Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.

ROANOKE IRON & BRIDGE WORKS, INC. 175 Forces of the United States, WE WILL notify her of her right to full reinstate- ment upon application, after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Serv- ice Act, as amended. WE WILL make whole the above-named Lillian Melby for any loss of pay she may have suffered because of the discrimination against her. All our employees are free to become and remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other union. WISCONSIN RUBBER PRODUCTS CO., INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Suite 230, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 272-8600, Extension 3866. Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-30.97. July 19, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On February 24, 1966, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action , as set forth in the attached Trial Examin- er's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent, General Counsel, and Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs.' The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case , and hereby adopts the findings, con clusions , and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.] 2 MEMBERS I3ROwN and JENLCLNS, dissenting: The issue posed by the complaint was whether the Company "negotiated with the union in bad faith and with no intention of entering into a final or binding agreement." Although the checkoff 'The Charging Party's request for oral argument is denied as the record, including the exceptions and briefs, adequately presents the issues and positions of the parties 2 The telephone number for Region 5, appearing at the bottom of the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is amended to read . Telephone 752-8460, Extension 2159. 160 NLRB No. 17. 176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD proved to be a major issue, the record shows: (1) neither the pre- election conduct of Respondent nor its subsequent actions reflect an unwillingness to bargain; (2) there in fact was bargaining over the disputed issue; (3) the Respondent did more than reject the union proposals, it engaged in full discussion and made counterproposals of its own; and (4) a contract was executed covering agreement on all other matters. We cannot conclude on this record that the Company's positions were taken for the purpose of injuring the Union or that bad faith was present. Accordingly, we would dismiss the complaint. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case, heard before Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel, at Roanoke, Vir- ginia, January 6, 1966, pursuant to a charge ' filed March 16, 1965, and a com- plaint issued November 2, 1965, presents the narrow and novel issues of whether the Respondent, herein called the Company, failed to bargain in good faith with the Charging Party, herein called the Union , with respect to a provision for facil- itating the collection of union dues, and, if so, whether an order should issue directing the Company to grant the Union such a provision. Upon the entire record in the case, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION, INVOLVED The Company, a Virginia corporation engaged at Roanoke, in -the fabrication and erection of steel, annually receives at Roanoke goods valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped to it .directly from outside the State, and is therefore engaged 'in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. H. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Background' 1. The history of the "checkoff" at the Company In 1951 and 1952 the Union enjoyed a brief-period in which it was the certi- fied bargaining representative of the Company's employees. The Company and the Union.at that time engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations for almost one year , before reaching agreement . The principal matter, which prolonged those negotiations was the Union's demand for, and the Company's refusal to grant, a "voluntary checkoff," i. e.,.,; a means under which the union dues of employees so desiring and so designating would be paid by the Company out of their wages directly to the Union. At last the Union yielded to the Company's position on that point, and a contract was executed which contained no. provision for "volun- tary checkoff." The contract expired after one year, and the Union did not nego- tiate for a new contract. In 1961, a union composed solely of company employees I won certification as the, bargaining representative , and commenced ^ negotiations for a contract. This organization, the "Steel Fabricators Union of Roanoke, Virginia," also sought a "voluntary checkoff" clause in the contract it was negotiating with the Company. According to the- testimony of W. A. Oakey, vice' president and general-manager of the Company, and one of its negotiators in all the 1951, 1961, and 1964-65 bargaining sessions here referred to, the Company was originally opposed to grant- ing the checkoff in 1961 , but ultimately agreed to it, under certain terms described, 1 Company counsel himself referred to this organization as "the Company Union" , In, occasionally employing that terminology , I, of course, do not intend ,to reflect on its status, which appears to have been that of a bona fide labor organization. ROANOKE IRON & BRIDGE WORKS , INC. 177 more fully below. In explaining why the Company yielded on the checkoff in 1961, Oakey testified: Those boys appealed to us that they had no organization and no bookkeepers or secretary, and no way to keep their records. They said it would be a great help to them if we would do this. Later he observed on this matter: We gave it to the local union because they had no going organization. We gave it to them to help them, Again on cross-examination: Q. I will ask you if you did not tell us that what you referred to as a company union or words to this effect, that those boys explained that they could not survive without some method of collecting dues. You told us that? A. Yes. Q And you gave some form of checkoff? A. Yes. The checkoff clause of the contract to which the Company agreed in 1961 pro- vided, inter alia, as follows: 1. All funds deducted from the pay of any employee for union initiation fees and monthly union dues are at all times under the complete control of regular, full-time employees of the Company. 2. Union representatives responsible for the care, control and disbursement of these funds shall perform such duties in an honest, fair and impartial manner. 5. The Company agrees to deposit once a month, in a local bank selected by the Union, all dues and fees collected during the preceding month. A copy of the bank deposit slip, together with a memorandum showing the source of the funds, will be delivered to the Union as soon as practicable following each deposit. All deposits made by the Company will be made to the account of "Steel Fabricators Union of Roanoke, Virginia." 6. The Union agrees to give to the Company the names of the employees authorized to sign checks against the account to which the deposits are made. The Union also agrees that the signatures of two (2) full-time employees on each check will be necessary in order for a withdrawal to be made from the account. 7. In order to insure the complete control of the funds at all times by only regular, full-time employees of the Company, the signature cards indicating to the bank the employees authorized to sign checks against the account must be countersigned by an officer of the Company to be valid. The Company will have no further control over the withdrawals or disbursements of Union funds except as stipulated in this Agreement. Although the checkoff was thus granted, no employees ever had their dues checked off in favor of the "Steel Fabricators Union." By 1964, when the Union here involved again sought recognition, the "Steel Fabricators Union" seems to have disappeared. 2. The Company's 1964 prebargaining statements concerning the checkoff The Company opposed the Union's efforts to organize in 1964, and in the course of this opposition sent a series of written communications to the employees. Excerpts from these documents, insofar as they bear on the checkoff and union dues, are as follows: (a) Letter of July 1, 1964: We know something about this union from our own experience. The Steel- workers Union was voted into this plant some years ago. We bargained with them, as the law requires, but when they insisted that we take union dues from the paychecks of our employees before our folks even saw their money, Nye refused to do it. We negotiated with this union for nearly a year before signing a contract. Since we did not accept their dues scheme, this contract was not renewed the following year. 25 7-551-6 7-v of 160-13 178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Letter of August 13, 1964: A little over ten years ago, this same Steelworkers Union put on a cam- paign just like this one. They made a lot of promises about what they would make us do, and they were voted in as bargaining agent. The going was pretty rough. We agreed on a few things, but we drew the line at collecting Union dues out of your pay check. For nearly a year we bargained with the Union. Pay raises bogged down, promotions fouled up and for months there was a threat of a strike. Finally, the men began to become impatient to move one way or the other and the Union gave in, and agreed on a contract without a checkoff of dues. Within a few months, many employees stopped paying the Union any money, when they found out they did not need a Union, and when the con- tract ran out, the Union pulled out and left us. (c) Letter of September 1, 1964: Q Why is this Union so anxious to get you into the Union, and get a con- tract here at Roanoke Iron and Bridge? A. The principal reason is money-your dues. As the union hires more organizers, somebody has got to pay their salaries, buy them automobiles, pay their expenses. That is where you come in. They are counting on your dues. (d) Letter of September 2, 1964: Q. How much are Union dues" What about fees and assessments? A. The regular dues are about $5 00 per month, so we hear. Special fees come in all kinds and amounts. Assessments usually come when there is a strike at some other plant, and the strikers need food handouts Q. What does the Steelworkers contract say about checking off dues? A. The contract says: "Unless the Company is otherwise notified, the only dues deducted from the employees' pay will be the regular monthly Union dues." Q. Does the contract say anything about dues when a man isn't working? A. Yes. The regular union contract says that if a man is out of work, the company collects all the back dues as soon as his pay check is enough to cover the dues. Q. If the checkoff ever gets started in a plant, can an employee get out of the union and stop paying? A. There is some legal question about this. We think a man ought to be able to change his mind and quit paying the Union. The Union people claim that no man can get out for at least a year, or until the contract runs out. a- , We feel confident that if our folks think over all the things we have tried to tell you, and if they realize what they have now, and what might come with the Union, they will vote NO on Friday. After all, we had this Union for a year, ten years ago. The employees found out the truth; they quit pay- ing dues; and the Union walked off. The Union won the election on September 7, 1964, by a vote of 97 to 26, and was certified as the bargaining representative of the Company's production and maintenance employees, thereby setting the stage for the bargaining negotiations which in turn gave rise to this litigation. B. The bargaining over the checkoff 1. Summary of the negotiations The Company and the Union commenced negotiations in October 1964. After some 12 or 13 meetings between that date and March 9, 1965, the Union called a strike which lasted until the fall of 1965. Meanwhile, bargaining continued dur- ing the strike and another 12 or 13 sessions were held. A primary subject of dis- cussion at each of the 25 bargaining sessions, and a primary cause of the strike, was the Union's demand that the contract contain provision for voluntary check- off or other means of facilitating collection of union dues, and the Company's refusal to grant this demand. The parties finally reached agreement late in Octo- ber 1965, and the strike ended. Under the agreement the parties executed a con- tract without any provision for checkoff or other facilitation of dues collection, but agreed that this would be without prejudice to the Union's urging in this liti- gation that the Company had violated the Act in allegedly refusing to bargain in good faith on the checkoff. ROANOKE IRON & BRIDGE WORKS, INC. 179 2. The Union's proposals and the Company's responses Basically, the Union sought some contractual means of facilitating its collection of dues, and the Company maintained that it was the Union 's business, and not the Company's, to collect union dues . In the course of negotiations the Union made several alternative suggestions , to which the Company in turn made responses. These positions may be summarized as follows: a. The Union asked for a regular voluntary checkoff under which the Company, upon being so authorized by individual employees, would withhold the individual's $5 monthly dues from his wages , and pay that sum to the Union . The Company declined, stating that the Union had won the election by such an overwhelming majority (97 to 26 ) that it ought to collect its own dues. b. The Union suggested that at one payday a month the Company make out two paychecks for each employee, one in the amount of $5, which the employee could endorse over to the Union. The Company responded that this would require a good deal of bookkeeping, and that it "just didn't want any part of dues collecting." c. The Union asked the Company to loan the men $60 for annual dues in advance, and then deduct $5 a month on the loan . The Company viewed this as simply a disguised checkoff, and declined. d. The Union suggested that the contract be signed and a checkoff insofar as voluntarily authorized go into effect 6 months later . The Company indicated that its opposition to a checkoff would be unchanged 6 months hence . It offered, how- ever, to sign a contract with a provision for renegotiating matters 6 months hence. e. The Union asked for a provision under which the shop stewards would have 30 minutes off without loss of pay the day after payday, and would be able to collect dues in the plant during that period. The Company objected to the disrup- tion of work that would be entailed . It offered to let the Union collect dues during lunch periods , a right which the Union asserted (and the Company agreed) the Union had under the statute regardless of contract . The Union asked for facilities in the locker room in cold weather, but the Company declined, agreeing only to the use of the outdoor picnic area or lunchroom during the employees ' free time. The Company also offered to let three to five men punch out 30 minutes early and set up a table or a station wagon in the parking lot at which to collect dues. f. The Union asked that at one payday each month the Company pay the men in cash, but the Company said it did not wish to have that much cash on hand, and also that it would be disruptive to pay by check three times and by cash once each month. g. On one occasion the Union asked if the Company wanted to "buy the check- off" apparently implying that if other benefits were sufficiently improved, the Union would abandon its checkoff position . The Company was not interested, and the matter was not pursued . At another meeting, the Union suggested that if some form of union security, such as maintenance of membership, were made available, it could be substituted for the checkoff . The Company expressed hostility to the suggestion, and that matter remained academic as Virginia law precluded union- security agreements , and Section 14(b) of the Act which permits such State laws remained in effect. 3. Arguments and counter arguments presented during the bargaining The Union urged the Company to grant the checkoff or some other means of facilitating dues collection , pointing out that the employees were scattered over a wide radius around Roanoke, rendering individual collections onerous, that the Com- pany had granted a checkoff to the "Company union" in 1961, that the Company made deductions from pay for employee contributions to the United Fund, that a checkoff would contribute to the stability of the local union, and that the union negotiators were aware that under their previous contract with the Company, which had not contained a checkoff , the Union had not survived. The Company told the Union that as the Union won the election by a wide mar- gin (97 to 26 ) it should collect its own dues , and that dues collection was the Union's job, not the Company's . The Company did not take the position that grant- ing the checkoff would be inconvenient or too expensive . The Company explained that it gave the checkoff in 1961 to the "company union" because that union repre- sented that it could not exist without the checkoff . The Company asked the Union if it felt it could not exist unless it had a checkoff provision, and the union negotia- tors responded that it would be difficult but they hoped that this time they could 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD exist without it. One of the negotiators told the Company that at least half of the men would pay their dues without a checkoff. The Company repeatedly expressed the hope that the Union would sign a contract without a checkoff, calling the Union's attention to the existence of such contracts between the Union and other employeis. To this the Union replied that the Company was not aware of the con- ditions attending agreement at the other plants in question, and at the hearing the Union explained that those employers had accepted one or another of the alterna- tives which the Union offered this Company. At the hearing the Company explained that it deducted from wages for contributions to the United Fund, the leading local charity, because if contributions were not collected in that manner, the United Fund would be able to collect only a small percentage of what was pledged. The Com- pany further explained that while the Union said it would have similar difficulty collecting dues, the union men, unlike the United Fund authorities, saw the employ- ees every day. C. Concluding findings All parties are in agreement that the checkoff is a "bargainable" matter, i e., a term or condition of employment as to which the parties must bargain in good faith, but may bargain to an impasse. The parties did indeed reach an impasse here; the contention of the General Counsel and the Union is that the Company did not bar- gain about the issue in good faith. The complaint alleges that the Company "negotiated with the Union in bad faith and with no intention of entering into a final or binding collective bargaining agree- ment" by "adamantly rejecting" the checkoff [emphasis supplied]. Taken literally, this allegation cannot be sustained, for the Company did enter into a final and bind- ing agreement once the checkoff issue was removed. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Company used the checkoff issue as a means of, and for the purpose of, frustrating the negotiations. On the contrary, the Company bargained in good faith on other matters, and did not use its position on the checkoff for the purpose of avoiding a contract Notwithstanding the portion of the compiaint iiahcized above, however, this case was fully litigated on the question whether the Company bargained on the checkoff in good faith, and that issue, having been fully litigated and being fairly embraced within the "bad faith" allegation of the complaint (the seven words immediately preceding the passage italicized above), I deem it ripe for decision here. The fact that the Union eventually accepted a contract without a checkoff provi- sion is, of course, not deteiminative of the question whether the Company bargained in good faith over the matter, particularly as the issue was expressly reserved for this litigation. Likewise not determinative is the fact that the Company was avowedly hostile to the checkoff even before bargaining commenced. The statute commands neither more nor less than good faith negotiation; it does not require agreement, and it does not require that the parties approach the bargaining issues in a spirit of neutrality. The Company's hostility to, opposition to, or strong reluctance to grant, the checkoff do not of themselves establish refusal to bargain in good faith. No other single factor taken in isolation goes any farther than the Company's avowed hostility to the checkoff in establishing the presence or absence of good faith. The fact that the Company expressed itself prior to the commencement of negotiations as opposed to a checkoff does not establish that it was in bad faith. This is not a case in which the employer expressed prior to negotiations a fixed determination and an unwillingness to negotiate on a subject of bargaining. The fact that the Company granted a checkoff to the "company union" in 1961 is likewise not dispositive, for it cannot be that once an employer has granted a benefit to one union he must in subsequent negotiations grant the same benefit to other unions. Finally, the fact that the Company "checks off" for charitable contributions does not require a finding that it was in bad faith when it declined to grant the Union a dues checkoff. To state that none of these items standing alone establishes a violation of the bar- gaining obligation does not, however, dispose of the case. Where the issue is whether the employer has bargained in good faith the matter must be resolved by viewing the conduct as a whole, rather than in its several, separated aspects. Cases holding that an employer has been "shadow boxing," "going through the motions of collective bargaining," engaging in "surface bargaining," or "giving the Union a runaround," to quote a few of the phrases courts have employed, necessarily turn on the entice context and not on any single specific action attending the bargaining. The rule is no different in analyzing whether as to one subject of bargaining the ROANOKE IRON & BRIDGE WORKS, INC. 181 parties bargained in good faith. No conclusion of bad faith can be drawn from the failure to reach agreement, but the avowed attitudes of the parties may shed light on whether they were negotiating in good faith. In the case of a single provision, even more clearly than in the case of an entire contract, either party may insist on his position without making a concession, and yet be in good faith. If an employer is in fact opposed in good faith to a lawful union -security clause or if a union is in fact opposed in good faith to a no-strike provision, they may maintain their respective positions to the end without violating the Act. One way of ascertaining that such positions are not taken in good faith is to find that they were resorted to and utilized for the purpose of frustrating agreement. If an employer or a union avows a position and the facts establish that the position was taken because the party adopting knew it would frustrate negotiations, and for no other reason, a find- ing of bad-faith bargaining would follow. But, as already indicated, this is not the case here; the Company did not use its position on checkoffs to prevent reaching a contract. But frustrating negotiations is not the only key to a finding of bad faith . This can be clearly perceived if we realize that "bad faith " has as its necessary antithesis "good faith ." To bargain in good faith, the bargainer must advance his contentions and reject the other party's contentions (when he does ) for legitimate reasons of self-interest, and out of what appear to him to be sound considerations of business (or union ) judgment. For example, in Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, 108 NLRB 1555, where the union had become a business competitor of the employer, the Board held that the employer was not required to bargain with the union because the latter might take a position in bargaining for the purpose of damaging the employer's business . Similarly in N.L.R B. v. Kentucky Utilities Company, 182 F 2d 810, 812- 814'(C.A. 6), the court absolved the employer of the duty to bargain so long as one Braswell was a union negotiator, because Braswell had expressed the hope that the company "might go broke" so that "his purpose to destroy the Respondent finan- cially made any attempt at good faith collective bargaining a futility." As I read these cases, it seems fair to conclude that if a party at the bargaining table espouses a position for the purpose of destroying or even crippling the other party to the negotiations , he has not bargained in good faith as required by the Act. Proceeding from this premise, I find that the Company did not bargain in good faith on the checkoff issue. Long before the outset of negotiations the Company equated the checkoff with the Union's survival. Company campaign literature empha- sized that the Union had disappeared from the scene in 1952 because of the failure to obtain a checkoff. Similarly in 1961 the Company gave a checkoff to the com- pany union because the Company believed that the checkoff was necessary to that union's survival. In the 1965 negotiations with the Union, the company's opposition to a checkoff was not based on the cost or inconvenience to the Company (it expressly disclaimed such factors ) but allegedly on the "principle" that collection of union dues was union business . The Company departed from this principle in 1961; this alone would not establish bad faith. But the reason assigned for the 1961 "departure" and the 1964 campaign literature lead me to find that the alleged "prin- ciple" was grounded in the Company's belief that if it refused the checkoff the Union would suffer and would probably again leave the scene. When an employer takes a position in bargaining, not to advance his own economic interest or to safeguard the rights or interests of his employees , but for the purpose of damaging or destroy- ing the union with which he is bargaining , then he is not bargaining in good faith. This is not to say that the employer must grant a union's demands which do not appear harmful to the employer , but only to say that the employer's motives and objective must be legitimate , and the "principle" on which he stands must be per- missible under the statute (e.g., an unwillingness to prefer the union over other credi- tors of his employees ), not, as here, the impermissible object of harm to the other party. Bausch & Lomb, supra; Kentucky Utilities, supra.2 See also H. X. Porter Company, Inc., Disston Division-Danville Woiks, 153 NLRB 1370. 3 The Company here inquired of the Union if the checkoff was necessary to the Union's survival, and the union spokesmen replied that they hoped they could survive without it, although they also stated "that the previous time that we had a union it folded because it did not have the checkoff " This exchange does not militate against the result reached above, which rests on my finding as to the Company's motive in opposing the checkoff Similarly, the fact that the Union would have surrendered its demand for a checkoff in return for what it regarded as sufficient other benefits is not material to the issue of the Company's motivation. 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By failing to bargain with the Union in good faith over the Union 's request for checkoff or other means of facilitating collection of dues, the Company has engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and ( 1) and 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY I shall , of course , recommend an order requiring the Company to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct. In view of the narrowness of the issue presented and the fact that agreement was reached on all other matters , I shall not recommend any broader "cease and desist" order . Affirmatively, I shall recommend an order requiring the Company , upon request, to bargain with the Union on the subject of checkoff or other means of facilitating dues collection, and also requiring it to post an appropriate notice. Although urged to do so by the Union and by the General Counsel, I shall not recommend an order which would compel the Company to grant one of the Union 's previous proposals in this area . To be sure, the Company cannot be heard to reiterate positions which ( assuming this Decision stands) it has heretofore espoused in bad faith. And any new grounds the Company may urge for opposing the Union's past proposals in this area will be subject to sharp scrutiny as afterthoughts . Cf. Polirh National Alliance of the United States of North Amorica v. N.L.R.B ., 136 F 2d 175, 181 (C.A. 7), affirmed 322 U.S . 643. Nevertheless I deem it inadvisable , if not in excess of the Board's authority, to direct the acceptance of any particular proposal heretofore advanced by the Union . The subsequent proposals and counterproposals of the parties on this subject should be subject only to the statutory obligation that they be presented in good faith. In all probability this will lead to the Company's accepting what it regards as the least objectionable of the Union's past proposals , but this is a matter for future negotiations and should not be frozen into the order. Accordingly, upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, and on the record as a whole, I recommend , pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the following: ORDER Respondent, Roanoke, Iron & Bridge Works , Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith with United Steelwork- ers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit certified as appropriate in Case 5-RC-4775, insofar as that Union requests bargaining over a voluntary checkoff or other lawful means of facilitating collection of union dues. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. a. Upon request of the aforesaid certified bargaining representative , bargain with it in good faith with respect to proposals it advances for a voluntary checkoff or other lawful means of facilitating collection of union dues b. Post at its plant at Roanoke , Virginia, the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 3 Copies of such notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent , shall be posted immediately upon the receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. c. Notify the said Regional Director , in writing, within 20 days from the date of its receipt of this Decision what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.4 IIn the event that this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an order " shall be substituted for the words " a Decision and Order" * In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith DIERKS FOREST, INC. APPENDIX 183 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES . Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: Upon request of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, the exclu- sive bargaining repiesentative of our production and maintenance employees, WE WILL bargain with it in good faith concerning proposals it may advance for a voluntary checkoff or other lawful means of facilitating the collection of union dues. ROANOKE IRON & BRIDGE WORKS, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro- visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth Floor, 707 North Calvert Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202, Telephone 752-2159. Dierks Forest, Inc. and United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO. Cases 16-CA-2522 and 16-RC-4064. July 00, 1966 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION On May 27, 1966, Trial Examiner Marion C. Ladwig issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam- iner's Decision. In addition, the Trial Examiner found that certain objections to the election filed in Case 16-RC-4064 warranted setting aside the election of November 3, 1965. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire rec- ord in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings," conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following addition. i Respondent attacks the credibility findings of the Trial Examiner in connection with his findings of 8(a) (1) violations We have reviewed the entire record and under the stand- ards -et forth in Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3), we find no reason to reject these findings 160 NLRB No 18