164 NLRB 975
Burger Boy Food-O-Rama
BURGER BOY FOOD-O-RAMA
B.B.S.A., Inc., d/b/a Burger Boy Food-O-
Rama and United Store Employees Union,
Local
No. 347,
Retail,
Wholesale and
Department Store Union , AFL-CIO. Case
9-CA-3242.
May 24,1967
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On March 9, 1965, the National Labor Relations
Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-
entitled
case,'
finding,
inter
alia,
that
the
Respondent
had
discriminatorily
discharged
Stephen N. Stogden in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and directing that Respondent make
whole the above-mentioned employee for any loss of
earnings
resulting
from
the
discrimination.
Thereafter, on March 11, 1966, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered its
decree enforcing the aforesaid Board Order.2
On August 17, 1966, the Regional Director for the
Board for Region 9 issued a backpay specification
and notice of hearing. Upon appropriate notice
issued by the Regional Director, a hearing was held
on
November 1, 1966, before Trial Examiner
Lawrence A. Knapp for determination of the
amounts of backpay due the claimant.
On January 18, 1967, the Trial Examiner issued
his supplemental Decision attached hereto, in which
he found that the claimant was entitled to the
amounts of backpay therein set forth. Thereafter,
the
Respondent
filed
exceptions
to
the
Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's supplemental Decision, the exceptions
and brief, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
On the basis of the Trial Examiner's
Supplemental Decision and the entire record in this
case, the National Labor Relations Board hereby
orders
that
the
Respondent,
B.B.S.A.,
Inc.,
Charleston,
West Virginia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall pay to the employee
involved in this proceeding as net backpay the
975
amount determined to be due by the Trial Examiner
in his attached Supplemental Decision.
151 NLRB 477
2NR LB v BBSA ,Inc,357F2d881.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION IN BACKPAY
PROCEEDINGS
LAURENCE
A.
KNAPP,
Trial
Examiner:
This
supplemental
proceeding
was heard before me at
Charleston, West Virginia, on November 1, 1966. The
question at issue is the amount of backpay due from
Respondent to Stephen B. Stogden, a discharged
employee of Respondent.
On March 9, 1965, the Board issued its Decision and
Order in which it found that Respondent had discharged
Stogden in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,
and ordered Respondent to offer reinstatement to Stogden
and make him whole for any resulting loss of earnings (151
NLRB 477). On March 11, 1966, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced the Board's Order
(357 F.2d 881). With the parties presumably unable to
resolve the question of the amount of backpay in the usual
informal compliance proceedings which follow Board
Orders or judicial enforcement decrees, on August 17,
1966, the General Counsel of the Board issued his
Backpay Specification and Notice of Hearing thereon. The
hearing, originally noticed for October 18, was later
postponed to November 1, 1966.
On August 26, 1966, purportedly on the basis of Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent
served on Stogden (then an Air Force enlisted man
stationed at Lowery Air Force Base in Colorado) certain
written interrogatories designed to ascertain from Stogden
what efforts he had made to find employment and from
what sources over the applicable period as defined in the
specification. Upon Stogden's failure to answer these
interrogatories,
Respondent ,
on
September 16, 1966,
moved to dismiss the proceeding, a motion to which the
General Counsel filed a written opposition and which I
denied at the hearing.
On or prior to August 31, 1966, Respondent filed its
"Motion For A More Definite Statement" addressed to the
specification
and
calling
for
further
information
concerning (1) the names of all employers from whom
Stogden sought employment and the corresponding dates;
and (2) any periods during which Stogden sought no
employment. This motion, to which the General Counsel
filed a written opposition, was granted by Trial Examiner
Charles W. Schneider on September 26, 1966. Thereafter,
on October 27, 1966, the Board simultaneously (1) granted
the application of the General Counsel for leave to appeal
the order of Trial Examiner Schneider and (2) reversed his
decision. At the hearing on November 1, 1966, Respondent
not having as of that date filed an answer to the
specification, counsel for the General Counsel moved on
that ground for judgment on the pleadings or for summary
judgment.' After hearing oral argument on this motion I
' In making this motion at the outset of the hearing, counsel for
the General Counsel served a copy thereof upon counsel for
Respondent While the motion was not specifically offered for the
record, on my own motion I hereby direct that it be made part of
the record herein as TX Exh. 1
164 NLRB No. 122
976
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reserved decision thereon and the hearing proceeded with
the taking of testimony, which was solely that of Stogden,
whom the General Counsel had brought to the hearing for
that
purpose.
To some extent on Stogden's direct
examination by counsel for the General Counsel, and quite
exhaustively
on
cross-examination
by
counsel
for
Respondent, this examination dealt with the efforts
Stogden
made after his discharge to find other
employment. Following the taking of this testimony, I
recessed the hearing to permit Respondent to conduct an
investigation
concerning
Stogden's
testimony,
on
condition that
Respondent's counsel advise me, by
November 14, 1966, whether as a result of that
investigation
Respondent
desired
to
adduce
any
countering testimony. By letter dated November 11, 1966,
counsel for Respondent advised me that the investigation
made did not put Respondent in a position to disprove
Stogden's testimony as to his efforts to find other
employment, and moved that the hearing be closed, which
I thereupon ordered.2
Following the hearing herein, briefs were filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record
in the proceeding, I make the following findings of fact and
conclusions.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
Respondent operates a restaurant at St. Albans, West
Virginia (a municipality near Charleston), where Stogden
was employed prior to this discharge on July 1, 1964.
Stogden, then age 16, was a high school student, and the
great majority of the other employees at this restaurant
were also students. Prior to his discharge, Stogden's hours
of work began at 5 p.m. and normally extended until about
1 a.m., with later quitting times on occasion. He worked
the same hourly schedule following his reinstatement by
Respondent on May 18, 1966.
In respect of the backpay period-July 2, 1964, throught
May 17, 1966-the Backpay Specification issued by the
General Counsel sets forth, by quarters, the amounts of
gross
backpay Stogden would have received from
Respondent had he not been discharged and deductions
therefrom representing Stogden' s earnings from other
employment. On this customary basis, the specification
arrives at the sum of $3,090 (plus interest and minus any
required withholdings) as the amount of backpay due
Stogden.
Respondent does not attack the General
Counsel's calculations of what Stogden's earnings with
Respondent would have been during the backpay period.
Its only contgtion, based upon Stogden's testimony at the
hearing, is that throughout the backpay period as a whole,
and during certain more specific periods in particular,
Stogden did not make sufficient efforts to obtain other
employment and that, accordingly, Stogden is entitled to
no or to a reduced amount of backpay. I reject
Respondent's contentions, upon which it has the burden of
proof, in their entirety.
In approaching my findings of fact concerning Stogden's
efforts to obtain other employment, certain circumstances
of overall significance should be mentioned. At the time of
his discharge, Stogden was a lad of 16 years of age,
becoming 17 in October 1964, and 18 in October 1965. On
the basis of his testimony, and the absence of any
countering proof by Respondent, I find that a principal
source of employment in and around St. Albans for
students such as Stogden consisted, in addition to
Respondent, of a number of supermarkets, which provided
hours of employment compatible with school hour
schedules. In connection with the question of the
reasonableness
of the efforts Stogden did make,
Respondent offered no testimony designed to show the
existence in the vicinity of any sources of actual or
potential employment for a person in Stogden's position
which he should have explored but did not. Finally, both
on the basis of his testimony and his impressive demeanor.
I am satisfied that Stogden, both because of financial
need springing from his family circumstances and because
of his own inner motivations, is the kind of person who was
determined to provide so far as possible for his own
support, and that his efforts to find other employment
were, consistently with his schooling and other legitimate
goals, imbued with his spirit; put in reverse, there is
nothing in the testimony or in Stogden's demeanor
suggesting any disposition on his part to rest idle or
otherwise to saddle Respondent with any willful loss of
earnings.
I
turn
now to the facts concerning the
employment efforts Stogden made.
Beginning immediately following his discharge in July
1964, and extending until early 1966, Stogden, by repeated
personal visits and written applications where indicated,
made extensive and recurring efforts to obtain
employment at St. Albans' supermarkets operated by
2 The motion of the General Counsel for judgment on the
pleadings or for summary judgment
is hereby denied. Sec.
102.54(c) of the Board's Rules, relied upon by the General
Counsel, provides that if a respondent fails to answer a Backpay
Specification within the 15-day period specified in Rule 102.54(a),
the Board "may" find the specification to be true and enter such
order as may be appropriate. But this is permissive language,
conveying an authority discretionary in nature , and hence one to
be exercised or not in the light of the pertinent surrounding
circumstances presented in the case at hand Cf. Star Wholesale
Meats, 133 NLRB 1416, 1417; Mastro Plastics Corporation, 136
NLRB 1342, 1343. In the instant case, the information needed by
Respondent to prepare its answer, and otherwise prepare its case
for the hearing, on the issue of the sufficiency of Stogden's efforts
to find other appropriate employment , could only, at least in its
preliminary form, be obtained by Respondent in advance of the
heanng from Stogden himself, or from the General Counsel to the
extent that he possessed it as obtained , in turn, from Stogden
Respondent's efforts to obtain such information from these two
sources, made promptly after issuance of the specification, were
unavailing. Hence, even though these recourses must be deemed
not legally within Respondent 's procedure rights, as a practical
matter the information could not become and did not become
available to Respondent until the General Counsel produced
Stogden for examination by Respondent at the heanng. In these
circumstances, and in view of the failure of the General Counsel
to establish any prejudice resulting from Respondent 's failure to
answer within the 15-day period , and because the issue referred to
was speedily litigated on the merits , I conclude that it would not
be in the interests of justice to grant the General Counsel's
motion. This disposition of the General Counsel's motion renders
it unnecessary for me to pass on the contention of Respondent,
advanced at the hearing, that there should be considered
applicable Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under
which , if applicable , Respondent's time to answer would have
been automatically extended until 10 days after the Board denied
Respondent's motion for a more definite statement, a time
Respondent actually met By letter postmarked November 5,
1966, Respondent filed its answer with the Trial Examiner and,
presumably on the same date, mailed its answer to the General
Counsel and the Charging Party In the light of my ruling on the
General Counsel's motion , I accept Respondent 's answer for
filing and hereby direct that it be made part of the record herein
as Resp Exh. 1
BURGER BOY FOOD-O-RAMA
971
Kroger, A & P, and at least one other ("Evans") company.
During parts of this period, as their potentials, e.g., a new
A & P store, appeared to warrant, Stogden appeared at
one or another of these stores several times a month. In
addition, he sought employment: from the Charleston
Gazette in the fall of 1964; through what appears to have
been a sort of informal employment service operated by
the municipal authorities of St. Albans in early 1965; from
the Neighborhood Youth Corps in, apparently, early 1965;
from a bank and grocery stores in California during a 3-
week visit there during August 1965; through the State
employment service in September 1965; from the
telephone
company, a bank, and one or another
department store in nearby Charleston in late 1965 (and
continuing into early 1966 in the case of the telephone
company); at the FMC Company (apparently an industrial
concern) in late 1965; from (with repeated visits in two
instances) three nongrocery stores in St. Albans in late
1965; and had inquiries made on his behalf at two other
companies in the vicinity in late 1965. During this period
he also read the newspaper "want ads" with considerable
frequency and responded by telephone in instances when
he thought some suitable possibility might be uncovered.
At some point or points of time not dated in the record, he
also wrote the United States Civil Service Commission
responsive to some notice he saw in the post office and
likewise made employment inquiries at automobile service
stations . During the above-described period it should be
borne in mind that Stogden was a high school student
during the 1964-65 school year and was a student at the
nearby West Virginia State College from September 1965
until January 1966.3
In late January 1966, at the end of the first semester,
Stogden dropped out of West Virginia State College, one
reason being his inability to find employment providing
him with sufficient funds to meet his college expenses and
his other needs. At the same time, moved by what he
described as the "intention" to enlist in the Air Force, he
made corresponding approaches to a recruitment officer
who, without any then actual enlistment by Stogden, put
Stogden down on a list "to go out in late March or early
April." This intention to enlist was, however, a conditional
one; i.e., as I read his testimony his preference still was for
a position which would permit him to return to college and
meet his necessary schooling and at least some living
expenses, or one, such as at the telephone company which
he was then still pursuing, which through the acquisition
of a skill or otherwise would be advantageous to him in
later life. To this end, he continued in the early part of
1966 to read the "want ad" columns and made what he
estimated as from 5 to 15 telephone calls in instances he
thought might be promising, even though the "ads"
themselves were unclear as to the work involved.4 During
this period also, the efforts being made through his father
to obtain employment for him at the McJunkin Company
were, so far as he knew, still active and he also discussed
(unsuccessfully) with his father-in-law'the possibilities of
working in the latter's floor finishing business. He was
unable to work due to illness from April 13 to May 12 and
returned to work for Respondent, pusuant to the latter's
offer of reinstatement, on May 18, 1966. He entered the
Air Force in early July 1966.
In its brief, Respondent appears to advance the broad
contention that Stogden failed throughout the backpay
period to seek employment actively, but this contention
obviously is unsupportable in the light of my prior findings.
Respondent then addresses this contention to particular
portions of the backpay period. Thus it asserts that the
efforts Stogden made from January to mid-April 1966 were
"so slight as to be disregarded." But the searches then
actively being made at the telephone company, the
McJunkin Company, and through the "want ad" columns
cannot be viewed as slight, particularly in the light of the
prolonged and extensive efforts Stogden had theretofore
been steadily but unsuccessfully making at other possible
sources of employment in the vicinity. Respondent
stresses Stogden's testimony that he did not during this
period "personally" make other searches than the ones
above mentioned, and his further testimony that at this
time he was not seeking a job such as he had had at Burger
Boy (Respondent). But the notable lack of success that
had attended Stogden's many and immediately preceding
efforts at the supermarkets and elsewhere rendered it
unnecessary that Stogden "personally" visit all those
employers during the early 1966 period in question. And
there is no suggestion from Respondent of other sources
Stogden might well have contacted.5
Respondent further contends that while Stogden was
receiving 15 hours of work from the Neighborhood Youth
Corps from march to May 1965, he failed to seek other
employment. But this assertion is factually incorrect as my
prior findings, and, indeed, Respondent's own related
factual summary, show.' Respondent advances similar
criticisms relative to Stogden's efforts in other portions of
3 The employment he obtained during this period consisted of a
newspaper delivery route (from which he netted about $7 per
week) over the period of September 1964 to January 1965, 15
hours' employment per week from March to May and 32 hours per
week from June to August 1965 from the Neighborhood Youth
Corps, 3 days' work in October 1964 and a month's work in
December 1965 at one or another Kroger supermarket
' The record does not establish what happened in all these
instances, but in some Stogden was informed he lacked the
necessary experience and in one, selling books or magazines, he
lacked the automobile necessary for the position
' I attach no adverse significance to Stogden's testimony that
during January to March 1966 he was not interested in the Burger
Boy type of lob, since there is no proof or indication that there was
any such type of opening to pursue, and because his surrounding
testimony shows that all he meant was that he preferred the Air
Force to the Burger Boy type of work from a long term viewpoint
and not that he was not interested in or would have rejected such
work while awaiting the outcome of the Air Force possibility
Indeed, when offered reinstatement later in May, he accepted the
Burger Boy work, at which I presume he remained for some
period prior to entering the Air Force in July
6 It is thus unnecessary to consider whether, in view of the fact
that Stogden was then still in high school, he had some choice in
the matter and may not have been obliged to seek employment
entailing the longer
same
hours or the greater earnings
characteristic of his)ob with Respondent.
978
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
the backpay period but they are not supported but are
refuted by the findings of fact hereinabove made.7
I conclude, therefore, that Respondent has failed to
carry the burden of establishing that Stogden failed to
make reasonable efforts to obtain suitable employment or
that
he incurred any willful losses of earnings.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Stephen B. Stogden
is entitled to backpay in the sum of $3,090 with interest
thereon and subject to the deductions as prescribed in the
following Recommended Order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions, I
recommend that the National Labor Relations Board issue
the following:
' As one of these contentions, Respondent points to Stogden's
class schedule in college during the months of September 1965 to
January 1966, and, referring to evening classes Stogden attended
on 2 nights a week, argues that Stogden was pro tanto unavailable
for work But it does not follow that work he was then seeking,
such as at the supermarkets, would have collided with these
nighttime classes or, if there had been such a conflict, that
Stogden would not have chosen or been able to abandon these
night classes Moreover, it appears to me that as a college student,
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that Respondent, B.B.S.A., Inc.,
d/b/a
Burger Boy Food-O-Rama, its officers ,
agents,
successors, and assigns, shall pay to Stephen B. Stogden
the sum of $3,090, with interest thereon at the rate of 6
percent per annum, computed in the manner set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. From the
foregoing amount there shall be deducted social security,
income tax withholding, and such other deductions as may
be required by the laws of the United States or the State of
West Virginia.
Stogden would have had the right to place college instruction
hours over those of work to the extent that any actual collision
between the two were to have confronted him But there is no
evidence that he, in fact, placed any such limitation upon the job
canvassing in which he was then engaged
Respondent likewise questions whether Stogden seriously
sought work during the California visit in August 1965, but it
adduced no supporting evidence from Stogden or otherwise