from the Armed Forces." P (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records and reports, social security tax payment records, timecards, and all other records necessary to compute the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order." ' Cf Interurban Gag Corporat on, 149 NLRB 576 ; Merchandiser Press, Inc , 115 NLRB 1441, 1442. GOODYEAR TIRE CO. RETREAD PLANT 837 [2. The first paragraph of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision is amended to read : [WE WILL bargain with the Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union, Local 315, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representa- tive of our employees in the appropriate unit described below. [All production and maintenance employees and truck- drivers at our Atlanta, Georgia, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [3. Add the following as the second paragraph of the Appendix and the present second paragraph will become the third paragraph. [WE WILL offer Eugene Carter immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and will make him whole for any loss of earnings which he may have suf- fered by reason of the discrimination against him. [4. Add the following immediately below the signature line at the bottom of the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision. [NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to reinstatement upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding , heard before Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel at Atlanta, Georgia, on January 17, 1966 , pursuant to a charge filed the preceding October 1 and a complaint issued November 1,1 presents questions as to whether the Respond- ent, herein called the Company (a) engaged in unlawful threats and interrogation of employees because of their activity on behalf of the Charging Party, herein called the Union , (b) discharged one Eugene Carter for union activity, and (c) by these alleged unfair labor practices prevented the holding of a fair election so that it should be ordered to bargain with the Union, which had authorization cards from a majority of the employees at the time the Union requested , and the Company refused, to bargain collectively. Upon the entire record , including my observation of the demeanor of the wit- nesses,2 and after due consideration of the briefs filed by General Counsel and by Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Company is an Ohio corporation, which operates among other- establish- ments a tire retreading plant in Atlanta, Georgia, from which it ships annually products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside that State. , The- Company I Unless otherwise Indicated all dates herein referlto the year 1965. 21n general I credit the testimony of all the witnesses called by both sides In this case except that of Plant Manager William Lucas, whom I thought evasive and less than candid. I do not credit his testimony where it conflicts with that of other witnesses. 838 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD admits, and I find , that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Union's organizing drive and the Company's response thereto On Tuesday, September 21, 1965, 7 of the approximately 18 production and maintenance employees of the Atlanta retread plant met at the home of Eugene Carter, who had been employed there since August 25, signed cards authorizing the Union to act as their bargaining representative, and elected Carter as chairman of the union committee. Four more employees signed such cards during the next 2 days, and another was signed September 28. On September 22, Plant Manager William Lucas asked employee John Black- mon, while the latter was at work, whether he had signed a union card When Blackmon answered that he had, Lucas went on to say that he "didn't want no- mess like that in the shop because you couldn't do one's job." He also asked Black- mon who the leader was, and when Blackmon professed ignorance, Lucas continued that "he wished he knew; he would get rid of them before the mess goes too far." That same day Lucas called employee Robert Driskell into the office, asked if he had heard anything about a union, and warned Driskell that he had "better leave it alone" as Lucas had done Driskell "a lot of favors" in the form of offering him overtime. Lucas also stated to Driskell that "if the boys wanted to get shitty about it, he [Lucas] had a 3-week vacation coming, and he could close the shop up and if he didn't open the door, well there wouldn't nobody have a job." The next day, September 23, Lucas addressed the employees in a group on a number of subjects, including unions. Stating that he was not antiunion and that he did not care whether or not anyone belonged to a union, Lucas also told the employees that if they had a union they should be careful in their selection of a union steward, who would be a go-between or pimp between them and their employer, and who might refuse to handle their grievances unless they privately gave him additional money to do so. In this connection Lucas named Carter as a possible union steward. After the meeting, Lucas asked Driskell to find out who the leader of the Union was, and offered Driskell an hour's overtime if he would do so. Later that week Lucas told employee David Clark that if the men "got a union" Lucas could put the employees "on production, and if we didn't work up to production, we'd be gone." In the same conversation Lucas stated that he did not "know who was, pushing the Union, but he had a good idea who was." 8 B. The discharge of Carter As noted above, Carter entered the Company's employ on August 25, at which time he was placed on the "Atlanta payroll" pursuant to company practice under which new employees were not put on the "Akron payroll," with certain additional prerequisites, until the completion of a "personnel check" which determined if they were to be retained as permanent employees or discharged as not meeting the requirements of the Company's regional personnel office. Carter was elected head of the union committee at the meeting which was held at his house on Tuesday, September 21. Shortly thereafter, as detailed above, Plant Manager Lucas indi- cated an intention to fire the union leader, and late that week Lucas indicated that he was aware of the leader's identity. On Friday, September 24, Lucas called Carter to the office. Carter's testimony, which I credit, describes the conversation as follows: Well, he told me that I was a good worker; that I was the fastest buffer that he knowed of and I was a very good buffer and I could have a very good future with the company if I would stop some of this foolishness. He told me that he 3 The record also contains testimony attributing unlawful threats and interrogation to Supervisor Edley Fountain. The complaint alleges no such violations, and as Fountain was not called as a witness , I cannot find that the matter was fully litigated. I there- fore make no findings with respect to whether he made the statements attributed to him. GOODYEAR TIRE CO. RETREAD PLANT 839 knew I needed to make more money and he could make me Assistant Super- visor or Foreman. And he asked me if I was him and he was me, what would he do. I told him, I said, "I don't know what you're talking about." He repeated the question again, says, "If I was you and you was me, what would you do?" I said, "Well, I assume you're talking about the Union, but I signed a Union card and they elected me Chairman of the Union committee. But if you was me and I was you, I don't know what I'd do." So, he told me that if I would keep my nose clean and I was a good worker, I could have a good future with Goodyear. And he asked me did I want to continue working for Goodyear and I told him, "yes." And he told me that- he asked me how many tires I had left to buff and I told him four or five. And he said, "Well, you come in tomorrow and buff those tires if you want to." He said, "I don't care how much overtime you make. You can make $150 if you want to." So, I told him, I said, "My baby is sick and I think I'm going to have to take her to the doctor tomorrow." He said, "Well, you come in in the morning if you want to. I don't care how much overtime you make." Q. What, if anything, did he say about a policeman? A. Oh, yeah. He said that he was like a policeman; he could get me fired if he wanted to. He said, "You're a good worker, but I can get you. A police- man can get you for jay-walking or speeding or get you for no reason at all." He said, "I could fire you if I wanted to." Lucas testified that he expected Carter to be at work the next morning, Saturday, September 25, but Carter was not there. (Saturday was an "overtime" day, not a regularly scheduled workday, but Carter had worked the three preceding Saturdays ) At about 10.30 that morning Robert King, an assistant district manager who super- vises Goodyear retail stores and the retread shop in the Atlanta area, telephoned Lucas to inquire if Lucas had an employee named Carter. Lucas replied in the affirmative, and King continued: "Well, the Personnel Department has disapproved this employee and it will be necessary for you to discharge him." Lucas replied: "Well, I've already discharged him, due to him not reporting to work this morning " The personnel report in question was a routine check made on every new employee. The Report on Carter, requested September 3, was stamped "disapproved" on Sep- tember 21 by Ralph Donaldson, personnel manager for Goodyear's southern region, who testified that he rejected Carter because of the data on the report showing Carter's difficulties with previous employers. Apparently King did not find this directive in his office until the morning of September 25, when he called Lucas. Early the following Monday morning, September 27, Lucas telephoned the shop and directed his assistant, Fountain, to tell Carter he was discharged for failure to report on Saturday. Fountain so advised Carter, who replied that there must be some misunderstanding as Lucas knew Carter was not coming in that Saturday. He obtained permission from Fountain to wait for Lucas, but later when Fountain saw Carter discussing his case with one of the employees, Fountain directed him to leave and Carter did so. At the hearing the Company introduced evidence establishing that Carter had been late several times during his brief employment. So far as the record shows, he had not been warned or reprimanded therefor. Lucas testified that he had dis- charged other employees for failure to report to work. C. The refusal to bargain On Wednesday, September 29, union representatives called on Lucas at the plant and formally requested recognition and bargaining. At this time the Union had authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the stipulated production and maintenance unit .4 Lucas replied that he lacked the necessary authority, and + The unit consisted of 18 men, including Carter, discharged September 25, and Williams, hired September 27 and discharged September 29 The Union had 11 cards, including those of Carter and Williams (plus a card from former employee Davis). It therefore had at least 9 out of 16 , even if both Carter and Williams be excluded S40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD telephoned King, who in turn telephoned his superior, Donaldson, whom King located in Memphis. Donaldson advised King that the Company's policy was not to recognize any union whose proof of majority rested on authorization cards, and that the policy was to follow the Board's election procedure, in which the Company would cooperate by stipulating to a consent election. Either before or after talk- ing to Donaldson (the record is unclear but the discrepancy is not material) King told the union representatives over the telephone that he too lacked authority to extend recognition, notwithstanding their representation that they had cards from a majority of the employees. Within the next week or 10 days the Union was offi- cially advised that the Company would consent to an election, but the Union declined to follow that procedure because of its belief that company unfair labor practices had destroyed the Union's majority. D. Concluding findings 1. The statements of Lucas to employees Blackmon, Driskell, and Clark, sum- marized above, establish that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by interrogating employees as to their union activity, by threatening to ascertain the identity of the union leader and to discharge him, by implying that whether an employee was a union adherent would affect the amount of overtime given him, by threatening to shut down because of union activity, by asking an employee to ascer- tain, and to report to Lucas, the name of the union leader, and by threatening that if the shop became organized, Lucas would impose new production standards and dis- charge employees who failed to meet them. 2. I further find that Lucas when he decided on Saturday, July 25, to discharge Carter was motivated by Carter's leadership of the Union. As noted above, the first union meeting was held at Carter's house on July 21 and Carter_ was elected head of the group. By the next day Lucas was aware of the union activity, and on two occasions that week he expressed a desire to ascertain the identity of the leader, stating on one occasion that he would fire the man. Late in the week he told another employee that "he had a good idea who was pushing the Union." Finally, of course, Carter told Lucas of Carter's role in the Union. Needless to say, Carter's union activity did not immunize him from discharge for cause such as a failure to report for duty when expected. But the question is whether Lucas was in fact motivated by Carter's absence on the Saturday in ques- tion or by his union activity. It is possible that Lucas and Carter. ,had a misunder- standing as to whether Carter was volunteering to work on that Saturday, which was outside the regular workweek. But even assuming that Lucas had expected him in, I find that Lucas would not have fired Carter, who Lucas admitted was a capable worker with a bright future,5 but for Carter's leadership of the Union, and that Lucas discharged Carter in implementation of Lucas' earlier threat to get rid of whoever was leading the union movement. After Lucas determined to fire Carter, Lucas received on the same day a directive from headquarters to let Carter go for other lawful reasons. This establishes that Carter would have been lawfully discharged at that time, and he is therefore not entitled to reinstatement or backpay. 3. Prior to the unfair labor practices which Lucas committed during the days following the Union's attempt to organize, the Union obtained authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the stipulated bargaining unit. The Company contends that it has a policy against recognizing unions on the basis of cards, and that it insists on elections to establish the Union's majority. Such a policy may be a defense to a charge of refusal to bargain where the employer has done nothing to prevent the holding of a fair election. John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99. On the other hand, quaere whether Serpa applies where the employer, as here, does not indicate any doubt of the Union's majority,6 for it is settled law that a Board certi- fication is not a prerequisite to the obligation to bargain. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooiing Co, 351 US. 62, 71-72. In any event, where the employer engages in conduct which prevents the holding of a fair election, he must needs abide by other means of establishing whether the Union in fact repre- sented a majority of the employees. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v., Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 5 Lucas also admitted that one day earlier that month when Carter came in late Lucas said he was glad Carter "wasn't out job-hunting because I thought he was a good buffer." 6 See N.L.R.B. V. C. J. Glasgow Company, 356 F.2d 476 (C.A. 7). GOODYEAR TIRE CO. RETREAD PLANT 841 F.2d 344, 346-347 (C.A. 6); N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 61 LRRM 2177 (C.A. 2). On the other hand, not every minor violation of the statute committed after a union attains majority status will automatically result in a bargaining order. Hammond & Irving, Incorporated, 154 NLRB 1071; Harvard Coated Products Co, 156 NLRB 162; see also N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (C.A. 2). In the instant case, the discharge of Carter, which would ordinarily be enough, standing alone, to warrant imposition of the rule followed in the Delight and Gotham Shoe cases, loses some of its force as Carter would have been discharged at the same time for lawful reasons. But quite apart from Carter's discharge, the interference, restraint, and coercion in which Lucas engaged lead to the imposition of the bargaining order. Threats to seek out the identity of the union leader and to discharge him, efforts to bribe or pay employees for espionage, and threats to shut down or'to impose severe terms if the employees organize are far more serious violations than those in Hammond, Harvard, and Flomatic.7 Moreover, in Ham- mond less than 6 percent of the work force was involved in the unfair labor prac- tices and in Harvard only 2 out of 60 employees were involved, whereas in the instant case unlawful, coercive statements were made to three employees out of 16 or 18. Flomatic has been repeatedly distinguished by the court which decided it on the ground that the interference was minimal and there was no demand to bargain. I conclude, therefore, that in the light of the Company's unfair labor practices, its refusal to bargain with the Union upon request violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Moreover, even assuming that the Union had lost its majority by the time of its requests, and even assuming that King and Donald- son were in good faith when they refused to bargain in the absence of an elec- tion, a bargaining order here would be appropriate to restore the status which existed prior to the Company's violations of Section 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Local 152, aff/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. N.L.R.B., 343 F.2d 307, 309 (C.A.D.C.); Summit Mining Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 260 F.2d 894, 900 (C.A. 3); N.L.R.B. v. Joe and Mike Calda- rera, d/b/a Falstaff Distributing Company, 209 F.2d 265, 268-269 (C A. 8); D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 179 F.2d 876, 879-880 (C.A. 5). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By interrogating and threatening employees with respect to their union activity as,described above, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By discharging Carter for his leadership of the Union, the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of the employees in the admittedly appropriate unit, the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY I shall recommend an order directing the Company to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and from any other invasion of its employees' Section 7 rights. N.L.R.B. v. Bama Co, 353 F.2d 320, 323-324 (C.A. 5). Affirmatively, I shall recommend an order directing the Company to bargain with the Union upon request (a provision which would be appropriate to remedy the violations of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) even had there been no violation of Section 8(a)(5) and to post an appropriate notice. I do not, however, recommend reinstatement or backpay for Carter, as the record establishes that he would have been lawfully discharged on the same day on which he was discharged' for union activity. Contrary to the contention of General Counsel, the reinstatement issue may be properly disposed of at this stage of the proceeding (see e.g., New Hyden Coal Company, 108 NLRB 1145, 1148-49), and on this record the disposition of that issue is likewise con- clusive as to backpay. 7 Lucas' profession of neutrality in his remarks to the employees can be given no weight as he continued his unlawful practices thereafter. 842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly , on the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions , and on the entire record, I recommend pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Retread Plant, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating, threatening , or discriminating against employees because of their union activities , or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. (b) Refusing to bargain with the Retail, Wholesale Department Store, Union Local 315, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the produc- tion and maintenance employees and truckdrivers at Respondent's Atlanta, Geor- gia, plant, excluding office clerical employees , professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor organiza- tion as the statutory representative of the employees in the above-described unit (b) Post at its tire retread plant at Atlanta, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 10, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material - (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision what steps have been taken to comply here- with 9 8 In the event that this Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 0 In the event that this Order Is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read , "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain with Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union, Local 315, AFL-CIO, as the representative of our employees WE WILL NOT question them as to whether they support a union, or threaten, or interfere with them in any way because of their union activity. All our employees have the right to join or not to join a union. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY RETREAD PLANT, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance, with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528 Peachtree-Seventh Building , 550 Seventh Street NE., Atlanta, Georgia, Telephone, 526-5741.