Rybolt Heater Co.

RYBOLT HEATER COMPANY 331 Rybolt Heater Company and United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-4401. June 13,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On April 12, 1967, Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, and the entire record in this case, including the exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Rybolt Heater Company, Ashland, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ' As we agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Plant Superintendent Buzzard's feigned use of a camera on three occasions to disperse congregating pickets, we find it unnecessary to make findings with respect to other instances where a camera was raised and no pictures taken, for such further findings would not affect the remedy provided herein TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RAMEY DONOVAN, Trial Examiner: United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, filed a charge against Rybolt Heater Company, herein the Company or Respondent, on October 28, 1966. Under date of December 12, 1966, a complaint issued, alleging violations 165 NLRB No. 36 of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Hearing was held on January 31,1967, in Ashland, Ohio, before me. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is an Ohio corporation, with its principal office and place of business in Ashland, Ohio, where it manufactures and sells heating and air-conditioning units. At all times material, Respondent, in the course of its business operations, directly ships goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside Ohio. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Union has been the certified bargaining representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees since 1941. The last contract between the parties was for a term from August 1, 1964, to July 31, 1966. On May 25, 1966, the Union gave notice of its intent to have the contract terminate as of July 31, 1966, and requested negotiations for a new contract. During contract negotiations in the latter part of 1966, the parties mutually agreed to extend the term of the contract to August 7, 1966. The first meeting for contract negotiations in 1966 took place on June 24. Other meetings were held on July 14, 28, and 30 and August 6, 13 or 14, and 22. In negotiations, the Company said that it was unable to grant a wage increase. At the July 30 meeting, although no request had been made by the Union for financial data, the Company presented a document entitled "Report on Examination For the Year Ended December 31, 1965," bearing the name of a firm of certified public accountants. The document included a balance sheet for 1964 and 1965; statement of net income for 1964 and 1965; and various schedules of expenses for the same years. Reeder, the principal union negotiator, refused to look at the aforesaid report, saying that the subject was prematture and that they were still negotiating on noneconomic issues. Reeder, in earthy terms, which we paraphrase, said that he would not use the report for toilet paper. At subsequent meetings, the above report was on the table in view of the parties but was not perused by Reeder. At the August 6 meeting the Union made it known that it would strike on August 8, Monday. The Company, on August 6, informed the Union that although it was unable to give a wage increase, it was offering the Union a 5-cent general wage increase with the other terms of the old contract unchanged, but for a term of 2 years, expiring in 1968. The Company said that in making the wage increase offer it was gambling that its business would improve because of an expanded sales force and new machinery. Also stated by the Company was the fact the foregoing proposal was contingent upon the employees continuing to work and not going on strike on August 8 as scheduled. All production and maintenance employees, about 32 in number, went on strike on August 8. The strike was continuing at the time of the instant hearing. At a meeting on August 14, the Company made it clear to the Union that the Company had withdrawn its 5-cent-wage-increase offer and was offering to agree to the terms of the expired contract, unchanged, for an additional 2 years. On 332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD August 22, the date of a meeting between the parties at which a Federal mediator was present, the Company stated that it was unable to pay any wage increase and again offered to agree to the terms of the expired contract. The Company said that its prior offer of a 5-cent wage increase had been made contingent on there being no strike; and that the strike which had taken place rendered the Company even more unable to pay a wage increase in any contract. The Union rejected the Company's proposal of a contract with the same terms as those that had existed under the expired contract. The Union, through Reeder, wrote to the Company on September 20, 1966, as follows: Inasmuch as you have withdrawn your offer of 5 cents an hour made prior to the strike because of claimed inability to pay, we are hereby requesting that you make available to us for examination and study your books and records so that we might bargain intelligently on economic matters.... By this request, we are not conceding in any manner that a 5 cent increase would be adequate. Smith, vice president of the Company, testified that no reply was made to the above letter since it was the Company's view at that time, and at the hearing, that no reply was necessary inasmuch as the Union had available the financial report submitted by the Company on July 30, 1966, supra. There was a meeting of the parties on October 17 at which Johns, district director of the Union, and Reeder represented the Union. The Company presented to Johns the same financial report, aforementioned, that it had produced on July 30. Reeder testified that he was not satisfied on October 17 that the financial report was adequate since it related only to the year ending December 31, 1965. He testified that he wanted books and records that would show the financial condition of the Company as of approximately the time when, in August 1966, the Company stated that it was unable to afford any wage increase.' On October 28, the Union filed the instant charge. On November 10, 1966, Reeder telephoned Smith of the Company. Reeder asked Smith, who had participated in all the prior meetings as the highest ranking company official present, whether he would sit down and negotiate that evening or "at any time." Smith testified that he replied that the Company was unable to meet with the Union "due to the fact that they [the Union] had filed charges" and the matter was in the hands of the Company's attorney. Smith was then asked: Q. Is it your position that you are unable to negotiate as long as the charge is pending? Is that your position? A. That is our position ... we would like to see the end results of the charge. The Company received a telegram from the Union, dated November 10, 1966, stating: DEMANDING IMMEDIATE RESUMPTIONS OF NEGOTIA- TIONS. ALSO DEMANDING IMMEDIATE PRODUCTION AND AVAILABILITY OF YOUR BOOKS AND RECORDS RE INABILITY TO PAY PLEA. IN VIEW OF LENGTH OF STRIKE, YOUR PROMPT ADVICE IS APPRECIATED. Reeder also testified that what he wanted was "something to satisfy us as to whether the Company has the ability to pay the up-to-date financial position of the Compa.iy to show their ability or inability to pay " 2 Respondent's counsel also asked the witness the date when he first saw "a record from-either from your own bookkeeping The Company replied by telegram on November 15 stating: UPON YOUR OWN APPLICATION THIS MATTER IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No further response had been made by the Company to the Union's requests. At the hearing, Smith testified that in the July- November 1966 period, and, apparently, through at least December, the Company had no records, other than the report for the calendar year 1965 submitted to the Union in July 1966, that would show the financial condition of the Company." In the course of cross-examination by the General Counsel, Smith stated that the Company did have a bookkeeper who maintained purchase records on a monthly basis as well as records of accounts receivable, accounts payable, monthly sales records, payroll records, fixed overhead, and general entries. Smith testified that in 1966 he knew that the Company was not doing "too well" because he "looked at general entries" and knew how the operation was going and knew that sales were off. The witness testified that "right after the first of the year [1967]" he saw a financial report for the year 1966. No effort was made to secure this report for the Union or to make it available to the Union or to report its contents to the Union. Conclusions With Respect to the 8(a)(5) Allegations It is well established that an employer who asserts in contract negotiations his economic inability to grant a wage increase, and, who, upon request by the union bargaining agent for substantiating evidence in the form of financial records, fails or refuses to make such evidence available, has made a material manifestation of lack of good faith in bargaining as required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.3 Without commending Union Representative Reeder's choice of language on July 30, it is our opinion that the legal issue herein involved was fully joined by Respondent's specific withdrawal on August 14 of its offer of a 5-cent wage increase and the statement of its position that it was financially unable to grant any wage increase; by the Union's refusal to agree to a new 2-year term of the expired contract without a wage increase, as proposed by Respondent; and by the Union's written request, on September 20, citing the Respondent's withdrawal of its 5- cent wage increase "because of claimed inability to pay," that Respondent make available to the Union its books and records for examination so that the good faith of the claimed inability to pay could be verified or otherwise. Respondent relies on the fact that, in and from July 1966, it proffered to the Union a financial statement for the calendar years 1964 and 1965. While the proffer was originally made before the issue of a wage increase and the issue of claimed inability to pay were mutually joined by the parties and before any union request for economic substantiation was made, these factors alone are not determinative. More important is Respondent's failure to reply to the Union's specific requests on September 20 and November 14, 1966, that books and records be made operations or from a public accountant that would show your financial condition during the year 1966 " Smith replied that it was on January 3, 1966, and that "record" was for the years 1964 and 1965. 'NLRB v Truitt Mfg Co,351US 149 RYBOLT HEATER COMPANY 333 available to the Union to substantiate Respondent's claimed inability to pay.4 Coupled with the foregoing, we now turn to the financial statement that Respondent, at the hearing, asserts constituted compliance with the Union's request on September 20 and November 14. In our opinion, a report of the financial status of a company in the years 1964 and 1965 does not constitute either a substantiation of, or the making available of records to substantiate, a claimed inability to grant any wage increase in August 1966 or thereafter. A company's economic status in 1 year may be worse, better, or the same, in any month, quarter, 6-month period, or longer in the following year. This is particularly true in a highly developed industrial economy such as our own, operating, as it does, in a free enterprise environment subject to many varied and fluctuating factors, tangible and intangible. Nor does the record satisfy us that Respondent, in 1966, did not have records that it could have made available to the Union for the purpose requested. An accountant's financial statement from the Company for 1966 was neither necessary nor was it requested. If relevant company records, which the evidence shows were on hand, had been made available to the Union on request, under reasonable conditions, the Company would have demonstrated its good faith. In the absence of a compendium of the records in the form of a financial statement by a company auditor, bookkeeper, or accountant, the Union, if it desired such a statement as a capsule of the Company's economic condition, could have had such a financial report prepared by its own accountant from the records that, in our opinion, the Company was obliged to make available. We find that Respondent by failing and refusing to make available to the Union, on September 20, 1966, and thereafter, its financial records to support its position that it could not pay any wage increase, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. We further find that Respondent's failure and refusal to meet with the Union, the certified bargaining agent, on and after November 15, 1966, for the purpose of negotiations, constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.5 Alleged Surveillance As we have seen, the strike commenced on August 8, 1966. The Company, thereafter, sought an injunction, and a hearing on the petition was held on August 13. Whatever the details of the injunction hearing, no injunction issued. Subsequently, on September 2, the Company refiled its petition for an injunction and a hearing was held on September 21. As far as appears, no injunction issued. During the strike, the Union customarily picketed across the street from the front of the plant where the Company's parking lot was situated. This lot, with a 16- foot entry driveway, was directly across from the front 'door of the plant. People doing business with the Company, company officials, and nonstrikers (employees who went back to work commencing about September 1) used the parking lot. The Union used about 5 to 10 pickets and a picket sign stating the name of the Union and that the plant was on strike. The pickets, usually about five, walked in a general area, from one end of the parking lot to the other, including the driveway, and also had some kind of a picket shack at one end of the lot, outside of which were a few chairs where the pickets lounged at various times. Testimony regarding conduct relating to the strike and the picketing was given by Reeder, the union representative; Hockenberry, a picket; Buzzard, the plant superintendent; and Smith, the Company's vice president. In some respects , the testimony of the witnesses was imprecise but we have distilled therefrom what we believe is an accurate picture of events. Our impression of Buzzard and Smith, in this connection, was of two individuals relatively unsophisticated in labor law, but basically reliable in describing what took place. On August 15, Buzzard stood in the window of one of the offices in the plant and took motion pictures of the pickets across the street. On this same day, there was a delivery van in the parking lot with a large carton or crate containing one of the Company's products that had been placed in the van for delivery elsewhere. When the van left the Company parking lot, Reeder and Hockenberry got into Reeder's car. Reeder states that Buzzard took pictures as Reeder entered his car. Thereafter, the van proceeded to Mansfield, a nearby town. Reeder and Hockenberry followed the van in Reeder's car. Reeder states that he wished to ascertain the destination of the delivery. Buzzard, in his car, followed Reeder's car as it followed the van on the highway. As he followed, Buzzard, with one hand, operated a motion picture camera from time to time, and took pictures of the scene and the rear of Reeder's car, including the license plate, as it followed the van. No untoward incident occurred during the trip involving the van or the following cars. On September 1, for the first time since the commencement of the strike, a few employees went to work in the plant. Smith took some motion pictures of the picket line and the pickets from the window of his office across the street. At the end of the day, the aforementioned working employees entered a passenger van in the company parking lot across the plant. Although the Union denies that it was preventing the van from leaving the lot, the evidence shows that the van had stopped near the exit driveway leading from the lot. The windows of the van were entirely closed and the driver, a company employee, was sitting with his arms folded on the wheel. It is our opinion that a picket, probably Hockenberry, at one point, had one foot resting on the running board and was asking the employees therein, in substance, why they were working during the strike. Various incidents occurred during the episode of the van. At one point, Hockenberry lay down briefly in front of the van. Reeder states that Hockenberry was "just clowning around." At another point, Hockenberry had some folded papers or a paper bag. Company witnesses state that he was trying to light the papers as a torch. Hockenberry states that he was trying to catch some bees in a bag. At some point Buzzard drove his car into the lot and apparently hit or grazed one or more pickets near the area of the van and the parking lot driveway as he drove out of the lot.6 Reeder testified that before "Buzzard got into the act," a policeman was on the scene and told the pickets to let the van leave. The van left. Reeder denies that the ' If Respondent had made available some records or data for the period from January to August 1966 or thereafter or had offered to do so , it would have then been incumbent upon the Union to be more specific if it deemed such data to be inadequate 5 It is well settled that the filing or pending of charges and of unfair labor practice proceedings does not relieve a respondent of its obligations under the Act " Buzzard's car had been parked on the street and he had finished removing a flat tire and replacing it 334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pickets had at any time prevented the van from leaving. In any event, Smith was taking some motion pictures at various times during the parking lot episode involving the van. On September 7, Smith observed a number of strikers in the general area of the plant shortly before some nonstrikers were to leave the plant. Some of the strikers were parking their cars across from the driveway where the nonstrikers would emerge. Police came to the scene. Nothing occurred. The Company took some pictures during the foregoing. Sometime in September, Buzzard testified that one of their dealers drove up in a truck with his wife and child to pick up some furnaces at the plant. The pickets were talking to the dealer and Buzzard came out with an unloaded camera and pointed it at the scene and the pickets dispersed.7 On a few other occasions, Buzzard pretended to take pictures when he observed the pickets "congregating." It is not entirely clear what Buzzard meant by "congregating" but we construe it as referring to incidents when the pickets gathered or grouped together as in the type of instance described by Buzzard, above, involving the dealer who drove up to the plant to pick up some material. We find further confirmation of this interpretation in Smith's testimony. Smith pretended to take pictures on an occasion when the pickets were talking to the driver of a truck delivering material to the plant. The pickets were endeavoring to persuade the driver not to make the delivery. Conclusions Surveillance is the act of observing and the term surveillance is commonly used in labor law to describe illegal observation by an employer of employee union activity. Thus, a supervisor's presence outside or nearby a union hall at the time of a union meeting is held to be illegal observation and surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is apparent that the supervisor's presence and observation outside the union hall in the above situation constitutes interference with the rights of employees for the simple reason that the supervisor has no legitimate reason to be present and to be observing what employees are attending the meeting. Moreover, the union meeting is of such a nature that it is an activity involving solely the union and the employees and they can expect to be free of employer observation while engaging in such activity. It is our opinion that picket line activity in front of a struck plant is a different situation than a union meeting or other employee-union activity in which the employer can have no legitimate interest. An employer's observation of a union meeting, whether he uses his eyes alone or a camera, constitutes unwarranted and illegal interference. But we can perceive no reason why an employer may not observe a picket line and its activity in front of its plant. A picket line is, by its very nature and intent, a public act and a public demonstration. Such demonstrations are meant to be observed and demonstrators generally would be disappointed if they were not observed and if they did not attract attention. Since we live in an age when scenes can be recorded by means other than crude drawings on the wall of a cave, photographs, still or moving, are not infrequently made of demonstrations, whether the picketing is in support of a strike, or civil rights, or antiwar, or any other subject. Newspapers are among those who take pictures of picketing and a newspaper picture is seen by employers, employees, pickets, and the general public. Photography in itself cannot be regarded as something sinister or occult. A photograph simply reflects and records a scene by viewing the scene through a lens so that, by means of a light opening, the scene is imprinted on chemically sensitive paper. The evidentiary weight of a photograph is, of course, like all other evidence, subject to scrutiny by reason of its selectivity, the angle of view, the time taken, and other factors. But the picture itself simply reflects mechanically and chemically what the observer or picture taker sees. In the latter part of the 20th century in the United States, we are well past the tales of explorers in distant jungles who reported that natives feared to have their pictures taken and fled into the jungle because the great chief who flew in an iron bird pointed a magic box at them that would steal their souls if representatives would see them. It is a profound illusion to entertain the belief that an employer and its representatives are not interested in observing the size, the composition, and the conduct of a picket line. Whether the employer stands at the door of its picketed plant or in a window thereof and daily observes the picketing, his conduct, as far as we are aware, is not illegal observation, to wit, surveillance. And the nature of a strike and picketing supports the legitimacy of observation by the employer who is being picketed. As Mr. Justice Douglas observed in Bakery and Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local 802, IBT v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777, "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." In connection with the foregoing, prudent awareness and alertness would seem to impel competent management to be consistently cognizant of the details of the picketing of its plant, albeit there is no presumption that the pickets will engage in any illegal conduct A strike and picketing and their circumstances have at least the potentiality of giving rise to legal contentions against the employer, the union, or both. Federal or State court proceedings or Board proceedings are a possibility. If the employer may observe the picket line from day to day, the next question is, may he do so as effectively as possible and with the normal mechanical aids of our contemporary society. If the plant official has less than perfect vision or is nearsighted, it would seem that he could observe the pickets in front of the plant with the aid of eyeglasses or resort to binoculars in order to se`e more clearly the pickets and their picket sign and their conduct and identity. Nor do we believe that a recording of daily events in a diary, including the numbers, identity, and conduct of the pickets, the identity of persons or vehicles entering or leaving the premises, would have been amiss. Unaided memory, as the often imprecise testimony in this r The content of the conversation between the dealer and the pickets is not shown The pickets were probably attempting to persuade the dealer from further dealings with the Company RYBOLT HEATER COMPANY proceeding illustrates, is something on which reasonably prudent people should not always rely.8 The evidence persuades us, in part, that the Company took pictures on some occasions when it thought that something other than the usual walking or sitting of the pickets might occur or was about to occur or was occurring. It was, for instance, not illegal for two union men, Reeder and picket Hockenberry, to follow a company van delivering a company product to a nearby town. But we are unable to conclude that the plant superintendent could not follow the car that was following its truck. We believe that the superintendent had a right to observe such conduct since there is no way that he would have known what the union car and its occupants would do or would not do. The driver of the truck probably could see in his rearview mirror that a car was following him. Who the occupants were might well have become a disputed point if the car had tailgated the truck or driven parallel with it at some point or engaged in other action. The fact that nothing illegal occurred proves only that fact. The union people did nothing illegal. We believe the superintendent had as much right to observe the union car as the latter had to observe the truck. If the Union took a picture of the truck because it believed that it would help to establish that the plant was farming out work or otherwise doing something that the Union deemed significant, we believe that the picture would have been simply a photographic record of what the union people had observed and had a right to observe. We believe the same is true of the pictures taken by the superintendent. For one thing, the latter's pictures showed the license plate of the union car. Just as there was no way of knowing what would occur during the following of the truck, there was no way of knowing whether the ownership or identity of the car would be admitted or disputed in the event an incident had occurred. In Board cases, the records not infrequently reflect efforts to identify unidentified persons or cars in situations where the Union is contending and endeavoring to prove illegal conduct by an employer and vice versa. While the Examiner was prepared to uphold the Employer's right to observe the picket line and picket line incidents and to record its observation by means of photographs, there is substantial evidence that persuades us that the camera was used not as a means of recording but as a means and an instrument of interfering with legitimate picketing activity protected under Section 7 of the Act. The pictures were not used in either of the injunction hearings . The initial picture taking commenced after the first hearing and no pictures were there shown. The same was true of the second hearing since the pictures were not developed until subsequent to that hearing." Testimony of both Smith and Buzzard demonstrates that they deliberately and visibly pretended to take pictures of incidents wherein pickets were verbally attempting to persuade a truckdriver and a customer to honor the picket line and not to deliver or pick up from the plant. The same tactic of simulated picture taking was used in other instances which the Company simply described as occasions when the pickets "congregated." The intended and actual result of these tactics was that " Reeder, the union representative in charge of the strike and picketing, who was present and who testified to the events on August 15, was unable to remember the name of even one picket on that occasion In retrospect , the identity of the pickets on that occasion was not important , but as of August 15 neither the Union nor the Company could have been sure of what might have occurred, including the possible importance of the precise 335 the pickets ceased their attempts to have their picket line honored on the aforedescribed occasions. We believe that Respondent's conduct was de facto interference in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and that the calculated effect of the conduct was one of interference with rights protected under Section 7 of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By failing and refusing to make available to the Union, upon request, on September 20, 1966, and thereafter, its books and records in support of its claimed inability to pay a wage increase in August 1966 and thereafter, and by failing and refusing to meet and negotiate with the Union as the collective-bargaining agent on and after November 15, 1966, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 3. By the taking of photographs and by the pretended taking of photographs for use as instruments of interference, and by using the aforesaid as instruments of interference with legitimate and protected picket line strike activity, Respondent has interfered with rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The appropriate unit consists of all production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Ashland, Ohio, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. The Union is the representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative remedial action to effectuate the policies of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , conclusions of law , and the entire record in the case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO , by failing and refusing, upon request , to make available to the said Union , Respondent's financial books and records pursuant to Respondent's claimed inability to grant a wage increase to its employees in August 1966 and thereafter. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the aforesaid Union since November 15, 1966 , by failing and refusing to identity and conduct of the pickets and others 'rite same may be said of the testimony of Hockenberry, an active picket, who was able to name only two pickets on an occasion in which he was an active participant Much the same is true of testimony by company witnesses " Radio Industries, Inc., 101 NLRB 912.925. 336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meet and negotiate with the Union as the collective- bargaining agent of Respondent 's employees. (c) Photographing or pretending to photograph or giving the impression of photographing protected picket line strike activity of employees for the purpose, and with the effect, of interfering with rights of employees under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the purposes of the Act. (a) Upon request, meet and negotiate with the aforesaid Union for the purposes of collective bargaining and make available to the Union , under reasonable conditions and circumstances , Respondent's financial books and records that will reflect Respondent 's financial condition for the year 1966 and thereafter. (b) Post at its premises at Ashland , Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director , in writing, within 20 days of the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. '" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " ' i In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: Upon request, WE WILL meet and bargain collec- tively with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and we will make available to the said Union our financial books and records that will show our financial condition for the year 1966 and thereafter. WE WILL NOT photograph or pretend to photograph protected picket line strike activity of employees for the purpose, and with the effect, of interfering with the rights of employees as guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of the aforesaid Union or any other union, except to the extent that union membership may be required by a contract as a condition of employment, or authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Our employees are free to engage in union and concerted activity, or to refrain from such activity. RYBOLT HEATER COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 720 Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44115, Telephone 621-4465.