164 NLRB 192

Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Co.

Last amended: 1967Year: 1967Length: 10,720 wordsOfficial source
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Company and United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone Masons' Union , Local No. 21. Case 13-CA-6882. April 28,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On February 11, 1966, Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and dismissed these allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. The Respondent filed an answering brief to the exceptions and briefs of the General Counsel and the Charging Party. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' We adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed insofar as it alleges that layoffs made on January 7 and 20 and February 2, 1965, were motivated by the fact that the employees were involved in union charges against Foreman Truesdale and hence violative of the Act. As more fully explicated by the Trial Examiner, layoffs on the aforementioned dates were necessary for economic reasons. According to testimony, accepted by the Trial Examiner, the selections for the layoffs were made on the basis of an established nondiscriminatory practice which took into account ability and seniority, and this testimony is in no way contradicted by other evidence.2 If it is also a fact that certain of those selected happened to favor charges against Truesdale to Respondent's knowledge or belief, it is equally significant that the record does not establish such knowledge or belief as to every complainant, that 9 employees who took no part in any action against Truesdale were among the 20 selected for layoff, and that some who were so involved did not suffer a layoff. It was alleged that one of those retained was later discriminatorily transferred to another worksite. The Trial Examiner dismissed that allegation and we also adopt this disposition. In addition to the facts recited by the Trial Examiner in this connection, the record contains testimony by Miller, who directed the transfer, that, when additional men were needed at the Touhy Avenue job, he included Clemons among those selected for transfer because Clemons had previously worked with the foreman at that site who "seemed to think quite a bit of him so I switched Mr. Clemons there." Like the Trial Examiner, we do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the complaint in the foregoing respects. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Company, Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting: I would find that, in addition to the violations of the Act found by the Trial Examiner, and affirmed .by my colleagues, the Respondent discriminatorily laid off 11 employees in January and February 1965, and discriminatorily transferred George Clemons to a more onerous job. In the fall of 1964 some employees of Respondent, a masonry contractor working on the new Chicago civic center, complained to their business agent, Charles Roche, about allegedly unsafe working conditions. Roche had several discussions concerning this matter with Foreman Ernest Truesdale, who was a member of the Union, and indicated that a number of men intended to press ' In fn 7 of his Decision, the Trial Examiner correctly listed William Cork among the employees who signed the union charges against Foreman Truesdale, but inadvertently stated (section I, A, subheading "The Current Facts," last paragraph) that Cork, who also appeared and testified at the hearing, had not signed the charge In addition, the record establishes that it was Bernard McCluskie and not Robert McCluskie, as found by the Trial Examiner, who failed to appear at the hearing due to illness ' The selection of Miller and Zawacki for layoff is not proof to, the contrary, as the dissent suggests , because another employee with equal seniority on the crew was retained The evidence does not show that either Miller or Zawacki had a better claim to retention than such other employee . And with respect to the matter of subsequent hirings for this crew, without recalling Miller and Zawacki, the employment pattern appears to be one of hirings and layoffs as called for by the workload, with hinngs being made from among those who apply for work 164 NLRB No. 29 FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO. union charges against Truesdale if conditions were not improved. On January 16, 1965, charges were filed with the Union against Truesdale and also against Stevens, a strawboss under Truesdale. The charge was filed by Roche and 14 employees and was received by Truesdale on January 20. At the February 1 hearing, 12 of the employees who signed the charge appeared and testified, as did Martin Zawacki. As a result of the hearing, Truesdale was fined $300 and Stevens $100. Prior to the hearing, particularly in December 1964 and January 1965, Truesdale was aware of the probability that such charges would be filed, and he either knew, or at least suspected, the names of employees planning to file charges. From the end of December on, he made a number of statements threatening that employees who participated in protesting the conditions would never work for him or the Respondent again. I join my colleagues in finding that these statements were designed to deter the employees from concertedly protesting what they regarded as unsafe conditions, and were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In addition, the Respondent laid off some 20 employees on January 7 and 20 and February 2, allegedly because economic reasons justified a reduction in force.3 Subjected to these layoffs were 11 men who were involved in the union proceeding against Foreman Truesdale and a lower ranking foreman, Stevens. While I accept Respondent's claim that economic reasons motivated some reduction in the work force, I am persuaded for the reasons discussed hereafter that Truesdale's selection of certain employees was but the fulfillment of his threats that employees who had protested the unsafe working conditions would never work for him or the Respondent again. In arriving at my conclusion that certain employees were discriminatorily selected for layoff, I note that in addition to Foreman Truesdale's repeated threats, Truesdale (except for the layoffs from Esposito's crew) made the initial selection of employees for layoff;' that Truesdale knew some of the employees who had protested the unsafe working conditions even before union charges were filed; that, after charges were filed, Truesdale learned the names of those signing the charges and, on the next layoff, all of the '5 men-laid off were involved in the proceedings against him. 3 The Respondent' s claim that its usual practice in making layoffs is to retain the best men, or if equal in ability to lay off the newest members of a crew, is supported only by oral expression of this policy by Truesdale and Job Superintendent Dan Miller Moreover, even if I accepted this as being the "policy," Respondent advanced no proof, aside from verbal declarations, that the policy was followed Such bald, after-the-fact declarations are of little weight-as opposed to the overt acts against those employees who had registered dissatisfaction with safety conditions on the job-in determining whether the selections for layoffs were based on solely nondiscriminatory reasons 193 Sometime before the initial layoff on January 7, Truesdale was aware that a number of employees were complaining that working conditions on the civic center job were unsafe. Indeed, this had been a continuing complaint among certain employees since the fall of 1964, and when the union steward on the job, Frank Ladone, had been unable to remedy the situation, Roche, the union business agent, appointed Benton as a new union steward. Thereafter, Truesdale commented to employee Reiner that while he had previously considered Benton a friend, he would never work for him or the Respondent, again. Further, on December 29, Truesdale commented to Union Business Agent Roche that Zawacki was the one who had reported the working conditions to the Union. Though Roche denied this, Truesdale was unlikely to place much credence in the denial inasmuch as Zawacki had several times complained directly to Truesdale about unsafe conditions on the job. Before the January 7 layoff, Truesdale commented to employee Charles Miller that he had heard that 15 or more men were going to prefer charges against him and he also questioned employee Reiner as to whether Reiner knew about people calling the union hall and creating discord and trouble on the job. After the layoff, Truesdale told employee Haas that he had laid off some men and that "we" never had "such big union trouble before" as with the new men. The inference is clear that Truesdale considered the new men as troublemakers and desired to get rid of them because of their complaints about safety conditions and their threats to file charges against him. On January 7, 5 of the 10 ten employees selected for layoff were among those who had protested working conditions or who later signed charges against Truesdale.s As the Trial Examiner noted, the record leaves "no room for doubt" that Truesdale at least suspected, if he did not know, the actual identity of some of the employees who desired to file charges against him. Moreover, it is also clear that he learned the names of those who signed the charges because, on January 18, he asked employee ,Reiner if he had signed the charges, and Reiner denied that he did. The following day Truesdale asked Reiner why he had lied. As Reiner had in fact, signed the charges, it is clear that Truesdale had' knowledge of who signed the charges even before the union hearing which he attended on February 1, ' In finding a discriminatory selection of employees for layoff, it is unnecessary to .resolve the conflict in testimony as to whether 'fruesdale alone was responsible for selecting the men for layoff or whether they were selected by Truesdale and approved by Job Superintendent Dan Miller after discussion with Truesdale In either case, Truesdale made the initial selection for layoff S The five were William Gray, Bernard McCluskie, Robert McCluskie, Michael Kristich, and Victor Blacconeri Except for Blacconeri and Bernard McCluskie, they also testified at the union hearing 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD where a number of employees testified as to unsafe working conditions. 6 All of the men laid off on January 20 were involved in the proceeding against Truesdale, as four of the five employees selected had signed the charges, and the fifth, Martin Zawacki, who appeared at the union hearing, was regarded by Truesdale as the main troublemaker.' Moreover, the three men selected by Truesdale from his crew (Johann Haas, Leonard Siemieniec, and Eugene Reiner) had been interrogated by Truesdale about the charges and, in some instances, on their participation in making the charges. On January 20, before the layoff, Truesdale indicated to Reiner that those who signed the charge would never work for him again.8 With respect to Haas, on or around January 20, Truesdale inquired if Haas had heard about the charges, and when Haas, on being laid off, asked why he was laid off, Truesdale stated he (Truesdale) did not have to tell Haas anything. The third man, Siemieniec, was asked by Truesdale, several hours before he was laid off, if he knew anything about the fellows who signed the charges and was told by Truesdale that while some of them had been his friends, they wouldn't be anymore. Two of the five men laid off on January 20 (Charles Miller and Martin Zawacki), only 2 days before had been assigned to work for Foreman Carl Esposito in the basement level. The facts surrounding this layoff make unpersuasive Respondent's testimony that the layoffs were solely because these two men were the last men in Esposito's crew, and that Truesdale had no hand in their selection. Esposito first testified that these were the newest men on the crew but he later acknowledged a third man, Patterson, was assigned to him at the same time as Miller and Zawacki. Thus, there was another new employee in Esposito's crew and the record fails to show why Patterson, who was not involved in the union charges, was retained instead of Miller or Zawacki, particularly since Miller was assigned to the basement because he was a good bricklayer (work in the basement called for more highly skilled workmanship) and Zawacki was one of the oldest employees (since August 1964) on the civic center job. Esposito's claim that he was unaware of the problems of his fellow supervisor, Truesdale, is highly unlikely on a job of this nature in view of Truesdale's open, extensive, and blatant hostility to the employees who complained about safety conditions, and it is rebutted by the uncontradicted testimony of Zawacki, not discredited by the Trial Examiner, that when Zawacki asked why he was laid off, he was told by Esposito that this was between Truesdale "and me [Zawacki]." Zawacki and Miller had long been objects of interrogation and accusations by Truesdale, and their transfer to a different crew resulted in their being the newest employees for purposes of crew seniority and in their being laid off 2 days later, while an employee with equal crew seniority was retained. Yet, shortly after Miller and Zawacki were laid off, Esposito was seeking additions to his crew. Indeed, on Monday, January 25, four men were added to Esposito's crew. Thus, Miller and Zawacki were laid off after 3 days' work on the pretext that they were the last men on Esposito's crew and were not recalled several days later when four men were added to Esposito's crew.9 The last layoff was on February 2, and involved five men, including William Cork who had signed the charges and who had appeared at the hearing on February 1. With his removal, all but four10 of those involved in the proceeding against Truesdale were effectively laid off from the civic center project. I would also find discriminatory the February 17 transfer of George Clemons from work on the civic center to work on another of Respondent's projects, the Touhy Avenue job. Clemons had complained about safety conditions in December 1964, and was injured on the job on January 6, 1965. Clemons' injury on January 6 resulted, after a discussion between Roche, Truesdale, and Dan Miller, in Miller calling the employees together and telling them that conditions would be improved. Clemons subsequently signed the union charges against Truesdale and Stevens, and appeared at the hearing of February 1 on these charges. A week after the hearing, Truesdale told Roche that he was going to lay off Clemons as he was nothing but a troublemaker. When Roche protested that Clemons was injured on the job and still going to the doctor, Truesdale stated he had told Dan Miller the job was not big enough for both of them (Truesdale and 6 Except for the union hearing on February 1 where employees testified with respect to their charges , Truesdale was never officially notified prior to this proceeding as to the names of employees who had signed the charges ' As noted previously, Truesdale had told Roche that he knew Zawacki was the person calling the union hall and making all the trouble In January , Truesdale several times accused Zawacki of calling the business agent , and Assistant Foreman Stevens told Zawacki that if he (Zawacki) didn't like the way the job was running he ought to get off the job 9 While Reiner and two other discimnatees received letters in March 1965 asking about their availability for work, this does not affect my conclusion that the employees were chosen discrimmatonly for layoffs in January inasmuch as the charge herein was filed before these letters were written I would also reject as unwarranted the Trial Examiner's assumption that the General Counsel's failure to ask 9 other employees if they received such letters indicates they did 0 The circumstances of Miller 's and Zawacki's layoff appear inconsistent with Respondent's alleged practice of retaining the best men in a crew , or laying off the newest men if other factors are equal See fn 2, above 10 The four remaining men presented special circumstances, and one , Clemons, infra, I find, was subjected to a subsequent discriminatory transfer Hartle had been scheduled for the first layoff, but was retained after Roche told Truesdale that Hartle needed the job because of medical expenses Union Agent Roche testified that Truesdale told him (Roche) that employee Berman had called Truesdale and warned him that charges were going to be filed Benton was the union steward and as such had super seniority FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO. 195 Clemons) and that Miller would have to get rid of Clemons or himself. Thereafter, Clemons was transferred to the Touhy Avenue job. While the civic center job involved indoor work unaffected by the weather, the Touhy Avenue work was outdoors and inclement weather in February and March interfered with work. Thus, between February 17 and March 10, Clemons worked only a total of about 35 hours in part because of poor weather conditions. I find that Respondent's transfer of Clemons was discriminatory and penalized him for engaging in union and lawful concerted activity." For the reasons set out above, I would find that the layoffs on January 7 and 20 and February 2 of employees involved in the union charges against Truesdale were discriminatorily motivated, and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, as did the transfer of George Clemons to the less desirable Touhy Avenue job. " When Clemons returned on March 30, he was discharged under circumstances which the Trial Examiner found were violative of the Act. TRIAL EXAMINER' S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Trial Examiner: This complaint' under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act), which alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Company (herein called Respondent or Company), by threats of reprisal, and by laying off certain employees because of their concerted activity and other support of United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone Masons' Union, Local No. 21 (herein called Local 21, or the Union), was heard by me at Chicago, Illinois, on August 3, 4, and 5. The basic issue presented for decision is whether (except in one instance), the employees were laid off because they participated in filing and prosecuting a charge before the Union against a foreman, who was a member of the Union, for maintaining unsafe working conditions. With respect to the one other employee who was discharged, the issue is whether the discharge was motivated by the fact that the employee had filed a charge with the Board. At the hearing all parties were represented by counsel, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant and material evidence, and to argue orally on the record. Oral argument was waived. Briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent, respectively, have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT2 1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED A. Background Respondent is engaged in the Chicago, Illinois, area, as a masonry contractor. Among the numerous construction projects on which Respondent was engaged at the time of the events here involved, was the civic center in downtown Chicago,' on which it began work in mid-1964. For a number of years Respondent has been a member of an employer association which bargained collectively with the Union, and at all times material there was in effect a contract with the Union, covering the wages, hours, and working conditions of the bricklayers and laborers employed by Respondent. The employees work in crews. Because of its size, a number of crews worked at this project, each under the supervision of a foreman. A general superintendent-at this job Dan Miller-coordinated and generally supervised all work to be performed by Respondent. Other duties performed by the superintendent are to attend weekly meetings which the various subcontractors attend with the general contractor for the purpose of scheduling the progress of the work and the completion dates for various stages thereof, by the several subcontractors. It is undisputed that for Respondent to perform its work at the civic center project, it is necessary that other craftsmen first perform the work required of them. On each floor of the building it was necessary that the sheetmetal workers complete about half of the area, and that the pipe coverers do the work required of them in the area completed by the sheetmetal workers, before Respondent's employees can work on that floor. Also undisputed is the testimony adduced by Respondent, that when it becomes necessary to reduce force because of lack of work, the employer selects for retention those he regards as the most competent, or if competency is equal, the more senior members of the crew are retained, and that when an employee is laid off for lack of work, there is no obligation on the part of the employer to seek out or offer work to the laid-off employee, when such work again becomes available. The Current Facts In the fall of 1964, certain employees of Respondent complained to their business agent, Charles Roche, that working conditions on the civic center job were unsafe. Roche directed his steward, Frank Ladone, to try and get the conditions complained of corrected. Ladone apparently was unsuccessful and was removed as steward. Roche then appointed Benton as steward, and directed him to obtain correction of the alleged unsafe conditions, but he also was apparently unable to achieve the results Roche sought. In the meanwhile Roche on several occasions, discussed the alleged unsafe conditions with Foreman Truesdale and told the latter, who is a member of the Union, that the men intended to prefer charges against him with the Union, unless conditons complained of were corrected. According to Roche, Truesdale promised to do what he could to correct the alleged unsafe conditions. On January 6, after employee George Clemons had been injured on the job, Roche talked with Foreman Truesdale and Job Superintendent Dan Miller about the alleged unsafe conditions, telling Truesdale that he (Roche) had ' Issued April 27, upon a charge filed February 5, amended :March 17, and further amended March 31. All dates mentioned herein are 1965 unless otherwise noted. 2 No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented. The complaint alleges and the answer admits the facts necessary to establish these elements. I find the facts to be as pleaded. 0 This building, covering an entire block at Randolph and Clark Streets, is intended to house the courts and other functions of Cook Country and the city of Chicago. 298-668 0-69-14 196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the names of 20 men who wanted to file charges against him. On this occasion Dan Miller called the employees together and told them that while conditions were not what they should be, they would improve. The record leaves no room for doubt that Truesdale at least suspected if he did not actually know the identity of at least some of the employees who desired to file charges against him. Thus, on December 29, 1964, when Roche and Truesdale were engaged in conversation, employee Zawacki passed by, and Truesdale commented that Zawacki was the "s.o.b." who had reported the working conditions to the union hall. Roche told Truesdale he was wrong.4 In early to mid-January, Truesdale told employees Miller and Haas that about 15 men were going to file charges against him, commenting that he had not theretofore had the kind of trouble he was now having with the new men. On January 18, Truesdale asked employee Reiner if he (Reiner) had signed the charges. Reiner denied that he had done so. The following day Truesdale asked Reiner why he had lied the preceding day about signing the charge. Some 3 weeks prior thereto Truesdale had told Reiner that steward Benton had worked for him before, and that he (Truesdale) thought Benton was his friend, but that Benton would never work for him or Respondent again. After charges were filed with the Union against Truesdale, as hereafter related, Truesdale told Reiner that he (Truesdale) would find out who had signed the charges against him and that none of them would again work for Respondent.5 By a document dated and filed with the Union on January 16, Foreman Truesdale, and Stevens, a strawboss under Truesdale, were charged with violations of the Union's working rules relating to safety.' The charge was signed by Business Agent Roche and 14 of Respondent's employees.7 By letter dated January 18, and received on January 20, Truesdale and Stevens were directed to appear before the Union on February 1 and answer the charges.' At the union hearing on February 1, 12 of the 14 employees who had signed the charge appeared and testified.9 Two employees (Martin Zawacki and William Cork), who had not signed the charges, also testified. The hearing resulted in the imposition of a $300 fine on Truesdale, and a $100 fine on Stevens. The Layoffs Involved Prior to the hearing on the charges filed against Truesdale and Stevens , Respondent laid off certain employees from the civic center project. Thus, on January 7, Respondent laid off 10 eployees10 and on January 20, laid off 5 additional employees ." Also, on February 2, Respondent laid off five employees, and on February 17, transferred George Clemons to another of its jobs, and thereafter , on March 30, discharged him. Of the five employees laid off on February 2, only William Cork had participated in the union proceeding against Truesdale and Stevens. In support of its contention that the aforementioned layoffs on January 7 and 20 and February 2 were entirely economic in nature , Respondent introduced the following evidence which is uncontradicted.12 During the month of December 1964 , work on the civic center had progressed at a faster rate than called for by the schedules , and by January 4 Respondent had substantially completed the work required of it up to the level of the 16th floor . However, at the progress meeting of January 6, Miller learned that because other trades, particularly the sheetmetal workers, had fallen behind in their work, the 17th floor would not become available until January 15. From this Job Superintendent Dan Miller concluded that a layoff was necessary . Miller, after discussing the situation with Foreman Truesdale , directed the latter to lay off 10 men . As heretofore stated , of the 10 laid off on January 7 , only 5 thereafter signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens (Hartle, Kristicht Gray, B. McCluskie , and R. McCluskie). One other (Pitman), although he did not sign the charges , or testify at the union hearing, is alleged in the complaint to have been discriminatorily discharged. The other four apparently had no part in the activity of the employees to promote safe working conditions and are not alleged to have been discriminatorily discharged . 13 On January 20, Miller concluded that the situation had grown worse, and that a further personnel reduction was necessary . After Job Superintendent Miller's discussion with Foreman Truesdale, three men from Truesdale's crew (Haas, Reiner, and Siemieniec), and two men from Foreman ' Zawacki had theretofore complained to Truesdale about unsafe conditions and Truesdale accused Zawacki of being the one who reported this to the Union 5 The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of the employees referred to, which, for the most part, was not denied by Truesdale when he testified. To the extent that he did deny the statements attributed to him, I do credit his denials I have not set forth all of the statements made to employees by Truesdale, only a sufficient number to show the character of his statements to the employees and to demonstrate that he was clearly aware of the intent of the employees to file charges against him with the Union, and of his displeasure with their contemplated action 6 Specifically, the charge alleged that on December 28 and 29, 1964, and January 6 (when employee Clemons was injured on the job), Truesdale and Stevens directed employees to work in elevator shafts which had not been protected from above with, proper covering Y The employees signing the charge were William Benton (steward), Victor Blacconeri, George Clemons, Leonard Siemieniec, Michael Kristich, Johann Haas, William Cork, Frank Hartle, William Gray, Charles Miller, Eugene Reiner, Robert McCluskie, Bernard McCluskie, and Charles Berman " Truesdale and Stevens were merely told the nature of the charge in general terms A copy of the charge did not accompany the notices, nor did the names of the persons listed who had signed the charge. 9 The two who did not appear at the hearing were Blacconeri and Robert McCluskie 10 Included among those laid off on January 7, were William Gray, Bernard McCluskie, Robert McCluskie, Michael Kristich, and Victor Blacconeri All five of these subsequently signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens The remaining five apparently took no part in said charges However, one of these (E L Pitman), is alleged to have been discriminatorily included in the layoff 11 The employees laid off on this date were Eugene Reiner, Johann Haas, Charles Miller, Martin Zawacki, and Leonard Siemieniec All of those had signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens, except Zawacki, and he later testified at the February I hearing 12 The fact relating to the transfer and subsequent discharge of Clemons will be hereafter set forth 13 There is a conflict in the testimony of Miller and Truesdale as to who made the selection of the men chosen for layoff on January 7 Miller testified that the selection was made by Truesdale and himself as a result of discussions and exchange of views as to their capabilities Truesdale testified that Miller merely told him of the necessity of laying off, and that he (Truesdale) made the selection In my view of the case, it is unnecessary to resolve the conflict. FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO. 197 Esposito's crew (Miller and Zawacki) were laid off.14 Foreman Esposito testified, without contradiction, that in accordance with usual practice he selected Miller and Zawacki for layoff because they were the two most recent additions to his crew. By February 1, progress on the job had still failed to improve, and Job Superintendent Dan Miller concluded that further layoffs were required. On the evening of February 1, after again discussing the situation with Foreman Truesdale, he directed the latter to lay off five men at the end of the next day. In accord with this direction Miller laid off Frigo, Cork, Duffy, Alexander, and Kivinachki. Of those only Cork had signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens or testified at the union hearing. There is no evidence that the others participated in any way in the movement regarding the alleged unsafe working conditions. The evidence also shows that, in addition to Steward Benton, who presumably by virtue of his position, had superseniority, employees Hartle, Clemons, and Berman, who signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens and testified in the union hearing, were not included in the layoffs of January 7 or 20 or February 2. Both Superintendent Miller and Foreman Truesdale testified that in making the layoffs referred to, they followed, except in one instance, the usual practice of retaining the best men, or if that was equal, the newest members of the crew were laid off first.15 The General Counsel adduced no evidence to establish any departure from that usual practice. The Transfer and Subsequent Discharge of George Clemons George Clemons, a bricklayer of 12 or 14 years' experience, went to work at the civic center in October 1964.16 On January 6, Clemons was injured on the job, but apparently lost no time as result thereof.'? Clemons signed the charges against Truesdale and Stevens, and testified at the union hearing on February 1. Clemons was not involved in any of the layoffs above mentioned, and continued to work at the civic center until February 17, when he was transferred to a job on Touhy Avenue, another of Respondent's projects, reporting there the following day.18 Clemons worked on the Touhy Avenue job, under the direction of Foreman Hardy, and Job Superintendent Frank Miller, Jr., until March 9 or 10, and then went to the hospital for removal of his tonsils.19 Returning from the hospital, Clemons received in the mails a check for the wages due him for work during the week of March 9, and a note asking him to call Job Superintendent Frank Miller, Jr. When Clemons called Miller the the latter wanted to know where Clemons had been and when he expected to return. Clemons told Miller that he expected the doctor to discharge him that weekend and that he could probably be at work the following Monday. Miller replied to the effect that there was no hurry as no work could be done until the snow melted. March 30 being a warmer day, Clemons went to the Touhy Avenue job to see if any work would be done.20 He found Foreman Hardy and Superintendent Miller in a nearby coffeeshop, and asked if there would be any work. Miller replied "stick around for a while." While still in the coffeeshop, Miller said to Clemons, "You filed charges at the Labor Board against me didn't you?"21 When Clemons professed not to understand what Miller had reference to, the latter added, "We can't keep a man around who goes to the Labor Board against us."22 Miller then asked Clemons to follow him outside where he pointed out some work that Clemons performed about March 9 or 10 and asserted that the work had been improperly performed.23 Clemons 14 Again the testimony is in conflict whether Superintendent Miller and Foreman Truesdale together made the selection of the employees to be laid off or whether Truesdale made such selection The evidence is uncontradicted that Foreman Esposito was told to lay off two men from his crew and he selected Miller and Zawacki There is no evidence to indicate that Foreman Esposito was aware of the efforts of the employees regarding working conditions, or of the plans to file charges against Truesdale Of the five men laid off on January 20, all signed the charge against Truesdale Truesdale did not receive the notice of the union hearing until he returned home on the evening of January 20, and did not see the list of persons signing the charges until August 5, the day he testified in this proceeding He did, of course, see the 14 employees who testified at the union hearing 15 The one instance referred to was that of employee Hartle who was originally selected for layoff on January 7. However, when Union Agent Roche told Truesdale that Hartle had a sick child and was hard pressed to meet hospital bills, Truesdale told Superintendent Miller that he (Truesdale) wanted to retain Hartle, and Miller consented. Hartle subsequently signed the charges filed with the Union, and testified at its hearing. 1s Whether he had theretofore worked for Respondent at other projects does not appear 17 Clemons, while working in an elevator shaft, was struck on the head by some object falling from above This was one of the occasions when Union Agent Roche talked to Foreman Truesdale about alleged unsafe working conditions, complaining that the injury to Clemons resulted from the absence of proper covering over the shaft 11 Clemons asked Strawboss Stevens, who notified him of his transfer, about the reason therefor, but Stevens' only reply was that he was carrying out orders There is no evidence that Clemons objected to or protested the transfer His rate of pay on the Touhy Avenue job was the same as at the civic center There is no evidence that one job was, for any reason , more desirable than the other 10 Clemons did visit the job on March 11, but no work was in progress that day because of bad weather 20 Clemons went to the job several days before March 30, but found no one there 21 The initial charge filed in this matter February 5, alleged that Respondent had laid off or discharged 11 named employees on January 7 and 20, for protesting working conditions on the civic center job The employees so named did not include Clemons. An amended charge filed March 17, repeated the allegations of the original charge, and added the allegation that on February 2, Respondent discharged William Cork, and on February 17, transferred Clemons because of their participation in the movement to obtain safer working conditions on the civic center job It was the amended charge to which Miller apparently referred A second amended charge, filed March 31, alleged that Respondent discharged Clemons on March 30, because of his assistance to the Board in the investigation of the prior charges All charges were filed on behalf of the Union by a law firm 22 Miller admits this conversation, but has a somewhat different version of what was said According to Miller, he asked Clemons if the latter had gone to the Labor Board, and after Clemons made some kind of a muffled reply he asked Clemons, "Do you think that was fair to me " I deem it unnecessary to determine the precise language employed Whichever version is correct, Miller plainly indicated his displeasure about the fact that the processes of the Board had been invoked Miller admitted that the charge he had reference to came to his attention on Monday, March 29, or the preceding Friday, March 26 This was after his aforementioned telephone conversation with Clemons 23 Miller's complaint was that the vertical mortar joints were too wide, that as the wall went up it became from 1/2 to 5/8 inches too wide, and that the leads were not properly run so as to fit with other work then in progress or to be thereafter performed. 198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD insisted that water had probably gotten on the wet mortar causing it to spread, and while admitting that the work looked bad, contended that he had performed the work as directed, and that the architect had approved it. Miller then told Clemons that he could not keep a man who did work of that kind, and discharged Clemons, paying him for 2 hours as reporting time, on March 30. Miller admitted that the alleged defective work by Clemons came to his attention on the morning of March 17 when he walked by that portion of the building, because the defect was so obvious; that after discussing the matter with Foreman Hardy the two of them concluded that Clemons had to be dismissed because they could not rely on a man who performed such work; and that on the same day he mailed Clemons his check for the hours worked during the week ending March 13, with the note asking that Clemons call the office. According to Miller the reason for the note was that he wanted to tell Clemons on the telephone that his service was no longer required. When Clemons did thereafter telephone Miller, the latter did not advise Clemons that he was discharged. Miller admits that he asked Clemons to come to the job, and gave as his reason therefor that he wanted to show Clemons the alleged defective work. Conclusions Independent 8(a)(1) Violations Although a great deal of testimony was taken with respect to complaints made by employees and their business agents about safety conditions on the civic center job, I find it unnecessary to decide-and I do not decide-whether conditions on the job were safe or unsafe. Whether their complaints were justified or not, the employees were entitled to seek through their own efforts, or through their business agent, to bring about a correction of what they regarded as unsafe conditions, and their activity in that regard constituted "concerted activities" for their "mutual aid or protection," which is protected by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Washtngton Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9. Any interference with, restraint, or coercion by Respondent, of employees in the exercise of such right, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As heretofore found, there were a number of statements by Foreman Truesdale, most of which he did not deny, accusing employees of making the complaint to the Union, and threatening that no employees who participated in protesting the alleged unsafe condThos ons, would ever again work for him, or for Respondent. statements were clearly designed to deter the employees involved from concertedly protesting what they regarded as unsafe conditions, and hence violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The 8(a)(3) Allegations No extended discussion is necessary to establish the proposition that the layoffs of January 7 and 20 and February 2, and the February 17 transfer of Clemons, as alleged in the complaint, were violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, if a motivating factor in that regard was that the employees involved had exercised their right to engage in the concerted activity looking toward the elimination of what they, justifiably or not, regarded as unsafe working conditions. On the other hand, it is equally well established that the layoffs and transfer referred to were not violative of the Act if motivated solely by economic necessity. The burden of proving the discriminatory motive rests upon the General Counsel. Upon consideration of the entire record, I find and conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct in question was motivated by the fact that the employees had engaged in the concerted activities referred to. I am persuaded to this conclusion by the following factors: 1. The evidence clearly establishes, indeed the General Counsel does not question, the economic necessity for some reduction in force because of the failure of the crafts working ahead of Respondent to complete their work in a given area to make room for Respondent to work. 2. The General Counsel adduced no evidence to establish that Respondent departed to any significant extent, from its usual practice in selecting the employees to be laid off.24 3. In each of the three layoffs, employees who did not participate in the filing of charges against Truesdale and Stevens, were selected for layoff, while employees who did so participate were retained. It could, of course, be argued that in the layoffs of January 7 and January 20, Truesdale did not have definite information as to the identity of the employees who particpated in the concerted activity mentioned, and laid off indiscriminately to be certain that he reached those whom he thought did so particpate. Such argument is, in my opinion, refuted by Respondent's conduct with respect to the layoff of February 2. Truesdale was present at the union hearing on February 1, and heard Clemons, Hartle, Berman, and Cork, as well as Steward Benton, testify against him. Yet of the five employees laid off on February 2, only Cork had participated in the union proceeding, and employees Clemons, Berman and Hartle, as well as Benton, were retained, Again, no claim is made by the General Counsel that on February 2, Respondent departed from its usual practice in selecting employees for layoff. 4. Finally, of the 12 employees alleged by the General Counsel to have been discriminatorily laid off on January 7 and 20 and February 2, three testified that in March 1965, they received letters from the Respondent asking if they were available for work, and that they did not respond. The remaining nine employees were not asked if they had received such letters. If they had not received such letters, I assume that the General Counsel would have proved that fact. It is inconceivable to me that if Respondent selected the employees involved for layoff because of their concerted activity herein referred to, that it would, in view of Truesdale's statement that such men would never work for Respondent again , have sought them out to offer further employment. 5. The transfer of Clemons on February 17 stands on the same basis. That Respondent needed additonal employees on the Touhy Avenue job, and that two men, in addition to Clemons, were transferred from other jobs to Touhy Avenue, at the same time as Clemons, is not controverted. The General Counsel offered no evidence to establish that the Touhy Avenue job was less favorable or less desirable than the civic center job. Notwithstanding the layoffs referred to, it was not until February 17 that 24 The one instance of deviation involving employee Hartle (see fn. 15, supra) clearly does not demonstrate such departure from normal practice to warrant a finding that the selection was discriminatorily motivated Moreover, when the February 2 layoff was made, which was after Truesdale heard Hartle testify at the union hearing on February 1 , Hartle was not laid off FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO. the decision to transfer Clemons was made. When the transfer was made Clemons did not, so far as the record shows, protest that the Touhy Avenue job was less desirable. In short, I find no evidence to support the allegation that the transfer constituted discrimination, or, assuming that it did, that it was discriminatorily motivated. For the forgoing reasons, I find and conclude that the General Counsel failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the layoffs of January 7 and 20 and February 2, or the tranfer of Clemons on February 17, was discriminatorily motivated. I shall recommend, therefore, that the Section 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations of the complaint be, to that extent, dismissed. The discharge of Clemons on March 30, is, I find and conclude, governed by different considerations. Although I conclude for the reasons above stated, that the evidence does not establish that Clemons was discharged because he had participated in the activity relating to the alleged unsafe working conditions, I am convinced, and for reasons hereafter stated find and conclude, that Clemons was discharged because, through the Union as his collective-bargaining representative, charges were filed with the Board alleging that his transfer on February 17 was discriminatorily motivated.25 Clemons' last day of work on the Touhy Avenue job was March 9 or 10. According to Superintendent Frank Miller, Jr., the deficiencies in Clemons' work were so open and obvious that one walking past it could not help but observe it. For this reason, I find it somewhat difficult to believe, if Clemons' work was as bad as Miller said it was, that he did not observe it before March 17, but his testimony in that regard is uncontradicted and I accept it.26 Miller further testified that after observing the work in question on March 17, and discussing the matter with Foreman Hardy, the two of them concluded that such work could not be tolerated and that Clemons had to be dismissed . Although Miller sent Clemons a check on March 17 for services rendered during the workweek ending March 13, no notice of dismissal was sent at that time; rather Clemons was asked to call the office. Even in Miller's telephone conversation with Clemons on some day between March 17 and March 30, no mention was made that Clemons' work was unsatisfactory; rather he was asked to come to the job, for which Respondent would be required to, and did, pay reporting time. Miller explained "The second amended charge filed herein on March 31 alleged inter alia that on March 30 Clemons was discharged because he had i,ooperated with the Board in the investigation of the first amended charge, filed March 17, which alleged that Clemons' February 17 transfer was discriminatory, and that the discharge was therefore violative of Sec 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act The allegation of the complaint, however, was that Clemons' discharge was violative of Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act, because motivated by the fact that he had participated in the activity to remedy the alleged unsafe working conditions Although some facts relating to Clemons ' discharge were in the record, it was not clear that Respondent fully developed all the facts or had tried his case in the light of a possible Sec 8(a)(4) violation Accordingly, I issued an order to show cause on January 12, 1966 (the original of which I have marked TX Exh 1, and hereby make a part of the record), directing Respondent to advise me whether , in view of the possible finding of a Sec 8(a)(4) violation, it wished to stand on the record as made, or whether it wished to offer additional evidence By written response dated January 21, 1966 (the original of which I have marked TX Exh 2, and make a part of the record), Respondent advised me that it did not wish to offer additional evidence, but would stand on the record Accordingly an adjudication as to whether Clemons' discharge was violative of 199 that the note was sent with Clemons' check because he wanted to tell him on the telephone that his services were no longer required, and that he did not so advise Clemons in the telephone conversation because he wanted to show Clemons the alleged defective work. I reject such explanations because they border on the petty, and have all the earmarks of an afterthought. According to Miller, the first amended charge filed herein on March 17 came to his attention for the first time on Monday, March 29, or the preceding Friday, March 26. That the filing of this charge was the matter uppermost in Miller's mind is made evident by the fact that it was the first subject he raised with Clemons when they met on the morning of March 30. For this reason, I find it unnecessary to decide whether Miller's statement was that he could not have men working for him who filed charges with the Board, as Clemons testified, or whether Miller merely asked Clemons whether he thought the filing of the charge was fair to Respondent, as Miller testified. In either event, it is evident, and I find, that what triggered Clemons' discharge was the fact that a charge had been filed with the Board. The alleged defective work, I find and conclude, was a mere pretext seized upon to obscure the true motive for the discharge.27 Clemons' discharge, under the circumstances and for the reasons above stated, I find and conclude, was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (4), and derivatively Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Although Section 8(a)(4) speaks in terms of an employer "has filed charges,"28 and in the instant case the charge was filed by the Union and not by Clemons, it is my view that Congress intended this statutory provision to be broadly interpreted to afford an employee protection from reprisal for the filing of any charge on his behalf which might affect his employee interests.29 The Union was the representative of all the employees, and when it filed the charge alleging that Clemons' transfer was discriminatory, that charge clearly affected Clemons' employee interests. In that sense the charge was in reality Clemons' charge, filed by his agent, the Union. That Respondent so interpreted the charge is clear from what Miller said to Clemons. In any event, and regardless of whether the discharge violated Section 8(a)(4) or not, it did violate Section 8(a)(3). The charge alleged not only the discriminatory transfer of Clemons, but the discriminatory layoff of 12 other employees, because of their concerted activity on their Sec 8(a)(3) or (4) of the Act, on some theory other than that urged by the General Counsel, may appropriately be made See Associated Home Builders , etc v N.L R.B , 352 F 2d 745, 752-755 (C A 9), and the cases there cited 26 Miller first testified that he observed the alleged deficiency in Clemons' work on March 11 , but thereafter said this was an error, and that the correct date was March 17 He was not cross- examined on this or any other point 27 Nothing herein shall be construed as a finding that the work performed by Clemons on March 9 or 10, was, or was not satisfactory All I decide is that assuming that the work in question was unsatisfactory , Clemons' discharge on March 30, was not for that reason 2s Sec 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act " 29 Cf N L R B. v Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, 318 U S 9, 17, where the Supreme Court held that one who had no interest in the matters in controversy had standing to file a charge because the legislative history of the Act showed that it was not always prudent for employees to file charges against their employer 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD own, and through their Union, in seeking correction of what they regarded as unsafe working conditions. A discharge for having participated in such activity clearly constituted discrimination regarding Clemons' tenure of employment, and tended to discourage membership in the Union, the organ through which, at least part, the employees sought to correct the conditions of which they complained, and which they sought to remedy. Accordingly, Respondent's discharge of Clemons on March 30, as above found, violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act. I so find and conclude. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging George Clemons on March 30, because charges alleged his discriminatory transfer had been filed with the Board, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Except to the extent above found, the General Counsel has failed to prove the remaining allegations of the complaint herein, and said complaint should, to that extent, be dismissed. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action designed to eradicate the effect thereof, and to effectuate the policies of the Act. As such violations go to the very heart of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to refrain from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged George Clemons, I shall recommend that Respondent offer him reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent job, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, by paying to him a sum of money equal to the wages he would have earned from the date of his discharge, until his reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period, in accordance with Board policy set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I shall recommend that Respondent be required to preserve and make available to the Board and its agents, all personnel records necessary or useful in computing the amount of backpay, as herein required. The record fails to disclose whether the civic center and Touhy Avenue jobs have been completed or not. I shall therefore recommend that in lieu of the usual posting at the jobsites of the attached notice, that Respondent mail a signed copy thereof to each of its employees who were employed on the Touhy Avenue job on March 30, 1965, and to each of its employees who worked on the civic center job at any time between December 1, 1964, and January 31, 1965. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees with respect to their activity in seeking to eliminate what they regard as unsafe working conditions on its jobs. (b) Threatening employees with loss of employment or other reprisal if they participate in efforts to eliminate what they regard as unsafe working conditions. (c) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone Masons' Union, Local No. 21, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminatorily discharging, or otherwise discriminating against any employee in regard to his hire, tenure, or any term or condition of employment. (d) Discharging, or in any other manner discriminating against, any employee because he has filed a charge under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self- organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the aforementioned or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent permitted by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer George Clemons immediate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights, privileges, or working conditions, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify George Clemons, if he is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Mail an exact copy of the attached notice marked "Appendix," to the last known address of each employee working at its civic center job at any time between December 1, 1964, and February 2, 1965, and to each employee working on its Touhy Avenue job, or on its FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING CO. 201 payroll for said job on March 30, 1965.30 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13,E after being signed by its authorized representative, shall be forthwith mailed, as herein directed. (e) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.31 30 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words " a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 3i In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX WE WILL NOT discharge, or in any other manner discriminate against, any employee because he has filed a charge against us with the Labor Board. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfer with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Bricklayers Local No. 21, or any other union, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent provided by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL offer George Clemons immediate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of his discriminatory discharge. FRANK MILLER'S SONS FIREPROOFING COMPANY (Employer) NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees with respect to their activity in seeking to eliminate what they regard as unsafe working conditions on any of our jobs. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of employment or other reprisal, if they participate in efforts to eliminate what they, regard as unsafe working conditions. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of Bricklayers Local No. 21, or any other union of our employees, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against our employees, regarding their wages, hours, or working conditions. Dated By (Representative) (Title) Note: We will notify the above-named employee, if, presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse & Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone 828-7597.
164 NLRB 192: Frank Miller's Sons Fireproofing Co. | Justis AI