164 NLRB 284
The Rogers Mfg. Co.
284
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Rogers Mfg. Co .
and
International
net backpay the amount set forth in the attached
Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case
Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision.
8-CA-3767.
May 2,1967
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
'155 NLRB 117.
2 After the Board filed a petition seeking enforcement of its
Order, Respondent consented to the entry of a decree enforcing
the Board's Order
S We deny the Respondent' s
request
for oral
argument,
because the record, the exceptions, and the brief adequately
present the issues and the positions of the parties
SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
On
October 11, 1965, the
National
Labor
Relations Board issued its Decision and Order in the
above-entitled case,' finding, inter alia, that the
Respondent had discriminated against employee
Sarah LaRue in violation of 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and directing the
Respondent to offer this employee immediate and
full reinstatement and to make her whole for any loss
of pay caused by its discrimination against her.
Thereafter, on June 2, 1966, the Board's Order was
enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.2
On September 30, 1966, the Regional Director for
Region 8 issued and served on the parties a backpay
specification and notice of hearing, and Respondent
filed
an answer to the backpay specification.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial
Examiner Thomas A. Ricci on November 29, 1966,
for
the
purpose of determining Respondent's
backpay obligation to LaRue, who had been
reinstated by that time.
On January 11, 1967, the Trial Examiner issued
the attached Supplemental Decision, in which he
found LaRue to be entitled to backpay in the amount
specified.
Thereafter,
the
Respondent
filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental
Decision, together with a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the
Trial Examiner at the supplemental hearing and
finds no prejudicial error was committed. The Board
has
considered
the
Supplemental
Decision,
Respondent's exceptions 3 and brief, and the
entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
On the basis of the entire record in this case, the
National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that
the
Respondent,
The
Rogers
Manufacturing
Company,
Akron,
Ohio, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall pay to Sarah LaRue as
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: On October 11,
1965, the National Labor Relations Board issued its
Decision and Order in this case in which, among other
things, it ordered The Rogers Mfg. Co., herein called the
Respondent, to offer reinstatement to Sarah LaRue and to
make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have
suffered
by reason of the Respondent' s
illegal
discrimination
against
her for the period starting
February 2, 1965, and ending with proper reinstatement.'
Following a petition by the Board for enforcement of its
Order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the Respondent consented to the entry of a decree
enforcing the Order in full; the court decision was entered
on June 2, 1966.
Pursuant to Section 102.52, et seq., of the Board's Rules
and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, the Regional
Director for Region 8 issued a backpay specification and
notice of hearing and caused it to be served on the
Respondent. The Respondent filed an answer to the
specifications, in which it admitted the truth of certain
specifications, denied others, and affirmatively stated
grounds assertedly sufficient to relieve it of the financial
liability claimed in the specifications.
Pursuant to notice a hearing upon the specifications was
held before me in Akron, Ohio, on November 29, 1966, in
which the Respondent, the Charging Party, and the
General Counsel on behalf of the Regional Director
participated. All parties were afforded full opportunity to
examine and to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce
evidence pertinent to the issues. A brief was filed after the
close of the hearing by the General Counsel.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT2
Sarah La Rue was unlawfully discharged on February 2,
1965; at that time she was working as a punch press
operator on the first shift at a rate of $1.95 per hour. The
Company recalled her to work on December 16, 1965, at
loading and unloading a brazing furnace on the third shift,
at a rate of $1.87 per hour. She continued on this job until
April 7, 1966, when she began a leave oT absence because
of illness. She had not yet returned to work at the time of
' The Rogers Mfg Co , 155 NLRB 117
2 On December 14, 1966, all parties stipulated, and jointly
moved, that the Informational Booklet and Reporting Record,
issued
by the State of Ohio Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation, and used by Sarah LaRue during the period
between her discharge and reinstatement, be received in
evidence The motion is granted and both the signed stipulation
and the booklet are received in evidence, marked G C. Exh 3-A
and 3-B.
164 NLRB No. 46
ROGERS MFG. CO.
285
hearing.
The backpay period, as set out in the
specifications, is therefore February 4, 1965 (apparently
the first workday after her discharge), to April 7, 1966.
The principal issue raised by the Respondent in defense
against the specifications is whether, as it asserts, the
backpay period should not instead be cut off at April 6,
1965, when the Union called a strike at the plant. There
was picketing of the premises for the next 3 months; it was
then discontinued permanently. LaRue picketed for
unspecified periods, every other day; she also continued,
after the discharge, to sit with the union committee in
bargaining negotiations which went on after the strike
started. She was also a trustee of the Union throughout
this time.
The Respondent argues that by joining the pickets from
time to time, and by participating in union affairs as
negotiator and officer, LaRue precluded herself from
working for this Company, and is therefore not entitled to
backpay after April 6. The theory here seems to be that
had she not been discharged, she would have had a job; if
she had had a choice in the matter she would have
voluntarily left work to join the strike; and finally, although
she had been sent away by the Company in February, she
would not have crossed the picket line if the Company had
recalled her during the strike. From all this, according to
the Respondent, it follows that LaRue must be considered
as one who chose not to work from April 6 and thereafter,
instead of as an employee who was not wanted at the plant.
The fatal weakness in this reasoning is the fact that all
LaRue knew of her status as a worker in the Respondent
Company is that the Respondent had sent her away
unequivocally, and that the Company never said to her,
before December 16, 1965, that she could return to work if
she wished. The Board has considered and rejected this
same argument in earlier cases, and I find it equally
unpersuasive here.3 LaRue's activities as union officer
and in contract negotiations, both before and after her
discharge, are irrelevant to the issue here.
As a punch press operator on the first shift at the time of
her discharge LaRue was paid $1.95 per hour. This rate
held on that job until April 6, 1965, when all classifications
of employees in the plant received a 7-cent-per-hour raise.
Six punch press operators worked on the first shift
during the full backpay period, April through December
1965, all junior to Sarah LaRue in service with the
Company.
One of these, Angie Locicero, worked
throughout the period; the other five were hired in mid-
April and their first full week of employment was April 25.
Rose Bye, one of this group, lost 7 consecutive full weeks
between October and December 5 because of illness. The
Company's records show that the average number of hours
of work performed by these six in the course of their
continuous
employment
throughout
1965
is
43.
Accordingly, the General Counsel on behalf of the
Regional Director claims gross backpay for Sarah LaRue
on the basis of 43 hours of work weekly that she would
have performed had she not been discharged.
The Respondent does not take issue with this assertion
that a normal, average employee occupied as a punch
press operator on the first shift throughout the year 1965
would have worked an average of 43 hours weekly.' It
disputes the assertion with respect to LaRue on two
grounds, the first being the disqualification allegedly
flowing from the fact she picketed the plant after her
discharge. That matter has been disposed of above. The
second ground for contending that LaRue would have
performed less work is the claim that she would have been
absent a great deal. The only evidence to prove this
assertion is the testimony of Donald DeHaven, the plant
manager:
Q. (By Mr. Rector) Now, let us say, during the last
2 or 3 years, that Mrs. LaRue was there, that is prior
to 1965, was there anyone in the employ of that
company during that time that you could actually,
with any reason at all, compare their absenteeism to
that of Sarah LaRue?
A. No, sir.
Q. Is it your testimony that she is the worst you
ever had?
A. Yes, sir.
I do not deem such conclusionary expression of opinion,
offered in
monosyllabic response to purely leading
questions, of sufficiently probative value to offset the
normal presumption that LaRue, who had for 16 years
been an acceptable employee, would have worked as a
normal employee throughout her backpay period. Neither
the extent of her absentee record, its nature, or any
possible explanation were offered in evidence. In his brief,
the General Counsel correctly states the applicable rule of
law. "When an employer's unlawful discrimination makes
it impossible to determine whether a discharged employee
would
have
earned
backpay in the absence of
discrimination, the uncertainty should be resolved against
the
employer." See
Mastro
Plastics
Corporation v.
N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2).
LaRue also said at the hearing, on questioning by
Respondent's representative, that she had been sick for an
unspecified time in May, a "couple of days" in June, and
perhaps a week and a half in October. There is nothing to
show whether this illness occurred on workdays or
weekends, what the nature of the illness was, or whether it
would have incapacitated the discriminatee so as to make
her unavailable for work. In these circumstances, again,
the Respondent has failed in its burden of proving that
LaRue was unavailable for work for even those brief
periods.
LaRue's gross backpay is therefore calculated as
follows for the period February 4, 1965, to December 16,
1965:
Period Ending
Computed Average Hrs.
2-7
17.2
2-14
43
2-21
43
2-28
43
3-7
43
3-14
43
3-21
43
3-28
43
4-4
8.6
4-4
34.4
S East Texas Steel Castings Company, Inc , 116 NLRB 1336
' In his specifications served on the Respondent the Regional
Director stated that "La Rue would have worked 40 hours per
week during the period February 4, 1965, to December 16, 1965 "
It seems that this document was prepared before examination of
the company records, which were placed in evidence, by agreed.
upon excerpts, as set out above As the uncontrovertible records
thus show the exact figure to be 43 hours per week, the General
Counsel moved, in his brief filed after the close of the hearing, to
conform the specifications to such proof The motion is hereby
granted.
286
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Period Ending
Computed Average Hrs.
4-11
43
4-18
43
4-25
43
5-2
43
5-9
43
5-16
43
5-23
43
5-30
43
6-6
43
6-13
43
6-20
43
6-27
43
7-4
43
7-11
43
7-18
43
7-25
43
8-1
43
8-8
43
8-15
43
8-22
43
8-29
43
9-5
43
9-12
43
9-19
43
9-26
43
10-3
43
10-10
43
10-17
43
10-24
43
10-31
43
11-7
43
11-14
43
11-21
43
11-28
43
12-5
43
12-12
43
12-19
25.8
TOTAL-1,935.0
For the period up to and including 8.6 hours the week of
April 4 (326.8 hours), at the rate of $1 .95 per hour, the
amount is $637.26. For the remaining period
(1,608.2
hours), at the rate of $2.02 per hour, the amount is
$3,248.56.
When LaRue was recalled to work on December 16,
1965, she was given work on the third shift loading and
unloading a brazing furnace at the rate of $1.87 per hour.
Her pay was later raised , retroactively , to $1.95 per hour,
and she continued at this rate until she went on sick leave
on April 7, 1966. In this period-December 16, 1965, to
April 7, 1966-she worked 497 hours ; as her rate would
have been $2.02 per hour had she been fully reinstated,
she was underpaid $34.79 for such time at work, an
amount which is due her now.
A final amount due LaRue is the cash vacation payment
she would have received during 1965 measured against
work performed and money earned during 1964 . As stated
in the specifications , and as conceded by the Respondent
at the hearing, in her case the sum would have been
$204.78, which is now due.
There is no evidence of any willful refusal to accept or
seek work ; indeed the record shows LaRue regularly
registered for work at the State of Ohio Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation,
and sought work at a
number of places during the backpay period.
On
cross-examination
by
the
Respondent's
representative, LaRue stated that on occasion she gave
home permanents to friends and sometimes performed
home work for her sister and a friend . For all of this work
she said she received a total of about $40 in payment.
Accordingly I shall deduct such interim earnings from her
backpay award.
LaRue also received about $100 from the Union during
the backpay period. She testified , without contradiction,
that she was not obligated to perform picketing duties to
receive this money, that "it was just to help anybody that
needed any extra money," and that it was paid to her even
while she was not picketing . In the circumstances, there is
no reason to charge this benefit received from the Union
from her backpay award.-5
Concluding Findings
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the record as
a whole, I find that Sarah LaRue is entitled to backpay as
follows:
Gross Backpay Due
Complete layoff period
$3,885.82
Under payment Dec. 16 to Apr. 7
34.79
Vacation payment
204.78
Total
$4,125.39
Interim earnings
40.00
Net Amount Due
$4,085.39
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is hereby recommended that the Board adopt these
findings and conclusions.
5 Standard Prtnteng Company of Canton , 151 NLRB 963, 967