Luxaire, Inc.

54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Luxaire, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-4272. May 31,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On December 29, 1966, Trial Examiner William J. Brown issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in his attached Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions' to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Luxaire, Inc., Elyria, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ' On May 2, 1967, the Charging Party, upon notice to the other parties, withdrew its cross-exception No 4 requesting that the Board amend the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order to include retroactive relief with respect to the violations of Section 8(a)(5) found by the Trial Examiner The request to withdraw said exception is hereby granted TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM J . BROWN, Trial Examiner : This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , hereinafter referred to as the Act, was heard before me at Elyria, Ohio, on September 29, 1966. The underlying charge of unfair labor practices had been filed on June 21, 1966 , by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Charging Party, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Union," with due service thereof on Luxaire, Inc., Respondent, hereinafter referred to as the "Company." The complaint, issued August 1, 1966, alleges, and the Company's answer denies, the commission of unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.' At the hearing the parties appeared and participated with full opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issues. Subsequent to the close of the hearing all parties filed singularly cogent briefs which have been fully considered. On the entire record herein and on the basis of my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY The pleadings and evidence herein establish that the Company is a corporation2 organized under the laws of the State of Ohio, with its principal office and place of business in Elyria, Ohio, where it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of warm air heating and cooling equipment in the course of which it annually ships products valued in excess of $50,000 from its Elyria plant directly to points located outside the State of Ohio. I find, as the Company concedes, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The pleadings and evidence establish and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction and Summary of Events The Company's maunfacturing operations at Elyria call for* a normal employee complement of some 200-plus employees. Prior to sometime in March 1966, these operations were under the supervision of President Richard W. Lindsay who was, sometime about March 20, 1966, succeeded by President E. S. Glines. At all material times Bernard S. Becker and Delis Huddleston have been supervisory employees having authority over certain groups within the bargaining unit here concerned. The pleadings as well as a prior representation case establish the appropriateness of this unit, which is as follows: All hourly rated production and maintenance employees, including truckdrivers, but excluding all office and shipping clerical employees, student engineers, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. ' On September 22, 1966, the Union filed with the Regions, Director a motion to amend complaint by adding allegations of unfair labor practices previously considered by the Regional Office but not included in the complaint The General Counsel by written memorandum filed September 23 opposed the amendment Renewed by the Union at the outset of the hearing, the motion to amend was denied by the Trial Examiner on the ground that the complaint could not be amended by adding allegations over the objection of the General Counsel 2 Sometime prior to September 3, 1965, the Company's name was changed from The C A. Olsen Manufacturing Company to Luxaue,Inc 165 NLRB No. 19 LUXAIRE, INC. On April 19, 1965, the Union filed a representation petition seeking an election in the above-described unit and on May 11, 1965, the Company and the Union executed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election. On May 28, 1965, a booklet (Handbook for Hourly Employees) was issued by the Company to all employees in the above-described bargaining unit; page 33 of the booklet, headed "Rules of Conduct," listed numerous offenses as misconduct resulting in discipline and possible discharge. The list included "Unauthorized selling, soliciting or canvassing." The election, conducted on June 4,1965, resulted in the following tally of ballots: Approximate number of eligible voters 215 Votes cast for Union 110 Votes cast against Union 105 Challenged ballots 53 The Company filed timely objections to the election on the basis of a union letter to employees mailed June 2, 1965, and allegedly misrepresenting rates at the Company's Medina, Ohio, operation some 25 miles from Elyria where the Union represents employees. Following a hearing on the challenges and the Company's objections, a Board Hearing Officer issued his report recommending overruling of the five challenges; he also found the Company's objections to union conduct affecting the results of the election to be meritorious and concluded that the challenged ballots should be counted and the election set aside if the final tally showed a union victory and a certification of results if it showed a union defeat. On February 18, 1966, the Board adopted the Hearing Officer's findings respecting the challenged ballots but reversed his recommendation concerning the Company's objection based on the preelection letter of the Union. On February 5, 1966, a revised tally of ballots issued showing 114 votes for the Union and 106 against. The Union was certified as representative of employees on March 2, 1966. In the interim Company President Lindsay, as appears from the uncontradicted testimony of General Counsel witness Ray Bentley, an assembly department employee, had announced certain improvements in employee benefits at a company-employee banquet on February 5, 1966. These improvements were also announced by a bulletin board posting on February 7, 1966, and, as appears from Joint Exhibit 0, included added benefits by way of pension and life insurance increases, jury pay, added vacation benefits, and an additional paid holiday. These additional benefits were also communicated to employees by letters mailed to employees (Joint Exh. Q) on March 8, 1966. About this time, on March 11, 1966, the Company posted a bulletin board notice (Joint Exh. I) referring to the existing rule against solicitation and specifically prohibiting further solicitation of union membership, dues, or funds during worktime while reminding employees that the Company had no contract with any union and that it was not necessary for employees to loin any union. It concluded by stating that at the Medina plant where there is a union contract many employees were not members of the union. As noted above, the stipulation entered into between the Union and the Company preceding the election of June 4 recognized that a question of representation existing by 3 Both the Company and the Union challenged five voters at the polls on the ground they were not listed on the eligibility list; subsequently the Company withdrew its challenges. 4 The union petition of April 19, 1965, reciteu that a request for 55 virtue of the union representation petition.4 In any event, as appears from the parties' stipulation above referred to and from Joint Exhibits J, K, L, and N, the Union requested bargaining by letters to the Company on March 15, 20, and 30, and the Company refused recognition by letters dated March 21 and 31. The union letters of March 20 and 30 threatened a strike in support of the union recognition demand, and on March 31 Foremen Becker and Huddleston called workplace meetings to discuss the forthcoming strike and its consequences on all parties. Their utterances on these occasions are alleged as independent instances of interference, restraint, and coercion within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The strike commenced on April 1, 1966, and a picket line was maintained 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. On May 2, 1966, a State court injunction limited the number of pickets to 6-8 at any one period. On June 20, 1966, the strike ended with all or substantially all employees returning to work. B. Interference , Restratnt , and Coercion The complaint alleges and the answer denies that the Company committed unfair labor practices defined within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the maintenance and enforcement of the no-solicitation rules set forth in the employee handbook of May 28 , 1965, and the bulletin board posting of March 11, 1966 , by a March 21, 1966, threat by Huddleston of reprisal for union activity and by threats of reprisals in the course of the March 31, 1966, workplace talks of Becker and Huddleston. 1. The no-solicitation rules It appears from a stipulation of all parties and from Joint Exhibits H and I that the Company on May 28, 1965, promulgated a ban on unauthorized selling, soliciting, or canvassing on company-owned or -controlled property and, by bulletin board notice of March 11, 1966, referring to the above-mentioned ban, specifically provided that further solicitation of union membership, dues, or funds during worktime would be subject to disciplinary action. Employee Donald Alexander, a union supporter, testified that in March 1966, prior to March 11, he passed out about 20-25 union cards on company property around the beginning of the shift and drove, around at noontime to pick up the signed cards. He testified that, although no foreman discussed the March 11 bulletin board notice with him, he ceased passing out union cards when the notice appeared. The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that the May 1965 rule contained in the employee handbook is an unlawful restraint upon employee rights to self-organization inasmuch as it embraces both work and nonwork time and that the May 11, 1966, bulletin board rule is invalid because, though limited to worktime, it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose; i.e., it prohibits only union solicitation. The Company contends that the handbook rule was a reasonable measure designed to protect both employees from unwanted solicitations and the employer from disruptions of production. It asserts that the March 11, 1966, bulletin board rule was preceded recognition had been made on April 17, 1965, and that no reply had been made thereto by the Company but there is no independent evidence of such request 56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by union solicitation on worktime and designed to prevent continuation of that practice. In this regard the Company points to the testimony of Alexander that he had been passing out union cards around the beginning of the shift and on posting of the notice quit such activity as establishing that Alexander had been soliciting for the Union on worktime. The Company further asserts that it can be assumed that others were similarly engaged and that multiplicity of worktime solicitations was the reason for the promulgation of the March 11, 1966, prohibition. With respect to the May 1965 handbook and the rules of conduct relating to disciplinary action including possible discharge for unauthorized soliciting on company-owned or -controlled property, it is now clear that such a broad prohibition against the exercise of employee rights under the Act is presumptively invalid. Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615. There is no showing in the present case of operational necessities justifying the prohibition against soliciting support for or opposition to the union campaign in nonwork areas and on nonworktime. Accordingly, I find that the Company by maintaining5 in effect the unauthorized solicitation rule in the employee handbook interfered with and restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Turning to the March 11, 1966, bulletin board notice concerning the subject, it is clear that the notice was directed specifically at solicitation of union membership, dues, or funds during worktime. Contrary to the Company's contention I can see no basis in the record for concluding that there had been widespread or even thinly spread solicitation on behalf of the Union during worktime. The case is one in which, at a time while the Union was still seeking the recognition to which it was entitled on the basis of the Board's March 2 certification, the Company singled out union solicitation for special treatment and proclaimed the prohibition against solicitation on worktime. It seems clear to me and I find that the promulgation of the March 11, 1966 rule against worktime solicitation was adopted and published with an antiunion motivation and that thereby the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Ward Manufacturing, Inc., 152 NLRB 1270. 2. The March 21 occurrence Alexander testified concerning an occurrence in the plant on March 21 or 22, 1966, involving himself, fellow employee Charles Scrivens, and Foreman Huddleston. It appears that local union officers were elected about March 19, 1966, and Scrivens was elected president. This became known to the Company since Scrivens was one of the signers of the March 20, 1966, letter requesting recognition of the Union and threatening strike action in the event of refusal thereof. Alexander's testimony is that on the occasion in question he was sent by his foreman, Becker, to get some motors from the cooling department where Scrivens works and Huddleston is foreman. On arriving at the cooling department, according to his account, Alexander first met Scrivens and was asking him where Huddleston was when Huddleston came up, asked him what he was doing talking to Scrivens, and added that Scrivens would get Alexander in trouble and that Alexander should get the hell out and stay out. It was only then that Alexander showed Huddleston the requests for the motors. Scrivens testified only that on the day in question he had some talk with Alexander but did not hear any talk between Huddleston and Alexander. Huddleston's account of the episode is that he saw Alexander and Scrivens talking and after observing them for 2 or 3 minutes walked toward them, asked Alexander what he wanted in his department, and told him not to be bothering his employees. He denied saying anything concerning the Union but was unable to recall whether he used the word "trouble." I credit Huddleston's account of this episode and I believe in accordance with his account that in fact he addressed his threatening remark to Alexander for bothering employees of his department. At that time Huddleston had no knowledge that Alexander was in the cooling department on legitimate business. In my view of the evidence it does not preponderate in favor of the conclusion that the allegations of paragraph 8(a) of the complaint are sustained and I recommend their dismissal. 3. Becker's threat of reprisals Employee Harold Smith, an active union supporter, testified that on two or three occasions in the period March 20 to 29 he had conversations with his foreman, Becker. On the last of these occasions he was with fellow employee James Cross, when, according to his testimony, Becker said to him that he hated to see a strike. Thereupon Smith told Becker that the Union would go ahead with the strike if the Company did not recognize it. Then, according to Smith, Becker said if there were a strike he would have to put four men in place of the two presently on the job of assembling electric furnaces then run by Smith and James Cross. Smith testified that such a step would decrease his rate of pay which was on an incentive basis. Becker did not testify concerning this matter. The General Counsel contends that Becker's statement constituted a threat of reprisal for engaging in the strike. The Company contends that the conversation does not in fact make out a threat inasmuch as an increase in Smith's incentive production would increase not decrease his pay; further, the Company asserts, the General Counsel did not establish that the addition of two men to the job would decrease the amount or the hours of work for the men on the job. I agree with the contentions of the General Counsel concerning the coercive nature of this conversation. There is no doubt but that Becker related the occurrence of a strike with a change in the nature of Smith' s earnings. It seems to me that the only reasonable interpretation of the threat is that placed on it by Smith, that the addition of more men to the job would decrease the incentive earnings of the two then performing the work. I find that Becker's statement on this occasion constituted an instance of interference with and restraint and coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act and was an unfair labor practice defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The March 31 meetings It is clear from the record herein that, faced with the Union's threat of a strike on April 1 unless recognition 5 There is no evidence of instances of enforcement of the rule. LUXAIRE, INC. were forthcoming, the Company instructed Foremen Becker and Huddleston to hold meetings with groups of employees on March 31. The foremen spoke to the employees about 3 p.m. and referred to notes which they had prepared at meetings with their superiors. Becker had about 30 employees present at his meeting and Huddleston had about 50 in attendance at his. Employees Smith and Alexander testified concerning Becker's talk. Smith testified that Becker stated that the Company would not recognize the Union until proper court action had been taken and that a strike could result in loss of hospitalization and vacation pay and even in possible replacement. According to Smith, Becker replied to an employee's question on the matter by stating that the strikers could be discharged. Alexander's testimony is that Becker said that the Company would not recognize the Union, that if the men struck they could be discharged and would lose their hospitalization on May 7, and that a long strike would mean replacement of the employees. Becker testified that he told the group that a strike could hurt the men and their families and that if it were prolonged the Company would be forced to hire replacements. He referred to the Company's policy of requiring men to work the days before and after a holiday to receive holiday pay unless legitimately excused, and further said that the hospitalization was paid up to May 7. Employees Bentley and Scrivens testified concerning Huddleston's talk. Bentley's account is that Huddleston told the men that he did not know if there would be jobs after the strike and that the hospitalization was paid up to May 7. Scrivens asserted that Huddleston told the group that they would be subject to discharge if they were out more than 48 hours and that he did not know if they would have their jobs at the end of the strike. Huddleston testified that he told the men that a strike would benefit no one and that they should stay on the job and let the court decide the matter of union recognition. He made the same comments concerning holiday pay, hospitalization, and possible replacement as Becker did, according to his account. It is quite apparent from the foregoing summary of the evidence relating to the March 31 speeches of Becker and Huddleston that they embraced a miscellany of varied appeals to employees to consider the seriousness of the step they were apparently about to take. Some of these appeals are plainly legitimate appeals to employees devoid of threats. I find, however, that both Becker and Huddleston went beyond legitimate persuasion and engaged in threats of reprisals as a consequence of strike action in the following respects: (1) Becker's statement in reply to an employee question that the strikers could be discharged; and (2) Huddleston's statement that strikers would be subject to discharge if they remained out for more than 48 hours. In finding these statements to have been in fact made, I rely on the testimony of Smith, 6 The Union's March 30 , 1966, letter requesting recognition, without waiving its rights to recognition on the basis of the Board's certification, requested the Company to make a count of the number of striking employees on the following day to dispel any doubt that the Union was the majority representative. The Company rejected this challenge as an unreliable gauge of the free choice of employees in the matter At the hearing the Union, over the Company's objection, was allowed to introduce in evidence Charging Party's Exh. 1, identified by Smith as a list of employees who actually performed picket duty during the strike. It subsequently appeared that the list was actually prepared on July 12, 1966, apparently on the basis of the memory of Smith, 57 Alexander, and Scrivens whose testimony on this I find credible. C. The Refusal to Bargain It appears from the pleadings and from a written stipulation of all parties (Joint Exh. 1) that the Union was certified on March 2, 1966, as the bargaining representative of employees in the concededly appropriate above-mentioned unit . Following that certification the Union, as appears from Joint Exhibits J, K, and M, request .d bargaining on March 15, 20, and 30, 1966, and the Company refused on March 21 and 31, 1966, as' appears from Joint Exhibits L and N. The Company's position was and is that the Board erred in refusing to adopt the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the election be set aside. The Board's Decision on this issue is the law of the case insofar as the Examiner is concerned, see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146. Accordingly I find that at all times after March 2, 1966, the Union was entitled to recognition as the statutory representative of employees and that the Company by refusing to meet with and negotiate with it engaged in unfair labor practices within the scope of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.6 The pleadings and evidence (the stipulation and attached Exhs. P and Q) establish that following the Union's certification the Company unilaterally and without notice to or consultation with the Union announced and effectuated changes in wage rates and terms and conditions of employment. Incentive and nonincentive base rates were increased and increased benefits were announced in the existing programs relating to group life insurance, pensions, jury duty pay, vacations, and holidays. The Company's plea that the adjustments were made pursuant to a practice of surveying adjustments of other employers in the labor market area and making such adjustments as are needed to retain and recruit employees is not supported by evidence other than the self-serving statements in the announcements themselves and in any event does not justify its failure to notify the certified representative and afford it the opportunity to bargain on the matters. On the basis of the foregoing I find that the Company has, by refusing from and after March 21, 1966, to bargain on request with the Union as the statutory representative of employees in the unit for which it was certified and by taking on March 8 and March 30, 1966, unilateral actions to effectuate changes in wages and terms and conditions of employment, engaged in unfair labor practices within the scope of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Company's Bentley, and Scrivens at Attorney Schwarzwald 's request. It also appears that their memories were spurred by vouchers turned in by men assigned to picket duty I am now persuaded that the list was erroneously received in evidence It is neither a reliable indication of those who actually picketed nor would it furnish a basis for employer knowledge of the number and identity of the pickets who apparently included a number of nonemployees. 1n finding that the Company violated its duty to bargain I do not rely on evidence as to the number of pickets , strikers , or nonworkers but solely on the admitted refusal to bargain in the face of the certification 58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY In view of the findings set forth above to the effect that the Company has engaged in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and take such affirmative action as appears necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act. Such affirmative action includes recognition of and bargaining with the Union as exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate unit and the posting of notices. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the purview of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By maintaining in effect no-solicitation rules which prohibit solicitation on behalf of labor organizations during employee nonworktime or which are specifically and discriminatorily directed against solicitation on behalf of labor organizations, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By threatening employees with reprisals in the event of their participation in lawful strike activity, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit; namely, All hourly rated production and maintenance employees including truckdrivers, but excluding all office and shipping clerical employees, student engineers, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. and by unilaterally effectuating changes in wages and terms and conditions of employment, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this, case, it is recommended that the Respondent Company, Luxaire, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Maintaining in effect plant rules which prohibit solicitation on behalf of the Union or any other labor organization by employees on company-owned or -controlled premises during nonworktime of employees in nonwork areas. (b) Threatening employees with reprisals in the event of their exercise of their right to strike or engage in other lawful concerted activities under the Act. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of employees in the above- described appropriate unit. (d) Unilaterally and without notice to or discussion with the Union as exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate unit effectuating changes in wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment. (e) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in exercise of their rights under the Act in any manner similar to those referred to in paragraphs (a) through (d), above. 2. Take the following affirmative action which appears necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the unit herein found appropriate, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Rescind plant rules prohibiting solicitation on behalf of the Union or other labor organizations on nonworktime in nonwork areas of company-owned or -controlled property. (c) Post at its plant in Elyria, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by the Company's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Company immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from the recei of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply here ith.8 7 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT maintain plant rules which prohibit employees from soliciting on behalf of the United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, on any other labor organization on nonworktime in nonwork areas. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of benefits in reprisal for their participation in lawful strikes or other concerted activity under the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization as exclusive representative of employees in the following appropriate unit: LUXAIRE, INC. All hourly rated production and maintenance employees of the Elyria, Ohio, plant , including truckdrivers, but excluding office and shipping clerical employees, student engineers, professional employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT , by maintaining plant rules or by threats as above or in any like or related manner, interfere with , restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act to form, join, or assist the above -named or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and, 59 if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. LUXAIRE, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 720 Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44115, Telephone 621-4465, Extension 42.