West Penn Hat & Cap Corp.

WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION West Penn Hat & Cap Corporation and United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO and Grievance Committee. Case 6-CA-3688. June 19,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On January 17, 1967, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his Decision in the above- entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a brief in support thereof and in answer to the Respondent's exceptions. The Respondent then filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's cross-exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the briefs, exceptions and cross-exceptions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Att, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, West Penn Hat & Cap Corporation, Arnold, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 165 NLRB No. 66 ' In rejecting the Respondent 's defense that the Union's request for recognition was premature in view of a claimed future expansion in operations, the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent President Baran's self-serving "predictions of expansion were highly speculative , [and] without sound business or evidentiary basis " The General Counsel has excepted, however, to the Trial Examiner's failure specifically to find that on July 19, 1966, when the Union made its demand for recognition , the 48 employees then in the unit constituted a substantial and representative complement We note that at the time of the hearing on November 2, 1966, there were 85 543 employees in the unit, and that the number of job classifications was the same then as on July 19, 1966 In General Extrusion Company, Inc, 121 NLRB 1165, 1167, the Board said that "a contract will bar an election only if at least 30 percent of the complement employed at the time of the hearing had been employed at the time the contract was executed, and 50 percent of the job classifications in existence at the time of the hearing were in existence at the time the contract was executed " Under the General Extrusion rule, if the parties here had entered into a contract on July 19, this contract would have barred a later filed petition. In view of the foregoing , and the highly speculative nature of the predicted expansion here, we find and conclude that the Union's demand for recognition was made at a time when the Respondent employed a substantial and representative complement of employees Cf Meramec Mining Company, 134 NLRB 1675, 1679-80, General Electric Company, 81 NLRB 654, 655-656 Accordingly, we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it refused to recognize and bargain with the Union TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE A. DOWNING, Trial Examiner: This proceeding brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 2, 3, and 4, 1966,' pursuant to due notice. The complaint which was issued on August 31, on charges dated July 22 and August 2, alleged in substance that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the Act by (1) various specified acts of interference, restraint, and coercion; (2) by dominating and by rendering unlawful assistance to the Grievance Committee, a labor organization; and (3) by refusing to bargain with the Charging Union as the majority representative of its employees in an appropriate unit on and after July 19. Respondent answered, denying the unfair labor practices as alleged. The General Counsel's motion to correct the record, filed with his brief, being unopposed, is hereby granted. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS; THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED I conclude and find on facts alleged in the complaint and admitted by answer that Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business at Arnold, Pennsylvania, and a plant at New Kensington, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of hats and caps, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act (through the purchase and receipt from extrastate points and annually of goods valued in excess of $50,000) and that the Charging Union (Hatters and Union herein) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.2 All events herein occurred in 1966 Findings concerning the status of the Grievance Committee as a labor organization are made in section C, infra 165 NLRB No. 77 544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IT. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction and Issues Respondent began operations at its New Kensington plant around April 6, and on May 18, Harry Fromkin, International representative of the Union, appeared and informed Respondent's President Max Baran that Hatters intended to organize the plant. A formal organizing campaign was begun in early June under the leadership of Carmen Lucia, an International vice president, who was assisted by Norman Schneider, and on July 19 they made a demand for recognition, claiming majority status. The demand was refused, and on July 22 a further demand was made. The General Counsel offered evidence that, during and after the course of the organizational campaign, Respondent engaged in a variety of unfair labor practices, such as surveillance and suggestion of surveillance, interrogations, and the promising and granting of benefits. Evidence was also offered that Respondent formed, dominated, and assisted the Grievance Committee, with which it dealt as the representative of the employees. Respondent rested its defense mainly on the testimony of President Max Baran, though Baran made no denial of some of the statements and conduct which were attributed to him by the General Counsel's witnesses. Respondent offered no denial of evidence concerning the conduct of Supervisor Sandra Evans. The chief issues herein involve various questions surrounding the refusal to bargain. Respondent attacks the majority showing of the Union and contends that in any case the evidence supports its claim of good-faith doubt of majority. Respondent also raises issues concerning the appropriate unit, claiming that (1) employees classified by it as "furriers" should be excluded, and (2) because the unit was an expanding one, the Union's request for recognition was premature. B. The Oigantztng Campaign The first contact between the Union and Respondent was made on May 18, when Harry Fromkin, an International representative, called on Respondent's President Max Baran in company with Joseph Ivanusic, staff representative of United Steelworkers, and informed Baran that Hatters intended to organize the plant. Fromkin testified that Baran became agitated and abusive, and Ivanusic agreed that there was "a bit of turmoil" and "a lot of name calling." When Fromkin introduced Ivanusic as the representative of Steelworkers, Baran responded that Steelworkers could have the shop anytime they wanted it but that Hatters would never get the shop and would never get him to sit down and sign a contract because the Union had mistreated Baran's father in New York. Baran also stated that he was in contact with District 50 of United Mine Workers and was ready to sign with any union except Hatters. ' Baran's testimony on direct examination was in accord that the first demand for recognition after May 18 was made by Lucia and Schneider on July 19, but he claimed on cross-examination that they also demanded recognition during the June meeting and testified that in refusing recognition he referred to the strike at his father's plant in New York City and stated that if the Union would do something for his father's plant, he would be willing to sit down with Lucia and Schneider Respondent attempts to ride in both directions with Baran, for Ivanusic testified that he informed Baran that when Steelworkers learned that Hatters was interested in organizing Respondent's plant, it withdrew, and that on a later occasion, on May 27, he informed Baran again that Steelworkers was not interested. Baran testified, and Fromkin denied, that Fromkin made a demand for recognition, though not claiming a majority, but Ivanusic was unable to recall whether Fromkin made such a demand. Fromkin remained in the area for approximately 10 days after May 18, visiting employees, and was followed by Carmen Lucia, who arrived on May 31. She was joined on June 7 by Norman Schneider, who assisted her intermittently until early August. On or about June 9, Lucia and Schneider called on Baran and informed him that the organizing campaign was underway and they wanted to make it as friendly as possible. Baran repeated his antagonism to the Union because of its treatment of his father and referred to the local in New York City as a "bunch of animals." Baran also stated that Steelworkers and Amalgamated Clothing Workers had indicated an interest in organizing the plant and that he had told them to come in. Lucia responded that when the other unions heard that Hatters had begun its campaign, they were no longer interested. Baran replied that there were still other unions who might be interested and without his cooperation it would be impossible for Lucia and Schneider to reach the girls. A few authorization cards had been obtained from employees prior to that meeting, and thereafter Lucia and Schneider continued their efforts through July 18, mainly through personal contacts with employees, with the assistance of Sylvia Romano as in-plant solicitor. On July 19 Lucia and Schneider made both oral and written demands for recognition3 and followed with a second written demand on July 22 as more fully set forth in section D, infra, which covers the matters relating more directly to the refusal-to-bargain issues. All other evidence concerning Respondent's conduct as it occurred both during and after the organizational campaign is summarized in section C, next to follow. C. Respondent's Countering Conduct Barbara Wright testified, without denial, that around mid-June Supervisor Sandra Evans discussed with her the possibility of the Steelworkers Union coming into the plant, informed her it was a better union than Hatters and would give the employees more benefits, and requested Wright to talk with the girls about not signing cards for Hatters. Evans also asked whether anyone from Hatters had visited Wright and told her that if they did so, she should not sign a card for them because Hatters was not the union which was wanted in the plant. Evans also asked Wright to inquire of several of the girls whether they had already signed cards for Hatters. Shortly before July 4, Baran called the employees together after working hours and informed them, it argues at one point in its brief that the Union made no demand for recognition prior to the end of June and at another point that it demanded recognition both in mid-May and mid-June In any event, the conflict here (as with Fromkin on May 18) concerns an immaterial issue, for it goes only to the matter of Respondent's knowledge that an organizing campaign was underway , a point on which there is no doubt . It does not bear substantially on the issue of good-faith doubt as will appear from the ensuing findings WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION according to cumulative and credited testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses, that he knew a union was contacting them; that the union was not the one they wanted; that while he had not paid them for Memorial Day, he would pay them for the Fourth of July and other legal holidays; that he would also procure hospitalization benefits for them; and that when certain production goals were reached, he would put the employees on a piecework plan which would benefit them through increased earnings. Baran's testimony was not in substantial conflict. He testified, however, that his offers were not made for the purpose of preventing the unionization of the employees, but were pursuant to a promise he made in December 1965 to representatives of a community development group that he would give his employees fringe benefits and paid holidays as soon as he was financially able to do so. Donald Beck, a community representative, corroborated the latter testimony. Baran's further claim that Respondent's financial condition had improved sufficiently to warrant the granting of benefits was disproved, however, by Schneider's testimony, not denied by Baran, that on one occasion when Schneider and Lucia were distributing leaflets, Baran told them of his financial difficulties, stated that he needed money for the payroll, and inquired whether he could borrow money from the Union. Baran acted promptly to make good on his promises, paying the employees for July 4, and later for Labor Day. Furthermore, he immediately contacted the office of the Blue Cross hospitalization group and requested that a representative call upon him, though the actual visit was not made until July 14. On that date Francis Stewart met with Baran, who explained that union organizational activities were in progress and a meeting was to be held that evening, and inquired how quickly Stewart could establish the hospitalization program. Upon being informed that it would be possible to have a group start by August 1, if necessary applications were received, Baran assembled the employees and had Stewart explain the program and pass out application forms. The plan was actually put into effect on August 1, with Respondent paying the individual rate for each employee, while the employee pays for any dependents included in the plan. In the meantime Lucia and Schneider passed out union leaflets from time to time in front of the plant. Lucia and employee Elizabeth French testified that on such occasions Baran stood near the exit door (where he normally did not stand) as the employees left the plant. French testified that on one occasion when she was working overtime, Mrs. Baran came in and reported that the "union people" were outside. Baran thereupon directed French to leave by the side door. Lucia testified that when she was passing out leaflets in July, Baran came out and engaged her in a lengthy conversation. When Lucia suggested he go inside for fear the girls might not take the leaflets in his presence, Baran asked why she did not come in. When Lucia inquired if she could pass out the leaflets inside the plant, Baran replied that she could not but that he wanted to get her away from there so that she The evidence is in conflict as to how many times Baran actually drove past the hall and whether he did so after talking with Lucia Baran admitted that he circled the block once That course would have taken him twice past the hall, as it was located on the corner which Baran first approached Since the entire evidence established , as hereinafter found , that Baran was 545 could not pass them out. Lucia later noticed that Baran was looking out through the venetian blinds to see whether anyone took a leaflet. The first formal meeting, scheduled for July 14, was announced in a leaflet distribution on July 11. Linda Cooper testified that prior to that meeting, Supervisor Sandra Evans questioned her about whether she was going to attend the meeting. Shortly before the meeting began on July 14, Baran was seen by some of the employees to drive past the union hall, which was not located on any normal route which Baran would follow in going to or from the plant or his home. When Lucia was informed of the fact, she went out, waved Baran down, and talked with him.4 Lucia testified that though the conversation proceeded on a friendly basis (Baran's wife and child were in the car with him), she accused him of driving around the hall for the purpose of spying on the girls and stated that the Board would interpret his conduct as surveillance. Baran claimed he "just happened" to pass. Lucia disputed that claim of coincidence because of his repeated passing and also charged Baran with having timed the visit of the Blue Cross representative that day so as to occur just before the union meeting. Baran stated he had no choice but to do so and that, "In view of all your activities, I have to call him in." Lucia also referred to rumors which Evans was spreading that employees who joined the Union or who went to the meeting would be fired and suggested that Baran instruct Evans not to spread such rumors. Lucia continued that foreladies, foremen, and executives were not admitted to membership and that the Union wanted only the production and maintenance workers. Baran disclaimed knowledge of Evans' alleged conduct but agreed to speak to her as requested. The conversation ended on a friendly note, with Lucia playing with the child. Baran admitted that he intentionally drove around the block, knowing that a union meeting was scheduled, and that he did so because he was "just curious." He admitted also that Lucia charged him with timing the Blue Cross meeting with the union meeting and that he replied that it was a coincidence. (Stewart's testimony supported that claim.) Lucia told him that he was not supposed to be at the hall and he stated he would leave. However, Lucia began playing with the child and talking with his wife and the entire conversation lasted some 5 or 10 minutes. To the extent that material conflicts exist between the respective accounts of Lucia and Baran, I credit the former, as I do also where other material conflicts occurred. Baran testified further that Evans informed him before the union meeting that she was going to attend it but that he directed her not to do so because, "They wouldn't let a supervisor enter the hall." The evidence established, however, that despite Baran's direction, Evans also went to the meeting, arriving shortly after Baran left, and that she was informed that she could not come in because supervisors were not eligible. Respondent's "curiosity" concerning organizational activities did not end with the visits of Evans and Baran to intentionally engaged in surveillance , it is immaterial how many times he circled the block I find , however, on the entire evidence that he went around more than once, for I credit the testimony of the General Counsel 's witnesses that he drove past the hall again after talking to Lucia 546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the union hall. Mary Grace DeAugustine (whom Baran admitted seeing at the meeting) testified that on the following morning as she punched in at the timeclock, Baran inquired, "How many attended the meeting?" DeAugustine replied, "Enough," and walked away. Sylvia Romano testified that after she was made a supervisor on July 19 Lucia passed out a leaflet which stated that the Union had a majority. Baran procured a copy of the leaflet, brought it over to Romano and Evans, and commented to Evans that he knew the Union did not have a majority because a lot of the people there were for him. Baran told Romano that she did not have to answer any of his questions but could do so if she wished to, and referring to his visit to the union meeting, stated that he saw six there. Romano did not reply, and Evans stated that she saw eight. Romano testified further that on July 21, after Baran had received a further letter from the Union listing the names of eight employees, Baran again referred to the union meeting and stated that he knew there were at least eight there because, "I saw six myself and Sandy said there were eight." Baran inquired if there were more, and when Romano did not answer him, he inquired if there were less. Romano told him she did not know. In the meantime Baran distributed among the employees on July 18 a notice dated July 21, which stated that management had found that a grievance committee was the best way to solve most differences and problems between the employees and management and they should choose among themselves whoever would be best qualified to bring their grievances to the attention of management. Attached was a ballot form, withh spaces provided for write-in votes for a chairman and two assistant chairmen, and following that, a statement that the committee would be in effect from August 1 to November 1, 1966. Romano testified that either on July 18 or 19 a ballot box was placed on top of the timeclock and thereafter Baran, who had given her a copy of the notice, approached her and stated, "Miss Lucia isn't going to like this, is she?" In a later conversation the same day when Romano was punching out her timecard, Baran shook the ballot box and, not hearing anything, stated, "I don't understand. Don't these girls know what they want? Can't they understand their own company union can help them?" When Romano commented that she thought a company union was illegal, Baran replied, "No, it isn't." Elizabeth French testified that on Tuesday (July 19), just before she left the plant, Baran shook the ballot box and commented that, "You girls don't know what you want." The balloting ended on July 21, and on the following day Romano saw Baran counting the ballots in his office. When Romano asked who won, Baran told her and threw the ballots (nor more than 8 or 10 in number) into the wastepaper basket. Thereafter, Romano saw Baran post on the bulletin board the names of those who had been elected. Romano testified further that last August, while she was still a supervisor, Baran asked her if she would start a petition that the girls did not want the Hatters Union and that they wanted their own union or some other one altogether. When Romano refused, Baran directed her to ask Mary Grace DeAugustme and Beatrice Enciso if they would start the petition. Romano informed Enciso of Baran's request, and Enciso testified that thereafter Baran asked her in Romano's presence if she would pass around a petition among the girls saying that they were against the Union and did not want a union in the shop. When Enciso refused, Baran asked if she were afraid of Miss Lucia, and told Enciso she need not be afraid because Lucia was "only a foreigner in this town." Aside from evidence relating to the refusal to bargain issues, set forth in section D, infra, there remains the following evidence concerning the Grievance Committee and the manner in which it functioned: On September 2, Respondent filed with the Board its RM petition in Case 6-RM-3065 in which it listed the Grievance Committee, along with the Hatters Union, as an organization which claimed recognition and as known to have a representative interest in the employees in the unit On November 1 (the day before the hearing opened), Baran and Shireen Adams, a supervisor acting at Baran's direction, distributed among the employees a second notice of election to the Grievance Committee which bore the date October 12, together with a ballot in the same form as before and a statement that the committee would be in effect from November 2 to January 2, 1967. There was no dispute concerning the manner in which the committee functioned since July 21, and none concerning the nature of its dealings with Baran. The committee has no constitution or bylaws, no treasury, no secretary, and it keeps no records of its meetings or proceedings. There are no membership requirements and the committee makes no use of any materials, such as paper, pens, or ink. It deals only with Baran, not with any lesser supervisors. Its only meetings are its regular weekly ones with Baran in his office, after working hours, at which they discuss with him any employee problems, any suggestions which may have been put in the suggestion box, and any matters which Baran wishes them to take up with the employees. Pursuant to one suggestion in the box, the committee had the box removed from its location near Baran's office, and pursuant to another one, it procured smoking trays for the girls restroom. The committee also participated in the processing of two disciplinary matters. In one case the employee had taken directly to Baran the matter of a reprimand from Evans about talking on the job. Baran called the committee in and after discussing the matter with Baran and the employee, the committee told the employee she was not supposed to talk while at her machine and that she should "keep it down." The other matter involved one Nancy Stone, concerning whom Baran complained to the committee about excessive absenteeism. The committee discussed the matter with Baran, decided that it would have nothing to do with her discharge, but it would suggest to Stone that she not be absent so often. In addition to the foregoing, Cindy Franczak testified that about a week before the hearing, Baran informed her that he had submitted to the committee a grievance on her behalf to the effect that because of Franczak's high production, it would benefit Franczak and the entire plant to be put on piecework. Franczak was not called to any meeting of the committee concerning the matter and was without knowledge as to the manner in which Baran may have presented the matter to it. ' The Regional Director dismissed that petition on September 5 because of the pendency of the present case, and on October 4 the Board denied Respondent 's appeal from that dismissal WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION CONCLUDING FINDINGS 1. Interference, restraint, and coercion It was plain from the time of the Union's first contact in May that Baran had a deep-seated antagonism to the Hatters Union, that he preferred any other union to it, that he intended to keep it from organizing the employees, and that he felt he was capable of doing so. Indeed, Baran did not bother to deny testimony which attributed to him specific utterances to the foregoing effect. Respondent's subsequent conduct as summarized above was manifestly directed to achievement of its end, i.e., preventing Hatters from organizing the employees. As early as mid-June and shortly after Baran was notified that the Union had started its formal organizational campaign, Supervisor Evans interrogated Wright about her knowledge of Hatters activities, asked her not to sign a card for it, and to ascertain whether other girls had done so. Also despite two prior specific disclaimers of interest by Steelworkers, Evans sought to invoke Wright's interest in that union as the representative of the employees. Baran, though less explicit, pursued the same theme in his meeting with the employees in late June by telling them that he was aware that a union was contacting them but that it was not the one they wanted. Baran's denial that his promises of benefits were not for the purpose of preventing unionization were refuted by that statement, by his earlier utterances to Lucia, Schneider, and Fromkin, by his explanation to Stewart concerning the need for speed in putting the hospitalization program into effect, and by his statement to Lucia at the union hall that the organizational activities had forced him to bring in Stewart. Baran also took advantage of his opportunities to engage in surveillance of the organizational activities outside the plant. Indeed by placing himself at the exit door (not his normal station ), he was able at least to effectively create the impression of surveillance and to discourage employees from taking leaflets while he was watching. That such was his intention was further demonstrated by his direction to Elizabeth French to leave by a side door so as to avoid Lucia, who was passing out leaflets at the normal exit. Furthermore, when opportunities for surveillance were not immediately available, Baran sought them out as established by his visit to the union hall and his repeated driving around the block. That trip had been preceeded by Evans' interrogation of an employee as to her intention to attend and was followed by Baran's interrogation of DeAugustine concerning the number at the meeting and by his repeated attempts to interrogate Romano about the meeting after the latter became a supervisor. Finally in late August, despite the pendency of the charges herein, Baran sought to inspire the circulation of an employee petition aimed at disavowing Hatters and, both directly and through his supervisors, solicited the assistance of employees for that purpose. 6 The latter finding is not based on any interrogation of Romano after she was made a supervisor on July 19, though that evidence is directly relevant on the point that Baran and Evans intentionally engaged in surveillance of the union meeting 7 Though the complaint contained no specific allegation concerning that conduct , it was fully litigated at the hearing and was fully established by the mutually corroborative testimony of Enciso and Romano, the latter of whom was acting as Respondent 's supervisor and agent at the time the conduct was engaged in 547 I conclude and find in the light of the foregoing that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by the following conduct: 1. The interrogation of employees by Evans and Baran concerning the union activities and concerning attendance at union meetings.t' 2. Evans' solicitation of Wright to ascertain the union membership of other employees. 3. The surveillance by Baran and Evans of the union meeting on July 14, and Baran's conduct in engaging in surveillance of union activities outside the plant and in creating the impression of surveillance. 4. The promising and the granting of employee benefits for the purpose of interfering with and restraining the organizational campaign. 5. The solicitation of employee assistance to circulate a petition to disavow the Union. Big Ben Department Stores Inc., 160 NLRB 1925.7 2. Assistance and domination The evidence surrounding the creation and functioning of the Grievance Committee plainly established in its entirety that the committee was an "organization"; Baran was its sole inspiration and was solely responsible for its creation; he alone determined the form and structure of the committee, the method of election, and the term of office; it constituted the forming of a "company union" among the --mplc lees (so explicitly acknowledged to Romano); it was a device by which he hoped to avoid recognizing Hatters; and he specifically recognized its claim of representative interest among the employees (as in his RM petition). The record is devoid of any indicia of employee control save for the limited, minority participation of employees in the first election, all details of which were prescribed and handled by Baran, including fixing the term of office. Whether the second election was actually held is not shown by the evidence, but it was plain again that all the arrangements were made by Baran, who this time chose to fix the term of office at 2 months rather than 3. Thus the committee existed solely as a creature which Baran conceived, and it functioned without membership and without assets, being wholly dependent for subsistence on the support which Baran gave it. It was also plain from the evidence that the committee dealt with Baran and he dealt with it concerning employee grievances and other matters involving working conditions. I therefore conclude and find that the Grievance Committee was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and that Respondent dominated it, interfered with its formation and administration, and contributed assistance and support to it. By such conduct Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 122 NLRB 13 8 There was, on the other hand, no evidence which supports a complaint allegation that Evans made threats concerning the closing of the plant " Since I am finding derivatively a violation of Section 8(a)(1) resulting from unlawful conduct directly proscribed by Section 8(a)(2), I do not consider it necessary to find a further specific violation of the former section through Baran's conduct in seeking to induce employee participation in the election as testified to by Romano and French 548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD D. The Refusal to Bargain 1. The unit issues a. The furriers Respondent's RM petition, filed on September 2, though specifying a production and maintenance unit, sought the exclusion of "furriers," a term which under the testimony of Beatrice Ann Enciso, Baran first applied to the operation near the end of August. Though considerable time was devoted at the hearing to the issue whether the furriers belong in the unit, Respondent's brief not only omits argument but fails to state a position on the issue. Though presumably it has abandoned its contention, I shall summarize briefly the more important factors, established by the credited testimony of Romano and Enciso which require the finding, here made, that the furriers belonged in the unit of production and maintenance employees in which the Union sought representation. The furriers were an intergal part of Respondent's production line and were located geographically in the center of the production area. Respondent's operations consisted of cutting pieces of cloth and leather into prescribed shapes and, through various separate operations, sewing them together to form a trooper's cap. The job clssifications involved were as follows: (1) lining makers, (2) cover makers, (3) sweat sewers, (4) furriers, (5) setup girls on bands, (6) setup girls on linings, (7) front makers, (8) finishers, (9) blockers, and (10) packers. The exterior of the cap is leather and the leather visor and ear covering are covered with a fake fur called "plush." The furriers sew the plush onto the leather while the other production employees are engaged in cutting the material, sewing together the leather pieces that form the crown of the cap, the cloth pieces that form the lining, sewing the lining into the crown, sewing the ear covering and visor to the crown, and sizing and packing the final product. The furriers receive the same wages and fringe benefits as the other production employees, have the same supervision, and work the same hours. The machines which they operate differ from the other sewing machines only in that they are operated by a pedal and have a small spindle. There is no formal training or apprenticeship program within the plant and new employees are hired without prior training to fill any vacancies in the position of furriers. Indeed, the degree of extra skill required of a furrier is minimal , for Romano testified she learned the operation in about a half an hour and Enciso testified she achieved a high degree of skill by working at the job for about 2 months. I therefore conclude and find that the work done by the furriers cannot be considered as craft work and that the furriers do not qualify as craftsmen within the purview of Board holdings. Furthermore, since it was stipulated that no other union is seeking to represent the furriers separately, they are properly to be included in a production and maintenance unit even assuming arguendo that they are craft employees. Finally, it is to be noted that aside from the question whether they are craftsmen, the furriers share a community of interest with the other employees in the plant and are thus appropriately to be included in the production and maintenance unit.' b. The expanding unit issue Further defending its refusal to bargain, Respondent contends that the Union's request for recognition was premature, in view of the expanding nature of its operations. It argues that the request was made shortly after the plant began production, at a time when there was considerable turnover as Respondent attempted to staff the plant with competent employees, and before there was a substantial and representative work force employed. It seeks to justify its own filing of an RM petition a few weeks later on the ground that by then it had hired sufficient additional employees to make the work force truly substantial and representative of the ultimate force which Respondent anticipated. Respondent's contention concerning the expanding unit is based almost entirely on Baran's self-serving, undocumented testimony in which he sought to forecast a projected expansion of the plant. His testimony may be summarized as follows: Plant operations began on April 6 and the first trooper's cap came off the production line on April 27. By May production was fully established, and by that time all 10 job classifications necessary for production had been established. Baran testified he "expected" to employ 100 employees by the end of 1966, "expected" to employ up to 150 by the end of April 1967, and "anticipated" a peak of 200 employees by the end of 1967. Baran proposed to finance the expected expansions solely through the revenues of the business, though at the same time disclaiming that profits had necessarily increased. ("There is more of a turnover than money.") Baran testified that he had ordered additional machines from the Singer Company for the expected expansion, but it developed on cross-examination that he did not know when the machines would or could be delivered because the war in Viet Nam made delivery of such civilian goods from Singer very uncertain. Furthermore, the machines on order were no different from those currently used for production in the plant. Though a nylon hat went into production in October, Baran admitted that it did not require the addition of any new job classification or any significant change in operations, and he testified that in fact he could produce additional items such as ear muffs within a day on his present machines without substantial varying existing operations. Baran testified further that he contemplated starting a new line, a spring "roller" hat, in the near future and that new machines would be required for it, but he admitted on cross-examination that the existing production facilities would be used for the new line, only one machine, a steaming machine, would be added, and he had not yet ordered either the new machine or any material for the new line. Baran made no claim of commitments or contracts with Goverment agencies or other customers and none either of fiscal or budget allocations for the expansion. It is also to be noted that on July 19 Respondent employed 70 percent as many employees as it did on September 2 (i.e., 48 versus 68) when Respondent argues that the work force reached the point where it was truly substantial and representative of the force which would be ' The foregoing conclusions are in full accord with the 387 , E. I DuPont de Nemours and Company, 162 NLRB 413; and principles adopted by the Board for craft severance cases as Holmberg, Inc., 162 NLRB 407 recently announced in Malltnckrodt Chemical Works, 162 NLRB WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION 549 ultimately employed. Or measured against the 85 employed at the time of the hearing, there were 55 percent as many employees on the payroll on July 19, all of whom were employed in the same job classifications. Bearing on the bona fides with which the present contention is advanced are the following facts: Although Baran claimed that prior recognition demands were made in mid-May and mid-June, he neither then or on July 19 objected that the request was premature. Indeed, Baran made it clear to Fromkin on May 18 that he stood ready to sign a contract with any union except Hatters, and he testified that in the June meeting with Lucia and Schneider he informed them he was willing to sit down with them provided the Union would do something for his father in New York City. Furthermore, Baran sought actively before that time to enlist the interest of other unions in representing the employees. Indeed, the present contention was advanced for the first time during the examination of witnesses at the hearing. 10 I therefore conclude and find that Baran's predictions of expansion were highly speculative, without sound business or evidentiary basis, and that Respondent therefore failed to establish its defense that the Union's request was prematurely made. Cf. Chrysler Corporation, 104 NLRB 606; Ryan Aeronautical Co., 120 NLRB 1291; Meramec Mining Company, 134 NLRB 1675. 2. The majority issue; the validity of the authorizations The parties stipulated to the identities of 40 employees who were in the unit as of July 19 and stipulated also on the identities of 13 college students who were to be excluded from the unit. Left in issue were some seven "furriers" (whose status was determined in section 1, supra), and the status of Sylvania Romano as a supervisor. I find on Romano's credited testimony that though she was made a supervisor on July 19, it was after the union representatives made their first demand for recognition. I therefore find that Romano was within the unit on July 19 but was not within it on July 22 when the second demand was made. I find further that between July 19 and 22, Respondent hired two new employees, Sandra Johnson and Diana Negley, who were in the unit. Thus, there were 48 employees in the unit on July 19 and 49 on July 22. As of both of said dates, the Union was in possession of authorization cards signed by some 31 employees" which bore dates from June 4 through July 15, and sometime during the last week of July it obtained an additional card from Shelia Merryweather Witcher. Though the dates were, with some exceptions, not entered on the cards by the signatories, the testimony of Lucia, Schneider, Romano, and of some of the employees' signers established, and I find, that the signatures were obtained on or about the dates which appeared on the cards.' z The authorization cards bore the caption, in large letters, "Application for membership," and contained the following unambiguous designation of a collective- bargaining agent: I hereby authorize the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International Union, its agents or representatives, to act for me as a collective bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Because Respondent contends that none of the cards should be accepted as valid proof of the Union's majority status, it is necessary to review the testimony concerning the representations made by the Union's representatives in obtaining the signatures. Lucia testified that after explaining the benefits of unionization, she showed the employees two cards, one the union membership card and another which authorized a checkoff of dues. She explained that the membership card was for the purpose of choosing a collective-bargaining agent if the employees wanted the Union to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining and that the other card would not be used until recognition was obtained; that the first step was to ask Baran to recognize the Union on the basis of the cards to be checked by a third party, but that if Baran refused, then the Union would go to an election provided there were no charges pending. Romano's testimony was to similar effect. Conceding that Lucia testified that the employees were told that the cards would be used either to obtain recognition or for an election, Respondent argues that Schneider virtually conceded that the employees were informed that the cards would be used only to obtain an election, citing the following testimony: TRIAL EXAMINER: Specifically, what did you say to them about the cards? THE WITNESS: To sign the card so that we can use these in the event we have to go to an election through the National Labor Relations Board. This is what the purpose of the card was, to indicate membership in our union , to designate us as their legal bargaining agent. By Mr. O'Reilly: Q. Do you recall if anything else was said? A. Well, we explained the check-off card after we explained about the membership card. Q. Do you recall anything further about the membership cards? A. In the strictest confidence, not shown to the employer, and to be used only if we had to go to an election. Q. Did you tell anything about its purpose? 10 Respondent's counsel made no opening statement though given an opportunity to do so at the conclusion of the General Counsel's. Shireen Adams Janice Jackson Dolores Bargo Marilyn Jones Jo Ann Beatty Regina Kaminski Linda Ray Cooptr Jane Kowalkowski Janet Crytzer Sandra Luzik Nita D'Amico Sharyn Macarowich Mary Grace DeAugustine Ethyl Newell Beatrice Ann Enciso Darlene Peters Paulette Faust Sylvia Romano Darla Flemm Elizabeth Jean Ross Jacqueline Flemm Frances Rozycki Cindy Franczak Nancy Stone Elizabeth French Janet Thompson Sara Haertig Sandra L. Wegner Shirley Houser Barbara Wright Sally Johnson 12 Respondent made a strenuous but abortive attempt to discredit the testimony of the union representatives as to the periods during which they were engaged in procuring the signatures by seeking to show that they were not in New Kensington at times when they testified that they were proceeding with the campaign. Ultimately, however, Respondent stipulated to the correctness of the dates of their visits 299-352 0-70-36 550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD MR. SCHEINHOLTZ: Objected to as leading. TRIAL EXAMINER: Overruled. THE WITNESS: The purpose of the card was to enlist those people who wanted to be members of the union, to be a matter of record, to prove a majority if such proof had to be used. Though Schneider was obviously no model for clarity of expression, it was apparent from his testimony that though he told the employees the cards were to be used in the event the Union found it necessary to go to a Board election, he also informed them that the purpose of the card was to indicate membership in the Union and to designate it as their legal bargaining agent. Thus, his testimony was in substantial accord with Lucia's and Romano's, and there is no other evidence in the record which supports Respondent's contention that the employees were informed the cards would be used only to obtain an election, nor is there any evidence which in any manner contradicts the plain, simple, and unambiguous designation of the Union as the collective-bargaining agent of the signatory. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America [Hamburg Shirt Corporation] v. N.L.R.B., 371 F.2d 740 (C.A.D.C ). I therefore conclude and find that the 32 cards which were received in evidence all constituted valid authorizations. As of July 19, the authorizations totalled 31 out of 48 employees. As of July 22, with Romano excluded as a supervisor and with two new employees on the payroll, the authorizations totalled 30 out of 49.1.3 Those majorities were increased by one in the last week of July by the authorization obtained from Witcher. Thus I conclude and find that all times on and after July 19, the Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit. 3. The request to bargain Lucia and Schneider testified that they informed Baran on July 19, that the Union represented a majority of the production and maintenance workers, asked for recognition, and offered to establish their majority claims by submitting the cards to some third party, such as a clergyman, to check the signatures thereon against Respondent's payroll. Baran refused unless he could see the cards. When Lucia inquired whether he did not trust a clergyman, Baran replied that he did not and that he wanted to see the cards himself. Baran also questioned the Union's majority and asked why they did not go to an election. He also began a tirade against the local in New York City, but Lucia informed him that was a separate union . At the conclusion of the discussion, Lucia handed Baran a letter, stating that it was to verify what had been said in person, but Baran did not open the letter before they left. The letter accorded substantially with what Lucia told Baran orally though it did not specifically designate production and maintenance employees. However, Lucia wrote a further letter on July 22, which, in reiterating the id It may also be noted that even were furriers excluded, the majority on July 19 was 24 out of 41 employees , and on July 22 it was 23 out of 42 request for recognition, designated a production and maintenance unit. Baran's testimony was not in substantial conflict with Lucia's and Schneider's, except that he denied that there was any discussion of the scope of the unit. I credit Lucia's testimony to the contrary, noting here also Lucia's credited testimony that she informed Baran at the union hall on July 14 that the Union wanted only production and maintenance workers, excluding foreladies, foremen, and executives. Finally, it is to be noted that in any event the letter of July 22 would have dispelled any doubt as to the scope of the unit in which the Union was interested. 4. The refusal; the alleged good-faith doubt On July 15 Lucia wrote Respondent listing the names of eight employees who had signed union cards and who attended the union meeting on July 14, and concluded with a warning against any reprisals against the employees in question. On July 22 Lucia wrote Baran listing the names of five other employees who had signed cards and who had attended a union meeting on July 21.14 Baran testified that when he met with Lucia and Schneider on July 19, he did not believe that the Union represented a majority because the letter of July 15 had listed the names of only eight employees; Lucia refused to permit him to see the cards or to tell him how many she had; the second letter of July 22 listed only five other employees as having signed; and the letters included the names of two college girls who were not properly in the unit. Respondent also cites Romano's testimony that on the day she was made a supervisor (July 19) Baran repeatedly stated that he knew the Union did not have a majority. As Romano's testimony showed, however, Baran rested his conclusion in part on what he and Evans had seen during their surveillance of the union meeting. Of course, the foregoing evidence is not to be viewed as standing alone for the question of good faith at the time of the refusal is "one which of necessity must be determined in the light of all relevant facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct." Joy Silk Mills, 85 NLRB 1263, 1264, enfd. 185 F.2d 732, 742, cert. denied 341 U.S. 914. Furthermore, it is well established that one of the essential prerequisites for a good-faith doubt defense is that it must not have been raised in a context of illegal antiunion activity. Dayco Corporation, 157 NLRB 1459; Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 627, enfd. 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2). The record in the present case establishes, as found in section C, supra, that beginning in mid-June, upon notice that the Union was proceeding with its campaign, Respondent launched upon a course of conduct to prevent Hatters from organizing the employees. That conduct included the interrogations, the surveillance of union activities and meeting, and the promising and granting of benefits as found above, including the hasty presentation and installation of the hospitalization program. The record i" Lucia's testimony, corroborated by other witnesses , was that she listed in the letters only the names of card signers who were willing to have their names disclosed to Baran WEST PENN CAP & HAT CORPORATION showed further that having failed in his efforts to enlist the interest of other unions," Baran was actively engaged at the very moment of the request for recognition in the creation of his own "company union," which he thereafter dominated and assisted until the time of the hearing. Furthermore, in late August he solicited employees to start a petition to repudiate Hatters. All the foregoing unlawful conduct was aimed directly at defeating the Union's organizational efforts and demonstrated that Baran was deadly serious in making earlier statements that he would recognize any union but Hatters, Hatters would never get the shop, and its representatives could not even reach the employees without his cooperation. Indeed, Baran's adamancy of purpose was no whit abated by the filing of charges herein on July 22, for he proceeded to put into effect the earlier benefits as promised and to complete the creation of his puppet organization which he actively continued to support and control to the date of the hearing. The RM petition added nothing as an indicium of good faith for it was filed after Respondent was served with the complaint herein on September 1. Indeed, the only purpose which is suggested under the circumstances shown by the record is that Respondent was seeking thereby to becloud the appropriate unit issue by raising (belatedly) a claim that furriers were to be excluded. But even were it assumed that some doubt may have existed concerning the appropriate unit, it is established law that such doubt is not a defense to an otherwise meritorious charge of refusal to bargain where the unit sought is, as here, a proper one. Southland Paint Co., Inc., 156 NLRB 22, and cases cited; Vaughan-Hicks Buick Co., 161 NLRB 587. I conclude and find from the entire evidence that the course of conduct which Respondent engaged in from mid- June to the date of the hearing was "an absolute refutation of any good-faith doubt on the part of the Company," N.L.R.B. v. Overnite Transportation Co., 308 F.2d 279, 283 (C.A. 4); cf. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 742 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914; that its refusal to bargain with the Union was not motivated by any such doubt but by its rejection of the collective-bargaining principle (at least vis-a-vis Hatters) and by its desire to gain further time in which to continue its unlawful conduct to undermine the Union and to dissipate its majority. JoySilk Mills, supra; Dayco Corp., 157 NLRB 1459. I therefore conclude and find that by refusing to bargain with the Union on and after July 19, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. By dominating and interfering with the formation and administration of the Grievance Committee and by 15 Baran 's vague claims that other unions were interested in the employees were wholly unsupported Steelworkers twice disclaimed any interest in the face of Baran 's invitations to Ivanusic, and there was no evidence that any other union made any organizational attempt or signed up a single employee. Indeed, Baran admitted that no other union demanded 551 contributing assistance and support to it, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. 3. All of Respondent's production and maintenance employees, including all office clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act 4. At all times on and after July 19, 1966, the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all of the employees in the aforesaid unit. 5. By refusing on and after July 19 and 22 to bargain with the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided in the Recommended Order below, which I find to be necessary to remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because of Respondent's avowed antipathy to the Union, its avowed intent never to recognize Hatters, and the flagrancy of the conduct by which it sought to prevent the unionization of its employees, I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following. RECOMMENDED ORDER West Penn Hat & Cap Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating coercively its employees concerning union activities and attendance at union meetings. (b) Soliciting employees to ascertain the union membership of other employees. (c) Engaging in surveillance of union activities and meetings or in conduct which is calculated to create the impression of surveillance. (d) Promising and granting benefits to employees for the purpose of interfering with or restraining union or other concerted activities. (e) Soliciting the assistance of employees to circulate petitions to disavow the Union. (f) Dominating, interfering with the formation and administration of, and contributing assistance and support to the Grievance Committee, or any other labor organization of its employees. (g) Refusing to bargain with the Union, upon request, as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. recognition and that Amalgamated Clothing Workers, for example, "pulled out" when Hatters showed up. Finally, Evans' solicitation of employee backing for Steelworkers despite Ivanusic's repeated disclaimers further evidenced the hypocrisy of asserted "rival claims 552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization, to form, join, or assist United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and completely disestablish, the Grievance Committee, or any successor thereto, as a bargaining representative of its employees. (b) Bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment of its employees in the appropriate unit herein found and embody in a signed agreement any agreement which may be reached. (c) Post at its offices and plant at New Kensington, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." i' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " i7 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " WE WILL NOT solicit employees to ascertain the union membership of other employees. WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of union activities or meetings or engage in other conduct which is calculated to create the impression of surveillance. WE WILL NOT promise or grant benefits to employees for the purpose of interfering with or restraining union or other concerted activities. WE WILL NOT solicit the assistance of employees to circulate a petition to disavow United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees. WE WILL NOT dominate, interfere with the formation and administration of, or contribute assistance and support to the Grievance Committee, or any other labor organization of our employees. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL permanently withdraw and withhold all recognition from the Grievance Committee, or any successor thereto, and completely disestablish it as a bargaining representative of our employees. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and will embody in a signed agreement any agreement which may be reached. The appropriate unit is: T4a All our production and maintenance employees, excluding all office clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. WEST PENN HAT& CAP CORPORATION (Employer) APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate coercively our employees concerning their union activities or attendance at union meetings. Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1536 Federal Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, Telephone 644-2969.