Great Lakes Screw Corp.

GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 149 Great Lakes Screw Corporation and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO. Cases 13-CA-6770, 6925, 7024, 7079, and 7130. April 27, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On April 7, 1966, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that those allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and the Charging Party filed cross- exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. The General Counsel filed an answer to Respondent's exceptions, brief in support of the answer, cross-exceptions and amended cross- exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a brief in support of the amended cross-exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record in the case,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions and modifications noted below. 1. Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's actions, including the exclusion from the hearing of Respondent's counsel John D. O'Brien, demonstrated bias and prejudice that denied it due process.2 In its brief, Respondent lists rulings and credibility findings of the Trial Examiner that it considers prejudicial. These include (a) his rulings on subpenas, (b) his rulings on adverse witnesses, (c) the evidentiary rulings, (d) his rulings on objections, (e) his personal examination of witnesses, (f) his rulings on amendments to the pleadings, (g) his treatment of Respondent's counsel, (h) his rulings on posthearing motions, (i) his Decision, and (j) his rulings on Respondent's motion for disqualification. In all, Respondent contends that the entire hearing was dominated by the Trial Examiner's bias which carried over into his Decision. This contention is not supported by the record. Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner resorted to browbeating and castigation of its counsel when they attempted to argue against his granting of the General Counsel's subpena and his denial of their requests for subpenas is without foundation in the record. The Trial Examiner was fair in hearing pertinent arguments from both sides before making a decision on whether to grant or deny a requested subpena, and it is not a denial of due process that he curtailed repetitious argument. Further, Respondent's reference in its brief to the "twelve drawers of invoices, orders and the like" supposedly subpenas by General Counsel, "[n]ot a single one [of which] was thereafter referred to by the General Counsel" neglects to add that most of I As the record, exceptions, and briefs in our opinion adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties, the Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied. On May 9, 1966, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the record, to introduce into evidence the Annual Report of the Great Lakes Screw Corporation's Profit-Sharing and Retirement Plan, which Respondent submitted to the United States Department of Labor. Replies in opposition to this motion were filed by the Charging Party and the General Counsel. Respondent filed an answer to the replies, and in turn General Counsel filed a reply to Respondent's answer. Respondent's motion to reopen the record is denied since the document it wishes to introduce is not relevant to the issues involved herein. 2 On July 12, 1965, after approximately 13 days of hearing, O'Brien was excluded from the hearing by the Trial Examiner. The Trial Examiner then granted Respondent 1 week to appeal his rulings to the Board. On July 14, Respondent requested that the Board review the Trial Examiner's exclusionary order, and that it be granted permission to file a brief. The Board granted permission to file a brief on July 15. Thereafter, Respondent, on July 26, 1965, filed a brief and appendix in support of appeal from Trial Examiner's ruling excluding counsel from hearing. On July 26, General Counsel filed a brief in support of Trial Examiner's action. On October 8, 1965, the Board issued an order granting Respondent's request for special permission to appeal from the Trial Examiner's exclusionary ruling; the Board then denied the appeal on the ground that the Trial Examiner did not abuse his discretion and was acting within the scope of his authority under Section 102.35 and 102.44(a) of the Board's Rules. The hearing was resumed on October 11, 1965. On October 11, 1965, Respondent, on the basis of affidavits submitted by Respondent's counsels John D. O'Brien and Charles J. Griffin, Jr., filed a motion in which it requested that Harry R. Hinkes withdraw as Trial Examiner from the above proceedings on the ground of personal bias towards Respondent and its counsel. At the hearing, on October 12, 1965, the Trial Examiner denied Respondent's motion, ruling that the affidavits were not sufficient on their face nor were they filed with due diligence. General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner to consider whether O'Brien's conduct, which resulted in his exclusion from the hearing, amounted to misconduct before the Board of such character as to warrant suspension or disbarment. Although we find O'Brien's conduct at the hearing warrants our condemnation, we do not rind it requires suspension or disbarment. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542 (The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania), 144 NLRB 1351. 164 NLRB No. 20 150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this material, some of which went back 18 years, was not in compliance with the subpena but resulted from Respondent's unwillingness to cull the personnel records for 1965 from the boxes of "confetti." Respondent contends there was prejudicial treatment in the Trial Examiner's rulings that Olive Stone, Charlotte Klaubo, Robert Barth, and Robert Farkos could be examined by the General Counsel under Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Charlotte Klaubo was not examined by the General Counsel as an adverse witness. Further, Respondent's brief ignores the testimony in the record in which Olive Stone prior to her examination under Rule 43(b) admitted that she had refused to talk to General Counsel when he visited her home on the morning of the hearing and at the hearing stated on advice of counsel "I don't have to [testify] if I don't want to." As for Personnel Director Robert Barth and Factory Manager Robert Farkos, their management positions with Respondent qualified them for examination under Rule 43(b). Moreover, Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner erred in not allowing it to examine Ernest Donnelly, an alleged discriminatee, under Rule 43(b) is not supported by the record which indicates no refusal on the part of this witness to answer questions. Respondent contends that, in his evidentiary rulings, the Trial Examiner favored the General Counsel. Thus, Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner permitted the General Counsel to employ a leading question in examining employee Wilbourn and thereafter credited him, while similar use of a leading question by Respondent in examining Barth led to Barth's being discredited. We are uncertain as to the nature of Respondent's argument. Obviously it does not contend that the Trial Examiner, in allowing both General Counsel and Respondent freedom in the use of leading questions, was indulging in bias and prejudice. Therefore, we are left with the improbable proposition that the Trial Examiner is biased for relying in part on Barth's response to Respondent's leading question in reaching the conclusion that Barth's explanations were vacillating. A careful reading of the transcript convinces us that the Trial Examiner was liberal in his evidentiary rulings in order to expedite the hearing, that there was no favoritism to either side, and that Respondent's use of these rulings to sustain its contention of bias and prejudice is groundless. Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner erred by refusing to sustain many of Respondent's objections on the grounds that they were "unwarranted" or "overly technical." At the hearing, both General Counsel and Respondent displayed zeal and ingenuity in pursuing their cases as a result of which some objections were overly technical and superfluous. The record indicates that the Trial Examiner, in attempting to maintain an orderly hearing, criticized both General Counsel and Respondent for their unwarranted objections. Moreover, at one point in the proceedings, Respondent's counsel, in a sympathetic reply to the Trial Examiner's comment concerning the making of objections "merely because they are technically objectionable," stated, "Mr. Examiner, I agree with you, but we are faced here with very competent counsel representing the government." Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's personal examination of some of the witnesses is further evidence of bias and prejudice. There is nothing in the record to sustain this contention. Out of a total of approximately 82 witnesses called by General Counsel and Respondent, Respondent names 4 witnesses personally examined by the Trial Examiner. The examination of witnesses by the Trial Examiner was solely in the interest of clarifying specific points and does not demonstrate either bias or prejudgment of the case. Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's bias and prejudice are exemplified by his permitting General Counsel to amend the pleadings on four different occasions over the objections of Respondent while not granting Respondent permission to amend its answer, and by the Trial Examiner's rulings on Respondent's posthearing motions. Section 102.17 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, states in part that "Any ... complaint may be amended ... at the hearing ... upon motion, by the Trial Examiner designated to conduct the hearing." The record does not indicate an abuse of the Trial Examiner's discretion in his rulings on amendments. As for Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner refused to hear its motion to amend its answer, the transcript indicates that at the hearing Respondent kept vacillating and could not decide whether to amend its answer or not. Finally, the Trial Examiner asked Respondent to take a position. Respondent then withdrew its motion to amend. In sustaining the Trial Examiner's refusal to grant Respondent's motion to disqualify himself, the Board relies solely on the failure of the record to sustain the objections contained in the affidavits on which the motion was based. Even assuming that the Trial Examiner erred in some of his rulings, such errors do not necessarily require setting aside the Trial Examiner's Decision. In deciding whether a fair hearing was held or whether the Trial Examiner's rulings were so prejudicial that there was a denial of due process, the Board has adopted as its criterion Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part "no error or defect in any ruling or order of the court is ground for setting aside a verdict ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 151 inconsistent with substantial justice."3 Hence, Respondent must show that the Trial Examiner's rulings were prejudicial to its substantive rights.4 This Respondent has not done. 2. We affirm the 8(a)(1) findings of the Trial Examiner and, in addition, are in agreement with the General Counsel's exceptions that the following acts of Respondent constituted violations of Section 8(a)(1): (a) The statement by Plant Manager Farkos to employee Chapman that "if the Union did come in Farkos would be a negotiator and it would be a year, or two before a contract would be signed." (b) Farkos' statement to employee Rentner "to tell Lundberg to take the badge off and he would get two men on his shift like they had on the night shift." (c) The response by Foreman Gerdzas on being reminded by employee Story that only 2 weeks earlier Gerdzas had praised Story's work, "Yes, but under the circumstances we have got to review this all again." 3. We find, in agreement with the General Counsel, in view of the massive and deliberate unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent, that the conventional reinstatement, backpay, and posting of notice requirements for 8(a)(3) and (1) violations are not completely adequate to undo the effect that these violations had upon Respondent's employees.' Thus, we have found that Respondent committed 21 violations of Section 8(a)(3) among which were the unlawful mass discharge of 37 employees and the transfer of 13 employees; that it committed 35 violations of Section 8(a)(1) including illegal threats, interrogations, and acts of surveillance; and, in addition, committed violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (4). Accordingly, we shall require that Respondent, in addition to posting the notice to employees attached hereto at all places where notices to employees are customarily placed, shall mail copies thereof, after it has been signed by Respondent's representative, to each of its employees. We shall also require Respondent upon the request of- the Union to give the Union and its representatives reasonable access, for a period of 1 year beginning with the issuance date of this Decision, to its bulletin boards and other places where notices to employees are customarily placed. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Great Lakes Screw Corporation, Riverdale, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified: 1. Delete paragraph 2(f). Renumber paragraph 2(g) as new paragraph 2(h). Add the following paragraphs 2(f) and 2(g). "(f) Copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix," to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13, shall be signed by a representative of the Respondent. Thereafter, a copy shall be mailed by the Respondent to each of its employees, and additional copies shall be posted by it and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material." "(g) Upon request of the Union, immediately grant the Union and its representatives reasonable access, for a 1-year period beginning with the issuance date of this Decision, to its bulletin boards and all places where notices to employees are customarily posted." 2. Add the following, after the Armed Services notification paragraph of the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision: WE WILL grant the Union and its representatives reasonable access for a 1-year period to our bulletin boards and all places where notices to our employees are customarily posted. 3 Rule 61 of the FRCP, in full, reads as follows No error in either admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defeat in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defeat in the proceeding which does not affect substantial rights of the parties 4 Spector Freight System , Inc, 141 NLRB 1110 Crown Corrugated Container, Inc , 123 NLRB 318 5 H W Elson Bottling Company, 155 NLRB 714 J. P Stevens and Co., Inc, 157 NLRB 869, and 163 NLRB 217 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, on November 3, 1964, filed the original charge in Case 13-CA-6770 against Great Lakes Screw Corporation, hereinafter called the Employer, Company, or Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. This charge was amended on December 11, 1964. On February 2, 1965, Respondent, the Union, and the Regional Director for Region 13 entered into an informal settlement agreement wherein in consideration for the withdrawal of the charges in that case Respondent promised not to interrogate its employees, threaten them with plant closure or reduction of wages or hours of work, withhold or threaten to withhold merit increases, require them to request return of their union cards, grant wage increases, discharge or threaten to discharge them, or in 152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce them. Further, in settlement of 8(a)(3) charges, Respondent agreed to reinstate, with backpay, employees Witkowski and Nelson. Less than 4 weeks later, on February 28, the original charge in Case 13-CA-6925 was filed and amended thereafter on March 29, April 5 and 28, and May 11, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of the Act. Thereupon, on May 11, the Regional Director for Region 13 withdrew his approval of the settlement agreement with the exception of the 8(a)(3) remedy. On May 14, 1965, the complaint was issued. The original charge in Case 13-CA-7024 was filed on May 14, 1965. Additional charges in Cases 13-CA-7079 and 13-CA-7130 were filed on June 23, 1965, and August 13, 1965, respectively. The complaint of May 14, 1965, was amended on May 26, 1965, and further amended during the hearing by certain additions. Respondent made its answer to the complaint on June 9, 1965, and also at the hearing. These answers admitted the timely filing and service of the charges, jurisdiction, labor organization status of the Union, and supervisory status of Robert Crawford, Jennings Crawford, Ford, Pavlov, Insalata, Gerdzas, Erickson, Norman, Pozniak, and Paravich. Respondent further admitted by its formal answer and by the statement of counsel during the hearing that during the last 3 months of 1964 it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: 1. Threatening its employees with loss of employment and wages through discriminatory application of plant rules and other reprisals. 2. Interrogating its employees. 3. Creating the impression that it kept under surveillance the union activities of its employees and the Union. 4. Soliciting and inducing employees to revoke their union authorizations. 5. Soliciting and inducing employees to refrain from wearing union buttons. 6. Instructing its employees to refrain from attending union meetings. 7. Soliciting individual grievances from its employees and promising to resolve these to employee's benefit. 8. Offering, promising, and granting its employees wage increases and other benefits or improvements in their terms and conditions of employment. 9. Keeping under surveillance the meeting places, meetings, and activities of the Union and the union and concerted activities of its employees. 10. Restricting the movement of its employees. 11. Prohibiting employees from communicating with other persons in the plant. 12. Warning employees that attempts to bargain through the Union would be futile. Respondent further admits the execution of the settlement agreement; the transfer (while denying the discriminatory nature thereof) of employees Wilbourn, Day, Story, Tulk, Guindon, Faron, Morris, Rito, Reynolds, Fuqua, Older, Terry, and Whatley to other departments or shifts in March 1965: the discharge (while denying the discriminatory nature thereof), of employees Smith, Story, Chapman, and Wilbourn; and the mass discharge (while denying the discriminatory nature thereof) on March 29, 1965, of the 37 dischargees named in the complaint. Respondent denies the supervisory and agency status of Gowran, Stone, and Rapley; the threat by Norman on December 6, 1964; the 8(a)(1) acts of Jennings Crawford on or about December 15, 1964; the labor organization status of, and the allegations concerning, the Employee Advisory Committee; the alleged pre- and post-settlement violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act; the alleged postsettlement violations of Section 8(a)(1); the discharge of employees Rentner, Casas, and Tulk; the suspension of employees Sebolt and Day; the layoff of employee McNanna; the obstruction of the Board hearing by publishing a plant rule penalizing witnesses and by the destruction of employee records and their replacement with manufactured ones; and the discharge of Supervisor Mann. Respondent further denies knowledge concerning the allegation that its alleged agent Stone attempted to alter or destroy certain records in violation of Section 8(a)(1). I cannot agree with Respondent that it has not violated the settlement agreement by its conduct after February 2, 1965. The findings below detail such violations. Accordingly, I must consider both the presettlement and postsettlement conduct of the Respondent in arriving at a determination whether the allegations of the consolidated complaint have been sustained. Larrance Tank Corporation, 94 NLRB 352; Northern California District Council of Hodcarriers, 154 NLRB 1384. The unfair labor practices of the Respondent discussed below are set forth in approximate chronological order. On the issues thus joined hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois, during much of June, July, and October, 1965. All parties (except the Party of Interest) were represented and afforded full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and make oral argument. The hearing was interrupted between July and October. When the hearing resumed in October a motion to disqualify the Trial Examiner was filed, accompanied by affidavits, alleging certain behavior on the part of the Trial Examiner indicating bias and prejudice. Section 102.37 of the Rules and Regulations of NLRB requires the Trial Examiner to disqualify himself "if, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, such affidavit is filed with due diligence and is sufficient on its face." Upon being questioned by me, counsel for the Respondent advised me that I was not required to accept as a fact whatever was recited in the affidavit. I then stated I had found at least one gross distortion of fact in the motion. After examining the allegations of that motion and the requirements of Section 102.37 of the Rules, I ruled that the affidavits were not sufficient on their face nor were they filed with due diligence and denied the motion to disqualify. At the conclusion of the hearing the parties were invited to file briefs and proposed findings and the maximum time was allowed them for this purpose in view of the length of the hearing and the complexity of the issues. Nevertheless, only the General Counsel has submitted a brief. The following findings of fact are based upon my study of the extensive record in this proceeding, my close observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and an examination of the only brief submitted for my guidance.' ' Following a motion to correct the transcript filed by some of the corrections proposed by Respondent, rejecting Respondent, I issued an order correcting the transcript, adopting others, and adding some not proposed by the parties. FINDINGS OF FACT GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Great Lakes Screw Corporation is, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Illinois. At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained a plant and place of business at 13631 South Halsted Street, Riverdale, Illinois, and has been at all times material herein engaged at its place of business in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of screws and related products. During the calendar year 1964 in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent manufactured, sold, and distributed products the gross value of which exceeded $500,000. During the same period of time it manufactured, sold, and distributed products valued in excess of $50,000, which products were shipped from its plant directly to States of the United States other than the State of Illinois. The complaint charges, the Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is now, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Boilermakers , Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, is now, and at all times material herein has been , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The complaint alleges that the Employee Advisory Committee is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent' s answer denies this allegation. An Employee Grievance Committee was formed in 1958. It was disbanded shortly after 1959 and resumed in 1962. Subsequent to December 1964, the Committee was renamed the Employee Advisory Committee. Meetings were held by the Committee once a month on average. Minutes of some of the meetings were received in evidence . Management representatives explained that meetings of the Committee are "used as an exchange of ideas. The meeting can best be used as an effective means of communication between employer-employee." Procedures devised by the Respondent specifically provide "Grievances of a general or group nature will be aired at the monthly meetings attended by the elected employee representatives and representatives of management." Among other things, the minutes show discussions of the employees' parking lot and its improvement , plans to improve the supply of hot water in the locker room, plans to revise employees ' vacation schedules , discussions of the amount of vacation pay, and cost-of-living pay increases and differences in hourly rates of pay in different departments , installation of additional drinking fountains for employees , and similar matters. Factory Manager Farkos testified that the workload study made in the shaver department was in response to a complaint from a committee representative. I conclude that the function of the Committee was to deal with management concerning grievances, labor disputes , wages, and conditions of work and find that the Employee Advisory Committee is, and all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act . (Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 NLRB 993, enfd . 305 F .2d 807 (C.A. 7).) III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Presettlement Activity 1. The motel incident 153 The Union began its organizational campaign in October 1964 by handbilling Respondent's plant. Respondent reacted by admittedly prohibiting union supporters from communicating with other persons, instructing its employees to refrain from attending union meetings, soliciting employees to revoke their union authorizations, threatening its employees with loss of employment and other reprisals for supporting the Union, and creating the impression that union meetings and other concerted activities of its employees were being kept under surveillance. The Union, nevertheless, called an employee meeting for October 25 at the Town and Country Motel. Employee Olive Stone, whose duties include the authority to make reservations for company personnel, made a company reservation at the motel for that date at the request of Personnel Director Travis. Although this coincidence of the union meeting with Stone's reservation for Personnel Director Travis would appear to be of no significance, this conclusion is negated by subsequent events. Respondent admits surveillance of this union meeting. The credible testimony of the manager of the motel reveals that Travis was registered at the motel on October 25. On the next day, October 26, 1964, Stone asked the motel manager to change the name of Travis' registration or destroy it. This the manager refused to do. Obviously, Respondent was seeking to destroy evidence that its agent was at the motel on the day of the union meeting. Such evidence would be important in a charge of unlawful surveillance and its destruction an impediment to the Board's investigation of the charge. To that extent, therefore, the attempted destruction of the registration was an interference with the right of employees to a fair appraisal of any charge of unfair labor practices by destroying evidence which would be instrumental to an order preventing unlawful surveillance by the Respondent. (Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 NLRB 611, 627, 630; Certain- Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB 1517; Duralite Co., Inc., 128 NLRB 648.) Although Respondent denies any knowledge of Stone's acts as well as her status as agent of the Respondent, the record shows that she was the employee whose functions included getting reservations for company officials and that she had done so both before and after October 25, 1964. There was no apparent limitation upon her authority as a reservation clerk. Although the record permits an inference of her actual authority to request a change in Respondent's registration at the motel, no such finding is required here or under the Act. Under the ordinary common law rules of agency, her apparent authority to so act was sufficient to bind the Respondent and I so find. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 237 F.2d 545 (C.A.D.C.). Respondent also seeks dismissal of this allegation of the complaint because of a variance between it and the evidence adduced. The attempted destruction of the motel record occurred October 26, 1964; the original charge in this proceeding was filed in November 1964. The complaint alleges that Stone attempted to interfere with an investigation conducted by the Board by attempting to destroy the motel record. Respondent argues that since no Board investigation had begun on October 26, Stone's 154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD attempt to destroy the records could not have interfered with any conducted Board investigation. I do not agree. The destruction of a record may, and in this case, would have interfered with the future Board investigation of a charge of unlawful surveillance. The fact that the investigation had not yet been conducted by the Board is not material. The issue was completely litigated and Respondent given all the time requested to present its defense to the evidence adduced on the issue. Southwestern of Dallas Optical Company, 153 NLRB 33. 2. Admitted 8(a)(1) violations Respondent's unfair labor practices intensified in November 1964. Admittedly, Foreman Norman threatened the employees with loss of employment and wages, discriminatory application of plant rules and other reprisals if they gave support to the Union; he also created the impression that Respondent kept under surveillance the union meetings or other concerted activities of the employees, and interrogated the employees concerning their union membership. Company President Robert Crawford, admittedly, also interrogated employees similarly. Nevertheless, some of Respondent's employees began wearing union buttons early in December whereupon Respondent's unfair labor practices multiplied. Respondent admits that during December 1964: 1. Company President Crawford, Factory Manager Farkos, and Superintendent Pavlov threatened the employees with loss of employment and wages, discriminatory application of plant rules, and other reprisals if they gave assistance or support to the Union or engaged in other concerted activities. 2. Plant Manager Farkos, Superintendent Pavlov, and Foremen Norman and Paravich interrogated employees concerning their union membership, activities, and desires. 3. President Crawford and Factory Manager Farkos solicited and induced employees to revoke their authorizations of the Union. 4. President Crawford, Factory Manager Farkos, and Superintendent Pavlov solicited and induced employees to refrain from wearing union buttons. 5. Factory Manager Farkos, Superintendent Pavlov, and Norman solicited individual grievances from employees and promised to resolve the grievances to employees' benefit if they refrained from becoming or remaining members of the Union or giving assistance or support to the Union. 6. President Crawford, Factory Manager Farkos, Superintendent Pavlov, and Norman offered, promised, and granted employees wage increases and other benefits or improvements in their terms and conditions of employment in order to induce them to refrain from becoming union members or giving any assistance or support to it. 7. Factory Manager Farkos and Foreman Norman restricted the movement of the employees because they gave assistance or support to the Union or in order to induce them to refrain from giving assistance or support to the Union. 8. Factory Manager Farkos prohibited employees from communicating with other persons in the plant because the restricted employees gave assistance or support to the Union. 9. President Crawford and Superintendent Pavlov warned employees that attempts to bargain through the Union would be futile. All the foregoing presettlement behavior was not only admitted by Respondent but conceded by it as well to constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Other presettlement violations a. Jennings Crawford There were other presettlement actions of the Respondent which I find to have been in violation of the Act. During the week following Thanksgiving 1964, employee Gary Corder received a telephone call at his home from Jennings Crawford, Respondent's executive vice president. After identifying himself, Crawford asked Corder if he knew who were involved with the Union; if he, Crawford, could keep in touch with him; that he would keep in touch with Corder; and hoped that he could rely on Corder. Corder testified that one Allen Hanson had called him previously, asking if Corder knew anything about the Union and whether Jennings Crawford could call Corder. Jennings Crawford, however, testified that Hanson told him that Corder wanted to talk to one of the Crawfords and that he called Corder in response. According to Jennings Crawford, Corder was not at home at the time, so Jennings told Mrs. Corder to have Gary call his telephone number and Gary returned the call later. Respondent did not put Hanson on the stand to corroborate Jennings Crawford's statement that Corder wanted to talk to one of the Crawfords. Instead Respondent called Mrs. Hanson who testified that she told Jennings Crawford that Corder wanted to talk to him. In a prehearing affidavit, however, Mrs. Hanson had stated, "I don't remember him [Corder] asking me to have Mr. Crawford call him or get in touch with him." With such contradiction I cannot credit Mrs. Hanson's testimony. Mrs. Corder also testified. She stated that she had never taken a telephone number from Crawford and given it to her husband. I find Mrs. Corder's testimony to be credible and persuasive and corroborative of Gary Corder's testimony. Corder's testimony is also impressive because he was employed by the Respondent at the time of the hearing and would be disinclined to jeopardize his continued employment with the Respondent by falsehood, particularly since he has paid no money or dues to the Union at any time. I therefore credit the testimony of Gary Corder rather than that of Jennings Crawford, and find that Respondent unlawfully interrogated Corder, created the impression that it was about to engage in unlawful surveillance, and solicited the employee to engage in such surveillance, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent seeks dismissal of this allegation of the complaint on the ground of variance between the pleadings and the proof. The complaint alleges that Jennings Crawford interfered with Respondent's employees' rights at an employee's home. The evidence proves such interference by a telephone conversation between Corder at his home and Jennings Crawford. I find this difference between the complaint and proof to be indistinguishable and, accordingly, reject this argument of the Respondent. b. Billy Spray Employee Billy Spray began wearing a union button shortly before December 8, 1964. On December 8, GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. Foreman Norman asked Spray why he was wearing the button. Several days later Norman told Spray he would have to stay in his own department as long as he was wearing the union button. He also said that when Spray was wearing the union button in other departments he was soliciting votes. When Spray denied soliciting votes on company time, Norman replied, "As long as you are wearing this union button you are soliciting union votes. You are more or less a representative of the Union." Later that month Spray was called into Farkos' office. Personnel Director Travis was also present as well as employee Maurice Chapman. Farkos wanted to know why Chapman and Spray were wearing union buttons, and he told them that President Crawford did not need Great Lakes Screw, that he had other interests and was a wealthy man. On several different occasions when Spray visited Farkos' office, Farkos questioned Spray's reason for wearing the union button and not pulling it off. On one occasion in December 1964, Spray was using a telephone on company property, something which he had done frequently in the past and concerning which no comments, rules, or prohibitions had been voiced. Shortly after starting the telephone conversation, Spray was approached by Foreman Norman who accused Spray of being on the telephone too long. Angry at this criticism, Spray went to Farkos and complained of Norman's "riding" him. Spray asked Farkos if he wanted him to quit. To which Farkos replied, "I would rather see you reform than quit. I would rather see you pull that button off than to see you quit." Since there was no criticism of Norman's behavior, the fair inference from Farkos' language is that the complained of treatment would continue unless Spray took off his button. It should be noted at this point that the Respondent has admitted Farkos was inducing employees to refrain from wearing union buttons in December 1964 in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Spray obtained his union card from employee Phelps who was discharged by the Respondent on December 11, 1964. On learning of Phelps' discharge, Spray went to Farkos' office and offered to pull his union button off if Farkos gave Phelps his job back. On the following Monday, Spray went back to Farkos and repeated his offer. Farkos then telephoned Phelps' home, stating that Spray had convinced him to give Phelps another chance and asking Phelps to come in. Spray then removed his button. The climate then changed rather dramatically for Spray. When Spray went to the same telephone to call the same party that he had called when Norman had reprimanded him, Farkos, seeing him, invited him to use Farkos' telephone. Although Spray had told Farkos previously that he had a "personal gripe" because he had not received all of the 10-cent raise but only 5 cents of it, a payroll change notice was put through on December 22 (after Spray had removed his union button), not only giving Spray the 5-cent increase but making it retroactive to the previous June 1. I find this retroactive pay increase the result of Spray's removal of the union button and a violation of Section 8(a)(3). Norman's contradiction of Spray's testimony was unconvincing. He first denied questioning Spray about wearing a union button but later admitted asking him why he put it on. He was in some doubt as to dates of his visits with Spray. With respect to restricting Spray's movement when he wore the union button, Norman first denied such restriction, admitting only that he told Spray to spend more time at his machine. Later he stated that he 155 requested Spray to stay by his machine. Norman also testified that this instruction was given to Spray in mid- November, although, according to Norman, Spray's alleged absences from his machine did not start until early December. Farkos' version of his conversations with Spray are similarly unpersuasive. For the reasons discussed later, I have placed little reliance upon the testimony of Factory Manager Farkos. Farkos testified that when Spray offered to remove his button if Phelps was reinstated, Farkos replied, "No, I don't make deals." It should be noted, however, that when Farkos testified about another employee (Rentner), he said, "I listened to his complaint on that merit increase. I said-I will make a deal with you." Farkos claimed that Spray asked to speak to President Crawford who later instructed Farkos to reinstate Phelps. Crawford, however, was not asked about this incident. Considering the credibility of Respondent's witnesses and the demeanor of employee Spray, I am convinced that the only credible version of the Spray story is the one given by Spray and not the ones given by Respondent's witnesses who contradicted themselves and for whom corroboration, though available, was not forthcoming. c. Earl Casas and Ernie Donnelly Ernie Donnelly was hired by the Respondent in February 1964 and engaged in union activity in November 1964 soliciting union authorization cards. On November 18, 1964, Foreman Norman called Donnelly to the office and told him "I was informed that you are pushing the Union...." "I am here to change your way of thinking if you are...." "For instance, if they gave you a dime raise , you would have to pay it all out in dues, the Company would cut down to maybe 8 hours a day instead of 9, you would lose your Saturday overtime, so what do you gain? Nothing." I find these remarks by Norman to Donnelly to be contrary to Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that they created the impression of surveillance and threatened loss of wages as alleged in the complaint and admitted by Respondent's answer. Employee Earl Casas was hired in March 1964. He began as a helper and was quickly promoted to setup trainee. He received two pay increases and was praised by two foremen. He began wearing a union button around mid-November 1964. Later the same month , he had a conversation with Norman, his foreman. Norman told him that employee Spray had been pushing union buttons and that Donnelly, who was Casas' operator, would not get far as long as he had anything to do with the Union. He also asked Casas why he was for the Union. Norman testified that he did not engage in such conduct. Respondent's answer, however, admits Norman's unlawful interrogation of employees in November 1964 as well as illegal surveillance by him at that time and I so find. On December 9, 1964, Casas punched in at 7 a.m., his starting time, and went to change clothes. Upon leaving the locker room, he met a foreman who offered to buy him a cup of coffee. He then headed for his machines where he saw Norman standing. Norman asked him why his machines were not running and when Casas replied that he thought the helper was supposed to start the machines, the foreman swore at him. Casas, angered, responded in kind, whereupon the plant electrician, passing by, advised Casas not to talk to a foreman that way and Casas went to work. An hour or an hour and a half later, Norman told 156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Casas he was wanted in the front office where he found Travis and Farkos. Farkos asked Norman what had happened and Norman said Casas had cursed him. Farkos then told Casas, "We are going to have to let you go." Casas offered to apologize in front of the whole plant to keep his job but Farkos was unrelenting. Norman testified that Casas used the obscenity, not he, but admitted that he did not become disturbed by it. The use of such language in the plant is a common occurrence and Casas and Norman had used such language in their conversations with each other when they were coworkers. Moreover, Arlene Casas, Earl's mother, also employed by the Respondent, spoke to President Crawford on the same day about her son's discharge. Crawford conceded that Norman had cursed first but went on to ask her if Earl wore a union button, saying that he did not allow the boys to wear union buttons in the plant and showed her a collection of union buttons which he said he had taken from the boys in the plant. The Respondent's discharge of Earl Casas for the alleged obscenity without any prior warning, in disregard of the offer to apologize, and irrespective of the general use of such language in the plant and particularly between Norman and Casas, added to Crawford's explanation given to Earl's mother, whose testimony is credited in this respect, makes it obvious that Earl's obscenity was only a pretextual cause for his discharge. Of real and immediate concern to the Respondent was Earl's union membership and activity. This conclusion is fortified by the Respondent's admission that at this time it was soliciting its employees to refrain from wearing the Union's buttons. I find, therefore, that the discharge of Earl Casas was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in that it was discriminatorily aimed at discouraging membership in the Union. d. Maurice Chapman Employee Maurice Chapman testified about a conversation he had with Farkos in the early part of November 1964 in which Farkos said he could not understand why the employees were wearing union buttons. A few days later, Farkos told Chapman that he would not have to worry about his job if Chapman would remove the union badge. Still later, Farkos told Chapman that if the Union did come in, Farkos would be a negotiator and it would be a year or 2 before a contract would be signed. He also said that the Union had organized Kentucky Screw, another plant formerly owned by Crawford, but when the employees came to work the following Monday, the machinery had been loaded upon trailers, removed from Kentucky Screw, and moved to Great Lakes Screw. These coercive statements were denied by Farkos. It should be noted, however, that the Respondent has formally admitted that Farkos threatened the employees with loss of employment, interrogated employees concerning their union membership, induced employees to revoke their union authorizations, and solicited employees to refrain from wearing the Union's buttons, all in December 1964. I credit the testimony of Chapman in any event rather than the testimony of Farkos which I have found unreliable, as discussed later. Chapman also had a conversation with Farkos about a merit raise. Farkos told Chapman in mid-November that Chapman had a merit raise coming but did not know whether to give it to him because Chapman had worn a union button. Respondent's knowledge of Chapman's union interests is corroborated by Chester Mann, a former foreman. He testified that Superintendent Ford asked him if he saw anything in his department. When Mann answered in the negative, Ford responded, "Do you mean you didn't see Chapman wearing a union button? Are you blind? You had better get on the ball." In December Mann recommended six or seven employees, including Chapman, for merit increases. Later, Ford told Mann that all of the increases had gone through except Chapman's. Still later, Personnel Manager Travis told Mann that Farkos was holding Chapman's merit rating on his desk.2 Mann then went to Farkos who told him to tell Chapman that "his raise was being held up until he came around to thinking the way they wanted him to." Farkos admits talking to Chapman about his merit increase but denies the statement attributed to him by Foreman Mann. He admitted, however, that "the papers had piled up" and that he told Chapman he would get his raise when the others did. The fact of the matter is that Chapman's increase was made effective on the same date as the others but was not approved on the same date as the others. Respondent's records show that Chester Mann prepared rating sheets on these employees on December 7, 1964. All of them except Chapman's contained a notation "OK 10" with the signature of Farkos and Ford and the date December 8. Chapman's bears the signature of Farkos and the date December 14 followed by a notation over the signature of Ford "effective date 12/7/64." The payroll change notices for these employees with the exception of Chapman's are dated "12/7/64" and carry an effective date of "12/7/64." Chapman's payroll change notice also carries an effective date of "12/7/64" 2 By motion filed December 29, 1965, Respondent seeks to strike the testimony of Foreman Mann, as well as that of employees Smith, Rentner, McNanna, Lundberg, and Donnelly, concerning their conversations with, or admissions of, Personnel .Manager Travis, who died on October 2, 1965. All of the subject testimony was received during June and July 1965, while Travis was alive. An Illinois statute provides: ... in every action , suit or proceeding a party to the same who has contracted with an agent of the adverse party-the agent having since died-shall not be a competent witness as to any admission or conversation between himself and such agent unless such admission or conversation with the said deceased agent was had or made in the presence of a surviving agent of such adverse party .... Counsel for the General Counsel opposes this motion with a memorandum of law. I have concluded that the motion to strike most be denied: 1. The Illinois statute refers to contracting parties, a situation which does not pertain to this proceeding. 2. The imcompentency must exist at the time of testifying, which was not the case here . 97 CJS p. 557. 3. There were surviving agents present at the time Travis spoke, such as secretaries and others. 4. The motion is not timely, having been made months after the close of the hearing. At the time of Travis' death, the General Counsel had not rested and Respondent had not begun its defense, yet nothing was said about the testimony now objected to. 5. Some of the employees involved were cross-examined by counsel for the Respondent about their conversations with Travis, indicating Respondent's waiver of their incompetency . Clarke v. Storchak, 52 N.E. 2d 229:(322 U.S. 713). 6. Rules of evidence in the U.S. District Courts need be followed only "so far as practicable.- Chun King Sales, Inc., 126 NLRB 851, 865. GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 157 but is undated. Moreover, the payroll change notices are approved by the initials "F. T." Chapman's notice appears to have been initialed similarly. A handwriting expert, however, testified that Chapman's notice was not initialed by the same individual whose initials appear on the other notices. I am convinced that the approval of Chapman's wage increase was held up by Farkos and I credit the testimony of Chapman and Mann indicating that the delay was due to Farkos' dissatisfaction with Chapman's union attitudes. I find, therefore, that the delay in approving the wage increase was discriminatory to discourage membership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3). e. The December 14 speech On December 14, 1964, President Crawford made a speech to the employees. Among other things he announced a general wage increase and reminded them of a union's attempt to organize Kentucky Screw and the Company's response, removing the machinery and transporting it to Great Lakes Screw. Again, Respondent's answer specifically admits his unlawful threats of unemployment, unlawful solicitation of employees to revoke their union authorizations, unlawful promises of wage increases, and unlawful warnings that attempts to bargain through the Union would be futile, all on December 14, 1964. Crawford testified that he had a plant named Kentucky Screw but denied mentioning it in his December speech. It should be noted that Crawford's denial of any mention of Kentucky Screw was made when called to testify on behalf of Respondent. Earlier, when counsel for the General Counsel questioned him as a managing agent of the Respondent, he could merely not recall speaking of Kentucky Screw. Crawford's denial was credibly contradicted, however, by many of the witnesses who took the stand. B. Postsettlement Activity 1. The new rules On February 2, 1965, Respondent entered into the settlement agreement previously described and on February 3 posted the settlement notice. On the same day, President Crawford again addressed the employees. In this speech he announced new absentee rules whereby three unexcused absences would result in a 1-week suspension and four absences bring discharge . Prior to this time Respondent's rule with respect to absenteeism was much less specific, employees merely being subject to discharge , after consideration of extenuating circumstances, if absences happened at a rate of more than 1 day per month. Crawford blamed the Union for the new rules. As one employee, Carl Black, recalled, Crawford said, "Everybody is not responsible because we have to go by these rules, but the ones that-for the Union are, and the rest of us have to suffer along with them." Another witness, employee McNanna, remembered Crawford saying, "It wasn't his doing but that was the way that the men in the shop were bucking the Union. They forced it upon him." Crawford denied making such statements claiming that what he said was taken entirely from a written text which was introduced in evidence. There is no corroboration, however, of Crawford's statement that what he told the employees was what was written in the text not even by supervisory personnel, some of whom were present at that speech. Moreover, Crawford's demeanor on the stand did not lead me to believe he would be apt to so discipline himself. He showed no hesitancy in speaking up, in offering unsolicited responses , and retorting sharply and, sometimes, impertinently. Thus, at one point counsel for the Respondent asked that I caution Crawford to answer only when questions were asked and on another occasion statements made by Crawford were stricken by me at the request of Respondent's counsel as there was no question pending at that time. In short, I cannot credit Crawford's testimony that he spoke only from the written text rather than spontaneously and impulsively very much as he did on the witness stand. Employee Day testified credibly that Crawford "explained this meeting was called to explain there was a new ruling on absenteeism and tardiness and these were not his [Crawford's] rules, but he would enforce them. These rules were handed down to him from the Labor Relations Board and the Boilermakers Union and some of youse [sic] out there." Later, Day testified, Ford, in the presence of Factory Manager Farkos, told him "they didn't like this paper work no more than we like having the rules, but the Labor Relations decision that they should-that this was the way it was going to be and they had to correspond with it." This was not contradicted by Ford or Farkos. Farkos in his testimony attempted to rationalize the institution of the new rules in February 1965. He allegedly ordered a study of absenteeism in the summer of 1964 and ordered the hire of extra employees because of it. He admitted, however, that after August 1964 he never checked on compliance with his order or whether extra employees were hired. If absenteeism was the real cause of the new rules in February 1965, Farkos would certainly have exhibited a continuing interest between the summer of 1964 and February 1965. His unfamiliarity with the problem in the fall and winter of 1964, if there was a problem, discredits the explanation for the institution of the new rules. The credible testimony of the employees who heard Crawford's speech on February 3,1965, clearly establishes that the creation of these new rules was a discriminatory change in a term or condition of employment to hinder union organization and union adherence by making it clear to the employees that the Union was responsible for the imposition of harsher rules and penalties. 2. Tulk, McCutcheon, Pierce, and Day Following the posting of the settlement notice, more employees began wearing union buttons. Edward Tulk had worn a union button but removed it shortly before Christmas 1964. When Nelson was reinstated in February 1965, Tulk put his button on again . Two or 3 days later, Stanley Gowran, his foreman at the time, ordered Tulk to stay in his department at all times except for coffee and to go to the washroom. Gowran testified that he ordered Tulk to stay in his department because he saw Tulk leaving his department to visit other departments. This testimony, however, is contradicted by Gowran's own writings. Thus, Tulk's rating sheet executed by Gowran in December 1964 notes "spends time checking machines often" and rates his conduct on the job "good." Likewise, the rating sheet, approved March 1965, has Gowran's remark, "Usually on the job at all times . conduct good on the job." I conclude that Gowran's explanation is not credible, and 158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that Tulk was discriminatorily restricted to his department to discourage union membership in violation of Section 8(a)(3). McCutcheon, employed by the Respondent since 1955, put on a union button during the first week of February 1965. Shortly thereafter, Foreman Insalata called him to the office and told him that since he was wearing the button, he was to stay by his machine. Two or 3 days later, Insalata asked him what he thought the Union was going to get in the Company. Insalata also said that he, Insalata, had helped organize motion picture unions ; that "they went to any limit to get what they wanted" and that they would ruin Great Lakes Screw. This time he "warned" McCutcheon to stay right by his machine. Foreman Insalata denied saying these things to McCutcheon, but I do not credit his testimony in view of his obvious unreliability as disclosed below concerning employee Smith's discharge . During his 10 years of employment at Respondent's plant , McCutcheon had never been so restricted in his movements . Many witnesses, including Farkos himself, testified that it was common practice in the plant for employees to move about , away from their machines and departments , and talk among themselves. Farkos' testimony in this respect is interesting. After first testifying that the workers "are always at their coffee machines" and that he saw them congregating at their coffee machines "virtually every time he walked through the plant," he added, "I never noticed it specifically with thought in mind that it was getting abused. The abuses came when the Boilermakers came." This was in October 1964. Nevertheless, Farkos admitted that he did nothing about this alleged abuse in October, November, December, January, February, or March nor did any of his superintendents or foremen report that the people were on idle time. The only reasonable conclusion is that the employees enjoyed a certain freedom of movement and that the alleged abuse of such freedom testified to by Farkos is incredible in view of his indifference for at least 6 months after he first was supposed to have noticed it and the failure of his subordinates to report such abuses to him. Employee Pierce also began wearing a button in February. Shortly thereafter, Insalata expressed his surprise at Pierce's wearing a union button and told him, "These guys are not going to tolerate you guys unionizing this place . the same thing will happen to you as happened before we had the other election." The record indicates that shortly before a representation election held at the Respondent's plant in 1962 , there was a mass discharge . I find these comments to be clearly coercive in violation of Section 8(a)(1) despite Insalata's denials of such language which I do not credit in view of his unreliability as disclosed in connection with the discharge of employee Smith, below. During the last week in February, employee Day also began wearing a button . In early March, Insalata came up behind him and when Day turned around , Insalata threw his arms up in surprise . Looking at Day's union button he asked, "What's the matter, what happened , what's wrong with ... [you] ?" adding, "You used to be a nice guy." I do not find this comment coercive or threatening in violation of Section 8(a)(1), but merely indicative of the union animus on the part of Respondent's agents. 3. James Lundberg James Lundberg was hired by the Respondent in May 1962 and began wearing a union button on February 12, 1965. He was the first to wear a union button in his department after the settlement agreement . Three days later, his foreman , Eddie Adams , transferred him to a new battery, consisting of two high-speed Hartford machines and a Waterbury No. 20. These machines ran faster and used bigger blanks than his previous machines, which were Waterbury No. 10. These blanks were dumped in a pan and were lifted to be emptied into a hopper. Each panful weighed 50 to 60 pounds . No such lifting was required on his previous battery. Lundberg's new battery had previously been operated by James Martin, who had injured his wrist while at work. When Martin asked to be returned to his high-speed machines , Foreman Adams said , "No," and told him that he had a man whom he wanted to put on the high speeders. Ray Rentner, a setup man on these high-speed machines , told Foreman Adams that Lundberg was too small a man to work that line. Adams retorted that if Lundberg "couldn't handle it, he could quit ." Rentner also reported this to Farkos who told him to tell Lundberg to take the badge off and he would get two men on his shift like they had on the night shift . Testimony by Respondent's witnesses suggests that Lundberg's new work was actually easier than his old work. Farkos himself, however, in testifying about the switch between Lundberg and Martin and his refusal to put Martin back on his high-speed machines , said Martin "still hadn't been formally taken off of light duty." Such a description of Martin's work on the Waterbury 10's as "light duty" makes the contention that the high speeders were even easier to work on than Waterbury 10's quite incredible and I reject the argument. I find Lundberg' s transfer discriminatorily motivated to discourage union membership in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Here too, Respondent claims a variance between pleadings and proof and seeks dismissal of the allegation of Lundberg's transfer. The complaint charges a discriminatory transfer of Lundberg to another department or shift. Lundberg's discriminatory transfer was to another battery. The difference is slight and not meaningful. Moreover, the issue was fully litigated . I, therefore, reject this argument . See Southwestern of Dallas Optical Co., 153 NLRB 33. Charges regarding Lundberg's transfer were filed on February 25, 1965. Farkos testified that a week later, seeing "that Lundberg had a lot of idle time," he told the superintendent that he wanted "that man put to work." Reference has been made to Farkos' testimony that he did nothing about the idle time of employees between October 1964 and March 1965. Here, however, he went out of his admitted course of conduct to see that Lundberg, specifically , was put to work , demonstrating an obvious discriminatory attitude , although not necessarily a violation of the Act. 4. Foreman Mann Chester Mann worked as a foreman for the Respondent for 15-1/2 years before leaving the Company in February 1965. During his employment he attended supervisory meetings. In his testimony he referred to such a meeting at Jenny's Restaurant at which President Crawford told the supervisory personnel present that he was going to "lay down the law to the employees " and tell them he would close the plant like he closed Kentucky Screw if they insisted on forming a union . Mann was confused as to the GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 159 date of this meeting, placing it in November or December 1964, instead of its actual date which was apparently early February 1965. The confusion is further compounded by the fact that Crawford's statement to the employees concerning Kentucky Screw occurred on December 14, 1964, which was prior to the supervisory meeting at Jenny's Restaurant in February 1965. I find Mann's testimony with respect to the supervisory meeting at Jenny's Restaurant unreliable and make no finding based upon it. Mann also testified about an emergency meeting of foremen in January 1965 at which meeting Factory Manager Farkos told the foremen that the Union was getting to be a problem and estimated the Union's strength at or about 100. Farkos also questioned each of the foremen about the number of union members in their departments and spoke of a rumor of a spy among the salaried personnel. Farkos instructed the foremen to "delve into the minds" of the employees and "stress the point that unions were no good." Farkos admitted that such a meeting was held and that he spoke of a rumor of a spy being among the salaried personnel. Although Mann testified that Farkos told the foremen the Company had paid $100 and discovered the spy, Farkos denies such a statement. He testified that he told the foremen that information of this type was worth probably $100. When pressed for an explanation of his reason for such a statement, he attributed it to "unpremeditated ingenuity." On balance, I credit Mann's version of this meeting and find that Respondent instructed its supervisors to engage in unlawful interrogation and surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Around the same time, Superintendent Ford upbraided Mann for not noticing that employee Chapman was wearing a union button, which incident has been mentioned previously in connection with employee Chapman. It was at this time that Mann was warned, "You had better get on the ball." Such criticism is consistent with the testimony that foremen were expected to report the union supporters to management. Mann's failure to do so occasioned the warning from Superintendent Ford. Ford did not deny this incident and I credit the testimony of Mann. I find that Ford's warning was an implied instruction to Mann that he engage in surveillance of employees' union activities and as such a violation of Section 8(a)(1). In the latter part of January 1965, Farkos told Mann he was taking Chapman to his office. When Chapman failed to return after some 25 minutes, Mann called Farkos to see if Chapman was still there. Farkos answered, "Yes" and slammed the receiver. Later both Ford and Farkos criticized Mann for disturbing Farkos at a time when, according to Mann's testimony, they were trying to get Chapman straightened out about his union beliefs. Mann concluded his testimony testifying that he was laid off for a week on February 18 and was discharged when he returned 1 day late. Although I credit Mann's testimony, I find it insufficient to base a finding of an unlawful discharge. Mann merely testified that he was reprimanded for not noticing Chapman's union button. Thereafter, no mention was made of this dereliction. Weeks later, he was suspended. Mann did not give any details whatever of the suspension interview. The causal connection between the reprimand and the suspension is left to conjecture and inference. Moreover, the discharge, according to Mann, was for his failure to return to work when due. There is no suggestion of any other reason for the discharge. I therefore conclude that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proving that Mann's suspension and discharge were the result of his refusal to conduct illegal surveillance for the Respondent. 5. Billy Wilbourn Billy Wilbourn started to work for the Respondent in November 1962 and transferred a year later to quality control. For more than 2 years he worked as an inspector, including final inspector in heat treat, final inspector in headers, and final inspector in rollers. Respondent stipulated that it had knowledge of Wilbourn's union activity on October 25, 1964, the date that Wilbourn attended the union meeting. Early in 1965, Quality Control Manager Erickson asked Wilbourn to change from second shift to day shift. Although Wilbourn told Erickson that he did not want to work days because he had a part-time day job and also had to take his children to school, he accepted the switch because Erickson said it would be only temporary. After 6 to 8 weeks of day work, he returned again to the second shift. On March 19, 1965, Wilbourn put on a union button. On the same day, Erickson told Wilbourn that the Company was going to start transferring its inspectors and that Wilbourn would go to day shift for final inspection. Wilbourn objected and Erickson said, "Don't give me any argument." Erickson also told him that he would learn the final inspection from another inspector, San Filippo. Erickson testified that this "rotation program" continued, but later admitted, however, that except for Inspector Prust, Wilbourn was the only inspector transferred under this alleged program for "each and every" inspector. Prust was so transferred for only 1 day to fill in for an absentee inspector. I find that the reason advanced by Erickson for Wilbourn's transfer was only pretextual, and that the real reason was Wilbourn's union membership, in violation of Section 8(a)(3). That night when Wilbourn punched out, Night Superintendent Pozniak said to him, "Good luck on days, Wilbourn. You will need it." Although little significance might be attached to such a remark, subsequent events, however, lead to a different conclusion. Workers on the new shift made life very unpleasant for Wilbourn. San Filippo called him a fink. Another employee called him a Nazi, scum, and a communist. Leadman Konsacki threatened to punch him in the nose. Stella Walters refused to talk to him. Here, too, such behavior by fellow employees would not ordinarily be indicative of any unfair labor practices on the part of Respondent. Farkos' explanation of the behavior, however, sheds a different light. According to him, "Perhaps they thought he violated a trust." With the added fact that Respondent knew of Wilbourn's union activity and, according to the testimony of Farkos and Pozniak, was receiving reports from supervisors regarding union strength, with Farkos maintaining a list of union supporters, it is quite likely that the Respondent was aware of antiunion attitudes among employees in Wilbourn's new day shift and used that animosity of those employees toward Wilbourn. San Filippo and Wilbourn had an argument on March 22. Foreman Smith summoned Quality Control Manager Erickson who heard San Filippo ask who was going to strike the first blow. Wilbourn began to cry and went to the washroom. Upon his return, Erickson asked both men what had happened. Wilbourn was silent but San Filippo complained that Wilbourn refused to do the job San Filippo ordered him to do. Erickson then asked Wilbourn if he still refused to do the job and Wilbourn's 160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD response was to start doing the task in question. Erickson made no inquiry to ascertain if San Filippo had given him the whole, true story, not even asking the other supervisor who was present. According to Erickson, San Filippo's order to Wilbourn was to file blueprints after both he and Wilbourn had used them. Although Wilbourn had been transferred to learn final inspection from San Filippo, the filing of blueprints was not a specialized operation in San Filippo's department but was done in all departments and it can be assumed that since Wilbourn had worked as a final inspector, Erickson knew that, in this respect, Wilbourn needed no instruction from San Filippo nor was any order from San Filippo warranted. Erickson's testimony in this respect is somewhat contradictory and unclear. At first, he testified that Wilbourn had never been a final inspector. Later, however, he admitted that Wilbourn gave the "final okay" of the heat treat department, the "only inspection" in headers, and the "last inspection" in rollers. In any event, Erickson reported the episode to Farkos. First, Erickson testified that he was instructed by Farkos to speak to San Filippo. Later he testified that Farkos spoke to both men, telling Wilbourn to avoid getting into arguments with other employees but telling San Filippo merely to stop such argument on company time. This disparate treatment was reflected in company records. Previously, Wilbourn's relations with other employees were considered satisfactory and he was rated as quiet and having a very good disposition. Nevertheless, a written reprimand was put into Wilbourn's file concerning the March 22 incident. None of the other employees who had threatened Wilbourn and called him various names had written reprimands put in their files, not even employee Dimitri, who, according to Farkos, had threatened to throw Wilbourn into the hopper and who, Farkos knew, was big enough to do it. The oral reprimand given San Filippo can hardly be deemed any reprimand. Farkos testified that he spoke to San Filippo about San Filippo's calling Wilbourn a fink to which San Filippo replied, "Yes, we don't need finks on the payroll." The response of Farkos was, admittedly, simply, "I am inclined to agree with you. In any event no more arguing on company time." This disparity in reprimands for improper behavior is indicative of Respondent's interference with, and coercion of, Wilbourn in the exercise of his right to join the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and I so find. Wilbourn complained to Farkos about the harassment he was experiencing. On the same day, Crawford spoke to Wilbourn in the presence of San Filippo and Foreman Insalata, and told Wilbourn, "I want to get you people like me, to thinking like me." On March 29, Respondent discharged some 37 employees. Erickson told Wilbourn that his job in inspection had been eliminated but that he could exercise his seniority and go back to material handling. This resulted in a 47-cent-per-hour pay cut. On April 2, Wilbourn was summoned to Farkos' office and was asked by Farkos "What are you doing with those union buttons on?" He also asked Wilbourn whether any employees in his department were for the Union. When Wilbourn answered, "None," Farkos said, "You are right." Farkos also added, "The percentage is higher in the rollers but we got rid of those guys." He also told Wilbourn that there were a few left, naming employees Nelson, McCutcheon, Gary, and Rentner. I find Farkos' comments to be coercive and interfering in that it created the impression of surveillance and threatened discharge, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Farkos showed Wilbourn some union buttons in his desk and told him, "It wouldn't be any reflection if you pull yours off and go in there and put it on Vic's [Erickson's] desk." When Wilbourn reminded him that he no longer worked for Erickson, Farkos again told him "Go in there and put them on his desk." This inducement to remove the union button is also violative of Section 8(a)(1) in implying rewards for so doing. Wilbourn promised to think it over during the weekend and when he returned to work on April 5, Foreman Pozniak told him that Farkos was waiting for him. At this time Wilbourn told Farkos that he had reasons for not pulling his union button off, one being that seniority was not followed in that Stella Walters took over his job in heat treatment. Wilbourn asked to see Jennings Crawford and when he saw him the next day complained about seniority not having been followed. Upon leaving Crawford's office, Wilbourn was told by Farkos, "We are getting rid of all the guys with buttons on ... I will be back . to see if you have yours off," a remark that is plainly threatening and violative of the Act. Although Farkos did not come back, Jennings Crawford came to Wilbourn the next day and said, "I see you don't have that button off yet." On April 8, Wilbourn was called to Personnel Director Barth's office where Barth read him a statement accusing him of engaging in arguments and soliciting union cards on working time. The arguments referred to in this reprimand were the events of March 22 described previously. On April 15, one day after the Union handbilled the plant, Foreman Orawiec told Wilbourn, "You will stay here at your job at all times, you won't be running around, you are nothing but a troublemaker and an instigator." I find this restriction a violation of Section 8(a)(3) in that it was a discriminatory change in a condition or term of employment. Wilbourn told him he had taken about all he could and asked for a temporary layoff until there was an opening in inspection. Orawiec promised to see about it. Orawiec admitted telling Wilbourn to stay at his machine but denied that he called him an instigator or troublemaker. Orawiec further testified that when another employee complained that Wilbourn had spoken to him about joining the Union, he told Wilbourn to leave the people alone, even though the conversation took place outside the plant. I find this restriction of communication an interference with Wilbourn's rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1). The next day Wilbourn asked Barth for a layoff but was refused. Wilbourn did not report for work on May 10, 11, or 12. On May 12, he received a telephone call from Personnel Director Barth asking him if he had quit. When Wilbourn denied quitting and said he would be back in the morning, Barth told him he would not find his timecard adding, "You quit." Barth testified that when he called Wilbourn he told him that his 3-day absence was an automatic discharge under the new absentee rules. The rules, however, provide for automatic discharge for "failure to call in or otherwise notify the Personnel Department by the 3rd day." Here, however, Barth admits being notified by Wilbourn on May 12, the 3rd day, that Wilbourn had not quit. I find, therefore, that Wilbourn's discharge was not pursuant to the absentee rules, but discriminatorily motivated to discourage union membership in violation of Section 8(a)(3). On May 15, Wilbourn went to Barth's office where he spoke with both Barth and Farkos. They informed him that they had an inquiry from another company for which Wilbourn had gone to work and that they were going to tell that company that they would not GREAT LAKES SCREW CROP. rehire Wilbourn because he had not given them enough warning before he quit. Farkos also told Wilbourn that they were going to make the Board hearing last for 6 months. Farkos' version is only slightly different. He claims that he merely said that the hearing would last 6 months because the Board was persecuting the Respondent. I credit Wilbourn's version of Farkos' statement and find such statement to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) in that it would tend to discourage union activities of employees by delaying adjudication of alleged wrongs committed by Respondent. 6. William Smith Employee William Smith began working for the Respondent in mid-January 1965, and was discharged on March 26, 1965. At first, Insalata was his foreman. About a week before his discharge, Eddie Adams became his foreman. About 2 weeks before his discharge, Insalata had praised Smith's work and informed him that he was getting a merit increase of 10 cents per hour, showing Smith a merit sheet that Insalata had prepared. Smith began wearing a union button on March 22 and 2 days later Night Superintendent Pozniak told him, "I see you got one of the buttons." On March 26, shortly before quitting time, Smith was called to Foreman Adams' office where Adams informed him that he was discharged. Adams told Smith that he had not slacked up on his work, that Smith's working area was not dirty, and that Smith's performance in any other respect was not bad, but Smith's "attitude" had changed ever since Smith's wife was not hired by the Respondent. Adams refused to explain in what way Smith's attitude had changed. Smith returned to the plant on the following Monday to pick up his check and while there spoke to Personnel Manager Travis. Travis showed him a note from Adams stating that Smith lacked "potential for training." Company records, which might be decisive on the issue of Smith's work performance, are, unfortunately, missing. Personnel Director Barth testified that he had seen a merit sheet on Smith which Foreman Insalata had prepared but that Farkos had destroyed the merit rating sheet about a week after the discharge. The company wage record card on Smith has an entry dated March 1, 1965, for an "automatic" increase . This wage record card, however, was not Smith's original card but was prepared in April after the Company had received the charge concerning Smith's discharge. Barth further admitted that when an employee was given a raise after 30 days' employment, as Smith was, it was a merit increase and the words "merit increase" were placed on the wage record card. In this instance, however, Farkos instructed Barth to change the "merit increase" on the card to "automatic increase." It must be concluded that Smith's pay increase in March 1965 was a merit increase duly recommended by his foreman and approved by management and that Respondent, nevertheless, wished to indicate that the increase was automatic rather than merited in order to destroy evidence that Smith's work performance was good rather than poor as claimed by Respondent's witnesses. This would tend to interfere with the freedom of employee Smith to vindicate his statutory right in the manner provided by the Act and constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc., 155 NLRB 185; Jackson Tile Manufacturing Company, 122 NLRB 764.) 161 The Respondent's position with respect to the cause for Smith's discharge is difficult to ascertain. Inasmuch as no brief has been filed by the Respondent, the record must be relied upon to ascertain the alleged reason for the discharge. At first it appeared that Respondent discharged Smith for loafing because he was working on another job and needed sleep. Counsel for the Respondent questioned Smith about his working at Young Spring & Wire: MR. O'BRIEN: Mr. Examiner, the relevance of the questioning concerning Young Spring & Wire is as follows: When this witness applied for employment at Great Lakes Screw Corporation, we will produce witnesses to this effect, our law firm happens to represent Young Spring & Wire, and this individual was employed by Young Spring & Wire during the day term and came to our place of employment and worked the night term. One of the reasons he was discharged was for loafing on the job. We intend to show that he was working for Young Spring & Wire from 8 a.m. until 3.30 p.m. in the afternoon and then came to Great Lakes Screw at 4 p.m. in the afternoon thereby giving him a small x number of hours of sleep. I intend to show that he lied in the application on two occasions when he was asked if he was employed elsewhere .... [Emphasis supplied.] Respondent's counsel went so far as to exclaim, "This man is not telling the truth." Then counsel for the General Counsel introduced into evidence the personnel records of Young Spring & Wire regarding Smith. Mr. O'Brien thereupon objected, saying, "There is no issue pending as to whether or not William Smith during the period of time in question in this particular case was employed or was not employed at Young Spring & Wire." Respondent then apparently shifted its position with respect to Smith's discharge. Foreman Insalata testified that Tom Burke, his setup man, told him that Smith would "never make it," whereupon, Insalata warned Smith and asked Burke and the other setup man, Ricketts, to teach Smith. After another week, according to Insalata, both Ricketts and Burke told him that "Smith would never make it." Then Insalata moved Smith to smaller machines where he worked with setup men Morrett and Tijerina. After 1 week with these setup men, Insalata testified that Smith was reported by them as being slow. Once again Insalata warned Smith. At the end of the next week, Morrett and Tijerina allegedly again reported to Insalata that Smith was too slow and would "never make it." Insalata then transferred Smith to an even easier battery where Pierce was setup man . Pierce allegedly told Insalata after the first week that Smith was too slow, whereupon Insalata warned Smith that if he "couldn't make it here," he would have to let Smith go. In the middle of the second week with Pierce, Smith was reported by Pierce to Insalata as improving and Insalata conveyed that message to Smith. Insalata then promised to recommend Smith for a pay raise. Insalata's testimony with respect to Smith's work performance is completely discredited by the testimony of the setup men involved. Burke testified that Smith never worked for him and that he never made any derogatory report to Insalata concerning him. Moreover, Burke was called to the company office before these hearings began and spoken to by Farkos and Attorney O'Brien, who 162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD informed him that Insalata had made a statement concerning Smith's working for Burke and Burke's complaint concerning Smith. Burke refused to verify such a statement and he was told not to talk about it. Burke, nevertheless, went to Insalata and told him he was wrong about Smith's working for Burke. Insalata merely replied, "I don't remember anything." Burke worked for the Respondent from 1959 until August 1965 when he quit. He still has two brothers working for the Respondent. Ricketts, who is still employed by the Respondent, testified that Smith never worked on a battery on which Ricketts was a setup man, that he never discussed Smith's work with Insalata, and never made any derogatory remark concerning Smith. Pierce, who is still employed by the Respondent, testified that Smith had worked on his battery but that he told Insalata that Smith was a very good operator and recommended his pay raise. Pierce even complained to Insalata about Smith's discharge, to which Insalata replied that he "didn't know what was going on any more," and he "keeps his mouth shut now," waving a hand in front of his mouth. Morrett, who is still- employed by the Respondent, testified that Smith worked for him about 2 weeks and stated, "He was one of the best I ever had." He could not recall discussing Smith with Insalata and denied making any derogatory reports. Tijerina, still employed by the Respondent, also testified that Smith worked for him for 2 weeks but thought that Smith was a "good" operator and denied making a derogatory report concerning Smith. I conclude that Insalata's testimony regarding Smith's work performance is completely untrue. Finally, Respondent's witnesses suggest that the reason for Smith's discharge was that he was "goofing off." Foreman Adams testified that one day after Smith put on a union button, he noticed that Smith was goofing off and that on the next two nights Smith did "leave the department four or five times in a half night." Adams then stated that Smith was discharged because "he was goofing off too much, stayed away from his machine, sitting back there on the work bench, his attitude had changed." Adams admitted, however, that he never spoke to Smith about his alleged dereliction but only waved to him to go back to his machine, once on March 23, once on March 24, and once on March 26, not, as first stated, four or five times in a half night. According to Adams, Smith immediately returned to his work on each occasion. Adams' testimony is shaken also by certain other contradictions. Thus, whereas Adams testified that foremen do not need the approval of their superiors to discharge probationary employees, Superintendent Ford, however, testified that no employee is discharged unless Farkos approves; Adams testified that after Smith's, discharge he talked to nobody about it, but later corrected himself by stating that he did talk to one of Respondent's counsels but to no one else and then further changed his testimony by admitting that he spoke to two other counsels; Adams also testified that an employee would need his permission to speak to any company official, but Foreman Norman stated that employees did not need their foreman's permission to visit Farkos; Adams was positive that he had written the word "Unsatisfactory" and only that word on Smith's termination report, but the termination document contains no such word and does contain much additional language. I conclude that Adams' testimony must be discredited as unreliable and that all the varying reasons for Smith's discharge suggested or stated by counsel for the Respondent or its witnesses were pretextual. The real reason was Smith's union membership making his discharge a violation of Section 8(a)(3). 7. Cingrani and Martin Employee Cingrani, who was laid off on March 29, began wearing a union button about 3 weeks before the layoff. On the first day he wore the button, Pete Warino, whom Cingrani described as an assistant foreman, told Cingrani "I didn't know you were for the Union. . . . I thought you were a good guy." Respondent contends that Warino was not a supervisor. The record, however, clearly establishes that Personnel Manager Travis told Cingrani that Warino was assistant foreman and even wrote Warino's name on his own calling card, designating Warino as assistant and Insalata as foreman. In addition, Respondent's own records in at least two instances show Warino as foreman (G.C. Exh. 54 a and c). Nevertheless, I find Warino's language insufficiently coercive or threatening to base a finding of an 8(a)(1) violation. Employee Martin was also discharged on March 29. He began wearing a union button about 2 weeks before that. Shortly after he put on the union button, he was called to Foreman Insalata's office and was told by Insalata that he was getting a pay raise which had been recommended some time before. Insalata asked Martin why he was wearing a union button. Martin told him that it was because he had not received his raise when he was supposed to and also because he had hurt his wrist while working and "they wouldn't fix it." Insalata's version of this conversation, although somewhat different than Martin's, is not credited. A few days later, Martin was called to Crawford's office where Crawford, Farkos, and Barth were present.. Crawford asked Martin why he was wearing a button and said that they were all shocked that he had a button on. When Martin said that he was afraid to remove the button, Crawford said he would see to it that no one would fire Martin and he would guarantee that his wrist would be fixed. Martin's version of Crawford's conversation is denied by both Farkos and Barth but, significantly, not by Crawford, who made no mention of the incident in his testimony. This inducing language by Crawford I find to be violative of Section 8(a)(1). Martin was not rehired after the March 29 discharge. Barth testified that in his application for employment, Martin had falsified certain statements. At first, the falsification, according to Barth, was Martin's answering "No" to the question, "Do you have any physical defects?" Barth admitted not knowing what Martin's physical defect was but felt that since Martin had sued the Company for an injury to one or both of his thumbs, that his answer on the application for employment was necessarily false. Later, Barth added the additional explanation that Martin had falsified his education in stating he had completed 2 years of high school. The specific discrepancy, however, could not be recalled by Barth. Still later, in response to leading questions by counsel for the Respondent, Barth added that Martin had falsified his application in omitting some of his former GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 163 employers . These vacillating explanations given by Barth for Respondent's failure to rehire Martin make his testimony unreliable , and I find , therefore , that Martin was not rehired because of his union membership , in violation of Section 8(a)(3). 8. The mass discharge On March 29, 1965, 37 employees were discharged and 13 employees were transferred . This was done without any prior notice or warning and , in fact, contrary to appearances created by Respondent . Thus, for example, on February 2, 8, and 15, 1965, notices were posted in the plant congratulating the slotter and roller departments on setting production records. On March 17 and 24, 1965, notices were posted informing the employees that Saturday work would be necessary attributing the necessity for overtime work to a high backlog of orders. Between February 10 and March 23, Respondent hired 18 employees . Two women , Naleway and Filipiak, were hired for specialty on March 23 . One day later, on March 24, Martha Morrett and Edna Gary submitted bids for operator jobs posted on the bulletin board and the change of these employees to the roller department was made effective March 29, 1965, the day 37 employees were discharged and 13 others transferred. a. Respondent's alleged reasons Respondent attempted to explain the mass discharge. Here, too, however, the explanations are not consistent, and in the absence of a brief explaining its position, Respondent's defense is difficult to understand . Thus, for example, counsel for the Respondent , appearing on behalf of the Respondent in a United States District Court, told that court that the action was due to "poor business." Factory Manager Farkos, however, testifying in this proceeding, flatly contradicted that statement and said that poor business had nothing to do with the discharges. Instead, Farkos attributed the discharges to excessive idle time among employees . However, as noted previously, Farkos admitted that his foremen never reported idle time to him . In fact, although Farkos himself allegedly noticed idle time as early as October 1964 , he admitted doing nothing about it for 6 months . Moreover, the employment of additional employees as late as February and March 1965 is hardly consistent with a claim of idle time among the regular employees . Respondent attempted to explain the employment of new employees by testimony that the foremen were unaware of the impending discharges and, therefore , had no reason to withhold requests for new help. This testimony , however , is negated by Barth's own testimony at one point that the foremen were called in prior to the discharge and manning charts were discussed with them . Even if this consultation had not taken place, the employment of additional new help would not have occurred without specific approval of the front office, i.e., Barth and Farkos , who certainly were aware of the impending discharges if, in fact, such discharges were impending. Respondent elaborated on this explanation of idle time. It was brought about , Farkos testified , by "creeping changes," which improve productivity . Farkos said that these creeping changes affected "virtually all departments . Specifically , the more dramatic changes were in the tool rooms , headers, shavers , rollers and machine repair." Farkos went on to explain in some detail the creeping changes in the header department . Eighteen employees were discharged in the roller department, where, Farkos had told Wilbourn , there was a high percentage of union members . Farkos had also told employee Rentner that the union strength was about 90 and most of the 90 were in the roller department. No employees were discharged in the header department where, according to the credited testimony of employee Tulk, no union buttons were seen . Of course, it cannot be denied that creeping changes do affect productivity and that there may have been some creeping changes in the Respondent's plant, but the testimony of Factory Manager Farkos gives little factual basis for any conclusion that creeping changes were the cause of the mass discharge. He was apparently unaware of the changes made in productivity and, in fact , had first heard of some of these changes while preparing for the hearing in this proceeding. Farkos also stated that the mass discharge was based, at least partially, on three workload studies made by Barth. In fact, however, only one workload study was made by Barth and that was in the shaver department. In the roller department , the workloads of only two employees were studied and Barth observed that two setup men were working less than full time there. There is no suggestion that this constituted a workload study. Similarly, Barth merely observed the work in the mill shank department and orally reported the work of setup men to be about 60 percent. b. Rollers Nine employees were discharged from the day shift in rollers. Of them , only two did not wear union buttons, Clare and Phillips . The other seven , Lundberg (see B, 3, supra), Cravens, F. Smith , Baratta , P. Kennedy, Martin, and Cingrani (see B , 7, supra), had started to work for Respondent in September 1964 or earlier and had received merit ratings while so employed which varied from satisfactory to very satisfactory in virtually all respects. Their termination notices, nevertheless , rated their ability and conduct as fair or poor and on some of them , Foreman Insalata had added that he would not reemploy that person. The wage record cards for these seven employees were marked prominently "Will Not Rehire." Employee Phillips, who was not a union button wearer, was hired by the Respondent in December 1964 and was rated shortly thereafter as unsatisfactory in attendance and punctuality with a recommendation that a merit increase be withheld in February 1965. He was again rated but even then his rating sheet carried the notation , "Fair judgment and ability." His termination notice, however , rated him as excellent and Foreman Insalata stated thereon that he would reemploy him. The Respondent 's wage record is marked , "Will Rehire." The other nonbutton wearer, Clare, went to work for the Respondent in 1962 and was denied merit increases in February, May, June, and August, 1963. He received a merit increase in January 1964. Nevertheless, his termination notice in March 1965 rated his conduct as excellent and his production good, together with Insalata's comment that he would rehire him and the records of Respondent are so marked. Nine employees were also discharged from the second shift of the roller department , Kordiak, R. Taylor, E. Taylor, Hickey, Carlson, D. Kennedy, Downey, Ruffalo, and Warden. At least five of these nine were identified in some fashion with the Union . Thus, Kordiak wore a union button . R. Taylor signed a union card and discussed the Union with E. Taylor and Hickey. Carlson signed a card 298-668 0-69-12 164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and attended a union meeting . D. Kennedy is the brother of Paul Kennedy, who wore a button on the day shift. Respondent's records are marked, "Will Not Rehire," for each of these nine men. Significantly , however, Foreman Adams, who executed the termination notices of R. Taylor, E. Taylor, Carlson, and D. Kennedy, marked each one to indicate that he would reemploy them. Nevertheless , the Respondent's wage record cards are marked, "Will Not Rehire." Of particular interest is the record of Kordiak, who began working for the Respondent in September 1963. His merit rating sheets contain Foreman Insalata's comment that he was "one of my best operators, always on the ball very good operator-works up to the last minute." His termination notice, nevertheless, rates his ability as fair and his conduct poor. c. Pointers Nine employees were terminated in pointers, Anderson, Barrett, Black, Brock-Jones, Donnelly, Kozik, Powell, Truschka, and Turnbull. Of these, three, Donnelly, Black, and Truschka, were known union adherents. Donnelly began working for the Respondent in February 1964 (see A, 3, c, supra) and received merit increases in March, April, August, and November. At various times his conduct was rated as "very satisfactory," "very good," "quiet-good disposition." His termination notices rate his conduct as poor and Respondent's records are marked, "Will Not Rehire." Kozik, who testified he never wore a union button, went to work for the Respondent in February 1965, and was merit rated in March as unsatisfactory in initiative and acceptance of responsibility. Even his termination notice recites that he "believes in just getting by." Respondent's records, nevertheless, state, "Will Rehire." Black went to work for the Respondent in May 1964 and was rated satisfactory or very satisfactory in June, September, and December, 1964. His record, however, is marked, "Will Not Rehire." Anderson, who was hired in March 1965, only 10 days before the layoff, had his record marked, "Will Rehire." Truschka's performance, like that of Black's, had always been considered satisfactory or very satisfactory in all respects. Nevertheless, Respondent's records are marked, "Will Not Rehire." d. Mill shank Three employees were laid off in the mill shank department, Miles, Witkowski, and Tulk. Witkowski is the employee whom Respondent discharged in October 1964, and who was reinstated in February 1965, by virtue of the settlement agreement referred to earlier. He began working for the Respondent in October 1962. One rating form in April 1963 rated him unsatisfactory in initiative but satisfactory or very satisfactory otherwise. Thereafter, merit ratings in May, September, and December, 1963, and March, May, and August, 1964, show him to be satisfactory or very satisfactory in all respects. In October 1964, just prior to his alleged unlawful discharge, he was rated unsatisfactory in ability to learn, attendance, and punctuality. He was reinstated in February 1965 and promoted to setup man in March 1965. His termination notice in March 1965 rates his ability, conduct, attendance , and punctuality as "fair" and his record is marked , "Will Not Rehire." Miles had worked for Respondent only slightly more than 1 month when discharged. The third employee dropped from mill shank, Tulk, like Witkowski, was also promoted to setup man on March 15, 1965 (see B, 2, supra), but was demoted to operator in slotters on March 29, 1965. One week later, Gowran, who had been ill, returned to work and was put into slotters making it necessary to eliminate one man from that department. Tulk, having the least seniority in that department, was let go. Respondent's records, however, do not suggest that Tulk was replaced by Gowran. Instead, they show Tulk's job "abolished," and that Tulk would not be rehired. e. Wire room Two employees, Lussenhop and Waters, were terminated in the wire room. Lussenhop, a union button wearer, started to work for the Respondent in January 1964 and was rated satisfactory or very satisfactory in all respects. One rating contained the comment "steady and tries hard." Nevertheless, the wage record card states, "Will Not Rehire." The other employee, Waters, started to work for Respondent on March 12, 1965; 2 weeks before the layoff. His wage record card, however, states, "Will Rehire." f. Toolroom Two employees were laid off in the toolroom, Arlene Casas and Mabel Smith. Arlene Casas is the mother of Earl Casas referred to in section A, 3, c, above. Mabel Smith is the mother of F. Smith, a button wearer who was discharged from rollers on March 29, 1965. Mabel Smith started to work for Respondent around May 1963 and was merit rated in June, September, and December, 1963, December 1964, and March 1965 as satisfactory or very satisfactory. Her foreman noted on her termination notice that he would reemploy her. Nevertheless, her wage record card states, "Will Not Rehire." Mrs. Casas' wage record card was similarly marked. Mabel Smith had worked for more than a year in the specialty department before being transferred to the toolroom in the latter part of October 1964. 'Two new employees, Naleway and Filipiak, were hired in the specialty department on March 23, 1965. Mrs. Smith called her foreman, Pozniak, to complain about these two new employees being kept on despite her greater seniority in specialty. Pozniak promised to look into it and called her back on March 31 to tell her, "They were going to rehire me ... when things settled down." Pozniak admitted that he promised to check to see because she was a very good worker and that he told Mrs. Smith that the job was eliminated. He did not deny saying that Mrs. Smith would be recalled when things settled down nor did he explain why Mrs. Smith was not permitted to exercise her seniority in specialty. g. Conclusions The varying and sometimes contradictory reasons advanced by the Respondent for the mass discharge of March 29, 1965, are singularly unpersuasive. Reference has already been made to the contradictory explanations given by counsel for the Respondent and Factory Manager Farkos regarding poor business. Similarly, the idle time referred to by Farkos is effectively contradicted by his own indifference to the alleged state of affairs as well as by the failure of his .foremen to report such idle time to him. Added to this unbelievable recitation is the continued hiring of new employees despite the alleged imminence of a mass discharge. Reference has already been made to the GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. so-called creeping changes which were supposed to have affected the header department dramatically. There, however, no layoffs occurred. Reference should also be made to Farkos' argument of "plant efficiency." Comptroller Wooster stated that increases in labor costs occurred primarily in the secondary production and service departments, where, presumably, labor costs savings should have been concentrated. The roller department, where the greatest impact of the mass discharge was felt, is, however, not a secondary department. The pattern in the mass discharge of March 29, 1965, is not hard to perceive. Seniority may have been followed, though not invariably, as in the case of Mabel Smith. But more significantly, the discharges were concentrated where there was union strength, and to the point where union adherents were hit. Thus, in the roller day shift, the discharge went far enough to reach Lundberg; in roller second shift, it reached no further than Kordiak, a union button wearer; in pointers it did not stop until it hit Donnelly, the employee who, Norman predicted, would not go far as long as he had anything to do with the Union; in mill shank, Tulk and Witkowski, the only setup men discharged, were hit; in the wire room it reached Lussenhop, a union button wearer; and in the toolroom, the only dischargees were the mothers of Earl Casas and F. Smith, both union adherents. Moreover, the Respondent's intentions were manifested only too plainly by its notations on the wage records, showing, in general, no intention to rehire the union supporters while favoring others who were not suspect, even where such others had little experience or bad work records. 9. C. Gordon Gary Gary has been employed by the Respondent for more than 12 years. On April 9, 1965, as he was entering the plant, he accepted some union handbills from a man who was passing them out in front of the plant. Later that day Factory Manager Farkos approached Gary with one of the handbills and asked Gary about a statement contained in the handbill. When Gary disclaimed any knowledge, Farkos told him that he ought to know, that Gary's name was on the pamphlet. The handbill was signed organizing committee but specified no names. Gary was wearing an organizing committee union button. Farkos looked at the button and again told Gary he ought to know. Farkos then told him, "If we were to sue the Union, we could sue you also, couldn't we?" I find this statement coercive and intimidating, violative of Section 8(a)(1). 10. Story, Chapman, Day, and McNanna Four employees, Story, Chapman, Day, and McNanna, were discharged by the Respondent. The Respondent contends that these discharges were occasioned by the operation of the new absentee rules issued on February 3, 1965. Since I have already concluded that the new rules were merely a device to hinder union organization by making the employees think the Union and its membership were responsible for the imposition of harsher rules and more severe penalties, the discharges made pursuant to those rules were illegal. Some discussion of the circumstances surrounding the discharges of these individuals is merited nevertheless. 165 a. Story Employee Story began working for the Respondent in February 1963, and began wearing a union button on March 19, 1965. He had been absent from work on March 16, 17, and 18. When he came to work on March 19, Foreman Gerdzas sent him to Personnel where he was asked for a doctor's excuse. Story visited the doctor and returned with the doctor's statement that he was fit for work. Later that day, while Story was at Gerdzas' desk, another employee approached and said to Story, "You stupid S.O.B., take that G-D-button off." Story asked if he knew anything. about unions. When the employee answered, "No," Story asked him to keep his opinions to himself. Foreman Gerdzas then got up, looked at Story, and told him there would be no union talk during company time and that Story would have to keep his thoughts to himself. Later the same day, Gerdzas told Story, "Since you choose to express your political views in the form of that button you are wearing," Story would have to remain in the department at all times and could not use the cafeteria. Moreover, Story would have to watch the quality of his work. Story reminded Gerdzas that he had praised Story's work only 2 weeks earlier, to which, Gerdzas replied, "Yes, but under the circumstances we have got to review all of this again." Story also asked Gerdzas if his fellow workers were aware that they, like Story, could only use certain coffee machines. To this, Gerdzas replied, "No, but we are not talking about the other employees in this department, we are talking about you, Mr. Story." Gerdzas' version of the foregoing incident is not much different. He admitted he saw Story wearing a badge, whereupon, he told him "There are certain things you can do and there are certain things that I can do." Gerdzas explained, "I just wanted him to understand that wearing a badge he was under certain conditions." Story was absent due to illness on April 13, 14, 15, 16, and 19. He notified Respondent of his illness on April 13. When Story reported to work on April 20, Foreman Moritz told him to get a doctor's statement: Story left the plant, went to his doctor, and returned with the doctor's statement. He was sent to Farkos' office and he gave Farkos the doctor's statement. Farkos said, "I can't understand how you can let those blankety-blank leeches out there that are soliciting outside of our door put a ring in your nose and lead you around this plant with a ring." Story asked, "Are you referring to the Union, Mr. Farkos?" to which Farkos replied, "You know blankety- blank who I am referring to. Story said, "I take it you mean you are referring to the Union." Farkos said, "You can blankety-blank take it any way you want to." Story then asked if he was going to be suspended for a week because of his absences and was told that a decision had not been reached. They then talked about Story's opinion of how the plant was being run. Story mentioned some of his dissatisfactions, after which he was told they had decided to let him go and that he was being permanently terminated. He was offered the opportunity to quit. When he refused to quit voluntarily, he was fired. Personnel Director Barth prepared a "Sequence of Events" leading to discharge of L. Story. According to this document, the cause of Story's discharge was the failure of the doctor's statement to verify the fact that that Story had been under a doctor's care and was unable to work plus the fact that Story's absences had exceeded 6 percent for 6 months. The absentee rules state, "Any absence for reasons of illness which extends 3 days or more must be 166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD supported by a physician's statement upon return to work." The rules make no mention of the penalty for failure to supply the physician's statement. In this instance, however, Story had been absent in March and had supplied a doctor's statement similar to the one he procured in April. This earlier statement was accepted by the Respondent and there was no way that Story could have anticipated the doctor's April statement was not sufficient for the purpose. The rules also provide that for the second absence of an employee he was to be given a written warning, that his next offense would result in a 1- week suspension without pay and for the third absence he was to be suspended for 1 week. It was only after the fourth absence, without notification to the Respondent, that an employee was to be discharged. Here, apparently, it was only Story's third absence which would not give rise to his discharge but only to his suspension. The rules also contain a provision that where an employee's absenteeism is in excess of 6 percent of his scheduled workdays in a 6- month period (which was the case with Story) "the employee's records" are to be "discussed with him" and "a determination will be made." These reviews, according to the rule, would be made semiannually by the personnel department. In the case of Story, however, there was no semiannual review of his absentee record by the personnel department. Even if we assume that the conversation Farkos had with Story constituted a semiannual review by the personnel department, it does not appear that the determination to discharge him was made on the basis of his record. An examination of his merit ratings in May and August 1964 shows his work performance to be satisfactory in all respects with a recommendation for a merit increase by the foremen on each occasion. His termination notice, however, like the termination notice of many of the dischargees of March 29, rates his conduct as poor. I find, therefore, that with respect to employee Story, the new absentee rules of February 3, 1965, were not followed by the Respondent. b. Chapman, Day, and McNanna These three employees were discharged on April 21, September 9, and June 12, respectively. The discharges were made under the new absentee rules of February 3, 1965. There is no evidence that the rules were not followed in these three cases. Nevertheless, their discharge, I find, was an 8(a)(3) violation. Respondent had falsely led these and other employees to believe that the Union should be blamed for the institution of the new rules. As a result, employees dismissed under such rules would be inclined to attribute their misfortune to the Union and, to that extent, be discouraged from union membership, an 8(a)(3) violation. In any event, the institution of the harsher absentee and tardiness rules, with the blame put upon the Union, was calculated or tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in union or concerted activity. As such, it was a clear 8(a)(1) violation. The Board has held that where employees lose their jobs by behavior of their employer which violates Section 8(a)(1), the appropriate remedy is 8(a)(3) reinstatement and reimbursement, (see Ellis and Watts Products Inc., infra), just as where an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) resulting in the discharge of employees, such implementation of the violation is a violation of Section 8(a)(3), Fleming Manufacturing Company, Inc., 119 NLRB 452. 11. Ray Rentner Employee Rentner started working for the Respondent in April 1953. He was promoted to setup man in 1955 and worked for the Respondent, with the exception of 1 year's absence, until April 26, 1965. Rentner attended a union meeting in November 1964 and signed a union card around that time. Rentner had injured his wrist on the job in November 1963. He received treatment at the clinic to which Respondent sends injured employees. On February 22, 1965, Rentner reinjured his wrist while attempting to assist Lundberg. He reported the injury to Personnel Manager Travis and went to the company doctor. On the Tuesday before March 15, Travis showed Rentner a statement from the doctor which indicated Rentner's wrist had no impairment, despite the fact that the doctor had scheduled two more treatments. On March 15, Rentner put on a union button. On the same day, Foreman Adams asked Rentner if he wanted to see President Crawford. Rentner replied, "No." In a few minutes, President Crawford came out and asked Rentner if Rentner wanted to see him. Rentner said "No," it was too late. Crawford, looking directly at Rentner's union badge, said, "I didn't think you would do that to me after all I have done for you and your father before you." Rentner said that he had put the badge on because of the letter regarding his wrist, to which President Crawford replied, "Well, remember, I got the ace in the hole." A few days later Farkos asked Rentner why he was wearing a union badge and added, "Don't you think I can have any man's job out there with or without a union?" When Rentner asked, "How?" Farkos replied, "It would be easy to overlook the scrap of the set-up men" if he wanted to "and we could pick up the scrap of one set-up man if we wanted to." This language of Farkos is too clearly coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) to require discussion. When the company doctor told Rentner there was nothing more he could do about Rentner's injured wrist, Rentner told Farkos and Barth that he wanted to see his own doctor. Farkos said that "under ordinary circumstances" Rentner could go to his own doctor and the Company would "pick up the tab," pay the hospital, and pay for surgery worth $3,000. Rentner asked, "Do you mean by this badge ordinary circumstances?" Farkos replied, "Yes." Rentner, nevertheless, refused to remove the badge. Farkos' version of this conversation is somewhat different. He testified that he told Rentner, "We pay for treatment. We pay for surgery if it is required. If there is a disablement, also. But in you case I think you need brain surgery and we are not paying one red cent." He denied telling Rentner that under ordinary circumstances the Company would give him $3,000 for treatment saying, "I have no control of that." It is difficult to reconcile his statement that he has no control over the Company's paying $3,000 for treatment with his statement, "We are not paying one red cent" for Rentner's injury. I credit Rentner's testimony and find Farkos' statement coercive in implying benefits for Rentner's removal of the union button. About 2 weeks later, Rentner spoke to Farkos and Barth again, asking if he could go to his own doctor and Farkos told him to go. Rentner left and when he returned, he told his foreman, Insalata, that he had the name of a doctor and would see him the following week. Insalata told him, "Go." On April 22, Rentner told Insalata that he was to see the doctor the next day and would have to leave around 11 GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 167 o'clock. Insalata said, "Okay." When Rentner reported to work at 7 a.m. the next day, Insalata asked if he would be leaving at 11, but less than 2 hours later, told Rentner that he could not go but would have to see Superintendent Ford. Ford refused to give him permission to leave and suggested that he get an appointment at a nonwork time. Rentner then made some calls and reported to Ford that Saturday appointments were not possible. Nevertheless, Ford refused Rentner permission to go during working hours. Rentner punched out shortly after 11 o'clock telling Farkos, Ford, and Barth that he was not quitting but that he had to go to the doctor and would be back later that day, if possible, and, if not, on Monday. When Rentner reported in on Monday, his timecard was missing. Superintendent Ford testified that it was Respondent's practice to send ill or injured employees to the clinic and then home if they were unable to work. There is no explanation why Rentner was refused permission to see his doctor. There is no suggestion that his attendance on that day was indispensable to the Respondent and no contradiction that he had notified the proper officials long before the date of his appointment with the doctor. The only conceivable opposition to Rentner's leaving work on that day would be his failure to secure an appointment with the doctor on a nonworkday. This was brought out in this proceeding by testimony and documentary evidence concerning the unemployment compensation hearing which ensued following Rentner's termination. At the unemployment compensation hearing Barth testified that "We made an appointment for Saturday morning, May 22, 9 o'clock . . . for a fictitious person." Respondent's Exhibit 6(c) is a "Sequence of Events" prepared by Respondent for the unemployment compensation hearing. It states in part: R. Barth went to the State of Illinois Office at 117E. 154th Street, Harvey, Illinois to appeal ruling that Rentner was eligible for unemployment compensation. While at the office learned Rentner admitted walking off the job, and his hand was not a handicap. He answered yes to a question regarding his physical ability to pursue his usual line of work. He had his examination on 4-23-65, at the Zeitlin X- Ray and Clinical Laboratory, at 55 E. Washington, by Dr. Grossman. Upon return to the plant called Dr. Grossman's office at 2:30 p.m. Asked for appointment to have left hand X-rayed. First question receptionist asked was, "Who is your lawyer?" Gave the name of Jensen. After telling receptionist a weekday appointment was impossible, got an appoinment for Saturday morning on 5-22-65 at 9:00 a.m. This appointment disproves Rentner's claim that he could not get an appointment during the evening or on Saturday. [Emphasis supplied.] In this proceeding, however, Barth admitted that the telephone call mentioned above was not made by him but by Farkos and that the call was not made to Dr. Grossman's office but to the Zeitlin X-Ray Laboratory. Barth insisted, nevertheless, that "We got a Saturday appointment" with Dr. Grossman. He also explained that "We called Zeitlin Clinical Laboratory ... this was Dr. Grossman at the Zeitlin Clinical Laboratory." Dr. Grossman, however, testified that it is impossible to make an appointment at his downtown office for Saturday through him or his office girl and that the Zeitlin Laboratory makes no appointments for him. Moreover, the Zeitlin Laboratory could not make an appointment for him on Saturday inasmuch as Dr. Grossman has office hours at a different location on Saturdays. I credit the testimony of Dr. Grossman and find that the Respondent never secured an appointment for a fictitious person with Dr. Grossman on Saturday, May 22, 1965. With such obvious inconsistencies in statements by Respondent's agents concerning Rentner's injury and doctor appointments, their testimony regarding other aspects of their dealings with Rentner are suspect and not worthy of credit. I find, therefore, that Respondent deviated from its usual practice and terms of employment in refusing Rentner time off during working hours to see his own doctor and that such discrimination was based upon Rentner's adherence to the Union and, therefore a violation of Section 8(a)(3). 12. The coloring book In April 1965 a coloring. book was distributed to the employees by Respondent's supervisors. Factory Manager Farkos conceived the thought and made rough sketches of the illustrations contained therein. On the first page, cash prizes were offered to the children of the Respondent's employees coloring the book. In the book are various illustrations, some showing a "union boss," wearing flashy stones in his shirt and sitting at a desk with stacks of money in front of him as well as a champagne glass emitting bubbles. One illustration shows the union boss cutting out paper dolls and saying, "Give them the works. I'll get them if it takes 100 years." Another sketch shows the union boss saying, "Go get our lawyer. I am sure he can make up some wild charges," and another illustration shows the lawyer running to the N.L.R.B. A later sketch shows the lawyer at a neighborhood tavern saying, "I'd rather be chasing ambulances." To be eligible for the prize the book had to be returned to the personnel department together with the name of the employee-parent of the child coloring the book. The complaint alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the publication and distribution of this coloring book, in that it promised benefits to induce employees to refrain from supporting the Union and interrogated them concerning union membership. I do not agree. Although the coloring book may have been in poor taste and uncomplimentary to the Union, it did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The monetary benefit was extended to children of all employees, regardless of union attitude, and the interrogation, consisting entirely of the child's name and his parent's name, was not unlawfully coercive or threatening. 13. The absentee rule during these hearings Reference has been made previously to the institution and administration of new absentee rules on February 3, 1965, and the fact that they provide for graduated penalties for absences such as oral reprimand, written reprimand, suspension, and discharge. On June 17, 1965, 4 days before the commencement of hearings in this case, Respondent posted a notice in its plant which read in part: The attendance and tardiness rule will apply during the course of this hearing. Those people that have been subpenaed will be excused. However, a day of absence will be charged. Inasmuch as the Respondent did not subpena any employees, the warning was necessarily directed to the 168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees subpenaed by the Board. Such employees were thereby advised that, depending upon the plateau they had already reached under the absentee rule, their absences, necessitated by compliance with the Board's subpenas, could result in their suspension or even discharge. As such, the notice discriminated against employees giving testimony under the Act and, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(4). The above-described notice was removed from the bulletin board on June 22, 1965. It was admitted, however, that the employees were not told that the notice of June 17 had been rescinded although Barth did notify a union representative, who was not an employee of the Respondent, that the rule was suspended. I find that the offensive notice was not suspended or rescinded effectively. C. The Employee Advisory Committee The complaint alleges that the Respondent has dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the Employee Advisory Committee in certain specified behavior. In response to the Trial Examiner's Order, General Counsel submitted the names of the Respondent's agents who committed the acts specified in the complaint. One of the acts thus specified was that the Respondent, through Supervisors Farkos, Travis, and Barth, appointed employee representatives to the Committee. No evidence was adduced to support such an allegation and this particular allegation was dismissed during the course of the hearing. Respondent distributed an employee handbook which among other things sets forth a grievance procedure. President Crawford denied ever having anything to do with the grievance committee. General Counsel's Exhibit 13, however, was signed and approved by President Crawford, Vice President Jennings Crawford, and Factory Manager Farkos and it sets forth the purpose of the plan, the scope of activity, the voting units, the selection of employee representatives, their term of service and other details concerning employee representatives on that committee. As noted earlier, the Employee Grievance Committee, which was formed in 1968 and reconstituted in 1962, was renamed the Employee Advisory Committee in 1964. Employee Chapman was elected a committee representative in October 1964 by secret-ballot vote. The ballots were slips of paper distributed by Foreman Mann who also counted the ballots. At a subsequent election in December 1964, Mann also distributed and collected the ballots. Employees voted on working time and were paid their regular wages. The Committee has no offices, no funds, no treasurer, and no equipment. Charlotte Klaubo, employed by the Respondent as secretary to Factory Manager Farkos, began attending meetings of the Committee in October 1964 where she took notes. After these meetings she typed up these notes during her regular working hours and was paid her regular salary while doing so. She performed these duties approximately five times between October 1964 and June 1965. Notices of committee meetings were posted on the company bulletin board and committee employees were paid their regular pay while attending meetings. Respondent set the time for such meetings and they were conducted by management officials. I conclude that the activities of Respondent, by its supervisory agents, constituted domination and interference with a labor organization. D. Credibility Much of the above Findings of Fact is based upon the testimony of the nonsupervisory employees. As noted from time to time such testimony is irreconcilable with the testimony of management officials. I have concluded that, generally speaking, the version given here by the nonsupervisory employees should be credited. During the weeks of the hearing in this matter I have had ample opportunity to observe and assay the demeanor of all of the witnesses, both on and off the stand. Although many of the workers had limited education and an inability to express themselves adequately, their testimony conveyed a sincerity that I was usually unable to find in the testimony and behavior of Respondent's witnesses. Some of my reasons for failing to credit the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses have already been mentioned. Nevertheless, a recapitulation of my dissatisfaction with the testimony of Respondent's witnesses is merited at this point. Perhaps the chief witness for the Respondent was its factory manager, Alexander Farkos, who is known as Robert Farkos. The coloring book referred to in B, 12, above, is his brainchild. It serves to demonstrate the deep animosity of the Respondent and, specifically of Farkos, to the union movement. His testimony, likewise, shows evidence of an inclination to go to any lengths in effectuating that animosity. Reference has already been made to his destruction of William Smith's merit rating sheet, and the instruction to change the noted "merit increase" for Smith to "automatic increase." Similarly, mention should be made of the forge initials of Chapman's payroll change notice. In addition, Farkos' testimony was self-contradictory in a number of instances. It should be remembered that he was the one who would not make deals when talking to one employee but would make deals when talking to another employee. He was also the one who purported to be disturbed by the idle time of employees, yet he was the one who admitted doing nothing about it for 6 months. He was the one who testified of dramatic changes brought about by creeping changes in headers, yet he was the one who ordered no reduction of personnel in that department. He was also the one who told Rentner that Rentner would not get one red cent for his injured wrist while in the same breath telling him that he (Farkos) had no control over payments to Rentner. Farkos even seemed unable to supply a firm and dependable answer on his own education, testifying first that he needed a half dozen lab courses, then changing it to a dozen courses, and finally admitting that he did not know just how many he needed. Another important witness for the Respondent was Personnel Director Barth. Reference has previsouly been made to his lack of credibility as evidenced by the statements made by him to the unemployment compensation authorities in connection with the claim of employee Rentner. In that proceeding he was unhesitant in stating that he had called Doctor Grossman. At this hearing he was just as sure that it was Farkos, not he, who had called the Zeitlin Clinic and not Doctor Grossman. Notice shoudld also be taken of his contradictions. Thus, at one point he testified to meeting with foremen concerning the mass discharges prior to March 29. At another point, however, he testified that he did not meet GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. with the foremen to discuss the impending discharges. This elasticity with the truth is also revealed by other actions. He admitted sending letters of reference inquiring about Respondent's former employees. Although these letters were mailed months after their discharge, they stated that the employee "has been employed by this Company" and not "had been." Similarly, although he testified that the dischargees were offered reemployment by the letter of June 11, a careful reading of the letter makes it quite clear that it is only an offer to apply for employment and not an offer of employment. The testimony of the chief executive of the Respondent, its president, Bob Crawford, also contains inconsistencies. Reference has already been made to his testimonial inconsistency concerning his mention of the Kentucky Screw Plant as well as to his seeming ignorance of a substantial layoff at Great Lakes as recently as 1962. Similarly, notice is taken of his denial while on the stand that he told a Mr. Brayman of a 10-week backlog of orders. Mr. Brayman's associate, however, testified that he was present when Crawford made such a statement. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this contradiction. The testimony of Foremen Adams and Insalata was also unreliable. Both of these men testified concerning Smith's poor work performance. In the case of Insalata, his version was overwhelming discredited by the testimony of the very men he claimed to have relied upon, men who were either still employed by the Respondent and, therefore, not apt to dispute the word of their foreman unjustifiably or who had left the employ of the Respondent voluntarily and on good terms and, therefore, without reason to be biased. Adams like others mentioned previously, also showed a certain elasticity with facts, first testifying that Smith left his department "four or five times in a half night" and later changing it to once on each of 3 nights. In addition, his testimony was incorrect in a number of instances if we accept the testimony of other witnesses for the Respondent, referred to earlier. In summary, the testimony of Respondent's witnesses, from company president to foreman, proved unreliable. Moreover, their demeanor on the stand, which the printed record reflects only partially, confirmed that conclusion. E. Concluding Findings As found above, Respondent has engaged in a variety and multiplicity of unfair labor practices between February 2, 1965, the date of the settlement agreement, and May 11, 1965, the date on which the Regional Director withdrew the approval of the settlement agreement. I conclude that the withdrawal of the approval was warranted. Accordingly, the presettlement conduct of the Respondent may be used not only as background evidence bearing upon Respondent's postsettlement conduct, but also on the merits as evidence of the unlawful presettlement activity. 1. Section 8(a)(1) The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)' of the Act in the following instances: a. The attempted destruction of motel records showing the presence of Respondent's personnel director on the day of the union meeting; b. Jennings Crawford's interrogation of Corder and the impression and solicitation of surveillance therein; c. Norman's interrogation of Spray concerning union desires; 169 d. Farkos' similar interrogation of Spray; e. Farkos' request that Spray remove his union button; f. Farkos' change of attitude on Spray's telephone calls after Spray's removal of the union button, as an inducement to Spray for not supporting the Union; g. Norman's interrogation of Donnelly, threatening loss of wages; h. Norman's conversation with Earl Casas implying surveillance and threats; i. Crawford's conversation with Arlene Casas concerning Earl's discharge and prohibiting union button wearing; j. Farkos' promises of job security to Chapman; k. Farkos' threats of plant closing to Chapman; 1. Crawford's speech of December 14 threatening plant closing and announcing a general wage increase; in. The institution of new absentee rules because of the Union; n. Insalata's threat of discharge to Pierce; o. Farkos' instruction to supervisors to engage in surveillance; p. Superintendent Ford's reprimand of Foreman Mann for not reporting union button wearers; q. Farkos' reprimand of Wilbourn: r. Farkos' conversation with Wilbourn creating the impression of surveillance; s. Farkos' request to Wilbourn to put his union button on Erickson's desk; t. Farkos' threat of discharge to Wilbourn for failure to remove the button; u. Orawiec's restriction of Wilbourn's union talk: v. Farkos' threat to Wilbourn to make the NLRB hearing last 6 months; w. Farkos' destruction of Smith's merit sheet and the alteration of his wage record card; x. Crawford's interrogation of Martin; y. Crawford's promises of benefits to Martin; z. Farkos' threat to sue Gary; aa. Gerdzas' restriction of Story's union talk; bb. Crawford's remark to Rentner about wearing a union badge: cc. Farkos' threat of discharge to Rentner; dd. Farkos' refusal to pay for Rentner's medical expenses implying union membership as the reason; ee. The various incidents of unfair labor practices alleged in paragraph VII of the complaint, admitted in the Respondent's answer and not specifically listed above. 2. Section 8(a)(2) Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by its domination and interference with the formation and administration of the Employee Advisory Committee and by its support of it. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., supra; Texas Bolt Co., 135 NLRB 1188. 3. Section 8(a)(3) Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in the following instances; (a) Norman's restriction of Spray's movement; (b) Farkos' grant of a retroactive pay increase to Spray after removal of the union button; (c) Farkos' discharge of Earl Casas: (d) Farkos' delay in approving Chapman's pay increase; (e) Gowran's restriction of Tulk's movement; (f) Insalata's restriction of McCutcheon' s movement ; (g) Adams transfer of Lundberg; (h) Erickson's transfer of Wilbourn; (i) Wilbourn's cut in pay; (j) Orawiec's restriction of Wilbourn's movement; (k) Farkos' dismissal of Wilbourn: 170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1) Adams' dismissal of Smith; (m) Barth's refusal to rehire Martin; (n) the mass discharge of 37 employees in March 29, 1965; (o) the transfer of 13 employees on March 29, 1965; (p) the discharge of Story; (q) the discharge of Chapman; (r) the discharge of Day; (s) the discharge of McNanna; (t) the refusal to allow Rentner time off to see a doctor: and (u) the discharge of Rentner. 4. Section 8(a)(4) Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act by its institution of a plant rule concerning absenteeism of its employees who appear as witnesses at a Board hearing. 5. Allegations dismissed The following portions of the complaint are dismissed for failure of proof: a. Paragraph VII (a), Item: Stangley Gowran-October 1964: (e), Item: Stanley Gowran-October 1964. b. Paragraph?X (b)-the appointment of committee representatives by Farkos. c. Paragraph XI (a)-Bill Sebolt. d. Paragraph XIV (b), Item: Tom Ford-February 15, 1965: (n)-the discharge of Foreman Mann. e. Paragraph XVI (a) and (b), Items: Bill Sebolt: (a) Item: Carsten Nelson. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action. Having found that Respondent has discriminated in regard to the tenure or terms or conditions of employment to discourage membership in the Union, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to offer such employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to the seniority and other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment to them of the sum of money equal to the amount they normally would have earned as wages from the dates of their discharges or demotions to the date of the offer of reinstatement less their net earnings , to which should be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the provisions set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. 3 It appears that some of the employees discharged, demoted, or transferred may have already been reemployed by the Respondent, but it is not clear that such rehirings have been with restoration of seniority and other rights or to the same position such employee held at the time of the discriminatory action. In those instances where the discrimination consists of a change in the condition of employment without any loss of pay, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to offer such employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and to discontinue any discriminatory term or condition of employment.3 Although not all of the employees discharged, demoted, or transferred were union members, the order recommends reinstatement and restoration for all. In Ellis and Watts Products, Inc., 130 NLRB 1216, enfd. 297 F.2d 576 (C.A. 6), Respondent argued that since its layoff was according to seniority it could not be said it discriminated against employees unlawfully. The Board rejected this argument, pointing out that there (as here) Respondent knew that the bulk of the employees affected supported the Union. ... The layoff was made to discourage union activity and in such circumstances the layoff of the entire group must be regarded as discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Moreover, whether or not the Respondent had knowledge of the individual employee's union activity, it is clear that the layoff was calculated to or tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to engage in union or concerted activity. Thus, whether or not the layoff was discriminatory, it was clearly an infringement of employees' rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thus in violation of Section 8(a)(1). The appropriate remedy in either case wherein a layoff constitutes the unfair labor practice includes reinstatement of the employees who were the victims of the layoff and their reimbursement for loss of earnings. I shall also recommend that Respondent discontinue its domination and support of the Employees' Advisory Committee. Having found that the absentee plant rule concerning witnesses attending Board hearings is a violation of the Act, I shall recommend the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist maintaining such a rule and notify its employees that such rule has been rescinded.4 Similarly, since I have found the absentee rule of February 3, 1965, to have been promulgated by the Respondent to interfere with the exercise of the rights guaranteed to its employees under Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to notify each and every employee that the Union is not and has not been responsible for the Company's absentee and tardiness rule. I shall also recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist in its various acts of interference, restraint, and coercion practices upon the employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act as found above. Inasmuch as the Respondent has engaged in substantial violations of the Act in a variety of ways and since I am of the opinion that there exists a danger of the commission of other unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Resolution of such problems are left to review upon compliance. 4 Although the illegal rule has been rescinded by the Respondent , a cease-and-desist order is appropriate. G & W Electric Specialty Company, 154 NLRB 1136. GREAT LAKES RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing , it is recommended that the Respondent , Great Lakes Screw Corporation, its officers , agents , successors, and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening its employees with loss of employment and wages and other reprisals for engaging in union activities. (b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union activities. (c) Surveillance or creating the impression of surveillance of the union meetings and activities. (d) Unlawfully soliciting employees to revoke their union authorization, to refrain from wearing union buttons, and from attending union meetings. (e) Promising financial and other benefits to employees if they refrain from supporting the Union or to induce them to do so. (f) Unlawfully restricting its employees from freedom of movement or communicating with other persons because of their support of the Union or to induce them to refrain from supporting the Union. (g) Warning employees that attempts to bargain through the Union would be futile. (h) Interfering with and obstructing a Board investigation by causing the alteration or destruction of records or attempting to do so. (i) Dominating and interfering with the formation and administration of the Employees' Advisory Committee and rendering unlawful support to said organization. (j) Changing the terms or conditions of employment of the employees as a reprisal for engaging in union activities or to induce them to forego union activities. (k) Instituting plant rules and disciplinary procedures affecting employees for assisting the Union or to induce them to refrain from so doing. (1) Instituting and applying a no-solicitation rule discriminatorily. (m) Instituting and applying a plant rule which penalizes witnesses appearing at a Board hearing. (n) Instructing employees to report the union activities and attitudes of other employees so as to interfere with the exercise of self-organizing rights of such employees. (o) Discouraging membership in the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers , AFL-CIO, by discriminating against employees in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (p) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders , Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer the following employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent SCREW CORP. 171 positions as of the date indicated opposite each of their names below , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make such employees whole for any loss that they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the section of the above Decision entitled, "The Remedy": C. Anderson March 29, 1965 V. Baratta March 29, 1965 D. Barrett March 29, 1965 C. Black March 29, 1965 'P. Brock-Jones March 29, 1965 R. Carlson March 29, 1965 A. Casas March 29, 1965 Earl Casas December 9, 1964 H. Case March 29, 1965 Maurice Chapman April 21, 1965 D. Cingrani March 29, 1965 B. Clare March 29, 1965 J. Cravens March 29, 1965 Dennis Day March 30, 1965 E. Donnelly March 29, 1965 W. Downey March 29, 1965 D. Evans March 29, 1965 J. Faron March 29, 1965 P. Fuqua March 29, 1965 H. Guindon March 29, 1965 T. Hickey March 29, 1965 D. Kennedy March 29, 1965 P. Kennedy March 29, 1965 M. Kordiak March 29, 1965 F. Kozik March 29, 1965 James Lundberg February 15, 1965 W. Lussenhop March 29, 1965 F. Martin March 29, 1965 Don McNanna May 3, 1965 B. Miles March 29, 1965 R. Morris March 29, 1965 D. Older March 29, 1965 J. Phillips March 29, 1965 C. Powell March 29, 1965 Ray Rentner April 26, 1965 R. Reynolds March 29, 1965 M. Rito March 29, 1965 F. Smith March 29, 1965 M. Smith March 29, 1965 William Smith, Jr. March 26, 1965 Lee Story March 29, 1965 H. Struthers March 29, 1965 E. Taylor March 29, 1965 R. Taylor March 29, 1965 A. Terry March 29, 1965 B. Truschka March 29, 1965 Edward Tulk March 29, 1965 J. Turnbull March 29, 1965 D. Warden March 29, 1965 R. Waters March 29, 1965 B. Whatley March 29, 1965 Bill Wilbourn March 22, 1965 J. Witkowski March 29, 1965 (b) Notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Notify the employees by posting in conspicuous places in its plant, including all places where notices to 172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees are customarily posted, an announcement that the Union was not responsible for the institution of its absentee and tardiness rule of February 3, 1965. (d) Notify each and every employee that absence and tardiness resulting from an employee's attendance at an NLRB hearing pursuant to a subpena served upon him shall be excused and not counted as an absence or tardiness under any rule of the Company. (e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determination of compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) above. (f) Post in conspicuous places in its place of business, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Steps should be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,. what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.6 5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify out employees that: WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of employment or wages or other reprisals for engaging in union activity. WE WILL NOT interrogate you coercively concerning union activities. WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of, or create the impression of surveillance of, union meetings and activities. WE WILL NOT unlawfully solicit you to revoke your union authorization, to refrain from wearing union buttons, and from attending union meetings. WE WILL NOT offer financial or other benefits to you nor restrict your freedom of movement or communication with other persons nor change your terms or conditions of employment nor institute plant rules and disciplinary procedures, either because you support the Union or to induce you to refrain from supporting the Union. WE WILL NOT warn you that attempts to bargain through the Union would be futile. WE WILL NOT interfere with or obstruct Board investigations by causing the alteration or destruction of records or attempting to do so. WE WILL NOT dominate or interfere with the formation and administration of the Employees' Advisory Committee or any other labor organization nor render unlawful support to it. WE WILL NOT institute or apply a no-solicitation rule discriminatorily. WE WILL NOT institute or apply any plant rule which penalizes witnesses appearing at a Board hearing. WE WILL NOT instruct employees to report the union activities or attitudes of other employees so as to interfere with the exercise of self-organizing rights of such employees. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, by discriminating against employees in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL offer the following employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions as of the date indicated opposite each of their names below without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed and make such employees whole for any loss they may have suffered by reason of the h di i i i i on aga nst t em: scr m nat C. Anderson March 29, 1965 V. Baratta March 29, 1965 D. Barrett March 29, 1965 C. Black March 29, 1965 P. Brock-Jones March 29, 1965 R. Carlson March 29, 1965 A. Casas March 29, 1965 Earl Casas December 9, 1964 H. Case March 29, 1965 Maurice Chapman April 21, 1965 D. Cingrani March 29, 1965 B. Clare March 29, 1965 J. Cravens March 29, 1965 Dennis Day March 30, 1965 E. Donnelly March 29, 1965 W. Downey March 29, 1965 D. Evans March 29, 1965 J. Faron March 29, 1965 P. Fuqua March 29, 1965 H. Guindon March 29, 1965 T. Hickey March 29, 1965 GREAT LAKES D. Kennedy March 29, 1965 P. Kennedy March 29, 1965 M. Kordiak March 29, 1965 F. Kozik March 29, 1965 James Lundberg February 15, 1965 W. Lussenhop March 29, 1965 F. Martin March 29, 1965 Don McNanna May 3, 1965 B. Miles March 29, 1965 R. Morris March 29, 1965 D. Older March 29, 1965 J. Phillips March 29, 1965 C. Powell March 29, 1965 Ray Rentner April 26, 1965 R. Reynolds March 29, 1965 M. Rito March 29, 1965 F. Smith March 29, 1965 M. Smith March 29, 1965 William Smith, Jr. March 26, 1965 Lee Story March 29, 1965 H. Struthers March 29, 1965 E. Taylor March 29, 1965 R. Taylor March 29, 1965 A. Terry March 29, 1965 B. Truschka March 29, 1965 Edward Tulk March 29, 1965 J. Turnbull March 29, 1965 D. Warden March 29, 1965 R. Waters March 29, 1965 B. Whatley March 29, 1965 Bill Wilbourn March 22, 1965 J. Witkowski March 29, 1965 WE WILL notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United SCREW CORP. 173 States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. The Union was not responsible for the institution of the absentee and tardiness rule of February 3, 1965. Absences and tardiness resulting from your attendance at a Board hearing pursuant to a subpena served upon you shall be excused and not counted as an absence or tardiness under any rule of the Company. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization. GREAT LAKES SCREW CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse & Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone 828-7597.