Carpenters Local Union No. 1849

424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their rights to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. WE WILL make whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered those employees whom we unlawfully laid off, discharged, or locked out, in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy." WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. All of our employees are free to become or refrain from becoming members of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization. SERV-AIR INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Sixth "Floor Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Forth Worth, Texas 76102, Tele- phone 335-4211 , Extention 2145. Carpenters Local Union No. 1849, affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO and William H. Parker. Case 19-CB-1074. October 25, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On May 10, 1966, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam- iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent they are consistent with our Decision herein. 161 NLRB No. 29. CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 425, We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the East- ern Washington Agreement was, by its terms, limited to new hires or was not intended to apply to existing employees. The critical con- tract clause in question provides that "when workmen . . . are needed, the Employer will notify the proper Union of number and classification of employees needed and it shall be the responsibility of the Union to refer the necessary men required by the Employer." [Emphasis supplied.] In our opinion, the Trial Examiner has placed too narrow an interpretation on the contract clause by concluding that the word "needed" limited the contract application to only those cases where additional employees are needed over and above present employees, wherever located, whose services could be utilized. This very question of interpretation was considered by the Board in almost identical circumstances in Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.' There the Board refused to apply a narrow construction to similar provisions in the contract relating to the hiring hall. On the contrary, the Board there found that the overwhelming practice in the construction industry was that the contractor would first attempt through the hiring hall to secure all needed employees from among the available local labor force. The same logic and rationale applied there applies in the instant case. As we said in Local 542, supra, to accept the Trial Examiner's conclu- sions would permit a contractor to hire as many men as he desired outside the Union's area and then, because they are then not "needed" after they have been hired, bring them into the area notwithstanding an exclusive contract referral system. Clearly, such a construction would sanction a practice contrary to that prevailing in the construc- tion industry. In such circumstances, we conclude that the Eastern Washington Agreement requires that the Employer first utilize the referral sys- tem in initially securing employees to work in Local 1849's jurisdiction. As the record shows that Parker was not referred to the Employer pursuant to the terms of the contract, we find that Respondents steward was within his rights in questioning Parker's status on the jobsite. We also find that Parker was not denied clearance or referral because of his lack of membership in the Respondent Local but, rather, was removed from the job because his status as an employee on the job violated the Employer's contract with the Respondent. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] 1151 NLRB 497 (Ralph A. Marino, General Contractor). 426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND • RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE The complaint herein, issued on October 15, 1965, based on a charge filed by William Parker, an individual, on August 4, 1965, against Carpenters Local Union No. 1849, affiliated with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent, alleged violations of Section 8(b)(2) and (1 ) (A) of the Act.' On October 25, 1965, Respondent wrote a letter to the Acting Regional Director, denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged. The letter was received on October 26, 1965, but no contention is made that it was filed too late. On November 3, 1965, Respondent, by attorney, filed a formal answer admitting certain allegations but denying the alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner James R. Hem- ingway at Richland, Washington, on November 30, 1965. At the outset of the hearing, motions were made to amend the pleadings in certain minor respects. These motions were granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties waived oral argument but requested time within which to file briefs. A time was fixed and was later extended. Within such extended time a brief was received only from Respondent. Ruling on Respondent's motion to dismiss on the merits was reserved and is now denied for the reasons herein set forth. Upon my observation of, the witnesses and all the evidence in the case, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Charles T. Parker Construction Company,2 herein called the Company, is an Oregon corporation with its offices and principal place of business in Portland, Oregon. It is engaged as a general contractor in the building and construction industry. During the past year, it performed construction services in excess of $100,000 for customers located outside the State of Oregon and it received sup- plies and materials originating outside the State of Oregon valued in excess of $50,000. In the course of its operations, the Company employs, among others, carpenters. The Respondent does not contest jurisdiction, and I find that the Board has jurisdiction, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. U. THE RESPONDENT AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION The Respondent is a labor organization representing about 800 carpenters in Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho. At all times material hereto the Respond- ent had a collective-bargaining agreement with the Inland Empire Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Restraint and coercion 1. Parker's employment and termination The Company, in early 1965, began construction of a transmission line for the Washington Public Power Supply System from Vantage Substation in central Wash- ington to the 100 North area of the Hanford Atomic Energy Site in Washington. The work involved the installation of foundations, the erection of towers, and the stringing of transmission lines. Among the workmen employed by the Company, it used carpenters in the construction of forms for the transmission towers. The work proceeded through the territorial jurisdiction of three Capenters local unions, one in Ellensburg, one in Yakima, and the Respondent's in Pasco. The first two locals were parties to a collective-bargaining contract with the Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, which contract was known as the Western Washington agreement, whereas the Respondent was a party to an agreement 129 U.S C, Sec. 151, et seq. 2 The Charging Party is no relation to the party whose name this Company bears. CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 427 known as the Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho agreement, herein called the Eastern Washington agreement. The dividing line between the area covered by the two contracts is the 120th meridian, a line appearing on maps but not identifi- able on the landscape .3 The work began in April 1965 neat Ellensburg. By June 1965 the work had progressed to a point near the 120th meridian . In the latter part of June, before reaching the Columbia River which was east of the 120th meridian at the con- struction line, the Company had reduced its carpenter crew , partly in anticipation of hiring men through the Respondent, but also because of a shortage of material. Because of the latter, work was shifting between points close to the river and points farther west. As is customary when contractors are moving from the jurisdiction of one local craft union to another, the Company held a precontract conference with the Respondent's business agent in order to become acquainted with Respondent 's rules and to learn of the availability of men. Lawrence Guthu, construction superin- tendent for the Company, understood that when he called for men through the Respondent's hiring hall, the men called for would be dispatched by the Respond- ent. He also understood that members of other locals, in order to work in the jurisdiction of the Respondent, would, by union rules, have to have a permit from the Respondent to work in that jurisdiction. He believed that if a member of a sister local had a permit to work in Respondent' s jurisdiction, the Company could request the Respondent to clear him. He did not, however, know that the Respond- ent would require that members of sister locals already employed would have to do more than clear with the Respondent by getting a permit to work in Respond- ent's jurisdiction. Because neither the Respondent nor the Company was aware of the exact loca- tion of the 120th meridian they could not reach agreement thereon at the prejob conference. Respondent's business agent, Guy Adams, testified that, at the time of that conference, the Company was working on top of the mountain (inferentially the Saddle Mountains ), and that he and the Company's representatives agreed that, when the work moved closer to the river, the latter would order some men from the Respondent under the Eastern Washington agreement. The Company expected to move back and forth "across that line" until the job was finished. Adams testi- fied that, when the woik moved to the east side of the river, "it would all be covered by this [Eastern Washington AGCY contract" The record does not reveal the date on which the Company (not previously a party to the Eastern Washington agreement) signed a contract with the Respondent, but I presume that this was done before the work crossed the river, because Adams testified that, when the work got near the river, the Company ordered men and they were dispatched. He also testified at another point that he would not have supplied men unless he had had a contract with the Employer. The carpenters dispatched by the Respond- ent worked together with three remaining carpenters from the Yakima and Ellens- burg locals on the work which shifted back and forth between the mountains and the river. Guthu contemplated taking these three men with him when he crossed the river, but one was injured and became unavailable, and another decided to go home. The only remaining one was William Parker, a member of the Yakima local, who had, however, been dispatched to the Company by the Ellensburg local. In anticipation of working in Respondent's jurisdiction, Parker, in late June 1965, had spoken with Guy Adams, Respondent's business agent, and asked if he could get a permit by mail from Respondent instead of losing time from work by going to the Respondent's office in Pasco. Adams told him he could. Parker showed Adams his working card from his own local, which revealed his dues as paid up. If Adams surmised that Parker had in mind continuing to work for the Company in the Respondent's jurisdiction and if he knew that Respondent might raise any objection to Parker's continuing on that job in its jurisdiction, he said nothing to Parker about it. Parker testified that he wrote for a working permit, paying the required fee, and received one from the Respondent by mail on July 1, 1965, which was good for the month of July. Parker actually received two slips, one called "Official Referral Slip," of the Columbia River Valley District Council, on which were listed the numbers of seven locals, including those of Respondent, the Yakima, and the Ellensburg locals, for which he had paid $1, and another card entitled 'The Respondent' s territorial jurisdiction was not established in the record, but presumably It, also, extended to the 120th meridian. 428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "Temporary Working Card," issued by the Respondent, for which he had paid Respondent about $7.25. Both were essential to enable a member of a sister local to work in Respondent's jurisdiction. On July 6, 1965, Parker was stripping forms on the west side of the river. Superintendent Guthu told Parker that, when he was through there , he should come over to the east side. On the morning of July 7, 1965, therefore, Parker appeared ready for work on the east side of the Columbia River .4 About 7:40 a.m. that day, 20 minutes before starting time, William Bateman, the Respondent's steward, approached Parker and asked if he had a dispatch slip from the Respond- ent. Parker said that he did not have. Bateman quoted Parker as saying that he did not need one. Bateman told Parker that he would have to have a dispatch slip or he could not go to work. According to Parker, whom I credit, he told Bateman that the latter would have to tell the foreman that. Bateman said that the foreman knew all about it. Parker stated that that was not good enough, that Bateman would have to tell the foreman in Parker's presence. The two of them then went to the foreman, Arthur Izer, and Parker told Izer that Bateman had told him he could not work, that he was being taken off the job because he did not have a dispatch slip, and that he wanted two men who were standing nearby to witness what was being said. Bateman denied that he was "taking Parker off the job." According to Izer, Bateman said that Parker would have to have a dispatch slip before he could go to work. Parker offered to show Bateman his dispatch slip from the Ellensburg local, his working permit received from the Respondent, and his receipts for assessments paid, and he claimed that he was on the job legally, that he had met all the requirements of the local, that he was already on the pay- roll and that he expected to draw pay until he was terminated, and that, when he was terminated, he expected a written statement as to why he was terminated. Foreman Izet said that if Parker wanted a written statement, he would better wait until Superintendent Guthu arrived so he could give the statement. Izer then busied himself with getting the carpenters to work. When he returned to Parker, Guthu still had not arrived; so Izer told Parker that the latter should write up something that he thought would explain the situation and then, if he (Izer ) found it accept- able, he would sign it. Parker thereupon wrote the following statement: 7-7-65 Hanford, Ore. 100 N W. H. Parker is being removed from Charles T. Parker Payroll this date because of a question arising regarding said W. H. Parker having a dispatch slip from Carpenters Local 1849 Pasco, Wn. The Steward on the job Mr. Murray Bateman has informed me that he cannot work without a dispatch slip. Signed ---------------------------------- Carpenter Foreman Izer signed the statement, and Parker picked up his tools and left. On the way out, Parker met Guthu and apparently stopped to explain the reason for his departure, for he showed Guthu his termination slip. Guthu testified that he told Parker to "come on back," thinking to take the matter up with the Respondent, but Parker declined, saying that he had what he wanted. Parker delivered his cap and badge to Guthu and left. 2. Additional relevant facts Before becoming a member of Local 770 in Yakima, Parker had twice been a member of Respondent. During the period of his membership, members seeking work through the Respondent had registered on an out-of-work list. When the name of a member of that local or of another reached the top of the list, he would be given a dispatch slip If he were a member of a sister local, he would also receive, at that time, a permit to work in the Respondent's jurisdiction. But no one was given a permit until he had been dispatched to a job. Thus, the fact that Parker, in this case, was given a permit by Respondent without previously having been given a dispatch slip would, in itself, suggest that the Respondent had approved of Parker's continuing on the job on which he was already employed. 'The location of the crossing is not shown in the record From such evidence as is available in the record, and by use of a map, I infer that the crossing was made into the lower part of Grant County , Washington, south of the Saddle Mountains , where the Columbia River is running in a generally north and south direction. CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 429 Parker had been a member of Respondent within 4 years before the date of the hearing, but the exact date was not shown. Because of that, Parker would have been privileged to register on the Respondent 's A (out-of-work ) list. The Respondent also maintained B and C lists. The B list was for members of other locals which belonged to the Columbia River District Council. The C list was for all others . Those on the A list would have preference in employment over those on the B and C lists . It might appear that if Parker had been registered on the A list, an employer for whom he had worked in the past year could, under a clause in the Eastern Washington AGC agreement, have called for him by name and he would have been dispatched . However, Parker was not registered on the A list,,' and, in any event, the Respondent apparently interpreted that provision of the contract to mean that , if, within the past year, a carpenter had worked within the Respondent's jurisdiction for a particular employer, the employer could call for him by name. Since the Company had not previously worked within the juris- diction of the Respondent , its request for Parker would, I deduce, not have been honored even if Parker had been registered on the Respondent 's out-of-work list. Although the Eastern Washington agreement contained a union-security pro- vision, this was not involved here. The Respondent relies on provisions of the contract reading: Article V-Hiring Section 1. . (c) The employer shall give preference in hiring to local men who are qualified to perform the work. Section 3. (a) . When workmen other than those described in Sec- tion 1 (b) of this Article [employees whom an employer may call for by name], are needed, the Employer will notify the proper Union of number and classification of employees needed and it shall be the responsibility of the Union to refer the necessary men required by the Employer. (b) It is recognized that the Union is the principal[,] but not necessarily the sole, source of procuring workmen... . The Columbia River District Council has working rules relating to the mainte- nance of out-of-work lists. One provision relates to A, B, and C out-of-work lists. Another provision therein reads: "All members seeking employment within the jurisdiction of any of the Locals affiliated with The Columbia River District Council of Carpenters who are in possession of a paid-up Council Working Card shall be eligible to register for work on the out-of-work list of an affiliated Local and will be referred for work when their name appears at the top of the list in accordance with the dispatch procedure of the respective Local Union." The Respondent's bylaws apparently provide that "All members must secure a referral slip in writing from the Office of the Business Representative before going to work on any job." This provision plus a constitutional provision making mem- bers of any local who are working in the jurisdiction of another local subject to the bylaws of the latter local enable the Respondent's business agent to prefer charges with the Columbia River District Council against any member who procures his own job without going through the Respondent 's hiring hall. If the charges are sustained, the guilty member may be fined. 3. Contentions and conclusions The General Counsel contends that Parker had been properly dispatched by another local to the job with the Company, that, because the work was progressive in character, moving from one jurisdiction to another , Parker was an existing employee rather than a newly hired one when the work entered the Respondent's jurisdiction, that, because of this, the Company was not obligated to discharge Parker and replace him with a newly hired one, and that the Respondent caused Parker's discharge because Parker was not a member of and /or had not been dispatched to the job by the Respondent. The Respondent takes the position that it was merely enforcing its contract with the Company. It argues that the contract does not permit an employer to bring into its jurisdiction any but key men (mean- ing supervisory employees) and that, when an employer comes into Respondent's jurisdiction to perform contract work, that employer must hire his carpenters 'By the Respondent's interpretation of the contract, a man who registered in the out- of-work list after the job was started in Respondent's jurisdiction would not have been privileged to work on the employer's call by name. 430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD through the Respondent's hiring hall whether he is beginning a new job or is merely progressing into the Respondent's jurisdiction on a job commenced else- where . It is the Respondent's position that, in the latter situation, it is the obliga- tion of the employer to discharge all existing employees when the work crosses the line into the Respondent's jurisdiction and to hire new employees through the Respondent's hiring hall. The complaint does not allege and the General Counsel does not contend that the Respondent's maintenance of A, B, and C lists of job seekers or that Respond- ent's administration of its hiring hall have resulted in discriminatory practices generally. And we are not here concerned with the Respondent's right to discipline its own members or members of sister locals within its jurisdiction. The sole question is whether or not the Respondent caused the Company to discriminate in regard to Parker's hire and tenure of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. This depends on (1) whether or not Respondent did, in fact, cause Parker's discharge and, if it did, (2) whether or not the Respondent was acting within the provisions of the Eastern Washington agreement, which is acknowledged to be valid. On July 7, 1965, Respondent's agent, Steward Bateman, first told Parker, alone, that Parker could not work without a dispatch slip. Later he made a state- ment in the presence of Foreman Izer that Parker would have to have a dispatch slip before he could go to work. Bateman, himself, denied that he had said that Parker could not go to work without a dispatch slip, but his denial was not only contrary to the testimony of Parker and Izer, but was contrary to a statement which Bateman had given a Board agent between the time of the filing of the charge and the date of the hearing. Whatever limitation of meaning might have been in Bateman's mind, it was not expressed to Parker and Izer. He did not, and would not be imagined to, select his words with such semantic nicety as to express a limited meaning by saying: "I recommend that you get a dispatch slip before you start work or I shall be obliged to report your failure to do so to the business agent, who, if you go to work without a dispatch slip, will probably prefer charges against you with the Columbia River Valley District Council and you may expect to be fined as a consequence." It is much more likely that Bateman used a cus- tomary shortcut and made the statement which Parker and Izer attributed to him, and I so find . If Bateman's statement were made to an employee alone and the latter quit as a conssequence, the presumption would be that the employee quit to avoid the discipline he could expect as a union member if he went to work. But a statement such as, "This man cannot work without a dispatch slip," made in the presence of a management representative who is responsible for keeping the job going's could carry a different connotation. This statement made in Izer's presence would be tantamount to telling the Company that, if it continued to employ Parker without a dispatch slip, the Respondent would take action to compel compliance with its wishes? That this meaning was in Izer's mind appears from his testimony of what, in his experience, happens if the steward's instructions are disregarded: .. probably the first thing they [would] do would [be to] call the Business Agent out there and then they would probably shut the job down, although it would be possible, I•think, just for the [steward] to tell the men not to go to work and I don't think they would." On all the evidence, I find that the Respondent did cause the Company to terminate Parker's employment. Guthu's statement to Parker, as the latter was leaving, to "come on back" cannot be considered as a revocation of Izer 's act of terminating Parker in view of Guthu 's testimony indicating that he would not have worked Parker without the Respondent's approval. The evidence is also quite clear that the Respondent's approval would not have been given while the Respondent had men on its own out-of-work list .8 If the Respondent had caused Parker's termination because he had been hired in violation of a lawful agreement, the Respondent would have been acting within 6 Normally, Superintendent Guthu did the hiring and discharging, but Guthu testified that when he was not on the job , Izer was in charge . I find that Izer could terminate Parker, but in any event Guthu did not rescind Izer's action. 7 Local Union No. 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (J. L. Sammons Company, Inc.), 157 NLRB 451; Local Union No. 592, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America AFL-CIO (Brunswick Corporation), 135 NLRB 999. 9 The Respondent had about 50 to 75 men on the list . The Company hired no more than. 8 or 10 from the Respondent. CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 431 its rights.9 But if there was no agreement requiring the Company to hire anew, and through the Respondent, all carpenters to be used for work to be done in Respondent's jurisdiction, then the Respondent would have had no justification for causing the discharge of Parker.10 The Respondent contends, however, that its contract did so provide. With this I do not agree. A reading of the Eastern Wash- ington agreement discloses only that when the employer "needs" men, he is required to notify the Respondent and the Respondent is then obligated to furnish them, and that when (in Respondent's jurisdiction) the employer "hires" men, he is to give preference to local men. The word "hire" implies a new employment rather than the continuation of an old one." The word "needs" clearly implies being without employees, a situation which did not exist here with reference to Parker, who was already in the employ of the Company on a continuing job at the time the work crossed the Columbia River. Witnesses for the Respondent showed a marked tendency to confuse the terms of the Eastern Washington agreement with its own laws, rules, or unwritten prac- tices.12 The Company would have been bound by the terms of the agreement but not by the Respondent's laws or unwritten practices which were not incorporated in the agreement. The Respondent argued that, even if the agreement did not expressly provide for employing only men dispatched by Respondent, that was the interpretation placed on the agreement by the parties who negotiated it.13 Con- ceding for the sake of argument that the agreement was subject to interpretation and had been so interpreted by the parties who negotiated it, I find no basis for finding that the Company, not a party to the negotiation of the agreement, and not familiar with that interpretation, was bound by such an interpretation merely because it had adopted the contract as written when it signed a compliance agree- ment. The Company had a right to rely on the language of the agreement as it was given to it. As between the Company and the Respondent there was a new contract. Parker, as a member of a local affiliated with the same International as Respond- ent, knew, undoubtedly, that, under the International's constitution, he could not work in Respondent's jurisdiction without permission of Respondent.14 However, the Respondent had issued to Parker a permit to work in its jurisdiction. Respond- ent argues that a permit merely privileged a member of a sister local to register on the appropriate out-of-work list, not that such member could get a job without being dispatched. I find, however, that Respondent was, deliberately or not, ambiguous e Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 324 (Roy Price Inc.), 121 NLRB 508, 134 NLRB 661. Respondent relies upon this decision here. However, that case is distinguishable, because there the employer and the union had a tacit agreement that in a particular county the employer would employ only those laborers whom the union had cleared See also International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 98, AFL-CIO ( Consolidated Gas & Service Co ), 155 NLRB 850; Plasterers & Cement Masons Local Union 394 , 145 NLRB 188 , 194 ("The . . . contractors shall requisition all workmen who are to be employed in the bargaining unit from the local hiring hall . .") ; Millwrights and Machinery Erectors Local Union No. 2471 ( Otis Elevator), 135 NLRB 79. '°Local Union No. 592, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL- CIO (Brunswick Corporation ), 135 NLRB 999 ; Hoisting and Portable Engineers , Local 4 (Standard Contracting Co ), 140 NLRB 785 11 Under the definition of "employ" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary ( 1961), which is ". . . (2) [T]o make use of services of," the meaning of "employ " Is compared to that of "hire" : "Employ . . . stresses the use of a person's services ; hire, the act of engaging a person's services for compensation " 77 For example, Business Agent Adams testified that an employer can bring into Re- spondent's jurisdiction only his supervisory personnel and that he would have to dis- charge other employees and call for men out of Respondent's hiring hall , and "under this agreement," this would be true even in cases where the contract work did not start within the Respondent's jurisdiction but started elsewhere and progressed into Respondent's jurisdiction. Respondent's counsel conceded that there was no provision in the contract which spelled this out. Harlon Brown, president of the Washington State Council of Car- penters since 1961, and before that a business agent of the Respondent , testified to the same thing-" . . . the contract says he can't bring in people, he can't bring them in." When questioned about where the contract so provided , Brown testified, "I can tell you, this is the way it is working anyhow." 19 Respondent offered in evidence a copy of "Superintendents ' Manual 1965-1968" issued by the Inland Empire Chapter of AGC, which lists the hiring hall for Carpenters, Mill- wrights, and Pile Drivers as "Exclusive Non-discriminatory." There is no evidence that the Company was furnished with a copy. 14 See Carpenters Local #40 ( Stop & Shop, Inc.), 143 NLRB 142. 432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in its reference to a permit. Two permits were actually involved-one from the District Council to which any member of a local which, itself, was a member of that Council could get; the other permit was one issued by Respondent. The former -did not entitle a member of a sister local to get his own employment in the juris- diction of the local in which he sought work. With reference to the one issued by the Respondent, Parker testified that, when he was -a member of Respondent, it was Respondent's practice not to issue such a permit until a man was dispatched to a job. Hence, he would, in such case, have both the permit and the dispatch slip. The issuance by the Respondent of a permit to Parker for the month of July, 1965, -without giving him a dispatch slip at the same time, suggests that Respondent did not deem a dispatch slip to be needed in this case since Parker was already in the ,Company's employ. I note that Respondent's business agent supplied Foreman Izer, who was a member of a sister local, with a work permit but not a dispatch slip. Although her, as a supervisor, was recognized as entitled to be brought into the jurisdiction by the Company, his situation of being on the payroll before coming in (and as therefore not needing to be dispatched) was parallel to Parker's. On the entire record, I find that Respondent caused the Company to terminate Parker's employment because Parker had not been dispatched by Respondent as required by practices sought to be enforced by Respondent but not as required by the terms of the contract between the Company and the Respondent. Although Parker was a member of a sister local, this, I believe was not, by itself, a motivat- ing factor in Respondent's conduct. It is involved only to the extent that Parker was not registered with Respondent. However, Respondent' s insistance upon com- pliance with its unilaterally established hiring rules as a basis for causing Parker's termination, alone, establishes a violation by Respondent of the Act since the effect of Respondent's conduct was to cause the Company to discharge Parker and thereby "to encourage members to perform obligations or supposed obligations of membership." 15 Accordingly, I find that Respondent, by causing the Company to terminate Parker's employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1) (A) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1) Charles T. Parker Construction Company is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. (2) The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) Of the Act. (3) By causing said Charles T. Parker Construction Company to discharge William H. Parker on July 7, 1965, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) Of the Act. (4) The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting .commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I hereby make the following: [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] " Radio Officers' Union [Bull Steamship ] v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 52. United Steel Fabricators, Inc. and International Union of Elec- trical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 23-CA- 2184. October 25, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On July 25, 1966, Trial Examiner Benjamin B. Lipton issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the com- 161 NLRB No. 36.