Arbco Electronics, Inc.

758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Arbco Electronics , Inc. and International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO. Arbco Electronics, Inc. and International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO. Cases 31-CA-245, 31-CA-245-2, and 31-RC-111. June 21, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On November 18, 1966, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also recommended that the petition in Case 31-RC-111 be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Respondent and the Charging Party filed briefs in support of their exceptions; General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision and in support of his exceptions thereto. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner,' as modified herein.' We find merit in the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that Respondent's posted notices to its employees on September 22 and November 4, 1966, were violations of Section 8(a)(1). In the first of these notices, Respondent stated that there had been a 30- percent decrease in production since the Union ' Member Brown , for the reasons set forth in his separate statement in Dan Howard Mfg Co , and Dan Howard Sportswear, Inc, 158 NLRB 805, In 5, would find all the authorization cards to be valid designations of the Union as the collective -bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit 2 We also note that the Trial Examiner found , and we agree, that Respondent "did discriminatorily deprive employees of overtime" in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act However , the Trial began its organizational campaign, that as a result of the "slowdown" Respondent had lost a substantial number of orders, and that if the "slowdown" continued, there would be a layoff of employees and a reduction in overtime. In the November 4 posted notice, Respondent said that the decrease in production had continued, that "worse still" quality of parts had deteriorated and Respondent was receiving complaints and rejections from its customers, and that an unnamed company had rejected Respondent's low bid for business because the customer noticed union buttons being worn by employees and feared the possiblity of a strike which would prevent deliveries. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had presented no probative evidence of a "slowdown," of a decline in quality of parts, or of an increase in the proportion of rejects. He also found that Respondent had refused to divulge the name of the customer who allegedly declined to place an order because of the fear of strikers, and that other parts of the statement were false. In these circumstances, we find that the two posted notices by their false statements were intended to convey the belief that, if the Union should be successful in its campaign of representation, the effect would be loss of jobs and earnings for employees and were thereby calculated to coerce employees into rejecting the Union. Accordingly, we find that by the September 22 and November 4 posted statements, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing additional findings of fact and the entire record in this case, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's Conclusions of Law 3 and 7 and in their place conclude as follows: 3. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Ileen Vaughan, the wage rates of Alice Sorg and Judith Prairie, and the overtime hours awarded to all employees, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 7. By the foregoing conduct, by threatening employees with economic reprisals for unionization, and by material misrepresentation in notices to employees dated September 22, 1966, and November 4, 1966, having a coercive purpose, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Examiner inadvertently failed to find, as we do , that Respondent deprived all employees of overtime for a certain period of time as well as certain designated badge wearers for an extended period of time after overtime was gradually restored to other employees Accordingly, we shall amend the Trial Examiner's Conclusions of Law, Recommended Order, and the Appendix, to reflect these modifications 165 NLRB No. 94 ORDER ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. 759 Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Arbco Electronics, Inc., Van Nuys, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following modifications: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b) in the Recommended Order. "(b) Make whole Ileen Vaughan, Alice Sorg, Judith Prairie, and all employees who were deprived of overtime, for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, in the manner provided in the section entitled `The Remedy.' of the Trial Examiner's Decision, as modified herein." 2. Substitute the following for the third indented paragraph of the Appendix. WE WILL make whole Ileen Vaughan, Alice Sorg, Judith Prairie, and all employees who were deprived of overtime, for any loss of pay suffered by reason of our discrimination against them. 3. Add the following paragraphs to the Recommended Order. "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for certification of representatives, filed by the Petitioner in Case 31-RC-111, be, and it hereby is, dismissed, and that all prior proceedings held thereunder, be, and they hereby are, vacated." "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found herein." TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN S. BENNETT,Trial Examiner: This consolidated matter was heard at Los Angeles, California, on 10 hearing dates between June 20 and July 7, 1966. The complaint in the unfair labor practice cases' alleges that on and after September 10, 1965, Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. The representation matter consolidated and heard with the foregoing stems from an election conducted on December 10, 1965, in the customary plantwide unit, pursuant to a direction of election issued by the Regional Director on November 17, 1965. The Union lost and duly filed objections to conduct affecting the election. On March 31, 1966, the Regional Director directed a hearing on said objections and, on April 8, 1966, the cases were ordered consolidated. I Issued March 30, 1966, and based upon charges filed December 6 and 15, 1965, and January 10, 1966, by International After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel moved for the correction of certain errors in the transcript of testimony. The motion has merit, it is hereby granted, and the pleading is received in evidence as Trial Examiner's Exhibit 1. Ruling having been reserved on various motions to strike the testimony of witnesses because they refused to answer questions ruled to be relevant, those motions are hereby denied. Similarly, Respondent's Exhibits 15 and 16 are hereby received in evidence, ruling having been previously reserved because certain matter was excised therefrom. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Arbco Electronics, Inc., is a California corporation maintaining its principal office and place of business at Van Nuys, California. It is engaged in the manufacture and sale of printed circuit boards and sells and ships products valued in excess of $50,000 per annum directly to points outside the State of California. I find that the operations of Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues; Introduction Respondent had 90 production and maintenance employees in the unit hereinafter found appropriate who were unorganized prior to the events discussed below. In the unfair labor practice case, the General Counsel contends that Respondent (1) interrogated employees concerning union activities and threatened them with reprisals for so engaging ; (2) granted reduced merit increases to two employees because of their union activities ; (3) unilaterally granted wage increases without notification to the Union; (4) temporarily abandoned and thereafter reduced overtime hours because of union activities ; (5) discharged one employee because of union activity; and (6) refused to bargain with the Union. The objections to the election parallel part of the foregoing. B. Sequence of Events Interference , Restraint , and Coercion Organizational activities commenced late in August or early in September 1965, and cards were signed on and after September 8. Ileen Vaughan, whose alleged discriminatory discharge on December 3 is discussed below, was the most prominent employee organizer. Union, United Automobile , Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO , herein called the Union 760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On September 11, Vaughan was lunching with two other named employees and encountered Foreman Joe Tokojai.2 Vaughan testified that she told Tokojai she had heard a rumor that Respondent would close down the plant "because of the Union." Tokojai replied that A.R. Buckles, then president and elevated to chairman of the board on September 24, had told him that "he would shut the plant down rather than have a union in there and work just a handful of people." Vaughan commented that this seemed foolish. Tokojai replied that Buckles was stubbon enough to "close it down." Tokojai did not testify herein and Respondent stated on the record that he was on vacation until July 11, 1966, a date shortly after the close of the hearing. Of the two named as present by Vaughan, only one, Schneider, testified and she was not questioned concerning the incident. Vaughan impressed me throughout as a clear and straightforward witness who endeavored to tell the truth and not shade her testimony in support of her personal interests. Her testimony is credited here as elsewhere. I find that Respondent threatened employees with reprisals for engaging in union activities, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel has also adduced the following evidence. William Berryman became a volunteer organizer and wore a badge to work daily after September 30. On or about November 10, as he uncontrovertedly testified, Berryman went to the office of Night Foreman Lon Kastonguay and asked about a rumor that Respondent had been guilty of racial discrimination. Kastonguay replied that he knew nothing about this and asked Berryman why he was not wearing his union badge. Berryman said that it no longer seemed necessary to do so and Kastonguay responded that he was "glad" that Berryman felt that way. Kastonguay asked Berryman if he had worn the badge because of a reprimand for excessive time off. Berryman replied that he put it on to protect female badge wearers from harassment; that this harassment had stopped; and that it was no longer necessary for him to wear it. Berryman then asked Kastonguay for some paper and the use of a typewriter but did not tell Kastonguay what he proposed to do. He went to another room and typed a notice which stated, in essence, that he had decided that a union could not be of service to employees of Respondent; that he was not opposed to organized labor; that he had been treated fairly; and that he had acted impulsively in participating in union activities. The notice closed with a suggestion that others reconsider "current events." Berryman handed Kastonguay the notice and proceeded to tear up a card designating him as a volunteer organizer. Kastonguay read the statement given him by Berryman, ascertained that he was doing this voluntarily, and then obtained his consent to use both the typed statement and the torn volunteer organizer card. I find that Berryman freely consented to their use. Within a day or two, both the statement and the torn card which had been reassembled and affixed thereto were placed on the company bulletin board by management. I see no basis for a finding adverse to Respondent based upon this incident. Demand and Refusal of Recognition On September 16, International Representative Karlin of the Union wrote to Buckles and named six day-shift employees who had agreed to serve as volunteer ' Also spelled as Tokoiay Willie disputing his agency. Respondent c om edes that he is a supervisor within the meanuIn organizers. They were Vaughan, Harold, Faubert, Gallegos, Pilkinton, and Pettit. All these promptly donned union badges at work on that date. Within the next few weeks, six swing-shift employees, the above-named Berryman, D'Andrea, Feliz, Fries, Prairie, and Sorg, did likewise. The record demonstrates that Respondent was well aware of their identity and most of these are the alleged victims of deprivation of overtime, discussed below. On September 28, Karlin again wrote to Buckles; stated that a majority of Respondent's production and maintenance employees had signed authorization cards designating the Union as their bargaining representative; offered to prove this majority by submitting the cards to a mutually selected impartial person; and requested the negotiation of a collective-bargaining contract. On September 30, Buckles, as chairman of the board, responded as follows: We acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 28, 1965, in which you request recognition of the Union as a collective bargaining representative in a unit not specifically defined. In your letter you offer to prove your contention that a majority of our employees are members of your Union by a check of authorization cards. We have been advised that employees of this Company have been threatened by Union solicitors with discharge and other substantial injury if they do not join your Union. Membership applications obtained by restraint and coercion do not reflect a true desire for representation by your Union. For this specific reason, and also because application cards are notoriously unreliable in determining the true desire of employees, your request for a card check is hereby denied. In addition, other information has come to our attention which indicates most strongly that your Union does not in fact represent a majority of our employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. In view of the effort of your agents to force employees, by threats and inflated promises, to sign application cards, it is quite understandable to us why you wish, at all costs, to avoid a secret ballot election, supervised by the federal government. Under the circumstances, we must insist that our employees have the opportunity, without fear of restraint and coercion, to express their wish in a free and secret election. We are confident, and we are sure you realize, that your Union will be rejected if a secret and democratic vote is permitted. I find, contrary to Respondent's claim, that the unit was adequately defined in the Union's letter of September 28. As set forth, the Union filed a petition for an election on October 4 and an election was held on December 10. Majority Representation in the Appropriate Unit The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that all production and maintenance employees at Respondent's plant, including shipping and receiving employees, truckdrivers, chemists, photographers, and regular part-time employees, but excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. of the Act There is no evidence that Respondent ever advised employees that he was not a representative of management. ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. 761 The record demonstrates that as of September 28, there were 90 in this unit. The General Counsel has introduced in evidence 51 cards containing only language authorizing the Union to represent the signer for the purposes of collective bargaining . All were signed on or before September 28, except as described below. One card, that of William Berryman, was signed on September 30. As I construe the Union's demand for recognition to be a continuing one, this card is deemed timely. Another card, that of Marlien Hartman , is dated "9/65." It being stipulated that volunteer organizer Sorg donned a union badge on October 4; that a union meeting was held some days earlier; and that Hartman signed the card 1 or 2 weeks prior to this meeting, I deem her card to be timely and find that she signed prior to September 28. Without passing on the merits, I do not rely on the card of Mary Lou Goodwin. She originally testified that she signed the card in September or October. She later testified that the date of September 20, not affixed by her and manifestly not in her writing, was on the card when she signed. Similarly, without passing thereon, I do not rely upon the card of Tullio Perotti. At one point, he testified that he asked to sign the card, that he considered the card for several hours and then signed. On the other hand, he twice testified that the volunteer organizer, apparently Faubert, told him that the card was "just for a vote." I equate this with a statement that it was solely for a vote. A small group of signers, approximately 10 in number, were variously told that the card was for an election among other purposes; that the Union could then demand an election; that this was being done in order to take an election vote; that the Union could demand a vote; and that it was to set up a vote if enough signed. None of these were told that the sole purpose of the card was for an election. The authorization cards were unambiguous on their face and the record demonstrates that the signers had adequate opportunity to inspect the cards and sign or refuse to sign. I find, therefore, that as of September 28, the Union had at least 48 and, as of September 30, 49 valid authorization cards. I further find that at all times material herein, the Union was the validly designated representative of a majority of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. See N.L.R.B. v. Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., 359 F. 2d 442 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6); and Bernard S. Happach v. N.L.R.B., 353 F.2d 629 (C.A. 7).' Merit Reviews The employees of Respondent receive a merit review or employee appraisal at approximately 6-month intervals. Considered herein are merit reviews to Alice Sorg and to Judith Prairie in November 1965, which the General Counsel alleges to be discriminatory. Alice Sorg entered the employ of Respondent in August 1963 and left in June 1966. She was a driller on the swing- shift at $1.85 per hour and, on October 4, commenced wearing a volunteer organizer badge nightly. Nightshift Foreman Lon Kastonguay admitted that Sorg had been branching out, learning other tasks and developing new skills, during the 6-month period prior to her review on November 12,1965. He admitted that a 10-cent raise is normal when an employee is doing a job satisfactorily. Sorg, according to Kastonguay, received a low score of 59 on her November 12 rating and, accordingly, received but a 5- cent raise. I note herein that in the case of Prairie who received a score of 63, Kastonguay recommended a 10- cent raise, but admitted that a 10-cent raise was given in "many cases much lower than this [Prairie]." Kastonguay testified that Sorg, because of her "barely passing" grade, would normally not have received a merit increase. However, aware of the fact that she was a union organizer, and to avoid a claim of discrimination, she was given an increase . Sorg testified that at the end of her shift on November 12, Kastonguay discussed her merit review. He adverted to the discard by employee Berryman of his volunteer organizer badge. Kastonguay said that the quantity and quality of her work were excellent and that she was most punctual, but that her "attitude had been moody" and that she was perforce "unhappy." He amplified the last, stating that "If you were not unhappy you would not be wearing a badge.... It shows you are against the Company ... so I can only recommend a 5-cent increase ... what would George [Plant Manager George Morris] say if I gave you 10 cents, and that the fact that you were wearing a badge indicates that you are against the Company." Indeed, Kastonguay admitted that Sorg asked him if the wearing of her badge had anything to so with his decision and he replied "Yes it did. It changed your attitude tremendously." Sorg protested this was unfair, stating that she had learned to operate all the machines, that she was performing work done by male employees and that she was learning drill work. She pointed out that she had previously told him her donning a union badge signified no animosity to Respondent.' Kastonguay admitted telling Sorg that her wearing of the union badge disclosed her unhappiness with Respondent. When Sorg asked if the wearing of the badge was the cause of the reduced 5-cent raise, he responded that it did not help her "attitude" and, as noted above, that it had changed her "attitude tremendously." He denied making reference to his inability to justify it to Morris if he gave her more than 5 cents. Kastonguay attempted to explain Sorg's low rating as based in large measure on her being awarded only four out of a possible ten points for "attitude." He stated that she displayed her dislike toward coworkers who teased her about union activities, this allegedly affecting her work performance. There is no direct evidence of this and, more significantly, there is no evidence of any reprimand to Sorg by any official about this alleged dereliction. Indeed, President Pacent testified that he approved this reduced wage increase, consistent with his policy to bend over backwards to badge wearers in an effort to have Sorg "straighten up." I note also that the raise to $1.90 put Sorg 5 cents over the top scale for class B assemblers, hardly ' Vaughan was asked if she told employees , when asking then[ to sign, that it was "only" for a vote and replied that she "ought have " Volunteer Organizer Pilkuuon testified that he told a "few people," when asked about the cards, that they were "just" for an election Attempts were made by Respondent to ascertain that the lard signers involved herein were the recipients of such statements, but these were entirely unsuccessful I deem this evidence not relevant I It is clear, and I find, that the merit reviews are passed upon and approved by top management personnel prior to consultation with the employee 762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD consistent with treatment of one whose attitude had changed tremendously. Sorg was an intelligent and impressive witness. The explanation of Kastonguay, corroborated by that of President Pacent, falls flat. And, a reading of the testimony of Kastonguay demonstrates that all he knew was that on one occasion an employee had heckled Sorg for her union activities. And the merit review in evidence points out, in contrast to Respondent's position, that she received a superior rate in intelligence and judgment as well as a superior grade in another category reflecting "Has no trouble in work environment. Has native ability to adjust and adapt to people and situations." I credit Sorg herein on a strong preponderance of the evidence. Judith Prairie entered the employ of the Respondent in April 1965 as an automatic driller on the swing shift and left in February 1966. She regularly wore a volunteer organizer badge during the period material herein. At issue here is the granting to Prairie of a 10-cent increase on November 22 rather than one of 25 cents. About one month before that date, Foreman Kastonguay had exchanged positions with his daytime counterpart, Stone, and the latter signed her merit review form. Kastonguay, it is clear, at the very least consulted with Stone and, indeed, Kastonguay recommeded the 10-cent raise. Prairie had received an increase from $1.50 to $1.75 per hour in May 1965 from Kastonguay because of her "ability and speed." On attitude toward company superiors and associates , she was given 9 out of a possible 10 points . She was then told that her work was exceptional. Prairie testified that she spoke with Kastonguay several weeks before her November interview and asked about a merit increase, pointing out that Stone had told her Kastonguay would make the decision. Kastonguay asked what she expected and she replied 25 cents. Kastonguay stated that there was no way to do this and she protested that she was qualified and deserved it. He merely grinned and stared at her with a "long look at the [union] badge on my shoulder," He also stated "I guess you know why." Prairie received a 10-cent raise to $1.85 per hour at her interview. Shortly thereafter, Kastonguay happened to visit the plant one night and asked if she was satisfied with the raise; she replied that she was not. Kastonguay then stated "I could have told you that you would not be ... just off the record [Plant Manager] Morris told me that all you guys would get a nickel. If you bitched, then you got a dime."5 On this occasion, Kastonguay also stared at her badge.6 Kastonguay denied staring at the badge and making any reference to Plant Manager Morris and his wishes in the matter. Here as well, Kastonguay pointed to a change in "attitude" on the part of Prairie, claiming that she had become unfriendly to a great many people, includisig him- self. President Pacent admitted that Prairie, as a badge wearer, received special consideration in November, as did Sorg. There is no evidence that Prairie's outstanding performance and rating as "very good at automatic drilling" in the May report had deteriorated, other than in the reference to her attitude. Her point score in November fell from 70 to 63, this in part reflecting a drop in attitude from 9 to 6. And, as in the case of Sorg, there is no evidence that she was spoken to or reprimanded for this purported change in "attitude." Here as well, I credit the testimony of Prairie over that of Kastonguay and Pacent. It is entirely conceivable that on a nondiscriminatory basis, Prairie would have received only a 10-cent raise. On the other hand, Respondent was willing to elevate Sorg, allegedly possessing a poor attitude, to a rate of $1.90. The inference is strongly warranted that Respondent equated unsatisfactory attitude with union adherence. I find that Prairie was told that she was receiving a 10-cent rather than a 25-cent increase because of her union activities. Indeed, as will appear in the discussion of the discharge of Vaughan, treated below, Respondent was not averse to granting increases one month apart where it felt so inclined. I find that by the foregoing conduct, Respondent has discriminated against its employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.7 Elimination and Reduction of Overtime Prior to commencement of organizational activities by the Union early in September 1965, employees regularly worked overtime. The day shift worked most Saturdays and the swing-shift employees would frequently work a double shift on Friday nights, and, on occasion, a separate shift on Saturdays. There was some overtime on other days. The General Counsel has introduced in evidence much data reflecting this overtime work which is taken from the records of Respondent and has made extensive computations based thereon in support of his contention that Respondent discriminatorily shuffled its overtime policy. In most respects, these figures support his arguments. It is the position of Respondent that overtime was stopped for 2 weeks on or about October 1 and thereafter gradually resumed. The record discloses that there was indeed little overtime worked during this 2-week period with a substantial drop from the overtime previously worked; e.g., overtime hours dropped from 443 to 53 in the weeks ending September 29 and October 10, respectively. The General Counsel points out that the weekly overtime average rose to 142 hours in October and to 253 in November and, in December, it increased even further. Throughout this period, the work load remained at a constant if not increasing level and President Pacent admitted that the reduction in overtime caused Respondent to fall behind in its deliveries, this indeed resulting in a latter decision to resume overtime. Respondent's reasons for temporarily eliminating and thereafter gradually resuming overtime are reflected in certain bulletins to employees. On September 22," it posted the following notice, primarily prepared by Pacent, on the plant bulletin board. She later testified that the reference could have been to "you all " In either event, I construe this, on the basis of her overall testimony , as a reference to union adherents '' Prairie wore the badge below her left shoulder While Respondent raised the inference that Kastonguay was merely staring at her body, it is clear that he stared only at the vicinity of her left shoulder where the badge reposed I find that he was looking at the badge ' The complaint alleges that Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally granting the foregoing increases without notification to or consultation with the Union As it appears that these merit reviews were made in conformity with existing company policy antedating the advent of the Union, I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation " It is noted that this issued 6 days after the Union wrote to Respondent on September 16 and supplied President Buckles with the names of six volunteer organizers ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. 763 TO OUR EMPLOYEES Our latest figures show that there has been a 30% decrease in production since the Union representatives began their agitation for your membership. We believe that this is a deliberate slowdown by a few employees who are in key jobs which affect the entire plant. If this is the way the Union and its supporters conduct themselves we do not wish to have anything to do with them. We are sure you do not either. Because of the slowdown we have not been able to make our shipments on time and, consequently, we have lost a substantial number of orders. If this situation continues, we will not have enough work next month for you to do. We have never had a layoff for lack of work in the past, and hope that those responsible for this slowdown will not force one upon you. We cannot afford to continue a regular overtime day and overtime on regular days if production does not return soon to its usual level. It would be unfortunate to eliminate the extra work day, and we do not want to do so as most of you would be penalized for the unwarranted actions of a few. We request that each of you report to the office any knowledge you may have of those who are responsible for this slowdown so that appropriate action can be taken. Please note that the card distributed by the Union is an authorization card, and not one which merely permits the Union to secure an election. Do you know the obligations you incur by signing such a blank check? Although the Union has a right to agitate for your membership, (and dues) it does not have the right to destroy this Company and your jobs. We hope you will refuse to sign any authorization to the Union. In that way you can show your disapproval of such irresponsible conduct which can only harm you and the Company. I note, initially, that Respondent presented no probative evidence of the purported slowdown. President Pacent was queried concerning the identity of customers and volume of orders allegedly lost but was unable to supply these. The reference to not having enough work in the following month is simply not the fact because Respondent admittedly then had a substantial backlog of orders. Moreover, Pacent, who was absent in the East from approximately August 30 to September 11 and again from September 19 to 26, variously testified that his reference to the 30 percent drop reflected production between September 1 and 15 and between September 2 and 21. He also admitted that a later calculation disclosed that the figure was much too high and that the purported drop in production was actully between 18 and 20 percent. In this respect, it is noted that is was Pacent, as Plant Manager Morris put it, who was handling "the present union situation." There is not an iota of evidence of any employee slowing down and there is only the claim of Pacent that he could sense this as he traversed the plant. The General Counsel has directed attention to a compilation reflecting greatly improved production in the 7-day period between September 22 and 30 as contrasted with 7 production days preceding the bulletin, despite the fact that less overtime was worked in the later period. Even Pacent admitted that he had noticed some improvement as of October 1. Yet Respondent went ahead with its decision on overtime. On November 4, Respondent posted the following bulletin, signed by Buckles: On September 22 we stated in a bulletin that there had been a 30% decrease in production since the Union representatives began their agitation for your membership. Our last production figures show that there has been no improvement. Worse still, the quality of the parts which have been produced has been very poor and we are receiving complaints and rejections from our customers. We have been bidding for new business. Yesterday a company in the Bay Area advised us that although our bid for their business was the lowest and our plant was rated higher than any other which bid on the order, we would not be given the order because a strike might occur which would prevent delivery of the order on schedule. The customer noticed the Union buttons which are being worn in the plant and talked to the Union agents about our situation. We are convinced that a few disgruntled employees are responsible for our present difficulties. Apparently, they feel that the destruction of this firm is warranted if they do not get what they want. The welfare of all other employees of the Company seems to mean nothing to them. We hope this Union will soon be behind us so we can settle down to work again in our usual way. Conduct as irresponsible as this can only hurt all of us. May we again request that you report to the office any knowledge you may have of those who are responsible for the slowdown and the poor quality of our product. Unless we can correct this situation soon, a serious loss of business will occur which will necessitate strong measures if we are to survive. As is apparent, the same admittedly erroneous 30 percent figure is used. Pacent testified that he did not learn of his error in using this figure for 30 to 60 days after September 22. Respondent adduced testimony and documentary evidence concerning the company described in this notice as refusing to place this order, but declined to divulge the name of the customer because of fear of harassment by the Union.9 Be that as it may, it is clear from the record that the notice is false to the extent that it states that the customer "talked to the Union agents about the situation." The testimony of Sales Manager Thomas Snodgrass demonstrates that he escorted a group of three from this concern about the plant and that, to his knowledge, they spoke with no one else. And there is affirmative evidence from volunteer agents that no such conversations took place. While Pacent claimed that October rejects were higher than in a normal month, he was unable to provide any basis for a normal ratio of rejections and had no record of these rejections in October. And as for the "poor quality" of the products, there is no probative evidence in support of this, either by description or name of customer. The General Counsel contends further that when overtime hours were gradually resumed in the October- December period, Respondent, contrary to its previous " This was the subject of the motion to strike evidence and reject exhibits previously considered, with ruling adverse to the General Counsel 764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD policy of distributing overtime equitably among the employees, did not apply this to certain badge wearers. Respondent's records disclose the following with respect to the overtime hours of certain volunteer organizers. Ileen Vaughan, on the day shift, averaged 24.2 hours of overtime from June through September, but was allowed only 6 hours thereafter until her termination on December 3, this reflecting one occasion when another employee was unable to work. Armand Faubert of the day shift did janitorial, plant maintenance, and truckdriving work for Respondent. His June-September average was 18 hours per month. From September 22 on, he never received any overtime. Respondent has adduced evidence that it hired an additional maintenance employee in August, this allegedly obviating the need for Faubert to work overtime. But the record discloses that Faubert's truckdriving duties occupied 60 percent of his time. Moreover, he was given overtime work in the weeks ending September 1, 15 and 22; this is hardly consistent with Respondent's claim. Finally, Faubert uncontrovertedly testified about his efforts to obtain overtime work. This work was customarily assigned on Friday afternoons, and each Friday he would ask Foreman Stone for overtime work; the latter, in response, would literally laugh. On one occasion in November, Stone told Faubert that he was wasting his time and that Faubert "should know better than to ask ... because I was Union. I was wearing a button ... I was a badge wearer." Any lingering doubt about Respondent's motivation in the case of Faubert is dispelled by his uncontroverted testimony that between September and December, Foreman Stone and Kastonguay had offered him Saturday work at straight time, this predicated on his taking time off during the week. Stated otherwise, the need was present.' e Volunteer Organizer William Berryman worked much overtime, averaging 51 hours per month from June through September. He received 12 hours of overtime in October and 9 in November. As found, he abandoned the Union on or about November 10 and authorized Respondent to post his written withdrawal on the bulletin board. Thereafter, he received 37 hours of overtime in the month of December. Mary Pettit, an assembler on the day shift, averaged 13.8 hours of overtime per month from June through December. After October 1, she worked overtime but once, for 5 hours during the week ending December 19. In a number of cases stressed by the General Counsel, the evidence is less compelling. Thus, Leadman Douglas Feliz of the swing shift averaged approximately 11.2 hours of overtime from June through September. He worked a total of 18 hours, averaging approximately 6 hours per month during the period from October through December, with 16 of these after he doffed his badge on or about November 1. The General Counsel points to much heavier overtime work by other leadmen. On the other hand, the testimony of Feliz discloses that he did not desire much overtime. Attention is also directed to swing-shift organizers Ginny Gallegos, Alice Sorg, Judith Prairie, and Helen D'Andrea. Gallegos averaged 8 hours per month from June through September, but worked a total of 6 hours from October through December 20 when she left the employ of Respondent. On the other hand, the record discloses that she had frequent absences. Sorg averaged 14.2 hours of overtime from June through September, but was not given overtime work again. Prairie averaged 10 hours per month from June through September, but was not assigned any overtime after October. There is evidence that family responsibilities limited her availability for overtime work. D'Andrea averaged 19.3 hours of overtime per month from June through September, but thereafter received only 5 hours during the week ending November 14. I note also that Eva Fries of the swing shift worked 16 hours of overtime from June through September and none thereafter. Respondent has contended that it ordered overtime reduced because it learned that it was violating a California law forbidding the employment of women in excess of 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week. And the record does demonstrate that, prior to the latter part of September, Respondent had frequently worked its Friday swing-shift employees a double shift into early Saturday morning, this shift including women. While this evidence is uncontroverted, it is also suspect. Respondent paid female employees for overtime on separate invoices, these not being reflected in the regular payroll records prior to October. And while witnesses Pacent and Morris for Respondent equivocated somewhat, the basic thrust of their testimony is that they became aware of their entanglement with California law at the "end" or "very end" of September. Yet the basic threat to reduce overtime issued on September 22, prior to serious consideration of these overtime violations. Moreover, Respondent never communicated its intent to abide by the California law to its employees, there was never any discussion of this matter with them, and the November 4 notice is conspicuously silent in this area. Indeed, Pacent admitted that his quarrel was not with the California authorities, but with the Union. Lending some assistance to Respondent is the fact that an inspection of its records discloses that all female swing- shift employees thereafter suffered a substantial reduction in overtime. On the other hand, of further support to the General Counsel is the fact that on the day shift, there were but two class A silk screen operators, badge wearers Harold Pilkinton and Marlin Harold. If Respondent wished overtime to be worked in this department, it perforce had to assign this to a badge wearer. This was done in the case of Pilkinton, the record disclosing that Harold was averse to overtime work. And there is evidence that, in the past, Respondent had on occasion worked female swing-shift employees for a separate shift on Saturdays. The General Counsel points out that a consideration of the 5-week period of weeks ending November 21 through December 19 discloses that the average overtime hours for all full-time employees ranged from 3.9 to 8.2 hours whereas those of designated badge wearers ranged from .6 to 3.3 per week. While he points to a similar contrast in the overtime work by Leadman Feliz and other leadmen, this is not deemed to be truly indicative, in view of the overall pattern of more overtime being worked by other leadmen and the fact that Feliz did not desire much overtime. And, turning to Respondent's claim based upon the California statute with respect to the hours of women, "' Stone did not testify and Kastonguay was not questioned concerning this Foremen Stone and Kastonguay exchanged shifts sometime in October. ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. Respondent's records disclose that some swing shift female employees did work overtime in the weeks following October. In fact, in two cases, those of Compton and Dalton, the records disclose a total of more than 48 hours worked on a number of occasions involving the former and one in the case of the latter. And, as noted, the drop in overtime given to certain day-shift employees belies this thesis. In view of all the foregoing considerations, I find, on a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent did discriminatorily deprive employees of overtime and thereafter withold it from volunteer organizers for the Union, thereby engaging in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Termination of Ileen Vaughan Ileen Vaughan entered the employ of Respondent in March 1962. At the time of her termination on December 3, 1965, she was classified as a class A inspector on the day shift. As Plant Manager Morris put it, and I so find, Vaughan was a "topnotch inspector. Her ability was excellent . She was probably one of the better inspectors we had. . . ." Indeed, Vaughan alone was assigned to and devoted 75 percent of her time to the task of "releasing." This was a most important step because it constituted a decision that the circuit board could go to the shop for manufacture. She became the chief organizer for the Union in the plant and distributed a substantial number of authorization cards, including many of those received in evidence herein. Her status as a volunteer organizer in behalf of the Union was well known to management. Vaughan had previously applied for a position in the post office, and received a notice that she was eligible for hire, but not a specific offer of work. On or about November 15, she informed Foreman Joe Tokojai1I that, in anticipation of such an offer, she would probably be leaving the employ of Respondent "in a couple of weeks." That same day, Tokojai sent a memorandum to Plant Manager Morris advising that Vaughan had given notice of her intent to leave. He also recommended that Inspector Syble Bandy be moved to the "number one position" (that of Vaughan) and that another inspector be hired to fill the vacancy. Morris approved the recommendation and added to the memo a statement that the resignation was to be effective not over three weeks after November 15. On November 16, Morris handed Vaughan a copy of this memorandum. He told her that while employees were normally retained for a maximum of 2 weeks after giving notice to leave, she would be granted 3. As Morris put it, he wanted to keep skilled inspectors on the job as long as possible and he regretted the departure of Vaughan. Vaughan admitted telling Morris that she had not been happy at the plant, that she did not like working there, and that, but for her high opinion of Foreman Tokojai, she would not have given 5 minutes' notice. Two weeks later, on November 30, Vaughan changed her mind. She told Tokojai that she would like to remain in the employ of Respondent because no offer of employment had been forthcoming from the Post Office Department, and he agreed to take up her case with Morris. Later that day, Tokojai told Vaughan that Morris no longer had any authority to act in the matter and that he had nothing to tell her. Vaughan persisted in her efforts to remain in the " As noted, Tokojai did not testify and findings as to this and other conversations with him are based upon Vaughan's 765 employ of Respondent and, on November 30, wrote to Chairman of the Board Buckles. The letter, received on December 1, stated: On or about November 15, 1965, I informed my supervisor, Mr. Tokaji, [sic] that I would probably be leaving my employment with Arbco some time in the future, as there was a possibility that I would be getting a job with the United States Post Office Department. The next day, Mr. Morris informed me that I could continue to work for Arbco for the next three weeks. I thought this was unreasonable because there was nothing definite on the Post Office appointment. As events have turned out, nothing has developed on the Post Office appointment, and I am writing this to inform you that it is my intention and desire to continue my employment with the Arbco Company. This was brought to the attention of President Pacent who, with the assistance of Respondent's industrial relations representative, prepared an employee-status or termination form for Vaughan. This form, prepared on or about December 3, states under "Reasons and Remarks:" Your resignation was effective on December 3, 1965 and replacement has been hired and trained. Consequently the withdrawal of your resignation cannot be accepted as the vacancy has been filled. If you desire, we will notify you of the next vacancy, for which you are qualified. You are subject to rehire. At quitting time on December 3, Foreman Tokojai told Vaughan that he had some "dirty work" to do and handed her a copy of this form. Vaughan subsequently went to work for the Post Office Dpartment on January 3, but resigned on January 27, 1966. Around mid-February, Vaughan received a telephone call from Tokojai. He stated that he had learned she had left the Post Office Department and was seeking employment and asked if she was interested in returning to work for Respondent. Vaughan replied that she did wish to return but not as a "new employee"; according to Vaughan, this would have affected certain fringe benefits. Vaughan asked for time to think the matter over. Shortly thereafter, she telephoned Tokojai and told him that she wanted to return. He agreed to explore the matter and said he would contact his "boss." Tokojai returned the call and advised Vaughan that there were no vacancies for inspectors. Vaughan having been an inspector for a substantial period of time prior to her termination, I find that this discussion related to employment as an inspector. Respondent initially defended herein on the theory that there were no vacancies for Vaughan as an inspector as of the time she left on December 3. Contrary evidence supporting the position of the General Counsel is indeed impressive. During the hearing, Rspondent shifted grounds and claimed that Vaughan's intemperate remark on November 16 to Morris rendered her unsuitable for rehire because of her "attitude." This too does not hold water. Turning to the former claim, the record discloses the following. It is Respondent's basic premise that it transferred Syble Bandy between November 15 and December 3 to take the place of Vaughan. Indeed, Vaughan did participate in training Bandy to take over her duties. According to Vaughan,12 she spent approximately 20 percent of her time during a 5-day period to pass on her uncontroverted and credited testimony 12 Bandy did not testify herein 766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD skills to Bandy. Respondent was so impressed with Bandy's performance that on December 6, Bandy received an increase from $2.75 to $2.85 per hour; the lower rate had been awarded her approximately one month earlier on November 8. Indeed, this put her rate above Vaughan's rate of $2.70 per hour. Morris deemed it unnecessary in December to have another performance review of Bandy because she had received one so recently. As indicated, Respondent's reasons do not stand up and for the following reasons: (1) Despite the rapid advancement of Bandy, the fact is that, as of November 15, Vaughan was the top inspector and the only one who handled the important function of "releasing." Morris did not know of any occasions when Bandy had performed this work previously and, according to Vaughan, Bandy had done it only once or twice prior to November 15. Yet, on November 30, Respondent chose not to retain Vaughan. (2) Respondent was uncertain as to who replaced Bandy. Morris testified at one point that it was Inspector Bowers, newly hired on November 5 as a class B inspector at a rate of $2.50 per hour. Morris also testified that Bethel Harrell was hired on November 17 as a class B inspector but was uncertain whether she replaced Bandy or Bowers. (3) Morris admittedly preferred to have only class A inspectors in his employ. Yet, he refused Vaughan her unconditional request of November 30 to stay on and thereafter did not recall her to work. Moreover, on December 14, Respondent hired two class B inspectors, Schantz and Moseley, and another, Hoffman, on December 17. In fact, Morris admitted that Respondent was in "dire need of additional inspectors" during December. (4) Compounding the foregoing is the fact that on or about December 20, two class B inspectors, Gallegos and Christophel, quit. Vaughan was not offered employment despite her pending request for same and the statement in her termination notice that she was eligible for rehire. (5) The abortive attempt of Tokojai to recall Vaughan to work in February buttresses of foregoing. The testimony of Morris discloses that the prior union activities of Vaughan played a part in the decision, albeit in an effort to avoid committing an unfair labor practice. The statement of Tokojai to Vaughan that a vacancy did not exist is intrinsically inconsistent with his invitation to Vaughan to return to work; surely, he was in a position to be aware of vacancies on his shift and there is no claim that he was not. Turning to Respondent's secondary claim that Vaughan was not subject to rehire because of her intemperate statement on November 16, this reflecting an unsatisfactory "attitude," the following factors are immediately apparent: (1) Pacent testified that Morris had recommended a three rather than a two week notice period for Vaughan because she had been a "good employee." Yet, the purported shock of Morris on November 16 at this statement by Vaughan was not so great as to warrant his suspending her employment at that time. (2) When asked about the use of the words "You are subject to rehire" on the December 3 termination notice, '1 President Pacent testified that he attended an unemployment compensation hearing on December 20, 1965, that Vaughan was then asked if when she wrote the letter of November 30. she wished to continue as a permanent employee, and that she replied in the negative, stating that she wished to work only until such time as her appointment came through In Morris conceded that he had the authority to change this language. He then testified that she was subject to rehire "Because of her loyality to Tokojai and further discussion with other people on this it was agreed that we would leave the statement like this." (3) President Pacent was asked why, if Vaughan was not eligible for rehire , this statement was placed on her December 3 termination notice. He explained that she was a badge wearer, that she was not eligible for rehire because of her attitude , and that he wrote this on the advice of his industrial relations representative. I have heretofore noted in the cases of Sorg and Prairie that Respondent's concept of attitude meant prominence in union activities . And, in the posture most favorable to Respondent, it was an untruthful statement. (4) Any lingering doubt about Respondent 's need for help is the fact that it was running advertisements in the local press on December 12, 14, and 16 for new employees and the language used therein was broad enough to include the classification of inspector . The advertisement was for factory help on printed circuits and both skilled and unskilled employees were sought. While Morris testified at one point that President Pacent chose as a policy matter to promote inspectors from within, he conceded that the advertisement was broad enough to include inspectors . Indeed , Respondent did hire new inspectors in December , as set forth. To sum up, Respondent was in dire need of inspectors in December ; it preferred to employ class A rather than class B inspectors because of their superior ability; it chose to hire class B inspectors rather than recall Vaughan; the claim of Vaughan's unsatisfactory attitude based upon an intemperate statement on November 16 falls flat in the light of the language in her termination notice on December 3; and her foreman 's abortive effort to procure her return in February demonstrates Respondent's unmitigated hostility to Vaughan , particularly in view of the admission that she was eligible for rehire because of her loyality to Tokojai. One further notes that Vaughan was terminated on December 3 but 1 week before the scheduled election. I find , on a strong preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent, by releasing Vaughan on December 3, 1965, and thereafter refusing to recall her to work, was motivated by its desire to rid itself of the leading union adherent in the plant and has discriminated with respect to her hire and tenure of employment, thereby engaging in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(3) and , derivatively, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.13 Refusal to Bargain I have previously found that the Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees of Respondent in an appropriate unit at all times material herein. On September 30, Respondent rejected the Union's offer of September 28 to prove its majority and its request for recognition. Respondent proceeded to state in this communication that it had been "advised that employees of the Company have been threatened by Union solicitors with discharge view of the fact that this took place after Respondent made its decision on December 3, based upon the unconditional offer in her letter of November 30, 1 deem this immaterial to the basic issue of Respondent 's motivation in previously terminating Vaughan ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. and other substantial injury if they do not join your Union" and that membership applications had been obtained by "restraint and coercion," thus not reflecting a "true desire" for union representation. It then stated, "For this specific reason" and because cards were "notoriously unreliable" recognition was refused. The letter further claimed that Respondent had information that the Union did not in fact represent a majority. It closed by insisting on an election "In view of the effort of your agents to force employees, by threats, and inflated promises" to sign cards. There is simply not a shred of evidence to support any of the foregoing assertions. No testimony was adduced of threats of discharge or "substantial injury" to those being asked to sign. The record is silent as to any cards being obtained by "restraint and coercion," the evidence reflecting solely persuasion in some cases. Respondent adduced no evidence to support its assertion that it possessed information that the Union did not enjoy a majority. And, finally, there is no evidence of anyone signing a card as a result of a threat; in fact, the record contains no evidence of any threats. Respondent did not sit idly by after making these unfounded assertions on September 30. On or about October 1, it eliminated all overtime for 2 weeks, relying on a claim made in a September 22 bulletin that there had been a 30-percent drop in production which it attributed to deliberate slowdowns as a result of "agitation" by the Union. As shown, not only was this claim at best greatly exaggerated, but production had risen sharply during the last week of September. And, as found, when overtime was gradually resumed, union badge wearers were singled out for reduced overtime in contrast with past practice. Respondent's bulletin of November 4 repeated the erroneous claim of a 30-percent drop in production and contended that there had been complaints and rejections of shipments; this was not established herein. I have also previously found that Respondent's treatment of Sorg and Prairie in their November merit reviews was clearly discriminatory and in obvious retaliation for their union activities. Finally, on December 3, but 1 week before the election, Respondent grasped the opportunity to eliminate the most active union adherent, Ileen Vaughan. As in the cases of Sorg and Prairie, its conduct was predicated upon her "attitude" whch, on this record, is perforce equated with union activities. In sum , Respondent rejected the Union's request for recognition, making various claims of a tainted majority which are entirely unsupported by the record. Consistent with its prior expressions of hostility to the Union and its unsupported claims of a slowdown, it embarked upon a campaign of reprisals, as set forth, which was designed to include employees to disaffiliate from and reject the Union. A preponderance of the evidence does not support the claim that Respondent entertained a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. I find, therefore, that by rejecting the Union's demand for recognition on September 30, 1965, Respondent has refused to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and has thereby also engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Joy Silk Mills v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 14 No precise argument has been made, and I am unable, on this ecord, to determine what overtime hours would have been worked by the designated union badge wearers had they been allotted on a nondiscriminatory basis I believe this is a matter 767 341 U.S. 914, and Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526. Although the termination of Vaughan on December 3, 1965, would alone appear to be grounds for setting aside the election, I have found that there was an unlawful and continuing refusal to bargain with the Union on or after September 30, 1965. Thus, there being no question concerning representation at the time of the holding of the election on December 10, it will be recommended that the representation petition be dismissed and the proceeding vacated. See Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 1277, and Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 627. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent has discriminated with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Ileen Vaughan, the wage rates of Alice Sorg and Judith Prairie, and overtime hours worked by union badge wearers. 14I shall recommend that Respondent offer Ileen Vaughan immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges. See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,65 NLRB 827. I shall further recommend that Respondent make whole Vaughan, Sorg, Prairie, and designated union badge wearers for any loss of pay or overtime, as the case may be, suffered by reason of its discrimination against them. Said loss, based upon earnings which each normally would have earned as wages from the date of discrimination to the date of reinstatement or departure from the employ of Respondent, as the case may be, 15 shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. See N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344. Interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,138 NLRB 716. I shall also recommend that Respondent recognize the Union as the representative of its employees in the above- described appropriate unit; that, upon request, Respondent bargain with said Union concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment; and that, if an understanding is reached, embody same in a signed agreement. On this posture, it is recommended that the representation petition be dismissed and the proceeding vacated. which can be worked out at the compliance stage. 15 The record discloses that Sorg, Prairie, and several badge wearers are no longer in the employ of Respondent 768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent involve a pretextual discharge, harassment of union adherents, and conduct in derogation of the principles of good-faith collective bargaining. The inference is warranted that Respondent maintains an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act with respect to the protection of employee rights in general . It will accordingly be recommended that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Arbco Electronics, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Ileen Vaughan, the wage rates of Alice Sorg and Judith Prairie, and the overtime hours awarded union badge wearers, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent, including shipping and receiving employees, truckdrivers, chemists, photographers, and regular part- time employees, but excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervisors, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW AFL-CIO, has been since September 28, 1965, and now is, the exclusive representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing on and after September 30, 1965, to recognize and bargain with the above-named labor organization , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 7. By the foregoing conduct and by threatening employees with economic reprisals for unionization, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)of the Act. 9. Respondent has not otherwise engaged in unfair labor practices. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law , it is recommended that Respondent, Arbco Electronics , Inc., Van Nuys, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: 1h In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall (a) Discouraging membership in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees , by discharging employees or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition thereof. (b) Threatening employees with reprisals in the event of unionization , or in any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in the excerise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above named or any other labor or- ganization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and to refrain from any or all such activities , except to the extent such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Ileen Vaughan immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges. (b) Make whole Ileen Vaughan , Alice Sorg, Judith Prairie, and designated union badge wearers for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them , in the manner provided above in the section entitled "The Remedy." (c) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union , United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the above -described appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of work , or other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (d) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (e) Post at its plant at Van Nuys , California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being duly signed by Respondent representative , shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 17 be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " I1 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. 769 Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively with International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our production and maintenance employees, including shipping and receiving employees, truckdrivers, chemists, photographers, and regular part-time employees, but excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervisors, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL offer Ileen Vaughan immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges. WE WILL make whole Ileen Vaughan, Alice Sorg, Judith Prairie, and union badge wearers for any loss of pay or overtime suffered by reason of our discrimination against them. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with reprisals in the event of unionization, or in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above named or any other labor organization. ARBCO ELECTRONICS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 10th Floor, Bartlett Building, 215 West Seventh Street, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 213-688-5850.