Converters Gravure Service, Inc.

CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE 397 Converters Gravure Service , Inc. and Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, and its Local Unions Nos. 33-L and 60-P, AFL-CIO.' Case 9-CA-3939. May 5,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On January 9, 1967, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in this proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices, and recommended that the allegations of the complaint pertaining thereto be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision and the entire record in this case, including the exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith. The record in this case shows that the Union approached Respondent's president, William Cronkrite, on May 27, 1966,2 claiming to represent a majority of Respondent's employees, and requesting recognition and bargaining. At this time, the Union had obtained authorization cards from 8 of the 15 employees in the appropriate unit. In reply to the Union's request, Cronkrite asked what "other alternatives" the Union offered. The Union offered to submit cards to a neutral party for a card check, explaining such procedure. Cronkrite asked to think it over, promising to send an answer by letter on the first or second working day hence.3 He further asked if still other alternatives existed. The Union replied that it "could take the cards and file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board for a representation election." Cronkrite asked "when [it was] going to do that," and the Union replied it "probably would go ahead with the petition before the Board, but that it would be understood that if he [Cronkrite] did send us a letter, or if he decided to go to a card check, that we could get the cards back from the Labor Board in order to have a card check performed, and we would then in that case withdraw the petition for an election." The meeting adjourned. At no time during this confrontation did Cronkrite question the validity of the cards or ask to see them. He did state that he doubted the Union's majority, but gave no reason. Immediately following the meeting with the Union, Cronkrite called all the employees together and told them of the Union's request for recognition. He remarked that, if the employees wished to have a union, he'd abide by their wish, but if he felt anyone signed thinking this card would only be used to obtain an election he "would resist this" (card recognition). A general question-and-answer period ensued. An employee suggested that a vote be taken right then and there; Cronkrite said that he was not allowed to take such a vote, and did not want to know who was for or against the Union. He went back to his office. The employees thereupon took a "secret ballot" vote, and the ballots were opened in the presence of them all. The results were announced 12 for no union, 1 in favor of the Union, and 1 blank ballot. An employee went to Cronkrite's office, and despite Cronkrite's protest that he did not wish to know about any vote, told him that only one employee was in favor of the Union, and the rest opposed. Cronkrite thereupon said that in that case he thought the only fair way to settle things was to go to an election. On May 31, Cronkrite wrote to the Union, stating: "You have requested ... bargaining rights ... I sincerely doubt that a majority of our employees desire that this status be granted to your union ... I must decline to grant your request ... unless and until" a majority choose the Union in an election. Further "From the conversation ... Friday you apparently do not object to such a procedure ... I am formally petitioning the National Labor Relations Board to hold such an election. . . ." Cronkrite in fact filed such a petition that very day. On June 1, without having received Respondent's letter, the Union wrote to Cronkrite. Its letter summarized what had transpired at the Friday meeting, including the statement that "We told you that we expected to file for an election . . ." and ending with the statement that "Our offer still stands. We are willing to prove our majority and to meet ... to negotiate a contract." In fact, the Union had filed the unfair labor practice in the instant case on May 31. No further communication between the parties was had. On these facts, the Trial Examiner found that Respondent did not in good faith doubt the Union's majority on May 27, and, accordingly, as of that date ' Herein the Union 2 All dates herein refer to 1966 I e., May 31 or June 1 .164 NLRB No. 53 398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD violated Section 8(a)(5) in refusing to recognize and bargain with the authorized representative of its employees. We do not agree. While Respondent's good- or bad-faith doubt must, of course, be established as of the time the Union actually made its demand on May 27, evidence of the parties' conduct before, during, and after their confrontation on that date certainly is relevant and material in establishing Respondent's motivation in refusing to accede to the Union's request for immediate recognition and bargaining. The Trial Examiner absolved Respondent of all alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1),4 with the exception of one incident of alleged improper interrogation.5 The Board has held that the burden of proving a respondent's lack of a good-faith doubt or bad faith in cases of this nature rests with the General Counsel.6 We cannot find in the circumstances of this case that the General Counsel has carried that burden by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, the very opposite is indicated. President Cronkrite's statement on May 27 that he doubted the Union's majority was not accompanied by knowledge, conduct, or words inconsistent with the expression of his belief as to the Union's status. At no time did Respondent make a free election impossible by attempting to dissipate the Union's majority by unlawful means. Instead, Respondent assured its employees that it would abide by their wishes and recognize the Union, if they so desired. When it appeared that most of the employees did not, in fact, wish union representation, Respondent filed an RM petition with the Board for a Board- conducted election, an alternative suggested by the Union on May 27, and one provided for in the Act. It is also significant, in our view, that Respondent did not unduly delay filing the above petition, but did so on May 31, within 4 days of the Union's request. On the other hand, the Union, contrary to its stated position on May 27, and repeated in its letter of June 1 to Respondent (to the effect that it expected to file a petition), did not file a petition, but in fact filed the charge in this case on May 31. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) or (1) of the Act, and we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. ' In the absence of exceptions thereto , we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's recommendation that the allegations of the complaint pertaining thereto be dismissed 5 The Trial Examiner found that one employee was asked what he thought about the Union We are of the opinion that even if the question was asked , as found by the Trial Examiner , it was, at most , an isolated occurrence not violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 6 Aaron Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION NATURE OF THE CASE JAMES V. CONSTANTINE , Trial Examiner: This is an unfair labor practice case initiated on May 31 , 1966, by a charge filed pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160(b). That charge, naming Converters Gravure Service, Inc., as Respondent, was filed by an International Union and two of its locals. On July 29 , 1966, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , through the Acting Regional Director for Region 9 (Cincinnati, Ohio), issued a complaint based on said charge. In essence said complaint alleges that Respondent has committed unfair labor practices forbidden by Section 8(a)(1) and (5), and that such conduct affects commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent has answered admitting some facts but denying that it violated the Act. Pursuant to due notice this case was heard at Middletown, Ohio, on October 11 and 12, 1966 . All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing and were granted full opportunity to adduce evidence , examine and cross -examine witnesses, submit briefs, and present oral arguments . Respondent's motion to dismiss portions of the complaint was denied. Respondent and the General Counsel argued briefly at the conclusion of the hearing. Briefs have been received from Respondent and the General Counsel. Upon the entire record in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. AS TO JURISDICTION Respondent, an Ohio corporation, is engaged at Middletown, Ohio, in repairing and engraving rotogravure printing cylinders. During the year prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, directly from points outside the State of Ohio. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over it in this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, and its Local Unions No. 33-L and No. 60-P, is each a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background During the month of May 1966,1 George R. Darner, Jr., president of Local No. 33-L, one of the Charging Parties, conducted an organizing drive among the employees of Respondent . In this campaign, Darner was often accompanied by Peter B. Schneider , International representative of Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, the parent of Local No. 33-L, and sometimes by members of Local No. 60-P, a sister union and another one of the Charging Parties. As ' Except where otherwise specified, all events hereinafter mentioned occurred in 1966 CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE part of the campaign each employee solicited was given a kit containing several pieces of literature, a pencil, and Darner's calling card. In addition, a copy of the International's constitution had been mailed to such employees prior to this. One of the items included in the kit was an "Informational Bulletin" (Resp. Exh. 1), which, in part, states that "You will soon have an opportunity to vote in an N.L.R.B. election" and describes certain employer conduct alleged to be proscribed by the Act. In another paragraph this bulletin states that "it is hoped that such tactics will be avoided in this election, but you should be on guard against the possibilities." Along with the literature contained in the above-described kit a "blue membership application" was also enclosed. This is in the record as Respondent's Exhibit 2. B. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain 1. General Counsel's evidence When Darner solicited employees of Respondent he also gave each one a "white authorization card." He succeeded in obtaining signed authorization cards from seven employees, each of whom subscribed in his presence, viz, William Howard, Jack Brandenburg, Wesley Blythe, Alfred Bradshaw, William Corbin, Larry Sinkowitz, and John Kalnai. (G.C. Exhs. 2-8.) One more card, that of Michael Casey (G.C. Exh. 9), was obtained by International Representative Schneider, who personally observed Casey sign it. Schneider turned it over to Darner. Thus, eight cards were obtained between May 2 and 26. These authorization cards in pertinent part provide that "the undersigned, an employee of [Respondent] do hereby appoint the Lithographers & Photoengravers International Union-AFL-CIO, and Local 33-L-- 60-P thereof, Dayton Ohio, or either of them, my true and lawful agent, for me and in my place and stead, to bargain collectively ' with said concern, and authorize the submission of this card to the National Labor Relations Board." On Friday, May 27, Darner and Schneider, accompanied by DeLater, secretary of Local No. 60-P, called on William Cronkrite, Respondent's president, at the latter's office. Thomas Wortley, a "partner" of Cronkrite, was also present at the time. The union men informed Cronkrite that they had talked to most of the employees "in his establishment and . . . had an overwhelming majority of the people who had signed authorization cards, and, therefore [asked] for recognition for the purpose of negotiating a contract to cover all ... production and maintenance people ... [covering] wages, hours, and working conditions." At this point Cronkrite left for a few minutes. Upon returning he told the union people that he could not recognize them as the bargaining agent for his employees and asked to know what "other alternatives" the union men offered. Replying to Cronkrite's request for "other alternatives," Darner said that the unions were willing to submit the cards to an impartial third person, such as a clergyman or, a public official, who would check the cards against an employee list to ascertain whether the Union had substantiated its claim of a majority. Cronkrite replied that he would not agree to this procedure "at the moment," and asked for more time "to think it over." When Darner inquired how much time Cronkrite desired, the latter responded that he "could give ... an answer by letter ... [on] Tuesday or Wednesday of the following week." 399 Continuing, Cronkrite asked if still "other alternatives" existed. To this Darner replied that the Union "could take the cards and file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board for a representation election." When Cronkrite asked when the Union was going to do that, Darner replied that "we probably would go ahead with the petition before the Board, but that it would be understood that if Cronkrite sent [the Union] a letter, or if he decided to go to a card check that [the Union] would get the cards back from the Labor Board in order to have a card check performed" and in that event the petition for an election would be withdrawn. During the above conversation Cronkrite neither asked to see the signed cards nor questioned their validity. However, a blank unsigned card was handed to Cronkrite at his request. The union people did not again meet with Cronkrite. By letter (Resp. Exh. 4) dated May 31, Cronkrite wrote to Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union that "I sincerely doubt that a majority of our employees desire that this status [recognition] be granted to your union. For this reason I must decline your request for such recognition unless and until a majority of our employees have voted in favor of this status in a secret ballot election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. From the conversation that I had with you Friday you apparently do not object to such a procedure.... I am formally petitioning the National Labor Relations Board to hold such an election as soon as possible." On June 1, President Darner of Local 33-L wrote to Respondent's President Cronkrite reviewing the meeting of May 27, at which recognition was demanded and recapitulating the events of that meeting. It closed with the assurance that "Our offer still stands. We are willing to prove our majority and to meet with you at any mutually satisfactory time to negotiate a contract covering wages, hours, and other conditions of employment on behalf of your production employees." Employee Alfred W. Bradshaw signed an authorization card (G.C. Exh. 7) in his living room on May 23, upon the solicitation of President Darner of Local 33-L. Paul Schuermann was also present at the time. Among other things, Bradshaw was told that the cards would be used in the event it became necessary to file a petition for an election "in the event the employer refused to recognize our union as exclusive bargaining agent ; that experience demonstrated that a showing of 70 percent of the cards rendered about an even chance of winning an election," and that "many things could happen between the time of signing the cards and the election." Darner and International Representative Schneider induced Jack Brandenburg to sign an authorization card (G.C. Exh. 5) on May 19, at Brandenburg's home. They told Brandenburg the card would be used in an attempt to obtain recognition as bargaining agent; if that request was refused, the cards would be shown to an impartial third party to ascertain whether the Union had a majority, in which case the Employer would have to bargain with the Union; and that, if neither of these two alternatives succeeded in "gaining bargaining rights, then the cards could be used, and probably would be used to trigger an election by the National Labor Relations Board." On May 19, employee William J. Howard signed an authorization card (G.C. Exh. 4) upon the solicitation of Darner and Schneider in Howard's driveway at home. Howard told them he had just returned from a funeral and "apparently was in a hurry to get in the house." 400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Substantially the same language was used in describing the purpose of the cards as that in soliciting employee Brandenburg. The blue application for membership card was also briefly discussed with Howard and its difference from the white authorization card was explained, but Howard was not asked to sign the blue "application blank." Howard, as well as all others solicited, was also assured that his authorization card would be kept confidential. Employee John S. Kalnai signed an authorization card (G.C. Exh. 3) on May 26 in the presence of Darner and Schneider in the living room of Kalnai. They told Kalnai that the card would first be used to obtain recognition, adding that "our union required us to get at least 75 percent of the cards because of the possibility of losing part of our majority in the time lag between going to the employer," or in the event there would be an election, to be fairly sure of winning it. Continuing, they told Kalnai that, if the Employer refused recognition the cards would be exhibited to an impartial third party to ascertain whether the Union enjoyed a majority; and, if the Employer rejected the third party's determination, the Union "would take the cards to the National Labor Relations Board ... and file for an election." Darner testified that he generally told employees that the Board needed 30 percent before it would entertain a petition for an election. In soliciting employees to sign authorization cards Darner told everyone he interviewed that during an organizing drive both the local union and the International each waived its usual initiation fee but not the $8 death benefit fee required of new members; but he did not condition such waiver upon the outcome of an election. After the charge was filed some employees asked Darner to withdraw the charge and proceed with an election. Employee Michael R. Casey subscribed an authorization card (G.C. Exh. 9) on May 17 at the request of International Representative Peter B. Schneider, who also witnessed the signing . Schneider told Casey that the card "was to begin proceedings with management ... for the purpose of collective bargaining and obtaining better working conditions for the employees"; that if management did not accept the cards, they would be submitted to an impartial person; "and then finally as a last-resort to the National Labor Relations Board." 2. Cronkrite's testimony as a witness for the General Counsel When the union representatives called on Cronkrite on May 27, they asked to be recognized as collective- bargaining agent of the production and maintenance employees, according to Cronkrite. Schneider claimed he had an "overwhelming majority of the employees" who had requested him to "bargain a contract" with Cronkrite. When Cronkrite asked if "this request" was for an election rather than to "bargain a contract," Schneider replied that it was a request to "bargain a contract." Thereupon Cronkrite said he "still had doubts as to this" and insisted it was "not his choice to make" but that it was a choice the employees had to make." Again Cronkrite asked if it was a request for an election , and Schneider reiterated that it was a "request from the majority of the people to bargain a contract." Then Schneider offered Cronkrite three alternatives: one, to accept Schneider's word as to majority; two, to let an impartial observer ascertain whether the Union had a majority; and three, to "present the cards to the N.L.R.B. for clarification of this recommendation." Cronkrite testified he doubted the Union's majority. At the hearing he based this doubt on comments of employees made to him and Vice President Wortley that they did not want union representation. But some of these employees had not signed union authorization cards and none of them said he had signed a card. However, Cronkrite did not "have any reason to believe" that Schneider and Darner did not have a majority of cards when they claimed on May 27 that they had such a majority in their possession; nor did Cronkrite ask to see such cards at the time. After the meeting of May 27, with the union representatives a straw vote was taken by the employees. Ray Casey, an employee, informed Cronkrite of the result thereof, stating that only one employee wanted union representation and that the remainder did not. Thereafter, Cronkrite wrote Respondent's Exhibit 4 on May 31, and mailed it to the Union. Ray Casey's status is in issue . Cronkrite supervised all but the copper plating and chrome plating operations. The latter were supervised by Vice President Wortley. Each morning a group meeting is held. It is attended by Cronkrite, Wortley, Haun in preparatory, Sinkowitz in finishing, and Ray Casey in engraving. At this meeting Cronkrite would provide Haun, Sinkowitz, and Ray Casey with a single complete, written schedule for the day. This was then posted on a bulletin board for all others to see. Wortley would prepare it in Cronkrite's absence. When both Cronkrite and Wortley were absent, a rare occurrence, the schedule theretofore posted would continue to be followed until a new one was posted. One other person, Bill Miller, works with Ray Casey in engraving. Casey also informs the night men of their assignments . Although the parties stipulated that Ray Casey is in the unit, I expressly find that he is not a supervisor because (a) his assignments to Miller and the night men involve only routine relays of orders from Cronkrite or Wortley to him and do not involve independent judgment, and (b) if he is a supervisor, so are Haun and Sinkowitz, thus producing a topheavy staff of five supervisors to direct 13 men. Two or three weeks before May 27, Respondent's President Cronkrite learned from Vice President Wortley and from three employees that the Union was organizing Respondent's plant. When it "became evident [to Cronkrite] that it was a strong campaign [he] held an informal meeting [of employees] in the plant" on May 23. Cronkrite opened the meeting by telling his audience that he knew the Union was contacting employees and that "there was no point in our not bringing it out into the open and discussing it." Then he said that the Union "can gain the right to negotiate." This was followed by expressions of concern as to "future expansion," Cronkrite pointing out that Respondent operated in a manner which allowed a great deal of flexibility in moving employees "from many different jobs," but that under a union Respondent would not be able to do this "to the same degree" and would be "more limited" in operating under a union. Continuing, Cronkrite mentioned that he could start a "second operation under [his] present system with fewer men than [he] could do under a union shop agreement." Next he remarked that he was considering opening a new and additional shop in Memphis, Tennessee. Responding to a question, he answered that the Memphis plant would be CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE started regardless of whether a collective-bargaining contract was negotiated. One employee at this point asked Cronkrite whether if a union came in and union journeymen were employed, an apprentice like him would lose his job in case of a reduction in force. Cronkrite replied that "it would have no effect on any employees who were presently with the company." However, Cronkrite did tell the assembled employees that, from contracts he had seen, they would have to join the Union if a collective-bargaining contract was negotiated. Cronkrite concluded by mentioning that his door would be open to any employee who "wanted to discuss it further." Before concluding Cronkrite told them that if it was their wish to have a union he would "abide by it," but if he "felt" that any had signed cards believing it was for a vote "where in fact it may have been for a bargaining agreement, then [he] would resist this." Many employees, according to Cronkrite, told Vice President Wortley that they signed cards because they thought "it was for a vote." 3. Respondent's evidence Prior to May 27, Vice President Wortley told President Cronkrite that about 11 employees had talked to him about the Union's organizing activities . These employees had informed Wortley that they had been approached at their homes by Union Representatives Schneider and Darner to sign cards and were given literature in a kit to read. Employee Fryman turned over his kit to Wortley, who in turn gave the kit to Cronkrite. However, not a single employee mentioned whether he had signed a card, and Wortley did not inquire whether he had. An unidentified employee told Wortley that he wished that they could get an election and "get it over with" because he was tired of being bothered at home. When the union representatives called on him on May 27, Cronkrite first asked them if the cards they possessed "signed a request to bargain or are they a request for an election." He was informed they were "to bargain." Then Cronkrite expressed that he doubted a majority, but did not say why. At the hearing he testified that this doubt was "based on a feeling that a doubt existed in [my] mind" that employees had signed the cards believing they were "for the largaining but ... thinking they were for an election." After the results of the straw vote of May 27 were disclosed to Cronkrite, he decided to file an RM petition for an election . So he mailed to the Union the letter in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 4 on May 31, and on the same day filed the petition in Case 9-RM-438. This petition was later dismissed by the Board. Employee Alfred Bradshaw on May 23 signed a union authorization card (G.C. Exh. 7) in his living room at the request of Darner. In his talk to Bradshaw, Darner gave a sales pitch about union policies and benefits: that he wanted to get from Cronkrite "all the blood we can"; and that the card would be kept confidential except that in "case of a hearing" the Board would see it. At this point Bradshaw inquired , "If I sign this card am I okaying for an election?" Darner replied, "Yes." Jack Brandenburg, another employee of Respondent, signed a union authorization card (G.C. Exh. 5) in May 1966 at his home, where he was solicited by International Representative Schneider and President Darner of Local 33-L. First, Brandenburg was told "what the union was all about." When he was asked to sign an authorization card, 401 Brandenburg was told that "this card represented something so they could represent us for the union, and we were signing these cards so we could have an election at the shop. [Also] these cards were ... confidential; nobody would find out except the Board." Brandenburg further testified that the "main reason" why he signed the card was because they told him there would be an election. However, on cross-examination he testified that he knew the union representatives were going to take these cards to Mr. Cronkrite and request recognition, that he had such knowledge when he signed the card, and that he was told an election would be held as a "second step" only if Cronkrite refused to grant such recognition. At no time did Brandenburg attempt to revoke or withdraw his authorization card. On redirect, Brandenburg replied, "Yes, sir," to the question , "Is it correct that you were told that the union would have to be voted on even if you signed the card?" Patently this is a leading question which suggests the answer. Of course evidence elicited by leading questions is not per se unreliable; but under the circumstances, including the fact that this question put words in the mouth of the witness after he had on cross given a contradictory version, I conclude that this answer is not worthy of probative value. Cf. Crawford Manufacturing Co., 161 NLRB 989. Hence I have disregarded it in evaluating Brandenburg's testimony, especially since, on re-cross, Brandenburg testified that he "took it for granted [from what employees had told him prior to signing] that there would be a vote" because Cronkrite would refuse recognition when it would be requested. Michael Casey, whom I have found to be an employee, also signed a union authorization card (G.C. Exh. 9) on May 17, at the request of employee Cannon and International Representative Schneider. After showing Casey the material in the Union's kit, Schneider explained the Union to him. Then Schneider handed Casey an authorization card which Casey read. When Casey asked if the card "Meant I vote for the union," Schneider replied that it did not. Continuing, Schneider asserted that when over 50 percent signed cards they would be taken to Cronkrite, Respondent's president; the cards would not be shown to anyone but, rather would be kept confidential; the cards would be seen only by the National Labor Relations Board or a clergyman if they had to be counted to ascertain "their percentage"; and the cards would be destroyed "after the count was taken." Then Schneider said there would be an election because he thought Cronkrite would not go along with the Union's demand for recognition, which would first be made. Casey also testified that the Union's campaign was discussed extensively among Respondent's employees, and it "was of major concern" to them prior to May 27. When he discovered that no election would be held, Casey "thought about it very seriously" but did not attempt to repudiate or withdraw his card. An authorization card (G.C. Exh. 4) was signed by employee Billy Joe Howard on May 19, upon the solicitation of Union Representatives Schneider and Darner. This occurred in Howard's driveway just as he returned from a funeral. When Howard insisted to them that he was in a hurry, they assured him they would be brief. After presenting him a kit containing union literature, they told Howard they were trying to organize shops in the Middletown area. Then they asked him to sign an authorization card , assuring him it would remain confidential. Although Howard did not want to sign it 402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD because his writing arm was broken at the time, he nevertheless did so. The card was read to him before he signed it. A day or two later he personally read an identical blank card. Among other things, the union representatives told Howard that the card "meant nothing," that it "was for an election," that a majority of employees had already signed such cards, and that he would receive a free subscription to a union magazine . Finally, Howard signed "just to get them off my back." But signing to get a solicitor "off a back," without more, will not annul the validity of a card. Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592. On cross-examination, however, Howard asserted that the union representatives "could have" stated that they would first demand recognition of President Cronkrite and "in the absence of him granting recognition , then they would go for an election." At no time thereafter did Howard ask for the return of his card or disclaim interest to the Union, even though employees at some time prior to May 27 explained to him that the card "was just the same as a vote. But there wouldn't be no election." Employee John Kalnai signed a union authorization card (G.C. Exh. 3) at his home on May 26, at the request of International Representative Schneider and President Darner of Local 33-L, who visited him there. Before signing Kalnai was presented with a kit and a copy of Respondent's Exhibit 1, which he then read. He was also told that they would like to have 75 percent sign cards to insure a better chance at an election, that the cards would be taken to President Cronkrite and a request for recognition and a contract would be made as the Union's first step "in attempting to get into Converters Gravure"; that if Cronkrite refused to recognize the fact that they had a majority of cards they would take them to some other party "to be verified" and then present them to the Board. C. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion 1. General Counsel's evidence Employee John Kalnai attended a meeting of employees on May 23, called by President Cronkrite of Respondent. It was held about 3 p.m. Addressing those so assembled, Cronkrite said that he had known the Union was trying to get the employees to have a union at Converters Gravure; he wanted everyone to know about this; Respondent was thinking of establishing a chrome and finishing department in Memphis; the Memphis work involved four jobs which could probably be handled by two men; but, if the Union got in, four men would have to do these jobs and also if journeymen were out of work "they would have to bring those in" rather than send an apprentice from Middletown; and if new hires were made, additional journeymen would first be taken on because the Union required a ratio of about nine journeymen to one apprentice, but that present employees, most of whom were apprentices, would not be affected thereby. Cronkrite also mentioned that Respondent was considering moving to a new location in Middletown, and that the Union "possibly" would oppose this. Finally, Cronkrite invited employees to bring out in the open anything they wished then to discuss. About 3 p.m. on May 27, Cronkrite held another meeting of employees at the plant. Someone asked him if a vote could be taken, but he replied that it would be illegal for him to do this, that he would have nothing to do with it, and they could do what they wished. When Cronkrite left Ray Casey suggested taking a vote and distributed blank pieces of paper to the employees, telling them to signify prounion sentiment with an X and to mark 0 if opposed to the Union. These ballots were then collected by employee Richard Diver and deposited in a can, after which they were counted by Casey in the presence of everyone. Then Casey announced 11 did not want the Union, 1 voted no, and 1 was for the Union. After this Ray Casey brought the can and the ballots to President Cronkrite's office and informed the latter of the outcome of the straw vote; i.e., 12 were against, 1 was for, the Union and 1 ballot was blank. Thereupon Cronkrite answered that he would go to the National Labor Relations Board and file for an honest election. None of the ballots was shown to Cronkrite. William Earl Corbin, an employee of Respondent during March, April, and May, also attended the meeting of May 23, described by employee Kalnai. Sometime thereafter in May, President Cronkrite invited Corbin to the office and spoke to him. Mentioning that the Union was conducting a campaign, Cronkrite added that he did not know how Corbin felt about the Union. Corbin replied that it sounded like a pretty good deal to him and explained that one of the reasons prompting him to think so was that the Union had a retirement plan whereas Respondent did not. This caused Cronkrite to observe that Respondent was considering a retirement plan and that Corbin was better off because he received a bonus and overtime and was free from paying dues. During this interview Cronkrite also asked Corbin what the latter thought about the Union. Corbin answered that he "kind of liked the idea" because the Union had much better hours, wages, and benefits than Respondent. 2. Respondent's evidence President Cronkrite talked to employee Bill Corbin at the latter's work station because Corbin had received a wage increase about 2 weeks before. Asking Corbin how things were going was part of Cronkrite's method of taking an interest in employees. However, because Corbin's reply manifested that something was bothering him, Cronkrite invited him to the office to talk about it. When Corbin came to the office, Cronkrite told him it was better "to bring things out in the open; that [Cronkrite] hoped we could keep things clean ; we each knew what was going on; and it would be better to discuss it openly." Then Corbin said that the Union had approached him and "had made him a full journeyman" so that he could get a job in a union shop at a considerable increase in wages. Cronkrite replied that he could not raise Corbin to a journeyman, assured him he was free to look elsewhere, and requested a notice before leaving Respondent. Corbin promised to give such notice. But Cronkrite did not ask Corbin how the latter felt about the Union; in fact Cronkrite told him he did not care how Corbin felt about the Union. In discussing the absence of a retirement plan at Converters, Cronkrite said he hoped that someday Converters would have one. At the May 23 meeting of employees "it was brought out" that Intanglio, a Cincinnati "union shop," sought to transfer some laid-off employees to its Detroit and Chicago shops but could not do so because unemployed journeymen in Detroit and Chicago were first required to be hired. At the May 27 meeting of employees, Cronkrite was asked if a straw vote could be taken then and there. CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE 403 Cronkrite replied in the negative, claiming "it would be illegal." He also insisted that he did not want to know who was for or against the Union. However, later in the same day the results of an "election" were disclosed to him but not the identity of the voters or how they voted. This meeting was held after the Union demanded recognition. D. Concluding Findings and Discussion as to the Refusal to Bargain 1. As to the Union's majority An employer is not bound to bestow recognition upon a union unless it represents an uncoerced majority in an appropriate unit . Citation of authority upon this branch of the law would be supererogatory. In view of the admission in the answer, I find that an appropriate unit consists of "all employees employed by the Respondent except office clerical employees and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors, as defined in the Act." Further, I find that on May 27, the International and its Local 33-L requested Respondent to recognize and bargain with them as the exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in said appropriate unit. In this connection I find that Local 60-P did not join in the foregoing demand, and that at no time material did Local 60-P take an active part in organizing Respondent's employees or in demanding recognition. Further, I find that on May 27, when recognition and bargaining were requested, the appropriate unit was composed of 15 employees, viz: Wesley Blythe, Alfred W. Bradshaw, Jack Brandenburg, Michael R. Casey, Raymond Casey, William E. Corbin, Richard Diver, Joseph Fryman, William F. Goertemiller, Garrett E. Haun, William J. Howard, John S. Kalnai, William A. Miller, Larry P. Sinkowitz, and James Robinson. I also find that on May 27, the Unions had in their possession authorization cards signed by employees Blythe, Bradshaw, Brandenburg, Michael Casey, Corbin, Howard, Kalnai, and Sinkowitz, and that these cards designated the Unions as bargaining agent for the subscribers, and that these eight cards patently amount to a majority. The immediate question is whether these cards are valid or whether one or more is tainted by coercion or substantial misrepresentation destroying that majority. It is therefore desirable to examine the circumstances under which each of said eight employees signed his card. a. Alfred Bradshaw I find that Bradshaw was told by President Darner that his card would be used to obtain recognition from Respondent and, failing that, it would be used in filing for an election. Manifestly, Bradshaw was not led to believe that his card was being solicited only for an election. Therefore the mention of an election as an alternative if voluntary recognition was not achieved is colorless to infect the validity of Bradshaw's card, since an election was not referred to as the sole purpose of the card. N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6); Bernard Happach v. N.L.R.B., 353 F.2d 629 (C.A. 7). Nor is a different result indicated because Bradshaw was told that experience demonstrated that a 70-percent showing of cards rendered an even chance of winning an election. This merely demonstrates that the Unions were anxious to obtain more than a mere majority of the cards to insure victory if an election were held; but it does not constitute either misrepresentation or an assertion that the sole purpose of the cards was to obtain an election. Lincoln Manufacturing Co., 160 NLRB 1866. Nor is Bradshaw's card rendered nugatory because he was solicited to sign at home, for I find that he voluntarily signed it without coercive conduct on the part of the solicitors . "The very act of signing ... calls for a finding that the employee knew what he was doing." Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8). Finally, I credit Bradshaw that President Darner told him the card would be kept confidential and that the Unions wanted to get from Cronkrite "all the blood we can." Contrary testimony of the General Counsel is not credited. I find that no confidence was broken in presenting Bradshaw's card as an exhibit in this case, for it is the only way in which the Union's majority can be established. And the fact that the Union sought to obtain "all the blood we can" from Respondent amounts to no more than a campaign representation that efforts will be made to better wages and working conditions; hence it does not affect the validity of Bradshaw's card. Conren, Inc., d/b/a Great Scot Super Market, 156 NLRB 592. Accordingly, Bradshaw's card will be counted in computing the number of valid cards possessed by the Unions on May 27. b. Jack Brandenburg This employee signed an authorization card at his home upon the solicitation of International Representative Schneider and President Darner of Local 33-L. I find that Brandenburg was told that the card would be used to obtain recognition, and if recognition was refused, it would be shown to an impartial third person to ascertain whether the Union had a majority, and that if this failed to obtain recognition, then the card would be used to obtain an election. Since an election was not mentioned as the sole purpose of the card, I find it is valid because not obtained by misrepresentation. Further, I find that Brandenburg was told that the cards would remain confidential. But I find no confidence has been betrayed in exposing the card at the hearing. Finally, Brandenburg testified that "the main reason" why he signed the card was because an election was mentioned to him. However, postevent testimony of a prior subjective testimony is unreliable to contradict the plain meaning of the text of an authorization card. N.L.R.B. v. Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 367 F.2d 371, fn. 2 (C.A. 1). And the Board has held that a subjective state of mind in signing a card must be disregarded in circumstances where fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion are absent. Gary Steel Products Corporation, 144 NLRB 1160; General Steel Products, 157 NLRB 636. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Brothers, Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5), is distinguishable because there the employee's thoughts or understanding were necessary to clear up an ambiguity appearing in the language on the face of the card. Accordingly, I find Brandenburg's card is valid and will be counted in determining whether the Union enjoyed a majority on May 27. c. William J. Howard Another employee who signed an authorization card is William J. Howard, who was told it would be kept confidential. This does not destroy its validity. He was also told that it meant nothing. I do not credit the contrary evidence of the General Counsel. But this does not destroy 298-668 0-69-27 404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD its validity since I find that he was also told it would be used to request recognition and, failing this, to obtain an election. I find that Howard was aware of the dual purpose of the card and that he knew what he was doing when he signed. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra. Further I find that Howard was told that the card would remain confidential and that it would be used to obtain an election if recognition was not voluntarily granted. Neither statement vitiates the card, and I so find. N.L.R.B. V. Cumberland Shoe, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., 359 F.2d 684 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (C.A. 6); S. E. Nichols Company, 156 NLRB 1201. Howard was also told that a majority had already signed authorization cards. Although untrue, this statement does not destroy 'the validity of the card. Engineers & Fabricators, 156 NLRB 919; N.L.R.B. v. Sagamore Shirt Company, d/b/a Spruce Pine Manufacturing Co., 365 F.2d 898; Home Pride Provisions, 161 NLRB 634, fn. 2; Merrill Axle, 158 NLRB 1113. Further, I find that Howard was solicited in his driveway at a time when he had dust returned from a funeral and was in a hurry to leave. But I find that this does not vitiate the validity of his card as no improper methods or words were utilized to induce him to sign. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, at 438. Cf. H. Rohstein & Co., 120 NLRB 1556, 1560. Accordingly, I find that Howard's card is valid and should be counted. d. John S. Kalnai This employee signed an authorization card in his living room at the solicitation of Union Representatives Darner and Schneider. I find nothing offensive to the Act because Kalnai was asked to sign in his home. And I find that nothing said to him vitiates his designation of the Union, regardless of whether I credit him or Darner, for they substantially corroborate each other. One statement made to Kalnai requires brief comment. Among other things Kalnai was told that the Union desired to have a card showing among 75 percent of the employees to insure a better chance of an election. But this does not imply that Kalnai was invited to sign only for the purpose of an election, because he was also told, as he testified, that the cards would be taken as the "first step" to Respondent to support a request for recognition and a contract. Manifestly, Kalnai was aware that an election would be conducted only if Respondent rejected the cards. Since an election was mentioned as an alternative if recognition were denied, which is proper, it was equally lawful to state that a 75-percent showing of cards would materially aid in winning an election which might be directed. American Cable Systems, 161 NLRB 332. Accordingly, I find Kalnai's card valid and it will be counted. e. Michael R. Casey This employee also signed a union authorization card. Nothing said to Casey by the union representatives impugns the validity of his card and I so find . I also find he is not a supervisor . N.L.R.B . v. Sinko Manufacturing and Tool Company, 369 F .2d 226 (C.A. 7). Perhaps two statements made to Casey deserve brief comment . Casey was told that, "after the count was taken," the cards would be destroyed . This may connote that the time of their destruction either follows a card- count recognition without an election or recognition subsequent to an election . Since the cards were not applications for membership , no need for their retention after recognition is necessary. Hence, no misrepresenta- tion was uttered to contradict the plain language on the face of the card. This, then, did not impair the validity of the card. Casey also was told that Cronkrite probably would not recognize a card count and that this would necessitate an election. I do not credit the General Counsel's contrary evidence on this issue. But this does not constitute a categorical assertion that Casey's card would be used only for an election; rather it denotes, and I find, that Casey was put on notice that the card would serve a dual purpose and that an election was the second of those purposes. This is proper. N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., supra. Casey also testified that, when he discovered no election would be held, he was disappointed. But his thoughts or afterthoughts in executing the card may not override the plain language on the card. Gary Steel Products, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe, supra; International Union, U.A.W. v. N.L.R.B., 363 F.2d 702 (C.A.D.C.). Accordingly, I find Casey's card is valid and it will be counted. Further, as to Casey and all other employees who expressed dissatisfaction with signing, I find that none of said employees sought to withdraw or repudiate his designation of the Union by communicating the same to the Union. In such cases the purported withdrawal or repudiation will not sap the Union's majority because it was not transmitted to the Union. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra; Moore's Seafood Products, 152 NLRB 683, 684; Tinley Park Dairy Co. d/b/a Country Lane Food Store, 142 NLRB 683, 686. f. Other employees Employees William E. Corbin, Larry P. Sinkowitz, and Welsey Blythe also signed union authorization cards. Nothing in the record undermines the validity of their cards. Hence, these three cards are found to be valid designations of the Union and will be counted in ascertaining whether the Union had a majority on May 27. N.L.R.B. v. Fritchof A. Fosdal, etc., d/b/a Fosdal Electric, 367 F.2d 784 (C.A. 7). Respondent vigorously assails the validity of all eight cards on the ground that Respondent's Exhibit 1, which admittedly was distributed to employees before they signed, refers to an election in the opening sentence and again in the second paragraph. However, this allusion to an election does not exclude the possibility of other uses of the cards, such as a request for recognition based upon a card check. In addition, I find that all employees were expressly informed that the cards would initially be used to substantiate a request for recognition and a contract, and would not be used to obtain an election unless such request was rejected. Thus, all employees became cognizant , prior to signing cards, that the initial function of the cards was to secure recognition and that obtaining an election was not their sole or only purpose. Since an election was not the only purpose of the cards, I find that the allusion to an election in Respondent's Exhibit 1, does not vitiate them and does not overcome the plain legend on the cards. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Delight Bakery, supra; S. E. Nichols Company, 156 NLRB 1201. Finally, the fact that at least one employee was told that initiation fees would be waived during the organizing CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE 405 campaign does not vitiate the card of this or any other employee for whom initiation fees were waived. Ottenheimer and Company, Inc., 144 NLRB 38, 46; The Gruen Watch Company, 108 NLRB 610, 612. Although I have found that on May 27, the Unions enjoyed an uncoerced majority in an appropriate unit, that does not dispose of the matter. For if the Employer at the time of the demand for recognition entertained a good- faith doubt of a majority, the General Counsel cannot prevail upon this segment of the case. Hence, the next question relates to the issue of whether Respondent in good faith doubted the Union's majority. H & W Construction Company, 161 NLRB 852. 2. As to the Employer's doubt of a majority It has been found that the Union represents a majority of employees (8 out of 15) in an appropriate unit . Ordinarily this imposes upon Respondent a statutory obligation to recognize and bargain with the Union regarding bargainable matters affecting those employees. N.L.R.B. v. Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229 (C.A. 8). But Respondent seeks to avoid this legislative onus by contending that it entertained a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority, and, therefore, was entitled to withhold recognition until that majority is established in a Board- conducted election. Aaron Brothers, 158 NLRB 1077. It is now elementary that, regardless of a union's majority status as disclosed by card authorizations, an employer may decline to recognize and bargain with an uncertified union if he entertains a good-faith doubt as to its majority. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson Bros., Inc., supra; Emma Gilbert, et al. d/b/a A.L. Gilbert Company, 110 NLRB 2067, 2069; John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99. On this issue the burden of proof rests upon the General Counsel to establish bad faith. Aaron Brothers, supra; John P. Serpa, supra; H & W Construction Co., supra. Respondent first seeks to show a good-faith doubt in President Cronkrite's testimony that many employees told Vice President Wortley that they signed cards because they thought "it was for a vote." But not one of these employees has been identified, so that this testimony carries little probative value. Apart from this, however, this hearsay testimony of Cronkrite contradicts Wortley's own testimony that employees who told him they did not want a union did not mention whether they had signed a card and he, Wortley, did not know of a single employee who had signed a card. Hence I do not credit Cronkrite that Wortley told him that employees had signed cards under the impression that it was for a vote. Accordingly, no reasonable basis exists on this testimony to question the Union's majority. Moreover, even if I credit Cronkrite as to what Wortley told him it would not follow that Cronkrite was reasonably warranted in concluding that the Union lacked a majority. At most this would disclose that some employees had signed under a misapprehension . But signing under a misapprehension is nevertheless a valid signing until the employee repudiates his card. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944; Moore's Seafood, supra; Tinley Park Dairy, supra. Since no employee, on Cronkrite's own testimony, told Wortley that he repudiated or withdrew his designation of the Union by signing a card, it was not reasonable for Cronkrite to infer want of union majority under the circumstances. Secondly, Cronkrite testified credibly2 that he told the union representatives that he doubted the Union's majority. However, he did not tell them why. It is not necessary to decide whether a naked assertion of doubt comports with good faith. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. C. J. Glasgow Company, 356 F.2d 476, 479 (C.A. 7). However, I find absence of good faith in this statement to the union representatives on Cronkrite's own testimony that he based this doubt on comments of employees made to him and to Vice President Wortley that "they did not want union representation." But since Cronkrite did not state how many employees who had signed cards had so informed him, there is no reasonable showing that the Union's claim of majority has been undermined. N.L.R.B. v. Superior Sales, supra. Further, Cronkrite testified credibly that he did not "have any reasonable basis" to question the claim of Schneider and Darner that they had in their possession at that time cards signed by a majority of the employees. It is also significant that Cronkrite did not ask to see such cards in the face of a claim of majority. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, 220 F.2d 573 (C.A. 6). "Where, as here, the Union had proof of its majority status readily available and [Respondent] chose not to learn the facts, it took the chance of what they might be." Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8). Accord: Irving Air Chute Company v. N.L.R.B., 350 F.2d 176, 182 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. V. C. J. Glasgow Co., supra. In my opinion, Indiana Rayon Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 355 F.2d 535, 539-540 (C.A. 7), does not govern the instant case because of its dissimilar facts. Then, again , Respondent contends that a poll of employees, sponsored by the employees themselves on May 27 following the Union's demands for recognition, demonstrates a solid premise for questioning the Union's majority. However, this poll occurred after the Union's demand for recognition. But the crucial time for establishing a good-faith doubt is when a demand for recognition has been made. A shift in employee sentiment after that event will not justify a refusal to recognize because once a bargaining relationship becomes operative, both parties must honor it for a reasonable period thereafter. Frank Bros. Company v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 705; N.L.R.B. v. P. Lorillard Company, 314 U.S. 512, 513; Ruffalo's Trucking Services, 114 NLRB 1549. Similar considerations apply to Darner's testimony that several employees asked him, after the instant charge was filed, to withdraw the charge and proceed with an election. Further, Respondent relies on Vice President Wortley's testimony, which I credit, that (a) about 11 employees had told Pin that they had been approached at their homes by untoil representatives and solicited to sign authorization cards, and (b) one employee wished an election would be held "to get it over with" because he was tired of being bothered at home. Yet soliciting at an employee's home is not improper. And, even assuming that the employee who wanted an election had a change in sentiment towards the Union, nowhere in the record is there evidence that this employee had signed a card-indeed Wortley testified that he did not know whether even one employee who spoke to him had signed a card. In any event, a designation of a 2 As a trier of fact, I may credit a witness in part only, as I have done as to Cronkrite, Darner, Schneider, and others Felix MacKevtcius, et al d/b/a Brighton Bakery, 158 NLRB 512, fn 1, N L.R B v United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1016 (Gil Wyner Contr Co), 230 F 2d 256, 259 (C A 1) 406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union will not be considered withdrawn , revoked, or renounced until the employee so informs the Union. Moore's Seafood, supra; Tinley Park Dairy, supra; Phil- Modes, Inc., supra . Therefore , Wortley was not presented with defections among, or improper solicitations of, employees which reasonably justified Respondent in expressing a good -faith doubt of the Union's majority. Finally, the fact that campaign literature distributed by the Union to employees referred to an election will not support a claim of good-faith doubt of majority . This is because (a) Cronki ite at no time advanced this reason on May 27, when recognition was requested, and (b) Cronkrite was specifically informed by the union representatives that an election would not be held unless he refused to abide by a card check. If material, I find that the union representatives did not offer Cronkrite a chance of one of three alternatives, one of which was an election . If this were the case, then his choosing to proceed to an election would be lawful and I would find no illegal refusal to recognize . Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Fosdal Electric, supra . But I expressly find that Cronkrite was told that an election would be petitioned for only if he declined to accept a card check by the Union or an impartial third person . In such case Respondent is bound to recognize the Union if in fact it enjoys a majority and may not insist upon an election . Cf. Maphis Chapman Corporation v. N.L.R .B., 368 F.2d 298 (C.A. 4). Summing up, I find that "This good faith doubt must have some reasonable basis and is not established merely by the employer's assertion of doubt of majority." N.L.R.B. v. Superior Sales, Inc., supra. See Vinylex Corporation, 160 NLRB 1883. And slimness of majority will not uphold a claim of doubt absent evidence that Respondent had knowledge of the number of cards signed. Superior Sales, Inc., supra. E. Concluding Findings and Discussion as to Interference, Restraint, and Coercion 1. The speech of May 23 When it "became evident [to Respondent's president, Cronkrite] that it was a strong [union] campaign," he assembled the employees in the plant during working hours. Characterizing this as a "captive audience," the General Counsel contends that Cronkrite's remarks contain coercive statements . While both the General Counsel's and Respondent's testimony substantially coincides upon this aspect of the case, I credit Cronkrite where conflict, if any, exists in the testimony. It is not necessary to reiterate Cronkrite's speech here, for it is summarized elsewhere above. While I find that Cronkrite spoke against the Union, described some disadvantages likely to ensue as a result of contract provisions usually required by unions, and pointed out existing advantages which might be lost because of union rules or contract provisions prohibiting or limiting the same, I find that Cronkrite did not utter anything which exceeds permissible limits set by Section 8(c) of the Act. For Section 8(c) sanctions expressions of opinion which belittle unions and aggrandize employers, so long as such expressions are free of threats of reprisals and promise of benefits. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Howard Quarries, Inc., 362 F.2d 236 (C.A. 8). Further, I expressly find that Cronkrite made no threats of reprisals or promises of benefit in said speech, and did no more than compare present conditions, which he praised, with probable union demands, which he denounced because they would adversely affect existing conditions then enjoyed by the employees. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 NLRB 577, 578. Also, I find that he did not threaten reprisals but rather predicted consequences beyond his control. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 NLRB 377, 378. Nor is a different conclusion required because Cronkrite in his speech invited inquiries from the assembled employees either there or in his office, mentioning that his door was always open. I find this language to be innocuous under Section 8(c) of the Act. And it is not unlawful to compel employees during working hours to attend a meeting where employer antipathy to the Union is expounded. Hence, I find no interference, restraint, or coercion in the fact that Cronkrite on May 23, addressed a "captive audience." Babcock & Wilcox, supra; Livingston Shirt Corporation, 107 NLRB 400, 406. Accordingly, I shall recommend that paragraph 5(a)(i) be dismissed. 2. Interrogation Paragraph 5(a)(ii) alleges that Cronkrite illegally interrogated employees in his office. On this branch of the case I find as follows: About May 25, President Cronkrite invited to his office employee William Corbin. Referring to the fact that the Union was conducting a campaign, Cronkrite went on to say that he did not know how Corbin felt about the Union. Corbin responded that it sounded like a pretty good deal to him because, among other things, the Union had a retirement plan whereas Respondent lacked one. This prompted Cronkrite to note that Respondent was considering a retirement plan and that Corbin was better off as he received a bonus and overtime and had no union dues to pay. Cronkrite also asked Corbin what he thought of the Union. Respondent's evidence not consonant with the foregoing is not credited. But I find no illegal interrogation in the first part of the foregoing conversation of Cronkrite. While it is true that Cronkrite stated he did not know how Corbin felt about the Union, I am unable to find that this is a question, or, if it is, that it constitutes a coercive prying into Corbin's sympathies or attitudes toward the Union. "A company has a right to interrogate employees for purely informational purposes." N.L.R.B. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 346 F.2d 936, 940 (C.A. 5). Accord: N.L.R.B. v. Tennessee Coach Company, 191 F.2d 546 (C.A. 6); N.L.R.B. v. Armco, supra. But Cronkrite also asked Corbin what he thought about the Union. I find this latter question coercive and, therefore, unlawful under Section 8(a)(1). Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 773-775, reversed on factual grounds 344 F.2d 617 (C.A. 8); Skyline Homes, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 323 F.2d 642,649 (C.A. 5). See Bonnie Bourne d/b/a Bourne Co. v. N.L.R.B., 332 F.2d 47 (C.A. 2). However, I find no promise of benefit in Cronkrite's statement that Respondent was considering a retirement plan, as no promise, express or implied, is discernible in this remark. 3. The employee poll of May 27 Following the union demand of May 27, President Cronkrite on the afternoon thereof assembled the employees during working hours to inform them of that demand and to discuss it. During the ensuing discussion DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 407 an employee asked if a vote could be taken right then and there on the question of union representation . Cronkrite replied he could not do so, as it would be illegal , but added that the employees could do what they wished. When Cronkrite left employee Casey took a vote in the manner described elsewhere in this Decision and announced the result thereof to Conkrite. Although I find that Cronkrite did not initiate or instigate the poll, so that Mid-West Towel and Linen Service, Inc., 143 NLRB 744, 751, does not apply, I find that Cronkrite authorized it to be taken in the plant. But this alone will not render it illegal absent threats of reprisal or promises of benefit by Cronkrite . Gulf Container Corporation, 161 NLRB 734 ; Industrial Stationery & Printing Company, 103 NLRB 1011 , 1016-17. And I find that Cronkrite made no such threats or promises at the time, that he did not participate in the poll, and that it was not conducted to enable him to ascertain the number and identity of those supporting the Union . Hence I find the poll was not unlawful . See Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 51; Burke GolfEquipment Corporation , 127 NLRB 241, 245. Accordingly, I shall recommend that paragraph 5(b) of the complaint be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY I find that the refusal to bargain did not extend to Local 60-P, since that local neither made a demand for recognition upon Respondent nor actively sought to organize the employees involved . Hence the bargaining order recommended below will not contain any provision requiring that Respondent recognize and bargain with said Local 60-P. But as it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific action, as delineated below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. However, Respondent's conduct in my opinion is not flagrant and does not depict a general hostility to the Act, so that a remedy broad in scope is not warranted. The remedy adopted should be commensurate with the violations found. Accordingly, I find that an order is appropriate which is limited to enjoining the conduct found to be objectionable under the Act and similar or like conduct. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By coercively interrogating an employee as to his union membership, sympathies, or desires, Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. All employees employed by Respondent except office clerical employees and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9 of the Act. 5. On May 27, 1966, and at all times material thereafter, the International and its Local 33-L, jointly represented a majority, and jointly have been the exclusive bargaining representative, of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9 of the Act; and Respondent was on that date, and has been since, legally obligated to recognize and bargain with said International and its Local 33-L as such. 6. By refusing to recognize or bargain with said International and its Local 33-L for employees in said appropriate unit on and since May 27, 1966, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and, derivatively, of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The above-described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 8. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize or bargain with the International and its Local 33-L jointly as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the above-mentioned appropriate unit. (b) Coercively interrogating its employees as to their union membership, sympathies, and desires. (c) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request , bargain collectively with the International and its Local 33-L jointly as the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. (b) Post at its premises at Middletown, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, and its Local Unions Nos. 33-L and 60-P, AFL-CIO, each is a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(a) of the Act. 2. Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 2(2), 9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL 9, after being duly signed by an authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.4 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. 4 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read `Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL , upon request, bargain collectively with Lithographers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 33-L, jointly as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written , signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All our employees except office clerical employees and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees as to their union membership, sympathies, or desires. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of said Unions or any other labor organization. CONVERTERS GRAVURE SERVICE, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407, Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone 684x3663.