Essex Wire Corp.

PARANITE WIRE & CABLE DIV. Paranite Wire & Cable Division, Essex Wire Corporation and Jim Oberer and Local Lodge No. 24, International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract. Case 17-CA-2712. May 3, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On June 6, 1966, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent and General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith. 1. The record evidence, as more fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, reveals that on December 23, 1964, the Union was certified as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees at the Topeka plant. The parties commenced contract negotiations in January 1965. On January 29, the union representatives reached agreement on contract terms with Respondent's attorney and negotiator, Walter Schrodi. Thereafter, the 12 employees in the unit were assembled in the plant to listen to Union Representative McEvoy explain the provisions of the agreement and to his recommendation that the employees ratify the agreement. However, all but the two employees who served on the negotiating committee were strongly opposed to approving the wage provisions of the contract. Some of the employees suggested that the negotiators be sent back to try again. Whereupon, McEvoy informed the employees he had obtained all that he could from the Respondent, warned the employees that Respondent had closed plants in the past and might well close the Topeka plant, and 319 stated that in these circumstances a strike would be unwise. When it appeared that ratification of the agreement was unlikely, at the invitation of McEvoy, Attorney Schrodi addressed the assembled employees. According to the credited testimony, Schrodi told the employees, "We don't pay high wages. We have taken strikes. It wasn't too long ago we took a 60-day strike and we settled it the employees' way and after that, a few months after that the place was padlocked up" and that "the company might not go to that trouble here, they might just close the doors before it got started good here." In addition, other credited testimony reveals that Schrodi, among other remarks, stated, "If we had labor trouble, we could close down and we [do not] have too much invested. We closed down back east" and "if we have labor trouble here, we will close the plant down and move out," and finally, "Fellows, this is what the company officer [sic] and I don't think they will go any higher if you go on strike, I suppose, as they don't have much invested here, they will close the doors and move out of the country." After Schrodi departed, McEvoy called for a vote on contract approval, and the employees approved the contract with the existing wage provisions by a vote of 7 to 5. One of the seven testified that when he heard Schrodi's threats to close the plant "that pushed the panic button for me, thatis when I voted for the contract." The Trial Examiner found that the above- described threats were in fact made and that the approval of the contract was obtained in circumstances where the employees were led to believe that their choice was to accept the contract or to chance the closing of the plant. We agree with these findings. However, the Trial Examiner, relying on American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, and Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, concluded that such threats did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) as alleged in the complaint, because in the circumstances, the employees did not have a protected right to be free of such coercion in their efforts to obtain a more acceptable wage scale. The General Counsel excepts to this conclusion of the Trial Examiner. We find merit in General Counsel's exceptions. In holding that an employer may close his entire business without committing an unfair labor practice, "even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness towards the union," the Supreme Court in Darlington made the following comment: "Nothing we have said in this opinion would justify an employer interfering with employee organizational activities by threatening to close his plant...." Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we do not believe that the Court intended by this language to sanction such conduct when directed at 164 NLRB No. 48 320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD nonorganizational employee activities which are also protected by Section 7 of the Act. Indeed, it is apparent that the Court was drawing a distinction between unlawful threats to close a plant and the announcement of a decision to close "already reached by the board of directors or other management authority empowered to make such a decision." We believe the Trial Examiner failed to give proper recognition to this distinction in concluding that Respondent's threat to close its plant did not constitute a violation of the Act. Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, an employer may lawfully threaten that he will engage in a lockout which would be permissible under American Ship, that is not what occurred here. Rather, it was clearly stated that the possible consequence of failure to ratify the contract was the complete closing of the plant and cessation of business at that location, with the resultant permanent loss of their jobs. We are of the opinion that the threats here involved are governed by legal principles which are substantially different from those applicable to situations involving actual plant closures and lockouts, and we do not deem relevant to our decision herein the principles applied by the Court in Darlington and American Ship. As previously noted, the employees were assembled, albeit at Respondent's plant during working hours, to receive a report from their representatives with respect to the terms of the agreement reached between them and Respondent, and to consider whether or not to ratify it. An overwhelming majority of the employees were dissatisfied with the wage provisions contained in the agreement and were prepared to reject the agreement on this ground. No serious contention can be made that the employees were not engaged in protected concerted activities.' We have already expressed our agreement with the Trial Examiner's findings that Schrodi made the threats attributed to him and that these threats had a coercive effect on the employees' decision to accept the contract. It is also apparent that McEvoy was aware of Respondent's past plant closures, and that the fear of similar events occurring at the Topeka plant was of grave concern to him when he urged the employees to ratify the contract. While it is true that Schrodi came into the ratification meeting at the behest of the employees, the invitation did not carry with it a license to coerce the employees in their choice whether to approve or reject the contract. As stated in the Jack Roesch case, supra, this conduct plainly created an atmosphere not conducive to a free exchange of ideas between the Union and its constituents concerning the negotiated agreement, and thereby constituted an inexcusable intrusion into the private affairs of the Union and the employees it represented. Accordingly, we conclude that Respondent, by threatening to close its plant if the employees did not ratify the contract, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. We agree, for the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by urging and soliciting employees to execute checkoff authorizations in favor of the Union. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening to close its plant, we shall order that it cease and desist from such unlawful conduct and post the usual notices. We shall also require that the contract entered into between the Respondent and the Union and ratified on January 29, 1965, be set aside as it is manifest that the ratification thereof was obtained through duress and coercion. We adopt the Trial Examiner's recommended Remedy as to the 8(a)(2) violation. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Paranite Wire & Cable Division, Essex Wire Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified: 1. Reletter paragraph 1(b) as 1(d) and add the following as paragraphs 1(b) and (c): "(b) Threatening to close its plant if the employees do not ratify the contract." "(c) Enforcing or giving effect to the contract ratified on January 29, 1965, or any modification, extension, or renewal thereof." 2. The notice attached to the Board's Decision herein is substituted for the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision. ' Jack Roesch, d/b/a Roesch Transportation Company, Western Trail Stages, and Best Way Charter Service, 157 NLRB 441. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT offer to applicants for employment dues-deduction authorization forms for the purpose of withholding dues and fees in connection with membership in Local Lodge No. 24, International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO , in any circumstances tending to suggest to such applicants that the execution of such a form is in any respect a requisite of employment. PARANITE WIRE & CABLE DIV. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with plant closure if they do not ratify a contract agreed upon by the Company and the Union. WE WILL NOT enforce or give effect to the contract between the Company and the Union which was ratified on January 29, 1965, or any modification, extension, or renewal thereof. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or for other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. PARANITE WIRE& CABLE DIVISION, ESSEX WIRE CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 610 Federal Building, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, Telephone FRanklin 4-7000. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WALLACE E. ROYSTER, Trial Examiner: This matter was tried before me in Topeka, Kansas, on January 11, 1966. At issue is whether Paranite Wire & Cable Division, Essex Wire Corporation, herein the Respondent, at its plant in Topeka, Kansas, engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein the Act; threatened employees with closing the plant to force agreement to a collective-bargaining contract; urged and solicited employees to execute checkoff authorizations in favor of Local Lodge No. 24, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, herein the Union; and told employees that favorable treatment by the Respondent was conditioned upon membership in the Union.' Upon the entire record in the case, in consideration of the briefs filed and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is a Michigan corporation with its 321 principal office and place of business at Fort Wayne, Indiana, operating a plant in Topeka , Kansas. It is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of electrical wire and other electrical products. In connection with operation of the Topeka plant, the Respondent makes annual purchases of material and products valued in excess of $50,000 coming to Topeka from points outside the State of Kansas, and in the same period, ships from Topeka to points outside the State of Kansas goods and products valued at more than $50,000. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES On December 23, 1964, the Union was certified as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees at the Topeka plant. Negotiations looking toward the execution of a contract began in January. The last bargaining meeting took place on January 29. On that occasion the Union 's negotiators , George McEvoy, a union employee, Delbert New and George Masters, both employed by the Respondent, reached agreement with Walter Schrodi, Respondent's attorney and negotiator on the terms of the contract. The 12 employees in the bargaining unit were then assembled in the plant and listened to McEvoy as he explained to them the provisions of the agreement reached and his recommendation that the employees ratify it. One or more of the employees affected protested that the wage rates were too low. McEvoy said that he had gotten all that he could from the Respondent, warned that the Respondent had closed plants in the past and might do so in Topeka, and suggested that a strike would be unwise. When it appeared that the ratification was unlikely, McEvoy asked the group if they would like to hear from Attorney Schrodi. There was an affirmative response and Schrodi was called to the meeting. Delbert New testified that on this occasion Schrodi explained that the Respondent did not pay high wages; that at another of Respondent's plants, after a 60- day strike, the Respondent accepted the demands of the Union but continued its operation for a few months only; and that this might happen in Topeka. Thomas Berberich, another of the employees in attendance, testified that Schrodi described the contract reached with the negotiators as a good one, establishing higher wages than those paid in some of Respondent's plants. Schrodi went on to say, according to Berberich, that if there was labor trouble at the Topeka plant, it could be closed for the Respondent did not have much invested there. Employees Morris Persing and George Rustin, both testified that on this occasion Schrodi threatened the closing of the plant in the event of labor trouble or a strike. George Masters, one of the Union's negotiators, called as a witness by the Respondent, testified that he did not recall any mention by Schrodi of closing the plant but conceded that he might not have heard all that Schrodi said at the meeting. ' Charge served July 2, 1965; complaint issued October 22, following. All dates mentioned are in 1965 except where otherwise stated. 322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Elmer Tornquist, who was present at the ratification but who is no longer in Respondent's employ, testified that Schrodi made no threats. George McEvoy testified to the same effect. Walter Schrodi, from the witness stand, denied that he made any mention of closing the plant on January 29. There is evidence that before the meeting opened on January 29 all of the employees excepting the two who were on the negotiating committee were strongly opposed to approving the wage provisions in the contract. During the course of the meeting, before Schrodi appeared, some of them suggested that the negotiators be sent back to try again . After Schrodi spoke to the group, a motion to approve the contract was carried by a vote of 7 to 5. One of the seven, Eldon Rice, testified that when he heard the threat to close the plant "that pushed the panic button for me, that is when I voted for the contract." Considering the testimony of all of those who were questioned about the happenings at this meeting, I am convinced that the threats attributed to Attorney Schrodi were, in fact, made and that the approval of the contract was obtained in circumstances where the employees affected were led to believe that their choice was to accept the contract or to chance the closing of the plant. Counsel for the General Counsel asserts that a threat to close a business in an effort to coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Assuming this to be so the question remains, however, did the employees in the circumstances recited have a protected right to be free of such coercion in their efforts to obtain a more acceptable wage scale? All of the cases cited by counsel for the General Counsel in support of this aspect of the complaint concern situations where an employer used the threat of closing either to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative or as part of a course of conduct intermeshed with a refusal to bargain . In all such situations it is obvious that the employees were coerced in the exercise of Section 7 rights. In the matter here for decision there is no complaint of a refusal to bargain and such an allegation could not be sustained had it been advanced. The Respondent was willing indeed to deal with the Union and to contract with it. In fact it is alleged that the Respondent gave the Union unlawful assistance and the General Counsel would like to show (if Section 10(b) permitted) that the Union obtained its majority status through Respondent's favor. Although employees have the right to be free of employer interference, restraint, and coercion in the selection of a bargaining representative and in utilizing that representative for purposes of bargaining , it does not follow of course that employer interferences, restraints, and coercions may not lawfully be used to persuade employees to accept the contract terms, otherwise lawful, sought by the employer. The fault that the employees found in the provisional agreement reached between the Respondent and the union negotiators was principally in the wage rates. They thought that they should be paid more. The Respondent was unwilling to satisfy this desire and the union negotiators thought that they had done as well as they could. Of course the employees were free to reject the contract offered to them and to strike, if they felt so disposed, in an attempt to better it.Certainly, the threat 2 Textile Workers Union of America v Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U S 263, 274. that if they did so the plant might close was potently dissuasive. It has now authoritatively been decided that, absent purposes or motivations not shown to be present here, an employer may close his business "even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness towards the union" without committing an unfair labor practice.2 May then an employer threaten to close his operation in order to bring his employees to heel? In the decision just cited the Court said that its holding on the legality of closing was not to be interpreted to justify threats to close which interfered with employee organizational activities. Clearly, however, Respondent's threats were not uttered at a time when its employees were engaged in such activities . The organizing period was over. The Respondent had recognized and had bargained with the Union . It is now decisional law that a: Lockout may well dissuade employees from adhering to the position which they initially adopted in the bargaining, but the right to bargain collectively does not entail any "right" to insist on one's position free from economic disadvantage . Proper analysis of the problem demands that the simple intention to support the employer's bargaining position as to compensation and the like be distinguished from a hostility to the process of collective bargaining which could suffice to render a lockout unlawful.3 Following this holding and its logic, it seems clear that as the Respondent could have locked out its employees in an attempt to gain ratification of the contract, it also could have threatened to do so. But the American Ship decision is not dispositive of the issue presented here unless a threat to close a business is the practical equivalent of a threat to lockout. The effect of such threats upon employees will always depend to some extent to the credibility accorded to them. Assuming that Respondent's employees took Schrodi at his word (and at least one of them did), then they could have believed, as Respondent desired, that a strike might bring their employment to an end. This was a development which they were unwilling to risk so they approved the contract. Had the threat been to lockout, a different course of action might have been chosen. The effect on employees would have been no more burdensome than a strike and perhaps less so for it is by no means clear that employees locked out in such circumstances could be replaced permanently as strikers might be. So the threat to close is a more powerful weapon in the employer's arsenal than the threat to lockout. I am supplied with no authority, however, and I have found none which instructs that the potency or efficacy of the threat is a guide to decision. Harking back to American Ship, the Court commented: Having protected employee organization in countervailance to the employers ' bargaining power, and having established a system of collective bargaining whereby the newly coequal adversaries might resolve their disputes, the Act also contemplated resort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures not avail . Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power. 'American Shtp Building Co V N.L.R.B, 380 U.S 300, 309, 317. PARANITE WIRE & CABLE DIV. I conclude upon this record that the Respondent was free to refuse to continue its operation unless the employees would ratify the contract offered to them and as free to threaten to do so. I find no violation of the Act in the threats to close or of possible closing voiced by Attorney Schrodi. In the contract between the Respondent and the Union, the former agreed to withhold union dues and fees from the earnings of those employees who authorized it to do so. John Suback, the plant manager, testified that after the contract became effective many employees questioned him about the dues-checkoff authorizations with the result that he directed James Ireland, the personnel manager, to "clear up the mess." Ireland testified that in consequence he obtained a supply of such authorizations and in the course of hiring applicants explained that the Union was bargaining representative and gave them dues-deduction authorizations. Ireland denied that he ever asked any of these persons to execute an authorization. Jerry O'Donnell testified that upon the occasion of his hire on May 26, Ireland asked if he would like to join the Union and offered him a dues-authorization card. Joseph Berberich testified that he was hired on June 1 and that Ireland then asked him if he wanted to join the Union. Roger Meyer, hired in June and Dorothy Logan, hired in August, both testified that Ireland gave them dues-authorizations to sign . Melvin Getsay testified that when he was hired in early September, Ireland made some explanation of the Union and that Getsay signed a dues-withholding card. The contract contains no provision conditioning employment upon the acquirement of union membership. In early September, Ireland testified, he was instructed to end the practice of giving applicants dues-withholding authorizations and that he did so. Ireland testified that he had no interest in recruiting members for the Union and that he undertook the business of providing the union forms to applicants so that other employees would not be distracted from their work by such activity. This is rather close to an admission that the Respondent did not want working employees to take time to solicit members for the Union and therefore undertook that task itself. But decision need not rest upon such a reading of the record. I am convinced that no matter what Ireland' s intention may have been he nonetheless conveyed to applicants at the time of hire, and thus at a time when a prospective employer's suggestions are almost sure to be heeded, the impression that the execution of a dues-withholding authorization was somehow a part of the hiring procedure. That several newly hired employees in the period from about May 1 to early September authorized the Respondent to withhold union dues and fees from their earnings is clear. It also is clear from the evidence they gave that they received the impression from Ireland that the Respondent desired them to give the authorization. Some of them, learning afterward that membership in the Union was not required, asked for and received the return of their authorizations. The propriety of telling applicants for employment that a union represents the employees in the plant and of explaining that they may authorize their employer to withhold dues and fees in connection with obtaining and retaining membership in that union is not broadly in issue here. I find that under the factual findings made the Respondent encouraged applicants to execute dues-deduction authorizations for the Union in a manner indicating that such executions were expected from applicants. By this practice the 323 Respondent has assisted the Union in obtaining members and to that extent has contributed support to the Union. I find that in this fashion the Respondent has committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. About June 1 George Masters, one of those who acted for the Union in negotiating the contract and one who appears to have been active in establishing the Union in the plant, told another employee, Herbert Abbott, that Abbott's chances for advancement would be heightened if he would join the Union. Abbott did so. There is, however, a complete absence of evidence to indicate that when this advice was given, Masters was a management representative. About a week later Masters was given an assignment as leadman. Whether this change to classification made him a supervisor is unnecessary to decide. He was a machine operator when he spoke to Abbott. I find that what Masters said on June 1 is not attributable to the Respondent. I will recommend the dismissal of the complaint in that particular. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Although the Respondent has halted the practice of offering dues- deduction authorization forms to applicants for employment, I consider it appropriate nonetheless for an order to issue forbidding such a practice in circumstances which reasonably would lead applicants for employment to believe that the execution of such a form is in any fashion a requisite step to employment. Because in the circumstances of this case I consider the assistance thus afforded to the Union not to have contributed in any substantial degree to the maintenance of the Union's status as bargaining representative, I consider it inappropriate to recommend the withdrawal of recognition from the Union. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Paranite Wire & Cable Division, Essex Wire Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Local Lodge No. 24, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By offering dues-deduction authorization froms, to applicants for employment in circumstances tending to influence such applicants to execute these forms, the Respondent has assisted and contributed support to the Union and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. 298-668 0-69-22 324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices by threatening the possible closure of the plant in the event that contract terms were not ratified. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that Paranite Wire & Cable Division, Essex Wire Corporation, Topeka, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Assisting or contributing support to Local Lodge No. 24, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by presenting dues-deduction authorization forms to applicants for employment in circumstances tending to bring about the execution of such forms. (b) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the right to self- S In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall organization , to form labor organizations , to join or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Topeka, Kansas, in all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. 1'4 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 17, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, Kansas City, Missouri, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken in compliance.5 [Appendix omitted from publication.] be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "