164 NLRB 192
Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Co.
192
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Company
and United Order of American Bricklayers
and Stone Masons' Union , Local No. 21.
Case 13-CA-6882.
April 28,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On February 11, 1966, Trial Examiner Joseph I.
Nachman issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor
practices and dismissed these allegations of the
complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the
Charging
Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. The
Respondent filed an answering brief to the
exceptions and briefs of the General Counsel and the
Charging Party.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
We adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the
complaint should be dismissed insofar as it alleges
that layoffs
made on January 7 and 20 and
February 2, 1965, were motivated by the fact that the
employees were involved in union charges against
Foreman Truesdale and hence violative of the Act.
As more fully explicated by the Trial Examiner,
layoffs on the aforementioned dates were necessary
for
economic reasons.
According to testimony,
accepted by the Trial Examiner, the selections for
the layoffs were made on the basis of an established
nondiscriminatory practice which took into account
ability and seniority, and this testimony is in no way
contradicted by other evidence.2 If it is also a fact
that certain of those selected happened to favor
charges
against
Truesdale
to
Respondent's
knowledge or belief, it is equally significant that the
record does not establish such knowledge or belief
as to every complainant, that 9 employees who took
no part in any action against Truesdale were among
the 20 selected for layoff, and that some who were so
involved did not suffer a layoff.
It was alleged that one of those retained was later
discriminatorily transferred to another worksite. The
Trial Examiner dismissed that allegation and we also
adopt this disposition. In addition to the facts recited
by the Trial Examiner in this connection, the record
contains testimony by Miller, who directed the
transfer, that, when additional men were needed at
the Touhy Avenue job, he included Clemons among
those selected for transfer because Clemons had
previously worked with the foreman at that site who
"seemed to think quite a bit of him so I switched
Mr. Clemons there."
Like the Trial Examiner, we do not find that a
preponderance
of
the
evidence
supports the
complaint in the foregoing respects.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations
Board
adopts
as
its
Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Frank Miller's
Sons Fireproofing Company, Chicago, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the
action
set
forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
I would find that, in addition to the violations of
the Act found by the Trial Examiner, and affirmed
.by my colleagues, the Respondent discriminatorily
laid off 11 employees in January and February 1965,
and discriminatorily transferred George Clemons to
a more onerous job.
In the fall of 1964 some employees of Respondent,
a masonry contractor working on the new Chicago
civic center, complained to their business agent,
Charles Roche, about allegedly unsafe working
conditions.
Roche
had
several
discussions
concerning this
matter
with
Foreman Ernest
Truesdale, who was a member of the Union, and
indicated that a number of men intended to press
' In fn 7 of his Decision, the Trial Examiner correctly listed
William Cork among the employees who signed the union charges
against Foreman Truesdale, but inadvertently stated (section I, A,
subheading "The Current Facts," last paragraph) that Cork, who
also appeared and testified at the hearing, had not signed the
charge In addition, the record establishes that it was Bernard
McCluskie and not Robert McCluskie, as found by the Trial
Examiner, who failed to appear at the hearing due to illness
' The selection of Miller and Zawacki for layoff is not proof to,
the contrary, as the dissent suggests , because another employee
with equal seniority on the crew was retained The evidence does
not show that either Miller or Zawacki had a better claim to
retention than such other employee . And with respect to the
matter of subsequent hirings for this crew, without recalling
Miller and Zawacki, the employment pattern appears to be one of
hirings and layoffs as called for by the workload, with hinngs
being made from among those who apply for work
164 NLRB No. 29
FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO.
union charges against Truesdale if conditions were
not improved. On January 16, 1965, charges were
filed with the Union against Truesdale and also
against Stevens, a strawboss under Truesdale. The
charge was filed by Roche and 14 employees and
was received by Truesdale on January 20. At the
February 1 hearing, 12 of the employees who signed
the charge appeared and testified, as did Martin
Zawacki. As a result of the hearing, Truesdale was
fined $300 and Stevens $100.
Prior to the hearing, particularly in December
1964 and January 1965, Truesdale was aware of the
probability that such charges would be filed, and he
either knew, or at least suspected, the names of
employees planning to file charges. From the end of
December on, he made a number of statements
threatening that employees who participated in
protesting the conditions would never work for him
or the Respondent again. I join my colleagues in
finding that these statements were designed to deter
the employees from concertedly protesting what
they regarded as unsafe conditions, and were
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In addition, the Respondent laid off some 20
employees on January 7 and 20 and February 2,
allegedly because economic reasons justified a
reduction in force.3 Subjected to these layoffs were
11 men who were involved in the union proceeding
against Foreman Truesdale and a lower ranking
foreman, Stevens. While I accept Respondent's
claim that economic reasons motivated some
reduction in the work force, I am persuaded for the
reasons
discussed
hereafter
that
Truesdale's
selection
of
certain
employees
was but the
fulfillment of his threats that employees who had
protested the unsafe working conditions would never
work for him or the Respondent again.
In
arriving
at
my conclusion that certain
employees were discriminatorily selected for layoff,
I note that in addition to Foreman Truesdale's
repeated threats, Truesdale (except for the layoffs
from Esposito's crew) made the initial selection of
employees for layoff;' that Truesdale knew some of
the
employees
who had protested the unsafe
working conditions even before union charges were
filed;
that, after charges were filed, Truesdale
learned the names of those signing the charges and,
on the next layoff, all of the '5 men-laid off were
involved in the proceedings against him.
3 The Respondent' s claim that its usual practice in making
layoffs is to retain the best men, or if equal in ability to lay off the
newest members of a crew, is supported only by oral expression of
this policy by Truesdale and Job Superintendent Dan Miller
Moreover, even if I accepted this as being the "policy,"
Respondent advanced no proof, aside from verbal declarations,
that the policy was followed Such bald, after-the-fact declarations
are of little weight-as opposed to the overt acts against those
employees
who had registered dissatisfaction
with
safety
conditions on the job-in determining whether the selections for
layoffs were based on solely nondiscriminatory reasons
193
Sometime before the initial layoff on January 7,
Truesdale was aware that a number of employees
were complaining that working conditions on the
civic center job were unsafe. Indeed, this had been a
continuing complaint among certain employees
since the fall of 1964, and when the union steward on
the job, Frank Ladone, had been unable to remedy
the situation, Roche, the union business agent,
appointed
Benton as a new union steward.
Thereafter,
Truesdale commented to employee
Reiner that while he had previously considered
Benton a friend, he would never work for him or the
Respondent,
again.
Further,
on
December 29,
Truesdale commented to Union Business Agent
Roche that Zawacki was the one who had reported
the working conditions to the Union. Though Roche
denied this, Truesdale was unlikely to place much
credence in the denial inasmuch as Zawacki had
several times complained directly to Truesdale
about unsafe conditions on the job. Before the
January 7 layoff, Truesdale commented to employee
Charles Miller that he had heard that 15 or more
men were going to prefer charges against him and he
also questioned employee Reiner as to whether
Reiner knew about people calling the union hall and
creating discord and trouble on the job. After the
layoff, Truesdale told employee Haas that he had
laid off some men and that "we" never had "such
big union trouble before" as with the new men. The
inference is clear that Truesdale considered the new
men as troublemakers and desired to get rid of them
because of their complaints about safety conditions
and their threats to file charges against him.
On January 7, 5 of the 10 ten employees selected
for layoff were among those who had protested
working conditions or who later signed charges
against Truesdale.s As the Trial Examiner noted, the
record leaves "no room for doubt" that Truesdale at
least suspected, if he did not know, the actual
identity of some of the employees who desired to file
charges against him. Moreover, it is also clear that
he learned the names of those who signed the
charges because, on January 18, he asked employee
,Reiner if he had signed the charges, and Reiner
denied that he did. The following day Truesdale
asked Reiner why he had lied. As Reiner had in fact,
signed the charges, it is clear that Truesdale had'
knowledge of who signed the charges even before
the union hearing which he attended on February 1,
' In finding a discriminatory selection of employees for layoff, it
is unnecessary to .resolve the conflict in testimony as to whether
'fruesdale alone was responsible for selecting the men for layoff
or whether they were selected by Truesdale and approved by Job
Superintendent Dan Miller after discussion with Truesdale In
either case, Truesdale made the initial selection for layoff
S The five were William Gray, Bernard McCluskie, Robert
McCluskie, Michael Kristich, and Victor Blacconeri Except for
Blacconeri and Bernard McCluskie, they also testified at the
union hearing
194
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
where a number of employees testified as to unsafe
working conditions. 6
All of the men laid off on January 20 were involved
in the proceeding against Truesdale, as four of the
five employees selected had signed the charges, and
the fifth, Martin Zawacki, who appeared at the union
hearing, was regarded by Truesdale as the main
troublemaker.'
Moreover, the three men selected by Truesdale
from his crew (Johann Haas, Leonard Siemieniec,
and Eugene Reiner) had been interrogated by
Truesdale about the charges and, in some instances,
on their participation in making the charges. On
January 20, before the layoff, Truesdale indicated to
Reiner that those who signed the charge would never
work for him again.8 With respect to Haas, on or
around January 20, Truesdale inquired if Haas had
heard about the charges, and when Haas, on being
laid off, asked why he was laid off, Truesdale stated
he (Truesdale) did not have to tell Haas anything.
The third man, Siemieniec, was asked by Truesdale,
several hours before he was laid off, if he knew
anything about the fellows who signed the charges
and was told by Truesdale that while some of them
had been his friends, they wouldn't be anymore.
Two of the five men laid off on January 20
(Charles Miller and Martin Zawacki), only 2 days
before had been assigned to work for Foreman Carl
Esposito
in
the
basement level.
The facts
surrounding
this
layoff
make
unpersuasive
Respondent's testimony that the layoffs were solely
because these two men were the last men in
Esposito's crew, and that Truesdale had no hand in
their selection. Esposito first testified that these
were the newest men on the crew but he later
acknowledged a third man, Patterson, was assigned
to him at the same time as Miller and Zawacki. Thus,
there was another new employee in Esposito's crew
and the record fails to show why Patterson, who was
not involved in the union charges, was retained
instead of Miller or Zawacki, particularly since
Miller was assigned to the basement because he was
a good bricklayer (work in the basement called for
more highly skilled workmanship) and Zawacki was
one of the oldest employees (since August 1964) on
the civic center job. Esposito's claim that he was
unaware of the problems of his fellow supervisor,
Truesdale, is highly unlikely on a job of this nature in
view of Truesdale's open, extensive, and blatant
hostility to the employees who complained about
safety
conditions,
and it is rebutted by the
uncontradicted
testimony
of
Zawacki,
not
discredited
by the Trial Examiner, that when
Zawacki asked why he was laid off, he was told by
Esposito that this was between Truesdale "and me
[Zawacki]." Zawacki and Miller had long been
objects
of interrogation
and
accusations
by
Truesdale, and their transfer to a different crew
resulted in their being the newest employees for
purposes of crew seniority and in their being laid off
2 days later, while an employee with equal crew
seniority was retained. Yet, shortly after Miller and
Zawacki
were laid off, Esposito was seeking
additions
to
his
crew.
Indeed,
on
Monday,
January 25, four men were added to Esposito's crew.
Thus, Miller and Zawacki were laid off after 3 days'
work on the pretext that they were the last men on
Esposito's crew and were not recalled several days
later when four men were added to Esposito's crew.9
The last layoff was on February 2, and involved
five men, including William Cork who had signed
the charges and who had appeared at the hearing on
February 1. With his removal, all but four10 of those
involved in the proceeding against Truesdale were
effectively laid off from the civic center project.
I would also find discriminatory the February 17
transfer of George Clemons from work on the civic
center to work on another of Respondent's projects,
the Touhy Avenue job. Clemons had complained
about safety conditions in December 1964, and was
injured on the job on January 6, 1965. Clemons'
injury on January 6 resulted, after a discussion
between Roche, Truesdale, and Dan Miller, in Miller
calling the employees together and telling them that
conditions
would
be
improved.
Clemons
subsequently signed the union charges against
Truesdale and Stevens, and appeared at the hearing
of February 1 on these charges. A week after the
hearing, Truesdale told Roche that he was going to
lay
off
Clemons as he was nothing but a
troublemaker. When Roche protested that Clemons
was injured on the job and still going to the doctor,
Truesdale stated he had told Dan Miller the job was
not big enough for both of them (Truesdale and
6 Except for the union hearing on February 1 where employees
testified with respect to their charges , Truesdale was never
officially notified prior to this proceeding as to the names of
employees who had signed the charges
' As noted previously, Truesdale had told Roche that he knew
Zawacki was the person calling the union hall and making all the
trouble In January , Truesdale several times accused Zawacki of
calling the business agent , and Assistant Foreman Stevens told
Zawacki that if he
(Zawacki) didn't like the way the job was
running he ought to get off the job
9 While Reiner and two other discimnatees received letters in
March 1965 asking about their availability for work, this does not
affect
my conclusion that the employees were chosen
discrimmatonly for layoffs in January inasmuch as the charge
herein was filed before these letters were written I would also
reject as unwarranted the Trial Examiner's assumption that the
General Counsel's failure to ask 9 other employees if they
received such letters indicates they did
0 The circumstances of Miller 's and Zawacki's layoff appear
inconsistent with Respondent's alleged practice of retaining the
best men in a crew , or laying off the newest men if other factors
are equal See fn 2, above
10 The four remaining men presented special circumstances,
and one , Clemons, infra, I find, was subjected to a subsequent
discriminatory transfer
Hartle had been scheduled for the first
layoff, but was retained after Roche told Truesdale that Hartle
needed the job because of medical expenses Union Agent Roche
testified that Truesdale told him (Roche) that employee Berman
had called Truesdale and warned him that charges were going to
be filed
Benton was the union steward and as such had super
seniority
FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO.
195
Clemons) and that Miller would have to get rid of
Clemons or himself. Thereafter, Clemons was
transferred to the Touhy Avenue job. While the civic
center job involved indoor work unaffected by the
weather, the Touhy Avenue work was outdoors and
inclement weather in February and March interfered
with
work.
Thus,
between
February 17
and
March 10, Clemons worked only a total of about 35
hours in part because of poor weather conditions. I
find that Respondent's transfer of Clemons was
discriminatory and penalized him for engaging in
union and lawful concerted activity."
For the reasons set out above, I would find that the
layoffs on January 7 and 20 and February 2 of
employees involved in the union charges against
Truesdale
were discriminatorily
motivated, and
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, as did the
transfer of George Clemons to the less desirable
Touhy Avenue job.
" When Clemons returned on March 30, he was discharged
under circumstances which the Trial Examiner found were
violative of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER' S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Trial Examiner: This complaint'
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as
amended (herein called the Act), which alleges
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by Frank
Miller's
Sons
Fireproofing
Company (herein called
Respondent or Company), by threats of reprisal, and by
laying off certain employees because of their concerted
activity and other support of United Order of American
Bricklayers and Stone Masons' Union, Local No. 21
(herein called Local 21, or the Union), was heard by me at
Chicago, Illinois, on August 3, 4, and 5. The basic issue
presented for decision is whether (except in one instance),
the employees were laid off because they participated in
filing and prosecuting a charge before the Union against a
foreman, who was a member of the Union, for maintaining
unsafe working conditions. With respect to the one other
employee who was discharged, the issue is whether the
discharge was motivated by the fact that the employee had
filed a charge with the Board.
At the hearing all parties were represented by counsel,
and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant and
material evidence, and to argue orally on the record. Oral
argument was waived. Briefs submitted by the General
Counsel and Respondent, respectively, have been duly
considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT2
1.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
A. Background
Respondent is engaged in the Chicago, Illinois, area, as
a masonry contractor. Among the numerous construction
projects on which Respondent was engaged at the time of
the events here involved, was the civic center in downtown
Chicago,' on which it began work in mid-1964. For a
number of years Respondent has been a member of an
employer association which bargained collectively with
the Union, and at all times material there was in effect a
contract with the Union, covering the wages, hours, and
working conditions of the bricklayers and laborers
employed by Respondent. The employees work in crews.
Because of its size, a number of crews worked at this
project, each under the supervision of a foreman. A
general
superintendent-at
this
job
Dan
Miller-coordinated and generally supervised all work to
be performed by Respondent. Other duties performed by
the superintendent are to attend weekly meetings which
the
various subcontractors attend with the general
contractor for the purpose of scheduling the progress of
the work and the completion dates for various stages
thereof, by the several subcontractors.
It is undisputed that for Respondent to perform its work
at the civic center project, it is necessary that other
craftsmen first perform the work required of them. On
each floor of the building it was necessary that the
sheetmetal workers complete about half of the area, and
that the pipe coverers do the work required of them in the
area
completed by the sheetmetal workers, before
Respondent's employees can work on that floor. Also
undisputed is the testimony adduced by Respondent, that
when it becomes necessary to reduce force because of
lack of work, the employer selects for retention those he
regards as the most competent, or if competency is equal,
the more senior members of the crew are retained, and
that when an employee is laid off for lack of work, there is
no obligation on the part of the employer to seek out or
offer work to the laid-off employee, when such work again
becomes available.
The Current Facts
In the fall of 1964, certain employees of Respondent
complained to their business agent, Charles Roche, that
working conditions on the civic center job were unsafe.
Roche directed his steward, Frank Ladone, to try and get
the
conditions
complained
of
corrected.
Ladone
apparently was unsuccessful and was removed as steward.
Roche then appointed Benton as steward, and directed
him to obtain correction of the alleged unsafe conditions,
but he also was apparently unable to achieve the results
Roche sought. In the meanwhile Roche on several
occasions, discussed the alleged unsafe conditions with
Foreman Truesdale and told the latter, who is a member of
the Union, that the men intended to prefer charges against
him with the Union, unless conditons complained of were
corrected. According to Roche, Truesdale promised to do
what he could to correct the alleged unsafe conditions. On
January 6, after employee George Clemons had been
injured on the job, Roche talked with Foreman Truesdale
and Job Superintendent Dan Miller about the alleged
unsafe conditions, telling Truesdale that he (Roche) had
' Issued April 27, upon a charge filed February 5, amended
:March 17, and further amended March 31. All dates mentioned
herein are 1965 unless otherwise noted.
2 No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented. The
complaint alleges and the answer admits the facts necessary to
establish these elements. I find the facts to be as pleaded.
0 This building, covering an entire block at Randolph and Clark
Streets, is intended to house the courts and other functions of
Cook Country and the city of Chicago.
298-668 0-69-14
196
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the names of 20 men who wanted to file charges against
him. On this occasion Dan Miller called the employees
together and told them that while conditions were not what
they should be, they would improve.
The record leaves no room for doubt that Truesdale at
least suspected if he did not actually know the identity of
at least some of the employees who desired to file charges
against him. Thus, on December 29, 1964, when Roche
and Truesdale were engaged in conversation, employee
Zawacki passed by, and Truesdale commented that
Zawacki was the "s.o.b." who had reported the working
conditions to the union hall. Roche told Truesdale he was
wrong.4 In early to mid-January, Truesdale told employees
Miller and Haas that about 15 men were going to file
charges against him, commenting that he had not
theretofore had the kind of trouble he was now having with
the new men. On January 18, Truesdale asked employee
Reiner if he (Reiner) had signed the charges. Reiner
denied that he had done so. The following day Truesdale
asked Reiner why he had lied the preceding day about
signing the charge. Some 3 weeks prior thereto Truesdale
had told Reiner that steward Benton had worked for him
before, and that he (Truesdale) thought Benton was his
friend, but that Benton would never work for him or
Respondent again. After charges were filed with the Union
against Truesdale, as hereafter related, Truesdale told
Reiner that he (Truesdale) would find out who had signed
the charges against him and that none of them would again
work for Respondent.5
By a document dated and filed with the Union on
January 16, Foreman Truesdale, and Stevens, a strawboss
under Truesdale, were charged with violations of the
Union's working rules relating to safety.' The charge was
signed by Business Agent Roche and 14 of Respondent's
employees.7 By letter dated January 18, and received on
January 20, Truesdale and Stevens were directed to
appear before the Union on February 1 and answer the
charges.' At the union hearing on February 1, 12 of the 14
employees who had signed the charge appeared and
testified.9 Two employees (Martin Zawacki and William
Cork), who had not signed the charges, also testified. The
hearing resulted in the imposition of a $300 fine on
Truesdale, and a $100 fine on Stevens.
The Layoffs Involved
Prior to the hearing on the charges filed against
Truesdale and Stevens ,
Respondent laid off certain
employees from the civic center project.
Thus, on
January 7, Respondent laid off 10 eployees10 and on
January 20, laid off 5 additional employees ." Also, on
February 2, Respondent laid off five employees, and on
February 17, transferred George Clemons to another of its
jobs, and thereafter , on March 30, discharged him. Of the
five employees laid off on February 2, only William Cork
had
participated
in
the
union
proceeding
against
Truesdale and Stevens.
In support of its contention that the aforementioned
layoffs on January 7 and 20 and February 2 were entirely
economic in nature , Respondent introduced the following
evidence which is uncontradicted.12
During the month of December 1964 , work on the civic
center had progressed at a faster rate than called for by
the schedules ,
and by January 4 Respondent had
substantially completed the work required of it up to the
level of the 16th floor . However, at the progress meeting of
January 6,
Miller learned that because other trades,
particularly the sheetmetal workers, had fallen behind in
their work, the 17th floor would not become available until
January 15. From this Job Superintendent Dan Miller
concluded that a layoff was necessary . Miller, after
discussing the situation with Foreman Truesdale , directed
the latter to lay off 10 men . As heretofore stated , of the 10
laid off on January 7 , only 5 thereafter signed the charges
against Truesdale and Stevens (Hartle, Kristicht Gray,
B. McCluskie , and R. McCluskie). One other (Pitman),
although he did not sign the charges , or testify at the union
hearing, is alleged in the complaint to have been
discriminatorily discharged. The other four apparently had
no part in the activity of the employees to promote safe
working conditions and are not alleged to have been
discriminatorily
discharged . 13
On January 20,
Miller
concluded that the situation had grown worse, and that a
further personnel reduction was necessary . After Job
Superintendent
Miller's
discussion
with
Foreman
Truesdale, three
men from Truesdale's crew (Haas,
Reiner, and Siemieniec), and two men from Foreman
' Zawacki had theretofore complained to Truesdale about
unsafe conditions and Truesdale accused Zawacki of being the
one who reported this to the Union
5 The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of
the employees referred to, which, for the most part, was not denied
by Truesdale when he testified. To the extent that he did deny the
statements attributed to him, I do credit his denials I have not set
forth all of the statements made to employees by Truesdale, only a
sufficient number to show the character of his statements to the
employees and to demonstrate that he was clearly aware of the
intent of the employees to file charges against him with the Union,
and of his displeasure with their contemplated action
6 Specifically, the charge alleged that on December 28 and 29,
1964, and January 6 (when employee Clemons was injured on the
job), Truesdale and Stevens directed employees to work in
elevator shafts which had not been protected from above with,
proper covering
Y The employees signing the charge were
William Benton
(steward),
Victor
Blacconeri,
George
Clemons,
Leonard
Siemieniec, Michael Kristich, Johann Haas, William Cork, Frank
Hartle, William Gray, Charles Miller, Eugene Reiner, Robert
McCluskie, Bernard McCluskie, and Charles Berman
" Truesdale and Stevens were merely told the nature of the
charge in general terms A copy of the charge did not accompany
the notices, nor did the names of the persons listed who had
signed the charge.
9 The two who did not appear at the hearing were Blacconeri
and Robert McCluskie
10 Included among those laid off on January 7, were William
Gray, Bernard McCluskie, Robert McCluskie, Michael Kristich,
and Victor Blacconeri All five of these subsequently signed the
charges against Truesdale and Stevens The remaining five
apparently took no part in said charges However, one of these
(E L Pitman), is alleged to have been discriminatorily included
in the layoff
11 The employees laid off on this date were Eugene Reiner,
Johann Haas, Charles Miller, Martin Zawacki, and Leonard
Siemieniec All of those had signed the charges against Truesdale
and Stevens, except Zawacki, and he later testified at the
February I hearing
12 The fact relating to the transfer and subsequent discharge of
Clemons will be hereafter set forth
13 There is a conflict in the testimony of Miller and Truesdale
as to who made the selection of the men chosen for layoff on
January 7
Miller testified that the selection was made by
Truesdale and himself as a result of discussions and exchange of
views as to their capabilities Truesdale testified that Miller
merely told him of the necessity of laying off, and that he
(Truesdale) made the selection In my view of the case, it is
unnecessary to resolve the conflict.
FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO.
197
Esposito's crew (Miller and Zawacki) were laid off.14
Foreman Esposito testified, without contradiction, that in
accordance with usual practice he selected Miller and
Zawacki for layoff because they were the two most recent
additions to his crew.
By February 1, progress on the job had still failed to
improve, and Job Superintendent Dan Miller concluded
that further layoffs were required. On the evening of
February 1, after again discussing the situation with
Foreman Truesdale, he directed the latter to lay off five
men at the end of the next day. In accord with this
direction Miller laid off Frigo, Cork, Duffy, Alexander, and
Kivinachki. Of those only Cork had signed the charges
against Truesdale and Stevens or testified at the union
hearing. There is no evidence that the others participated
in any way in the movement regarding the alleged unsafe
working conditions. The evidence also shows that, in
addition to Steward Benton, who presumably by virtue of
his
position,
had superseniority, employees
Hartle,
Clemons, and Berman, who signed the charges against
Truesdale and Stevens and testified in the union hearing,
were not included in the layoffs of January 7 or 20 or
February 2.
Both Superintendent Miller and Foreman Truesdale
testified that in making the layoffs referred to, they
followed, except in one instance, the usual practice of
retaining the best men, or if that was equal, the newest
members of the crew were laid off first.15 The General
Counsel adduced no evidence to establish any departure
from that usual practice.
The Transfer and Subsequent Discharge of George
Clemons
George Clemons, a bricklayer of 12 or 14 years'
experience,
went to work at the civic center in
October 1964.16 On January 6, Clemons was injured on the
job, but apparently lost no time as result thereof.'?
Clemons signed the charges against Truesdale and
Stevens, and testified at the union hearing on February 1.
Clemons was not involved in any of the layoffs above
mentioned, and continued to work at the civic center until
February 17, when he was transferred to a job on Touhy
Avenue, another of Respondent's projects, reporting there
the following day.18 Clemons worked on the Touhy Avenue
job, under the direction of Foreman Hardy, and Job
Superintendent Frank Miller, Jr., until March 9 or 10, and
then went to the hospital for removal of his tonsils.19
Returning from the hospital, Clemons received in the
mails a check for the wages due him for work during the
week of March 9, and a note asking him to call Job
Superintendent Frank Miller, Jr. When Clemons called
Miller the the latter wanted to know where Clemons had
been and when he expected to return. Clemons told Miller
that he expected the doctor to discharge him that weekend
and that he could probably be at work the following
Monday. Miller replied to the effect that there was no
hurry as no work could be done until the snow melted.
March 30 being a warmer day, Clemons went to the
Touhy Avenue job to see if any work would be done.20 He
found Foreman Hardy and Superintendent Miller in a
nearby coffeeshop, and asked if there would be any work.
Miller replied "stick around for a while." While still in the
coffeeshop, Miller said to Clemons, "You filed charges at
the Labor Board against me didn't you?"21 When Clemons
professed not to understand what Miller had reference to,
the latter added, "We can't keep a man around who goes to
the Labor Board against us."22 Miller then asked Clemons
to follow him outside where he pointed out some work that
Clemons performed about March 9 or 10 and asserted that
the work had been improperly performed.23 Clemons
14 Again the testimony is in conflict whether Superintendent
Miller and Foreman Truesdale together made the selection of the
employees to be laid off or whether Truesdale made such
selection The evidence is uncontradicted that Foreman Esposito
was told to lay off two men from his crew and he selected Miller
and Zawacki There is no evidence to indicate that Foreman
Esposito was aware of the efforts of the employees regarding
working conditions, or of the plans to file charges
against
Truesdale Of the five men laid off on January 20, all signed the
charge against Truesdale Truesdale did not receive the notice of
the union hearing until he returned home on the evening of
January 20, and did not see the list of persons signing the charges
until August 5, the day he testified in this proceeding He did, of
course, see the 14 employees who testified at the union hearing
15 The one instance referred to was that of employee Hartle
who was originally selected for layoff on January 7. However,
when Union Agent Roche told Truesdale that Hartle had a sick
child and was hard pressed to meet hospital bills, Truesdale told
Superintendent Miller that he (Truesdale) wanted to retain Hartle,
and Miller consented. Hartle subsequently signed the charges
filed with the Union, and testified at its hearing.
1s Whether he had theretofore worked for Respondent at other
projects does not appear
17 Clemons, while working in an elevator shaft, was struck on
the head by some object falling from above This was one of the
occasions when Union Agent Roche talked to Foreman Truesdale
about alleged unsafe working conditions, complaining that the
injury to Clemons resulted from the absence of proper covering
over the shaft
11 Clemons asked Strawboss Stevens, who notified him of his
transfer, about the reason therefor, but Stevens' only reply was
that he was carrying out orders There is no evidence that
Clemons objected to or protested the transfer His rate of pay on
the Touhy Avenue job was the same as at the civic center There
is no evidence that one job was, for any reason , more desirable
than the other
10 Clemons did visit the job on March 11, but no work was in
progress that day because of bad weather
20 Clemons went to the job several days before March 30, but
found no one there
21 The initial charge filed in this matter February 5, alleged that
Respondent had laid off or discharged 11 named employees on
January 7 and 20, for protesting working conditions on the civic
center job The employees so named did not include Clemons. An
amended charge filed March 17, repeated the allegations of the
original charge, and added the allegation that on February 2,
Respondent discharged
William
Cork, and on February 17,
transferred
Clemons because of their participation in the
movement to obtain safer working conditions on the civic center
job It was the amended charge to which Miller apparently
referred A second amended charge, filed March 31, alleged that
Respondent discharged Clemons on March 30, because of his
assistance to the Board in the investigation of the prior charges
All charges were filed on behalf of the Union by a law firm
22 Miller admits this conversation, but has a somewhat different
version of what was said According to Miller, he asked Clemons
if the latter had gone to the Labor Board, and after Clemons made
some kind of a muffled reply he asked Clemons, "Do you think
that was fair to me " I deem it unnecessary to determine the
precise language employed
Whichever version is correct, Miller
plainly indicated his displeasure about the fact that the processes
of the Board had been invoked Miller admitted that the charge he
had reference to came to his attention on Monday, March 29, or
the
preceding
Friday,
March 26
This
was
after
his
aforementioned telephone conversation with Clemons
23 Miller's complaint was that the vertical mortar joints were
too wide, that as the wall went up it became from 1/2 to 5/8 inches
too wide, and that the leads were not properly run so as to fit with
other work then in progress or to be thereafter performed.
198
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
insisted that water had probably gotten on the wet mortar
causing it to spread, and while admitting that the work
looked bad, contended that he had performed the work as
directed, and that the architect had approved it. Miller
then told Clemons that he could not keep a man who did
work of that kind, and discharged Clemons, paying him for
2 hours as reporting time, on March 30.
Miller admitted that the alleged defective work by
Clemons came to his attention on the morning of March 17
when he walked by that portion of the building, because
the defect was so obvious; that after discussing the matter
with Foreman Hardy the two of them concluded that
Clemons had to be dismissed because they could not rely
on a man who performed such work; and that on the same
day he mailed Clemons his check for the hours worked
during the week ending March 13, with the note asking
that Clemons call the office. According to Miller the
reason for the note was that he wanted to tell Clemons on
the telephone that his service was no longer required.
When Clemons did thereafter telephone Miller, the latter
did not advise Clemons that he was discharged. Miller
admits that he asked Clemons to come to the job, and gave
as his reason therefor that he wanted to show Clemons the
alleged defective work.
Conclusions
Independent 8(a)(1) Violations
Although a great deal of testimony was taken with
respect to complaints made by employees and their
business agents about safety conditions on the civic center
job, I find it unnecessary to decide-and I do not
decide-whether conditions on the job were safe or
unsafe. Whether their complaints were justified or not, the
employees were entitled to seek through their own efforts,
or through their business agent, to bring about a correction
of what they regarded as unsafe conditions, and their
activity in that regard constituted "concerted activities"
for their "mutual aid or protection," which is protected by
Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Washtngton Aluminum
Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9. Any interference with, restraint,
or coercion by Respondent, of employees in the exercise of
such right, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As
heretofore found, there were a number of statements by
Foreman Truesdale, most of which he did not deny,
accusing employees of making the complaint to the Union,
and threatening that no employees who participated in
protesting the alleged unsafe condThos
ons, would ever again
work for him, or for Respondent.
statements were
clearly designed to deter the employees involved from
concertedly protesting what they regarded as unsafe
conditions, and hence violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The 8(a)(3) Allegations
No extended discussion is necessary to establish the
proposition that the layoffs of January 7 and 20 and
February 2, and the February 17 transfer of Clemons, as
alleged in the complaint, were violative of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act, if a motivating factor in that regard was
that the employees involved had exercised their right to
engage in the concerted activity looking toward the
elimination of what they, justifiably or not, regarded as
unsafe working conditions. On the other hand, it is equally
well established that the layoffs and transfer referred to
were not violative of the Act if motivated solely by
economic
necessity.
The burden of proving the
discriminatory motive rests upon the General Counsel.
Upon consideration of the entire record, I find and
conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conduct in
question was motivated by the fact that the employees had
engaged in the concerted activities referred to. I am
persuaded to this conclusion by the following factors:
1. The evidence clearly establishes, indeed the General
Counsel does not question, the economic necessity for
some reduction in force because of the failure of the crafts
working ahead of Respondent to complete their work in a
given area to make room for Respondent to work.
2. The General Counsel adduced no evidence to
establish that Respondent departed to any significant
extent, from its usual practice in selecting the employees
to be laid off.24
3. In each of the three layoffs, employees who did not
participate in the filing of charges against Truesdale and
Stevens, were selected for layoff, while employees who did
so participate were retained. It could, of course, be argued
that in the layoffs of January 7 and January 20, Truesdale
did not have definite information as to the identity of the
employees who particpated in the concerted activity
mentioned, and laid off indiscriminately to be certain that
he reached those whom he thought did so particpate. Such
argument is, in my opinion, refuted by Respondent's
conduct with respect to the layoff of February 2. Truesdale
was present at the union hearing on February 1, and heard
Clemons, Hartle, Berman, and Cork, as well as Steward
Benton, testify against him. Yet of the five employees laid
off on February 2, only Cork had participated in the union
proceeding, and employees Clemons, Berman and Hartle,
as well as Benton, were retained, Again, no claim is made
by the General Counsel that on February 2, Respondent
departed from its usual practice in selecting employees for
layoff.
4. Finally, of the 12 employees alleged by the General
Counsel to have been discriminatorily laid off on January 7
and 20 and February 2, three testified that in March 1965,
they received letters from the Respondent asking if they
were available for work, and that they did not respond.
The remaining nine employees were not asked if they had
received such letters. If they had not received such letters,
I assume that the General Counsel would have proved that
fact. It is inconceivable to me that if Respondent selected
the
employees involved for layoff because of their
concerted activity herein referred to, that it would, in view
of Truesdale's statement that such men would never work
for Respondent again , have sought them out to offer
further employment.
5. The transfer of Clemons on February 17 stands on
the same basis. That Respondent needed additonal
employees on the Touhy Avenue job, and that two men, in
addition to Clemons, were transferred from other jobs to
Touhy Avenue, at the same time as Clemons, is not
controverted. The General Counsel offered no evidence to
establish that the Touhy Avenue job was less favorable or
less desirable than the civic center job. Notwithstanding
the layoffs referred to, it was not until February 17 that
24 The one instance of deviation involving employee Hartle (see
fn. 15, supra) clearly does not demonstrate such departure from
normal practice to warrant a finding that the selection was
discriminatorily motivated Moreover, when the February 2 layoff
was made, which was after Truesdale heard Hartle testify at the
union hearing on February 1 , Hartle was not laid off
FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO.
the decision to transfer Clemons was made. When the
transfer was made Clemons did not, so far as the record
shows, protest that the Touhy Avenue job was less
desirable. In short, I find no evidence to support the
allegation that the transfer constituted discrimination, or,
assuming that it did, that it was discriminatorily
motivated.
For the forgoing reasons, I find and conclude that the
General Counsel failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the layoffs of January 7 and 20 and
February 2, or the tranfer of Clemons on February 17, was
discriminatorily motivated. I shall recommend, therefore,
that the Section 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations of the complaint
be, to that extent, dismissed.
The discharge of Clemons on March 30, is, I find and
conclude, governed by different considerations. Although
I conclude for the reasons above stated, that the evidence
does not establish that Clemons was discharged because
he had participated in the activity relating to the alleged
unsafe
working conditions, I am convinced, and for
reasons hereafter stated find and conclude, that Clemons
was discharged because, through the Union as his
collective-bargaining representative, charges were filed
with the Board alleging that his transfer on February 17
was discriminatorily motivated.25
Clemons' last day of work on the Touhy Avenue job was
March 9 or 10. According to Superintendent Frank
Miller, Jr., the deficiencies in Clemons' work were so open
and obvious that one walking past it could not help but
observe it. For this reason, I find it somewhat difficult to
believe, if Clemons' work was as bad as Miller said it was,
that he did not observe it before March 17, but his
testimony in that regard is uncontradicted and I accept
it.26 Miller further testified that after observing the work in
question on March 17, and discussing the matter with
Foreman Hardy, the two of them concluded that such work
could not be tolerated and that Clemons had to be
dismissed . Although Miller sent Clemons a check on
March 17 for services rendered during the workweek
ending March 13, no notice of dismissal was sent at that
time; rather Clemons was asked to call the office. Even in
Miller's telephone conversation with Clemons on some day
between March 17 and March 30, no mention was made
that Clemons' work was unsatisfactory; rather he was
asked to come to the job, for which Respondent would be
required to, and did, pay reporting time. Miller explained
"The second amended charge filed herein on March 31
alleged inter alia that on March 30 Clemons was discharged
because he had i,ooperated with the Board in the investigation of
the first amended charge, filed March 17, which alleged that
Clemons' February 17 transfer was discriminatory, and that the
discharge was therefore violative of Sec 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act
The allegation of the complaint, however, was that Clemons'
discharge
was violative of Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act, because
motivated by the fact that he had participated in the activity to
remedy the alleged unsafe working conditions Although some
facts relating to Clemons ' discharge were in the record, it was not
clear that Respondent fully developed all the facts or had tried his
case in the light of a possible Sec 8(a)(4) violation Accordingly, I
issued an order to show cause on January 12, 1966 (the original of
which I have marked TX Exh 1, and hereby make a part of the
record), directing Respondent to advise me whether , in view of
the possible finding of a Sec 8(a)(4) violation, it wished to stand on
the record as made, or whether it wished to offer additional
evidence
By written response dated January 21, 1966 (the
original of which I have marked TX Exh 2, and make a part of the
record), Respondent advised me that it did not wish to offer
additional evidence, but would stand on the record Accordingly
an adjudication as to whether Clemons' discharge was violative of
199
that the note was sent with Clemons' check because he
wanted to tell him on the telephone that his services were
no longer required, and that he did not so advise Clemons
in the telephone conversation because he wanted to show
Clemons the alleged defective work. I reject such
explanations because they border on the petty, and have
all the earmarks of an afterthought.
According to Miller, the first amended charge filed
herein on March 17 came to his attention for the first time
on Monday, March 29, or the preceding Friday, March 26.
That the filing of this charge was the matter uppermost in
Miller's mind is made evident by the fact that it was the
first subject he raised with Clemons when they met on the
morning of March 30. For this reason, I find it unnecessary
to decide whether Miller's statement was that he could not
have men working for him who filed charges with the
Board, as Clemons testified, or whether Miller merely
asked Clemons whether he thought the filing of the charge
was fair to Respondent, as Miller testified. In either event,
it is evident, and I find, that what triggered Clemons'
discharge was the fact that a charge had been filed with
the
Board.
The alleged defective work, I find and
conclude, was a mere pretext seized upon to obscure the
true motive for the discharge.27
Clemons' discharge, under the circumstances and for
the reasons above stated, I find and conclude, was
violative
of
Section 8(a)(3)
and (4), and derivatively
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Although Section 8(a)(4) speaks
in terms of an employer "has filed charges,"28 and in the
instant case the charge was filed by the Union and not by
Clemons, it is my view that Congress intended this
statutory provision to be broadly interpreted to afford an
employee protection from reprisal for the filing of any
charge on his behalf which might affect his employee
interests.29 The Union was the representative of all the
employees, and when it filed the charge alleging that
Clemons' transfer was discriminatory, that charge clearly
affected Clemons' employee interests. In that sense the
charge was in reality Clemons' charge, filed by his agent,
the Union. That Respondent so interpreted the charge is
clear from what Miller said to Clemons.
In any event, and regardless of whether the discharge
violated Section 8(a)(4) or not, it did violate Section 8(a)(3).
The charge alleged not only the discriminatory transfer of
Clemons, but the discriminatory layoff of 12 other
employees, because of their concerted activity on their
Sec 8(a)(3) or (4) of the Act, on some theory other than that urged
by the General Counsel, may appropriately be made See
Associated Home Builders , etc v N.L R.B , 352 F 2d 745, 752-755
(C A 9), and the cases there cited
26 Miller first testified that he observed the alleged deficiency
in Clemons' work on March 11 , but thereafter said this was an
error, and that the correct date was March 17 He was not cross-
examined on this or any other point
27 Nothing herein shall be construed as a finding that the work
performed by Clemons on March 9 or 10, was, or was not
satisfactory
All I decide is that assuming that the work in
question was unsatisfactory , Clemons' discharge on March 30,
was not for that reason
2s Sec 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act "
29 Cf N L R B. v Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, 318
U S 9, 17, where the Supreme Court held that one who had no
interest in the matters in controversy had standing to file a charge
because the legislative history of the Act showed that it was not
always prudent for employees to file charges against their
employer
200
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
own, and through their Union, in seeking correction of
what they regarded as unsafe working conditions. A
discharge for having participated in such activity clearly
constituted discrimination regarding Clemons' tenure of
employment, and tended to discourage membership in the
Union, the organ through which, at least part, the
employees sought to correct the conditions of which they
complained, and which they sought to remedy.
Accordingly, Respondent's discharge of Clemons on
March 30, as above found, violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and
(1) of the Act. I so find and conclude.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings, and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in and is
engaging
in
unfair labor practices proscribed by
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discharging George Clemons on March 30,
because charges alleged his discriminatory transfer had
been filed with the Board, Respondent engaged in and is
engaging
in
unfair
labor
practices
proscribed
by
Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Except to the extent above found, the General
Counsel has failed to prove the remaining allegations of
the complaint herein, and said complaint should, to that
extent, be dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and
desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to eradicate the effect thereof, and to effectuate
the policies of the Act. As such violations go to the very
heart of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be
required to refrain from in any manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees.
Having
found
that
Respondent
discriminatorily
discharged George Clemons, I shall recommend that
Respondent offer him reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent job, and make him whole for any
loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him, by paying to him a sum of
money equal to the wages he would have earned from the
date of his discharge, until his reinstatement, less his net
earnings during said period, in accordance with Board
policy set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I
shall recommend that Respondent be required to preserve
and make available to the Board and its agents, all
personnel records necessary or useful in computing the
amount of backpay, as herein required.
The record fails to disclose whether the civic center and
Touhy Avenue jobs have been completed or not. I shall
therefore recommend that in lieu of the usual posting at the
jobsites of the attached notice, that Respondent mail a
signed copy thereof to each of its employees who were
employed on the Touhy Avenue job on March 30, 1965,
and to each of its employees who worked on the civic
center job at any time between December 1, 1964, and
January 31, 1965.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations
Act,
as
amended,
Frank
Miller's
Sons
Fireproofing Company, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees with respect to
their activity in seeking to eliminate what they regard as
unsafe working conditions on its jobs.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of employment or
other reprisal if they participate in efforts to eliminate
what they regard as unsafe working conditions.
(c) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone
Masons'
Union,
Local
No. 21, or any other labor
organization
of its employees, by discriminatorily
discharging,
or otherwise discriminating against any
employee in regard to his hire, tenure, or any term or
condition of employment.
(d) Discharging, or in any other manner discriminating
against, any employee because he has filed a charge under
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
the aforementioned or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities,
except to the extent permitted by Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer
George
Clemons immediate, full, and
unconditional reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights, privileges, or working conditions, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him, in the manner set
forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify George Clemons, if he is presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll
records,
social
security
payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Mail an exact copy of the attached notice marked
"Appendix," to the last known address of each employee
working at its civic center job at any time between
December 1, 1964, and February 2, 1965, and to each
employee working on its Touhy Avenue job, or on its
FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO.
201
payroll for said job on March 30, 1965.30 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 13,E after
being
signed
by its authorized
representative, shall be forthwith
mailed, as herein
directed.
(e) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
it has taken to comply herewith.31
30 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words " a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
3i In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
WE WILL NOT discharge, or in any other manner
discriminate against, any employee because he has
filed a charge against us with the Labor Board.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfer with,
restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist Bricklayers Local No. 21, or any other
union, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the
extent provided by Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL offer George Clemons immediate, full,
and unconditional reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position, and
make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered
by reason of his discriminatory discharge.
FRANK MILLER'S SONS
FIREPROOFING COMPANY
(Employer)
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
with respect to their activity in seeking to eliminate
what they regard as unsafe working conditions on any
of our jobs.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of
employment or other reprisal, if they participate in
efforts to eliminate what they, regard as unsafe
working conditions.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or
activities on behalf of Bricklayers Local No. 21, or
any other union of our employees, by discharging or
otherwise
discriminating
against
our employees,
regarding their wages, hours, or working conditions.
Dated
By
(Representative)
(Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employee, if,
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States
of his right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly
with the Board' s
Regional Office, 881 U.S.
Courthouse & Federal
Office
Building,
219
South
Dearborn Street, Chicago,
Illinois
60604,
Telephone
828-7597.