Billen Shoe Co., Inc.

BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 57 Billen Shoe Co., Inc. and Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 1-CA-5504 and 1-CA-5642 June 28,1967 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On March 24, 1967, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismis- sal of them. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions to the Decision and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed a brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Billen Shoe Co., Inc., Lewiston, Maine, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: On April 29, 1966, Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called the Union), filed a representation peti- tion with Region 1 of the National Labor Relations Board seeking to represent the approximately 350 production and maintenance employees, including shipping, receiv- ing, and plant clerical employees, of Billen Shoe Co., Inc. (hereinafter called the Respondent), in Case 1-RC-8958. A stipulation for certification upon consent election agreement was executed by the parties on May 20, 1966, for an election to be held on June 8, 1966. By virtue of charges filed by the Union on June 7, 1966, and sub- sequently amended on July 6, 1966, in Case 1-CA-5504, the scheduled election was indefinitely postponed pend- ing disposition of the charges. A complaint issued alleging 8(a)(1) and (2) violations in Case 1-CA-5504, resulting in a hearing scheduled for September 6, 1966, at Lewiston, Maine. Prior to officially opening the hearing, a settlement agreement was entered into by the parties' subject to compliance, after which a joint motion by the parties was to be filed requesting dismissal of the com- plaint. During the interim, however, new charges were duly filed by the Union on September 12, 1966, and amended on September 28, 1966, and, following in- vestigation of such charges, a complaint issued alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by Respondent. The new complaint bearing Case 1-CA-5642 included one discriminatee, Paul Sevigny. Subsequently, by order dated November 9, 1966, the settlement agreement in Case 1-CA-5504 was set aside and Cases 1-CA-5504 and 1-CA-5642 were consolidated for a reopened hear- ing which took place before Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes at Lewiston, Maine, on December 7,1966. At said hearing all the parties appeared and were af- forded full opportunity to examine witnesses, adduce relevant evidence, and make oral argument. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent and have been given careful consideration. On the basis of the record thus made, I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is and has been at all times material herein a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Maine, maintaining its place of business in the city of Lewiston, Maine, where it is and has been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu- tion of shoes and related products. In the course and con- dua of its business, Respondent ships to and receives from States outside the State of Maine products valued in excess of $50,000 per annum. The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Re- spondent is and has been an employer, as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Union is and has been a labor organiza- tion as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. In addition, the complaint in Case I-CA-5504 alleges that the Department Committees are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. In its answer Respondent has denied that allegation. The record in this proceeding indicates that the em- ployees of the hand sewers department at the Respond- ent's plant formed a Department Committee around September 1965. At first the Department Committee consisted of about 13 employees. Later, similar Depart- ment Committees were created for other departments in the plant and these eventually combined into a con- solidated Department Committee, sometimes referred to 166 NLRB No. 19 58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL as a Shop Committee. The Respondent recognized these Department Committees as the bargaining agents of the employees and negotiated with them with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions, but without con- cluding a written contract. Members of the Department Committees met with and negotiated with the president of the Respondent in his office and were paid by the Respondent for the time spent at negotiations, as well as for the time spent by the members discussing negotiation issues among themselves. In the latter part of May 1966, the Department Com- mittees disbanded. Respondent's president held a meet- ing with the chairman of the Shop Committee, Marcel Roy, and suggested that the Shop Committee intervene in the representation election which was pending so as to give the employees not only a choice between the Union and no union but an opportunity to vote for the Shop Committee. About the same time he suggested to the hand sewers that the Department Committee be rein- stated, that it was powerful, and that the employees would not have to pay any dues. Consequently, on the following day, the Department Committee was reinstated by the employees. Thereafter it met with the Respondent and negotiated with it and received pay for the time so spent. From the foregoing findings which are essentially un- disputed, there can be no doubt that the Department Committees are labor organizations as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act and I so find. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Alleged Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1) The Union commenced its organizational campaign at the Respondent's plant in Lewiston, Maine, in March 1966. Paul Sevigny, one of the hand sewers, was con- tacted by the Union to help in the campaign and con- sequently distributed about 150 union authorization cards to employees, obtaining from 60 to 70 signatures. He was observed at this activity by his foreman, Fernand Simard, as well as by Superintendent Cleveland and Stitching Room Foreman Parnel. On the same day that Sevigny made this distribution, he stopped during his coffee break to talk with employee Marcel Roy. Foreman Simard came up and told Sevigny not to bother Roy to which Sevigny replied that he would leave for now but that he would continue passing out union cards at noon and, if Simard interfered, he would bring Simard before the Na- tional Labor Relations Board. On the following day, when Sevigny was again speaking with Roy, he was again instructed by Simard not to interfere with the help. About the same time Simard accused Sevigny of passing out union cards on company time and told him he was "through." Simard then told Roy that Sevigny was passing out union cards, whereupon Roy, who was then chairman of the Department Committee referred to earli- er, investigated the charge and, finding it untrue, advised Simard, who immediately rehired Sevigny. The above incidents were uncontradicted. Moreover, credible testimony establishes that it was not uncommon for employees to stop to talk to other employees while at their benches and that such practice was not criticized by the Respondent. In fact, the credible testimony of Marcel Roy, who impressed me as being quite truthful, establishes that Simard did not object to anyone talking LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with Roy except Sevigny and it was only after Roy com- plained to Feinstein, president of Respondent, that Simard ceased driving Sevigny from Roy's bench. Simard, in his testimony, stated that Sevigny "got into his hair." He was asked, Was he getting into your hair from the time he started this union activity, is that when it started? Simard replied, No, before that he used to do things, but I just let them go. On or about May 6, 1966, Foreman Parnel approached employee Mary Turcotte and asked her if she had at- tended the union meeting the night before. He also asked her if she had signed a union card and what she thought of the Department Committee and of the Union. She was not told the purpose of the inquiry or given any as- surances that her answers would not give rise to any reprisals. On or about May 11, 1966, Respondent posted a notice as follows: As PER NEGOTIATIONS WITH YOUR VARIOUS COM- MITTEES, EFFECTIVE APRIL 18TH, THE MINIMUM WAGE WILL BE AS FOLLOWS: $1.25 1.28 1.33 First 12 weeks Next 12 weeks Thereafter ALSO, EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 1966, ALL HOURLY AND PIECE WORKERS WILL BE PAID AN ADDITIONAL 3 CENTS PER HOUR. OVERTIME WILL BE COMPUTED ON A DAILY BASIS OVER EIGHT HOURS. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE MEMBER. The notice seems to speak of two different wages, one a minimum wage and the other a wage increase. The record is completely silent concerning the minimum wage. As respects the wage increases, Roy testified that Feinstein had told him that the Respondent would follow, "penny for penny," the pattern that another local union representing some of the shops in Lewiston, would reach in its contract with such other chops. This intention was not communicated, however, to other employees. When the other union obtained a 3-cent-per-hour increase for its members, to be effective in June, Respondent, comply- ing with its earlier promise, announced a similar increase for its employees. Although the record is not clear as to the exact date when Roy was told of the Respondent's in- tention to meet the wage increases obtained by the other union, it appears that it was prior to the commencement of organizational activities at the Respondent's plant which had started barely 5 weeks before the posting of this announcement. B. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(A)(2) Respondent concedes that it paid the members of the Department Committees for the time spent in negotia- tions and argues that this is insufficient to shcw domina- tion of the crganization by the Respondent. The com- plaint, however, does not allege domination but only that the Respondent has aided, assisted, and supported the Committees unlawfully. BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 59 C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) The complaint in Case 1-CA-5642 alleges that Respondent discharged employee Sevigny in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. Respondent admits the discharge of Sevigny but denies the alleged illegality, ar- guing that the discharge was for cause. Reference has been made earlier to Respondent's ex- periences with Sevigny in April 1966, when Foreman Simard drove him from employee Roy's bench, as well as to the attempted discharge of Sevigny for the unfounded charge of distributing authorization cards on company time. Thereafter, in June 1966, everything had been going smoothly while Sevigny was gone and that he had "better watch out." On or about August 25, 1966, Sevigny was called to the office of the president. Roy and Simard were also present. Feinstein accused Sevigny of interfering with the help but when Sevigny asked him to name the employees affected, the president told him it was none of his busi- ness. Sevigny objected to this approach, whereupon he was asked if he wanted to quit and he replied that he did not. Feinstein also made some mention of the Union's ac- tivities. Finally, Sevigny called Feinstein a "damned liar," or "God-damned liar," and walked out. During the last week in August 1966, Simard informed Department Committee Representative Roy that he was going to discharge Sevigny because of poor work. De- partment Committee representatives then looked at Sevigny's work and told Simard that his work was not below par and that the discharge would not be justifiable. Simard agreed and told them to forget it and keep it quiet. During the week of August 29, Sevigny received a sub- pena from the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board requiring him to be present and testify at a hearing involving Respondent and scheduled for Sep- tember 6. On September 2, Sevigny told Simard that he would have to attend the hearing on the 6th but that he would come to work for 2 hours that morning and leave at 9 a.m. Simard's only comment was "Oh, you're going to the hearing?" On September 6, at approximately 8:15 a.m., while Sevigny was on his coffee break, Simard motioned for him to come over. Simard asked Sevigny, "Have you got a subpena to attend this hearing?" Sevigny told Simard, according to the testimony of some of the witnesses in- cluding Roy, that it was none of Simard's business. Other witnesses testified that Sevigny told Simard that it was none of his "God-damned" business. Simard then said, "If you go to court and you haven't got a subpena, you're all through." Sevigny punched out at 9 a.m. to attend the hearing and returned to the plant before noon. There Simard met him and told him "you're all through." Shortly thereafter Roy met with Respondent's president who told Roy that that Sevigny had been fired because he did not have a subpena. Other employees (Chasse, Turcotte) who informed Simard or other foremen of their intention to attend the September 6 bearing were not asked whether they had received subpenas. CONCLUSIONS A. 8(a)(1) Allegations 1. The Turcotte incident I have found that Foreman Parnel asked Mary Tur- cotte on May 6 about the union meeting, and whether she had signed a union card. Respondent argues that this was merely a casual conversation but does not deny it was without any indication to the employee of the purpose of the questions nor any assurance of no reprisals regardless of the answers given. Moreover, there was little, if any, reason for inquiring of employee Turcotte whether she had signed a union card in the absence of any demand for recognition by the Union. Under such circumstances the incident must be deemed coercive and an interference within the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, espe- cially in the light of the unfair labor practices found below. 2. The Sevigny incidents I have found above that Foreman Simard falsely ac- cused Sevigny of distributing union cards on company time, telling him that he was through, but countermanding that order when the Department Committee representa- tive advised Simard of the falsity of the charge. This ac- tion was obviously coercive, having the necessary result of discouraging lawful union activities. I have also found that Simard drove Sevigny from Roy's bench although he did not do so to others who stopped at Roy's bench to talk to him. Since Simard knew that Sevigny was active in the union organization, this disparity of treatment was also coercive and discouraging to Sevigny's and other em- ployees' union activities. Similarly, Simard's remark to Sevigny, in June, that he "better watch out" conveyed a similar threat as did Simard's remark to Roy, in August, that he was going to fire Sevigny for poor work, a charge, like the one involv- ing alleged union solicitation on company time, which was unfounded and tacitly admitted as such by Simard who asked the Committee representatives to forget it and keep it quiet. 3. The wage increases Respondent's announcement on May 11 of a minimum wage and a wage increase was made in the midst of the union's organizational campaign. Ordinarily such an an- nouncement would be presumptively invalid as discouraging union activities by reason of benefits promised or given by the employer at such time. As noted earlier, the record is completely silent concerning the an- nounced minimum wage. We do not know whether it represents an increase or decrease , or whether it is in compliance with statutory requirements imposed upon the Respondent , or whether it represents any change and, if so, whether the change is significant enough to warrant the attention of the Board or is only the matter of a penny or two and, therefore , de minimis. Inasmuch as counsel have not argued the matter in their briefs , I conclude that the issue is not the minimum wage announcement but only the 3-cent increase which was announced simultane- ously, to be effective June 1. The mere existence of an organizational campaign does not have the result of prohibiting all wage increases. Certainly it cannot be laid down as a governing rule that during a union campaign , management must deny to its employees increased advantages which in the absence of the campaign would be granted. (N.L.R.B . v. W. T. Grant Co., 208 F.2d 710,712 (C.A. 4).) Here the 3 -cent hourly wage increase had been both planned and promised to the recognized Department Committee representative before the organizational cam- paign of the Union, contingent on the success of another 60 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union in other shops in that area. If Respondent had withheld the 3-cent hourly increase such action might, in- deed, be a violation of Section 8(a)(1). American Paper & Supply Company, Container Division, 159 NLRB 1243. I conclude, therefore, that the 3-cent-per-hour wage in- crease announced 'on May 11 to be effective June 1 did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and recom- mend dismissal of that allegation of the complaint. B. 8(a)(2) Allegation Respondent argues that since the Department Commit- tees were formed prior to any activity by the Union in the shop and were formed spontaneously by the employees themselves , the actions of the Respondent in paying com- mittee members for time spent in negotiations constituted mere cooperation by the Respondent. Respondent's argu- ment, however, overlooks certain additional facts which, in my opinion . lead to a contrary conclusion. Thus, I have found that in the latter part of May during the organiza- tional campaign of the Union these Department Commit- tees spontaneously disbanded. At this juncture Respond- ent's president initiated a meeting with employee Roy and asked that the Committee intervene in the pending representation election. At the same time the president met with the employees advising that the hand sewers' Department Committee be reorganized , noting the power of the Committee, and reminding the employees that they did not have to pay any dues. But for the interference of the Respondent's president there is no basis to assume that the Department Committee would have been revital- ized. It is also significant that this revitalization sug- gestion was made while the representation petition of the Union was pending and management's endorsement of the Department Committee's status could not but have an effect on the Union's campaign. Under all those circum- stances, although Respondent may not have dominated the Department Committees nor has the General Coun- sel alleged such behavior , it did certainly interfere with and support them in violation of Section 8(a)(2), and in so doing interfered with the rights of the employees guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Arduini Manufacturing Corp., 153 NLRB 887; Irving Air Chute Company , Inc., Marathon Division, 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2), enfg. 149 NLRB 627. C. 8(a)(3) and (4) Allegation Respondent argues that Sevigny was discharged for in- subordination and profanity towards his supervisor, Simard, and that this episode was merely the culmination of a long series of such incidents. The record does not support that argument. Simard first testified that the in- subordination giving rise to Sevigny's discharge was the fact that Sevigny told Simard that it was none of his "God-damned" business whether he, Sevigny, had a sub- pena. Simard added, however, that before Sevigny started his union activities, Sevigny used to do such things but Simard just let them go. It appears significant to me that his conduct became objectionable to Simard only with the advent of Sevigny's union activities. In any event, how- ever, if Sevigny's use of profanity was justification for the discharge, it would have been natural for Simard to have fired him summarily there and then just as he had at- tempted to do when he thought Sevigny was passing out union cards on company time. I am led, therefore, to the conclusion that the profanity was not the cause of Sevig- ny's discharge and this conclusion is fortified by the testimony of employees that profanity was not uncom- mon in the plant, by Simard's admission that there were no plant rules regarding the use of profanity, and by the fact that no warnings were given anyone regarding the use of profanity. This conclusion is further fortified by Simard's later testimony in response to my questioning that he would have kept Sevigny if Sevigny had not attended the NLRB hearing. It therefore appears from the testimony of Simard that the motivating cause of Sevigny's discharge was Sevig- ny's absence from work to attend the NLRB hearing on September 6. In this connection, Respondent points to the fact that Simard asked Sevigny if he had a subpena to attend the hearing and that Sevigny refused to tell him. From this, Respondent argues that it assumed Sevigny had no subpena and was therefore justified in discharging him for the absence. Respondent's position, however, is undermined by the fact that it became aware that Sevigny had a subpena shortly after the hearing. It therefore knew that if it had discharged Sevigny for absenting himself from work without a subpena, its action was incorrect and Sevigny should have been reinstated. He was not, how- ever, reinstated which leads me to the conclusion that his dismissal was not based upon a belief that he had no sub- pena to attend the NLRB hearing. Only one other osten- sible reason could justify Sevigny's discharge on Sep- tember 6 and that would have been his alleged use of profanity towards Simard, which has already been discussed and rejected. Having found, therefore, that the stated reasons for Sevigny's discharge were unfounded and merely pretex- tual, I conclude that the real motive was one that the Respondent desired to conceal and that such a motive might be an illegal one. Shattuck Denn Mining Corpora- tion v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9). In this instance, I conclude that Sevigny was fired because he was known to be active in the Union's organizational campaign and that his dismissal came after several unsuccessful at- tempts to discharge him. Such a discharge was in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In addition, the discharge of Sevigny for the stated reason of attending an NLRB hearing, despite the fact that he had a subpena to attend that hearing, constituted an interference with that employee's right to give testimony under the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. Standard Packaging Corporation (Royal Lace Paper Division), 140 NLRB 628. The Board dismissed the complaint in the Standard Packaging case because it found that the employer was not motivated by any desire to interfere with the Board's processes or with such rights the complainants may have had to attend the Board proceeding as prospective witnesses. That conclusion was based upon the fact that the Respondent in that case was merely attempting to provide itself with a sufficient work force without preventing anyone from attending the hearing. The Respondent in this case, however, makes no such contention or argument. Moreover, in the Standard Packaging case the dischargees in absenting themselves disregarded specific orders of the employer. Here the only "order" of the Respondent, if one may call it such, was Simard's remark to Sevigny that he had better have a subpena if he was going to attend the hearing. Sevigny had a subpena and he was therefore not in disregard of his employer's orders when he absented himself for 2 or 3 hours to attend the NLRB hearing. Pacemaker Corpora- tion, 120 NLRB 987. THE REMEDY BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 61 Having found that Respondent engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full rein- statement to his former or substantially equivalent posi- tion without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by payment of a sum of money equal to that which he nor- mally would have earned as wages from the date of discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstate- ment, less any net earnings during said period (Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440) and in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the variety and comprehensive- ness of the unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner in- fringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. Finally, upon representations that many of the Respondent's employees are French speaking, I shall recommend that the usual notices required to be posted by the Respondent be written in both English and French. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions, I recommend that the Board issue the fol- lowing: ORDER Billen Shoe Co., Inc., Lewiston, Maine, its officers. agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating its employees concerning their union activities or attitudes. (b) Threatening its employees with loss of employ- ment or other reprisals for engaging in union activities. (c) Unlawfully preventing employees from commu- nicating with each other on matters. (d) Interfering with the administration of or contribut- ing support to the Department Committees or any suc- cessor thereto or any other labor organization of its em- ployees. (e) Recognizing or negotiating with the Department Committees or any successor thereto for the purpose of discussing grievances or other terms or conditions of em- ployment. (f) Unlawfully restricting employees from testifying at Board proceedings or discharging or otherwise dis- criminating against an employee because he has absented himself to give testimony under this Act. (g) Discouraging membership in and activity on behalf of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by discharging or refusing to reinstate employees or by discriminating . against em- ployees in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment. (h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay which he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify Paul Sevigny, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from the Department Committees or any successor thereto as the exclusive representative of its employees for the purpose of dealing with it concerning grievances, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ- ment unless and until such organization shall have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of such employees. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant and necessary to a determination of compliance with paragraph (a) above. (e) Post at its plant in Lewiston, Maine, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix,"' written in both the English and the French languages. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps should be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered. defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.2 In all other respects, the complaint herein is dismissed. ' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 2 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re spondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor 62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate you coercively concern- ing union activity. WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of employ- ment or other reprisals for engaging in union activity. WE WILL NOT restrict your freedom of communi- cation with other employees either because you sup- port the Union or to induce you to refrain from sup- porting the Union. WE WILL NOT interfere with or render unlawful support to the Department Committees or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Boot and Shoe Workers Union. AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by discriminating against em- ployees in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has absented himself to give testimony under this Act or unlawfully restrict any employee from testifying at a Board hearing. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO,, or any other labor organization, to en- gage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activi- ties except to the extent that such rights may be af- fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed and make him whole for any loss he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition from the Department Committees or any successors thereto as the exclusive representative of our em- ployees for the purpose of dealing with it concerning grievances, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ- ment, or other conditions of employment unless and until such organization shall have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of such em- ployees. Dated By BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) Note: We will notify Paul Sevigny if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 20th Floor, Federal Office Building, Cambridge and New Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02108, Telephone 223-3300.