Newman-Green, Inc.

1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he alllegedly had a problem of his pants not fitting , perhaps a more reliable indi- cation of his views is his statement that the uniform did not improve his driving ability and his reference to it as a "monkey suit." This leads , to the purported concerted activities relied on . by the General Coun- sel. Bruso and coworker Dean Naeve'who drove the same truck decided to ask Toi- ler to meet with the drivers and discuss the cost of the new uniforms . Naeve tele- phoned Toiler and arranged a meeting for April 1 0, 1965. The various drivers met with Toiler on this occasion and discussed the cost of the uniforms, upkeep, and the portion thereof that Respondent would assume. There is no evidence that Toiler or any other representative of management was aware of the previous discussion between Bruso and Naeve which led to this meet- ing. The record also reveals that Bruso never suggested to any other employee that he be their spokesman and, similarly, he was never so authorized by any employee. Nor did Bruso ever so indicate to management . And, assuming arrangements for the April meeting were a concerted activity with respect to the cost and maintenance of the uniforms, the fact is that what management found fault with was rather Bruso's personal unwillingness to wear a uniform. There is much evidence of Bruso's intractability and finding fault with company policies in a number of other areas, but I believe that it would unduly burden this Decision to set it ' forth: Suffice it to say that (1) Bruso was discharged for cause and reasons unrelated to engagement in protected concerted activities, namely, his continuous manifestation of personal dissatisfaction with numerous aspects of his job and constant complaining concerning management decisions as they affected, him, Bruso; and (2) if Bruso was engaged in protected concerted activities , Respond- ent was not aware of this fact . The incidents most clearly related to the time of dis- charge were his individual refusals to work Saturdays and his delay in complying with the deadline for wearing uniforms . See Disneyland, A Division of Walt Disney Productions, 157 NLRB 1342. As stated by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21: "In sum, Section 8(a) (1) is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such. . .." [Emphasis added.] In view of all the foregoing considerations, I shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Mushroom Transportation Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d 683 (C .A. 3); N.L.R.B. v. Office Towel Supply Company Incorporated, 201 F.2d 838 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Ansonia Plant), 179 F.2d 507 (C.A. 6); Borg-Warner Corp., 155 NLRB 1087; and Continental Manu- facturing Corp., 155 NLRB 255. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., 156 NLRB 1130, and Norfolk Conveyor, 159 NLRB 464. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The operations of Respondent, Continental Oil Company, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER In view of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Newman-Green, Inc. and Charles J. Fortune, Jr. Case 13-CA- 7109. November 16, 1966 DECISION AND ORDER On June 14, 1966, Trial Examiner W. Edwin Youngblood issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor 161 NLRB No. 94. NEWMAN-GREEN, IlVC. 1063 practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that such allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed an answering brief, cross-exceptions, and a brief in support of cross- exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Jenkins and Zagoria]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions, briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with the following modifications : [1. Add the following as the last sentence to paragraph 2(a) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order : "Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as requiring the Respond- ent to revoke any insurance benefit which it has heretofore granted." [2. Add the following as the last sentence to the second indented paragraph in the Appendix (notice) attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision : [However, we are not required to revoke any insurance benefit which we have heretofore granted.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed July 26, 1965,' and an amended charge filed August 16, by Charles J. Fortune, Jr., a complaint was issued against Respondent on October 19. The complaint, as amended before and at the hearing, and after dismissal of cer- tain allegations at the conclusion of General Counsel's case -in-chief to which Gen- eral Counsel interposed no objection , alleges that Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by interrogating employees about their union activities and by announcing and granting its employees free hospitalization insurance , violated Sec- tion 8 (a)(2) of the Act by certain conduct more specifically described herein, and violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging Charles J. Fortune, Jr., because of his union activities. Respondent's answer denies the commission of any unfair I Unless otherwise Indicated , all dates herein are In 1965. 1064 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD labor practices. This case was heard at Addison, Illinois, before Trial Examiner W. Edwin Youngblood, on January 24, 25, and 26, 1966, and briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record ,2 including my evaluation of the witnesses based on the ,evidence, and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, an Illinois corporation, is engaged at its factory at 57 Interstate Road, Addison, Illinois, in the manufacture of aerosol valves. During the past year, Respondent manufactured and shipped products valued in excess of $100,000 from its factory at Addison, Illinois, directly to points located outside the State of Illinois. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of 'Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America , AFL-CIO, `herein called the Union, and the Employee Suggestion Committees , herein called the Committees or the Committee,3 are labor organizations within the meaning of ,Section 2 (5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Company hierarchy The complaint, as amended, alleges in paragraph 5 that the following named persons occupied the positions set forth opposite their names, and are supervisors .and agents of Respondent within the meaning of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act: E. H. Green, President Walter G. O'Neill, Administrator Edmond S. Buchacz, Plant Superintendent Marvin Wojnicki, General Foreman Hector Langhi, Foreman Jerry Shipley, Assistant Foreman Rae Irvin, Personnel Officer 1n its answer, filed prior to the hearing, Respondent admitted that Green, O'Neill, Buchacz, Wojnicki, and Langhi are supervisors and agents within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act, but denied the status of Shipley and Irvin as supervisors and agents. At the hearing, Respondent amended its answer to admit that Shipley was a supervisor and agent of Respondent within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(11) and (13) of the Act until he left Respondent's employ on July 3, and that Irvin likewise was a supervisor and agent up to and including May 13 when she ceased to be a supervisor, and asserted that Irvin has been since then and is now a -nonsupervisory employee. At the conclusion of his case-in-chief, General Counsel stated that he had no evidence to present to show that Irvin was a supervisor after May 13. I therefore find in accordance with the foregoing, and uncontradicted testi- mony herein, and Section 102.20 of the Board's Rules and Regulations that the per- sons named above are supervisors and agents of Respondent within the meaning of 'Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act, and occupied the positions set forth opposite their names at all times material hereto except for Shipley and Irvin whose status is specifically limited as referred to above. In addition, I find that Walter O'Neill became Respondent's controller and assistant treasurer on October 1. I also find on 'the basis of his undisputed testimony that Daniel Budi was general production man- ager in 1962 and occupied that position for about 21/2 years, then worked as sales ,coordinator in the sales department until December 1 when Budi resumed the job ,of general production manager. I further find on the basis of the undisputed testi- mony of O'Neill that Mrs. Green, wife of Respondent's president, is secretary of -the corporation and acts in an administrative capacity for the Respondent. 2 Motions to correct the record were received from the General Counsel and the Respond- ent and are hereby corrected. 8 See discussion herein of the facts upon which this finding is made. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1065- B. The alleged violations of Section 8(a) (2) 1. The facts In March 1959, an NLRB election was conducted at Respondent's plant which the Union lost. After the election was over, a group of employees on the second shift were "just standing around" and E. H. Green, Respondent's president, said that he was happy to hear that the Union had not gotten in and told the employees that if they wanted a union, they could form their own union and get their own lawyer. Mrs. Green and Walter O'Neil were also present .4 In 1962 the Union reactivated its 1959 campaign to organize Respondent's employees, and union cards were signed, one of which was dated March 12, 1962. Several women employees discussed the fact that the Union was trying to get in. It appears that they wanted somebody to represent them with management, but did not want to pay union dues. So they decided to discuss the matter with Budi, Respondent's production manager. In April or May 1962 several employees approached Budi and requested the establishment of employee representation with management regarding matters of interest to employees. Budi replied that "if a majority of the people wanted such representation, then we would discuss it further. But, if the majority did not, there would be no further discussion involved." Similar requests were made by employ- ees on other shifts and similar replies were made. Respondent operates three shifts. An election was then held on each shift to determine whether a majority wanted this type of representation. At the request of employees, Respondent supplied them with printed ballots, the polling place and fixed the time of election. Balloting then occurred on each shift during worktime in Budi's office. Budi "let them have" their own "judges" for the voting, and they counted the votes, certified the results, and turned over the certified tally sheets to Budi. These sheets reflected that the major- ity wanted group representation from each shift. Over a period of time after employee discussion, it developed that the employees wanted three people on the committee. Budi advised O'Neill that the employees had approached him "request- ing that a committee be set up," to which O'Neill replied "good, leave them form their own committee." The employees then requested a place for the election and that forms be given out for nominations. Budi caused a box of "speed letters" to be placed in the lunchroom to be used in nominating people for the committee .5 In April or May 1962 a notice was placed on Respondent's bulletin board by the lunchroom concerning the committee, which notice was signed by either the produc- tion manager or Green, but probably by Budi, the production managers The notice stated that "they were going to have a nomination of girls to form this grievance committee." The day of the nomination was stated as well as how it would take place, specifically that three signatures on a speed letter were required to form a nomination. Newmann was one of those nominated and all nominees were called into Budi's office. There were so many nominees that Budi inquired if anyone would like to drop out, and Newmann replied that she would drop out, and others did also. The committee then asked for an election and asked that Respondent supply the ballots and the time and place. Budi agreed to this request. A secret-ballot election was held in Budi's office using ballots which his secretary had typed. Three employee members from each shift now serve on what is known as Employee Suggestion Committees and meet with representatives of management. Wages, hours, and con- ditions of employment are discussed at these meetings, some of which have been 4 The foregoing is based on the testimony of Mrs. Mary Newmann. O'Neill's version of this incident was that somebody "made a passing remark, could we form our own union, could we have our own union. The reply was that I have nothing to do with that, every- thing is to be done on your own, you can contact your own lawyer if you care to." Green was the one who made this reply. Newmann's testimony was given in a persuasive manner. My Impression of O'Neill's testimony, however, was that he was trying to minimize the incident so as to put Respondent in the best light rather than relating the incident as best he recalled the way it happened. Accordingly, I have credited the testimony of Newmann. 5A speed letter is a company form which apparently was used in various ways such as transmitting messages and communications between employees and management 6 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Newmann whose best recollection was that Budi signed this notice. Teresa Grossi credibly testified that someone from the front office whose name she did not recall signed the notice, and that this person was not a clerical employee. Although Budi testified at the hearing, he did not deny signing this notice. 1066 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD held since February 1965.7 These meetings are held in Respondent's production office during working time, and Mrs. Green's secretary has kept the minutes of some of these meetings.8 Annual elections to elect members of the committees are held in April or May, and such an election was held in 1965, following the posting of a notice similar to the one referred to above. Elections are held on company property during working hours, and a list of nominees goes to the production manager. The Union reactivated its earlier campaign to organize Respondent's employees starting in January. On April 30, Joseph Zanoni, Jr., field representative of the Union, wrote Green advising that certain named employees were openly working on behalf of the Union. The 1965 election was held as usual on company property dur- ing working hours. Prior to the election, Buchacz advised Langhi that he had received a speed letter from the committee on Langhi's shift asking for a vote of the shift for new committee members. Buchacz instructed Langhi "to provide an office and allow them to have their vote." Langhi did so and also at the request of the committee, Langhi selected two employees to act as overseers of the balloting. In addition, Buchacz' secretary typed notices relating to the election pursuant to the committee's request which were posted on the bulletin board. On the day of the election, Langhi showed the observers where the room for the balloting was located and "left them on their own." At least some of the employees were advised by Fore- man Langhi when they could leave their machines to go vote. The committees have taken up various grievances on subjects such as employees' workloads in meetings with management. One such grievance was submitted on a speed letter by Newmann in September or October. Newmann received a verbal answer to her grievance from committee member Mary Horvath. Newmann also received a written reply to her grievance which was written on the bottom of the speed letter and signed by Buchacz. Later Buchacz told Newmann about the change in her duties which resulted from her grievance. The Suggestion Committee has a stock of speed letters for use in submitting grievances.9 2. Analysis and conclusions The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 7 of the complaint, as amended, that Respondent did initiate, form, sponsor, and promote the establishment of the Com- mittee. This conduct, if it did occur, occurred in 1962 when the Committee was established, which was long before 6 months prior to the filing and service of the charge herein. Section 10(b) was enacted to eliminate the processing of just such outdated matters, and I am therefore precluded from finding any violation based on this allegation and shall recommend its dismissal.lo The complaint, as amended, also alleges in paragraph 7(a) and (b) that Respondent has since February 16 assisted, dominated, and contributed to the support of, and interfered with the administration of the Committee as follows: (a) On or about April or May 1965, Respondent by its officers and agents, permitted, assisted, and directed its employees in the selection or election of new members of said Committee on Respondent's time and property. (b) Once each month, or when called by the Respondent, by its officers, and agents, E. H. Green and Walter G. O'Neill, meet with members of said Committee on Respondent's time and property to discuss changes in wages, hours of work, or the terms and conditions of employment, including employee grievances. The record establishes that the Union reactivated its earlier campaign to organize Respondent's employees starting in January. On April 30, Zenoni wrote Green advising that certain named employees were openly working on behalf of the Union. (General Counsel's Exhibit 3-A.) 7 O'Neill stated that he had attended a meeting in the latter part of February. 8 As noted above, Mrs. Green is secretary of the corporation and also acts in an admin- istrative capacity. 9 The foregoing findings, except as indicated above, are based on the credited and un- denied testimony of Mary Newmann, Joseph Zanoni, Daniel Budi, Ann Rench, Walter O'Neill, Rose Marie Fuller, Hector Langhi, the stipulation of the parties, and General Counsel's Exhibit 6. 10 Mt. Clemens Metal Products Company, 126 NLRB 1297; see also Local Lodge No. 1421, v. N L R B , 362 U S. 411, where the Supreme Court stated "a finding of violation which is inescapably grounded on events predating the limitation period is directly at odds with the purposes of the Section 10(b) proviso." NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1067 As found above, representatives of Respondent have met at intervals since Feb- ruary with representatives of the three Committees in the office of the production manager and minutes have been kept by the secretary to Mrs. Green. It was stip- ulated that wages, hours, and conditions of employment are discussed at these meetings and, as I have found above, the Committees are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.ti Respondent supplies employees with grievance forms, and at least one grievance (filed by Newmann) was processed in September or October 1965. In addition, the election of committee members was held as usual in April or May, and as usual the election was held on company time and property with company printed ballots, and after the Company had typed and posted an election notice, and after some voters were released by one of Respond- ent's foremen who also at the request of the Committee selected two employees to act as overseers of the balloting. There is no evidence that the Committees have a constitution or bylaws, collect any dues, elect any officers or have any meetings with employees. The above facts clearly establish that Respondent has assisted and supported the committee in violation of Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.12 The Gen- eral Counsel contends also that Respondent has dominated the Committees since February 16, or within the 10(b) period, and cites Franklin Electric Co., Inc., 154 NLRB 901, as support for that contention. In Franklin, however, indicia of domi- nation present in the pre 10(b) period continued into the 10(b) period. For exam- ple, in that case Respondent's industrial relations manager, called the election for members of the employee committee which was held during the 10(b) period by placing an announcement in the company publication. In addition, the bonus com- mittee continued to operate during the 10(b) period under the terms and condi- tions of the "Franklin Electric Bonus Plan" which was originally prepared and dis- tributed by Respondent. Likewise in Seneca Plastics Inc., 149 NLRB 320, also cited by General Counsel, indicia of domination continued into the 10(b) period. Thus, for example, three of the six members of the employee committee were originally appointed by the employer in the pre 10(b) period, and it was not until after the charge in that case was filed that the employer removed its three appointees from the committee. In this case, it seems clear that the Committees function at least with some degree of independence in their relations with Respondent. Thus grievances by employees have been prosecuted by the Committee to a successful conclusion, and it appears from Buchacz' testimony that the Committees have been quite insistent in their demands on the employer. I cannot conclude on this record on evidence within 10(b) period that the Committees are the creatures of Respondent, or that Respondent dominates and controls these Committees. I find the evidence falls short of establishing domination, and I shall recommend the dismissal of this allegation.13 C. The alleged interrogation and discriminatory discharge of Charles P. Fortune, Jr. 1. The facts Fortune was employed by Respondent in April 1963 at a starting rate of $1.50 an hour. Three weeks later he received a 5-cent raise and after 3 months on the job received another 5-cent raise. After 6 months on the job, Fortune received 5 cents more per hour. For the first few months, Fortune worked as a material han- dler, and then became a machine operator and received an automatic 10-cent raise at the time. Fortune's rate was then $1.75 an hour. About January 20, 1964, For- tune began working on the second shift with hours from 4 p.m. to midnight. In addition, in September 1964, Fortune was told by Wayne Vator, second shift fore- man, that he was going to become an assistant to Vator. Fortune did not ever occupy this post, however, except for a short period of time. In November 1964 Fortune received a 25-cent raise based on seniority bringing his rate to $2 an hour. In February or March of 1965, Fortune received another raise of 10' cents an hour, and when he thanked Marvin Wojnicki for the raise, Wojnicki said that he thought that Fortune deserved it. By letter to Green dated April 30, Joseph Zanoni, who had charge of the Union's organizing campaign, advised that certain named employees, including For- tune, were openly working on behalf of the Union. (General Counsel's Exhibit 3-A.) In addition, Fortune served on the Union's organizing committee, and assisted Zanoni in handing out union leaflets. Fortune, as well as other organizing 11 N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc., 360 U.S. 203. 19 Wean Manufacturing Company, 147 NLRB 112. 13 Mt. Clemens Metal Products Company, supra. 1068 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD committee members, passed out leaflets beginning on May 3. The pamphlets which Fortune handed out on May 3 had his name on them. Later on May 3, as Fortune started to run his machine, Foreman Jerry Shipley called him "a union man" to which Fortune replied, "So I am fighting for some- thing I believe in." Shipley then inquired, "What do you expect to accomplish by getting the Union in the Company, we have enough stuff for you now." Fortune replied, "seniority rights" and that ended the conversation. Toward the end of May, Fortune had another conversation with Shipley at Fortune's machine at 4:30 p.m. Shipley apparently again asked Fortune what he expected to get by having the Union in the plant, and Fortune again replied by referring to seniority and pos- sibly free insurance. Shipley stated "'we are already going to get insurance." 14 Fortune said that "when the Union stands out there, you usually get something." Then Fortune asked Shipley why he did not join the Union, and Shipley said, "Why should I and then every 6 months later you come up and tell me that-you come up to chew me out 6 months later because you got a bad deal." Fortune then said, "You are going to be quitting, you won't be here" and that ended the conver- sation. On June 18 at about 4:30 or 5 p.m., Fortune had another conversation with Shipley at Fortune's machine. On this occasion, Shipley asked Fortune how many cards were signed to which Fortune replied, "enough." Fortune described this con- versation as "almost similar" to the second conversation in that Shipley said that he was quitting and Fortune again inquired of Shipley why he did not join the Union. Fortune passed out some union leaflets on June 1.15 Some of the union pam- phlets were mailed to employees who had signed union cards previously, and some were distributed at the plant gate by the parking lot. Zanoni personally handed copies of most of the pamphlets to O'Neill, some of which had Fortune's name thereon.16 Fortune served as one of the two union observers at the NLRB election on June 22, and on the same day signed a certificate of conduct relating to the election. The Union lost this election by a vote of 38 for and 148 against the Union. It appears also that Fortune's father is an organizer for the United Auto- mobile Workers; however, there is no evidence to establish that Respondent knew of this fact prior to his discharge. On June 23, Fortune was ill and did not report for work. The next day, how- ever, he did work and had a conversation with Production Manager Buchacz in the production office about 4:15 p.m. Also present were Marvin Wojnicki, Carl Her- manek, and Hector Langhi, Fortune's foreman. Fortune went to the office to inquire about a change that had been made in his work assignment. Buchacz asked how he felt and Fortune said "fine." Buchacz asked Fortune what was wrong with him the day before and Fortune said that he had "a slight sore throat." Buchacz then said, "See, if you weren't out there handing out pamphlets, you wouldn't have gotten this sore throat and you lost the elecion anyhow." Fortune replied, "that is all right, there is another year," and walked out.17 1* See discussion, herein, regarding free hospitalization insurance. 15 There was some testimony about an incident occurring on June 1 between Fortune and Rae Irvin. As there was no evidence of Irvin's supervisory status on this date, General Counsel interposed no objection to dismissal of paragraph 6(b) of the complaint, which related to this incident. Accordingly, I have given no consideration to this incident in evaluating Fortune's discharge. 16 Fortune's name appears on 9 of the 14 pamphlets which were received as General Counsel's Exhibits 7-A through N. General Counsel stated that these exhibits were offered only to show that Fortune's name appeared thereon and not to prove the truth of the contents thereof, and they were received for the limited purpose offered. Therefore I have not considered General 's Exhibit 7-B, referred to by General Counsel in his brief, in evaluating the allegations of the complaint in paragraph 6(d) and (e) regarding the hospitalization plan discussed herein. 17 Wojnicki denied that he told Fortune on this occasion that he would not have had a sore throat except that he had been passing out circulars on the street. Further Wojnicki denied hearing anyone else make such a remark to Fortune Wojnicki also denied that Fortune said anything about there was always next year as far as the union effort was concerned. Buchacz denied hearing Wojnicki say Fortune would not have had a sore throat if he had not been passing out leaflets a few days earlier, denied that he said any- thing like that and denied hearing Fortune saying anything about being back the next year. Although Langhi was a witness at the hearing, his testimony makes no reference to this conversation. Neither Wojnicki nor Buchacz testified to what was actually said on this occasion. I was not impressed by their denials and credit Fortune's testimony on. this. point which was persuasively given. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1069 On June 30, the certificate of results of the election was issued. Also on June 30, Fortune punched in and went to the 'lunchroom where free coffee is distributed to employees and drank some coffee. Then following his usual practice Fortune took an extra cup of coffee with him to his machine which he then started. About 4:05 p.m. Langhi came over to Fortune and asked him how he felt, and Fortune replied "fine." Langhi said, "So" and walked away. About 4:15 p.m. Langhi walked back to the machine and told Fortune to shut it off. Fortune demurred -saying that he had a good count. Langhi then told Fortune to shut the machine down because he wanted to talk to Fortune. Fortune agreed, and they went into a "little office" in the subassembly room and started talking. Langhi told Fortune that O'Neill said that he was drinking, and that he was "drunk" while running the machine. Fortune replied that he might have had a "can of beer or something, but this isn't going to make me drunk, you know." Langhi said that he was "sorry," adding that it was not up to him. Fortune then inquired if the was fired and Langhi replied, "No, come back to work tomorrow." Fortune also asked if there would be something about this in his record and Langhi replied in the negative; Langhi did not write anything about this in Fortune's record.18 Fortune then left the factory. Fortune was operating a machine that day making aerosol felts and testified that he had no trouble with the machine, and that his production was about 1,400 which he characterized as "good." Fortune operated his machine about 20 minutes. The operator of another machine in the area was having trouble with parts jamming up and called Fortune over to fix it, which Fortune did.19 Fortune freely admitted that he had had three 7 ounce bottles of beer that day between about 2 and 3:30 p.m. which was after he had had his lunch 2a The next day, July 1, when Fortune reported for work his timecard was missing so he went to the production office and asked Buchacz where his timecard was. Buchacz told Fortune that he had some bad news for him and handed Fortune an envelope. Fortune opened the envelope and found a letter inside. The letter (Gen- eral Counsel's Exhibit 5) notified Fortune that he was terminated "for reporting to work under the influence of alcohol on June 30, 1965," and was signed by Buchacz. After Fortune read the letter, he asked for his money, and Buchacz handed him his check. Buchacz said that he was sorry to see Fortune go, and that he liked For- tune's work, but "it wasn't up to him it was up from the the higher office." Fortune said that he had to go clean out his locker and left. Admittedly, Buchacz did not talk, to Foreman Langhi prior to discharging Fortune 21 Marvin Wojnicki is general foreman in charge of production on the first shift and has been since February. Prior to that time, Wojnicki was in charge of production 38 The foregoing two sentences are based on the credited testimony of Langhi as given on ,cross-examination I reject Langhi's testimony, however, denying in effect Fortune's testi- mony that Langhi had told him that O'Neill had said he was drunk. I note Langhi's testi- mony that he told Fortune that he had not even talked to O'Neill or Wojnicki. Since O'Neill and Wojnicki both testified to a conversation between them and Langhi, and O'Neill specifically testified that he told Wojnicki and Langhi that he thought Fortune was drunk, It is probable that Langht did refer to O'Neill having said that Fortune was drunk. 10 The foregoing sentence is based on the credited testimony of Ann Rench. 21 The bartender,' William Weir, who sold Fortune this beer, credibly testified that Fortune had three or four small bottles of beer that day: Weir recalled the incident be- cause Fortune told him that be had been fired that day. 81 The foregoing is based on Fortune's testimony except as otherwise indicated. Buchacz at first testified that being under the influence of alcohol was the only reason he gave Fortune for terminating him, then Buchacz stated that he had spoken too freely, and said that he had also told 'Fortune that they were terminating him because of his previous record and the incidents that had occurred in the past. If this were so, I believe these reasons would have appeared in the termination letter. (General Counsel's Exhibit 5 supra. ) In addition, I believe Buchacz would have referred to reasons other than in- toxication when he told O'Neill why he intended to discharge Fortune. But Buchacz spe- cifically testified that he told O'Neill that he "had decided to terminate Mr. Fortune for being under the influence of alcohol again." And O'Neill himself testified specifically that intoxication was the only reason Buchacz gave him for the discharge. To the extent that O'Neill's later somewhat vague testimony that Buchacz told him that "under the condi- tions of the previous afternoon and other instances, that he was discharging Charles Fortune" might be regarded as contradictory of his earlier specific testimony, it is rejected. Moreover, Fortune's testimony had the ring of truth whereas I was not similarly impressed with the testimony of Buchacz Therefore I have credited the testimony of Fortune, and rejected that of Buchacz including his denial that he told Fortune that he was sorry to see him go, but that it was not up to him but to "higher office " 1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on the second shift. On Wednesday, June 30, Wojnicki first saw Fortune shortly before 4 p.m. as he walked by the production office. Fortune's face was flushed and it seemed to Wojnicki that Fortune's gait was "slightly impaired" as if he was trying to keep his balance. Wojnicki got up and followed Fortune to the locker room. Wojnicki next saw Fortune in the cafeteria holding a cup of coffee in his hand which Wojnicki described as "visibly shaking." At this time Wojnicki spoke to For- tune who did not respond. The shift started work at 4 p.m. and Wojnicki went out and stood behind Fortune's machine and watched Fortune. As Wojnicki described the scene, Fortune was fumbling with the switches and dropping parts on the floor. There are four switches involved in activating parts of the machine, and these switches have to, be activated in a particular sequence. Fortune was having a hard time finding the right switch to start the machine, however, he finally did get the machine going. Wojnicki went back into the production office where Langhi was present and O'Neill soon appeared in the office. O'Neill said that he had heard that Fortune was "in the plant intoxicated." Wojnicki stated that he thought so too.22 Earlier that day, one of the employees in quality control testing, Margaret How- ard, went to O'Neill and told him that Fortune was drunk. O'Neill then looked and saw Fortune coming down the aisle skipping and waving his hands. O'Neill then went directly to the production office where Wojnicki and Langhi were present. O'Neill told Wojnicki that he would like for them to "check out". Fortune "because it appears that he was drunk." 23 Wojnicki then told Langhi to go out ^ and speak with Fortune and to observe him,, and "if in his opinion he was intoxicated, that he should send him home." Later Wojnicki saw Langhi who told Wojnicki that in his opinion Fortune was intoxicated and "he was sending him home." Thereafter, Woj- nicki saw Fortune coming out of the locker room and as Fortune walked by, he said, "You're wrong again, Marv." Later, Wojnicki and Langhi had a conversation with O'Neill in which they told O'Neill what their opinions were and Langhi said that he had sent Fortune home 24 We turn now to the testimony of Buchacz who, as Wojnicki stated, made the deci- sion to discharge Fortune. Buchacz testified that he left the plant to go to a funeral on June 30 about noon, and did not return that day. The next morning, Buchacz testified that he had,a conversation with Wojnicki. Wojnicki said that Fortune had reported to work under the influence of alcohol. Buchacz asked what happened and Wojnicki said that they had sent Fortune home. Then Buchacz stated that he told Wojnicki that he would look into the matter. Wojnicki then told Buchacz the names of several people who had seen Fortune the day before. According to Buchacz, he talked to these people about whether they had seen Fortune under the influence of alcohol, and when they answered in the affirmative took statements from them to rr The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Wojnicki. 43 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of O'Neill. u The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Wojnicki . I reject, however, Wojnicki's testimony that he told O'Neill that he thought Fortune was intoxicated and that in his opinion Fortune should be fired. This testimony is inconsistent with other testimony of Wojnicki that he told Langhi to check Fortune and If Fortune was drunk to send him home and that he later saw Langhi who advised that Fortune was intoxicated and that he was sending him home. Wojnicki testified that he told Langhi to send Fortune home because he thought this was the thing to do. I note that O'Neill testified that either Wojnicki or Langhi had the authority to send an employee home or take whatever action was necessary to handle this situation . If Wojnicki thought Fortune should have been fired for being drunk, it seems that he would have instructed Langhi to fire Fortune if he was drunk when he gave Langhi the instructions to check Fortune out. Or at least when Langhi, after checking, said that he was sending Fortune home, Wojnicki would have told him at that point that he should fire Fortune . But Wojnicki did not do so. I consider it significant that Wojnicki after observing Fortune operating the machine at the start of the shift took no action to stop him. Surely if Wojnicki thought the situation serious enough to require the discharge of Fortune, he would at the very least have stopped Fortune from operating the machine . In addition, Wojnicki was an unimpressive witness and gave contradictory testimony on cross -examination . For example, Wojnicki testified that he told the Board agent taking his affidavit about certain telephone conversations with Fortune. Later in his testimony he stated there was no discussion with the Board agent at all about telephone conversations with Fortune. In view of Wojnicki's authority, Langhi's authority, and all the circumstances, I cannot accept Wojnicki's testimony that be told O'Neill that Fortune should be fired. Likewise I reject Wojnicki's testimony that he told Buchacz on July 1 that Fortune should be fired. I note that Buchacz in his testimony about this conversation does not refer to Wojnicki making such a statement. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1071 that effect. Prior to talking with these people, Buchacz talked with Rae Irvin, who had custody of personnel records, and asked her if there were any records in For- tune's file that would indicate that he had received written warnings about coming to work under the influence of alcohol25 and was advised that there were. Buchacz did not examine these records himself. General Counsel's Exhibit 11(a) dated March 13, 1964, is a speed letter from Jerry Shipley to Fortune which reads as follows: "Reporting for work in a physical condition which makes you unsuitable and unsafe for the performance of your normal duties will not be tolerated. This is a first warning notice." It is clear, and I find, that this notice related to Fortune hav- ing reported to work under the influence of alcohol. Then, according to Buchacz, he decided to discharge Fortune. Next he talked to O'Neill and told him that he had decided to fire Fortune for being under the influence of alcohol again.26 That after- noon, Buchacz told Fortune that they were terminating him because he was under the influence of alcohol. Buchacz stated that he told Fortune on this occasion that he had nothing against Fortune personally and that he was a good worker. Buchacz also testified that a few weeks after he was employed by Respondent on March 22, on a Monday morning, Wojnicki came to him and advised that Fortune had telephoned him and used vile, lewd language and had threatened him 27 Buch- acz told Wojnicki that he would look into the situation and take care of it. Buchacz then called Fortune and two other employees into his office, and told them that the Company would not tolerate anybody calling supervisors and insulting and threat- ening them and using vile language. When he got through, Fortune admitted that he was the one who did the calling. Buchacz then suggested to Fortune that he go to Wojnicki and apologize. A short time later, Wojnicki advised Buchacz that For- tune had apologized, and Buchacz said that was "fine" and as far as he was con- cerned the incident was closed and forgotten.28 2. Analysis and conclusions To summarize the facts as found above, Fortune was a good worker which even the supervisors involved in the events of June 30 and July 1 admit, and Fortune had had several years experience working for Respondent. Fortune was also very active on behalf of the Union, openly working on its behalf by activities such as passing out union leaflets, serving on the organizing committee and as a union ob- server at the election. Fortune was interrogated several times about his union activities by Foreman Shipley, who indicated a lively interest in and opposition to the Union during these conversations. Respondent showed its opposition to the Union in other ways also. For example, as found herein, the Respondent illegally assisted and sup- ported the Committee in order to defeat the Union, and the free insurance program was illegally instituted by Respondent in order to defeat the Union. On June 22 the Union lost a Board-conducted election and the next day that Fortune worked he had a conversation with Buchacz in which Buchacz indicated his opposition to the Union and Fortune indicated he was going to continue his efforts on behalf of the Union. On June 30, the certificate of results of the election was issued. The next day Fortune was discharged. Let us examine the events preceding the discharge. On June 30, Fortune reported for work under circumstances which establish that he was under the influence of alcohol,29 and it is quite clear from the record that Fortune was sent home on June 30 for being under the influence of alcohol. Thus, for example, Administrator 26 It seems odd that Buchacz framed the question that way since he testified that he talked with Shipley in early April about Fortune and stated that Shipley told him then that Fortune had come to work under the influence of alcohol on several occasions, and that he had written a warning notice to Fortune in that regard. 25 O'Neill testified as noted above that Buchacz told him that he was going to discharge Fortune for being intoxicated, and that was the only reason Buchacz gave him for the discharge. -' - N Wojnicki testified that there were three telephone calls from Fortune and Fortune testified that there was only one telephone call. In view of the fact that I do not consider the telephone calls to have been a factor in the discharge of Fortune, I find it unnecessary to resolve this question. 28 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Buchacz. 20 I do not pass on the question of whether Fortune was intoxicated ; that is, in any event, a subjective matter determined by varying standards as far as most of us are concerned. Of course, medical definitions do exist but I do not think Respondent sought to determine what they were, nor do I. 1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD O'Neill upon being informed that Fortune was "drunk" instructed Wojnicki to check this out. Wojnicki then told Langhi to investigate it and if Fortune was "drunk" to -send him home. After Langhi sent Fortune home for being under the influence of alcohol, Wojnicki informed O'Neill of what had been done. As Neill testified, both Wojnicki and Langhi had had the authority to handle the situation as they thought best. It is clear that these supervisors who were responsible for operation of that shift made their decision as to the appropriate step to be taken which was to send Fortune home. Langhi even informed Fortune that he was not being dis- charged and that the incident would not go into his record. Therefore the question that necessarily arises is why Buchacz came in the next day and decided to dis- charge Fortune after the foregoing had occurred and had been handled by responsi- ble supervisors on the scene and had been tacitly approved by Administrator O'Neill. I have found that Wojnicki, although reporting what had happened to Buchacz, did -not recommend further action. Buchacz, on his own, instituted an "investigation" of a matter already handled and closed as far as the supervisors were concerned. It seems very improbable under these circumstances that Buchacz would reopen the incident. I note also the speed with which Buchacz acted actually "investigating" the matter and effectuating the discharge without even checking with Fortune's immediate supervisor, Langhi, for his, recommendation. I have also found, above, that the only reason given Fortune by Buchacz either verbally or in writing for his discharge was, as stated in the discharge letter, "for reporting to work under the influence of alcohol on June 30, 1965." I reject as afterthoughts the other reasons now urged by Respondent for the discharge. I consider it significant also that For- tune was precipitantly discharged without warning and that Respondent had no pol- icy calling for discharge under these circumstances. Under all the circumstances, including Fortune's leading role in the union activities which was known to Respond- ent, Respondent's hostility and opposition to the advent of the Union, the fact that ,the discharge came on the heels of the Union lost election, and was effectuated by Buchacz who had personally shown his opposition to the Union in a recent conver- sation with Fortune in which conversation Fortune revealed that he would continue to work to bring the Union in, the precipitant haste in effectuating the discharge without even consulting Fortune's immediate supervisor, and finally the fact that responsible supervisors had already handled and disposed of the incident of June 30, I conclude and find that the incident of June 30 was not the real reason for For- tune's discharge but merely a pretext concealing the real reason which was his union activities 30 Accordingly, I find that Respondent by discharging Fortune for his union activities has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I also find that Respondent ,by Shipley's interrogation of Fortune about his union activities on June 18, in con- text with the other unfair labor practices found herein, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 31 D. The hospitalization issue 1. The facts The complaint, as amended, alleges in paragraph 6(d) and (e) as follows: (d) On or about April 29, 1965, E. H. Green advised the employees that, effective May 1, 1965, all employees would be covered by a hospitalization plan at no cost to the employees. (e) On or about May 1, 1965, the Respondent granted its employees free hospitalization insurance. For at least 5 or 6 years prior to 1965, employees of Respondent had paid 100 -percent of the cost of the premiums for their Blue Cross-Blue Shield insurance. Insurance programs had been a subject of discussion for several years at meetings .of the Committee with management, and the Committee wanted the Company to ao In view of the foregoing, I cannot attach the weight Respondent desires to the absence of evidence that other union adherents were discriminated against (cf. W. C. Nabors, d/b/a W. C. Nabors Company, 89 NLRB 538, 542), or to the fact that the Illinois Department .of Labor had determined that Fortune was discharged for being under the influence of -intoxicants. 'The General Counsel alleges only this incident as violative of Section 8(a)(1). The .other instances of interrogation by Shipley are not so alleged. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1073 pay for the insurance. In November 1964 Respondent was notified by Blue Cross- Blue Shield that effective in January the cost of premiums would increase by $5 or more per employee based on the type coverage the employee had. This was a 25 percent or more increase in the cost of the premiums. At that time, Mr. and Mrs. Green authorized O'Neill to investigate with other group insurance companies to .see what kind of benefits could be obtained and particularly to check out a situa- tion where the employees' premiums would be paid by Respondent 32 The death of the Company's accountant in December 1964 necessitated extra work by O'Neill and delayed the start of his investigation . Beginning in early February O'Neill met, however, with an insurance representative for Lincoln National Life Insurance Company. Discussions were had regarding insurance plans. Lincoln Life presented an insurance proposal subsequently which Respondent rejected as too costly. O'Neill then contacted Prudential Insurance Company of America and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for their proposals. Such proposals were later submitted along with a revised proposal from Lincoln Life. Respondent decided to take Lincoln Life's proposal; this decision being reached about mid-April. O'Neill then tele- phoned a representative of Lincoln Life and told him to "immediately process this through so we could put this into effect immediately." By notice dated April 29 (General Counsel's Exhibit 13), employees were advised: N O T I C E April 29, 1965 TO ALL EMPLOYEES EFFECTIVE MAY 1st 1965 ALL EMPLOYEES OF NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. WITH 3 MO SERVICE WILL BE COVERED BY A HOSPITALIZA- TION PLAN. THIS PLAN WILL COVER THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE AT NO COST TO THE EMPLOYEE. THE PLAN WILL ALSO HAVE PROVI- SIONS FOR EMPLOYEES TO INSURE THEIR DEPENDANTS AT A SMALL COST TO THE EMPLOYEE. NEXT WEEK A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INSURANCE COM- PANY WILL BE HERE AT NEWMAN-GREEN TO EXPLAIN THE PLAN TO YOU. IF -YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, WRITE THEM DOWN, AND THE INSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AS HE EXPLAINS THE PLAN TO YOU. E. H. GREEN PRESIDENT The policy was put into effect on May 1. Early in May, insurance representatives came to Respondent's plant and explained the basic details of the plan including the cost of premiums to employees on each shift. By letter dated June 18 (General Counsel's Exhibit 14), which was on the eve of the election held on June 22, E. H. Green advised employees in an antiunion letter of several benefits they had received without paying monthly dues and assessments to the Union and specifically referred to a paid health insurance policy.33 2. Analysis and conclusions It is clear from the foregoing that Respondent had known for years of the employ- ees' desire for an employer paid insurance program as expressed at various meet- ings of the Committee. Although Respondent may have decided to grant this bene- fit at some indefinite time in the future, it is clear from O'Neill's testimony that no final decision was reached to put into effect a specific insurance plan until mid- April which was after the resumption of, the Union's campaign, a fact known to Respondent. Indeed, Respondent concedes in its' brief that knowledge by the Respondent of the union campaign "is inferrable from the fact of distribution of union handbills outside the plant, which began in early April." I consider very sig- nificant the fact that Respondent utilized the granting of this benefit to seek to con- 33 O'Neill was also to check on the cost to, the Company of paying on a family insur- ance plan. 33'The foregoing 'is based on the credited testimony of O'Neill and Rench. 264-185-67-vol. 161-69 1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD vince employees in an antiunion letter on the eve of the election that they did not need a union in order to get insurance and other benefits thereby seeking to dis- suade them from voting for the Union.34 This is especially true in the circumstances of this case where the Employer was aware from discussions with the committee representatives that this insurance benefit was strongly desired by the employees, and the benefit was first announced to representatives of the Committee after the union activities started. Under these circumstances, it helps Respondent little to argue as it does in its brief that it had decided to grant this benefit before the union campaign was resumed. The Terri Lee, Inc., case, 107 NLRB 560, cited by Respondent, is distinguishable because the benefits therein were announced before the union activities started. Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by announcing and granting this insurance benefit in order to discourage the union activities of its employees.35 Moreover, even if one were to conclude that this was not Respondent's purpose in granting this benefit at this time, this conduct reasonably tended to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act, and thereby is violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.36 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec- tion with the operations of Respondent, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev- eral States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. Having found that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(2) by assisting and supporting the Committees, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, that it withdraw and withhold recognition from the Committees as representatives of its employees unless and until the Committees shall have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representatives of Respondent's employees. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Charles J. Fortune, Jr., I recommend that he be offered reinstatement and made whole for any loss of pay resulting from his discharge to the date on which he is offered reinstatement, less his net earnings during that period. Such backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest at 6 percent as provided by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 137 NLRB 716. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, the commission of similar and other unfair labor practices reasonably may be anticipated. I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Employee Suggestion Committees are labor organizations within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, by assisting and supporting the Committees, and by dis- u Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405. 15 Cf. Douglas and Lomaaon Company, 142 NLRB 320, enfd. 333 F.2d 510 (C.A. 8). 88 American Fretghtwaye Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146, 147. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. 1075 couraging membership in a labor organization through discrimination in employ- ment, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent has not violated the Act except as specifically found herein. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I recommend that Respondent Newman- Green, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating its employees concerning union activities in a manner consti- tuting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (b) Announcing or granting insurance benefits to its employees in order to dis- courage membership in or activities on behalf of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (c) Assisting or supporting the Suggestion Committees or any other labor organizations of its employees. (d) Discouraging membership in and activities on behalf of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organizations of its employees by discouraging any employee or in any other man- ner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con- dition of employment. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be effected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from the Suggestion Committee, or any successors thereto, as the exclusive bargaining representatives of its employees, unless and until said labor organizations shall have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of such employees. (b) Offer to Charles Fortune, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to his for- mer or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suf- fered as the result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Notify Charles Fortune, Jr., if he is serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to ascertain any backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (e) Post at its factory at Addison, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 37 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondent, shall, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. av In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order of the" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order of the." 1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing , within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith 38 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint , as amended, be dismissed inso- far as it alleges that the Respondent violated the Act in any way other than as found herein. ° In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from the date of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursant to the Recommended order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning union activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT announce or grant insurance benefits to our employees in order to discourage membership in or activities on behalf of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT assist or support the Suggestion Committees or any other labor organizations of our employees. WE WILL NOT recognize the Suggestion Committees or any successors, as representatives of our employees unless and until these labor organizations have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of our employees. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by discharging any of our employees or in any other manner discriminating against our employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, except to the extent permitted by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer to Charles J. Fortune, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as the result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named union or any other union, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. NEWMAN-GREEN, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered, defaced. or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone 828-7597.