Kellwood Co.

HAWTHORN COMPANY 251 Hawthorn Company, A Division of Kellwood Com- pany and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO New Haven Manufacturing Company and Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO. Cases 14-CA-3876 and 14-CA-3906 June 29, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On August 9, 1966, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had en- gaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondents had not engaged in certain other un- fair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that those allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent Hawthorn filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in these cases. and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the follow- ing additions, modifications, and exceptions. A. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Respondent Hawthorn violated Section 8(a)(1) by engaging in surveillance of its employees' union ac- tivities and by its showing of the film "And Women Must Weep," and violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging John Oliver and suspending William Cooke from work. We find merit, however, in the General Counsel's exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's findings that the following conduct did not constitute further violations of the Act by Respond- ent Hawthorn. 1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent Hawthorn did not engage in further unlawful sur- veillance when, during the period of union organiza- tion, Foreman Hagedorn adopted the practice of sitting at employee tables in the cafeteria, instead of the foremen's table, during the coffee breaks. Hagedorn testified that he did so in order to hold the men to their 10-minute limit for coffee breaks, and the Trial Examiner noted that "on other occa- sions foremen had intensified their immediate su- pervision for one reason or another." It is not shown, however, that it was necessary in this in- stance to do so by moving over to the employees' tables, particularly as the foremen's table afforded a clear view of the men during their coffee breaks. We conclude, upon the entire record, and particu- larly the timing of the adoption of this practice, that Hagedorn's conduct was motivated by a desire to inhibit the employees from using their coffee breaks for purposes of self-organization, and that Re- spondent Hawthorn thereby engaged in further unlawful surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. The Trial Examiner found that the record does not support the allegation that a statement read by Respondent Hawthorn's supervisors to small groups of employees was violative of the Act. The statement opens with the assertion that "We do not want the union in our plant. This is the official position of your company." It then warns of trickery by union agents, the danger of deceptive entrapment into obligations to pay fines and assess- ments, and the intent of the Union to "call a strike to try to force their demands on the company and in the process they can cause our employees to lose their jobs." The statement further warns the em- ployees that "this union can very well destroy the jobs of our employees and inflict suffering upon them and their families." The record also shows that, during the reading of this statement by one of the supervisors, in response to a question by one of the employees as to whether they would lose their jobs if they signed union cards, the supervisor replied that "if the union got in there and the com- pany could not comply with their demands, it is a possibility that the plant would shut down and everybody would lose their jobs." In our opinion, the statement read by the super- visors to the employees, considered in the context of the conduct hereinbefore found unlawful, clearly conveyed to the employees the threat that selection of the Union would endanger their jobs. Under all the circumstances of this case, this statement con- stituted interference with, and restraint and coer- cion of, employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.I B. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Respondent New Haven violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening and interrogating employees concerning their union activities. We find merit, however, in the General Counsel's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's findings that the following conduct did not constitute further violations of the Act. Walter Meyer had been employed by Respondent New Haven as a truckdriver for more than 3 years before his discharge on February 21, 1966. IJ C. Penney Co., Inc., 160 NLRB 279 166 NLRB No. 20 252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Meyer's work while he was employed by Respon- dent New Haven took him regularly to Respondent Hawthorn's plant. Both Respondents learned that Meyer had joined the Union. As the Trial Examiner found, on the basis of uncontradicted or credited testimony of Meyer, Poynter, general foreman of New Haven, told Meyer that all he was going to get out of his union activity was "a lot of trouble," and Monzyk, the president of New Haven, told Meyer that he would be "automatically fired" if he "sent one of those union cards in." The incident that gave rise to Meyer's discharge occurred when he was at the Hawthorn plant on Friday, February 18, and stopped to speak to his son-in-law who was employed there. The record shows that Meyer had stopped to speak to em- ployees at Hawthorn on prior occasions without any objection on the part of Hawthorn supervisors. When Foreman Hagedorn saw Meyer on this occa- sion, however, he seized Meyer forecefully by the arm and told him to leave. It was at this point that Meyer used obscene language to Hagedorn. As set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, Hawthorn's plant manager reported this incident to New Haven, and as he testified he told New Haven that "some disciplinary action should be required and I certainly didn't want the fellow down there until some action was taken, I mentioned that cer- tainly an apology was in order." On the following Monday, however, as the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion states, President Monzyk "did not give Meyer a chance to apologize; he took the extreme measure instead." Monzyk discharged Meyer without giving him any opportunity to explain or apologize. In the light of these facts, and while we do not condone the obscene language used by Meyer, we conclude and find that Respondent New Haven's president seized upon this incident to carry out his threat to discharge Meyer if he became a union member, and that the discharge of Meyer was there- fore violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent Hawthorn en- gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in addition to the incidents found unlawful by the Trial Examiner, we shall order that it cease and desist from such conduct. Having found that Respondent New Haven has discriminated against employee Walter Meyer in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, we shall order it to offer him immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former or substantially equivalent posi- tion, without prejudice to his seniority or other -rights and privileges, and to make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7. By threatening employees with reprisals, Respondent Hawthorn has engaged in and is engag- ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. By discharging employee Walter Meyer for discriminatory reasons, Respondent New Haven has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. ORDER A. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent , Hawthorn Company, a Division of Kellwood Company, New Haven, Missouri , its of- ficers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging , laying off, or otherwise dis- criminating against employees because of their ex- ercise of the right to self-organization or to join labor organizations. (b) Discouraging membership of its employees in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by threatening its employees with discharge if they join or engage in activities on behalf of the said Union or any other union; by engaging in surveillance of the union ac- tivities of its employees ; by showing employees the moving picture film "And Women Must Weep"; or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , or of any of their rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to John Oliver immediate and full rein- statement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make whole John Oliver and William Cooke for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them , in the manner referred to in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision, entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify John Oliver if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security pay- ment records , timecards , personnel records and re- HAWTHORN COMPANY 253 ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its plant in New Haven, Missouri, co- pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. B. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, New Haven Manufacturing Com- pany, New Haven, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging, laying off, or otherwise dis- criminating against employees because of their ex- ercise of the right to self-organization or to join labor organizations. (b) Threatening employees with discharge if they sign union cards, interrogating employees in a coercive manner concerning their union activities, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, or of any of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Walter Meyer immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniori- ty and other rights and privileges previously en- joyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, in the manner referred to in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy," as modified herein. (b) Notify Walter Meyer if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security pay- ment records, timecards, personnel records and re- ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its plant in New Haven, Missouri, co- pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges viola- tions not found herein. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or dis- criminate against any of our employees in re- gard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, because they have engaged in union or concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by threatening our employees with discharge if they join or engage in activities on behalf of the said Union or any other Union; engaging in surveillance of the union activities of our em- ployees; showing employees the moving pic- ture film "And Women Must Weep"; or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing our employees in the exercise of their 2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En- forcing an Order." 3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En- forcing an Order." 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL right to self-organization, to form labor or- ganizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in, or to refrain from engaging in, any and all of the activities specified in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer John Oliver immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges previ- ously enjoyed. WE WILL make John Oliver and William Cooke whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. Dated By HAWTHORN COMPANY, A DIVISION OF KELL- WOOD COMPANY (Employer) (Representative) (Title) Note: In the event the above-named employee is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita- ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by. any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 622-4156. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, or other- wise discriminate against any of our employees because they have engaged in concerted activi- ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization, by threatening employees with discharge if they LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sign union cards, by interrogating employees in a coercive manner concerning their union ac- tivities, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Tex- tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in, or to refrain from engaging in, any and all of the activities specified in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Walter Meyer immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent positio a, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges previ- ously enjoyed. WE WILL make Walter Meyer whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. NEW HAVEN MANUFAC- TURING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) Note: In the event the above-named employee is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita- ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 622-4156. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly designated Trial Examiner on June 7, 8, and 9, 1966, at Washington, Missouri, on complaint of the General Counsel against Hawthorn Company, a Division of Kell- wood Company, the Respondent in Case 14-CA-3876, and against New Haven Manufacturing Company, the Respondent in Case 14-CA-3906. The issues litigated are whether the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Briefs were received from the General Counsel and both Respondents. HAWTHORN COMPANY 255 Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses. I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS leged joint illegal object by the two companies in the dis- crimination against Meyer, that the two cases- 14-CA-3876 and 14-CA-3906- were con- solidated and a single complaint issued . In its separate answer each Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Hawthorn Company operates three plants and is a divi- sion of Kellwood Company, a multistate business. One of its plants is located in the city of New Haven, Missouri. where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu- tion of l ents. tarpaulins, sleeping bags, insulated un- derwear, and related products. During the calendar year 1965, a representative period, Hawthorn purchased and caused to be delivered to its New Haven plant goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Missouri, and manufactured, sold, and distributed from this plant products valued in excess of $50,000 to out-of-State locations. New Haven Manufacturing Company, a Missouri cor- poration, maintains an office and place of business in the city of New Haven, Missouri, and is also engaged in the manufacture and sale of camping supplies, tents, and re- lated products. It. too, annually receives materials valued in excess of $50,000, from out-of-State sources. It has an- nually sold products valued in excess of $50,000 to enter- prises in the State of Missouri which in turn annually sell over $50,000 worth of products to customers located out- side the State of Missouri. I find that both these companies are engaged in com- merce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effec- tuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is a labor organization within the mean- ing of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Late in the year 1965 the Union started an organiza- tional campaign among the employees of both the Hawthorn and the New Haven companies, whose plants in the city of New Haven are situated one-half mile apart. Ninety percent of the business done by New Haven is with Hawthorn. Hawthorn was firmly opposed to self-or- ganization by its employees and instituted its own pro- gram to prevent the success of union activities. The com- plaint charges illegal coercive conduct to management representatives of both companies. It also alleges that Hawthorn discriminated against two of its employees- William Cooke and John Oliver- for the purpose of discouraging their union membership. There is a further allegation that Walter Meyer, an employee of New Haven, was discharged in consequence of both that Com- pany's union animus and because of pressure by Hawthorn, upon New Haven, aimed at furthering Hawthorn's antiunion resolve. It is because of this al- i At one point in the record there seemed to be a stipulation that Meyer's card is dated September 9 In his testimony, which came later, Meyer, speaking of his earliest acquaintance with any agent of the Union, said "The first time was the 7th or 8th of December, 1965 ... I got a letter that Danny Cripe was passing out with a card, and I sent the card Interference, Restraint, and Coercion Daniel Cripe, union organizer, testified that he came to New Haven to begin the organizational campaign "In November or December, around that area." The first signed union authorization card he obtained at Hawthorn is dated November 15; the first employee to sign at the New Haven company was Walter Meyer who signed on December 9.1 From this period through February 21. 1966, 93 employees of the 450-500 total complement at Hawthorn had signed union cards, and 2 of the 32 em- ployee total at New Haven had done the same. The Union distributed leaflets and other organizational litera- ture at the Hawthorn plant entrances, and at the homes of employees; it held employee meetings, both in private homes and in a public hall. Its literature was of the usual kind, explaining the benefits assertedly flowing from con- certed action and in union membership, advising em- ployees not to heed belated promises of future benefits, disparaging comments about unions, or threats of reprisal that might be circulated by employers. Hawthorn reacted with its own literature, some placed in the hands of employees, some posted about the plant premises. The Company also had its foremen call their employees together in groups of three to eight and read a printed statement to all of them. The statement was placed in evidence and starts with the unequivocal phrase "We do not want the union in our plant." It then warns, in a long series of paragraphs, of trickery by union agents, misrepresentation. the danger of deceptive entrapment into obligations to pay fines and assessments, intent by the Union to "strike" and possibly cause employees "to lose their jobs," and the destruction of jobs and suffering inflicted upon employees and their families in con- sequence of signing union cards. "The union people are here to make trouble and nothing else." The statement also lists benefits previously enjoyed in this Company without union representation.2 About January 25 Hawthorn assembled its employees in groups in the plant, and, during paid working hours, showed all of them a moving picture entitled "And Women Must Weep." It is a frightening and fearful por- trayal of human misconduct in a story, real or fancied, built about the events associated with a strike in a distant location 10 years earlier. The Board has had occasion to consider the use of this professionally produced film, with its contrived script, by employers determined to keep their employees from turning to a collective-bargaining agent as a way of life. No need here to describe, in minute detail, the picture sequences, the actors' words, the terri- fying sound effects. As Chairman McCulloch said in an earlier decision: "It pictures a labor dispute as one in which Americanism. religion, family, motherhood, and in- in." The card itself was not placed in evidence and I find Meyer signed it on December 9, and not in September. 2The record does not support the General Counsel's contention that the statement read by the supervisors , as received in evidence, is in itself violative of the Act. 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD nocent childhood are arrayed on one side, and goons, brutes, and murderers on the other or prounion side."3 Twice the Board has ruled that the mere showing of this picture suffices for setting aside the results of a Board election, on the ground that it improperly interferes with an untrammeled expression of choice by employees.4 And only recently it held-"under the circumstances of this case"--that the showing of this film was an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 I make the same finding here. There is some testimony that with the advent of the Union, Hawthorn supervisors started to watch the men more closely at their work stations, and to sit near them during lunch and coffee breaks in the plant cafeteria. The suggestion here is that the Company used the technique of increased pressure of supervision as a form of retalia- tion, and had supervisors spy on the employees in the cafeteria to overhear their union talk and single out the adherents. Thus employee Cooke said Hagedorn, his foreman, started coming to look closely at his work "more frequently" than in the past, and took to sitting near him at coffee. Employee William testified "... it looked like Earl [Hagedorn] was kind of following him [Cook] around wherever he would go." Connor, who also worked under Hagedorn, said that after a union meeting the foreman was "kind of getting rough ... he kept getting on me." Hagedorn denied he ever spied on the employees; he did admit that about this time he took to sitting at the same tables with the men in the cafeteria, but explained he did so because there had been orders to hold the men to the established 10 minutes for coffee breaks, in the in- terest of production needs. The record does show that such crackdowns had occurred from time to time in the past to curb recurring lapeses by the employees generally. There is also indication that on other occasions foremen had intensified their immediate supervision for one reason or another. I do not deem this evidence sufficient to rest a finding of illegal surveyance of employees in the building or of coercive conduct in the course of produc- tion work. Shortly before January 23, 1966. the Union distributed an invitation to a union meeting scheduled for that day at the Stoney Hill hall. Employee Holliman showed it to Hagedorn, who took it and said he "wanted to show it to somebody else." Hagedorn did recall having received the letter and testified he showed it to Plant Superinten- dent Rothmeyer. While the union meeting, attended by about 30 Hawthorn employees, was in process at the Stoney Hill hall, Lola Cooke, an employee waiting for her husband there, saw Supervisor Victor Hoerstcamp ride slowly along a side road, which flanked the building off the main highway, three times during an 18-minute period. Hoerstcamp lived 12 miles away and he did not testify. I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Hoerst- camp that evening engaged in illegal surveyance of the employees' union activity and thereby committed an un- fair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act chargeable to Respondent Hawthorn. A further precise complaint allegation is that Respond- ent Hawthorn violated the statute by maintaining in ef- fect a broad no-solicitation rule which illegally prohibited distribution of union literature in the plant outside of working hours. The proof for this charge is found in a company booklet long given all employees as they are hired, which read as follows: "The Company does not permit soliciting or posting of notices asking for contribu- tions for any purpose at any time on its property except upon permission of management." The following facts are also undisputed. On October 15, 1965, Hawthorn posted a notice on all its bulletin boards modifying that rule and reading, in pertinent part: Employees should not engage in any type of solicitation, selling, or other nonwork activity during worktime." At the same time the Company placed a stamp on all the reserve booklets in its possession with the phrase "no longer in effect" across the wording of its old no-solicita- tion rule. Thereafter all booklets given employees carried that stamp. In March 1966 new booklets were printed and contained the precise language of the new no-dis- tribution rule posted in the plant the previous October. The original charge in this proceeding was filed on January 24, 1966, 3 months after the impropriety of the old rule had been cured. There is no reason to believe the Company then anticipated a union organizational cam- paign, or that the restrictive terms of the old rule were en- forced against such conduct or that any occasion arose to do so. In the circumstances, no useful or pertinent pur- pose would be served by making a finding now of illegali- ty. There is also considerable testimony respecting two other pinpointed allegations of the complaint, each charg- ing Hawthorn with direct economic action aimed at brib- ing its employees into resisting the Union's solicitation toward membership. About a week after January 1, 1966, the Company announced a new pension plan paid entirely by the Employer, to the bulk of its employees in New Haven, who never previously enjoyed such a benefit. Evidence, both documentary and oral, and all uncon- tradicted and therefore credible, shows that the an- nouncement was an incidental aspect of a long-planned companywide innovation. For more than a year the Kell- wood Company, of which Hawthorn is one division, had been studying the advisability and cost of a company-ad- ministered pension arrangement for the employees of its 30 plants throughout the country. The study culminated, with the cooperation and integration of certain insurance companies, in a resolution by the Kellwood Company board of directors to establish the plan and to place it in effect as of January 1, 1966. It was decided centrally to announce the plan to employees soon after that date, and this was done, at the New Haven plant of Hawthorn, the first week in January, and at the other Hawthorn Com- pany locations-one in Missouri and one in Utah-later that month. Instructions were issued in December to all but three of the remaining plants of Kellwood for the manager of each to do likewise throughout the Company. At three plants in Arkansas announcement was withheld because Board-ordered elections were shortly to be held. In these circumstances I conclude that the General Counsel has not satisfied the affirmative burden of prov- ing that announcement of the new pension plan at this New Haven location was intended to or necessarily con- stituted illegal coercion upon the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.6 It has long been a basic policy of the Hawthorn Com- 3 Carl T. Mason Co., Inc, 142 N LRB 480 4 Carl T. Mason Co , Inc, supra, and Plochman and Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods Inc., 140 NLRB 130. 5 South Wire Company, 159 NLRB 394. 6 United Screw and Bolt Co., 91 NLRB 916; cf. Bata Shoe Co, 116 NLRB 1239. HAWTHORN COMPANY 257 pany to grant satisfactory hi _ly rated employees a 5-cent-per-hour raise after 3 months' employment, and successive 5-cent-per-hour raises every 6 months thereafter. One employee, Marvin Williman, testified that although he had received such a raise in February 1966, he was thereafter given two further 5-cent raises within the 4 months preceding the hearing in June. The com- plaint alleges that such departure from past practice, with wage increases thus accelerated, was a device to imple- ment the Company's intent to discourage membership in the Union. Williman was only one of many hourly paid employees who received accelerated raises during the period of the union organizational campaign. The General Counsel subpenaed, and the, Respondent produced, a detailed chart reflecting every instance- over the 6-month period, October 1965 through March 1966 - where an in- dividual hourly rate was changed. There appear upward of 250 separate entries. Included are a number of items unrelated to raises; these show employees who changed to or from piecework, and thereafter had their base rate altered upwards or downwards. There are also reflected a number of instances of regular raises that simply fell into the old established pattern of 3-month and 6-month raises under the old system. Precisely how many of the raises shown were quickened increases that would not have been granted had the Respondent merely continued its former merit raise methods, cannot be ascertained from the machine record as made. Concededly the number of employees who received ac- celerated raises during the 6-month period is very sub- stantial, and from this one fact the General Counsel ar- gues that the Company engaged in a broadside effort to combat the Union's campaign by means of such raises. The Respondent uses the same objective record of so widespread and extended a program of wage changes-starting as early as October-as partial proof of its contention that the changes had nothing to do with the employees' union activities. In further support it called Morris Tillman, personnel manager, and Thomas Nolan, vice president of Hawthorn and plant manager of the New Haven plant, who testified that the rates were so broadly changed in consequence of an areawide study, long antedating the inception of the union campaign. Both testified that in May 1965, the Company felt its wage structure was too low in comparison with rates prevalent in comparable industry in the area. Noland said he caused a survey to be made, and Tillman said he did this. They said they decided it was necessary to "adjust iniquities," both among their employees and between Hawthorn's work force and workmen of other companies. To this end, according to their oral testimony, they decided both to shorten the period between raises for certain employees, and to raise the base rate-by further successive raises-for others, and that they began the program in October with the hope of completing it by June or July 1966. In the sense that general self-serving explanations gain persuasion by hard facts, there is much to be desired in both the oral testimony and the record of raises offered by the Respondent. The personnel manager, who said he had much to do in evolving the direct mechanics of the revised wage structure, was indefinite and evasive as to how the selection of individuals for increases was made; he said it was not a matter of job categories, work of one kind or another that had to be raised generally, nor an across-the-board flat increase for everyone. He spoke of studying the wage structure of other plants in the same in- dustry, but it then developed there are really none such; he called it all the "textile" industry, although clearly the various companies in the area produce fundamentally dif- ferent end products. In the end all that remained of his en- tire story, so far as concrete statements are concerned, was that the Company selected at random as fancy dic- tated, giving raises to some and not to others. Further, it is not possible, from a study of the exhibit charts, to tell which of the many raises were only applications of the old system, and which attributable to the alleged revised companywide program. There are certain pencil checks placed next to a number of the recorded rate changes; at one point Tillman said these indicate which of the raises were the result of the overall plan at the time to lift the plant level of wages. No written records were produced to give body to the management representatives' testimony in explanation of all these unexpected raises received by the employees while they were being so- licited to join the Union. And while the testimony that wage rates elsewhere were examined and changes made here for the purpose of eliminating "iniquities" went unchallenged, it is in the nature of such testimony that it cannot be contradicted. It is nevertheless true that a great many individual raises were given during this period, for the General Counsel also makes that assertion. And although the printed records do not plainly identify which raises fell into which category, the substance of Tillman's uncon- tradicted testimony that his pencil checks tell the story was seemingly accepted by the General Counsel. From this it would appear that during October, 16 such new type increases were granted, and that during the sub- sequent 4 months they totaled 51, 39, 42, and 54 succes- sively. In some instances several of these raises went to a single employee, all within the 5-month span. Whatever frailties in the general proof said to support the Respond- ent's contention as to why these raises were given, the fact that so many were granted in October, and perhaps 25 more in the first half of November, inevitably weakens the inference sought by the General Counsel that the un- derlying explanation was a reaction to the union activity. Organizer Cripe said clearly he only arrived in the city of New Haven late in November or December. The first card signed by any employee is dated in the middle of November. No amount of suspicion can alter the fact that the general sweep of the raises began over a month before any events which can be said to have alerted the Re- spondent to the Union's later activities. The burden is upon the General Counsel to prove affirmatively that the raises were intended as a coercive device. On this record I cannot make the finding.' The Suspension of William Cooke By February 1966, William Cooke had been employed by Hawthorn for over a year; he was a very outspoken proponent of the Union. About a week after January 26, when the Company showed its film "And Women Must Weep" to the employees, Cooke wrote a long nine-para- graph statement "to my fellow workmen at Hawthorn" in order, as the document reads, to "speak out against this attempt by management to instill fear of unionism." He charged the Company with paying low wages and making 7 True Temper Corp, 127 NLRB 839 , 842-44 258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD excessive profits, promised improved pay and better liv- ing conditions through the Union, assured the employees of Government protection against threats and reprisals, and then generally, in very forceful language, urged all to sign up. Cooke signed his name to the document as a "Member of Hawthorn Employees' Organizing Commit- tee." The paper was widely distributed among the em- ployees. The Respondent reacted on February 9 by posting a notice on the bulletin boards and at other locations throughout the plant. It starts with: "One of our em- ployees recently distributed a union leaflet which he signed as a member of the `Hawthorn Employees' Or- ganizing Committee.' We have not been notified of any other employees belonging to this so-called `committee' but we do want everyone to clearly understand that no employee is going to receive any preferred or special treatment just because he joins or becomes a part of a union `organizing committee."' It continued by saying that participation in an organization committee was no as- surance "the company can no longer take any action against them," that no one would receive preferred treat- ment, but would be subjected to "the same rules, policies and regulations as everyone else," and that union mem- bership would never be a condition of employment. A copy of this notice was posted on the door to a small shop, 100 feet from the main plant, where Cooke and one or two other employees worked at making miniature tents. When Cooke arrived that morning he removed it and put it in his pocket. At the hearing he explained he did so because it was raining and the notice had become wet and illegible. An hour later his foreman, Hagedorn, came to the shop, asked for the notice, and brought Cooke to the office of Rothmeyer, Hagedorn's superior. The mana- ger had already consulted the personnel director and it had been decided to impose a 3-day suspension on Cooke in discipline. They asked Cooke to sign a warning notice reading: "Willfully removed company notice, posted on company property without permission, in outright defi- ance of company rules." He refused to sign. Cooke lost 3 days' pay because of his suspension. I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Hawthorn suspended Cooke from work for the purpose of discouraging union membership among the employees and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Its resentment against union activities of any kind is clear on the record, even to the extent of resorting to illegally coercive conduct. As of that moment Cooke was perhaps the most outspoken employee assisting Union Organizer Cripe. If any of his behavior up to that point could be called "defiant" in the opinion of management, it was cir- culation of his prounion statement only a few days earlier. Indeed the notice whose removal from a door so offended the Company that day was aimed precisely at him. In the teeth of its own promise that very morning to everybody that even prounion employees would be "subject to the same rules" applicable to all, the Com- pany took away from Cooke the written assurance against excessive discipline long given all workmen. There is a 39-page booklet entitled "Welcome to Haw- thorn" placed in the hand of every employee who joins' the Company. One of the subjects explained is "discipli- nary procedure," and as the least serious offenses lists 14 mistakes a man can make, one of them being "removing notices or signs on bulletin boards or elsewhere on com- pany property without permission." As to these offenses the booklet precisely provides discipline as "verbal warning" for a first offense, "written warning" for a second offense, and "written warning and suspension" for a third offense. Cooke's foreman, Hagedorn, testified he had once warned the man verbally for overstaying his coffee break, but it is admitted he had never committed any other offense or ever been given a written notice of any kind. Personnel Manager Tillman said the em- ployees had a right to rely upon the regulations set out in the booklet. Asked why in this instance the Company ignored its plantwide rules and inflicted the greater pun- ishment for the lesser offense, all he could say was he thought the man "merited the three-day suspension." On the record as a whole I can make no other finding but that the real reason was to punish Cooke, not for re- moval of the notice, but for having presumed to criticize the Company in its antiunion campaign and to urge his fellow workmen to join. The Discharge of John Oliver Oliver was hired by Hawthorn on November 15, 1965, and assigned to learn how to make miniature tents; he worked together with Cooke in the small building separate from the main plant. Throughout his employ- ment he was also used, as need arose, to load trucks, paint boards, and package finished tents. The Company has a 90-day probationary period, and Oliver knew this when he started. He favored the Union; he signed a card himself in December and solicited several other employees at their homes. On February 23, 1966, while sitting at coffee dur- ing a rest break, he found Zastrow, assistant foreman of the shipping department in which Oliver worked, next to him at a table in the cafeteria. The two talked about the union campaign, Oliver starting the subject and even hop- ing to convince Zastrow. The assistant foreman ridiculed the idea, saying he thought the Union would not succeed, "If they do they will be a strike ... Everybody will be let off and it will be a long, drawed-out affair ... Everybody will be laid off and they have the warehouses full and they will start shipping anyway." That same afternoon Oliver was discharged. The General Counsel's theory of complaint respecting this employee is that Hawthorn learned that day of Oliver's attempts to win adherents to the Union, and, in furtherance of its desire to defeat the organizational cam- paign, decided to release him to curb such activities by the employees. Hagedorn, Oliver's foreman, who par- ticipated in the discharge decision, said he did not know of the man's union sentiments at the time; in affirmative defense the Respondent asserts Oliver was released because his probationary period was up and his produc- tion not satisfactory. I am satisfied that by the afternoon of February 23 Respondent Hawthorn had learned of Oliver's prounion attitude. Whether or not Zastrow, the assistant foreman, was a supervisor within the technical definition of the Act, as the General Counsel contends and the Respond- ent Hawthorn disputes, is a close question. Part of the time he does physical work, such as driving and loading trucks; his major duties are doing the paper work of the shipping department, keeping records, answering telephones, and generally seeing to it that the proper trucks are loaded at the right time. Zastrow did not testi- fy, but Hagedorn, his immediate superior, said the assistant tells the men what to do, orders them to "change from one job to another" when Hagedorn "is away," and HAWTHORN COMPANY is told to "look after" the department at certain times. Hagedorn is in charge of 23 men and every day spends some time at two other locations in the city where some of these are regularly assigned. Unlike the foremen, Zas- trow is hourly paid, and there is conclusionary testimony that he has no authority to hire or discipline others, or recommend such action, or to grant time off. Hagedorn also said, however, that Zastrow reported to him when- ever any employee "might be goofing off or something," and "always" told the foreman if any men did not follow the assistant's instructions. With Zastrow thus used as watchman over the men, with Respondent Hawthorn's resolve to combat the union campaign at every turn, with the reason advanced by this Company in explanation of the discharge clearly false (as will appear shortly), and with the discharge fol- lowing so precipitously, before quitting time, upon Oliver's attempt to persuade the assistant foreman toward the Union that morning, the inference is amply warranted both that management learned quickly through Zastrow of Oliver's attitude and that this was the true reason for the discharge. To prove that Oliver was not competent and was released for that reason, the Respondent started with the testimony of Personnel Manager Tillman, who offered into evidence a paper on which are listed 43 dates, and opposite each certain numbers called "amount completed" (of miniature tents) and "hours on miniature tents," meaning time devoted that particular day to produce the number of tents indicated. It will be remem- bered that Oliver also did other work, either entire or full days. The entire purport of Tillman's testimony on this point is that Oliver's deficiency was that he did not produce an average of one miniature tent per hour, said to be the norm requirement in the plant. Tillman also produced certain daily reports, prepared in Oliver's hand, from which he said he took the data to prepare his list ex- hibit. Cross-examination reveals clearly that the summary sheet, the alleged basis for discharge, is not a reliable summary of Oliver's miniature tent production. Shown two of the reports -from which he had recorded 9 hours as spent producing only one tent each day, Tillman pointed to a certain .09 entry, and said this meant to him 9 hours of tent-making work in a single day. He then con- ceded it did not, and could not mean 9 hours of work, that these cards gave no inkling of the time so devoted, and finally that he simply had no idea what that entry meant. It is also a number .09 that appears on many other forms he used. Tillman finally added that because Oliver had prepared the data report haphazardly the summary sheets were no more than his, Tillman's, "interpretation" of the original entries. Four daily reports were placed in evidence, each used by Tillman for his summary, and each so written that there is no coherent way of reading the number of hours devoted to tent making. Foreman Hagedorn followed Tillman to the stand to support the alleged ground of discharge for cause. He said he was asked to help explain the daily reports to Tillman when the latter prepared the summary sheet. His testimony as to the meaning of certain entries is equally confusing and incomprehensible. There is another box on the daily report designated "hours worked"; most of the cards show a number 9 there. Hagedorn started by saying this entry shows how many hours Oliver worked on miniature tents. But some of the cards bear the statement across the face that Oliver that day also did other work. Hagedorn then said that under the heading "Number of 259 units or hours," he had told Oliver "he could put the style - anything." The fact is Oliver prepared his reports slovenly, and they do not, as Tillman attempted to say, make possible any reliable picture of his true tent produc- tion against hours on that particular work. Hagedorn also persisted in the story that it was the in- sufficient quantity of tent production by Oliver that the Company deemed unsatisfactory. He was then referred to Tillman's summary, where for 14 workdays in Februa- ry Oliver produced about as many tents as the document charges hours against him. A number of times it shows eight tents against 9 hours, seven against 8, five against 5, and six against 6. Hagedorn countered with saying it was the 3-month average that showed only 50 percent produc- tion by Oliver. He ended with a final admission: "At last he was- at last he could, or he was getting one out an hour ...... With this from Oliver's foreman, the total af- firmative defense that Oliver was discharged because he had not learned to produce enough tents collapsed completely. The whole purpose of a probationary period concept is that a man must show, within the time allotted, he has developed the requisite skill, and therefore logi- cally, whatever his inadequate production may have been back in November when Oliver started, is totally irrele- vant here. After all this emphasis at the hearing on quantity, I must credit Oliver where he said that in the discharge conversation with Tillman on February 23 the personnel director said nothing about the quality of his work. In- deed as a witness Tillman made no contrary contention. Hagedorn's belated attempt, at the hearing, to inject criti- cism of Oliver's quality of work as a collateral cause, is supported by nothing more than the office record of a 45-day interview with Oliver when his work was discussed in the middle of his probationary period. Here the element of quality is checked off as "fair." On the record in its entirety I find that Respondent Hawthorn discharged Oliver on February 23, 1966, to discourage his union activities and thereby violated Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Discharge of Walter Meyer Walter Meyer worked for 3-1/2 years for Respondent New Haven Company; he was normally a truckdriver, and sometimes janitor and watchman. His truck duties regularly took him to the Hawthorn plant to make deliv- eries or pickups. He signed a union card about December 9. New Haven also was opposed to union representation for its employees. Meyer testified that on December 11, as he was showing a letter from the Union to employee Holliman at the Hawthorn location, Foreman Hagedorn passed by and looked at it. When Meyer returned to his base, later in the day, and entered the office to turn in his tickets, Marvin Poynter, the New Haven general foreman, was just completing a telephone conversation and told him: "Walter, all you are going to get out of this is a lot of trouble." Three days later, still according to Meyer, Robert Monzyk, president of New Haven, ap- proached him in the lunchroom to ask "If I had sent one of those union cards in." When Meyer said yes, Monzyk said: "You know you are automatically fired when you send that card in." In disbelief Meyer asked did Monzyk really mean what he was saying, and the officer reaf- firmed his statement. A month later, about January 23, Robert Monzyk again approached Meyer in the lunchroom and said: "I hear you are going to have a union 260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting," and then added: "All you are going to do, you are going to spoil everything for us." Poynter was not called as a witness. Monzyk gave a different version of his talk with Meyer on the 14th. He said he had heard Meyer "was helping a union to try to organize the Hawthorn plant." and therefore asked him "if he had received literature from the union organizer" and "Do you intend to follow it up?" When Meyer said he did propose to pursue the matter, Monzyk, still according to his own testimony, answered he was indifferent on the subject but that if Meyer were caught distributing union literature during working hours in the shop "he was sub- ject to being automatically discharged." Later in his testimony Monzyk admitted that before talking to Meyer, he "did not have any idea he was distributing literature during working hours," and that he had also told Meyer that day: "You might make hardships on some of the fel- lows in the shop." I credit Meyer. Monzyk's inquiry was no idle curiousi- ty about one man's attitude; he wanted to know what Meyer was going to do with respect to the rest of the em- ployees. He intended to watch him and wanted the em- ployee to know it. Meyer had given no cause for concern to the Company about interfering with production by soli- citing during working hours, and Monzyk had no basis for expecting he might do so. Under the circumstances, talk of discharge and hardship to employees could only have been intended to coerce. I find Monzyk did say the Company would discharge employees if they signed union cards, and interrogated Meyer concerning his union activities in a coercive manner, and that by such conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Meyer was discharged 2 months later, on February 21. 1966. He exchanged words with Foreman Hagedorn on Friday. higher management persons then complained to New Haven about the driver's conduct and asked that he no longer be permitted to come to the plant, and the fol- lowing Monday, New Haven discharged him. The reason stated at the time was the Friday incident, and there was no mention of the Union during the terminal conversa- tion. The theory of the General Counsel in this case is that Hawthorn seized upon the incident as a convenient excuse to curb Meyer's union activities, urged New Haven to dismiss him for this reason, and is therefore jointly responsible with the latter company for a direct discrimination in employment violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. While there is ground for suspicion. I do not believe the relevant facts, in toto, warrant the conclusion that New Haven discharged this man for a proscribed purpose, or that Hawthorn Company urged his dismissal because of his union activities. Hawthorn's general union animus is clear, and its foreman, Hagedorn, did learn in December that Meyer had something to do with the Union when he saw the letter the employee had recieved. On the other hand, there was no mention of the Union by any of the partici- pants in the incident of misbehavior on Friday, and there is no evidence that during whatever conversation took place between agents of the two companies the Union was referred to at all. In defense, New Haven maintains Meyer was discharged because he was essentially an outdoor man, he could no longer be used for deliveries to Hawthorn- his regular duties- and as Hawthorn was its principal customer, its officials had to be respected. A weakness in this assertion is that while Hawthorn people may have asked Monzyk, of New Haven, what the company "was going to do about it," they did not ask for outright discharge. Indeed, Thomas Nolan, Hawthorn's plant manager, testified that all he told the other company was "it was a pretty serious matter and that some disciplinary action should be required and I certainly didn't want the fellow down there until some action was taken, I men- tioned that certainly an apology was in order." But Mon- zyk did not give Meyer a chance to apologize; he took the extreme measure instead. Maybe this was because while they talked in the office Meyer became a little offensive to Monzyk too. Or could it have been because Monzyk had threatened Meyer with discharge 2 months earlier, in a certain conversation about the Union? All this notwithstanding, it remains a fact that Meyer gave cause both for complaint from Hawthorn and for discharge by New Haven. He wandered away from where his truck was to be loaded on the Hawthorn premises and went to speak to his son-in-law, an em- ployee, about a personal matter. Foreman Hagedorn saw him talking to still another workman who was on duty. He told Meyer to remove himself from that area because he did not belong there. Hagedorn said he just touched the other's arm to attract his attention in the noise. Meyer said the foreman wrenched his arm and twisted his back. Who will ever know? No other person present were asked to describe the extent or nature of the physical con- tact. What is sure is that Meyer spoke in very vile lan- guage to Hagedorn. No need for detail, for while at some points in his testimony he attempted to deny it. Meyer also twice admitted "I may have" called Hagedorn a . . . The very weak testimony intended to establish that obscene language was not unusual among Haw- thorn's employees is entirely unpersuasive. I have no reason to find that dirty language was the order of the day in that plant, or that any significant bad language was excused. Meyer had no business being where he was talking to busy employees, and his behavior was offensive and justly subjected him to criticism. The complaint to the New Haven supervisors came immediately that same day, and he was in fact disciplined by discharge the very next workday. I conclude that the General Counsel has not proved a prima facie case supporting the complaint allegations regarding the discharge of Walter Meyer. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondents set out in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondents set out in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com- merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondents have committed certain unfair labor practices. I shall recommend that they be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and to take certain affirmative action designed to dis- sipate its effect The Respondent Hawthorn having il- legally discharged John Oliver, it must be ordered to rein- state him to his former or equivalent position. The Respondent Hawthorn must also be ordered to make whole Oliver and William Cooke. who was suspended from work illegally, for any loss of earnings they may have suffered in consequence of the illegal discrimination HAWTHORN COMPANY 261 against them in their employment. Backpay shall be com- puted in accordance with the formula prescribed by the Board in F.W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and the assessment of interest shall be computed in the manner prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the unfair labor practices committed by Hawthorn, the commision of similar and other unfair labor practices by that company may reasonably be anticipated. I shall therefore recom- mend that Hawthorn be ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondents are employers within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging John Oliver and by suspending from work William Cooke, Respondent Hawthorn has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the foregoing conduct, by showing employees the moving picture film "And Women Must Weep." and by surveying the union activities of employees, Hawthorn has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By threatening employees with discharge if they signed union cards and by interrogating them concerning their union activities, Respondent New Haven has en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 308-926 0-70-18