Walker's

WALKER'S 1159 This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Room 2023, Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street , Cincinnati , Ohio 45202, Telephone 684-3627. Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's and Edna P. Mashburn Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's and Retail Clerks Orga- nizing Council of Southern California , Retail Clerks Interna- tional Association, AFL-CIO and A. J. Cruciani ; Lester B. Newsome ; Kunion Beauty Salon, Inc.; Barton Jewelry Co., Inc.; Harry Camp Millinery Company ; Dr. Marston E. Melton; Wetherby-Kayser Shoe Co.; Helen Grace Candies ; Ralph and Muriel Nymer d/b/a Pacific Coast Fur Co.; and Edwin R. Brown, Parties in Interest. Cases ?1-CA-5977, 6087, and 6143. June 24, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On December 28, 1965, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief ; General Counsel filed a brief in opposition to Respondent's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con- nection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCul- loch and Members Jenkins and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and 1 The Respondent has excepted to many of the Trial Examiner's credibility resolutions. It is the Board's established practice , however , not to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolu- tions with respect to credibility unless , as is not the case here , the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect . Standai d Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 159 NLRB No. 106. 1160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD recommendations 2 of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications : 1. In agreeing with the Trial Examiner's finding that the signed union designation cards constituted effective designations of the Union as the bargaining representative of Respondent's employees, we rely on the fact that the Trial Examiner specifically credited the testimony of the union organizers that they did not tell any of the employees solicited to sign union authorization cards that the only purpose of the cards was to bring about an election.3 Such testimony plus the fact that the cards clearly and unequivocally stated that the cards were for authorization purposes convinces us that the card signers were well aware that the cards could and might be used to obtain recognition of the Union without an election. We also agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the state- ment in Union Organizer La Rocca's affidavit of November 1964, when considered in context as it must be, cannot logically be inter- preted to mean that La Rocca told employees that the cards would be used only for an election, that the cards were not binding on them, and that employees still had a freedom of choice.4 When the affida- vit is considered in its entirety, it is clear that La Rocca correctly told the employees that the cards were not binding upon them and that they would have a freedom of choice to vote for or against the Union only if the cards were used for election purposes rather than for authorization purposes. 2. In finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) by threat- ening to "change" the cosmetic saleswomen's line commissions in the event of unionization, the Trial Examiner credited the testimony of employee Van Ness and discredited that of Shuff, Respondent's manager. However, the Trial Examiner failed specifically to men- tion the testimony of employee Whitney which corroborated that of Shuff. Also, in finding that the Respondent violated Section 2In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner 's findings that Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a)(3) and ( 1) by discharging employee Edna P. Mashburn , and 8 ( a) (1) by granting wage increases to certain employees. 3 Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 , enfd 351 F.2d 917 ( C A 6) ; Peterson Brothers, Inc, 144 NLRB 679, enfd. as modified 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5). Cf. Trend Mills, Inc., 154 NLRB 143 ; Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394. 4In his November 1964 , affidavit, La Rocca stated that although he told employees "one of the purposes for signing the cards was to get an election ," he "never told any employee who signed a card that the card was for the purpose of obtaining an election only" and that he told employees "the procedure of a card check " He then stated, "I told employees that the card was not binding on them and that they still have free- dom of choice, and that the employees in the secret ballot could vote against the Union, for the purpose of the card was to give them that right This came up when I was ex- plaining that the Union never went to an election with less than 50 to 60 percent of the employees signed up because inevitably someone would change their vote because the card was not binding on them to vote for us " He concluded his affidavit by stating that "I always outlined that the purpose of the card was to get an election and also to designate the Union as a bargaining representative , and for use in a card check." WALKER'S 1161 8(a) (1) by threatening the closing of the store, loss of employee benefits, and forced retirement of older employees, and by stating to employees that Respondent was aware of the identity of those employees who attended union meetings, the Trial Examiner cred- ited the testimony of employees Guacci, McGinnis, and Hoff, and discredited the testimony of Supervisor Pollack. However, the Trial Examiner did not discuss the testimony of employee Grimes which corroborated that of Pollack. The Respondent excepts to these two findings of the Trial Exam- iner. We find such exceptions to be without merit. The failure of a Trial Examiner to detail completely all conflicts in the evidence does not mean, as the Respondent infers, that this conflicting evi- dence was not considered.5 A "Trial Examiner [is] not `compelled to annotate to each finding the evidence supporting it.' " 6 Indeed, the Trial Examiner stated in his Decision that his findings were based "upon the entire record in the case, from [his] observation of the witnesses, and upon consideration of the briefs filed." Since the Trial Examiner specifically credited testimony directly contrary to that of Whitney and Grimes and specifically discredited testimony which was the same as that of Whitney and Grimes, it reasonably can be inferred that the Trial Examiner did not find the testimony of Whitney and Grimes credible. 3. In the light of Respondent's other unfair labor practices and unconcealed hostility toward the Union, we concur in the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Respondent counsel's interrogation of its employees concerning the unfair labor practices with which it was charged was violative of Section 8(a) (1) .7 We rely, however, only upon the Trial Examiner's findings relating to "the systematic inter- rogation by Respondent's counsel, particularly in the area of [the employees] subjective intentions in signing designation cards." We do not find unlawful the questioning of employees as to whether they had given statements to Board personnel.8 4. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent was responsible for a coercive, antiunion bulletin composed and distributed by some of Respondent's employees. The Respondent contends that it can- not be held responsible for this bulletin because it was composed, circulated, and distributed by rank and file employees, and there is no evidence indicating that the Respondent instigated, ordered, 5 Olin Industries, Inc., 86 NLRB 203, enfd. 191 F.2d 613 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 343 U.S. 919; Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 NLRB 1525. 6 Trumbull Asphalt Co . of Delaware v. N.L.R.B., 314 F.2d 382, 383, cert. denied 370 U.S. 808, citing as authority U.S. v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 529. 7 See Plains Cooperative Oil Mill, 154 NLRB 1003; Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, enforcement denied 344 F.2d 617 (C.A. 8). 8 See Montgomery Ward t Co., Incorporated, 146 NLRB 76, 79, 81. 1162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD encouraged, authorized, ratified, or adopted the conduct of these employees. We disagree. At the hearing, Manager Shuff admitted that employee Hauck, the composer of the petition, came to his office and stated that she would like him to read the petition. Shuff testi- fied that he replied, "No, Miss Hauck. I'm sure whatever you've done is fine and I'd prefer not to read it." [Emphasis supplied.] Shuff then gave Hauck permission to use company equipment and supplies to "put out the bulletin." Shuff testified that, after consul- tation with counsel, he informed the employees that if company equipment and supplies were used to publish the bulletin, a statement should be added at the bottom of the bulletin that the materials were furnished by Respondent.9 In our opinion, such a statement at the end of the antiunion bulletin could only cause the employees to believe that it was the Respondent "speaking," since the bulletin con- tained the same type of antiunion propaganda which the Respondent had already expressed to employees, even though the bulletin stated that it was an "expression of the undersigned employees." Accord- ingly, as the Respondent was aware that the bulletin was to be cir- culated to employees, as the Respondent supplied the equipment and supplies for the publication of the bulletin, and as the Respondent required that a statement be placed on the bulletin that the materials were furnished by the Respondent, we find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent is responsible for the bulletin.10 5. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union violated Section 8(a) (5) for the reasons stated in the Trial Examiner's Decision. Moreover, even if the record warranted the conclusion, contended for by the Respond- ent, that it refused to bargain with the Union because it had a bona fide doubt of the Union's majority status, effectuation of the policies of the act would still require a remedial order directing the Respond- ent to bargain with the Union upon request in order to remedy the Respondent's other unfair labor practices found herein." The record establishes that the Union had a clear majority when the Respondent began its course of unfair labor practices directed at destroying that 0 The Respondent contends that this statement was placed at the bottom of the bulletin "out of an abundance of caution to insure that Respondent complied with the spirit of the 'contemporaneous disclosure ' exception to reporting requirements of the 1959 Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act." 10 The Borden Company, 142 NLRB 364, relied upon by Respondent, is clearly inap- posite. In that case, unlike here , the employer refused to let employees use company time and materials to type up an antiunion petition, and the employer required employees to halt soliciting signatures to the petition when it discovered employees were soliciting signatures during working hours. 11 N.L.R B. v. Delight Bakery Inc , 353 F 2d 344 ( C A 6) ; Piasecki Aircraft Corpora- tion v N L.R.B., 280 F 2d 575 (C.A 3), cert denied 364 US 933 ; Editorial "El Impartial" Inc. v. N L.R.B., 278 F.2d 184 (C.A. 1) ; N.L.R.B. v. Joe Caldarera d/b/a Falstaff Distribut- ing Company, 209 F.2d 265 (C.A. 8) ; D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 179 F.2d 876 (C.A. 5). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (C.A. 2). WALKER'S 1163 majority. To the extent that the election revealed a loss of union support thereafter, such loss must be attributed to Respondent's unfair labor practices. Therefore, we shall order the Respondent to bargain, upon request, with the Union to remedy its violations both of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.12 [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] 13 Member Zagoria agrees that a bargaining order is appropriate to remedy the Respond- ent's serious violations of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act which, as the Trial Examiner found, were designed to destroy the majority which the Union ultimately received and evidence a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle. He deems it unnecessary therefore to decide whether the Respondent's conduct in the circumstances of this case also violated Section 8 ( a)(5). TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges filed by Edna P. Mashburn, an individual, and by Retail Clerks Organizing Council of Southern California, Retail Clerks International Associa- tion, AFL-CIO,' the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a consolidated complaint on February 18, 1965, alleging that Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's, herein the Respondent, had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1),(3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein the Act. The Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. The matter was tried before Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster, in Long Beach and in Los Angeles, California, on various dates beginning May 10 and ending June 25, 1965. At issue is whether the Respondent by means of threats, promises, wage increases, and interrogations intertered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; discrimina- torily and unlawfully discharged Edna P. Mashburn; and refused unlawfully to extend recognition to and to bargain with the majority representative of its employ- ees in an appropriate unit. Upon the entire record in the case, from my observation of the witnesses, and upon consideration of the briefs filed, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a California corporation engaged in the retail sale of general merchandise at its store known as Walker's Department Store in Long Beach, California. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of City Products Corporation, an Ohio Corporation. Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, has a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000 per annum and during the 12- month period preceding the issuance of the complaint, purchased more than $50,000 in goods and services directly from suppliers outside the State of Cali- fornia. A number of business entities operate within Respondent's store as licens- ees and are named in the caption as "Parties in Interest." It is conceded, and I find, that the Respondent at all times material herein with its licensees constituted a single employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. I find that the business of the Respondent and its licensees constitute operations in commerce and affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. IT. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Retail Clerks Union Local No . 324, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, is now and at all times material has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1 Mashburn filed her charge on June 2, 1964. The remaining charges were filed July 24 and August 28, 1964, and on January 19, 1965. 1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The setting Situated a few miles from Los Angeles , Long Beach is a city of approximately 400,000. The Respondent's department store , known to its customers as Walker's, has been in existence for a number of years and became the property of City Products Corporation in 1960. Many of its employees had worked for Walker's for years before this most recent change in ownership . The population of Long Beach, reputedly, consists in large measure of persons well past their middle years; at times in the past, and perhaps now, it is regarded by some as the Mecca of retired midwest farmers and shopkeepers . If it be true that the residents of this area are on average beyond the years attained by those in other urban areas, this circumstance is mirrored and perhaps exaggerated among Respondent's employees. Of the approximately 240 working there in the spring of 1964,2 75 to 100 were at least 60 years old. Early in that year the Union began its campaign to organize the store. A team of solicitors consisting of Jerome La Rocca, Donald Taylor, Dorothy Copinger, and Joyce Turney called upon employees at their homes , held employee meetings, and distributed literature at points near the store . These efforts attained a measure of success. Eventually 140 employees signed designation cards which unequivo- cally authorized the Union to represent them in dealings with the Respondent. On March 17, before the Union held such designations from a majority of Respondent's employees, it wrote to the Respondent asserting that it had been chosen as bargaining representative by a majority of the employees and suggesting that its claim could be proved through some disinterested agency by a check of the signed cards in its possession . On the same date it filed a petition with a Los Angeles office of the National Labor Relations Board seeking a representation election By a letter dated March 24, the Respondent refused the Union's sugges- tions, said that it doubted the assertion of majority designation , questioned the authenticity of whatever designation cards the Union possessed , and expressed a desire that the matter be determined by a secret-ballot election conducted by the Board. Following a hearing, an election was directed among Respondent 's employees in a unit which all agree and I find to be appropriate .3 The election was held on May 22 and the Union lost. The complaint alleges that the Respondent from about mid-March to the date of the election conducted a campaign against the Union which was marked by threats, predictions of disaster, and misrepresentations calculated to destroy the Union's majority ; and by the granting of wage increases as an inducement to employees to oppose the Union. The Respondent denies that it did anything but to point out to employees that a union would not necessarily provide happy answers to their problems and that after all it had been a pretty good employer. Counsel for the General Counsel asserts that on a date no later than March 25 the Union attained the status of majority representative and that the Respondent never held a good faith doubt to the contrary . The Respondent denies that the designa- tion cards which the employees signed were obtained in circumstances fairly sus- ceptible of a conclusion that the cards really evidenced a desire by the employees to have the representation the Union Was offering . This flames the major issue. There are other matters of less import which will be discussed and decided at a later point in this decision. B. The Union's majority By any computation a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had signed designation cards by March 25. Counsel for the General Counsel claims that 135 of 249 employees had signed by that date Counsel for the Respondent reaches the same result by conceding that the Union then held cards from 121 of 236 employees . I am unable to determine from the record the reason for the disagreement about the number of employees in the unit. In any event it is the contention of the Respondent that many of the designation cards were signed as a result of misrepresentations of the Union's solicitors and that many of the cards therefore do not evidence an intent by the signers to have the Union as bargaining 2 All dates mentioned are in 1964 except as otherwise stated 3 The unit is . All regular full-time and part-time employees in the store , excluding pro- fessional employees , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act WALKER'S 1165 representative. Before entering upon a consideration of this contention, it may be noted that at all times after March 25 to the date of the election on May 22 the Union held unrevoked designations from a majority of Respondent's employees. In the course of its campaign the Union sent literature to employees which included a designation card headed in bold print, AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION and continuing, "Desiring to enjoy the rights and benefits of collective bargaining, I" then followed spaces to be filled out showing place of employment, job title, and home address. Immediately over the signature line it read "hereby authorize Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or its chartered Local Union to represent me for the purposes of collective bargaining, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ- ment, in accordance with applicable lau " Date and signature lines followed The cards used by the Union's solicitors in making calls at the homes of employees dif- fered in no important respect from the mailed card Missing from the card used by the solicitors was the phrase, "Desiring to enjoy the rights and benefits of collective bargaining"; instead of "in accordance with applicable law," the card ended with the words "and proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board." Neither of the cards used makes reference to an election and both are, I find, clear and unequivocal designations of the Union as bargaining representative of the signers. But the Respondent argues that at least 78 cards are not what they appear to be and, in support of this position, specifically attacks the validity of the designations evidenced by 46 cards on the grounds that these were signed upon representations by the solicitors that they were needed only for the purpose of bringing about an election or that the cards were not "binding" so that a signer could vote as he desired in any election or that initiation fees would be waived for those who signed or that the cards didn't really mean anything or that the solicitors asserted at the time the signature was sought that the Union already had received cards from a malouty of the employees. Before examining the evidence adduced by the Respondent in support of these assertions of invalidity, the observation must be made that counsel for the Respondent (over the objections of counsel for the General Counsel) was afforded by my rulings at the hearing an impermissible scope in the examination and cross- examination of witnesses. Many witnesses who had signed designations were questioned about their subjective intent, whether by that act they meant to select the Union to represent them. Any lingering thought that perhaps such question- ing might be permissible during the course of a hearing, with the answer given such weight as it might appear to deserve, is laid to rest by a recent Board holding that in the absence of ambiguous designations, such evidence is irrelevant and that it is error to receive rt.4 Mindful of that adjuration, I have not given considera- tion to such evidence in reaching my conclusions as to the efficacy of the designations. The union solicitors, Jerome La Rocca, Donald Taylor, Dorothy Copinger, and Joyce Turney, all testified flatly that although the probability of an election was often mentioned to prospective card signers, no one was told that the signed designations would be used only to bring about that outcome. Edna M. Tillery testified that she recalled only that the union representative said that signatures were needed to bring about an election; that she could not remember whether she read the card before signing it. She filled out the card herself. It is difficult to believe that she did not see the words "AUTHORI- ZATION FOR REPRESENTATION" printed boldly across its face or realize their import. The overt act of signing an unequivocal designation is not overcome by evidence of this character. I count her card as valid. Faye McGinnis testified that she was told that the Union had to obtain a number of signatures before an election could be held. She also recalled that she was told by the solicitor that signing the card would not oblige her to vote for the Union when the election was held. There is no evidence that McGinnis did not read the card which she admittedly signed and I do not consider that the testimony adverted to above establishes that she was induced to sign the card by reason of the fact that she could in the privacy of the voting booth vote as she chose. Edna Mashburn testified that she recalled only that if enough cards were signed an election could be held. However, Mashburn testified credibly that on some occasion shortly after she signed the card she told her supervisor, Thomas Pollack, 4 Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc., 154 NLRB 954. 1166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that she thought a union was needed in the store . This statement, coupled with the fact that the card is wholly unambiguous , causes me to conclude that Mash- burn's card is a valid designation of the Union. Semmie Brager testified that the union solicitor told him if enough signatures were obtained, an election could be held ; that "what I remember him saying" was that the card had no other purpose. Brager denied that he read the card before signing it. However, further questioning developed that Brager filled out the card and, of course, had it before him when he did so. It is difficult to believe his testimony that he overlooked the language over his signature which authorized the Union to represent him and I do not do so. His card is a valid designation of the Union. Fern Genter testified that she learned from the Union 's organizer that if enough cards were signed an election would be held "and you would have it explained what the union could do or what it couldn't do." She recalled that the organizer might have said that the card was not "binding or anything"; that at union meet- ings she could listen to a discussion about what the Union could do; and that in an election she could vote as she pleased. However, on further examination by Respondent's counsel she amended her testimony by denying that the organizer said anything about the card being "binding." Genter testified that she read the card at the time of signing I find her card to be a valid designation of the Union. Willene Bowker and her daughter, Nancy Bowker, signed cards on the same occasion. As a witness for the Respondent , Willene Bowker testified that the union representative said that he was getting card signatures "merely" to bring about an election . She went on to testify that she was told on this occasion that the Union would have to bargain with the Respondent to get any benefits but that an attempt would be made to improve wages and working conditions . I find that neither Willene nor Nancy Bowker were misled and that they executed valid designations of the Union. Bobby Bradley testified that he signed a card at the solicitation of La Rocca and that La Rocca told him he was trying to get the signatures of 85 percent of the employees so that an election could be held . However, Bradley testified that La Rocca also mentioned the benefits that the Union could obtain for the employ- ees and that he told La Rocca at the time of signing that most of the employees in the department in which he worked favored the Union . I find no evidence of misrepresentation in respect to the card of Bobby Bradley and hold it to be a valid designation of the Union. Catherine Montgomery testified that she was told only that the card would facili- tate an election and that she was unsure whether she read the language on the card authorizing the Union to represent her. Considering the unambiguity of the card. I find that it constitutes a valid designation of the Union. Florence Green testified that she was told only that the card was to bring about an election . However, she read the authorizing language on the card before sign- ing it and I conclude that her designation is a valid one. Beatrice Klick testified that the umon solicitor told her her signature was needed so that an election could be held, that the card did not mean anything , and that it was confidential . The solicitor went on to say that if the Union won the election there was much that could be done for the employees . Klick denied that she read the authorizing language on the card . Considering the testimony of the union solicitors that in no case did they say that a card was only for an election and bearing in mind the clear language of the card itself, I find that Klick's designation is valid. Forrest Heck testified that he signed a card at the solicitation of Donald Taylor and that Taylor told him he wanted the card so that an election could be held; that signing would not indicate that Heck wanted a union . Heck denied that he read the authorizing language on the card. Heck gave Taylor the names and addresses of other employees in the department in which he worked and attended at least one union meeting. I am convinced that he knew the significance of the card and, in signing it, understood what he was doing and thus validly designated the Union. Gladys Meyers testified that La Rocca told her that he wanted her signature so that the Union could start to organize the store and that she would not be obli- gated in any way. Meyers denied that she read the authorizing langauge on the card. There is no indication that Meyers had any difficulty reading or understanding the language; the card is unambiguous and I find it to be a valid union designation. WALKER'S 1167 Hattie Dollarhide testified that she was told that those who signed cards would not have to pay initiation fees. The Union's policy of no initiation fees was early and widely publicized. The benefit of the initiation fee arrangement was not lim- ited to card signers. I find that Dollarhide's designation is a valid one. Dorothy Morrison testified that the union solicitor told her that he was attempt- ing to get cards signed so that an election could be held, that she was undertaking no obligation by signing, and that if she did so she need not pay an initiation fee. However, all employees were told that there would be no initiation fee. The solicitor left the lard with her and she signed it in his absence. Obviously she had time and opportunity to read the card and to understand the nature of her act. [ find that the designation of Morrison is a valid one. Mildred Agan testified that the solicitor told her that the card was to bring about an election and that she could not remember that any other purpose was men- tioned. The card was left with her and she signed it. Obviously she had oppor- tunity to read and to understand the card and by signing it I find she validly designated the Union as her representative. Roy Flounoil testified that La Rocca told him that if enough signatures were obtained an election would result in which Flounoil could vote as he desired. La Rocca left the card with him and Flounoil signed it. There is no suggestion that Flounoil was unable to comprehend the plain language on the card and I find that his designation is a valid one. Olive Fulton testified that she did not remember clearly just what was said to her by the union solicitor but that there was mention of the necessity to obtain a certain number of signatures to bring about an election. Fulton also testified that the solicitor stressed the argument that signing the card placed her under no obliga- tion to the Union and that there was mention of the benefits that the Union might be able to obtain I find that Fulton knew that she was designating the Union as bargaining representative when she placed her signature on the card and that her designation is a valid one. Adelaide Whitney testified that the union solicitor told her that the signatures of a majority of the employees were needed in order to hold an election. That the union representatives routinely told employees of the possibility or probability of an election is certain. I find no reason based upon this record to invalidate the clear and unambiguous designation of the Union which Whitney made by signing the card. Marie Ratcliffe testified that she was told that if enough cards were signed, an election would eventuate in which she could vote as she desired. I find nothing in this testimony to cause me to conclude that her designation of the Union is in any respect invalid. Anne Blanchard testified that the solicitor, Donald Taylor, said that the act of signing the card did not necessarily mean that she favored a union but that a certain number of signatures were needed in order to bring about an election. Blanchard denied that she read the authorizing language on the card. However, at one point in her testimony Blanchard said that when she was given the card she was told that it was to enable the Union to "come into the store." Blanchard manifested considerable confusion throughout the course of her testimony. It ap- pears that she signed the card in the absence of union representatives and perhaps after consultation with her husband. I find her card to constitute a valid desig- nation of the Union. Marie C. Garrison testified that the union solicitor said that he was trying to obtain signatures so that an election could be held and that she was not told that the card would serve any other purpose. On further examination she testified that the representative said he was trying to get enough signatures to hold an election so that the Union would be able to come into the store and the employees could vote on the question of union representation. The card itself, however, bearing as it does a clear designation of the Union as bargaining representative, is not to be overcome by testimony such as this. I find her card to be valid. Bonnie Hill testified that she was asked to sign a card because the Union had to show if she could vote against the Union in an election if she changed her mind asked if she could vote against the Union in an election if she changed her mind and was assured that she could. Although Hill testified that she was told of no purpose that the card would serve other than to bring about an election, it is clear, in addition to the language of the card itself, that she knowingly signed the card because she then favored the Union. I find that her designation is valid. 1168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Helen Mahoney testified that she was told that if two-thirds of the employees signed cards, there would be an election in which she could vote as she desired. This does not constitute evidence satisfactory to me that Mahoney was in any way misled with respect to the card. I find her designation to be valid. Agnes 1. Phillips testified that the union representative told her the card was to bring about an election or that it might be checked against an employee list by "an outside party." In the discussion with the union representative she told him that the Union could not help her because as a social security annuitant her earnings were necessarily limited. When he replied that signing might help her fellow employees, she complied. Obviously her designation is valid. Marguerite Swanson testified that she was told the cards were essential to bring about an election. Swanson at first testified that she did not read the authorizing language on the card and then amended her testimony to say that she did not recall doing so. The card is a clear designation of the Union and I do not find that Swanson's testimony makes it less so. It is valid. Marian Krug testified that La Rocca told her that if 70 percent of the employees signed cards an election could be held in which she could vote as she desired. La Rocca said that if the Union won the election, it would be the representative of the employees. She signed the card and mailed it to the Union. Obviously she had time to read and to consider the authorizing language of the card and I find her designation is a valid one. Dessie Peevler testified that the union representative tried to persuade her of the advantages which representation would afford; asserted that he already had enough signatures to bring about an election, and held out the hope of higher wages and better retirement benefits. Peevler recalled that she was told that anyone who had not signed a card before an election was held would have to pay an initiation fee. Considering the publicity that the Union gave to all employees in connection with initiation fees, I am sure that Peevler is mistaken in her recollection of what what was said to her in that connection. Her card is a valid designation. Christy Dodd Houston testified that La Rocca told her that a certain number of signatures were needed in order to hold an election and that signing the card would not obligate her in any way. Houston was not persuaded to sign on the first visit and La Rocca left some union literature with her. She signed the card but told La Rocca, she testified, that she was uncertain whether she favored the Union because she did not have a complete understanding about it. Obviously Houston gained an understanding in some fashion so that she signed the card apparently outside the presence of La Rocca. As the card is an unambiguous designation of the Union, I find it to be valid. Mudcihn Howard testified that the solicitor, Dorothy Copinger, told her that sig- natures were needed to bring about an election. Howard said that she was not interested in the Union, but nonetheless a conversation developed in which union benefits were discussed. Howard seemingly came to the conclusion that even if a union could not help her it would be of benefit to the other employees. She signed the card and I find that it constitutes a valid designation. Georgean Gaddis testified that La Rocca told her signatures were needed to bring about an election and that she signed the card without reading it. The card is clear and Gaddis had opportunity to read it. I find her designation to be valid. Evangeline Lucenti Glassnei testified that she was told signatures were necessary in order to bring about a vote in which employees could express their desires Glassner read the authorizing language on the card before signing it. . I find that her designation is valid Maitha Martin testified that she was solicited on the basis that a percentage of card signatures was essential to bring about an election; that she could vote in the election as she desired, that if a malouty chose the Union it would become the bargaining representative. Again the, card is clear and unambiguous. I find her designation to be valid Illa Mullenneix testified that she asked the union representative why he wanted her to sign the card and received the answer that it was to determine whether enough people favored an election. Mullenneix commented that she could not see where it would do her any good but that she would sign it and the decision would be up to the other people in the store This does not detract from her designation; I find it to be valid Edward Leinmerinan testified that he told La Rocca that he was working only part time and did not want to sign a card which might antagonize his employer. Upon La Rocca's insistence that the card was needed in order to bring about an election and that no one would see it, Lemmerman, he testified, signed. La Rocca WALKER'S 1169 denied that he told Lemmerman that the card was solely for the purpose of bring- ing about an election and testified that Lemmerman spoke to him about his unhap- piness at the wage he was being paid. Witnessing Lemmerman's extreme discom- fort on the stand where, in my opinion, he was fearful that he might say something which would offend his employer, I give. little credence to his testimony concerning the conversations attending the card signing. The card itself is clear and unam- biguous and I find it to be a valid designation of the Union. Francis Hornsby testified that he was told the card was for the purpose of bring- ing about an election. On cross-examination, Hornsby conceded that he was not told that an election was the only purpose that the card might serve and that he read it. The card is clear and unambiguous and I find it to be valid. Lura Maxwell testified that after about three visits from a union representative she signed a card and mailed it to the Union. She was told that an election would probably be held, read the card and understood it, and in a conversation with the union representative was told that higher wages might result. I find her card to be valid. Mary Huntly Jenkins testified that she was told that if a sufficient number of employees signed cards an election would be held in which she could vote as she desired. Although La Rocca told her, she testified, that the Union would benefit her, she felt that this was not so and told him that because of her age she was not interested in a union. Jenkins denied reading the authorizing language on the card but I am not convinced that this is so. She had several visits from union representatives and had ample time to read and understand the card. I find that her designation is a valid one. Mary S. Pursell testified in substance that she was told that the card was needed in order to bring about an election in which she could vote as she pleased. She told the solicitor, Donald Taylor, that she had not decided how she would vote. Although Pursell testified that she did not recall reading the authorizing language on the card, it is clear that she had opportunity to do so and I find that her desig- nation is valid. Marguerite Silverthorn testified that the union representative said the card was for an election and that the Union would be the bargaining representative of the employees if it succeeded in getting a majority of the votes. This testimony does not detract from the efficacy of the designation card and I find it to be valid. Louise M. Bromley testified that La Rocca told her he was trying to get enough cards so that an election could be held Bromley told La Rocca that it made no difference to her which way the employees voted. Bromley testified that she did not read the authorizing language on the card. Surely she had opportunity to do so and I greatly doubt hei recollection, many months after the event, that she did not is to be trusted. I find her card is a valid one. Franklin Rothenbush testified that La Rocca told him that signing the card would make it possible to have an election in the store. This testimony does not detract from the efficacy of the card and I find it to be a valid designation of the Union. May Walker testified that Dorothy Copinger asked her to sign a card so that Copinger could demonstrate to her employer that she had been working Walker denied that she read the authorizing language on the card. There may have been some casual comment by Copinger on this occasion to the effect that obtaining Walker's card would show that she had been at work, but it is not credible that this was the plea made by Copinger to obtain the signature. I find that Walker's card is a valid designation. Ruth C. Davis testified that La Rocca told her that the purpose of the card was to bring about an election in which she could vote as she desired. Although at points in her testimony Davis said that La Rocca said the card would be used only for an election, at other times she testified that she did not recall if the card was to be so restricted. The card is a clear and unambiguous designation of the Union and the testimony of Davis as to what was said to her on the occasion of signing does not in my opinion detract from its validity. Signa Bullock testified that it was explained to her that the card was needed "merely" to bring about an election in which she would be privileged to exercise her choice. No doubt Bullock was told that an election was likely and probably that she could vote as she pleased. However, the card constitutes a clear and unambiguous designation of the Union and I find it to be valid for that purpose. Underlying my findings of validity in connection with the signing of designation cards is a conviction based upon circumstances later to be elaborated that long before this hearing was held most of the card signers became fearful that any 243-084-67-vol. 159-75 1170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD admission that they had ever truly wanted union representation would earn them the displeasure of their employer. After all the election had been lost. The Respondent had made evident its belief that a union was hostile to the best inter- ests of the employees and of the store. Thus it was easy to rationalize that they did not really understand what they were doing in signing a designation card or had been misled into doing so. I am also convinced by the testimony of La Rocca, Taylor, Copinger, and Turney, given at the hearing, that they were engaged in an effort to persuade Respondent's employees to support the Union in an election should it eventuate and not in the sterile business of collecting signed cards on whatever basis they could. Each of them testified credibly that in no circumstance was any card signer told that signing the card was solely for the purpose of bring- ing about an election. La Rocca testified that he did not tell any employee "that the card was not binding on them and that they still had a freedom of choice." This testimony is challenged by the Respondent on the basis of an affidavit given by La Rocca in November 1964, which might be interpreted to the contrary. In that document La Rocca said, "I told employees that the card was not binding on them and that they still have freedom of choice and that the employees in the secret ballot could vote against the Union for the purpose of the card was to give them that right. This came up when I was explaining that the Union never went to an election with less than 50 to 60 percent of the employees signing it because eventually someone would change their vote because the card was not binding on them to vote for us Also things would happen at election time to make them change their minds." Reading the whole of La Rocca's November statement on this point, I think it to be clear that he was not soliciting cards on the basis that they were meaningless but that when the question arose as to the percentage of cards needed, he explained that a certain number of signers could be expected to change their minds and to vote against the Union as they had a right to do. I find that none of the designation cards submitted are invalid by reason of mis- representation on the part of the solicitors and that they constitute effective desig- nations of the Union as bargaining representative of Respondent's employees. In early March, the Union distributed handbills to employees and mailed to many of them an explanation of its initiation fee policy. This was that there would be no initiation fee charged to any individual until after the negotiation of a bar- gaining agreement with the Respondent. This I find negatives the suggestion in the testimony of some individuals that they were told that only card signers would be exempt from the imposition of initiation fees. On March 17, the Union wrote to the Respondent claiming that it represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit and demanding recognition. On March 24, the Respondent answered that it had no "credible knowledge" con- cerning whether the Union represented any employees; that it doubted the claim of majority; was uninformed as to the authenticity of any designation cards in the Union's possession, and declined to extend recognition. Respondent's manager, James Shuff, testified that he held the doubts outlined in the letter for a number of reasons. In consultation with Respondent's attorney, George Richter, and George T. Moore, who was then Shuff's superior, the conclusion was reached, based in part upon reports from subordinate officials in the store, that the Union was obtaining signatures to designation cards on the representation that the signers were doing no more than evidencing a desire to gain more information about the Union and upon the misrepresentation that everyone had signed cards. Further- more, Shuff and Richter testified, a few weeks earlier the same Union, in connection with an organizing campaign at another store owned and operated by City Products Corporation in a nearby area, had taken the position that buyers and employees in leased departments should not be included in the bargaining unit. Assuming that the Union was taking the same position in respect to Respondent's store, the belief was held that such a unit was inappropriate foi bargaining purposes. Of course, as it developed, the Union did not ask for the exclusion of buyers or leased depart- ment employees and the wording of its demand for recognition mentioned no such exclusions. However, I am convinced that in the circumstances outlined, the Respondent could have held a good-faith doubt as to the status of the Union either on the basis of the number of cards of their validity and also because of a not unreasonable uncertainty as to the scope of the bargaining unit. C. Interference, restraint, and coercion Shuff testified that beginning Saturday morning, April 18, he held weekly meet- ings with all of Respondent's personnel. According to Shuff, he told the employees in general that they should examine the promises of the Union carefully; that the WALKER'S 1171 Union was primarily interested in the revenue it could obtain from the employees in the form of dues and perhaps other assessments; that the Union had failed in its attempt to organize other comparable stores in the Los Angeles area; that wages in organized discount and variety stores ranged from $1.30 to $1.50 an hour, less than the rate earned by some of Respondent's employees, and that any cutback of higher wages then being ieceived would be a subject of negotiation. Shuff went on to say that because an individual had signed a designation card he was not obliged to vote for the Union; that the Respondent hoped that the Union's effort would be repulsed; and that the Respondent was paying wages as high as it could and would continue to do so. Six days before the election on May 16, Shuff reminded the employees that in May 1965, those who had become employees of the Respondent upon its acquisition of the store in 1960, and who were not dis- qualified because of age, would become eligible for the pension plan offered by City Products Corporation. He ended the meeting with the plea that the employees "vote for me." Shuff held additional meetings on three occasions during this period, limited to employees over 60. He told them that they were an asset to the store and that he had jeopardized his own position with City Products Corporation by insisting at some time in the past that no person should be forced to retire because of his calendar age. He reminded them that in the past 4 years of his managership, not one older person had been discharged. Saying that many had asked him if older employees would be terminated after the store became organized, he said this was not necessarily so, that a mandatory retirement age would be a matter subject to negotiation and that no arbitrary age could be set without Respondent's acquies- cence. He reminded his audience, however, that a sister local of the Union was on record as stating that no one over the age of 58 should be allowed to continue working. Edna McGinnis, who was discharged in January 1965, and who was the Union's observer at the election, testified that Shuff said at one of the meetings that in the event the Union was successful, employees over 65 could lose their jobs and that the store might have to close. McGinnis testified that Thomas Pollack, her super- visor, told her on May 21, the day before the election, that the Respondent was not financially able to pay the wages the Union would demand and that a result of union success could be the closing of the store. Grace Gigliuto testified that at one of the employee meetings Shuff said that if the Union came in the Respondent would have to close its store and that he feared the Union would require the layoff of those over 58. Joann Hoff, an elevator operator, testified that her supervisor, Pollack, told her about a week before the election that the store was operating at a loss, could not meet union wage demands, and probably would close. Robert Guacci, a truckdriver, testified that his supervisor, Pollack, at two meet- ings of employees, said that he did not want them to join the Union and that they would be better off without it. About a week before the election, according to Guacci, Pollack said that if the Union succeeded in organizing the store, the employees might lost their bonuses, some of their privileges and their jobs. Pollack commented, according to Guacci, that he knew who attended union meetings. Laraine Norcross, a buyer, and a witness called by the Respondent, testified that Wilder Morrison, director of personnel and industrial relations for City Prod- ucts Corporation, was present at one of the employee meetings held by Shuff. Norcross testified that at some point in this meeting Morrison commented that City Products once owned a store "that went union" but that City Products no longer had a store in that location. Marguerite Van Ness, an employee for the past 9 years in cosmetics, testified that she derives commissions directly from cosmetic suppliers amounting to approxi- mately $1,000 annually. Two or three days before the election, according to Van Ness, Shuff met with the employees in the cosmetic and jewelry departments, and said that if the Union got in, the Respondent might arrange to have such commis- sions paid directly to the store. Fern McCormick Leham testified that Hazel Heinz, the West Coast supervisor of Kunion Beauty Salons, Inc , one of the concessions operating in Respondent's store, told employees in the beauty salon that she hated unions because they bene- fitted gangsters. Heinz went on to say that the beauty salon would be discontinued if the employees voted for the Union. Still, according to Leham, on May 19 or 20, 2 or 3 days before the election, Heinz visited the salon again and told the employees' that if the store went Union her employer would close the shop at once. Leham further testified that the manager of the salon, Sally Patterson, on the day of the election said that Harold Seymour, the assistant manager of the store, wanted to 1172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD know how the employees were going to vote. Leham answered that it was none of Patterson's business. On the same day, Heinz asked Leham the same question and Leham gave her the same answer. Irene Baxter, a buyer, testified that sometime in May she told the employees in her department that as an expression of loyalty to their employer, a reply should be made to some of the literature then being distributed by the Union. Soon there- after, Baxter composed the following: This is an expression of the undersigned employees however time did not permit many more signing this bulletin, who would have liked to do so. Have you talked about and carefully considered what a "YES" vote for the union will do to us, the employees at Walker's? Are you going to vote yourself out of a job? Union retirement in retail clerks union is now 60, and last March they voted for retirement at 58. Walker's is the only City Products store with indefinite age limit employment. For you who are over 60, where can you get a job at any pay for the output you produce here? Are you going to get less salary and pay union dues besides? Retail clerks in comparable department stores, now get $1.30 and $1.35 an hour-top pay after two years $1.45 and $1.50. Are you going to sacrifice the best medical plan available to you now with Walker's9 Union offers choice of medical plans-none as good as City Prod- ucts. You cannot go to your own private physician, they do not pay as much towards hospital or doctor bills, ambulance or anaestheist etc. Are you going to be replaced by self-service and a cashier? Yes, IF Walker's meet union promises made to you--similar to Save-On or the grocery stores who have Mio the employees-do five times the volume-work Sundays and all nights. City Products are going to show a profit for their stock holders, this would cut all employees to "nil" would completely shut the doors to you and cus- tomers for ever. If you vote union in-Walker's will never become a closed shop, will not agree to unreasonable union demands. You as a union member would be required to strike and to picket. While you are picketing, do you think your job will remain open for you? NO, you will be replaced. After you have joined the union and are no longer employed at Walker's, where would you work-no similar store will hire you-they do not want a union either. We appreciate our medical plan, the privilege to work at any age, 15% employee discount, vacation benefits, retirement plan for "young" ones, a pleasant association with co-workers and management. Remember the union promotors promise you anything and everything-can give you nothing . Everything you get at Walker's must come from Walker's and what they can give you. Are you going to bite the hand that feeds you? Vote NO Friday vote .. . . The next day, Baxter gave this in draft form to an employee in her depart- ment, Bernice Hauck. Although this was her day off, Hauck took it to Emma Bruce, an employee in the general offices on the fourth floor of the store. Bruce cut a stencil following the draft given her by Hauck and Hauck took the stencil in to Shuff, telling him it was a "bulletin" against the Union. Shuff said that he did not desire to read it. Hauck then took station in an office on the fourth floor of the building. She asked buyers to send employees to her and directly solicited other workers to come to the office to sign the stencil. About 70 did so. After the stencil was signed as space permitted, it was mimeographed, and at closing time Hauck passed copies to employees as they left the store. At the bottom of the sheet was a statement to the effect that the materials were furnished by the Respondent. Although a large number of employees from throughout the store came to the fourth floor to affix their signatures to the stencil, both Shuff and Sey- mour denied that they were aware of this activity. On the morning of the day of the election before the store opened for trade but during working hours, a large group of employees paraded throughout the several floors of the store carrying signs urging a "No" vote. The respondent feared that the Union might succeed in its organizing efforts and the employee meetings were held in an attempt to blunt the Union's appeal. Shuff denied that he made any statement to the effect that union success might bring about a closing of the store or that he suggested that the Respondent in that WALKER'S 1173 event would lay off its older employees. However, Edna McGinnis and Grace Gighuto testified that he warned his audience that the Union might force the early retirement of employees or bring about the closing of the store. Neither McGinnis nor Gighuto is now employed by the Respondent and it may be in the case of McGinnis that this circumstance has aroused her resentment. Furthermore, all witnesses were testifying to happenings which occurred more than a year ago. The likelihood of inaccurate recollection pervades the record. However, there is no question but that the "bulletin" was prepared by Baxter, was stenciled by Bruce, was mimeographed by use of Respondent's facilities, and was distributed in the store by Hauck. It is beyond belief that the Respondent's managers were not aware of what was taking place. Hauck exhibited the stencil to Shuff and he declined to iead it. The Respondent cannot escape responsibility for this happening by a pre- tense of ignorance. Certainly the employees who were invited by Hauck or by the buyers in the various departments to go to the fourth floor to sign it could only suppose that they were doing the bidding of their employer and reading what it wanted them to believe. All employees were provided with duplications so that all got the message. Thus they were informed in circumstances which would cause any sensible person to understand that he was listening to the voice of his employer: That a vote for the Union might mean the loss of employment with little likelihood of finding work elsewhere. That if he was making more than $1 .50 an hour his wage might be lessened. That he might be replaced by a self-service arrangement. That a strike was possible if not likely attended by the possible loss of job. That other employers would not hire Union members. Furthermore, even though Shuff did not read the stencil, he was told by Hauck that it was against the Union. Knowing as he did that it was to be stenciled and mimeographed by use of Respondent 's equipment and distributed in Respondent's store, he cannot escape sponsorship . No doubt the Respondent hoped by seeming to "see no evil" to avoid responsibility and at the same time to reap the benefits flowing from the coercive language of the bulletin. The actions of the Respondent in respect to the bulletin lend credence to the testimony of McGinnis and Gigliuto that Shuff made similar predictions and uttered similar threats in his weekly meetings with the employees . I find, despite the denial of Shuff and the support of his denial in the testimony of employee Frances Bran- nock, Advertising Manager Betty Walsh, and Buyer Loraine Norcross , that the threats outlined in their testimony were made. Indeed, the testimony of Shuff standing alone establishes that he attempted to arouse fears among the older employees that the Union would force their early retirement and that only Shuff could be and had been their protector from such a development. Employees in the cosmetics department in 1964, were assigned a manufacturer's "line" to sell and were paid a commission directly by the manufacturer for all pur- chases of that "line" made by the store. This amounts to a substantial part of the earnings of such sales persons. Shuff testified that he had heard that the employees in the cosmetics and costume jewelry departments were dissatisfied because in mid- 1963 the Respondent had discontinued a practice of paying a one percent commis- sion on all sales. This change had affected all sales employees and was not limited to those in the cosmetics or costume jewelry departments . So, nearly a year after the change, Shuff testified," he called these employees together to explain why the commission had been terminated and to demonstrate that their salaries had been adjusted to compensate for that loss. He denied that he uttered any threat to change the "line" commission arrangement and testified that when one of the employees questioned him on that point he replied that it was something which, in the event of union organization , would be a matter for negotiation . The record suggests, however, that there may have been a different reason for the meeting between Shuff and these employes. Lillian Putnam , the cosmetics buyer, testified that she discussed the union compaign or more than one occasion with Shuff and that Shuff commented at some point that he had been told that all of the employees in Putnam's department were union supporters. I find that in meeting with these employees Shuff was not acting to allay any possible dissatisfaction with the stale business of the one percent commission but in the belief that these employees con- stituted a group in which union interest was strong. A threat of change in the "line" commission arrangement was a potent one and I credit the testimony of Van Ness that Shuff said that this might result were the Union to succeed. 1174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Thomas Pollack, Respondent's traffic manager, has about 35 employees under his supervision. As the date of the election approached, Pollack held two meetings of his employees. On these occasions he told them, he testified, that he had heard rumors to the effect that he would receive a bonus should the Union be defeated and that he had threatened older employees with the loss of their jobs should the Union win. He denied that either of these had any basis in fact. He conceded, however, that he did predict that the Union would insist upon an early retirement age, that with the Union as a bargaining representative he would be unable to arrange wage increases or permit time off, observed that no business would con- tinue to operate at a loss, and that he was aware of the identity of those who were attending union meetings . He denied saying anything about losing bonuses or privileges or telling McGinnis that union success would bring about the closing of the store. I find that Pollack spoke to employees substantially as outlined in the testimony of Guacci, McGinnis, and Hoff. It is apparent that the Respondent hoped to per- suade the employees to vote against the Union by suggesting the likelihood of the store closing, forced retirements, and the like. To the extent that Pollack's testi- mony is in conflict with that of Guacci. McGinnis, and Hoff, I do not credit it. I am persuaded to this resolution in part because both Guacci and Hoff are still employed and still under Pollack's supervision . Dependent at least to some extent as they are upon his approval for wage increases and perhaps for an occasional hour off duty, it is most unlikely that they would manufacture testimony to support the complaint. Guacci, in particular, impressed me as a witness unhappy about the requirement to appear and eager to give his testimony and leave. There was noth- ing about him (or about Hoff and McGinnis for that matter) to suggest that he held any antipathy toward his employer. Hazel Heinz conceded that she had spoken to the employees in the beauty salon on two occasions about the impending election and that she may have asked some of them how they intended to vote. She denied, however, that she said anything to the effect that the closing of the salon would follow upon a union victory. It may well be that Leham harbors some resentment against Patterson and the Respondent over her discharge some months after the election. Even with this factor in mind I credit Leham. Her testimony was circumstantially detailed and unshaken in any important respect by cross-examination . Because Leham's testimony that she was hired by the manager of the salon, Sally Patterson, in August 1963, stands unde- nied, I find that Patterson is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Her questioning of Leham about how Leham intended to vote is attributable to the Respondent. In the period from March 1 through May 1, the Respondent gave wage increases to about 113 of its nonsalaried employees. The increases were small and only a few of them exceeded five cents an hour. Although Respondent has followed a practice of selecting employees each year to receive increases , some of those who were so favored in the spring of 1964 had not been raised for several years. At all times in the past the increases had been based upon evaluations of persons under consideration with the aid of performance rating sheets prepared by the supervisor or the buyer in the department where the individual worked. In the spring of 1964, this practice was not followed . Shuff and Assistant Manager Seymour, upon the basis of personnel records, decided which individuals should be given raises. Shuff explained, rather lamely, that time did not permit him to have the usual ratings prepared, that he and Seymour could do the job much faster and that the two of them managed to get the job done in about three months . Apparently about half of the employees received raises. The logic of the situation seems to lead to the conclusion that Shuff and Seymour would have saved much of their own time had they received the aid of employee ratings and that the raises could thus have been effected more quickly if that was Respondent's desire. Furthermore, Shuff's testi- mony that individual selling records were helpful in reaching decision on whether to grant an increase , leaves unexplained how he evaluated about one-third of the employees in nonselling jobs for which such records do not exist. No doubt both Shuff and Seymour had opportunity from time to time to observe the work per- formance of employees . These opportunities would seem, however, to be minimal in comparison with those of the persons directly in charge of the several depart- ments. There is no evidence that the giving of wage increases was publicized although it may be permissible to infer that such changes generally do not remain secret. The Respondent may have been trying to dilute the interest the employees WALKER'S 1175 held in the Union in this fashion, but I am not convinced that this was so .5 The increases were small; hardly enough to persuade anyone who though that bringing in a union would mean more money in the wage envelope to conclude that the battle was won Furthermore, any dubious dividend of good will accruing to the Respondent by this action was likely to be diminished or even canceled by the resentment of those who were passed over. I do not find that the granting' of wage increases in the circumstances recited amounted to interference , restraint, or coercion of the employees. On May 18, four days before the election, Shuff met with the buyers. One of them asked Shuff how he thought the election would go. He replied that those assembled were closer to individual employees than he and should better be able to answer the question. Shuff then asked each individual how he thought the employees in his department would vote. Some essayed to answer ; two did not. Seymour tabulated the responses. Within a day or two of this meeting, according to the testimony of Marguerite Van Ness, an employee in the cosmetics department, her buyer, Lillian Putnam, said to Van Ness and two other employees that Putnam had to know how they were going to vote. One of them, Marian Krug, answered that she would vote as she pleased. Putnam replied that employees had been getting a living from the Respondent for a number of years and that she had a right to the information. Thelma Bostwick, then working in the department for which Laraine Norcross was buyer, testified that at about the same time Norcross said that she had to know how Bostwick stood on "this Union business." When Bostwick asked if she was serious, Norcross replied impatiently that she was. Bostwick gave her an incon- clusive answer. Counsel for the General Counsel argues that buyers were Respond- ent's agents, encouraged to poll employees to determine the amount of sentiment for the Union. I am sure that some.of the buyers considered , themselves to be a part of management even though, as will be found, the evidence does not establish them to be supervisors. This belief was a reasonable one and surely was shared by the employees in the selling departments . Although buyers appear to have given directions to employees only in respect to matters not involving the exercise of independent judgment, still it was direction based upon authority arising from the employment relation. Buyers also rated employees in connection with annual or semiannual wage increases. The evidence is that Shuff or Seymour then independ- ently determined who would be given a wage rise but the buyers nonetheless participated in this action. Employees could hardly have avoided the conclusion that a route to preferment was through the buyer and to this extent at least buyers appeared to be management. When Shuff evidenced interest in how the employees would vote, some of the buyers followed through on what was at least a suggestion. I find that the Respondent encouraged its buyers to poll the employees and that the employees could reasonably have concluded that the buyers, in doing so, were acting for management. Following the filing of the representation petition in March 1964, a hearing was held in which testimony was adduced bearing upon the status of Respondent's buy- ers. After this testimony was in, the Respondent and the Union entered into a stipulation which in effect constituted an agreement that the buyers were not super- visors and thus were within the bargaining unit . After losing the election the Union asserted that the conduct of the buyers contributed to that result and asked the Regional Director to attribute the actions of buyers to the Respondent upon the ground that, after all, buyers are supervisors . The Regional Director found no merit in the Union's claims about supervisory status both on the basis of the stipu- lation referred to and on the record evidence concerning the powers and duties of buyers. Now, the General Counsel argues, he should not be bound by this deter- mination because he was not a party to the stipulation in the representation case and because the buyers are in fact supervisors. I permitted evidence to be taken concerning the authority of buyers and I conclude, as did the Regional Director, that they do not exercise supervisory authority within the Act's meaning. Doreen Andal, Respondent's comptroller, is admittedly a supervisor and has a number of office employees under her direction . One of these, Solveig Berglund, testified that shortly before May 1, while commenting favorably on Berglund's work 51 recognize that what is controlling here is not whether the Respondent intended to allure the employees from the Union by means of wage increases but whether the increases reasonably tended to interfere with Section 7 rights. I find that they did not See American Freightways Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146, 147. 1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and while telling Berglund that her wage rate was being increased, Andal accused Berglund of "talking union" to sales personnel. Berglund said that this was untrue. Andal then said that Berglund favored the Union. Berglund answered that she was interested in both sides. Andal commented that Shuff was "very concerned" about Berglund's feelings toward the Union and had asked Andal to speak to her about it. Ethel Harrington, another employee under Andal, testified that a few days before the election Andal asked her how she felt about the impending vote. Harrington answered that she was interested in anything that would mean more money. Andal denied that the Union or Shuff's name was mentioned to Berglund on the occasion described. As to Harrington, Andal testified, rather than asking Harrington how she would vote, it was Harrington who asked for advice in the matter. Andal then replied that Harrington must use her own judgment. Both Berglund and Harrington are still in Respondent's employ and each of them, I am convinced, has been and hopes to remain on friendly terms with Andal. I credit their testimony and disbelieve the disclaimers of Andal. It was Respondent's policy and purpose to discourage support for the Union and it would be strange indeed if Andal did not participate in its effectuation. D. The discharge of Edna Mashburn Edna Mashburn was discharged on April 21 after 10 years' employment as a marker. Her supervisor, Thomas Pollack, evidenced his satisfaction with her work performance in rating reports dated February and August 1963, which characterized her as a "very excellent worker," "far above average," "very dependable & efficient," "well liked," "very cooperative," and "will do anything ask[ed] of her." Pollack was not asked to rate Mashburn in the spring of 1964, this task was performed by Shuff and Seymour. In February or March, returning to work after an extended absence, Mashburn asked Pollack what had happened at an employee meeting held while she was away. In the course of his answer, Mashburn testified, Pollack remarked that he did not think that the Union would do the employees any good. Mashburn replied that she thought that it would and added that the store needed a union. Pollack denied that the Union was mentioned in any conversation he held with Mashburn. About April 1, Shuff called Mashburn to his office and told her that he had received complaints about errors she was making in marking . Shuff said that he knew Mashburn could do better work and Mashburn said that she would try. On April 15, Mashburn's wage rate was increased by 5 cents an hour. On April 21 she was again called to Shuff's office. Shuff exhibited some mismarked merchandise to her and said that so many errors were upsetting the buyer in the department affected, Jennie Westfall. Mashburn protested that she did not believe she had made the mistakes attributed to her and told Shuff of a mixup on pricing some items for Westfall's department. Shuff then discharged her. Westfall testified that she complained first to Pollack, and later to Seymour and Shuff, beginning in December 1963, about errors in marking her merchandise. According to•Westfall the marking errors probably brought about losses of several hundred dollars She last complained about mismarkings to Shuff in April. Shuff testified that he had no information about Mashburn's feelings toward the Union and was concerned only with the fact that she seemed to be making an inexcusable number of errors. On the occasion of discharge, Shuff testified, Mash- burn said that she did not intend to give good service to Westfall. Shuff then told Mashburn that she had left him no alternative; that she was discharged. It does not seem unlikely that, on an occasion when her work was the subject of criticism, Mashburn would so recklessly threaten to continue making the errors she was accused of committing. Her testimony on cross-examination, however, indicates that this is just what she did. Mashburn admitted that she was annoyed by the fact that Westfall had again complained about her and that she confided her dislike for Westfall to Shuff. She further conceded that she "could have" told Shuff that she intended to give poor service to Westfall, whereupon Shuff said "some- thing like" he had no alternative but to terminate her. Crediting Mashburn, I find that she told Pollack on some occasion before her discharge that a union was needed in the store. It does not follow as of course, however, that her attitude in this area was reported to Shuff. Pollack valued Mashburn's work highly and I think would not have attempted in any way to pro- vide cause or excuse for her discharge. Mashburn thought that the criticisms directed to her work by Westfall were unmerited. Perhaps they were There is WALKER'S 1177 some possibility that Mashburn was charged with mistakes that should have been attributed to others. But Westfall didn't think so and neither did Shuff. I find that Shuff reasonably believed, upon the occasion of his last interview with Mash- burn, that the latter was so resentful of the complaints voiced by Westfall as to say, in effect, that she would make no attempt to do accurate and satisfactory work on merchandise going to Westfall's department. Her discharge followed. I find that it was not based upon discriminatory considerations. E. Interrogation by Respondent's counsel Counsel stipulated that in September, October, and November 1964, Respond- ent's counsel, David A. Maddux, interviewed approximately 160 of the employees in the bargaining unit and that the interviews were held in an office in Respondent's store. Maddux told those he spoke to that their employer had been accused by the Union of engaging in "certain technical violations of the National Labor Rela- tions Act" and that it was his purpose to learn the facts about the charges in order properly to represent the Respondent. At the outset, Maddux said, "I want you to understand that the questions I ask and the answers you may give to them have absolutely nothing whatever to do with your job here at Walker's or your future here at Walker's. They are solely for the purpose of assisting me in my investiga- tion. I am not personally interested in whether you are sympathetic to or in favor of the Union, or against it. I am interested in learning the true facts pertaining to these charges. I do want you to understand that your answering my questions is entirely voluntary on your part. You do not have to answer any questions and your refraining to answer will not be held against you in any way." The questions were: 1. Has anyone ever attempted to get you to sign a Union authorization card? a. How many times? b. When c. Who else was present? d What was said by the person about the purpose of signing the card? 2. To refresh your recollection, did the person seeking to have the card signed say anything to the effect: a. The only purpose for signing the card was to get an election; b. That the card did not mean anything, all it was for was for an election; c. That you were the only person in your department, or in the store, who had not signed a card; d That if you did not sign the card, when the Union came in you might lose your job; e. That if you signed the card now, when the Union came in you would not have to pay any initiation fees; f. That if you wanted to receive more information from or learn more about the Union, you should sign a card or that signing a card merely puts you on the mailing list; g. That signing the card authorized the Union to represent you for purposes of collective bargaining with them. 3. Did you sign a card? 4. Did you read the card before you signed it? 5. Why did you sign the card? (Asked of some employees.) 6. By signing the card did you intend to authorize the Union to represent you for purposes of collective bargaining9 7. By signing the card did you intend to authorize the Union to represent you for collective bargaining even though a majority of the employees had voted against it? 8. Did you ever change your mind about the Union? a. When? b. What caused you to change your mind? 9. Have you answered the foregoing questions fully and completely to the best of your recollection? 10. Do you have anything that you would like to add or say in addition? 11. Have you given a statement to an agent of the National Labor Relations Board? When these interviews took place, no complaint had issued. However, a copy of the charge alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain had been served along with a request that the Respondent provide the Board's Regional Director with a written 1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD account of the facts and a statement of position concerning the charge. I conclude that the questioning of employees was not unlawful solely because no complaint had as yet issued upon the charge. The question of what may be permissible interrogation in such circumstances is a troubling one. Counsel for the Respondent had a duty to his client to discover as best he could what evidence might be avail- able to the Union to support its charge and thus available to the General Counsel to support a complaint. It is part of the same duty for such counsel to discover, if he can, evidence which might persuade the General Counsel that no complaint should issue. Employees have a right, guaranteed by statute, to engage in con- certed activities or to refrain from doing so. I think it to be a corollary of those rights to be free from any questioning about whether they have been invoked and how. Respondent's employees had validly designated the Union to represent them and through the Union had charged that the Respondent had unlawfully refused to honor that designation. This placed the question in controversy, and, I find, privi- leged the Respondent through its counsel to conduct an investigation free from retaliatory threats or promises of benefit reasonably designed to provide an answer to the Union's claim. If counsel could show by interviewing employees that they had been misled by the Union's solicitors; had been duped, or had not in fact executed the designations as claimed, I think that he was free to do so. The inter- views were conducted in an atmosphere ostensibly free of compulsion but no soft words of counsel could be expected to erase from the minds of the employees a recollection of what their employer had said during the campaign preceding the election. They knew that the selection of a bargaining agent had been described to them as a step toward unemployment. No doubt many of those interviewed attempted to justify their actions to Attorney Maddux, as they did later as witnesses in this hearing, by asserting that they did not really understant what they had done, that they had been the victims of a glib sales campaign, and that of course they did not want a union interposed between them and their employer. Furthermore, in preparation for the interviews, all employees had been told in writing by the Respondent that: You solidly affirmed our beliefs by voting to reject the Union in the NLRB election by a majority of over two to one. Surely the Union knows just as well as we do that an overwhelming majority of you have never, at any time, wanted it to represent you, or it would agree to another secret ballot election. Obviously the Union knows it would lose any election by an even greater margin than before. So, knowing it can never win a free and democratic election, it has filed a technical legal charge in an attempt to force a union contract upon you, against your will. Let me assure each one of you that we are not going to stand by and do nothing, while the Union tries to force itself upon you. We have instructed our attorneys to protect you and your rights. In the next few weeks our attorneys may want to discuss this matter with you personally. You can all help in protecting your rights by giving your full cooperation to them. It would be a bold and chauvinist employee who would decline to be interviewed or who would not respond to this invitation Jo say that of course he did not want a union and never did. One employee, Liberty Guacci, admitted that upon the occasion of his interview, he told Maddux, contrary to fact, that he had never signed a designation card. In any event, questions about an employee's subjective state of mind at the time of signing an unambiguous designation and whether he has given a statement to an agent of the Board, seem clearly under the decisions 6 to be well beyond the scope of permissible inquiry and to constitute an unlawful invasion of rights guar- anteed in Section 7 of the Act. I find that the questioning in the interviews con- ducted by Maddux exceeded permissible bounds. F. Conclusions It has been noted that the Union had not gained majority status when it made its request for recognition on March 17. It did not reach that position until March 25. So when the Respondent on March 24 refused recognition and expressed its doubt that the Union held cards from more than half of the employees, no excep- tion can be taken to its action on the basis of facts then existing. But thereafter 9 Johnntie'a Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770. Although this decision was set aside by the 8th Circuit, 344 F.2d 617, I do not believe that the Board has departed from the prin- ciples there enunciated. WALKER'S 1179 much happened. Almost immediately the Union secured sufficient designations so that it did attain the majority status which it had prematurely claimed. Quickly the Respondent embarked upon a course of unfair labor practices demonstrating that whatever doubt it entertained about the number of adherents the Union had attracted, it, the Respondent, was going to insure that this support was diminished or destroyed. The Respondent was not really content to let the question be settled through an election as its March 24 letter asserted. It was its purpose to and it did use the time preceding the election to frighten the Union's followers. Absent the unfair labor practices upon the part of the Respondent, its protestations of good faith doubt might be credible. But Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union was motivated, I find, not by the principle that it should not deal with a labor oiganization without persuasive assurance that its employees had freely chosen it to act for them, but rather by a determination that it would deal with no union at all. In these circumstances it is clear, and I find, that any demand for recognition by the Union after it had obtained the additional designations would have been futile. The Respondent's objection to the Union was not based upon considera- tions of arithmetic or upon the desires of its employees. I find that by refusing after March 25 to extend recognition to and refusing to bargain with the Union the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The explicit and implicit threats to continued employment or forced retirement set forth above in the talks Shuff made to the employees generally and to the older employees in particular; the dire consequences of a union victory spelled out in the "bulletin" composed by Baxter and distributed by Hauck in circumstances indicat- ing Respondent's approval, if not sponsorship; the intimation by Wilder Morrison that if the Union won, Respondent's parent might not keep the store; the suggestion by Shuff that buyers poll their employees concerning their attitude toward the Union and the polling which eventuated; the threats by Pollack about closing the store, loss of benefits, forced retirements, and his comment that he was aware of the identity of those who attended union meetings; Shuff's intimation to the cos- metics department employees that they might lose all or a portion of their "line" commissions; Heinz' threats to close the beauty salon and the questioning by Heinz and Patterson of employees concerning their voting intentions; Andal's questioning of employees about their feelings toward the Union; and the systematic interroga- tion of employees by Respondent's counsel, particularly in the area of their sub- jective intentions in signing designation cards and whether they had given state- ments to Board personnel. constitute in the context of this case, interference with and restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The Respondent thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent !set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent has unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union as the majority representative of its'employees in an appropriate unit, it will be recommended that upon request. the Respondent so bargain, and if an agree- ment is reached with the Union, reduce it to writing and sign it. . Because I consider the conduct of Respondent, as detailed in the body of this decision, to manifest a determination to deprive employees of statutory rights, it will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's, Long Beach, California, and its licensees are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. . 1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 324, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening employees with a curtailment or cessation of operations, by suggesting that older employees would be forced into retirement, by threatening a change in cosmetics commission arrangements, and by questioning employees in a context of coercion respecting their feeling about the Union, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. All regular full-time and part-time employees of the Respondent and its licensees at the Long Beach store, excluding professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. On and since March 25, 1964, the Union has been and now is the majority representative of Respondent's employees in said appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining in respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing since March 25, 1964, to recognize the Union and to bargain with it, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 8. The evidence does not establish that the discharge of Edna P. Mashburn was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's, Long Beach, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with curtailment or cessation of operations; suggest- ing that older employees will be forced into retirement; threatening a change in the commission arrangement of cosmetics department employees; questioning employ- ees in a coercive context concerning the Union or activities in behalf of the Union; suggesting that union meetings are under surveillance; or in any other manner inter- fering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Retail Clerks Union No. 324, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing; and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir- ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (b) Refusing upon request to bargain with the Union as the exclusive represent- ative of all employees in the appropriate unit. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request of the Union bargain with that organization in respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and if an agreement is reached, reduce it to writing and sign it. (b) Post at its store in Long Beach, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Direc- 7 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." WALKER'S 1181 tor for the Board's Region 21, Los Angeles, California, shall, after being signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days after receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order what steps have been taken in compliance.8 8In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE STORE Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively upon request with Retail Clerks Union No. 324, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described below with respect to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is: All regular full-time and part-time employees including employees of licensees in the store, excluding professional employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in or to refrain from engaging in union activities by questioning them in a context of coercion concerning their union activities or interests, suggesting the loss of commissions or any privileges or benefits, threatening directly or indirectly that adherence to the above-named Union or any labor organization might bring about the closing of the store or result in forced retirements, intimating that union meetings are kept under surveillance, or in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all such activities except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring mem- bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended. All employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor organization except to the extent mentioned above. BISHOP AND MALCO, INC., d/b/a WALKER'S, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may , communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 688-5229.