Phil-Modes, Inc.

'944 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Phil-Modes, Inc., and Harold Berlin d/b/a Berlin Coat Manufac- turing Co.* and International 'Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-3451. June 22, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On April 26, 1966, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Coun- sel and the Respondent filed exceptions and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. The Respond- ent and the Charging Party both filed briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire rec- ord in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with the following modifications : 2 [1. Paragraph 1(b) is amended to read: [" (b) Threatening employees with loss of insurance benefits and other economic benefits or other reprisals if they join the Union or if the Union succeeds in representing them." [2. The third paragraph of the notice is amended to read : [WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of insurance bene- fits and other economic benefits or other reprisals if you join the above-mentioned Union or if said Union succeeds in repre- senting our employees.] QED. NoT>a.-See footnote 1 of Trial Examiner's Decision. 3 We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the correctness of the Trial Examiner's finding that the authorization cards of employees Hickman , Powell, Paris, and Spradlin are not to be treated as valid authorization of union representation, as resolution of this issue does not materially affect our Decision herein. 2 The telephone number for Region 16, appearing at the bottom of the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is amended to read : "Telephone 335-4211, Extension 2145." 159 NLRB No. 84. PHIL-MODES, INC. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION 945 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an unfair labor practice case which came on to be heard before Trial Examiner James V. Constantine at Athens, Texas, on January 11, 1966, upon a complaint dated November 4, 1965, against a partnership known as Phil-Modes.' That complaint, issued by the General Counsel of the Board, through the Acting Regional Director of Region 16 (Fort Worth, Texas), was based on a charge dated August 31 filed by International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, against the partnership and Berlin Coat Mfg. Co.2 An answer to the complaint was filed by the partnership. At the opening of the hearing on January 11, 1966, the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint, inter alia, by (1) deleting the partnership as a Respondent and substituting as a Respondent therefor Phil-Modes, Inc., a Texas corporation, (2) adding as a party Respondent Harold Berlin, doing business as Berlin Coat Mfg. Co., and (3) alleging that Phit-Modes, Inc , and Berlin "are a single integrated enterprise." This motion was allowed; but, since Berlin had not been served as a party, the General Counsel asked for a recess "to bring Mr. Berlin in and let him speak to the Trial Examiner." I granted the recess but informed counsel that I refused to talk Berlin into doing anything if he appeared before me. However, I did insist that the General Counsel inform Berlin when he was served that he, Berlin, had 10 days to answer the complaint and could retain counsel to represent him. After the recess the General Counsel informed me that Berlin desired to remain away from the hearing until he had filed an answer. Thereupon, upon motion of the General Counsel, the case was continued to February 1, 1966. It was later continued to February 2, 1966, and all parties were notified thereof. The case then was resumed and heard on February 2, 3, and 4, at Athens, Texas. Certain piocedural matters arising at the opening of the hearing are narrated below. In substance the amended complaint alleges that Phil-Modes, Inc., and Berlin, as joint Respondents, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Phil-Modes, Inc., and Berlin filed separate answers. All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing, and were granted full opportunity to offer evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, present oral argument, and submit briefs. Phil-Modes, Inc., and the General Counsel have filed briefs, and the Charging Party has submitted a letter in lieu of a brief. By registeied letter dated January 14, 1966, the General Counsel wrote to Berlin that he had been made a party upon motion, that, under the Board's Rules and Regulations, Berlin had 10 days to answer following service of the complaint; and that failure to file a timely answer may result in a default against him. This letter further averred that enclosed with it were copies of the original and the fiist and second amended charges,3 the original and amended complaint, and the answer of Phil-Modes, Inc., and notified Berlin that the hearing would reconvene at 10 a.m. February 1, 1966, in the Third Floor Community Room of the F & M Bank Build- ing, Athens, Texas. General Counsel's Exhibit 2. Berlin was timely notified o. the change to February 2. I find that Berlin received this letter and its enclosures on Januai y 17, 1966; and I further find that, since it was received on January 17, Respondent Berlin received adequate notice and was afforded a reasonable time for an opportunity to defend both under the Board's Rules and Regulations as well as under the due process clause of the Constitution. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 314. See Edward G. Partin v. N.L.R.B., 356 F.2d 512 (C.A. 5). Nevertheless, for reasons best known to himself, the General Counsel transmitted to me a document captioned "Notice of Hearing Upon Amendment of Complaint," and requested that I serve this upon the parties. General Counsel's Exhibit 1(n). 'This part of the caption is derived from motions made and allowed at the herring. 2 The charge was amended on November 4, 1965, to drop Berlin Coat Mfg. Co , as a Respondent 3 The second amended charge, dated January 12, 1966, was not received in evidence, having been excluded upon objection. 243-084-67-vol. 159-61 946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD This is dated January 21 , 1966 ; I signed it and caused it to be served by mail as requested. Patently when received by him this did not give Berlin 10 days before February 1 or 2 to answer. Trial Examiners are not process servers or mail clerks for the General Counsel. Hence the fact that I mailed General Counsel 's Exhibit 1(n) as a courtesy to the General Counsel did not detract from the validity •of the service of General Counsel 's Exhibit 2 upon Berlin. Although General Counsel's Exhibit 1 (n) when received by him did not grant Berlin 10 days before February 1 or 2 to answer, as required by the Board 's Rules , I find this is not fatal because General Counsel's Exhibit 2 complied with the Board 's Rules. Further I find that General Counsel's Exhibit 1(n) did not annul , revoke, or supersede General Coun- sel's Exhibit 2. I do not reach the question of whether Berlin would have been properly served or given sufficient time to answer if only General Counsel's Exhibit 1(n) had been served upon him. Accordingly, I deny the motion of Respondent Berlin to dismiss because he was improperly served by me and because he claims that he was not given enough time to answer as required by the Board 's Rules and Regulations See Edward G. Partin v. N.L.R.B, 356 F.2d 512 (C.A. 5). Upon the entire record in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. AS TO JURISDICTION Phil-Modes, Inc , a Texas corporation, is engaged at Athens, Texas, in manufac- turing and selling ladies' coats and other products. During the 12 months preceding the hearing herein, it sold finished products valued in excess of $50,000 and shipped the same directly to points outside the State of Texas. This is direct outflow in commerce Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. Harold Berlin, an individual doing business as Berlin Coat Manufacturing Co., is engaged at Athens, Texas, in manufacturing ladies' coats and other products. During the 12 months preceding the hearing herein, Berlin performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for Phil-Modes, Inc. Under the Board's decisions, Berlin's operations constitutes an indirect outflow of commerce. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. I find that Phil-Modes, Inc , and Berlin each is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. In addition, I find that Phil-Modes, Inc., and Berlin constitute one integrated enterprise, as more fully set forth below, and that they are one employer for the purposes of this case. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Berlin denies that Inteinational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. But I find that it is such a labor organization . It is herein called the Union. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This case involves the following issues: (1) Whether Phil-Modes, Inc., and Harold Berlin are engaged in an integrated enterprise. They are collectively called Respondents herein. (2) Whether Respondents, or either of them, lawfully refused to recognize and bargain with the Union because it had no majority in an appropriate unit, or because in good faith they, or either of them, doubted the Union's majority. (3) Whether Respondents or either of them engaged in certain coercive conduct. A. The relationship between Phil-Modes, Inc., and Berlin Phil-Modes is engaged at 1504 West Corsicana, Athens, Texas, in manufacturing and selling women's and misses' coats. Since April 1965, when it was incorporated, its officers have been Theresa Walters, president; Lloyd Walters, vice president and manager; Ruth Mills, secretary; and R Ginsberg, assistant secretary These same persons also have been its directors since April 1965. Prior to this it was a part- nership. Berlin occupies part of the same building as Phil-Modes. Berlin is a con- tractor who makes coats for Phil-Modes pursuant to a contractual arrangement between them; Phil-Modes itself does not manufacture any garments. The total output of Berlin goes to Phil-Modes, whereas Phil-Modes receives its total product from and pays Berlin therefor. See General Counsel's Exhibit 3. Material for the garments is owned and furnished by Phil-Modes, "but the machinery and equip- PHIL-MODES, INC. 947 ment incident to the manufacture of said ladies' garments are owned by the said Harold Berlin." The finished garments are turned over by Berlin to Phil-Modes and the latter sells and ships them to buyers. Phil-Modes and Berlin each pays part of the rent of the building, since neither owns it. There are no maintenance employees ; that work is done, when necessary, by production employees . Employees who manufacture the coats are all hired and supervised by Berlin, their rates of pay are established by Berlin, but their paychecks are issued by Phil-Modes, and Phil-Modes withholds from wages any taxes required by law to be withheld. Berlin does not hire shipping clerks or office help. They are employees of Phil-Modes . In addition, Phil-Modes pays for health,4 unemployment , and workmen's compensation insurance covering these employees . The foregoing arrangement has existed for about 15 years between Berlin and Phil-Modes , part of the time in California and lately in Athens, Texas On this evidence, I am of the opinion, and find, that Phil -Modes, Inc., and Berlin are engaged in a single , integrated enterprise, N.L R.B. v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613, 615 (C.A. 2); Pacific Hosts, Inc, 156 NLRB 1467 . Cf. Proviso to Section 8(e) of the Act . Accordingly , I find that Phil-Modes , Inc., and Berlin are employ- ers of the employees involved herein and that they are jointly and severally liable for any unfair labor practices which may be proved under the complaint. Somer- set Classics, Inc., 90 NLRB 1676, 1682. B. The refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union 1. The appropriate unit Both Respondents question the unit alleged in paragraph 8 of the complaint as appropriate . No evidence has been received thereon However, the Board has held that a production and maintenance unit is proper in the garment industry. H. A Satin & Company , Inc., 97 NLRB 1001, 1002 , Florence Manufacturing Com- pany, Inc., 92 NLRB 185, 186. Accordingly , I find appropriate a unit composed of all production and maintenance employees of Respondents employed at their Athens, Texas , plant, exclusive of all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. Included in the unit aie the shipping clerks. See Respondents ' Exhibit 3. 2. The union demand for recognition About 11:47 a.m., on August 25 , 1965,5 Phil-Modes, Inc., received a telegram from "John Vickers, Texas District Council , ILGWU, AFL-CIO." (General Coun- sel's Exhibit 5) This telegram , addressed to "Phil-Modes Inc. Berlin Coat Mfg. Co, Athens, Tex" reads PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF YOUR EMPLOYEES IN A UNIT APPROPRIATE FOR BARGAINING HAVE DESIGNATED THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, AS THEIR EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE FOR PURPOSE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. THIS WIRE IS TO REQUEST THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE AND BARGAIN WITH THIS UNION. I WILL BE AT YOUR PLANT THIS AFTER- NOON AT 4.30 ... TO MEET WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES .. . WE WILL HAVE IN OUR POSSESSION AT THAT TIME SIGNED, AUTHORIZATION CARDS FROM AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF YOUR EMPLOYEES WHICH WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE FOR YOUR INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION WITH COMPANY REC- ORDS . . . . JOHN VICKERS . . . . At the time, Phil Walters , manager of Phil-Modes, Inc., was in nearby Dallas, but_ he was informed of the telegram's contents by a telephone call to him by Ruth Mills, the secretary and a director of Phil-Modes, Inc. Soon thereafter Walters. returned to the plant. About 4:30 that afternoon Union Representative Vickers, accompanied by a committee of about 18 employees, called on Walters at the offices of Phil-Modes, Inc., and Berlin Coat Manufacturing Company. According to Walters , Vickers "told me that he had a majority of people signed up and I objected to it. It was my knowledge that he did not have a majority of the employ- ees' signatures and that was it." However, Walters also testified that he and Rutht 4 As to health insurance premiums, Berlin and the employees also contribute. 5 All dates mentioned hereafter related to 1965 except where otherwise noted 948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Mills, who was also present , checked the Union's authorization cards against his payroll on that occasion . These cards were photostatic copies (General Counsel's Exhibit 6), the originals being in the possession of Vickers who placed them on the desk for examination . Walters did not inspect the originals. Before proceeding with the card check, Walters asked Secretary Ruth Mills "to take notes on this." She did. When Vickers stated that the Union represented a majority and that he was there to prove it, Walters interrupted to say that he desired to "make a statement first." Thereupon Walters said that he did not believe that the Union represented a majority 6 of his employees , that he was willing to prove this, and that a majority wanted their cards back . Thereupon Vickers stated that he would not recognize evidence that employees wanted their cards back or wished to withdraw from the Union because "the same was gotten" through coer- cion and intimidation of the employees . At this point Mills insisted that she did not intimidate or coerce anyone, and that "they wanted their union cards back [and also] asked me if they could get their cards back." Walters claimed that the employees voluntarily wanted their cards back and that Mills did not solicit any withdrawals . Walters also wanted to have Mills check the cards to verify signa- tures and "method" of obtaining signatures "from each and every one ." Respond- ents' evidence is substantially in accord with this narration of facts. Vickers insisted the Union had a majority and offered to prove it by a card count. Walters agreed to this but not in the presence of the full employee com- mittee. Finally it was agreed that one employee could be present at the card count. The counting was accomplished in the private office of Walters . He com- pared the photostatic copies of cards given him with a "list" provided by Mills. When Vickers asked what Walters was doing, Walters replied he was checking off the employees and that he had before him a list of such employees who wanted their union cards back . Walters commented that Freddie Allen was not then or at the time he signed a card an employee , and that Luke Jumper 7 is a foreman and not in the unit. Continuing, Walters said he had just spoken to employee E. G. Barker and that Barker wanted his card back. Vickers replied that Barker had not communicated this change of sentiment to him and , therefore , that card should be counted. Walters then "counted the card as being good." Finally, the count was completed and Walters claimed that some employees wanted their cards returned. He checked off 20 in this category . But Vickers maintained that "even by your standards we still have a majority ." Thereupon Walters recounted the cards and said "twenty-four out of forty-five." Then Vickers asked for a date to meet for negotiating a contract. But Walters insisted upon an election "to let the people decide." 3. The Union's majority Union Representative Vickers inaugurated the Union 's organizing campaign on the evening of August 19 when he "met with a group of employees from Phil- Modes and Berlin Coat Company" at a second floor room in the F & M Bank Building in Athens. Six employees were present . All six signed union authoriza- tion cards. Vickers met with employees again on August 20 and the following Monday and Tuesday. Many more employees signed union authorization cards at these subsequent meetings. As found above, Vickers called on Walters on August 25 and presented the latter with a number of cards. I find that the number of signed cards offered at that time was 44. I further find that Freddie Allen was not an employee on August 20, when he signed, or on August 25, when the Union demanded recognition. Hence his card will not be counted . In addition I find that Luke Jumper is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, and, therefore , his card will not be counted. Thus I find that the Union had 42 signed cards on August 25. A perusal of General Counsel's Exhibit 7, the payroll for the week ending August 28, discloses 47 employees in the production and maintenance unit. This document reflects only those working that week. Two who did not work that week, but whom I find are in the unit, are to be added to said 47; i.e., Alice Boyd and Rebecca Torrez. One will be deducted therefrom because he is a supervisor; i.e., Luke Jumper. I also find that Jessie Fulce was not in the unit on August 25, 6 At another stage of the meeting Vickers said he had cards from all but three in the unit. Walters told Vickers that he doubted that also. 7 However, Jumper's name appears on the payroll which Walters testified included all but two in the unit See General Counsel's Exhibit 7. PHIL-MODES, INC. 949 as she had been terminated prior to then. Further, I find that two shipping clerks were in the unit. See Respondents' Exhibit 3. Hence I find that on August 25 the production and maintenance unit included 49 employees. Since the Union on August 25 had 42 cards in a unit consisting of 49 employees, it is patent that it enjoyed a majority in an appropriate unit, and Respondents were legally obligated to recognize and bargain with it unless either one or more of three defenses advanced is well taken. These obstacles are contended to be (a) the Union's majority is illusory because many employees repudiated the Union and wanted their cards back, (b) the Union's majority is tainted by illegal methods or other misconduct in obtaining signatures, and (c) Respondents entertained a good- faith doubt of majority at the time of the Union's demand on August 25. I now proceed to discuss these defenses. 4. Illegal methods or other misconduct in obtaining signatures Employee Nener Hunt in June conceived the idea of a union at the plant and talked to fellow employees about it. About early July she asked Respondent Ber- lin "if it would help him or us if we had a union " She signed a union authoriza- tion card on August 19. Five other employees signed up with her at that time at a meeting held by Union Representative Vickers. The next day, with employees Till and Pryor, Hunt solicited employees at the company parking lot to sign cards from about 7:30 to 8 a.m. Work starts at 8 a in. They signed up 27 employees. Luke Jumper signed "because Mr. Berlin is for it [the Union] " Till and Pryor also signed cards. Hunt was not scheduled to work that day. From the plant all three went to the home of employee Price whom they successfully induced to sign a card. Then they went to the home of employee Wood and succeeded in having her sign a card after soliciting her. Shortly thereafter they met in the street, and signed up, employee Paris. Continuing their journey of soliciting, they went to the home of employee Sanders where they left a card because Sanders was away at the time. From there they went to the home of employee Powell, who signed a card. Then they signed up employee Boyd at a beauty shop where they were informed they would find her. Upon returning to the home of Sanders they found her in. Sanders signed a card. Thereafter they turned in these signed cards to Hansen of the Furniture Workers' Union. From there they went into the plant to turn in their piecework tickets. It was then 3:30 or 4 p.m. At the plant they met Respondent Berlin who asked them, "Where's my card9" Employee Pryor handed a card to Berlin. Then Berlin remarked, "If you girls go through with this, you know you will lose your insurance." That evening Luke Jumper asked that his card be returned to him, because Berlin told him "it would hurt his case." 8 They told him to obtain it "from the man" as it had been turned into him. In soliciting, Hunt told some employees "when we had a union we would pay the dues." This, I find, does not contaminate any card. Ottenheimer and Com- pany, Inc., 144 NLRB 38, 46, 334 F.2d 581 (C.A.D.C.). It is desirable that at this point the individual cards be evaluated. As found above, employees Hunt, Pryor, and Till signed cards. No evidence received impairs their validity. Hence all three cards will be counted in computing the number of valid union cards. Some cards were signed by employees, but the spaces therein, such as the dates, were in whole or in part filled in by those solicit- ing the signature. This filling in does not destroy the validity of the card. S. E. Nichols Company, 156 NLRB 1201. Employee Lorene Morris signed a card without reading it on August 20 upon the solicitation of employee Lottie Till who told her that if the card were signed "we would get a raise in our wages." 9 Morris "knew it was a union card" although she did not read it. Morris also is one of those who signed a typewritten docu- ment the text of which reads "August 25, 1965. Mr. William H. Kugle, Jr., Attor- ney at Law, Athens, Texas. Dear Mr Kugle: We, the undersigned employees of Phil Modes in Athens, Texas, wish to employ you for the purpose of obtaining the return of certain cards signed by us for the International Garnet [sic] Workers 8 The "case" refers to litigation pending between Phil-Modes and Berlin. I find no union animus or coercion in Berlin's or Jumper's statement 0 This is a campaign promise and not a guarantee. Hence Oonren, Inc., d/ b/a Great Scot Super Market, 156 NLRB 592, is distinguishable 10 50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union. We signed these cards after we were misled about the facts in this situa- tion and we want these cards returned to us. We do not wish to join the Union." See Respondents' Exhibit 2. As found below, this document does not constitute an effective revocation of withdrawal of the card signed by Morris and the others whose signature appears thereon. Further, I find that Till's statement that by signing the card wages would be raised does not detract from its validity. Nor does the fact that Morris did not read the card before signing it destroy its vitality. It is not fatal that a signer does not read a card when he was not prevented from doing so.10 N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6); Happach v. N.L.R.B., 60 LRRM 2489 (C.A. 7); General Steel Products, Inc., 157 NLRB 636. Accordingly, the card of Morris will be counted. Employee Betty Whorton signed a card on August 20 in the company parking lot at the request of employee Hunt, who asked her to join the Union and "have a Union." She did not read it. Ruth Mills, the secretary and a director of Phil- Modes, telephoned Whorton at the latter's home 2 or 3 days later. Mills asked if Whorton had signed a union card. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, Mills asked if Whorton would like to have it withdrawn. Whorton answered in the negative. On these facts I find that Whorton's card should be counted. Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 156 NLRB 511. Vena Todd also signed a card on August 20, although she did not read it. The employee who handed it to her asked "Would you like to make $1.75 an hour?" Todd said she would. Some days later (Todd testified it was 2 or 3 weeks)" Todd signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. I find this did not constitute a revocation or withdrawal of her card, not only because she testified that when she signed the card she intended that the Union would represent her in collective bargaining but also for the reasons given below in finding said Exhibit 2 not to be effective as a withdrawal. On the above evidence I find that Todd's card should be counted. Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592, is distinguishable, for there a pay raise was guaran- teed to induce the employees to sign. Alice Boyd signed a card on August 20 at a beauty shop in nearby Brownsboro in the presence of employees Pryor, Till and Hunt, who gave it to her, telling her it was a union card. When Boyd asked who else had signed, she was told "every- one except you and Nola Mae Sandeis " This last statement, even if untrue, does not destroy the validity of Boyd's card. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 156 NLRB 919. However, Boyd also signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. According to Boyd, "it was laid [on the table] by Luke Jumper." After she signed it, Boyd went to the office where she asked Secretary Mills "how could I get my card back," but gave no reason why she wanted it. This was about August 23. As found below Respond- ents' Exhibit 2 is ineffective to constitute a withdrawal. Moreover, I find the inquiry of Boyd to Mills inadequate to constitute a withdrawal because it was not communicated to the Union. Jas H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432, 438 (C.A. 8). N.L.R.B. v. Fort Smith Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 874, 881 (C.A. 8), and Indiana Rayon Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 355 F.2d 535 (C.A. 7), are distinguishable. Accordingly, I find that Boyd's card should be counted. Employee Elizabeth May Hickman signed a card on August 19 after being told by employees Hunt and Pryor, who gave it to her outside the plant, that it was a union card and that Berlin said it was all right to have a union. Hickman did not read the card. Later on 12 Supervisor Luke Jumper asked her if she wanted her card back and, if she did, to sign a paper he gave her. That paper is Respondents' Exhibit 2. Hickman signed it, being the first employee to do so; but she also testi- fied, that none of the typewritten matter appeared on it at that time. About 2 weeks after signing the union card, Hickman told Secretary Mills that she wanted to withdraw that card. On the foregoing evidence I find that Hickman's card was not in full force and effect on August 25 and that it should not be counted because of the misrepresenta- tion as to Berlin's attitude toward the Union. 10 "The very act of signing .. . calls for a finding that the employee knew what he was doing." Jas. H. Matthews e Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C A 8). 11 Todd is mistaken as to this , as I find this document was prepared on or before Au- gust 25 when the Union demanded recognition . But I credit Todd's other testimony. 12 Hickman testified it was a month later I find it was on or before August 25 4 PHIL-MODES, INC. 951 A card was signed by employee Verba Clower on August 20 after she read it. It was left at her home by employees Hunt, Till, and Pryor with a note to fill it out, sign it, and bring it to a union meeting, that afternoon Clower brought it fully completed to the meeting as requested. Some time thereafter, but not later than 4:30 p.m. on August 25, Secretary Mills while in the plant, asked Clower if Clower was for the Union and if Clower would like to have the card back. Clower replied, "Not at the present time." On this evidence I find that the card of Clower should be counted. Another employee who signed a card on August 20 is Rosa Lee Green. But she did not read it. She knew it was a union card. She was invited to sign by employee Hunt who "said something about joining the union and they said we'd get $1.75 an hour." Later Green signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 in the plant, during working hours, when Supervisor Luke Jumper told her about it and she found it lying on a press in the plant. It is my opinion, and I find, that the reference to $1.75 an hour amounted to no more than a promise of better working conditions, and was not a guarantee within the meaning of Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592. Therefore, it was not a false repre- sentation. Hence, this statement does not vitiate Green's card. Nor does Green's signature on Respondents' Exhibit 2 supersede or annul her union card. This is because she did not communicate her change of heart to the Union, so that the purported withdrawal did not become effective; and also because I have found Respondents' Exhibit 2 to be nugatory, as more fully set forth below. Accordingly, I find that Green's card should be counted. Employee Verda Johns signed a card on August 20. She did not read the card but'knew she was "signing a union card." It was given to her by employee Till or Hunt who said they were trying to get a union in the plant and that "we would get $1.75 an hour." Thereafter, Secretary Mills asked Johns if she would like to get her card back. Johns said that she did. Later Johns signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. On the above evidence, I find no fraudulent representation on wages which viti- ates the card, and I further find the signing of Respondents' Exhibit 2 ineffectual to countermand her signature on the card. Hence I find that the card of Johns should be counted. Employee Carlie McGee signed a card on August 23. It is witnessed by employee Sophie Krysinski who gave her the card.13 Although McGee did not read it, she knew it was a union card. Krysinski told McGee at the time, "Go ahead and sign . . . it doesn't mean anything anyway. They will quit aggravating you." On August 24 McGee went to the office of Secretary Mills and asked how she could get back her card. Mills promised to see what she could do. On August 25 McGee signed Respondent's Exhibit 2. On the above evidence I find that McGee's card should be counted since the statement by Krysinski is neither coercive nor a fraudulent representation, and the signing of Respondents' Exhibit 2 does not cancel or revoke the union card. Further I find that the statement to Mills is insufficient to constitute a withdrawal or revocation of the card since it was not communicated to the Union. On August 20 employee Clara Powell signed a card. It was given to her in her living room by employees Till, Pryor, and Hunt. They told her "everybody in the plant had to sign it and Mr. Walters and Mr. Berlin was for the Union and that everbody had signed it except [employee] Alice Boyd ...:. Powell did not read the card. I find that the first part of this solicitation amounts to a substantial mis- representation of fact which destroys the validity of the card. It will not be counted. The last part has been held to be unobjectionable. Engineers & Fabri- cators, Inc. 156 NLRB 919. Later Powell went to the office of Secretary Mills and asked Mills to get her card for her. She also asked Supervisor Jumper to do this. If material, I find this not to be effectual as a withdrawal of the card because not communicated to the Union. Powell also signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 when Supervisor Jumper pre- sented it to her. " If material, I find this not a revocation of the card because said Exhibit 2, as found herein, is blemished because attended by unfair labor practices, and therefore, not a valid vehicle for withdrawing cards. Employee Lula Stone testified credibly she signed a union card. But she was unable to identify it at the hearing. Hence, no evidence unfolds the text on the 13 Krysinski, who also signed a card, later signed Respondents ' Exhibit 2. J 952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD card. Accordingly, her card will not be counted. She also signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. If material, I find that this does not constitute a withdrawal, if her testimony otherwise establishes that her card should be counted. On August 20 or 23 employee Dorothy Wyatt signed a card. It is dated Au- gust 23. She thought she signed it on August 20. She "glanced over it" before subscribing it. Later 14 Supervisor Luke Jumper told her some employees wanted their cards back, that he was making arrangements to get them back, and asked her if she was interested in getting hers back. Shortly thereafter Wyatt told Secretary Mills she wanted it back. Then Wyatt signed a paper which others signed. For reasons heretofore explained as to other employees, this card is good and had not been revoked. Hence I find that Wyatt's card should be counted. Moreover, the fact that Hunt, who gave her the card, mentioned it was the last day to sign and that the cards had to be in that night does not affect this conclusion, and I so find. Employee Elizabeth Price signed ,a card on August 20 in her home after reading it. It was given to her by employee Pryor who told her "they were in the process of trying to get the Union" and asked if she wanted to sign the card. On this evi- dence I find that Price's card should be counted. Employee Alla Bea Paris signed a card on August 20 in front of Wolfe-Durphone Hospital without first reading it. However, she knew it was a union card when she affixed her name to it because the persons (employees Till, Hunt, and Pryor) giving it to her described it as such and that "they were trying to organize a union." They also told her that everyone had signed a card except Paris, another woman, and "one fellow," and that "Berlin wanted us to go Union." I find this statement unobjectionable except for the words "Berlin [a Respondent] wanted us to go Union." The reference to Berlin is substantial misrepresentation of fact which "impaired [Paris'] freedom of choice." Hence I find that the card of Paris may not be counted. Teletype Corporation, 122 NLRB 1594, 1595. See Ottenheimer and Company, 144 NLRB 38, 46. Later Secretary Mills came to the machine of Paris and asked her if she had signed a card. When Paris said she had and "wanted out of it" Mills gave a "slip of paper" and asked her to sign it. Paris did so. I find it was Respondents' Exhibit 21 If material, I find this not to constitute a revocation of her union card if the card is held to be otherwise valid. Mabel Stalter, an employee, signed a card on August 20, given to her by employee Pryor in the company parking lot. Although she knew it was a union card, she did not read it. Pryor asked her to sign a union card After that, but before August 25, Secretary Mills came to her machine and asked her if she signed a union card and what was better about a union shop than at the plant. Stalter told Mills she had worked in a union shop before, and that she signed a union card and did not care who knew it. On this evidence, I find that the card of Stalter should be counted. On August 20 employee Eva Meyrel Richardson signed a union card. It was given to her by employee Till who asked her if she wanted to become a member of the Union. Richardson read the card before signing it. On this evidence I find that Richardson's card should be counted. Employee Ruth Whitener signed a card on August 19 at a meeting held in "Mr. Hansen's office." On about August 27 Supervisor Luke Jumper said to Whitener, "This is your last chance; don't you want your card back?" Whitener said she did not. On this evidence I find Whitener's card should be counted. Employee Wilma Leopard signed a card on August 20 after being asked if she was interested in a union. She signed because everybody else was signing one. At the time Supervisor Luke Jumper who happened to be present, also signed, stat- ing "Yes, we are interested in the Union." Jumper "talked like Mr. Berlin" was also interested in the Union. Leopard testified that, although not sure of the date, she signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 a day or two after August 25. But I find she is mistaken, and that she signed on or before August 25. This is because that docu- ment, prepared before or on August 25, contains Leopard's name. She signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 when Supervisor Jumper "brought it around and asked me did I want my card back." She said she did. 14 Wyatt testified it was the following week But I find that it was on or before Au- gust 25 because she referred to a paper which I find is Respondents' Exhibit 2, and I fur- ther find Exhibit 2 was prepared not later than August 25. PHIL-MODES, INC. 953 On this evidence I find no fraud or coercion practiced on Leopard to induce her to sign the union card. Nor is her card blemished because she signed as everyone else was signing or because of Jumper's remarks.15 . an employee's thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed a card, and what he thought that card meant, cannot negate the overt action of having signed a card designating a union as bargaining agent . . The very act of signing . . . calls for a finding that the employee knew what he was doing:" Jas. H. Matthews & Co. V. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8). And I-find that her signing of Respondents' Exhibit 2 is inef- fectual to revoke, supersede, or annul her union card. According, I find that Leopard's card should be counted. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5), is distinguishable because there the employee's thoughts or under- standing were necessary to clear up an ambiguity on the face of the card. Another employee who executed a union card on August 20 is Mrs. Willie Spradlin. She did not read it. The card was handed to her by employee Till, who asked her if she, Spradlin, "was interested in signing this card as they were trying to organize a union." When Spradlin asked Till if Berlin and Walters wanted her to sign, Till replied that Berlin did. Thereupon Spradlin signed.' It is my opinion, and I find, that the reference to Berlin is a -substantial misrepresentation on a material fact which mars the validity of Spradlin's card. All other circumstances and statements attending the signing do not impugn the card's validity, and I so find According, I find it should not be counted.' A few days, later Spradlin signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. She did so after she found out that Secretary Mills "had the list." If material, I find this is not an effective revocation of Spradlin's union card, if said card is found to be otherwise valid, because Spradlin's change of mind was not communicated to the Union. Employee Fayrene Burnett signed a card on August 19 at a union meeting at which Union Representative Vickers spoke. Employee Till asked Burnett to go.to the meet- ing. At the same time Till showed Burnett "a contract where I'would be getting $1.70 an hour." A few days later she signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 in the factory dur- ing working hours. This occurred after Supervisor Luke Jumper told her that "if I wanted to try to get my card back . I could go and sign." It is my opinion, and I find, that Till's showing of a contract is no more than propaganda as to benefits that might be obtained through union representation and not a positive assurance that $1.70 an hour would be obtained. Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592. Hence I find no fraud or coercion which prompted Burnett to sign the card. Further I find ineffectual Burnett's purported defection from the Union by signing Respondents' Exhibit 2, for the reasons given herein in finding said docu- ment inoperative as a disavowal of the Union. Accordingly, I find that Burnett's union card should be counted. Employee Nereus Howell signed a union card on August 20 after reading it and after being told by employee Till it was to "join the Union." Also "they told [her] that [her] wages . would get higher . . . if the Union went through." The following week Supervisor Luke Jumper came to her place of work during working hours and asked her to come to Berlin's office. When they arrived at the office Berlin asked her if she wanted to withdraw from the Union, at the same time displaying "a list of paper . .. with a list of names on it." When Howell answered that she did not, Jumper replied that if Howell "went on with the Union that they couldn't do anything for [her]. That what they told [her] wasn't the truth and Mr. Berlin said that if [Howell] went on with the Union [Howell's] insurance could be cancelled." On this evidence I find that Howell's card should be counted. Another employee signing a union card on August 20 is Edith Brown. No evi- dence was introduced tending to undermine or attack its validity. Accordingly, I find that it should be counted. ' Employee Bettie Norton signed a card on August 20 after reading it. It was handed to her by employees Hunt, Till, and Pryor, who asked her if she would be interested in joining a union. Patently this evidence does not impair the validity of Norton's card. Hence I find it should be counted. Employee Violet Tucker also signed a card. She read it first. This occurred on August 20 at work. The card was given to her by employee Pryor or Till who asked if she would like to have a union. The fact that this took place at work is 'e Although Jumper is a supervisor, the record does not show that Leopard was induced or coerced to sign by a remark of Jumper which was not addressed to her. 954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ,insufficient to deprive the card of vitality, and I so find. Although Secretary Mills spoke to' Tucker about the card, nothing in that conversation detracts from the foregoing conclusion. No other evidence suggests or hints any impropriety in soliciting Tucker's signature. Hence I find that Tucker's card should be counted. Employee Gracie Jones signed a card on August 20. It was given to her by employee Pryor who said it was to help organize a union and to help get better wages and working conditions in the plant. Jones read the card before signing. In the morning of August 25 both Supervisor Jumper and Secretary Mills, attempted to induce Jones to retract her signature and repudiate her card. But I find nothing in said talk bearing upon the question of fraud or coercion in obtaining the signa- tures of Jones. Some time during the morning of August 25 Jones told employee Green and Roy Tucker, a local funeral director, that Jones had decided to get her card back but Jones did not convey this decision to Secretary Mills. How4er, Green did tell this to Mills. I find Green was not the agent of Jones in doing so. Nevertheless when Mills asked Jones about it, Jones expressly insisted that she did not want her card back. On this evidence I find that the card of employee Jones should be counted. The purported withdrawal is nugatory absent evidence that it was brought to the atten- tion of the Union. Moore's Seafood Products, Inc., 152 NLRB 683; Tinley Dairy Park Co.,' d/b/a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB 683, 686. Among those signing a card on August 20 is employee Vera Hood, who was solicited by employee Till. Hood read part of the card and signed "for the purpose of trying to get a union." Hood testified she "figured" there would be a vote on whether the Union came in or not. Shortly after signing Supervisor Jumper spoke to Hood about this, but said conversation does not affect the card's validity because it occurred after the card was completed. On August 25 Secretary Mills came to the girls "with a slip of paper and she had a bunch of girls going up there to a[n] ironing table." Hood did not sign that paper. On August 27 Supervisor Luke Jumper told Hood that he had a piece of paper which she could sign if she wanted to "get your name out of that union." Hood declined. Hood also heard Jumper repeat this same offer to employee Whitener, but Whitener replied she was in the Union to stay. On this evidence I am of the opinion, and I find, that Hood's card should be counted. Although Supervisor Jumper told Hood that he favored a union, this did not induce Hood to sign because she had already signed. Nor did this statement prevent Hood from withdrawing from the" Union if 'she was so inclined. Nor does the fact that Hood did not read the entire card detract from its effectiveness, for she knew what she was doing. General Steel Products, Inc., 157 NLRB 636. Finally, the fact that Hood "figured" there would be an election does not impugn the card for two reasons: (a) no one told her this, so that her subjective state of mind must be disregarded Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592; Gary Steel Products Cor- poration, 144 NLRB 1160, and (b) where an election is not the only purpose of a card, that card is not rendered invalid. N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co, 359 F.2d 684 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (C.A 6); S. E. Nichols Company, 156 NLRB 1201; N.L.R.B. v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (C.A. 6). Contra, N.L.R.B. v. Peterson, supra. Employee Travis Barker signed a card which was handed to her by employee Pryor. Barker was asked if she was interested to help organize a union. She read the card Although the 'card is dated September 20, I find it was signed on or before August 25 because Barker testified that it was signed in August and also because it was included in the cards submitted by the Union to Respondents on August 25. See General Counsel's Exhibit 6. Later, Secretary Mills asked Barker if Barker wanted her card back and if she was "going union." Barker replied she was "going union " Supervisor Jumper also asked Barker if she wanted to take her card back. Barker replied she did not. On this evidence I conclude, and find, that Barker's card should be counted. Still another employee who signed a card on August 20 is Eddie Mae Overton. It was handed to her by employee Till, who asked her to sign if she were interested in a union Overton read the card before signing, and "understood" that "if they got enough cards they would have an election." In my opinion, Overton's card is not defective and, therefore, should be counted. I so find Although Overton "understood" there would be an election, it was not induced or caused by anything uttered by employee Till. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 144 NLRB 679, 682, enfg. in part 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5). Hence, absent fraud or coercion, or ambiguity on the face of the card, Overton's subjective state of PHIL-MIODES, INC. 955 mind may not overcome her overt act of voluntarily signing. Gary Steel Products, supra; General Steel Products, supra. Moreover, nothing in the evidence indicates that an election was the only motive behind Overton's signing, for she also signed "for the purpose of organizing a union " Since an election was not the sole or only purpose in signing, the card is valid. S. E. Nichols Company, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe Co., supra, N L.R B. v. Delight Bakery, Inc., supra. Employee Addie Wood signed a card on August 20 It was obtained at her home by employees Hunt, Pryor, and Till, who called on her there They asked her whether she wanted to become a member of the Union, and told her "the purpose of the card was to take out the dues in case we got the Union." After reading it Wood signed the card and "understood" thereby that she became a member of the Union. On this evidence I am of the opinion, and find, that the card of Addie Wood should be counted. Employee Lois Brown signed a card on August 20 which was presented to her by employee Till. At the time Till told Brown "they were going to try to organize a union," and to sign the card if Brown wanted to join the Union. Before signing it, Brown read the card. On this evidence I find that Lois Brown's card should be counted. Employee Lena Dunn signed a card on August 20 which employee Till 'offered her. Dunn read it first Till asked her "if'I would like to draw more 'money [and] . . . how would I like to have a union come in." When Dunn agreed to sign if it "would help us," Till replied. "I think it will help us." This does not vitiate the card. S.N C Manufacturing Co., Inc, 147 NLRB 809, 822, footnote 32. To Dunn's question whether "everyone else signed," Till replied, "Yes, everyone else has signed. We can try to get more money if we can get a union in." Then Dunn remarked "if everybody else is for it, I will be too." The foregoing state- ments of Till are neither fraudulent nor coercive. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 156 NLRB 919. In this same conversation Till stated that "if they got enough cards signed you could have an election." Since I find the sole purpose of the statement was not to obtain an election, Dunn's card is not impaired- by this utter- ance of Till. N.L R.B v. Gotham Shoe Co., supra. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc, 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5). On the foregoing evidence I find that Dunn's card should be counted. Still another employee who signed a union card is Vernice Grayer. She did this the morning of August 20 at the request of employee Till, who had handed the card to her as Grayer was going to work. Till asked Grayer to sign if she "would like to try to get a union " On this evidence I conclude, and find, that Grayer's card should be counted. Another Grayer (Ida Mae) also signed a card on August 20, after reading it. It was given to Grayer by employee Pryoi, who asked Grayer if she "would like to sign that card to try to get a union." Grayer noticed that Supervisor Jumper and employee Morris signed a card at the same time in front of the plant. How- ever, Jumper said nothing to Grayer This evidence, including Jumper's signing, fails to disclose coercion, misrepresentation, or other conduct tainting Grayer's card. Accordingly, I find that it should be counted Employee Elbridge G. Barker signed a card on August 19 at the request of Union Representative Vickers The card is mistakenly dated August 20. Barker's remaining testimony follows. The next day Respondent Berlin told Barker that "the girls are crazy-it wouldn't hurt if it was the lesser paid girls trying to orga- nize the girls, but it was the highest paid girls that was trying to organize it." But this was in reply to Barker's first voluntarily informing Berlin that the Union was organizing Three or four days later, Berlin repeated the above remarks and added that Manager Walters "would pack no his machinery and leave it" because Walters did not want the Union checking his books. About 4:30 p.m. on August 25, Manager Walters asked Barker if he was going to get his card back as reported to Walters by Secretary Mills. Barker replied that he did want his card back. A few minutes later, Barker brought some refreshments to Berlin, at the latter's telephonic request, at a nearby motel where Berlin resided. After again repeating that he could not understand why the highest paid girls were organizing the Union, Berlin continued that he was going to teach them a lesson by cutting "some of the prices back down " When Barker returned to the plant he joined Union Representative Vickers and a group of employees as Vickers made his demand upon Manager Walters. The latter told Barker that he, Walters, thought that Barker was going to get back his 956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union card . Continuing, Walters said that "you don't have to get it back because we can appeal it for two years," and that, if any girls wanted their cards back "to tell them to see Mr. Kugle" at the expense of Walters. About August 26, Barker saw Kugle, an attorney, at the plant Later in the day Secretary Mills told the employees to come to the front office if they wanted their union cards returned to them. Upon the above evidence I find that Barker's card should be counted . Although I also find that Barker told Walters he wanted to have his card returned , I turther find that this does not constitute an effective withdrawal because it was not com- municated to the Union by Barker. However, Barker's demeanor on the stand and his reaction to cross-examination convince me that he is not a reliable witness. Hence, I do not credit that part of his testimony which tends to show that Berlin , Mills, and Walters made coercive statements to Barker. Hence, it would be superfluous to recite the contradictory testimony of Berlin and Walters upon this issue. A comparative late signer of. a card is employee Rebecca Torrez. She did not work during August, being absent on maternity leave. I find that at all times mate- rial she was employed in the unit, for she continued to be an employee while on said leave. This is because Torrez was employed by Respondents both before and following her absence for maternity reasons . Torrez signed a card given to her at her home by employees Till and Pryor. The latter told Torrez that "everybody was signing. up for the Union and I might as well sign up." As found above as to other employees, this expression- does not vitiate the card . Further, Till and Pryor told Torrez that "we would get better wages later on. We would be better off if he got a union ." I find this is insufficient to preclude the card from being counted. About August 26 or 27, Torrez visited the plant. While there Respondent Berlin twice told her to go to the office "and sign the . paper and get your card." When Torrez went to the office, she signed a , "slip," handed to her by Secretary Mills. This is Respondent's Exhibit 2. On the above evidence, I find that neither coercion, nor misrepresentation, nor any other reprehensible conduct has been demonstrated which would debase the card of Torrez . Accordingly; I find that it should be reckoned as a valid card. Further, for reasons stated elsewhere herein, I find said withdrawal ineffective. Employee Margaret Pryor signed a union card on August 19 . On August 20, Respondent Berlin asked Pryor, in the presence of employees Till and Hunt, "in a joking way," where his card was . Thereupon, Hunt gave him one Berlin then laughingly said he did not want "that thing." As heretofore found, Pryor's card will be counted . However, I find no coercion in Berlin's statement since it was made in a jocular mood or manner . Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 157 NLRB 1193. Although a photostat of employee Ida Mae Graeley's card is in evidence (Gen- ,eral Counsel's Exhibit 6), it will not be counted . This is because Graeley did not testify, and her card has not otherwise been authenticated within the rule of Irving Taitel et al. d/b/a I. Taitel and Son, 119 NLRB 910, 912, enfd . 261 F.2d 1 (C.A. 7). Similar considerations require that the cards of employees Emma Saudi , Sophie Krysinski, and Cletus Wilson be rejected in computing the Union 's majority. While employee Nola Sanders did not testify, her card was authenticated by employees Hunt, Pryor, and Till. Accordingly, the card of Sanders, which is in evidence as a photostatic copy (General Counsel's Exhibit 6) will be counted. Gissel Packing Company, Inc., 157 NLRB 1065. A recapitulation of all the foregoing findings discloses that on August 25 the Union enjoyed a majority in the appropriate unit by having signed cards from 34 employees in a unit comprised of 49 employees . I have found these cards valid in appraising each card separately . It follows that Respondents were under a statutory onus to recognize and bargain with the Union unless that majority was lost by reason of purported defections or withdrawals of cards by 20 employees. See Respondents' Exhibit 2. I proceed to discuss this issue. 5. Repudiation of the Union and withdrawals of cards As recited above 20 employees signed a paper, addressed to Attorney Kugle, in pertinent part alleging that they wished to employ him "for the purpose of obtaining the return of certain cards signed by us for the International Garmet [sic] Workers Union. We signed these cards after we were mislead [sic ] about the facts in this situation and we want these cards returned to us. We do not wish to join the PHIL-MODES, INC: 957 Union." None of the subscribers testified that they were retaining counsel when they signed Respondents' Exhibit 2. Rather, they testified either that .a supervisor told them to sign if they wanted their cards back or, in a few instances, stated that they voluntarily signed to obtain a return of their cards. Secretary Mills testified that about August 20 16 employee Boyd told her that Boyd had signed a union card but did not want a union, and asked Mills for assist- ance in getting it back. Although Mills replied that "all you have to do is ask for it," Boyd was not satisfied with the answer. Mills then ,promised to think it over and help Boyd if possible. According to Mills, other employees also came to Mills to repudiate their cards or mention others who recanted on their cards and wanted to know how they could obtain a return of their union cards. They are listed in the left hand column of Respondents Exhibit 4, which was prepared by Mills on August 25 after she learned of the Union's demand for recognition as delineated in General Counsel's Exhibit 5. Mills further testified that these employees requested that their names be recorded "on paper." At the hearing I received testimony from Mills, secretary and a director of Respondent Phil-Modes, that employees came to her and told her they wished to withdraw from the Union or to get back their union authorization cards. This was admitted on the issue of the Union's majority as well as on the question of Respondents' good-faith doubt of that majority. However, upon objection, I excluded testimony of Mills as to the reasons given to her by these employees for such withdrawals. In its brief, Phil-Modes contends these reasons were admissible. Of course, they are hearsay because the employees'had already testified themselves. But this does not automatically exclude such evidence. However, upon further reflection, I adhere to the original ruling. This is because the subjective intent or reason for signing or canceling an authorization card is immaterial. Gary Steel Products Corporation, 144 NLRB 1160. This doctrine has received court sanc- tion. Thus it has been held that ". . . an employee's thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed a union card, and what he thought that card meant, cannot negate the overt action of having signed a card" Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L R B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8). Hence, afterthoughts are inadmissible but con- duct flowing from such thoughts, i.e., withdrawing or attempting to withdraw, is competent and admissible. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5), does not compel a different conclusion. For in that case an employee's subjective state of mind was held competent to resolve ambiguities patent on the face of the card. Neverthe- less, that case did not disturb or overturn the Board's general rule that the validity of cards must be ascertained "on the basis of what the employees were told, not on the basis of their subjective state of mind ...." Peterson Bros., 144 NLRB 697, 682. Thus, as I read Board and court decisions, a subjective state of mind in sign- ing or revoking a union card is generally not litigable. Although I credit Mills that these employees told her they wanted their cards returned, I also find, as more fully delineated elsewhere in this Decision, that such employees were prompted to do so by various unfair labor practices of Respond- ents, including active soliciting of card withdrawals and circulating Respondents' Exhibit 2. Werstein's Uniform Shirt Company, 157 NLRB 856. Further, I find that Respondents' Exhibit 2 was prepared or caused to be pre- pared 17 by Respondents, that Respondents circulated it among employees, and that Jumper, Mills, and Berlin not only invited employees to sign it but also engaged in illegal interrogation of many employees to ascertain which employees had signed cards and whether those signing cards desired to revoke the same. Such testimony of Respondents which is inconsistent with such findings is not credited. A few examples of illegality suffice. Thus Mills asked employees Whorton, Clower, Johns, Stalter, T. Barker, Jones, and Paris, if they had signed union cards, asked employ- ees Whorton, Clower, Johns, Paris, and Jones if they wanted their cards back, and solicited employees Jones and Paris to sign a paper listing employees who, wanted their cards returned. And Jumper not only was identified with the prepara- tion of Respondents' Exhibit 2, but he also circulated it among employees to sign 211 infer this date from a description by Mills of events on that day. Mills testified it was August 24 or 25. 11 This results from inferences drawn from the testimony of employees Paris, Jones, Wyatt, and Hickman and the entire record Wyatt and Hickman connect Jumper, and employees Jones and Paris connect Mills, u ith the list. 958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD it. Finally, Respondent Berlin told employee Torrez to go to the office to sign a paper "and get your card " Testimony of Mills, Jumper, and Berlin which clashes with these findings is not credited. It has been held that revocation of union cards will not be upheld when caused by unfair labor practices . Engineers & Fabricators, supra; Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 744 (C.A.D.C.). I find that the revocations of those signing Respondents' Exhibit 2 were caused by untair labor practices in that Respondents prepared or caused to be prepared Respondents' Exhibit 2. But, even if they had nothing to do with the origin of Respondents' Exhibit 2, Respondents circulated said document in some cases and in others asked or told employees to sign it. This conduct, too, constitutes unfair labor practices destroy- ing the soundness of the withdrawals appearing on Respondents ' Exhibit 2. N.L.R.B. v. Delight Bakery, supra; Country Lane Food Store, infra. Nor does the fact that many employees told Secretary Mills that they and others had repudiated the Union iequire a conclusion that such withdrawals are valid. The names of these employees are recorded in the left hand column of Respond- ents' Exhibit 4. I find that such employees asked Mills to record their opposition as a result of the unfair labor practices found above in connection with Respond- ents' Exhibit 2. Hence, I find that the employees who requested Mills to note their purported withdrawal from the Union did not do so freely and voluntarily but rather as the proximate consequence of such unfair labor practices. Hence, I find that Respondents' Exhibits 2 and 4 represent a coerced withdrawal and do not detract from the Union's majority. Further, the Board, with court approval , has held that withdrawals do not sap a union's majority unless 'communicated to the union by the employee or his agent on or before the time that the union demands recognition of the employer . Jas. H. Matthews & Co v. N.L.R.B, supra, 438; Moose's Seafood Products, Inc, 152 NLRB 683; Tinley Park Dairy Co., d/b/a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB ,683, 686. I find that none of the employees , or their agents , 18 notified the Union on or before August 25, the critical date, that they were revoking the cards which they signed . Although I find that Manager Walters and Secretary Mills told Union Representative Vickers on August 25 that some employees had defected from the Union and wanted their cards back, I find that this did not constitute notice of withdrawals because (a) Walters and Mills were not the agents of the employees, and (b ) in any event Respondents by their unfair labor practices had caused such withdrawals to occur. Werstein's Uniform Shirt Company, supra. Accordingly, I find that the Union's majority on August 25 was uncoerced. How- ever, this does not dispose of the issue relating to Respondents' alleged refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union. This is because a good-faith doubt as to a union and affords a defense to a charge under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. Whether Respondents had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority on August 25 Regardless of a union's majority status, an employer may refuse to recognize and bargain with an uncertified union if he entertains a good -faith doubt as to its majority. A. L. Gilbert Company, 110 NLRB 2067, 2069; N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., supra . Respondent contends that it had a good-faith doubt. In this respect I find the subsidiary facts to be as follows: At some time on August 25 Secretary Mills learned of the Union 's telegram (General Counsel's Exhibit 5) demanding recognition. At that time Manager Walters was in Dallas, but Mills telephoned him about it. Thereupon Walters returned to the plant, arriving about 4 p.m. Then Mills "went over the list" with Walters. The "list" is Respondents ' Exhibit 4. Shortly afterward Union Repre- sentative Vickers came to the plant . Mills and Walters "presented this list [to Vickers] and said these people wanted their cards back and could they have them." Vickers replied that would not surrender such cards. On August 25 in the afternoon Mills had prepared the "list.' when employees, gathered in a group , gave her their own names and also , in a few instances, the names of other employees who wanted their cards back. Then she went to each employee on the-list to ascertain if such employee desired to have her or his is I find Kugle is not an agent. Respondents' Exhibit 1 was admitted solely to show that Kugle was retained and not for the truth of the matters asserted in it. PHIL-MODES, INC. 959 name remain thereon . She crossed off any who gave a negative reply. In addition to those mentioned in the list, Mills asked three other employees if they wanted their cards back. On the occasion of the card count on August 25 Secretary Mills had produced for ready reference company records "reflecting each employee 's signature." A com- parison was made between the signatures on the union cards, and those on the Company's records of "signature cards." When Union Representative Vickers, accompanied by a group of employees, told Manager Walters on August 25 that the Union represented most of the employees in the plant and would like to meet to negotiate a contract , Walters replied that he did not believe Vickers had a "sufficient number of employees ." Walters explained this as "due to the fact that there were almost half or more of the peo- ple who wanted their cards back." Continuing, Walters stated that he also "wanted to check each and every employee 's signature and method of obtaining these signatures." After some discussion between Walters and Vickers they decided that one of the girls in the Vickers ' group and Secretary Mills would check the signatures on the photostatic copies. This was done. Then a card was held in the presence of these two and Walters and Vickers . In addition, Walters placed. a check mark on the photostats of those employees who "wanted their cards back." I have counted 20 such checks on General Counsel's Exhibit 6. After adding the check marks, Walters told Vickers that in view of the number thereof, plus five or six who had not signed union cards, he (Walters ) did not believe the Union represented a majority At that time Walters had before him a list of employees who were declared by Secretary Mills as desiring to regain or recover their union cards See Respondents ' Exhibit 4 Walters also told Vickers that employee E. -G. Barker had previously told Walters that Barker wanted to retrieve his union card. Finally, Walters wanted an election. Since Manager Walters had presented to him the names of 20 employees who were represented to him by Secretary Mills to have repudiated their union cards, and since the total number of union cards amounted to 44, manifestly Walters had received evidence disintegrating the Union 's majority. For then the Union appar- ently had but 24 cards in a unit of 49 employees . Elsewhere I have found that such purported repudiation did not destroy the Union 's majority . The question here is whether Respondent had a good -faith doubt of majority . For evidence sufficient to support a good-faith doubt of the Union 's majority "will serve as a defense to a refusal to bargain charge ." Skyline Homes, Inc v. N.L.R.B., 323 F.2d 642, 648 (CA. 5); Roh lik, Inc., 145 NLRB 1236, 1240 . And ordinarily evidence that employees reported or communicated to supervisors that they , the employees, wished to''withdraw from the Union , absent any contemporaneous unfair labor practicet ,19 warrants a finding of good-faith doubt as to majority. N.L R.B. V. Cactus Petroleum , 61 LRRM 2303 (C A. 5), Paramount Paper Products Co., 154 NLRB 1064 ; Mitchell Standard Corporation . 140 NLRB 496; N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5); Skyline Homes v. N.L .R.B., supra, 649 But unfair labor practices engaged in concurrently with the refusal to bargain destroy a contention that the doubt as to a union 's majority is begotten in good faith Skyline Homes v. N.L.R B., supra, Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra; Drug King, Inc., 157 NLRB 343; New England Liquor Sales, 157 NLRB 153. See Ben Duthler, Inc, 157 NLRB 69; John P. Serpa , Inc., 155 NLRB 99; Strydel, Incorporated, 156 NLRB 1185 ; Indiana Rayon Corp . v. N.L.R.B., 355 F.2d 535 (C:A. 7). It is my opinion, and I find, that Respondent 's doubt as to majority was not bona fide because ( a) it was based upon employee withdrawals from the Union which are instigated or solicited by Respondent (Engineers & Fabricators, supra), and (b ) Respondent- engaged in unfair labor practices contemporaneously with the organizing campaign of the Union . See Master Transmission Building Corpo- ration, 155 NLRB 364. As to ( a) I have already found that most of the withdrawals were solicited or suggested by Supervisors Mills, Berlin, and Jumper. Hence they cannot afford a basis for genuine doubt. New England Liquor Sales, 157 NLRB 153; Price'-Less Discount Foods, Inc. d/b/a Payless, 157 NLRB 1143. I do not credit the ev dence 19 Diamond National Corporation, 133 NLRB 268, 270; N L P. B v C J Glasgoro Co., 356 F.2d 476 (C.A. 7) ; N.L R B. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 346 F 2d 936, 940 (CA 5). '960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of Respondent inconsistent with this finding. Perhaps the pertinent testimony of Mills requires brief comment . Mills testified that she did not solicit, advise, or tell any employees to withdraw . But several employees testified that she asked each of them whether they had signed a card and , upon receiving an affirmative answer, told them they could withdraw; and she invited some to sign a paper of withdrawal. It is difficult to discredit these employees , especially since their testimony was straightforward, coincided with their affidavits to the Board, and tended to aid Respondent insofar as an actual attempt to withdraw is shown . Hence I have credited the employees . Since Respondents took the initiative in suggesting or seeking withdrawals, I find that such action undermines Respondents ' good faith in protessing a doubt as to majority Cf. N.L.R B. v. Security Plating Co., 356 F.2d 725 (C.A. 9). Phelps Dodge Copper Corporation v. N.L.R.B. 354 F.2d 591 (C.A. 7), is distinguishable. As to (b), I have found in subsection C of this Decision that Respondents engaged in coercive conduct proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is my opinion, and I find, that since this occurred during the time that the Union carried on'• its campaign to obtain union cards it demonstrated an union animus incongru- ous w,th a genuine belief that the Union lacked a majority. N.L.R.B. v. Cumber- land Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917. It follows, and I find, that the record does not sustain Respondents' assertion that they questioned the Union's majority in good faith. Hence they were not justified in asking for an election. It further follows, and I find, that since the Union had an uncoerced majority on August 25, when it made a demand for recog- nition, that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to recognize and bargain with the Union. Skyline Homes v N.L.R.B., supra. Cases 'like N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Bros., Inc., supra, and similar authorities cited by Respondents, do not dictate a different result. C. Interference, restraint, and coercion 1. By Respondent Berlin About August 20, Berlin told employees Till, Pryor, and Hunt, during the course of a conversation relating to union cards, "If you girls go through with this [the Union], you know you will lose your insurance ." This is the General Counsel's evidence. Berlin's version is that he said, "when [you] joined the Union we'd probably have to pay a certain amount of health benefit to the Union, so this will come off" Berlin's present contribution to their current health insurance pre- miums. He amplified this by saying this meant "If they get into this they will lose this." Patently Berlin himself testified that employees would be deprived of present benefits if the Union came in. Hence I find that this statement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. When these same employees asked Berlin whether they should join the Union, he replied it did not matter to him and it was entirely up to them whether they did. I find no violation of the Act in this statement. About August 27 Berlin spoke to a group of employees, among whom was employee Brown. He told them he did not know why they wanted a union and that it would do them no good It is not contended this is an unfair labor practice. Further, I expressly find that it is protected free speech under Section 8(c) of the Act. About August 26 and 27 Berlin told employee Torrez to go to the office to sign a paper and "get your card back." Berlin's denial is not credited. I find this inter- feres with an employee's freedom to decide for himself whether he will voluntarily withdraw from a union. It thus tends to coerce or restrain an employee in exercis- ing that right . Hence I find this transgresses Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Priced- Less Discount Foods, Inc., supra. 2. By Secretary Mills Mills telephoned to employee Whorton asking whether Whorton had signed a union card and whether Whorton would like to have it withdrawn. The contrary evidence of Mills is not credited. "Although a company has a right to interrogate employees for purely informational purposes" (N.L.R.B. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra ), such immunity is lost when the interrogation is used for unlawful ends, such as an attempt to induce those interrogated to withdraw from a union. PHIL-MODES, INC. 961 Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 773-775,'reversed' on factual grounds, 344 F.2d 617, (C.A. 8). See Skyline Homes v. N.L.R.B., supra, 649. Hence I find this conduct of Mills is coercive. Priced-Less Discount Foods, supra. Employee Norton testified that she heard Mills ask employee Boyd if Boyd wanted her card back. But Boyd testified'that she went to Mills for advice on how to withdraw her card. I credit Boyd. Hence I find no unfair labor practice occurred during this incident. Employee Lottie Till testified that she heard Mills asked employee McGee if McGee wanted her card back. However, McGee testi- fied that she told Mills that she wanted her card back. I credit McGee on this aspect of the case . Hence I find no violation of the Act by Mills in this incident. Employee Clower, whom I credit, testified that Mills on or shortly before August 25 asked Clower if she was for the Union and whether Clower wanted her union card back. Clower replied negatively. I find that this is coercive. Mills asked employee Johns if she would like to have her card back, and Johns answered that she would. I do not credit Mills on this issue, both because of demeanor and also since Johns signed Respondents' Exhibit 2 and attempted to withdraw from the Union. I find that soliciting Johns to withdraw is coercive. _ Mills also asked employee Wyatt if she wanted her card back and, if so, to sign a paper. I credit Wyatt, who signed Respondents' Exhibit 2, for the same reasons I have credited employee Johns. Mills asked employee Paris if Paris signed a union card and if she wanted to get out of the Union. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, Mills gave Paris a paper to sign . Paris did sign Respondents' Exhibit 2. I credit Paris. Hence I find coercion in this incident . Employee Tucker testified to a conversation with Mills the week following August 20. This is not alleged as a violation in the complaint. In any event I find the interrogation of Tucker by Mills is protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. About 2 or 3 days after August 20 Mills asked employee Jones if she wanted her card back. Continuing, Mills said "they" were going to try to get a lawyer to get the cards back for the girls. Later the same day Mills unsuccessfully sought to have Jones sign a "list." I do not credit Respondents ' contrary evidence. I find this conduct is coercive. Mills told employee Lois Brown that Mills was dis- appointed that Brown "went for the Union." I find this is shielded by Section 8(c) of the Act. Mills asked employee Travis Barker if Barker wanted her card back and if Barker was "going union." I find this is coercive. Further, Mills asked employee Stalter if she signed a union card and what was better about a union shop than present conditions at the plant. It is lawful. to inquire whether an employee signed a union card in the face of a union demand for recognition, for an employer need not accept a union's assertion ,of majority. N.L.R.B. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra. And an employer, under Section 8(c) of the Act, may point out the good points of his system and the demerits of unionization. Hence I find no violation of the Act in this conversation by Mills. 3. By Supervisor Jumper Jumper did not testify. I have taken this into consideration in crediting the employees mentioned below in this subsection. Jumper brought Respondents' Exhibit 2 to employee Boyd and asked Boyd to sign it; he also asked employee Hickman to sign this instrument. Jumper told employee Wyatt he was making arrangements to have employees get their cards back and asked Wyatt if she was interested . I find the above three conversation by Jumper to be coercive. Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., supra. A few days after employee Price signed a union card, Jumper told her, "I'll bust this Union" because someone had lied in telling Manager Walters that Jumper was organizing a union at the plant. Jumper added that this was one way of proving he was not organizing. While this demonstrates union animus , and, if isolated, would be protected by Section 8(c) of the Act as freedom of expression (N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 4) ), I find that it is coercive when appraised in the light of Jumper's other coercive conduct found herein. Savoy Leather Mfg. Corp., 139 NLRB 425, 426; Mr. D's No. 2, Inc., 145 NLRB 1227, 1229. On about August 27 Jumper said to employee Whitener, "This is your last chance; don't you want your card back?" I find 'this is coercive. Whitener also testified that she heard Jumper tell a group of employees that he was going to tear 243-084-67-vol 159-62 962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Union all to pieces . But she was unable to mention when this occurred : Hence I find that this latter incident has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Not long after August 20 Jumper asked employee Howell if she wanted to with- draw her card and informed her that she would lose her insurance if she "went on" with the Union. I find this is coercive. Two or three days after August 20 Jumper asked employee Jones if she signed a card. Proceeding with his topic , Jumper told Jones how kind he had been to her and asked her, as a favor to him, because Manager Walters accused him of organizing the Union , to cancel her card or else speak to Secretary Mills to get her card back. This statement is coercive, and I so find. About August 20 Jumper inquired of employee Hood, "Did you sign the card outside ?" As Hood replied affirmatively, Jumper said "We want the Union in there." Since Hood had already signed the card, no coercion may be found in this conversation . However, about August 27 Jumper offered Hood a "piece of paper" to subscribe to "get [Hood's] name out of the Union." A similar remark was made by Jumper to employee Whitener . I find these two last statements by Jumper to be coercive , although neither Whitener nor Hood yielded to Jumper's requests to sign the paper. About August 22 or 23 Jumper asked employee Travis Barker if she wanted to take back her card. This is coercive and I so find. About August 23 or 24 Jumper told employee Ida Grayer that Respondent Berlin had told him "if we did get a union . . . [Grayer] would be reduced from $1 .40 an hour to $1 .25 an hour." Berlin testified, and I credit him in this respect that he did not transmit any such threat to Jumper. But since Jumper is a supervisor , his statements are attributable to Respondents . Accordingly, I find that this statement is coercive. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec- tion with their operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor prac- tices prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and ( 5) of the Act, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and that they take specific affirmative action, as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The conduct of the Respondents in my opinion does not portray a general hostility to the Act. Hence the remedy adopted should be commensurate with the violations found ; and relief broader in scope is not warranted . It follows that an order is appropriate when limited to enjoining the conduct found to constitute unfair labor practices and similar or like acts. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Sections 2(5), 8(a ), and 9 of the Act. 2. Respondents , and each of them, are employers engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondents are engaged in an integrated enterprise and they are jointly and severally liable for the unfair labor practices found herein. 4. By (a ) refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union as the exclusive bar- gaining agent of all the employees in the above -mentioned appropriate unit, (b) threatening employees with loss of economic benefits and other reprisals if they join the Union or if the Union succeeds in representing them , ( c) soliciting employ- ees to withdraw from the Union, (d) circulating among employees a written request to withdraw their union cards, (e) threatening to bust the Union, and (f) coercively interrogating employees as to their union membership , sympathies, or desires, Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. PHIL-MODES, INC. 963 5. All production and maintenance employees of Respondents employed at their Athens, Texas, plant, including shipping clerks, but excluding all guards and super- visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a) (5) and 9 of the Act. 6. On August 25, 1965, and at all material times thereafter, the Union repre- sented a majority, and was the exclusive bargaining representative, of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9 of the Act, and Respondents were ,on that date, and have been since, legally obligated to recognize and bargain with .the Union as such. 7. By refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union in said appropriate unit on and since August 25, 1965, Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 8. The above-described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. Respondents have not committed any other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondents, and each of them, the officers, agents, successors, and assigns of Respondent Phil-Modes, Inc., and the agents, successors, and assigns, of Respondent Berlin, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargain- ing representative of all the employees in the above-mentioned appropriate unit. (b) Threatening employees with loss of economic benefits and other reprisals if they join the Union or if the Union succeeds in representing them. (c) Soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union. (d) Circulating among employees a written request to withdraw their union cards. (e) Threatening to bust the Union. (f) Coercively interrogating employees as to their union membership, sympathies, .or desires. (g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive represent- ative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement (b) Post at their premises at Athens, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 20 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, shall, after being duly signed by Harold Berlin and a duly authorized representative of Phil-Modes, Inc., be posted by them immediately upon receipt .thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspic- uous places, including all places where such notices are customarily displayed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other, material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith?' IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. w In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, this notice shall be further amended by substituting the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order." 21 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, ,what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith " 964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL upon request, bargain collectively with International Ladies' Gar- ment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed statement. The bargaining unit is: All our production and maintenance employees, including shipping employees, but excluding all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of economic benefits or other reprisals if they join the above-mentioned Union or if said Union succeeds in representing our employees. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to withdraw from said Union or circulate a written request among them to withdraw their union authorization cards. WE WILL NOT threaten to bust the said Union. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees as to their union mem- bership, sympathies, or desires. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of said Union or any other labor organization. PHIL-MODES, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) BERLIN COAT MANUFACTURING CO., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Tele- phone 335-2145. Makela Welding, Inc., Kemp Welding, Inc. and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im- plement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO. Case 30-CA- 265. June 22, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On March 1, 1966, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommend- ing that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative 159 NLRB No. 93.