Collins & Aikman Corp.

678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Collins & Aikman Corporation and Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO and Carl Jenkins Furr, Jr., James W. Isenhour, Charles E. Krick, Judy E. Misenheimer, Edna H. Bailey, Evelyn Clark, Martin L. Drye, Daniel C. Hinson , Mack W. Lam- bert, Polly G. Mason, Jewell Lambert, Bobby Ray Martin , Peggy Wagoner, William Crawley, Sherrill Vanhoy, Katherine C. Watson , George C. Murray, William C. Efird, Charles E. Jordan , Tony M. Jordan, Pauline V. Rinehardt, Billy Thompson, Cassie L. Thurman, George Bill Misen- heimer, Marion P. Wilhoit, Barbara Poplin, Larry Gene Efird , Martha Gaye Efird, Douglas B. Morgan, Elmer Hamp Talbert, James Douglas Talbert , Johnny M. Garmon, Ira Lee Burleson , James M. Dennis, John E. Eudy, Phyllis Howell , William H . James, Richard Mauney , Howard C. Montgomery, J. D. Almond, Vernon C. Furr, Artis B. Sellers, Tim L. Eudy, Ray F . Howard, and Edith R. Russell. Cases 11-CA-2971, 11-CA-2978-1-33, and 11-CA-2978-35-46. June 21, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On January 3,1967, Trial Examiner Phil Saunders issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices, and recommended that those allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent consistent with our Decision herein. ' About August 18 the Respondent , with union approval, granted a 4-1/2 percent wage increase for "several job We affirm the Trial Examiner's Section 8(a)(1) findings. However, we disagree with his conclusion that the extensive interference and coercion engaged in by the Respondent during bargaining negotiations lack significance in assessing its 8(a)(5) responsibility. As we analyze this record, the employees were restive in early September, when 3 months of bargaining by their representative gave no indication of resulting in a contract. The Union expressed its concern about the failure to bargain on wage rates and workloads,' evidenced by its August 27 letter to the Respondent. The employees, having been advised by International Representative Hoyman that another month of negotiations was needed, set a strike deadline for September 30 and so informed the Respondent in early September. The plan to strike, as the Trial Examiner specifically found, resulted from the feeling of the employees that the Respondent was not bargaining in good faith. During the month of September, and continuing during the month-long strike, Respondent through its foremen attempted to discourage adherence to the Union by telling employees they would never get a contract because the "Company won't sign," or would pack up and move rather than sign , or would not give "any money," or would blacklist committeemen and shop stewards and strikers would have to leave the county to get jobs and would suffer economic losses, as well as interrogating employees concerning union activities, soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union and to abandon the strike after it started, all as the Trial Examiner found. Also, during September no meaningful bargaining concessions were being made by the Respondent until September 29, the day before the strike deadline; the Respondent capitulated on arbitration, checkoff, and its no-strike clause, and offered a wage reopener provision and a lump sum for adjustment of inequities. The Union considered the wage proposals unacceptable. The parties continued discussions on the 30th. In the afternoon the Union requested that Respondent reduce its final offers to writing so that some sort of list or outline of its proposals could be presented to the membership. Respondent apparently said that it could not prepare such a list by the end of the day. Admittedly the Union did not agree to recommend the offer to the membership. However, the membership had voted on September 26 to give its negotiating committee discretion to extend the strike deadline beyond September 30. On the 30th, beginning about 9 p.m., while the second shift was still working at the plant, union representatives came to the company guest house where bargaining representatives were staying to see whether the list was ready and to request further bargaining so that the third shift could be instructed classifications" considered by it to reflect inequities, but indicated that this was about as far as it would go on wages 165 NLRB No. 76 COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. to report for work and some proposals could be taken to the membership at the coming meeting on Sunday, October 3. Manager Frisch was critical of the presence of the union representatives at the guest house on this occasion, commented that there had not been enough time for the Respondent to reduce its proposals to writing, and stated that in any event previous offers were "out the window" and also that "there would never be a check-off or arbitration in a contract." This withdrawal by Respondent of its previous offers the Trial Examiner placed about 10 p.m., at which time he concluded that Frisch had reasonable grounds fot assuming that the strike had already started because of the report of a telephone call from the plant.' We note, however, that the record shows that the strike did not actually start until after 11 p.m., when the union president went from the guest house to the plant and told employees that they might as well strike because there was nothing to report from the Company.3 We also note that in the interim following the call to Respondent from the plant, the Union had contacted the remaining members of the union negotiating committee by telephone and corroborated the fact that the strike had not yet started, and had informed the Respondent's representatives at the guest house of this fact. Nevertheless, the Respondent would have no part in further negotiations. We conclude in these circumstances that the Respondent's actions as a whole do not constitute good-faith bargaining with desire to reach an agreement, or qualify as mere "hard bargaining."`' The Respondent's serious 8(a)(1) violations in disregard of its employees' statutory rights while going through the motions of bargaining,' its failure to make concessions on important contract clauses such as arbitration, checkoff, and strike liability until the day before the strike deadline, and its withdrawal of such concessions the next evening on the mere assumption that the strike had started, despite contrary information from responsible union officials that it had not yet started and could still be averted, we find amounts to bad-faith bargaining on the part of Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).fi Having found that the Respondent's failure to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) precipitated the strike which began on September 30, we also find that the strike was caused by the Employer's unfair labor practices and therefore became an unfair labor practice strike x The call was attributed to managerial employee Diaz , who was not called as a witness 3 This testimony was corroborated in detail by Deputy Sheriff Simmons, who rode past the plant at regular intervals beginning about 10 p in , when he saw no activity which attracted his attention ' See N L R B v Herman Sausage Co , Inc., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (C A 5) ' This activity by the Respondent is consistent with 679 rather than an economic strike as found by the Trial Examiner. Thus these unfair labor practice strikers were entitled to reinstatement upon their personal application to return to work on November 1, 2, and 3. The Union, as it had a right to do, reserved the right to litigate the unfair labor practice character of the strike, and in the meantime agreed with the Company that the strikers could be put back to work according to the Respondent's needs and the strikers' qualifications. This type of reinstatement, suitable for economic strikers, was not appropriate for unfair labor practice strikers. Accordingly, as to those strikers not reinstated upon their personal application to return to work, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Trial Examiner also dismissed that portion of the complaint which alleged a refusal to bargain based on the Respondent's August 29, 1966, letter, written in response to the Union's notice of termination of the contract and desire to negotiate an improved contract, withdrawing recognition and stating that the Union no longer represented a majority. Had the unfair labor practice strikers been reinstated immediately, as was their right, the assertion of lack of continued majority would probably not have arisen. There can be no doubt, however, that the reasons asserted by the Respondent as indicative of the Union's alleged loss of majority constitute an insufficient affirmative showing with respect to majority status when viewed in the context of the Respondent's unfair labor practice violations which we have found herein. Accordingly, we find that commencing on August 29, 1966, and continuing to date, the Respondent has refused to recognize and bargain with the Union notwithstanding that the Union was the duly designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees, and has thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices. we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent on August 29, 1966, and thereafter, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing its recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees at the end of the contract term based background evidence introduced by the General Counsel showing marked opposition to the Union from the time of the election in December 1964 and beyond the certification on May 3, 1965, including threats to discharge union officers and disciplinary layoffs of shop stewards for interceding in behalf of other employees. s See "M" System, Inc, 129 NLRB 527, 548, Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co, 146 NLRB 420, 431, Phodes-Holland Chevrolet Co, 146 NLRB 1304, 1316, Berger Polishing, Inc , 147 NLRB 21,36 680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD apparently on alleged loss of majority status in the months following a strike which we find to be an unfair labor practice strike, we shall order Respondent to recognize, and upon request bargain with, the Union as such representative, and in the event an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. As we have found that Respondent unlawfully refused to reinstate its striking employees upon application, we shall order the Respondent to offer to all strikers at Respondent's Albemarle, North Carolina, plant, who have not been reinstated, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging, if necessary, any replacements in order to provide work for the strikers, including those who may have subsequently been reinstated, and to reimburse them, for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, by'payment to each of a sum of money equal to that which each normally would have earned as wages during the period from their unconditional request for reinstatement to Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less the net earnings of each, to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest at 6 percent per annum as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Paragraph 4 is deleted and the following paragraphs are inserted: 4. All production and maintenance employees, including plant clerical employees and local pickup and delivery drivers at Respondent's Albemarle, North Carolina, operation, excluding all professional employees, techincal employees, office clerical employees, watchmen and/or guards, over-the-road truckdrivers, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute an appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. At all times since May 3, 1965, Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, has been and now is the exclusive representative of the employees in the above appropriate unit, for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By the totality of its conduct, culminating on the evening of September 30, 1965, in the withdrawal of previous bargaining offers, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 7. By refusing to recognize and bargain collectively since August 29, 1966, with the aforesaid labor organization as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 8. The strike , which commenced on September 30, 1965, resulted from Respondent's unfair labor practices and hence was an unfair labor practice strike. 9. By refusing immediate reinstatement to the unfair labor practice strikers upon their uncon- ditional request, Respondent has discriminated in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, thereby discouraging membership in the above labor organization , and has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Collins & Aikman Corporation , Albemarle, North Carolina, its agents , officers , successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating employees and job applicants as to their union activities, soliciting employees to abandon a strike, and to withdraw from the Union, threatening employees with economic losses and inability to find work in the local area because of union activities , and threatening plant closure rather than sign a contract with the Union as well as the futility of contract negotiations. (b) Refusing , upon request, to bargain in good faith with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the certified unit : all production and maintenance employees , including plant clerical employees and local pickup and delivery drivers at Respondent's Albemarle, North Carolina, operations , excluding all professional employees, technical employees, office clerical employees, watchmen and/or guards, over -the-road truckdrivers, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (c) Discouraging membership in the above-named Union, or in any other labor organization , by refusing reinstatement to unfair labor practice strikers upon their unconditional request, or by discriminating against their employees in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any terms or conditions of their employment. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which it deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request , bargain collectively in good COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. faith with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance employees of Respondent at Albemarle, North Carolina, including plant clerical employees and local pickup and delivery drivers, but excluding professional employees, technical employees, office clerical employees, watchmen and/or guards, over-the-road truckdrivers, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Offer to the employees named in the attached Appendix A, who have not been reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, displacing, if necessary, all employees hired since September 30,1965. (c) Make whole the said employees in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against them. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its plant in Albemarle, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."7 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found herein. APPENDIX A Adkins, Winfred C. Efird, Larry Gene Aldridge, Phillip Efird, Martha Gaye ' In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the Blakeley, William Blalock, William Bowers, Mickey Brown, Henry Burris, Harlan E. Burris, Jimmy D. Clark, Ray Von Colely, Doyce L. Earnhardt, Jimmy W. Faggart, Daniel A. Fesperman, Hoyle Furr, Colon B. Gainey, Ronald Greene, Joel E. Harris, Billy D. Helms, Lonnie J. Holt, Larry Ray Hopkins, Alvin Hopkins, Elmer Knight, Raymond Lambert, Gene Lemmons, Edgar L. Meeks, Hazel M. Morton, Joel M. Parnell, Bob Presson, Lynwood Spinks, Jimmy R. Thompson, Lanny Vanhoy, Hollie K. Whitley, Edward R. Almond J. D. Bailey, Edna H. Burleson, Ira Lee Clark, Evelyn Crawley, William Dennis, James M. Drye, Martin L. 681 Efird, William C. Eudy, John E. Eudy, Tim L. Furr, Carl Jenkins, Jr. Furr, Vernon C. Garmon, Johnny M. Hinson , Daniel C. Howard, Ray F. Howell, Phyllis Isenhour, James W. James, William H. Jordon, Charles E. Jordon, Tony M. Krick, Charles E. Lambert, Jewell Lambert, Mack W. Martin, Bobby Ray Mason, Polly G. Mauney, Richard Misenheimer, George Bill Misenheimer, Judy E. Morgan, Douglas B. Montgomery, Howard C. Murray, George C. Poplin, Barbara Rinehardt, Pauline V. Russell, Edith R. Sellers, Artis B. Talbert, Elmer Hamp Talbert, James Douglas Thompson, Billy Thurman, Cassie L. Vanhoy, Sherrill Wagoner, Peggy Watson, Katherine C. Wilhoit, Marion P. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain in good faith, upon request, with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employ- ees, including plant clerical employees words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order " 682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and local pickup and delivery drivers at our Albemarle, North Carolina, plant, excluding all professional employees, technical employees, office clerical employees, watchmen and/or guards, over- the-road truckdrivers, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees or job applicants as to their union activities and memberships. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to withdraw from the Union or to abandon strike activity. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with economic losses and inability to find work because of their union activities, or with plant removal, or refusal to sign a contract. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer the employees listed in the attached schedule i reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, to the extent that we have not already done so, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. All of our employees are free to become , remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO. or any other labor organization. COLLINS& AIKMAN CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 310 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-2911, Extension 392. ' Such schedule shall contain all the names listed in Appendix "A," above TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PHIL SAUNDERS , Trial Examiner : The unfair labor practice charges and amended charges on which the consolidated complaint herein is based were filed by the Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein the Union, on February 17, 1966 , and on May 31, 1966. The individual charges in Case 11-CA-2978-1 through 46 were filed on various dates in February, March, and April 1966. The complaint was issued on June 1, 1966, against Collins & Aikman Corporation, herein the Company or the Respondent , alleging violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Company filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. The parties were represented by counsel and participated fully in the hearing before me. The General Counsel filed a brief. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation operating a plant in Albemarle, North Carolina, engaged in the manufacture of textile and related products. During the last 12 months, which period of time is representative of all times material herein, the Respondent manufactured, sold, and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000, to points and places directly outside the State of North Carolina. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint , as amended , alleges that in numerous instances certain supervisors of the Company unlawfully interrogated, threatened, promised, and solicited employees, and that supervisors also informed employees the Company would not sign a contract and any contract signed would give employees less or no increased monetary benefits. It is further alleged the Company refused to bargain in good faith with the Union, and specifically that the Respondent showed bad faith in unilaterally changing wage rates and working conditions in the molding department, withdrawing, without good cause, previously made agreements on workloads, voluntary checkoffs , arbitration, pay inequities and wage reopening, delayed in furnishing information on incentive pay, and that the Company negotiated without any intention of entering into a meaningful agreement. The complaint further alleges that the strike starting on September 30, 1965, was an unfair labor strike, and that after the Union made an unconditional offer to return employees, named in the schedule A attachment to the complaint, the Company refused such reinstatement. The complaint was further amended at the hearing to include the allegation that since August 29, 1966, the Company also refused to bargain with the Union. This record shows that in October 1964 the Union filed a representation petition in Case 11-RC-2059. In December 1964, a consent election was held which the Union won, and after considering the Respondent's objections to the ' The Company has four plants in its Automotive Division with three of them located in North Carolina We are concerned here with only the plant located at Albemarle COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 683 election the Board certified the Union on May 3, 1965 2 On June 7, 1965, the Union sent a letter to the Company asking for information on seniority, wages, and incentive rates. The first negotiating session was held on June 22, 1965, and thereafter some 18 to 20 negotiating sessions or meetings between the parties were held. On October 30, 1965, a memorandum of agreement was reached between the parties which ended the month-old strike, and on November 15, 1965, an agreement or contract was signed for a 1-year duration and retroactive from November 1, 1965. Basically, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's' bad faith is readily apparent from the record in this case, and outlines, in support of his position, numerous reasons and arguments discussed below and herein, which he contends was to disparage, undermine, and destroy the Union. The General Counsel also maintains that the Respondent's unfair labor practices caused and prolonged the strike. The Company initially maintains that the question of whether or not they bargained in good faith was essentially put to rest by the execution of the collective-bargaining agreement achieved through the negotiations between the parties, and would deem the strike starting on September 30, 1965, as an economic strike 3 At the first negotiating meeting on June 22, 1965,4 the Union presented their proposed contract. Prior to the start of the negotiations the Union had filed with the Company a number of employee grievances, and at this first meeting there were also some discussions on these matters with the Union proposing an interim grievance procedure. At the second and third meetings on July 13 and 14 the Company agreed to the installation of a temporary grievance procedure. At these meetings the Union again went over their proposed contract with the Company requesting information, and the parties concluded with an understanding that the next few meetings would be largely devoted to discussions and the handling of grievances which had been filed by employees in the first 4 months of 1965. The Union also renewed its request for the information on piece rate jobs and average earnings. The fourth meeting on July 21 was taken up wholly with discussions on the grievances and the Company went over each grievance in considerable detail. At the next meeting on August 3 some time was first given to the various grievances, and the Company then presented its proposed contract. The Respondent's original proposed contract did not contain clauses or provisions relating to checkoff, arbitration, and workloads, but did contain a no-strike clause and also a provision for unlimited financial liability on the Union. At the meetings on August 3 and 4 the Union made a wage proposal for an 8-percent across-the-board increase for unit employees and a 2-percent increase for "inequities."5 The Company then made their first wage proposal and suggested a general wage increase of about 4-1/2 percent which had been previously installed in Respondent's other plants in North Carolina. The Com- pany indicated that such a wage increase would preclude further economic considerations during the negotiations. The Union replied that they would like to accept a 5- percent general wage increase, but the Company would have to leave the balance of the Union's wage proposal open for further negotiations. At these meetings on August 3 and 4 the parties also had discussions on seniority, arbitration, and on checkoffs. The parties agreed on a preamble clause, and reached a tentative agreement on a recognition clause. At the next negotiating session on August 12 the Union again requested more information on job classifications, and also raised other matters which the Union registered complaints about.6 The parties then had further discussions on wages and the Company stated that they wanted to institute a wage increase and would make another wage proposal at the next meeting. At this meeting on August 12 the parties also had a discussion about some 88 people who had been challenged at the election, and further talked about the major omissions in the Respondent's proposed contract (no arbitration, checkoff, and workload provisions or clauses). At the meeting the Company presented to the Union a roster of employees by departments and by job classifications, and with their hiring dates, and this filled out the information given to the Union on July 13 when the Company had presented an alphabetical list of employees and their rates of pay.' At the meeting on August 18 the Company instituted a wage increase of about 4-1/2 percent covering several job classifications where the Company felt there were inequities, and this action was commensurate with the June 28 increases previously given to employees in the other North Carolina plants of the Company. This wage increase at the Albemarle plant went into effect on August 23, and the Union agreed to it. The Company also informed the Union that by these increases they were not precluding further discussions on wages, but that this was about as far as the Company would be able to go. The Company then sent a letter to the Union on August 23 further advising them of the wage increases at the Albemarle plant (G.C. Exh. 21). At this meeting the Company further discussed the 88 challenged voters in the election, as aforestated, and as a result the parties were able to reach agreements on a considerable number of these employees and whether or not they should be included or excluded from the unit. The Company's letter to the Union dated August 19 shows the extent of these agreements on the challenged voters (Resp. Exh. 3). The Union's International representative, Scott Hoyman, testified that at this meeting on August 18 he informed the Company that the employees were concerned over the 2 The basic bargaining team for the Company was the Respondent's director of personnel, Donald Burger, plant personnel manager, Paul Cox, Riley, and Frederickson The basic bargaining team for the Union was International Representative Scott Hoyman, mine employee members, and Union Representative Michael Botelho, who entered into the negotiations after the initial meetings ' The appropriate unit involved consists of all production and maintenance employees, including plant clerical employees and local pickup and delivery drivers at the Respondent's Albemarle, North Carolina, operations, excluding all professional employees, technical employees, office clerical employees, watchmen and/or guards, over-the-road truckdnvers and all supervisors as defined in the Act 4 All dates mentioned are 1965 unless specified otherwise 5 Apparently some unit employees had dropped behind in their wage scale, and the 2-percent proposal was to cover such situations. 6 See G.C Exh 16 'On July 13 the Company had also given the Union a description of their fringe benefits (holidays, vacation plan, He and hospitalization plan) and on July 16 mailed to the Union a brochure which described the Company' s pension plan 684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD lack of progress in the negotiations.8 At the negotiation session on September 1, the parties reviewed all the proposals that both sides had made. At this meeting, and the next one held on September 3, the discussions mainly revolved around seniority and the grievance procedure. There was a mutual agreement on using departmental seniority and the parties agreed on what constituted the various departments within the Albemarle plant. There was also an agreement on large segments of the grievance procedure-particularly on steps 2, 3, and 4. Hoyman testified that at this meeting the Union again informed the Company that the employees were very distrubed over the delays, and that the negotiations would have to be expedited. On September 10 the parties discussed workloads, work assignments , shift rotations, lunchbreaks, and fatigue time. The Company detailed information on how it made up or calculated workloads. The parties also discussed incentive pay and the Company gave full details on their incentive methods and the potential earnings on their molding lines.9 At the September 15 meeting the parties again discussed seniority and grievance procedures, and the Company also submitted a redraft of all proposals that had been agreed upon up to this time.10 On September 16 the Union presented their counterproposal. In part it called for a 15-cent across-the- board wage increase, $75,000 for inequities to certain employees, 8 paid holidays instead of 6, a vacation plan going to 3 weeks after 10 years' service, jury duty pay, improvements in insurance payments by employees, and full settlements on grievances. The Company indicated that the Union's economic proposals were far above anything they could consider, but that they would nevertheless look over the counterproposal and see if there was any area they might consider. The Company pointed out that they had a superior fringe benefit plan in effect, and that the Union was attempting to divorce the Albemarle plant from the basic textile industry and trying to link it to the automotive industry. At this time there was no change in the Respondent's position on arbitration, checkoffs, and their no-strike clause." At the negotiation session on September 24 the Company stated that they could not grant any general wage increases, but indicated that something might be done on the proposal relating to inequities. At this meeting the Union also suggested a "fall-back" rate to employees on the mold line, and the Company supplied the Union with a proposal on workloads and work assignments. On September 28 the parties again reviewed the various economic proposals, and the Company indicated a willingness to pay $15,000 for the elimination or adjustments of the inequities in pay to certain employees. The Company also informed the Union that they would 8 By letter dated August 27 the Union advised the Company that the parties should meet and bargain on any further changes in rates and workloads. Hoymen testified that by August 30 he had received reports of unilateral changes, the tightening up of rest periods and smoking areas , and that the employees wanted to strike at this time Hoyman stated he then informed the employees that the parties needed another month of negotiations to reach the basic issues involved 8 Incentive pay only existed in the molding department and there were no other incentives in the Albemarle plant. 10 Agreements or understandings reached at this time included the following the recognition clause, bulletin boards, the wage agreement put into effect on August 23, call -in and report-in pay take a "hard look" as to the possibility of including an arbitration clause in their proposed agreement. Chief negotiator and director of personnel for the Company, Donald Burger, testified that in this general period of time the September 30 strike deadline was fast approaching and that the strike talk was rampant in the plant. Burger stated that the Union had informed the Company at the beginning of September that it had imposed a strike deadline, and that the parties would have to reach an agreement by September 30. At the session on September 29 the Company changed its previous positions with regard to arbitration, checkoffs, and its no-strike clause. The Company informed the Union that if they would agree to a suitable management clause the Company would offer arbitration. The Company agreed to a voluntary and revocable checkoff procedure, and the Company further indicated that they could revise their proposal on the no-strike clause to provide some method whereby the Union could be relieved of potential liability in event of a strike. The Company again offered $15,000 for the adjustments of inequities, and also offered a wage-reopener provision effective in June 1966, conditioned upon the amount of wages then being paid in the textile industry. The Company indicated that they would also consider higher fallback rates on incentive work, and that they would consider a clause on protective clothing, workloads, and on seniority. The Union then informed the Company their proposals were entirely unacceptable, and the Union countered with a proposal calling for $75,000 for inequities and a 3-year contract with wage increases to be spread throughout the contract term. On September 30 the Company withdrew its proposal on payment of inequities as it would not cover the entire bargaining unit, and in lieu thereof offered to make its August wage increases, as aforestated, retroactive to June 28. The Company informed the Union that this action would amount to more than the $15,000 it had offered for the adjustments of inequities, and also told the Union that they would include a wage-reopener clause on June 1, 1966, regardless of the general wage picture in the textile industry. The Union stated that the above was unsatisfactory. The Company then countered and offered both the $15,000 in inequities and the retroactive pay proposals, and also offered protective clothing for employees as the Union had requested and further informed the Union that it would again take into consideration some improvement in the fallback rates (incentive pay) for mold line employees. Furthermore, the Company made it clear that its other offers made on September 29 were still standing. The negotiating team for the Union-including the negotiating employees' committee, herein the committee-then caucused before informing the Company "that its going to take more money to set up this agreement." The Company then informed language, incentive earnings to be computed on a daily shift basis, fatigue allowances (breaks and lunchtime), supervisory people not to displace employees, discipline and discharge , grievance procedures (steps 2, 3, and 4), seniority (that such list be brought up to date every 6 months-seniority on transfers to a new department-and seniority of laid-off employees), leaves of absence, health and safety, union representatives ' access to the plant, and agreement that there should be no discrimination by the Company because of race, color, creed, and sex. 11 On September 22 the Company sent a letter to its employees outlining certain aspects in the bargaining between the parties and right of employees in the event of a strike (G.C. Exh. 29) COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. the Union that it could not make any additional offers. A. Additional Events on September 30 Union Representative Hoyman testified that during the conclusion of the negotiating meeting on September 30, the Union advised the Company that it wanted the Respondent's final offer in writing so that it could be submitted to the membership on the following Sunday, and that the union negotiators and the committee would be kept together for the balance of the day at the nearby Sunset Motel. Hoyman stated that Burger replied he would "get off" a paper outlining the Respondent's offers. Hoyman also testified that he and the other people on the negotiating team for the Union then returned to the motel and waited for the Respondent's written proposals, and during the afternoon Burger was contacted over the telephone about this matter, and stated that Burger then informed the Union he would be unable to reduce the Respondent's offers to writing on September 30, but might be able to do so by the next day. Hoyman also stated that Burger was informed that the Union needed the Respondent's proposals in writing for a meeting that night and in order to keep the employees in the plant. President of the union local , Charles Krick, testified that at the negotiating meeting on September 30 the Company was informed that their final offers were "totally unsatisfactory," but the door was "left open" for the Union by asking that these proposals be put in writing. Krick then admitted that on September 30, the Union left the impression that the offers by the Company were "flatly rejected," and at this meeting never indicated to the Company that the Union would recommend their final offers to anyone. Krick also admitted that on September 30, the Company was told by their chief negotiator that the Union had to have more money. Burger testified that at the conclusion of negotiating meeting on September 30 he was again told there was a strike deadline at midnight. Burger stated that on the afternoon of September 30 he received a telephone call from the Union, and was then asked for the first time to put down in writing the final offers by the Company. Burger testified he then informed the Union that he did not see what good this would do since the Union had rejected the last offers by the Company, that it would take some time to do this, but possibly he could have something on it by the next day. Burger also stated that about 6:30 p.m. on this same day the Union again called him and asked for his final proposals in writing, and he informed the Union that he would put the same in writing and might be able to have it by tomorrow or on the next day thereafter. Paul Cox, in his appearances as a witness , corroborated the above testimony by Burger. B. Events at the Company Guest House on the Evening of September 30 This record shows that on the evening of September 30 Federal Mediator Roseberry who had entered the negotiations, and two members of the employees' union negotiating committee, Charles Krick and Lynwood Presson, went to the guest house of the Company. Krick and Presson testified that they left the motel for the guest house at or about 9:45 p.m.12 Presson testified that their 685 mission was to get the written proposals of the Company in order to avert the pending strike. Presson stated that upon arrival he informed Burger that money was by no means the biggest issue in the negotiations . Presson also testified that after they had been at the guest house for about 15 or 20 minutes, Michael Frisch, the Respondent's General Manager of the Automotive Division, drove up to the house and after inquiring as to what Presson, Krick, and Roseberry were doing there, told them "they had every damned thing they wanted, but they hadn't got nothing now." Hoyman testified that he and Union Negotiator and Representative Botelho had waited at the motel for about 45 minutes and then they also decided to go to the Company's guest house . Hoyman stated that Botelho informed Frisch that he had come to seek a further meeting and that the Union had not received the Respondent' s written proposals. Hoyman testified that Frisch then replied, "What paper-that paper is out the window," and that Frisch also stated, "If you want a strike you can have it, this money will be used up in a strike, and as far as we're concerned, we're withdrawing our offers." Hoyman further testified that Frisch then told him he had been advised by Krick and Presson that settlement could be reached without any money and Hoyman stated he then replied, "it will take money." Hoyman also testified he informed Frisch that the Union could arrange a negotiating session and get the third shift into the plant and then take the company proposals to the membership on October 3. Presson testified that, beforehand, Krick had used the telephone in the guest house to call the remainder of the Union's employees negotiating committee waiting at the motel to "make sure" the committee was waiting until they heard from the union representatives at the guest house. Krick testified that about 10:45 or 10:50 the Respondent's personnel manager at the Albemarle plant, Paul Cox, and who also was at the guest house, told the gathering that there was a strike on. Krick stated he then called the motel again and was assured by the committee that there was not any strike activity, and he then told Cox and Burger, "There are people congregating around on the lot, but there is no strike at this time." Krick further related that he and Presson left the guest house and went to a lot close by the plant entrance-which they had rented in case of a strike-and that they arrived there about 10 minutes after 11 p.m. Krick stated that people gathered there inquired as to what was going on, and he replied the Company had refused to give the Union their proposals on paper so that they might as well go ahead with the strike, and that this was actually the official beginning of the strike. Burger testified that when Hoyman and Botelho arrived at the guest house, Botelho stated that the Union had to have $75,000 for inequities , and Hoyman told them that it would take more money. Burger stated that about 10 p.m. they received a telephone call from the plant to the effect that pickets were in front of the plant and the plant was struck, and at this time Frisch told Botelho that the company offers of September 29 and 30 had been withdrawn. Frisch testified he arrived at the guest house about 9 p. m. and at this time there was a general discus- sion on what could be done to avert a strike. Frisch also stated that about 9:30 p.m. Botelho and Hoyman arrived and they informed him the Union had to have money to settle the dispute. Frisch further related that about 10 p.m. 12 The guest house is a relatively short distance from the Sunset Motel and from the Albemarle plant 686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Cox told those assembled at the guest house that the picket lines were up, and he then informed Botelho it was pointless to talk about another negotiating meeting, that the "matters on the table were no longer there, that we would have to reposition ourselves." Paul Cox testified that Burger told Krick at the guest house he could not see what good it would do to talk further with negotiating committee for the Union since the committee had already rejected the Respondent's final offers that morning. Cox also stated that Botelho told them it would take $75,000 for inequities. 13 C. Further Events on the Night of September 30 Following the Guest House Incident Hoyman testified he thought the picketing began at 11 p.m. and that the strike prevented the 11 and 11:30 p.m. shifts from going into the plant. Deputy Sheriff Ardell Simmons testified that in driving past the plant around 10 p.m. on September 30 he did not see anything which attracted his attention. In 15 minutes or so after 10 p.m. Simmons again went by the plant and testified that at this time he saw four or five people, and about 25 or 30 cars were parked alongside the road leading to the plant and waiting to get into the nearby vacant lot. Simmons stated that on his next trip pass the plant about 10:40 p.m. there were some 50 to 75 persons gathered, and there were men along the edge of the road hollering at cars going by, and upon being asked if the employees were striking the employees replied, "no, not officially." Simmons further related that about 11 or 11:10 p.m. he heard Krick tell some of the gathered crowd that the "company didn't sign no contract and he guessed the strike would be official." James Burris testified for the General Counsel that on the night of September 30 he arrived at the plant about 10:30 p.m., and that while there were 30 to 40 people on the nearby lot he did not see any picket signs, and the picket signs were not put up until about 6 a.m. the next morning. W. C. Adkins testified that when he arrived at the plant at 11:30 p.m. no one was blocking the plant entrance road and he did not see any picket signs. John Reilly, testifying for the Company, stated that around 9:45 p.m. on September 30 he observed a large gathering of people (between 60 to 80) walking around in a circle at a slow pace, and he then got in contact with the plant manager and department heads as he thought the strike had started. Roy Lomp testified that about 10 p.m. he received a telephone call at the guest house from Ed Diaz, the Respondent's director of management recruitment, and was told by Diaz the picket line had gone up and he then so informed Cox. Albert Wolpin stated that after Cox informed the group that the picket line was up he left the guest house and went to the vicinity of the plant. Wolpin stated that there were about 75 persons gathered at the intersection of Betheney Road and the road going into the plant and 20 or 30 of them walking in a circle. Wolpin further testified that upon returning to the guest house he and others in management decided to go to the plant and did so in a caravan of cars. Robert Hoerter, the division comptroller for the Company, testified he was in the lead car of the caravan and he observed many people at the entrance to the plant road and that there were pickets circling in the roadway. Hoerter also stated that 13 The Company also presented some evidence through John Reilly and Cox to the effect that on the afternoon of September 30 they had noticed people putting up stakes and a rope around a nearby vacant lot After the strike started this lot was used as his car was stopped and was "rocked," but then the crowd recognized the caravan as officials of the Company and they went into the plant. Paul Cox, who was also in the caravan, testified he observed people across the road as they were going into the plant, but did not see any picket signs. Rudolph Long stated that someone called him at his home about 9:45 on September 30 and told him not to report to work as the strike was on. Long testified that, nevertheless, he went to the plant and when he arrived about 10:20 p.m. there was a big crowd of people standing in front of the road. Woodrow Almond stated that when he reached the plant at 10:35 p.m. he observed "masses" of people on the road, and that he was surrounded by them. D. Negotiations and 1. -ppenings Subsequent to the September 30 strike At the negotiating session on October 9 Burger offered the Union the agreement as it stood on September 15. The Union replied that if the Company would reinstitute their proposed contract of September 30 the Union would recommend this proposal to their membership. At the meeting on October 13 the Company again referred to their September 15 proposal. Subsequently, however, Burger and Botelho drew up the memorandum of agreement, and, as aforestated, a contract was signed on November 15,14 after approval at a union membership meeting on October 30, and which ended the strike. This record shows that the day after the strike terminated Hoyman and Cox also reached an agreement on the procedures to be followed in putting the strikers back to work. This agreement provided that during the 6 weeks to follow the Company would put people back to work according to its needs and their qualifications, and at the end of the 6 weeks the Company would supply the Union with the names of people who had not been put back to work and the reasons therefor. It also provided that at the end of the 6-week period there would be a 10-day period within which such persons could notify the Company they were still available, and those so notifying the Company would be given first consideration as their qualifications would permit.'5 The Company, with no objections from the Union, also asked the strikers to immediately start registering with them as to whether or not they wanted to return, and accordingly registrations were so held on November 1, 2, and 3. Cox testified that during the 6 weeks following the termination of the strike the Company put back to work about 200 employees in accordance with its needs and based on their particular qualifications for the specific job to be filled. Cox further stated that at the end of the 6-week period as set forth in General Counsel's Exhibit 43, he furnished the Union with a listing of employees who had not been recalled, and at a meeting on December 14 informed the Union that the reason these strikers had not been rehired was because the Company did not have work available for them. Insofar as the 10-day grace period following the 6-week period is concerned, Cox told Hoyman on December 14 that the Company would recognize such notifications, and subsequently the Company received about 65 such notices or applications (G.C. Exh. 46). Cox testified that the Company also fulfilled this provision of the agreement. Another document agreed to between the parties on union headquarters. 1"G C Exh 41 15 G C Exh 43 COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. October 30 dealt with persons engaged in violence during the strike. The document provided that within 3 weeks from October 30 the Company would inform the Union of the names of such employees, and the reasons why they should be refused jobs or disciplined because of violence or threats of violence (G.C. Exh. 42). Cox stated that the Company also complied with this agreement. E. The 8(a)(1) Allegations and Findings The credited evidence in this record shows the following: A week or so before the strike on September 30, Foreman Robert Holt told Lynwood Presson "you boys are fighting a losing battle. You won't ever get a contract because the Company won't sign." On the same occasion Foreman Olin Griffin told Presson, "if you did strike, the Company will starve you out so that yQu'll lose your homes, your cars, your furniture, and everything else that you owe money for." Foreman Holt and Griffin also told Presson that if the employees did get a contract it would not do any good because the Company would pack up and move. A week before the strike Foreman Holt told employee James Isenhour "we weren't going to get a contract," and that the Company would "pack up and leave" before they would give the employees a contract. Holt also told Isenhour that if the employees in the Albemarle plant received a contract the employees in the other plants of the Company would also want the same benefits. Holt further inquired if Isenhour would support a strike by the Union, told Isenhour that he would lose his car, home, and that his family would "starve to death," and further stated that the Company would move to Marion before they would sign a contract. About a week after the strike started Foreman Holt called Isenhour and wanted to talk to him about coming back to work. On September 18 Foreman Herrin inquired of Walter Thompson, who was on the employees' negotiating committee, as to the progress of the contract negotiations, and then told Thompson, "Well you're not going to get one. The Company has done told me so." Herrin also told Thompson that he was too old to "get mixed" up in the Union, and further stated, "The Company will have every committeeman, shop's steward's name over every company in town and you cannot get a job." Herrin then asked Thompson if he was trying to bargain the Company out of business. Employee Lamar Eudy was also present at the time of the above conversation between Thompson and Foreman Herrin. A week before the strike Foreman Roy Mason inquired of Elmer Talbert whether he and the other employees were going to strike. Three or four weeks before the strike Foreman Phil Weatherby inquired of Tony Frick as to whether or not he was going to strike, and then further stated that the Company knew all the people who had signed cards for the Union and who the officers were. Weatherby also informed Frick that he had written out forms so that the employees could get their union cards back, and asked Frick to send in such a form so that his card would be returned (see G.C. Exh. 33). Weatherby told Frick that he had written up copies of General Counsel's Exhibit 33 for other employees to use. Mack Lambert was contacted by Foreman Griffin during the strike and was asked if he was coming back to work, and Griffin then stated "Well, you just as well to come back because the Union was as near in as it would ever be." A few weeks before the strike Foreman Almond inquired of employee Jim Burris how the negotiations were 16 In addition to the above the General Counsel also placed into this record a few instances of background testimony to support 687 going-Burris was also on the employees' negotiating committee-and after Burris told Almond that money was not the main issue, Almond replied, "you're not going to get any money." During the strike Foreman Jerry Maiden asked Roger Bunting when he was coming back to work. During the strike Foreman Tom Fretina inquired of William Bowers as to why he was striking, and then told Bowers, "If you don't come back chances are you won't ever get a chance for a better job." Fretina also informed Bowers that the Union was losing the strike. Prior to the strike Foreman Griffin asked Frank Cranford if he was going out on strike. During the strike Foreman Burbank inquired of Brice Witley if he did not want to give up the strike and return to work. On about September 27 Gay Efird applied for a job at the Company and in so doing Paul Cox inquired, off the record, if she would join the Union. Mrs. Efird replied that she had already done so. A few days before the strike Foreman Shelley Bowers told Donald McGhee that if he went on strike he would not be able to secure employment because the Company had distributed a list of people who were connected or who had anything to do with the Union. A few days after the strike started Foreman Herrin told McGhee that he would not be driving his car very much, and then stated, "The Union wasn't going to make the payments or buy the groceries, or make payments like that," and he said when my children get hungry that "I'd wake up and see the light and come back to work." Clifford Smith had some previous discussions with Foreman Maultsby about the possible purchase of a carpet, and on the afternoon or night of the strike Maultsby told Smith that if he was at work on the next day Maultsby would give him the carpet. Smith then informed Maultsby that he would not cross the picket line. A few days before the strike Foreman Herrin told Floyd Efird that he might as well come back to the Company because every place in the county would know about Efird being involved with the Union. A week after the strike started, Foreman Herrin told Jim Morgan that if he ever returned to work he would find "things" different, and also told Morgan that the strikers would not be able to get a job and that they would have to go out of the county to get employment. During the strike Foreman Herrin informed Robert Litaken that if a contract was signed the employees would get less wages than they received before the strike, and that the employees would have to get employment outside the county. On the morning of September 30, before the strike, Foreman Burbank inquired of Lonnie Helms if the men would work in event of a strike, and then told Helms and Colon Furr that if anyone harmed or threatened his family he would get his gun and kill "one" of them. During the strike Foreman Burbank and Foreman Hatchock inquired of Douglas Burkson if he was coming back to work. During the strike Foreman Kay Mason and Foreman Joe Morgan would call Carl Efird and ask how he was getting along, and on the first call Mason told Efird that he might lose his job and that he wanted Efird to return to his job. On the next two calls Mason informed Efird that the Company was going to replace him. On one occasion Foreman Morgan told Efird that it would be hard to get a job and that his job was open anytime he wanted it back. Before the strike started on the night of September 30, Foreman W. Lapiere told Hoyle Festerman that if he went on strike Festerman would not have a job when it was over.16 his 8(a)(1) evidence The cutoff date in which unfair labor violations may be found in this case is August 17, 1965. 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The foregoing instances that have been credibly attributed to the Respondent include unlawful interrogations into union activities and memberships, interrogating a job applicant as to union membership, soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union, soliciting individual employees to abandon the strike, threatening employees with reprisals because of their union activities, threatening employees that they would be unable to secure jobs, threatening to kill any striker, threatening to move the plant, threatening employees that they would not be rehired, statements that the Respondent would not sign a contract, and informing employees that a contract would give them less pay or no increased monetary benefits than they had received before the strike. This conduct on the part of the Respondent constitutes violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. Final Conclusions In evaluating the totality of the Respondent's conduct to ascertain whether or not the Company bargained in good faith, I think it initially important to emphasize several factors. As aforestated, the Company met with the Union in at least 18 negotiating sessions, and had several other side meetings or conferences with the Union. As I have pointed out the Company also submitted numerous counterproposals, changed its original positions on different occasions, discussed at length the Union's various proposals, and where the Company remained adamant on an issue gave the reasons for its position in considerable detail. This record further shows that by September 15 the parties had reached complete or partial agreements on about 15 different subject matters. By the end of September the Company had further changed its previous positions on arbitration, its no-strike clause, checkoffs, and in its original wage proposals, as previously set forth herein. The Company thereby demonstrated a continual and flexible position, and did not remain adamant on highly important proposals to both parties. Moreover, the parties were ultimately able to reach a contract effective November 1 and were also able to work out certain agreements as to how the employees would be called back to work. The Board prescribes no timetable for negotiators, nor does it lay down any rules as to required substance or content of agreements. With this general format I will turn now to the specific 8(a)(5) allegations in the complaint. The complaint alleges that since August 17 the Company refused to bargain in good faith in that it unilaterally changed wage rates and working conditions in the molding department at their Albemarle plant. In this respect the General Counsel generally relies on the testimony of Hoyman and Presson to the effect that the lines in the molding department were being speeded up and that workloads were being increased. Hoyman stated that he advised the Company on August 18 that this was a dangerous situation and requested the Company to bargain on any such changes. Presson stated that the parties discussed these changes in their bargaining sessions, and that the piece rate was changed when the mold line was speeded up. Presson further testified that during the negotiations a mechanic was taken off work in the fabrication department and that prior thereto there had always been two men. Presson admitted that this matter had been brought up in negotiating sessions, but testified that the Company was never able to give a satisfactory answer. Burger testified that whenever there were changes forthcoming in the molding department the Company would, ahead of time, contact Charles Krick, president of the union local and give him the information. Burger also stated that there were some routine changes made from time to time, and that the employees or the Union could also use the grievance procedure which was available. Cox testified that during the negotiations there was a discussion about the mold line and the increase in the rate from $1.75 to $1.80 an hour. Cox stated that he and Foreman Maultsby talked with Charles Krick about it. In my analysis of this allegation it appears clear to me that the Company adequately explained these circumstances and changes to the Union on several occasions during the negotiations with extensive discussions between the parties, and there is also adequate evidence that these minor changes were made necessary in the usual, and more or less routine, operation of the plant. Hoyman even admitted in his testimony that there were 3 or 4 months in the year when the plant was "cleaning up" on new floormat styles and the mold lines were then speeded up. Krick, president of the Local, admitted that Foreman Maultsby informed him of a change on the mold line, but then ventured that the change was made before he could notify the Union. Krick was also a member of the employees' negotiating committee, as aforestated. The complaint alleges that since August 17 the Company refused to bargain in that it had unreasonably delayed furnishing to the Union information concerning the wage rates, wage structure, and incentive pay in the molding department. The General Counsel maintains that as late as September 24 the Union was unable to make its proposal on wages because they did not have the necessary data which they had requested in June. However, Hoyman testified that at the session on September 10 or 15 the Company described the three different methods of pay for employees on the mold line, and admitted that on September 21 the Union received the actual piece rate incentive earnings for mold line operators. Hoyman further testified that prior to August 3 he advised the Company that the Union would not make a wage proposal in advance of getting the economic information he had requested, and then Hoyman stated, "and which we were gradually getting at." In the first instance it is noted that the Company as early as July 13 provided the Union with an alphabetical listing of employees and their rates of pay, and also gave the Union a description of their fringe benefits. On August 12 the Company gave the Union a roster of employees by departments and by job classifications, and admittedly by September 24 the Union received the piece rate incentive earnings that had been previously requested. This record further shows that the matter of wage discussions between the parties was not of immediate importance in the initial phases of the negotiations as reflected in Hoyman's testimony, and that the parties had numerous other matters to discuss prior to their wage talks. Based on the employee rosters and rates of pay provided the Union as early as July 13, the subsequent discussion on September 10 as to the method of pay in the molding department, and upon the other factors herein mentioned, there is no real basis in the record which will adequately sustain this allegation in the complaint. The complaint alleges that since August 17 the Company refused to bargain in that it withdrew without good cause or proper explanation previously made agreements on workload clauses, voluntary checkoffs, arbitration, pay inequities, and wage reopening. While the COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. General Counsel does not specifically discuss this allegation in his brief it must be assumed that he relies on the events at the guest house on the night of September 30 for proof thereof. As noted earlier herein, the Company made numerous concessions and changes in its positions on the above clauses or matters at the negotiating sessions on September 29 and 30. However, the Union terminated the meeting on September 30 by informing Burger that the Respondent's final proposals were completely unacceptable, and by this time the Company had also received numerous prior announcements and warnings, through the Union, that unless a contract was reached by the end of September there would be a strike. On the evening of September 30 the parties gathered at the guest house, and after some aspects of the negotiations and the possibility of another meeting had been reviewed or discussed, the Company then received word from the plant that the strike was on. The credited testimony in this record shows that after General Manager Frick was so advised he informed the union negotiators that the final company offers were withdrawn. There is a good deal of emphasis in the testimony as to the time elements here involved, and at what time the various parties arrived at the guest house on the night of September 30, as aforestated, but for the purposes here it is crystal clear that the Union had made extensive prior preparations for the strike, and it is also clear that by 10 p.m., or thereabouts, there was sufficient activity and people gathered on the road or lot for the reasonable assumption by Ed Diaz that the strike had started. This is also indicated from the admitted fact that Krick had to place two calls from the guest house to the Sunset Motel where the remainder of the employees' negotiating committee was assembled, and from the fact that by 10:15 p.m. there were 25 to 30 cars parked alongside the road leading to the plant waiting to get into the lot used as union headquarters. It appears obvious to me that the Company revoked their final contract proposals on the night of September 30 because it became readily apparent that their proposals and negotiations could not avert the strike. In addition, there is also interwoven into this allegation the contention by the General Counsel that there was a failure of the Company to reduce its final proposals to writing. While there is, no specific allegation in the complaint which alleges such conduct as indicative of bad-faith bargaining, it was, nevertheless, fully litigated before me, and I will therefore make a brief analysis. The credited evidence shows that Burger was not requested to put his final offers in writing-made on September 29 and 30-until about 3 or 3:30 p.m. on September 30. Burger replied that he did not see what good this would do as the Union had completely rejected his final offers at the negotiating session that morning, but nevertheless, agreed to put them in writing but informed the Union that it would take a day or more to do so. It appears to me that under the circumstances Burger was perfectly justified in taking this position. The Union admittedly informed Burger that his final offers were totally unsatisfactory; admittedly the Union left the impression that the Respondent's proposals were flatly rejected, and admittedly the Union never indicated that they would recommend the Respondent's proposals to anyone. Therefore, Burger had ample reasons and grounds to reasonably assume that placing his final offers in writing would be of no help, yet, in the final it The Union informed their people that it was necessary to register their willingness to return to work 689 anaylsis, he did agree to do so, but needed extra time in order to comply with the request. Furthermore, it is also admitted by the Union that most of the bargaining had been previously done on an oral basis. The Union maintains that the written company proposals were necessary in order to present them to its membership on the following Sunday. In this respect it is pointed out that in 1965 September 30 fell on Thursday, so the Union actually had a grace of 2 days before their membership meeting, and by Sunday Burger would have had sufficient time to comply. There is insufficient evidence in this record to adequately sustain the allegation that the Company withdrew its final offers without good cause and likewise, no sufficient basis to show bad faith by the Respondent's inability to have its final proposals reduced to writing within the time limitations noted above. The -matters thus far discussed are the only specific allegations in the complaint bearing directly on the 8(a)(5) aspect of this case. However, as aforestated, there is also a good deal of testimony in this record bearing on the overall conduct of the Company subsequent to the ending of the strike on October 30. While it is not entirely clear as to the exact purpose of this testimony, the Respondent's entire course of conduct must be taken into consideration, and, therefore, at this time I think it essential to briefly discuss and consider these aspects in relation to the total 8(a)(5) picture and bearings on subsequent issues and findings herein. In the first instant it is noted that on October 30 the Union and the Company agreed in writing, as aforestated, on the procedure to be followed in putting employees back to work because of the strike and pursuant thereto, in agreement with the Union, the Company then requested that striking employees register for purposes of ascertaining their availability." In accordance with company needs, as specified in the agreement, about 200 employees were returned to work. Also at the end of 6 weeks, again pursuant to the written agreement made on October 30,18 the Company furnished the Union with the names of employees who had not been recalled, and orally stated their reasons. In addition, the agreement called for a 10-day grace period following the 6- week interval, as aforestated. This record shows that about 65 employees filed notifications with the Company in the 10-day grace period, and as the Company received such notifications a departmental list was compiled and as jobs opened up the plant personnel manager would check this list to see if any person on it had qualifications to fill that particular job. Pursuant thereto, approximately 14 persons were rehired, and the Company is still operating from this list. The other written agreement between the parties made on October 30 and also coupled to the main collective-bargaining contract dealt with persons accused of engaging in violence during the strike, as previously noted herein. At a meeting on November 22 the Company supplied the Union with a list of such employees pursuant to their agreement, and admittedly explained to the Union what misconduct these individual employees had been charged with. The Union made notes on each one, and the Company maintained that the people on this list, because of evidence on their misconduct, warranted discharge. Hoyman testified that after the meeting on November 22 the Union then interviewed such employees and concluded that much of the misconduct these employees had been accused of was incorrect, and that he 18 This agreement was attached to the main collective- bargaining contract between the parties. 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD accordingly informed the Company that some of them could not be discharged . For purposes in this stage of my Decision I think it sufficient to merely note here that the Company substantially complied with both of the agreements in question . As to the recalls , the credited evidence shows that the Company did not deal individually or unilaterally with the employees except upon and after specific knowledge and authorization from the Union. The Union , beforehand , was given an opportunity to register any objections and to bargain or negotiate with the Company. It had no objections and the parties then reached the agreement , and the Company duly recognized and carried out its main responsibilities in fulfillment of this agreement. The Company also supplied the Union with the list of employees it had accused of violence and stated the individual reasons on which they based such determinations , and this is all the agreement called for. The Company maintained they had sufficient evidence on each for discharge , and the Union maintained that there were insufficient reasons on at least some of the strikers. Again , the Union was given full opportunity to bargain and negotiate over the matter after the agreement was reached and after receiving the Respondent's list and reasons. However , subsequent to their own investigation the Union merely concluded that some of the Respondent 's reasons were insufficient . I submit that upon the basis of both these agreements and'the events that followed there is insufficient evidence to adequately show that the Company was not bargaining in good faith. In other attempts to show bad faith the General Counsel also relies to some extent on his testimony that the Company insisted on a strict no-strike union liability clause while rejecting arbitration . It appears to me that this argument is largely disposed of by merely pointing out that on September 29 the Company changed its position in respect to such proposals , and Hoyman admitted the same in his own testimony . The original proposal by the Company,19 and the clause contained therein on union liability, provided that the Union would be liable to its full resources if it directly or indirectly authorized any strike, walkout, or other such activity. However, in the signed or executed contract between the parties, and on which the General Counsel also relies , the Union is given the right to strike under certain conditions and notifications following the failure to satisfactorily settle grievances , and it is also provided, in the executed contract , that if the Union does not authorize a strike, lockout , or other concerted activity, then the Union shall not be in any respect liable for such violations . The Union is held liable only for strikes and walkouts it directly or indirectly authorizes . Furthermore, in the executed contract between the parties the Company is also held liable if it directly or indirectly violates any provisions of article IX. From this record it is clear that the above changes in the Respondent 's original proposals were contemplated by the Company on September 29 and 30 when they openly announced to the Union that they were changing their former positions on these proposals. We now can see that in the final analysis the Company changed its original position and permitted the Union to strike upon the unsatisfactory settlement of a grievance, and that the two factors relied upon by the General Counsel to show bad faith-a no-strike clause coupled with no arbitration of grievances-are not combined together in the existing contract between the parties in this case, and all indications show that this was the change offered by the Company immediately prior to the strike. The General Counsel's contention that the Company adamantly rejected any change in its original positions on these proposals cannot be adequately sustained. A like determination must also be made on the General Counsel's argument that the Company remained adamant with respect to checkoff clause. Hoyman even admitted that at the meeting on September 29 the Company changed its position on checkoffs, and the evidence shows that the Company then suggested or indicated the strong possibility of including a voluntary and revocable checkoff clause. Thus, it can be readily seen that the Company did make a significant concession from its original position whereby they had refused any such proposal, and it cannot be successfully contended that the Company entered into the negotiations with a predetermined resolve not to budge from its initial positions. Based upon the 8(a)(5) allegations and other testimony bearing and litigated in relation thereto, I have found insufficient evidence to sustain the General Counsel's contention that the Company did not bargain in good faith. However, before any final dismissal of such allegations can be made there remains for consideration the impact and effect of my 8(a)(1) findings, as aforestated, upon the 8(a)(5) aspect of this case wherein various foremen or supervisors committed serious violations of Section 8(a)(1), and on which the General Counsel relies in his presentation of the Respondent's total conduct. I can find no reliable evidence that these relatively minor supervisors, involved in the 8(a)(1) violations, were acting at the instigation or with the knowledge or authority of responsible officials in the Company, and the fact that Burger, Cox, and others on the company negotiating team were bargaining in good faith with the Union at the conference table places such violations on a minor premise as relating to the overall and total conduct. The threat to move the Albemarle plant has a restricted impact in that by July of 1964 the Company had definite and known plans to build a new plant in McDowell County, North Carolina, and upon its completion in March and April 1966, some of the machinery and operations from the Albemarle plant were moved to the new plant in accordance with the expansion plans formulated long before. Lynwood Presson even admitted in his testimony that he had heard from outside sources about the Company building a new automotive division plant. It is noted also that several instances of interrogation centered around questions by supervisors as to how the negotiations were proceeding. Admittedly, none of the foremen making such inquiries were in the Respondent's negotiating group, had no knowledge of the meetings, and it appears to me that such questions were merely an instant and natural exercise of curiosity. The General Counsel also offered a few instances of background testimony to shed light on the violations within the 10(b) period, and in accordance therewith Walter Thompson testified that in 1964 a supervisor had informed him that he would not be with the Company much longer. On cross-examination Thompson then admitted that on the next day he was told by the same supervisor that he should have known the Company would not fire him since he had been with them 8 to 10 years, but that he must work properly. Thompson also testified that when he was informed that the Company would not give the employees a contract he replied, "Well, I'll wait to see about that when Mr. Burger says so."20 It is obvious from 19 See G C Exh 36 returned to his same job He was also on the employees' 20 Thompson was one of the stokers, and after the stoke was negotiating committee COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 691 this record that the employees did not consider the remarks by these minor supervisors as final or controlling and were looking to the officials in the Respondent's hierarchy. Elmer Talbert stated that when he was asked whether or not the employees would strike, he then asked Foreman Mason if he was afraid of his (Talbert's job) being left unattended, and admitted that Mason then stated, "Yes, that's the point that I'm getting at." In the final analysis, Tony Frick admitted that Foreman Weatherby never put any pressure on him, nor did he ever directly inform him that he, should or must send in a letter to the Union requesting the return of his authorization card. Frick testified that a week or so later he told Weatherby that he had not sent the letter in as yet. It appears to me that this is another good example where employees exercised their own discretion and paid little or no attention to their immediate boss in matters of this kind. Jim Burriss admitted that when Foreman Almond told him that the employees were not going to get any money during the negotiations he knew that Almond was not in the Respondent's negotiating group and that Almond said nothing as to whether he had received such information. When Gaye Efird was applying for a job she told Personnel Manager Cox, in reply to his question, that she was already a member of the Union, but, nevertheless, Cox then hired her. Certainly the technical violation in this instant was also considerably diluted by the fact that a known union member was employed by the Company about 3 days prior to the strike. When Supervisor Treadway told Brenda Doby in early August (background) that the Company was not going to give the Union a contract, she inquired where he had acquired such information, and Treadway then walked off. This again shows or indicates that employees were in no way convinced by the statements of minor supervisors who they were in daily contact with. Several of the employees (Floyd Efird, Jim Morgan, and Robert Litaker), who were told that they would have to go out of Stanley County to secure jobs because of their activity for the Union, were reinstated by the Company at the Albemarle plant in Stanley County following the termination of the strike. Carl Efird admitted that when he was contacted during the strike the Company was having trouble with the tubes in the plant boilers, and they were asking him to do the Company a favor by returning and to help out in this particular situation since he had considerable past experience in such work. Unless I were to hold, contrary to precedent, that the commission of 8(a)(1) unfair labor practices by an employer automatically precludes the existence of a good faith in bargaining, I do not believe that a finding of bad faith is justified on the total facts of this case. The determination of an employer's good or bad faith depends on the particular facts and circumstances in each case. For the reasons given here-upon my observations of the witnesses and their demeanor, and my feelings in the case based upon the record as a whole-I find that neither separately nor collectively do the 8(a)(l) unfair labor practices found evidence a plan or a campaign upon which it can be successfully concluded that the Company was bargaining in bad faith under all the circumstances here. The only unlawful acts were committed by relatively minor supervisors, and there is no evidence whatsoever that such were made pursuant to any instructions or authority from the Respondent's hierarchy. The Respondent's good faith in bargaining established after many months at the conference table must stand in this case, and its unfair labor practices away from the table were sufficiently separated and understood so that they do not in themselves destroy or override the good bargaining between the parties. The total picture will not so warrant nor does it show a pattern of behavior which directly obstructed or inhibited the actual process of discussion which reflected a cast of mind against reaching a contract. The complaint alleges that the strike was caused an prolonged by the unfair labor practices of the Respondent. The General Counsel contends that Section 8(a)(3) was violated by failing and refusing to offer immediate and full reinstatement to all strikers. The Company would deem the strike economic in nature. I find that the strike against the Respondent was called and waged to compel capitulation to the Union's economic demands, and that it remained an economic strike. This record clearly indicates that the main stumbling block between the parties was the differences in their economic proposals. As shown herein the Company made various monetary offers throughout the negotiations, and on September 29 and 30 favorably revised their economic measures . Hoyman even admitted that on the night of September 30 at the guest house he informed the Company that a settlement between them would "take money." After leaving the guest house, Charles Krick admittedly informed the gathered employees at the nearby lot that the Company had refused to give the Union their final proposals in writing, and stated that this was the beginning of the strike. It is abundantly clear that the strike was planned and resulted because of the feeling on part of the employees' negotiating committee that the Company had refused to bargain in good faith. Since I have found that the Respondent did bargain in good faith the strike at its outset cannot be deemed an unfair labor practice strike nor was it ever converted into such. For numerous reasons given herein I also find there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between the strike and the 8(a)(1) violations. Overwhelming evidence shows that the bargaining issue was the sole and controlling element in calling the strike. Hoyman testified- that on October 30 the membership approved the agreement by a vote, and stated that the Company was then advised by telegram that the strike was over. As detailed earlier herein the parties also immediately reached a written agreement as to how the employees would be returned to their jobs (G.C. Exh. 43), and such agreement contained definite steps to be followed and with the specific provision that the Company would put people back to work "according to its needs and their qualifications." At this point it appears to me that even the Union acknowledged that the strike was an economic one. By the agreement the Union gave their consent to return the strikers pursuant to the written conditions between the parties, and most certainly there is lacking any unconditional offer to return them. There is no credited evidence in this record to the contrary, and the personal applications by the strikers at the plant on November 1, 2, and 3 with admitted instructions from the Union that it was necessary for the strikers to register their willingness to return, is further indicative of the Union's consent to meet the conditional requirements of reinstatement which it had previously agreed to on September 30. Had the Union or its negotiators and advisors entertained any thoughts at this time that the 692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD strike was an unfair labor practice one they would have demanded full and unconditional reinstatement as a group.21 An employer's lawful right during a strike to operate his business by hiring employees to replace economic strikers is not challengable.22 If economic strikers were replaced before their application to return, and if the Company rehired on the basis of the agreements reached herein, actually preferential hiring list, then the Respondent's refusal to take back certain strikers was justified. There is no contention or evidence that the agreements in question were in any way discriminatory on their face. Recalls were to be based on company needs, and qualifications for the particular jobs unfilled. Pursuant to the above about 200 employees were returned, and at the end of the 6-week period, in accordance to the agreement, the Company furnished the Union with a list of about 104 employees who had not been returned, and at a meeting with the Union in December explained that there was no work available for these employees 23 A further list was also prepared in recognition of applications received during the 10-day grace period also provided for in the agreement, and as jobs opened up this list is checked and 14 employees had thus far been rehired from it, out of approximately 65 who signed up. Furthermore, this record shows that pursuant to the above, striker James Isenhour was offered reinstatement in April 1966, and at least three strikers on the employees' negotiating committee were called back. Also relevant in this discussion are the 40 strikers who were not recalled because of accused violence during the strike, and some of the other strikers failed to sign up during the 10-day grace period so they are not eligible for recall by the terms of the agreement. The General Counsel attempted to show that employee Polly Mason was not recalled although she had signed up and listed the number of jobs she could perform. It appears, however, that Mason filed a grievance which was denied, and that the employee hired had experience in the particular job to be filled. The General Counsel also tried to show that another employee was hired while striker James Isenhour was still out. The record shows that Isenhour was not qualified for the particular job open and that he so informed Paul Cox. There is insufficient evidence to show that the Company delayed or refused in the reinstatement of returning economic strikers or that it violated the conditional agreements of their recalls. At the hearing before me the General Counsel amended the complaint, and added a separate and new 8(a)(5) allegation which reads as follows: Commencing on or about August 29, 1966, and continuing to date Respondent did refuse to recognize and bargain with the Union notwithstanding that the Union was at the time the duly designated exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees as described in paragraph 6. This record shows that on August 29, 1966, both the Union and the Company exchanged correspondence relating to the termination of the existing contract (G.C. Exhs. 30 and 31). The Union first notified the Company 2' On November 15 the Union notified the Company by letter that in consideration of the agreements reached they were waiving and withdrawing all grievances and unfair labor practice charges heretofore filed against the Company, and that the same would not be renewed or reinstituted in any way . The Union also stated that in giving the Company such assurances, they would not waive the right to claim that the strike was an unfair labor that pursuant to the existing contract they were giving a 60-day notice of their intention to terminate the contract upon its expiration date and desired to negotiate for improvements of the contract. The Company on the same date then notified the Union that in accordance with the contract they were giving notice of termination at the expiration of the contract-November 1, 1966. The Company further informed the Union that all circumstances indicated that a great majority of employees at the Albemarle plant no longer desired to be represented by the Union, and that, therefore, the Company would not be able to enter into negotiations for a new contract, but would continue to deal with the Union under the terms of the existing contract until its expiration. It has been well established by the Board and the courts that there is an irrebuttable presumption that a union- majority status continues for 1 year from the date of certification, but that after the year the majority status is normally rebuttable by an affirmative showing that the Union no longer commands a majority status. The General Counsel maintains that the Respondent offered no probative evidence to rebut the presumption of continuing majority status of the Union. Initially, it is clear to me that the 1-year doctrine of an irrebuttable presumption of union majority is not a bar to the Respondent, nor is it in issue here. The Union was certified on May 3, 1965, and the company letter to the Union in August 1966 specifically stated that the Company would continue to recognize and deal with the Union and fulfill the terms and provisions of the existing contract in every way until the time of its expiration-November 1, 1966. As noted, the certification year expired on May 3, 1966. There is no contention by the General Counsel otherwise, and it is most obvious that the Respondent's position is only aimed at the lack of majority upon the Union's request for renegotiations. Since the 1-year bar is not available to the General Counsel, the basic question for determination is whether or not the Company made a sufficient showing that the Union no longer retained a majority status. I find that it did. Testimony in this record indicates that the Union had not set up a shop committee until September 1966. The Union has shop stewards in only 2 departments out of 10 to 15 departments in the plant, few grievances were filed, there were also few union meetings with small turnouts, and also reports from employees in the bargaining unit that there were no dues being paid to the Union. While some of the circumstances relied on may be somewhat sketchy, it must be remembered that there was also a considerable loss of union members through the many replacement workers hired during the strike. Accordingly, the Company had sufficient evidence upon which it could base a reasonable cause to believe that the Union had lost its majority status24 In accordance with my entire findings and discussions herein, I hereby dismiss all of the 8(a)(5) allegations in the complaint and the 8(a)(3) allegations. practice stoke if they "hereafter" see fit to do so. G 1. N.xh 44. 22 G C Exh. 54 shows about 170 employees hired during the stoke. 23 Some departments in the plant are now only working 4 days a week 24 Titan Metal Manufacturing Co., 135 NLRB 196 COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 693 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Since I have found that the Respondent interfered with, restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend that they shall cease and desist from such activity and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall also recommend that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, Imake the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The Respondent has not refused to bargain with the Union within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publications.] 299-352 0-70-45