Mutual Industries, Inc.

MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC. 885 WE WILL NOT interfere with the effort of Local 84, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, to negotiate for, or represent as exclusive bargaining agent of, the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL upon request, bargain with the above -named Union, as exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of employment, if an understanding is reached , embodying such an understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All inspectors excluding all office clerical employees , guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. CERTIFIED TESTING LABORATORIES, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1700 Bankers Securities Building, Walnut and Juniper Streets, Philadelphia , Pennsylvania 19107, Telephone 597-7617. Mutual Industries, Inc. and Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 21-CA-6863. June 91, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On April 14, 1966, Trial Examiner Abraham H. Mailer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam- iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewd the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,' conclusions,2 and recommendations. i We do not pass on the Trial Examiner's conclusion with respect to Kardaschian's card as the Union had in any event been designated as their representative by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. 3 The Trial Examiner inadvertently described a telegraphic request for additional bar- gaining, dated August 24, 1965 , as having been sent by Plant Manager Meyers , when in fact that telegram was sent by Union Organizer Schwartz ; the Trial Examiner', inadvei tent finding Is hereby corrected. 159 NLRB No. 73. 886 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons articulated in Aaron Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077, that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act when it refused to bargain with the Union after it had recognized the Union's majority status and had entered into negotiations with it. See, also, Greyhound Terminal, 137 NLRB 87, enfd. 314 F.2d 43 (C.A. 5). [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE On July 28, 1965, Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , filed a charge against Mutual Industries , Inc.,' herein called the Respondent . On August 12, 1965, the Union filed an amended charge. Upon such charges, the Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board, on October 5 , 1965, issued on behalf of the General Counsel a complaint against the Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C., sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. In substance, the complaint alleged that since on or about April 12, 1965,2 the Union had been designated by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit described in said complaint , as their exclusive bargaining representative ; that on said date the Respondent and the Union entered into a written recognition agree- ment by which the Respondent agreed to recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of the employees in said unit ; that since that date the Respondent has failed and refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union; and that during the month of July, without notifying or bargaining with the Union and for the purpose of undermining the Union , Respondent announced to the employ- ees that it was planning to secure for its employees health and medical insurance benefits. In its duly filed answer , the Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Abraham H. Mailer at Los Angeles, California, on December 7, 8, and 9, 1965. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs with me. Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon consideration of the entice record , including the briefs of the parties, and upon my observation of each of the witnesses, I made the following: FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a corporation having its main office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is engaged in the manufacture of bias binding and webbing at plants located in the States of California, Georgia, North Carolina, Missouri , and Texas. Annually, in the regular course of business , Respondent has an inflow of goods and materials across State lines of at least $50,000, and an outflow of products across State lines of at least $50 ,000. Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction here. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board , International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, is now and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1 The name of the Respondent as amended by amendment to complaint. ,'All events Involved herein took place during 1965 MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC. M. THE ISSUES 887 1. Whether the Union represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit when it requested recognition and bargaining. 2. Whether the Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority. 3. Whether the Respondent bargained in good faith with the Union. 4. Whether the Respondent offered its employees a group insurance plan in lieu of the Union. IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of events 1. The advent of the Union Respondent's Los Angeles plant, which is the only one involved in this proceed- ing, become operative about January 1.3 David Meyers was the plant manager. Among other functions, Meyers hired and fired employees, received correspondence addressed to the Respondent and acted upon such correspondence, and in his discretion determined what correspondence should be forwarded to Respondent's main office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Edmund Dunn was vice president of Respondent and Meyers' immediate superior. Meyers and Dunn communicated about twice a week by telephone. During late February or early March, the Union began an organizing campaign at the Los Angeles plant. Jack S. Spindler, a business agent of the Union, made numerous trips to Respondent's premises and was never denied access. Plant Manager Meyers was fully aware of Business Agent Spindler's activity, testifying that it seemed that every time -Respondent had a new employee, Spindler was at the plant. 2. The Union requests recognition and bargaining On March 10, Union Organizer Sam Schwartz mailed a letter to Respondent stating that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's production and maintenance employees and requested Respondent to advise the Union of a suitable time and place for a conference to negotiate hours, wages, and other conditions of employment .4 Plant Manager Meyers denied receiving this letter, although in his pretrial affidavit, which had been cleared by Respondent's attorneys in Philadelphia prior to submission to the Board, he admitted that he had received the letter. Meyers testified that his affidavit was incorrect in that respect. For reasons more fully discussed infra, I do not credit Meyers' denial of the receipt of the letter. Approximately 10 days later, Schwartz telephoned Meyers. Schwartz asked Meyers if he had received the letter, and Meyers replied that it was unfair of the Union to send that type of letter to the Respondent. Schwartz then told Meyers that he would come to Respondent's plant to discuss the matter.5 In the latter part of March, Schwartz and Spindler went to Respondent's prem- ises and met with Meyers and Norman Gross who was in charge of sales for Respondent's plant. During the meeting, Schwartz told Meyers that the Union represented a majority of the employees. Meyers repeated that it was unfair of the Union to send the letter. Schwartz then told Meyers that the industry was not a confined industry; that any union could come into the field and the Union wanted Respondent to know that it was the first one to sign up the employees and wanted to bargain with the Respondent. Meyers pointed out that the Respondent had certain problems; that he would like to discharge certain employees. Schwartz replied that since the Union was the legal representative of the employees, it could not permit Respondent to fire .anybody. He told Meyers that if he would sit down and work out a contract, he, Schwartz, would work out conditions of hire so that Respondent would have the right to discharge people within certain periods of time. Schwartz suggested working out a stipulation whereby the Respondent recognized the Union. Meyers replied, "All right. You bring the paper down. The only thing is, I want you to know that I speak to Philadelphia on Thursdays, and I would have to get an okay from them." Schwartz also assured Meyers that 3 Respondent operates this plant under the name of Mutual Industries of California 4 Although the letter was mailed by Union Organizer Schwartz, it was signed by John Ulene, manager of the Union 6 The credited testimony of Schwartz. Meyers did not remember the conversation 888 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he would give Respondent concessions because it was a new company. He also told him that when the recognition agreement was submitted to Meyers, he would have Spindler bring the authorization cards with him to show them to Meyers.6 On April 13, Spindler came to Respondent's plant with the signed authorization cards and a document which has been described as a recognition agreement. The document was dated April 12, and was signed by John Ulene, manager of the Union. It read as follows: It is agreed that Mutual Industries of California, Inc., hereby recognizes the Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, ILGWU, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining agent of all of its production and maintenance employees (including shipping and receiving department employees) employed at its plant at 1118 Santa Fe Avenue, Los Angeles, California. The first negotiating conference for a collective-bargaining agreement shall take place April 12, 1965, and shall continue until concluded. It is the Company's intention at the present time, that the final phase of negotiations will be undertaken by the principal officers of the Company who will shortly be in Los Angeles for that purpose. Spindler gave Meyers the authorization cards.? Meyers flipped through the cards and said, "I know you have this shop, and there will be no problems." He then signed the recognition agreement.8 Spindler left a signed copy, of the recognition agreement with Meyers. According to Meyers, he did not forward the document to Respondent at Philadelphia. Vice President Dunn testified that the first time he heard of the recognition agreement was in August, after the charge had been filed by the Union, when he was informed about it by his attorney in Philadelphia. He testi- fied further that he did not communicate with the Union concerning the document. 3. The bargaining negotiations On or about April 20, after a telephone conversation with Meyers, Schwartz sent Spindler to Meyers with a copy of an agreement which was prevalent in the industry. Meyers forwarded the agreement to Vice President Dunn who under- stood the contract to be a union proposal. A few days later, Schwartz asked Meyers if the contract had been sent to Philadelphia, and Meyers answered in the affirmative. During this conversation, Meyers" told Schwartz that Vice President 6 The credited testimony of Schwartz corroborated by Spindler. It is admitted that the meeting took place. However, all that Meyers could remember about the meeting was the fact that he raised the question about his right to fire two of the employees. Meyers also testified that on one occasion he may have told Spindler and Schwartz, "If you have a majority' of the people, we will not fight you." He also testified that he may have believed Spindler when the latter told him that the Union had a majority because "I have never known him to lie to me." T The cards were signed by: Ustica, Thomas, Rodriguez, Lara, Hill, Bocage, Jana, Eloy Elias, Mario P. Elias, and Kardaschian. 8 Plant Manager Meyers denied that Spindler had handed him the authorization cards. He admitted signing the recognition agreement, but testified that after he read it, he asked Spindler'-' what this was all about" and that Spindler replied, "All it means, Dave, is that we are the first Union to come in here." Meyers testified further that he replied, "In that' case, I don't see any objection to signing it." Based on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified, I credit Spindler's testimony and I do not credit Meyers In addition, the following circumstances derogate from the credibility of Meyers' testimony. Prior to working for Respondent, Meyers had been plant manager for another concern for approximately 18 years. While so employed, he had occasion to deal with a union representing the employees of that plant (although not as a negotiator). Moreover, Meyers has had the benefit of a college education. I find it difficult to conceive that a man with Meyers' background, after reading a clear and unambiguous document, would take the word of a union representative that the document did not mean what it said In short, I find Meyers' explanation disingenuous. Nor does Meyers' testimony become credible because it was corroborated by that of Gross. Gross' recollection of the event was hazy and fragmentary. It may well be that Gross was confusing what had admittedly been said by the union representatives at the earlier meeting in March, when the union representatives told Meyers that the industry was of a type that could be organized by anyone and the Union wanted Respondent to know that it was the first union to have the employees signed up. MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC. 889 Dunn would be in Los Angeles about May .15, and when Schwartz said that he would be in the 'East at that time, Meyers suggested that Schwartz telephone Dunn while he was in the East. ' It is not disputed that on, or about May 12, Schwartz 'telephoned Dunn from Miami and asked to meet with him. -Dunn suggested that Schwartz call him again on May 25. According to Schwartz" credited testimony, he informed Dunn ,that the Union wanted to conclude an agreement if possible, since the Respondent had the Union's proposals, and that Dunn, said, "You know we are just getting started." Schwartz replied that the Union would work out something-for him. On May 25, Schwartz telephoned Dunn 'from New York City and was told by Dunn's secretary_that,Dunn was'in Los Angeles. ` ' ` In 'the latter part ' of, May, Samuel Otto, Pacific coast director of the Union, was in Philadelphia and attempted to arrange a meeting with Dunn. Otto was unsuccessful during 'his stay in Philadelphia and asked Samuel Ross, vice president of ILC4WU and, manager of Philadelphia Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, to meet with Dunn and to handle the negotiations' on behalf of the Union. 'Schwartz sent Ross a copy of the industry agreement which he had previously given Meyers and informed. Ross as to what concessions he could make. t After several unsuccessful attempts to reach Dunn, Ross succeeded in arranging a meeting for June 27 at Dunn's office. During this meeting, they discussed the following matters: minimum wage rates for" operators, length of apprenticeship period, rate for, spaghetti workers,9 the fact that Respondent had already' granted high wage rates in order to lure workers away from other employers, the fact that the Teamsters Union was mentioned in the contract, and fringe benefits. The parties did not arrive at any agreement, and according to Ross' credited testimony, Dunn said he would leave the ' above matters to be negotiated by Meyers and would give him authority to conclude the agreement.10 ' ' On or about July 1, Schwartz telephoned Meyers and requested a meeting. Meyers told Schwartz that "[i]t is an odd thing that he called, because I was going to call him, because Mr. Dunn instructed me to do so." They arranged to meet on July 6, at which time they discussed certain wage rates. Meyers requested Schwartz to put these items in writing, and on July 14, Spindler delivered to Meyers a document setting forth certain proposed hourly rates, which Meyers forwarded to Dunn. During this meeting Spindler exhibited to Meyers the additional author- ization cards which he had received from Respondent's employees.ii 0 Spaghetti workers are those who make a particular type of binding 10 Dunn testified that all he was doing at this meeting was attempting to secure in- formation as to what the Union wanted. He denied that he agreed to authorize'DZeyers to negotiate, but said he would ask Meyers to secure more information concerning the points discussed . Based on my observation of Dunn's demeanor while testifying„ I do not credit his testimony. Although it appears from Meyers' subsequent handling of the nego- tiations that Dunn did not carry out his promise to authorize Meyers to conclude an agree- ment, I find that his failure to do so may well have been motivated by his desire to delay the negotiations by requiring time-consuming communications between Los Angeles and Philadelphia 11 Having already received a recognition agreement from the Respondent, Spindler's action in showing Meyers the additional authorization cards may appear to be somewhat unusual. The explanation may lie in the fact that, since the signing of the recognition agreement, there had been several changes in Respondent's personnel, and it may, be that Spindler wanted to demonstrate to Meyers that the Union still represented a majority df Rspondent's employees. Should the Union's majority status in July be deemed material, ,the record shows that on July 14, Respondent employed 13 people in the appropriate unit and that 10 of these: M. Elias, Lara, E. Elias, Estrada, Marinez, Jasso, Kardaschian, Bocage, Fairfield, and Ustica had signed cards. Jasso testified that she later changed her mind and asked M Elias to, return her card, but was told that the man who had brought the cards was gone. The fact that Jasso attempted to get the card back from Al. Elias does not operate as an unequivocal revocation of the authorization , as it is in the nature of telling a fellow employee that the signer no longer desired to be represented by the Union. There is no evidence in the record which indicates that she attempted, in any manner, to communicate her desire to the Union This is, therefore, no sufficient un- equivocal revocation of a valid authorization . Moore's Seafood Products, Inc., 152 NLRB 683, Tinley Park Dairy Co., d/b/a Country Lane Food 'Store, 142 NLRB 683, 685-686. In any event, even if Jasso's card were not to be counted, the Union nevertheless had a majority on July 14: 890 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD During the first week of August, Schwartz telephoned Meyers and asked him if he had heard from Dunn. Meyers replied that he had not and suggested that Schwartz telephone Dunn directly. Schwartz did so, but was informed by Dunn's secretary that Dunn was out of the office. Schwartz left his telephone number, but Dunn did not return the call. Schwartz again called Dunn later in the day, but was told that Dunn had not returned to the office. The next business day (Monday) Schwartz telephoned Dunn twice, but on each occasion was told that Dunn was on a long distance call and would call back when he vas finished. Dunn acknowledged receipt of the telephone messages and admitted that he did not return any of Schwartz' telephone calls. He testified that the reason he broke off contact with the Union was because he felt that a majority of the employees did not want a union and because oaf Respondent's inability to pay the requested rates. On or about August 23, Schwartz telephoned Meyers, and asked if Meyers had heard from Dunn. Meyers said Dunn would arrive in Los Angeles the next day. On August 24, Meyers sent Dunn at Respondent's Los Angeles plant the following telegram: Being you and your attorney are in Los Angeles. Request we meet for closing of collective bargaining agreement heretofore negotiated. Dunn did not reply to the telegram. The Union's final contact with Respondent was in late August or early September, when Robert Wachs, attorney for Respondent, spoke to Schwartz on the telephone and asked whether the Union would consent to an election, promising a fast elec- tion if the Union consented. Schwartz suggested that Wachs speak to Basil Fein- berg, attorney for the Union. Attorney Wachs then said: "Well, let me tell you this: If you don't consent to an election, we could drag this thing around." 4. Respondent proposes a medical insurance plan In addition to the refusal to bargain outlined above, the complaint alleged that in July, the Respondent through Foreman Anthony Elias,12 announced to the employees that the Respondent was planning to secure for its employees health and medical insurance benefits. Three of the employees, Estrada, Fairfield, and Ustica, testified credibly and unequivocally that Foreman Elias told them that the Com- pany was offering a medical plan in place of the Union. Foreman Elias did not specifically contradict their testimony. His recollection of the incident was admit- tedly vague. He remembered only that he had obtained information from the employees as to their ages and the number of children that they had 13 and that he told them, "I believe it is for insurance." The employees later learned that they, rather than the Respondent, were to pay the premiums and expressed disinterest in the plan. The group insurance plan was never put into effect. It is admitted that neither Meyers nor Dunn consulted or bargained with the Union at any time regarding a medical or hospitalization insurance plan. B. Concluding findings 1. The appropriate unit The Union sought a unit of all production and maintenance employees, includ- ing shipping and receiving department employees. During their discussions, the Union and the Respondent understood this to include the truckdriver. "It has long been established that a single plant unit is presumptively appropriate under the Act." Gordon Mills, Inc., 145 NLRB 771, 773.14 Respondent did not introduce any evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, I find and con- clude that all production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Los Angeles plant, including shipping and receiving department employees and truckdrivers, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 12 Respondent's answer admits that Foreman Elias was a supervisor. 1 Meyers testified that he had directed Foreman Elias to get this information from the employees because the Respondent was interested in providing a group insurance plan for the employees 141t is significant that the unit found appropriate in Gordon Mills included truck- drivers as well as production and maintenance employees. MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC. 891 2. The Union's majority On April 18, when Spindler presented to Meyers the recognition agreement, the Respondent employed 14 production and maintenance employees. Of these, nine- had signed cards authorizing the Union to act as its bargaining representative.15 The authorization card was in both English and Spanish. The English version reads as follows: AUTHORIZATION CARD I, of my own free will, hereby authorize the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, its affiliates and its representatives, to act exclusively as my agent and representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.16 Respondent contends that a majority of the employees had not designated the Union as a bargaining representative. The argument is based on the contention that three employees who had signed cards, Rodriguez, Hill, and Thomas, did not testify; that two employees, M. Elias and Eloy Elias, signed cards on the basis of misrepresentation as to the effect of the cards; and that one employee, Kardaschian, was solicited by the foremen and signed the card without understanding it and with- out intending it to constitute a designation. These contentions will now be examined. There is no merit to the contention that the cards of Rodriguez, Hill, and Thomas should not be counted because they did not testify. Their cards were authenticated by Trudy Slaughter, a union organizer. It is well settled that cards may be authen- ticated by a witness to their execution. The Colson Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 128, 134 (C.A. 8), enfg. 148 NLRB 827. Respondent, argues that the Gen- eral Counsel is under the duty of proving the subjective intent of these signers to designate the Union as their bargaining representative, and in support of this con- tention relies upon N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5). The Peterson case is inapposite. The court there held that the authorization card was ambiguous. In the instant case, the authorization card unequivocally authorized the Union to act as the bargaining representative of the signer. With regard to the card signed by M. Elias, Respondent relies on the testimony of M. Elias to the effect that when Spindler gave him the card to sign, he told him it was necessary for him to sign it in order that he, Spindler, could enter the plant to solicit the workers to join the Union. This testimony does not derogate from the validity of the card. The witness had been an ILGWU member since 1957 and was an ILGWU member when he signed the card. At one time he had been a union committeeman. He admittedly read the bold print on the type which said "AUTHORIZATION CARD," filled out the card, and signed it. It is unrealis- tic to believe that Spindler told him that he needed authorization cards in order to talk to the employees. Union representatives had appeared frequently at Respond- ent's plant and had talked to employees: In any event, even assuming arguendo that Elias was testifying correctly as to what Spindler had told him, it is apparent that Spindler did not tell him that this was the sole purpose of the card. Absent such limiting representation, it is well settled that the card was a valid union author- ization. See, e.g., S.N.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc, 147 NLRB 809, enfd. sub nom. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. N.L R.B, 352 F.2d 361 (C.A.D.C.); cert denied 382 U.S. 902; Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 862, enfd. 61 LRRM 2177 (C.A. 2). The foregoing principles apply with equal force to the authorization card signed by E. Elias. Although E. Elias testified.that an unidentified union representative told him that the card did not mean anything, he was also told: "We just like to know how many people are going to be in the shop, so we could form a union." Furthermore, he testified that the card was read to him before he signed it, that he "knew what it was, having been a member of the union for approximately 5 years, and that he knew that the purpose of the card was to give the union permission to represent him." In sum, it is clear that E. Elias signed the authorization card for the purpose of designating the Union as his bargaining representative, and the card is valid for that purpose. 15 M. Elias, Rodriguez, E. Elias, Jana, Kardaschian, Hill, Bocage, Ustica, and Thomas. One employee, Marinez, signed a card after April 13, while four, Benbow, Burga, Bushwar, and Ross, did not sign cards. 16 Respondent does not contend that the Spanish version of the authorization differed in any way from the English version. 892 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The testimony of Kardaschian„who testified, through an interpreter, is vague con- cerning the circumstances under which she signed the card. However, there is no testimony whatsoever of. any misrepresentation to her as to-the purpose and effect of the authorization card. What does stand out from her testimony is the fact that she was told by an -unidentified representative of the Union that -if she filled out the card, the Union would help her; and that after signing the card she gave it to Foreman Elias. Respondent contends that her signature was solicited' by 'her, foreman and, relying upon' Heck's Inc., -156 NLRB 760, argues that the participa- tion of a foreman in the solicitation or organizational efforts of a union tarots the showing. Heck's Inc. does not support Respondent's position; as slier was not•solic- ited by the foreman. To the contrary,-Spindler- testified credibly 'that he obtained Kardaschian's signature.- In any event, 'there is nothing in her testimony' which would overcome the presumption of validity flowing from the authorization which appears on the face of the card. The Colson Corporation, 148 NLRB 827, 840; enfd. 347 F.2d,128 (C.A. 8)., , In view of all the foregoing, I find and conclude-that on April 13, the Union had been designated by 9 of the, 14 employees in the appropriate unit, a clear majority. 3. Respondent's alleged doubts as-td the Union's majority Respondent claims that it had a good-faith doubt gas to the Union's majority. , The record contradicts the claim. At no time-either at the time of the signing of the recognition agreement or thereafter during the various discussions of the Union's bargaining demands-did any representative of the Respondent express to the' Union any doubt as to the Union's majority, or ask the Union to prove its major- ity status,17 or petition for an election.18 It is inconceivable that Meyers and Dunn would discuss the Union's bargaining demands and request special consideration because of the newness of the Los Angeles plant, if. Respondent entertained any good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority. Moreover, it is unreasonable to believe that, if Respondent had any doubt as to the Union's majority, Dunn would have directed Meyers to meet with the Union in July to obtain more specific informa-' tion as to the rates demanded by the Union. Atlanta Journal Company, 82-NLRB 832, 835.19 The only testimony offered by Respondent to support its alleged doubt as to the Union's majority is, in itself, singularly unconvincing. Meyers testified that he was told by Foreman Elias that the Union did not represent a majority of the employ- ees, and Dunn's doubt, in turn, is based on what Meyers allegedly told him. But Foreman Elias, called by Respondent to corroborate Meyers, did not support Meyers' testimony. Foreman Elias denied that he told Meyers that the Union did not represent a majority. Rather, he told Meyers that "several" of' the employees did not desire the Union. This is, indeed, a flimsy basis on which to claim a good- faith doubt as to the Union's majority. In view of all the foregoing I find and conclude that the Respondent at no time had any good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority. ' 17 N.L R.B. v. Crown Can Company, 138 F.2d 263, 266-267 (C.A. 8), cert. denied 321 U.S 769, enfg. 42 NLRB 1160. The failure of the Respondent to demand proof impliedly supports Spindler's testimony that, in April and again in July, he exhibited authorization cards to Meyers, demonstrating that the Union represented a majority 18 United States Gypsum Company, 90 NLRB 964, 966. Indeed, the only reference by Respondent to an election was in the form of a threat by Respondent's Philadelphia at- torney, made-after the Union had filed a charge, that "if you don't consent to an election, we could drag this thing around " 19 In view of the fact that Vice President Dunn met with the Union's representative and discussed the Union's bargaining demands, Respondent's contention that Meyers lacked authority to recognize the Union would appear to be moot. In any event, it is settled that, as plant manager, Meyers had at least ostensible authority to receive the Union's request for recognition and to act thereon. James Thompson & Co., Inc., 100 NLRB 456,' 462, enfd in part 208 F.2d 743 (CA 2) ; Rural Electric Company, Inc, 130 NLRB 799, 801-802, enfd . In part 296 F.2d 523 (C A. 10). Neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party contends that, when Meyers recognized the Union, he had authority to conclude a collective- bargaining agreement. Indeed, the recognition agreement clearly provided that final negotiations would be undertaken by the principal officers of the Re spondent. But this does not derogate from his ostensible authority to recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of the employees. - MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC. 893 4. Respondent's ' refusal to bargain As noted above, the Union submitted its bargaining demands to the Respondent, and these demands were discussed by Dunn and Ross in rPhiladelphia. Later, at Dunn's request, the Union submitted to Meyers a schedule of more specific hourly rates. Respondent did not make any counterproposals other than to suggest that it receive special consideration because of the fact that Respondent was new in the area. Finally, Dunn broke off the negotiations, refusing to return Schwartz' calls. Admittedly, one of the reasons Dunn broke off the negotiations was because he felt that the Union's demands were too high. However, Dunn never communicated Respondent's inability to pay the scale demanded by the Union, nor did he make any counterproposals to the Union. By summarily breaking off negotiations with- out notice, expressed reason, or counterproposal, Respondent had rejected the principle of collective bargaining and thereby refused to bargain within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and I so find.' Respondent relies ' on the Board's recent decision in 'John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99, to the effect that a mere exhibition of cards to an employer in such a way that he probably saw the names and signatures does not create the obligation to bargain or establish the employer 's bad faith. Serpa does not assist the Respond- ent in the instant case. In Serpa, supra, 100-101 , the Board laid down the principle: Where the General Counsel seeks to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(5) on the basis of a'card showing, he has the burden of proving not only that a majority of employees in the appropriate unit signed cards designating the union as bargaining representative , but also that the employer in bad faith declined to recognize and bargain with the union . This is 'usually -based on evidence indicating that respondent has completely rejected the collective-bargaining principle 'or seeks merely to gain time within which to undermine the union and` dissipate its' majority. ' . As demonstrated above, the facts of the instant case fully satisfy this requirement. First, the Respondent in the instant case, after seeing the cards signed an agreement rrecognizing the Union. Second, Respondent 'never challenged the Union 's, majority, but on the contrary engaged in discussions as to the Unions bargaining demands. Third, the Respondent did not negotiate in good faith, never made any counterpro- posals, but broke off- negotiations without any explanation to the . Union . Indeed, Vice President Dunn's incredulous explanation that in his discussions with the Union he was merely seeking information as to the Union 's demands is, in itself, an indica- tion that the Respondent did not bargain in good faith, but "has completely rejected - the collective-bargaimng , principle" (Serpa, supra). 5. Respondent's offer of a medical or -hospitalization insurance plan Foreman Elias' statement to the employees that the Company was offering a medical plan in place of the Union was independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It was a promise of a benefit to discourage the employees from joining or adhering to the-Union. The fact that the Respondent did not contemplate pay- ing the premiums for such insurance does not derogate from this conclusion. It is common knowledge that group insurance rates are lower than individually pur- chased hospitalization insurance . The plan, if implemented, would therefore inure -to the benefit of the employees . -Accordingly; Respondent's conduct constituted interference within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1), of the , Act. Joy Silk Mills Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732; 739 (C.A.D.C.), enfg. 85 NLRB 1263. In bypassing the , Union which had. been designated as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees and offering the plan directly to the employees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. It is well settled that group insurance is within the meaning of wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment. General Motors Corporation, 81 NLRB 779, 780; Clinton 'Foods, Inc., 112 NLRB 239; W. W. Cross and Company, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 174 F.2d 875, 878 (C.A. 1), enfg. 77 NLRB 1162. An employer violates Section 8(a)(5) by dealing directly with his employees concerning wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment after the employees have designated a union as their exclusive -bargaining representative. Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 683-684. 894 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent 's conduct in this regard was independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section IV above, occurring in con- nection with the business operations of Respondent set forth in section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow thereof: VI. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it be ordered to bargain collectively with the Union, upon request. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing, upon request, to bargain collectively with Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board , International Ladies' Garment Workers Union , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the following appropriate unit: all production and maintenance employees at Respondent 's Los Angeles plant, including shipping and receiving department employees and truckdrivers, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Promising and/or unilaterally providing a group hospitalization or medical insurance plan in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its Los Angeles plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 20 Copies of such notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent , be posted by said Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted , and maintained by it for a - period of 60 consecutive days. . Reason- able steps ' shall be taken by said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.21 20 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner," in the notice . In the further event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" 21 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read . "Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' ISLAND COAL AND LUMBER CORP. 895 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a trial examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse, upon request, to bargain collectively with Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at our Los Angeles plant, including shipping and receiving department employees and truckdrivers, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT promise and/or unilaterally provide a group hospitalization or medical insurance plan in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Los Angeles Dress and Sportswear Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named Union or any other labor organization. MUTUAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 688-5229. Local 1205, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Island Coal and Lumber Corp. Suffolk County District Council of Carpenters , AFL-CIO and Island Coal and Lumber Corp . Cases 09-CP-20-1 and 20-2. June 21, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On -April 15, 1966, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ents had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (7) (C) of the National Labor Relations Act, as 159 NLRB No. 77.