Union Carbide Corp.

UNION CARBIDE CORP. Union Carbide Corporation, Olefins Division, En- gineering Department Design and Construction and Local 625, United Association of Jour- neymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-3987 and 9-RC-6750 June 30, 1967 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On March 30, 1967, Trial Examiner Phil Saun- ders issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respond- ent has not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. He also found that interference with the election in Case 9-RC-67500 was not established by the evidence presented. Thereafter the General Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party filed exceptions to the Decision and supporting briefs, and the Respondent and Charging Party filed answering briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Triai Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.- The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employees concerning their union ac- tivities; by creating the impression of surveillance, of union activity; by the job transfer of a union ad- herent; and by issuing a written reprimand to a union adherent while failing to take similar action for the same offense against another employee. We also agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that this conduct is not of such a serious nature as to warrant a finding that Respondent completely re- jected the collective-bargaining principle or that it refused to bargain so as to gain time to undermine the Union.2 However, contrary to the Trial Exam- iner ,3 we find that Respondent's preelection con- 166 NLRB No. 39 441 duct, found violative of Section 8(a)(1) herein, was sufficient to constitute interference with employees' freedom of choice in the election. Accordingly, we shall set it aside and direct a second election. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Union Carbide Cor- poration, Olefins Division, Engineering Depart- ment Design and Construction, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on July 14, 1966, among Respondent's employees, be and it hereby is, set aside, and that Case 9-RC=6750 is remanded to the Regional Director for Region 9 for the purpose of conducting a new election at such time as he deems that circum- stances permit the free choice of a bargaining representative. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, be, and it hereby is, modified by striking therefrom the third indented paragraph in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: WE WILL NOT transfer a known adherent for the Union from one job to a less desirable job because of his sympathies for, membership in, or activities on behalf of, any labor organiza- tion. [Direction of Second Election4 omitted from publication. ] I Member Jenkins finds the evidence insufficient to support a finding of unlawful surveillance. 2 In view of our adoption of the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the 8(a)(5) allegation in the complaint, we find it unnecessary to consider any of the Trial Examiner's findings on issues related to the Union's majority status 3 In adopting the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the allegation of an un- lawful threat to contract out work made by Supervisor Mitchell in his con versation with employee Debord, we rely solely on the Trial Examiner's credibility finding. 4 An election eligibility list containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 9 within 7 days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director. The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election. No ex- tension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director ex- cept in extraordinary circumstances. Failure to comply with this require- ment shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper ob- jections are filed. Excelsior Underwear Inc., and Saluda Knitting Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PHIL SAUNDERS, Trail Examiner: Upon a charge filed on July 20, 1966, by Local 625, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe 442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO,, herein called the Union or Charging Party, against Union Carbide Corporation, Olefins Division, Engineering Department Design and Construction, herein called Respondent or Company, the General Counsel issued a complaint on October 31, 1966, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Company filed an answer to the complaint denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. The parties were represented by counsel and participated fully in the hear- ing, and all of the parties filed briefs. Upon the entire record and from my observation and demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the manufacture of chemicals and related products at its plants located in and around Charleston, West Virginia. During the past year, which is a representative period, Respondent had a direct outflow of its products valued in excess of $50,000 which it sold and caused to be shipped, in interstate commerce, from its said West Virginia plants directly to points outside the State of West Virginia. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED At all times material herein, the Union is and has been a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced certain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent denies that any of its conduct violated the Act or ex- ceeded the free speech guarantees of the Act, and further maintains that even if accepted, arguendo, as true, the al- leged incidents were isolated to a very few employees when considered in light of the total number of employees involved in the unit in question, and had no impact on the overwhelming majority of employees. The complaint also alleges that a particular unit found by the Regional Director in his decision in representation case 9-RC-6750, rendered June 8, 1966, constitutes an appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining under Section 9(b) of the Act.' Respondent denies and takes issue that the said unit is an appropriate one. The complaint further alleges that since on or about March 10, 1966, the Union has requested the Respond- ent to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclu- sive bargaining representative and that at all times since on or about March 15, 1966, Respondent has refused to recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union, and The unit found appropriate is as follows: All pipe fitters, instrument fitters, welders and pipe shopmen, and all of their helpers and trainees employed by Respondent in its Field Group and Pipe Fabrication Shop , working in and out of its Institute and South Charleston, West Virginia locations, excluding all Metal Fabrication Shop employees , all office clerical employees, guards, further, since on or about June 8, 1966, a majority of the employees of Respondent in the above unit have designated or selected the Charging Party as their exclu- sive representative, and that all the foregoing constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Company denies that it has violated Section 8(a)(5) in any manner and maintains that they had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority at all times. The case for the General Counsel and the Charging Party is based upon the Bernel Foam theory set forth by the Board in Bernel Foam Manufacturing Company, 146 NLRB 1277, and clarified in Irving Air Chute, 149 NLRB 627, enfd. 350 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2, 1965). Generally, it is their position that as of June 8, 1966, the Union represented a majority of the employees in an ap- propriate unit and the Company was under an obligation to bargain with the Union as of that date and all times thereafter. Further, they maintain that the Respondent's refusal was not based upon a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status in an appropriate unit, but was based upon a repudiation of the principle of collective bargaining and was done to gain time to dissipate the Union's majority by unlawful interference, restraint, and coercion of the employees, and but for the Respondent's interference which dissipated the Union's majority, the Union would have won the Board election held on July 14,1966. Under the factual circumstances of this case the main issues for determination are as follows: 1. Whether the Union's initial demand for recognition was a continuing demand. 2. Whether the Union represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for which it was seeking recognition. 3. Whether the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union was based upon a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status and appropriateness of the unit. 4. Whether the Respondent interfered with and coerced the employees between the date of the original demand on March 10, 1966, and the date of the election in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. A. Background and Events As previously noted the Company is engaged in the manufacture of chemicals and related products at its plants located in and around Charleston , West Virginia. The operation of the Respondent for the unit alleged in the complaint and found appropriate by the Board in the earlier representation case, 9-RC-6750 (General Coun- sel's Exhibit 1(f)), involves Olefins Division , Engineering Department Design and Construction. The headquarters for the department under which the pipefitters work is located at the technical center. The Respondent employs a maximum of 228 employees in the appropriate unit listed on General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2 containing the names of the employees as of June 8, 1966.2 The Union began to organize the employees of the Respondent's Olefins Division during the early part of 1965.3 This effort was unsuccessful , and in early 1966 the Union again started another campaign to organize, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees. 2 All dates are 1966 unless specifically stated otherwise. 2 The Union is affiliated with the Charleston Building and Construction Trades Council. UNION CARBIDE CORP. 443 and we are concerned here with the latter. On March 10 the Union made a written demand on the Company to recognize and bargain with it for a unit consisting of all "pipefitters, welders, instrument mechanics and their trainees, helpers and/or apprentices" in Design and Con- struction of the Olefins Division of the Respondent. On the same day the Union filed a representation peti- tion with Region 9 of the National Labor Relations Board in Case 9-RC-6750 seeking certification for the same unit. On March 15 the Respondent notified the Union that its request for recognition was being denied because the Company had a "good faith doubt that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining desired to be represented by your Union" and "there is the question of the appropriate unit." A hearing on the representation petition in 9-RC-6750 was held on March 31, and on June 8 the Regional Director issued his -Decision and Direction of Election granting the unit requested by the Union, as previously set forth herein, and excluding the metal fabrication shop employees, numbering approximately 52, whom the Company had sought to include in the unit. No review of the Regional Director's decision was sought by the Respondent. An election was then held on July 14 which the Union lost, and on July 20 the Union filed timely ob- jections to the election and to conduct affecting the results of the election. At the same time the Union filed the unfair labor practice charge against the Company setting forth the allegations involved herein. On November 22 the Regional Directcr ordered a hearing to be held on the Union objections numbered 1, 2, and 3 and further, consolidated hearing on the objections with the hearing on the complaint in 9-CA-3987. The objections are, therefore, included within the specific 8(a)(1) allega- tions involved herein. In addition to the above, it should also be initially noted that the International Association of Machinists, herein called the TAM, was also seeking to represent the em- ployees involved in this case but in a larger unit. It ap- pears that the Respondent first became aware of the IAM efforts about March 3. Joseph Fallon, Respondent's as- sociate director, engineering department, testified that he was aware of the IAM organizing efforts toward the em- ployees in this case early in 1966, prior to March. Fallon stated that he directed that all recorded messages given by the IAM over a publicized public telephone number be transcribed and reduced to writing. Respondent's Ex- hibits 12A-12H were received as examples of the IAM recorded telephone messages. As pointed out Respond- ent's Exhibit 12A, recorded on March 3, was directed to construction employees, including those involved in this case; it states, "The IAM will represent all crafts and all employees under one local lodge and under one con tract ... "; similarly Respondent's Exhibit 12B recorded on March 4 stated, "... The construction hourly em- ployees also can have a local lodge controlled by mem- bership and all under one contract regardless of craft." The remaining exhibits, Respondent's Exhibits 12C-12H,, made it clear that the IAM was seeking to represent all construction department employees, includ- ing those involved in the instant case, and was aware it was competing with other unions in its organizational drive. IAM Grand Lodge Representative, Richard No- ble, testified that his union was engaged in organizational efforts since early 1966 toward employees involved in this case, prior to the demand for recognition and representation petition filed by the Charging Party. Noble testified that the IAM sought and received authorization cards from employees in hourly classifications involved in the instant case and forwarded those cards to the Re- gional Director in support, of the IAM petition-9-RC-6902-filed on July 6. This petition was preceded by a demand for recognition and request for bargaining for all of Respondent's hourly employees, in- cluding those involved in this case and dated July 2. A few of the General Counsel's witnesses also confirmed that IAM was active in organizing in the classifications in this case, and had in fact signed IAM authorization cards. However, the IAM seeks to represent the employees herein involved as part of a larger unit, and this was true from the beginning of 1966 and up to the hearing of this case. The IAM petition covered all the unit (about 950 employees) rather than the much smaller portion involved in this proceeding, and after notification the IAM did not participate in the representation hearing on March 31 on the petition filed by the Charging Party herein, as -afore- stated, nor was the IAM on the ballot at the election con- ducted on July 14. B. The Demand, the Unit, and the Authorization Cards The General Counsel introduced 127 union authoriza- tion cards into the record. On March 10, when the Union made its original demand for recognition, it had approxi- mately 88 authorization cards out of a unit composing about 228 employees. The Union, therefore, did not have a majority on March 10, but in this respect the General Counsel and the Charging Party maintain that the Union's original request for recognition was a continuing demand, and that the Union did acquire a majority status in the unit on June 8. When the Company rejected the Union's demand on March 15, as aforestated, it did not request a card count and company witnesses testified that at the time the Respondent had no knowledge as to how many authorization cards the Union had. Edgar Dryden, the Union's chief organizer in this case, stated that he talked to the Respondent's vice president, J. S. Freeman, in March and June. Dryden told Freeman on one of these occasions that he represented a "majority of the people and that I thought that he should go along, and. he [Freemen] said when you win the election then we will recognize you." Freemen admitted that Dryden talked with him a number of times, and that during some of these conversations informed him that "Union Carbide would be better off if we had a union." Paul Gregory, manager of industrial relations at Design and Construction, denied having any conversations with Dryden from March 10 up to the time of the election. However, on cross-examination Gregory admitted that he did talk with Dryden on March 31 at the hearing on the Union's petition and possibly on July 13. Gregory also knew on July 13, at the preelection conference, that Dryden was seeking to represent the employees and get recognition. In efforts to explain his answers, Gregory said he could not remember if he had any conversations with Dryden on March 31, but if he did it was only social. This record also shows that again at the preelection conference on July 13, Dryden requested recognition from Joseph Fallon, the Respondent's associate director of engineering, who was attending on behalf of the Com- pany. Dryden said they could call the election off if the Company would recognize the Union, but Fallon refused 444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD recognition and said the Company would go through with the election. Employee N. R. Lilly corroborated the testimony of Dryden concerning this conversation, and, although Fallon testified, he did not deny Dryden's direct testimony on this point or issue . Moreover, this record shows that at the representation hearing on March 31 the Company was specifically asked by counsel for the Union if they were ready to recognize the Union as the bargaining agent , and the Company again declined. I find nothing in this record to indicate that the Union's demand was ever withdrawn; on the contrary, it appears from the above testimony and other events in the record that the Union's demand for recognition continued up to the time of the election or at least up until the Union did acquire a majority status.4 Moreover, as pointed out, after the Union's initial demand was rejected by the Company, the Union continued to process its election petition by participating in the hearing on March 31, working out the arrangements for the election , campaigning among the employees, attending the preelection conference and, finally, participating in the election. It has been well established that a Union's participation in the election processes of the Board constitutes a continuing demand for recognition and obligates the Employer to bargain with the Union when it reaches majority status even though it lacked majority status at the time of its original demand. Lake Butler Apparel Company, 158 NLRB 863. Also in Scobell Chemical Company v. N.L.R.B., 267 F.2d 922, 925 (C.A. 2), where the court, assuming that the union lacked a majority at the time of its bargaining request, found that it had such a majority the next day, and held that in the light of the strike and picketing which there ensued, the Union's request for bargaining must be deemed a continuing request. The instant case is somewhat like Scobell except that here, instead of strik- ing and picketing, the Union pursued its bargaining request through a representation petition. See N.L.R.B. v. Burton-Dixie Corporation, 210 F.2d 199, 200, 201 (C.A. 10), where the union lacked a majority at the time it requested recognition but where the request was un- derstood to be of a continuing character. In Burton-Dixie, as here, the employer's attitude made it quite clear that a latter request would have been futile, and the court's holding there suggests the propriety of a similar finding here: In addition to these cases also see Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 862; American Compressed Steel Company, 146 NLRB 1463; and Morris Novelty Company, 157 NLRB 1471. In view of the above, I am convinced, and find, that the March 10 demand was in fact a continuing demand, and was still in effect when the Union subsequently attained its alleged majority status. It is the position of the Charging Party, joined in by the General Counsel, that three persons listed on the Em- ployer's payroll sheet of June 8, 1966, are supervisors within the meaning of the Act and therefore not in the unit. A deletion of J. S. Ellis, C. F. Forth, and O. C. Mc- Callister reduces the appropriate unit to 225 and a neces- sary majority of 113.5 It is well settled that in an unfair labor practice proceeding, the Trial Examiner and the 4 Aspects of whether or not the Union did receive sufficient and adequate authorization cards are discussed subsequently herein. 5 At the hearing the Charging Party objected to the inclusion of four in- dividuals, but is now withdrawing any objection to O. L. Lambiotte. The Charging Party agrees with Respondent that he should be included within the appropriate unit. Board will not reconsider a determination of the ap- propriateness of a unit made by a Regional Director or the Board in a representation case in the absence of newly discovered evidence. Here the Union is not trying to relitigate the unit determination made by the Board's Re- gional Director. The Union is merely saying that there are persons on the list supplied by the Company who are not within the unit found to be appropriate by the Re- gional Director. There was no issue in the representation hearing concerning the supervisory status of anyone. Employee N. C. Debord testified that he worked for Ellis in the summer of 1966, and that at the time Ellis was a foreman. Debord stated that there were eight em- ployees in the work crew, that Ellis did not work with tools, that he reported to Ellis in the mornings, that Ellis assigned him and the other employees in the crew their work, that he told them what jobs he wanted done, that Ellis carried timecards and charges for the different jobs, that he also kept records pertaining to employee trainees and gave tests to trainees, and that a foreman has the authority to make recommendations with regard to trainees. This record also shows that Debord has worked for Marvin Stuart and Harry Statts, both of whom are ad- mitted supervisors, and testified there was no difference in the direction and orders he received from them when in their crews and from Ellis when in his crew. Russel McMellon, a witness for the Respondent, admitted on cross-examination that Ellis told employees what to do, and then further admitted that in the summer of 1966 Ellis was a foreman. The above factors duly establish that Ellis was and is a supervisor, and I so find. This record shows, through a stipulation between the parties, that C. F. Forth and O. C. McCallister moved up to foremen and back to journeymen. Forth, however, was a permanent foreman from October 26, 19644, to June 28, 1965, and a temporary foreman from May 2 through July 24, 1966. McCallister was a temporary foreman from May 2 to 15, 1966 , and again from July 17 to 31, 1966. The Charging Party argues that although these two men do not have the same authority as a regular foreman, they do have the responsibility of directing the particular job they are on, that they also assign their crews to work, carry their time, keep job logs, and give trainees tests in conjunction with the craft superintendent, and, consider- ing the size of the crews at Carbide, which range from 8 to 15 men, it is submitted that by responsibly directing the men in their crews on each job, Forth and McCallister are supervisors under the Act, even if they do not exercise the full range of authority of regular foremen.6 I agree, and find that Forth and O. C. McCallister were super- visors within the meaning of the Act. In accordance with the above I will delete these three people from the unit. The Company objected to a number of authorization cards that were introduced through persons who wit- nessed the signing of the card, claiming that each signer must identify his own card.7 The law is clear that authorization cards may be identified by a person who saw the individual sign his card. I. Taitel and Son, 119 NLRB 910, enfd. 261 F.2d 1 (C.A. 7, 1958). In the in- stant case union representatives and organizers testified 6 Joseph Fallon, assistant director of the engineering department, ad- mitted the above duties in his own testimony. 7 On appeal the Board may or may not have to adopt or pass upon my findings as to the cards, and with my final conclusions herein I could also assume card validity , but, for various other reasons , I deem it necessary to set forth the entire proceeding for complete evaluation and disclosure of the record UNION CARBIDE CORP. 445 that cards were obtained in the course of the Union's or- ganizational campaign, and that some of these cards were then passed out at union meetings and other places for the execution by interested employees." Some cards were also given to key employees on the Union's organizing committee for distribution. After such cards were signed they were returned either by the employees who executed the cards or by the key employees, as aforestated, who in- itially secured them. With such cards in evidence, the Respondent also had ample opportunity to check the authenticity of the signatures on the cards by compaing them with the payroll records or with the employee's W-4 Federal tax forms. The Company also objected to authorization cards in- troduced through witnesses and signers who could not specifically recall or remember the exact date on which they signed their card, but in such instances the witnesses generally concluded in their testimony that their card, or the ones they received, were signed during the union or- ganizational campaign in 1966, and in many instances on or about the date shown on the card. Also, in some in- stances, the signer did not put the date of their cards, and the Company objected to these cards so received. How- ever, the Board law is clear that undated, or cards dated by someone other than the signatory, are valid if the testimony in the record shows that the card or cards in question were signed prior to the crucial date. Here there is sufficient testimony by the signers, or the one who received the card, to show that such undated cards were signed prior to June 8. See Indiana Rayon Corporation, 151 NTLRB 130, and Southland Paint Co., Inc., 156 NLRB 22. In addition to the above, the Company further objected to cards where the local union number was left blank, and in four or five instances where a different local was designated other than 625. As pointed out in this record the Union used two types of cards. One stated: I authorize the United Association Plumbing and Steamfitting Industry, AFL-CIO, to bargain for me for a labor contract providing for wage increases, better vacation pay, paid holidays, job security and other improved conditions of employment. This is followed by blank spaces for the employee's name, address, employer, classification and wage rate. The other card had blank spaces at the top for the name of the employee, classification, and location, and then stated: Hereby authorize Local Union No. of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, affiliated with the American ]Federation of Labor, to represent men [sic] and on my behalf to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of labor, wages and other employment conditions in accordance with the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, as amended by the Labor-Management Act of 1947. The card then goes on to provide that it shall remain in ef- fect 1 year and supersedes all prior authorizations. On some of the latter type cards the local union number was left blank. Other cards of this type had "625" filled in, and, as aforestated, a few cards designated other locals of the Union. This records shows that 625 is the local af- filiate of the United Association in Charleston, We Vir- ginia, and the record also shows that Dryden was sent to Charleston by the United Association to organize, with Local Union 625, the employees in this unit. Local 625 is merely the branch of the United Association in whose jurisdiction this plant is located and who would handle representation of the employees as an affiliate of the United Association. Moreover, this record reveals that all the employees knew that the United Association was organizing the unit. From my observation of the wit- nesses all the employees involved herein were fully aware that they were individually designating the United As- sociation to bargain for them, and in those few instances where other locals were designated the signators so in- volved fully understood the interrelations within the United Association.9 The authorization cards of George Elmore and Clyde Pettit were introduced throught N. R. Lilly. While Lilly did not see either one of these employees sign their cards, he recognized the signature of Elmore on the basis that he had seen enough of Elmore's handwriting to know that it was Elmore's signature on General Counsel's Exhibits 3-25. Lilly stated that he gave a card to Pettit who took it home and then brought it back to Lilly the next day al- ready signed. Again the Company did not avail itself of the opportunity of presenting any evidence to contradict Lilly with regard to his testimony on these cards. The Company could have, if it had so desired, produced the W-44 forms or other documents for a comparison of the handwriting. The Board has repeatedly held that cards identified in this manner are valid. The Company also objected to three cards on which the signer printed his name rather than signing in script. The employees involved were Parsons, Hoover, and Moubray. Dryden stated that Parsons printed his name on his card dated February 18, 1966, in Dryden's presence. Marvin McCallister, one of the union or- ganizers who assisted Dryden in obtaining authorization cards, testified that Hoover also printed his name on his card on February 14, 1966, in McCallister's presence, but did not write his signature in script. Moubray testified that he printed his name on his card on March 2, 1966, after reading the card. In doing this, he stated he wanted to authorize the Union to represent him. As pointed out it is not necessary that employees sign their authorization cards. The only important point is that they indicate through some means, such as filling the card out or print- ing their name on the card, that they want the Union to represent them. Where names are printed rather than written in script prior to the crucial date, the Board has held such cards to be valid. Indiana Rayon Corporation, 151 NLRB 130, and Shapiro Packing Company, Inc., 1555 NLRB 777. Two employees, Charles Fletcher and C. S. Massey, testified that they signed authorization cards for the Inter- national Association of Machinists as well as the Union. Fletcher testified that he signed his card for the Union on March 9, 1966, although he did not date it. He also stated 8 The Company questioned a few of the union organizers who testified concerning what they had told the employees from whom they were requesting cards, particularly counsel questioned Marvin McCalhster and N. R. Lilly on this point Both these witnesses and other individual em- ployees who testified were quite explicit in stating that they told the em- ployees, and were told that the cards were to authorize the Union to represent them and to bargain for them with the Company 9 See Knickerbocker Plastic Co., Inc., 104 NLRB 514, Glass Fiber Moulding Company and Aurcolo Manufacturing Company, 104 NLRB 383, and Franks Bros. Company, 44 NLRB 898 446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that he signed a card for the IAM prior to the election but did not state the day he signed the card or whether it was subsequent to signing his authorization card for the Union, The IAM card was not introduced in evidence. There is no evidence that Fletcher ever withdrew his authorization from the Union, but, on the contrary, the evidence is clear that he did not; he testified that he never asked that his authorization card be returned. Massey testified that he signed his card on June 3, 1966, and never asked the Union to return it. Massey's card also stated it was to be valid for 1 year and superseded all prior authorizations. On cross-examination, he admitted that he signed an authorization card for the IAM (not in- troduced) but was never asked and never volunteered when or under what circumstances he signed the card for that union. Under these circumstances it appears to me that the union cards of Fletcher and Massy are valid, and, therefore, will be counted. Employees Emmett Moore and B. M. Farley testified that they signed their cards in 1965. Moore testified that he signed his card for the Union in the fall or last quarter of 1965, but that he left it undated.10 From his testimony Moore knew what the card was for, and admitted that he never asked the Union to return the card to him. Farley testified that he received his union card through the mail in 1965, and that he signed it and returned it without any date on it (the card itself is dated February 2, 1966, and also has an NLRB time stamp of March 10, 1966). Far- ley stated that he did not receive any card in 1966, but that he voted in the election on July 14, 1966.11 The only real clue as to when Farley signed his card was his admis- sion that people had talked to him about signing a card, that this was during the "recent campaign" by the Union, and that it was during this campaign that he signed his union authorization card. Both cards clearly state that they were to be "in full force and effect for one year from date" and it has been held that an employee's designation of a 1-year time limitation on an authorization card should be honored. Moore admitted signing his card in the last quarter of 1965, well within the 1-year time limitation, and Farley admitted signing his "during the recent cam- paign," also well within 1 year prior to June 8, 1966. From the above it appears to me that the two card appli- cations here involved were made contemporaneously within the beginning of the Union's most recent cam- paign, and, even assuming otherwise, they are not too remote in time to sufficiently demonstrate their continued adherence to the Union. Blade-Tribune Publishing Com- pany, 161 NLRB 1512. In accordance with the above the cards of Moore and Farley will also be counted. Two card signers, Bishop and Morris, testified that they were told by Dryden that their union books would be "pulled" if they refused to sign union authorization cards. Bishop could not remember when he signed his card, but admitted that it was in the spring of 1966. The date on his card is February 16, 1966, but Bishop stated that he did not put the date on the card. Bishop then testified that Dryden allegedly told him in May 1966, during a visit to Bishop's home, that his union book would be "pulled" un- less he signed an authorization card. Morris testified that he signed his card on May 2, 1966, and that Dryden had informed him "maybe that we might lose our card if we didn't sign one for being a member of 625." Even assum- ing here, arguendo, that Dryden told Bishop that his book would be pulled, it is quite clear that Bishop's card was signed at least 2 months prior thereto and there is no evidence that he ever asked for his card back. Further- more, employee Stanley Cornell testified that he was present during Dryden's visit in May 1966 to Bishop's home, and that Dryden did not threaten to pull Bishop's book. Dryden,told Bishop that since he was already a union member, he, Dryden, would like Bishop's support in the organizing campaign. Cornell also stated that he is a member of Local 625 and knows of no one being threatened that his book would be pulled for not signing an authorization card. If Dryden made any remark to Morris about the possibility of losing his card it was ad- mittedly made at some meeting in 1965. Morris and Bishop have worked at the Company for many years, through several elections, have been union members dur- ing the entire time, and their books have not been pulled. They knew they did not have to belong to the Union to work at the Company and Bishop also testified that Dryden never told him that he could not work at the Company if the Union lost the election. Bishop knew of no United Association member whose book was pulled and only heard a story about a book being pulled from a a member of another union. The overall evidence shows that both these employees signed cards voluntarily, and that, therefore, these two cards are also valid. The Company also called three employees who claimed they were coerced or threatened into signing authorization cards. However, even assuming the truth of what they claim, their testimony is somewhat irrele- vant since no cards were introduced for these employees. Russell McMellon testified that he was a member of Local Union 625 until October 1965, when he was brought up on certain charges for conduct detrimental to the Union. McMellon was suspended and fined but he never bothered to appeal his suspension and fine to the Union Association International headquarters. McMel- Ion did not sign a card during the- 1966 organizational campaign and he admitted knowledge that the Union could not get him fired for such a refusal. William Javins stated that after the 1965 election Dryden informed him that he would pull the union books out of the Company since they had lost the 1965 election. Javins testified that if Dryden attempted this he and a few other employees had discussed hiring a lawyer to oppose such action. Javins also stated that in 1966 he signed his union card under pressure. Javins has been working for the Com- pany for several years and has been a member of the Union since 1943. No charges have been brought against him in the Union as a result of the Union losing any elec- tion, and he knows he does not need a union book to work at the Company. Javins is not in good standing either, his dues being in arrears for 8 months. Andrew Anderson stated that N. E. Debord threatened to blackball him or "get him at home" if he did not sign an authorization card. Anderson did not take the alleged threat seriously, if made, because he did not sign a card and has not been hurt. Debord denied making any threats to anyone to force them to sign an authorization card. Moreover, there is no evidence that the threats to these employees, even if made, were common knowledge or, as also pointed out, that any card signer in the 1966 campaign knew of them. 10 The fill-in date on Moore 's card shows March 4, 1966, and it also had an NLRB time stamp on it of March 10 , 1966, as did many of the other union cards involved in this proceeding 11 The cards signed by Moore and Farley, on their face , provide that they shall remain in force and effect for 1 year. UNION CARBIDE CORP. The Company argued that these alleged threats show that the authorization cards which were received in evidence must have been obtained under duress and tainted with doubt. This argument has been repeatedly rejected by the Board. Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709; West Coast Lug- gage Co., 105 NLRB 414. I find that the Company has not shown that any employee who signed a card was coerced or threatened into signing. The Company also raised several other miscellaneous objections to some of the authorization cards introduced. A few cards showed that different colored ink was used in filling out various portions of the card, one or two had erasures, and some had initials on them. These grounds are insufficient to reject an otherwise valid card in the absence of evidence that the card was signed subsequent to the crucial date, and no contradicting evidence was in- troduced by the Company to invalidate such cards. In some instances the card signers also explained in their testimony the reasons for the different ink and other minor variations from the normal. The Company further tried to maintain that Dryden's letters of May and August 1965 (Respondent's Exhibits 1A through 1C), indicated an intent other than representation when he was asking that cards be signed and returned to him. However, as pointed out by the Charging Party, there is no evidence that any cards Dryden received as a result of those letters were introduced in this hearing before me. In fact, Dryden testified he only received approximately 12 to 14 cards as a result of those 1965letters and none were used in the 1966 campaign. As also pointed out the Company objected to the card of H. R. Bennett. Bennett's testimony and affidavit both show that while he was in the hospital, he received a telephone call from James Bonham who asked him if he could sign an authorization card for Bennett. Bennett was familiar with the card, knew what it said and told Bonham to sign his name to a card. He stated in his affidavit "I definitely authorized the signing of my name to a card about the date shown on the card." Bonham corroborated Bennett's testimony, and under such circumstances Bennett's card is valid. As pointed out the Company raised a question about a card signed by Kenneth Moubray who, when he signed the card in March 1966, was a laborer. However, the evidence shows that Moubray was in the pipe gang before March and was returned to the pipe gang in May 1966, and is still there. He was a laborer in March only because of shortage of work in the pipe gang and, throughout the his- tory of his employment with the Company, from 1960, he has moved up and down from the pipe gang to the labor- ing gang. Moubray's name is also included on the Em- ployer's payroll eligibility list of June 8, 1966. Moubray definitely has a community of interest with the employees in this unit and his card is valid. Scobell Chemical Com- pany, 121 NLRB 1130 (authorizations cards signed by laid-off employees who have a reasonable expectancy of future employment with the employer in the foreseeable future are valid and must be counted in determining the union's majority status at the time of its request for recognition.12 I find that on or by June 8, 1966, the Union had 125 valid authorizations, and that this constituted a majority in the unit of 225 employees. 12 Two cards were signed after June 8, 1966. Clair Smith signed his June ll 3, 1966, and John Morris signed his on June 29, 1966. These cards cannot be counted toward a majority on June 8. 447 C. The Alleged 8(a) (1) Violations and Conclusions Charles Thompson testified that on July 7 Supervisor Clifford Allen asked him several questions about his medical or health problem. Thompson stated that Allen told him about a clinic in Cleveland and that a man with a similar problem had recovered with a cost of $10 or $12, that Thompson had enough seniority so he did not have anything to worry about and to take all the time he needed, and that Allen also told him that they had a union vote coming up "and he thought he was in trouble this time and he would like to have my [Thompson's] help." Thompson further testified that Allen then told him that he had given jobs to two men when they needed money to support their families, but that they were now the "big- gest organizers" that he had, and that Allen also stated that the Company and employees had a good enough rela- tion so that a union was not needed. Allen testified that his discussion with Thompson was in relation to his health because it had been reported to him by the foreman that Thompson had missed too much work. Allen denied having any conversation with Thompson about union matters. Allen stated, "He was in no shape to talk about anything. He was actually in a depressed condition when I saw him." The complaint in this respect alleges that Allen violated the Act in: "Threatening an employee that the employee could suffer the loss of employment and/or other benefits should the Union be selected as the em- ployee's collective bargaining representative and in sol- iciting the employee to cast his ballot against the Union in the then forthcoming Board-conducted representation election." Even accepting Thompson's version of the conversa- tion I am unable to find the alleged violation. There is no evidence showing any threatened loss of employment to Thompson. Further, there was no threatenedloss of any benefits that Thompson enjoyed. As pointed out Allen made no claim that existing benefits or any promised fu- ture benefits would cover Thompson's medical expenses. Thompson admitted that Allen did not imply or state that Thompson's health insurance benefits would cover the majority of the expenses, and Thompson did not com- plain about his bill to Allen and dealt directly with Blue Cross concerning the debt. The only possible violation is the statement by Allen that a union vote was coming up and he needed his help. However, under the circum- stances of the conversation there were no intimations of threats, promises, or warnings of any kind nor was there any interrogation or solicitation as to Thompson's loyal- ties or feelings toward the Union, and Allen merely asked for Thompson's support in the election.13 Allen's remark that he thought the Company and employees had a good enough relation so that a union was not needed is not a violation of the Act, and was merely a personal opinion completely permissible. The complaint alleges that Respondent Supervisor Frank C. Eggelton interrogated an employee about his union sympathies and threatened the employee with a loss of his job, and approved the conduct of Jack Steele, an inspector of the Company, in interrogating the em- ployee concerning his union sympathies and in threaten- 13 Parties in a controversey of this type have alsways been permitted to ask employees for their support so long as their appeals are not coupled with violative forms of coercion. 448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing the employee with loss of benefits if the Union won the election. Charles Fletcher testified that a week prior to the July 14 election, Jack Steele informed Fletcher that Super- visor Allen had sent him to talk to Fletcher and to find out how Fletcher felt about the Union. Fletcher stated that Steele then informed him that the Union was not needed, and that this conversation changed Fletcher's mind to the extent that he told Steele he would not vote for the Union. Steele admitted that he had a conversation with Fletcher, and also stated that Fletcher was a "material boy" for Eggelton, but that he would get the various or- ders "mixed up" and the Company did not know what to do with him. Fletcher did not give any specifics as to any alleged threats or coercion by Steele . The only attributa- ble quote by Fletcher was that Steele said that a union was not needed at Carbide, and this statement certainly cannot constitute a violation of the Act. This record ac- tually shows that Steel was talking to Fletcher concerning their working together back in 1956 or 1957 when Fletcher was working for Steele following an accident at a time when Fletcher was not able to do his regualr work. At the time Fletcher was talking to Steele, prior to the 1966 election, there was no foreman-employee relation- ship directly between them. I also agree with the Re- spondent that Steele made no promises of any benefits or favors at this time, nor did Fletcher claim Steele made any promises of benefits . The testimony by Steele that he would take care of Fletcher clearly related to events and the accident that transpired many years ago. Moreover, Fletcher was admittedly on the Union's organizing com- mittee and this fact appeared to be well known to about everyone. It would also appear to me that the main thrust of this allegation must hinge on Supervisor Eggelton's participation in approving the statements of Steele to Fletcher, yet Fletcher's own testimony does not even mention Eggelton or the presence of Eggelton and if Steele, as an inspector, is to be deemed a supervisor it will have to be on very general inferences only as this record is without sufficient evidence to so establish. It is alleged that Supervisor Robert Mitchell in April violated the Act by interrogating an employee in regard to his membership in, activities on behalf of, and sym- pathy for, the Union, and in giving the impression to the employee that he had engaged in surveillance of the em- ployee's activities of the Union. Fletcher testified that a week or two before the July 14 election Supervisor Mitchell stated, "We didn't need no union and I don't know, he just went on talking and he changed my mind also, and I said, well,maybe we don't need a union but I said we are going to have one if we are going to work here, and I said maintenance has got a union .. . Fletcher also testified that Mitchell then mentioned something about him having a union card and told Fletcher that he did not "need it here." Mitchell testified that he merely talked to Fletcher about his work, and that he had no conversation with him about the Union. As aforestated, Fletcher testified that he had a conversation with Mitchell a week or two before the election which was on July 14 and, therefore, it is difficult to believe that their talk occurred in April 1966 , as alleged in the com- plaint. Fletcher's testimony is further confused and in- consistent on whether or not Mitchell mentioned anything about the IAM , and the only specific statement he could attribute was Mitchell 's remark that they did not need a union or did not need it at Carbide. There is no testimony that Mitchell threatened , warned, coerced, or made any promises of benefits . Fletcher did testify that Mitchell made some remarks about a union book or card, but Fletcher did not claim that Mitchell in any questioned him about it, nor did he inquire as to how Fletcher was going to vote. It is pointed out also, that Fletcher was continually confused as to whether or not he would sup- port the Union , and further whether he even wanted the Union at all to represent him inasmuch as Fletcher testified that he had also signed an authorization card for the IAM sometime prior to the election of July 14. I agree that, in light of the confusing state of Fletcher's changeable mind, it seems doubtful any conversation con- cerning the Union, even in the limited way as expressed by Fletcher, did in fact occur. Upon the above and upon my observation and demeanor of the witnesses, I must therefore, credit the testimony and denials of Mitchell. It is further alleged that on or about July 5, Supervisor Frank Eggelton violated the Act by the following con- duct: "Interrogating an employee about his sympathy for the Union, in threatening the said employee that other union members could take his job , and in approving the conduct of Jack Steele, an inspector of Respondent, in in- terrogating the aforesaid employee about his Union sym- pathies, and in threatening the said employee with loss of benefits if the employees select the Union to represent them , in the said Eggelton's presence , in an attempt to dissuade the employee from his union adherence." Em- ployee Guthrie Mack testified that on or about July 5, Eggelton asked him how he felt about the Union, if Mack thought they needed a union , mentioned that Mack's union book was not any good, and also informed Mack of the disadvantages he would have working "outside" com- pared to what he would have working for the Company. Mack further testified that Eggelton also told him of the company advantages he had in the event of a long layoff, and if the plant was organized Mack would not enjoy the same benefits. Mack stated that a week before the elec- tion he also had a conversation with Jack Steele. Accord- ing to Mack , Steele then asked him why he felt the em- ployees needed a union , told Mack how "well he had it" compared to the outside (vacations and other company benefits). Mack then testified about a conversation he had with Supervisor Mitchell in April. Mack stated that Mitchell asked him why he felt the Company needed a union, inquired whether or not the Union was going to be successful, and also asked "how many books had been bought." Eggelton admitted a conversation with Mack prior to the July 14 election, but stated that they only discussed seniority and denied that he asked anything about union books or whether or not Mack belonged to the Union. Steele stated that he talked to Mack after Eggelton had talked to him, but that they only discussed company benefits. The interrogation by Supervisors Eggelton and Mitchell as to whether or not an employee thought a union was needed, how employees felt about the Union, how many union books or cards were out, and inquiries as to whether or not the Union would be successful goes beyond the permissible sanctions of the Act, and I find such conduct constitutes unlawful interrogations. It is alleged that Clifford Allen on or about July 7 inter- rogated an employee by making disparaging remarks about two union adherents , and in promising an increase in benefits if an employee would vote against the Union. It is also alleged that on July 12, Allen interrogated an employee in regard to his union sympathy by giving the UNION CARBIDE CORP. 449 impression of having engaged in surveillance of union ac- tivites, and in admonishing the employee to cast his ballot against the Union. Kenneth Loar stated that Allen talked to him in July and inquired about his union card, asked what he had ever done to Loar, told Loar about company benefits and about 2 employees (Farmer and Cornell) who he had given jobs to and who were now trying to or- ganize, and informed Loar that if the Union came in he (Allen) would lose his job and he needed help.14 Shirley Cavender testified that in July, Allen talked to him along with several other employees , and told them that the men had turned against him, that he had given jobs to em- ployees who were now trying to organize , and that he hoped Cavender would vote for him. Allen admitted in his testimony that he did have a con- versation with Loar in July and stated that at this time he also talked individually not only to Loar but to three other employees as well - Neal, D. L. Snodgrass, and Shirley Cavender. In these conversations Allen stated that the basic conversation he had concerned the incident involv- ing Loar and Cavender with Supervisor Marcum when Marcum criticized them for not working outside during a rainstorm. Allen denied asking Loar how he was going to vote in the election , and denied that he in any way promised Loar anything if he voted against the Union. From my observation and demeanor of the witnesses I believe Loar and Cavender. In accordance therewith, I find that Allen engaged in unlawful interrogations of Loar, and also gave the impression to Loar, Cavender, and Snodgrass of having engaged in surveillance of union activities. The complaint alleges that Respondent Supervisor Marvin Stuart on or about July 11 interrogated an em- ployee about his sympathies and membership in the Union in soliciting the employees to cast his ballot against the Union in the representation election. Loan testified that in July Supervisor Stuart told him, "I don't think we need a union at Carbide ... ," and then went on to talk about benefits. Loar also stated that Stuart told him that he did not blame Loar for "buying" a union card, but that when he voted Loar could still vote no. Even assuming everything Loar testified is true, I am unable to detect anything which could be deemed viola- tive of the Act, and certainly, the mere discussion of cur- rent employee, benefits without the promise of any addi- tional benefits is not violative. Words are not spoken in a vacuum, but gust be analyzed in the context of the cir- cumstances surrounding their issuance . See N.L.R.B. v. Zelrich Co., 3''44 F.2d 1011, 1013 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v. Plant City Steel Corp., 331 F.2d 511, 513 (C.A. 5). There is an additional allegation in the complaint that on July 11, Supervisor Clifford Allen admonished an em- ployee to forsake his union adherence . Alfred Blanken- ship testified that in July he and Allen were alone, and that Allen just patted him on the back and said, "You better change you mind about voting," and Blankenship replied "what mind," and that Allen then just walked away. Blankenship also testified that on July 12 he was guilty of smoking on company property and he was very much aware that this was an infraction of the rules. There was no allegation or showing that the written reprimand Blankenship received as a result of his smoking was not in furtherance of known company policy or Blankenship's treatment was different than that of other employees guilty of the same infraction. Insofar as Allen's statement to Blankenship is concerned , there is an insufficient showing that Allen was referring to Blankenship's union adherence in view of no testimony that Allen knew of Blankenship's union affiliation or that Blankenship com- municated that union affiliation to him. As pointed out the conversation was only about voting in the election and contains no reference as to which way Blankenship was to vote, and there is also no showing that this short con- versation transpired with any surrounding threats or coer- cion or promise of benefits or that any fear of reprisal was left with Blankenship. It is also alleged that Respondent Supervisor Harry Statts interrogated an employee regarding his sympathy for the Union on or about June 1. James Waldron testified that in June Statts asked him what he thought about the election, and that Statts also inquired if Wal- dron thought the Union would do any good at Carbide. I agree with the Respondent that this conversation did not take place in connection or in relationship with any threats or promises or under an air of intimidation in any way. Waldron further testified that during safety meetings 4 or 6 weeks preceding the representation , Statts com- pared the benefits that employees presently had with the benefits Respondent's unionized employees had. There was clearly nothing improper in this conduct as there is no showing of any threats or any promises that if the Union was defeated in the representation election, addi- tional benefits would be forthcoming , nor is there any paragraph in the complaint making or setting forth such an allegation. N. C. Debord testified that on July 13 Supervisor E. C. Shipley told him that he did not feel the employees needed a union, that "more" depended on qualifications instead of seniority, and on this occasion also told De- bord that when he voted at the representation election to "be selfish." Shipley stated that in July he and Debord did have a conversation about the Union, but that he merely told Debord that in his opinion he did not think the employees needed a union. There is no showing that this conversation between Debord and Shipley took place under any circumstances surrounded with threats or coer- cion, and Shipley's initial statement to Debord was nothing more than his own personal opinion and there- fore, cannot be deemed violative of the Act. Debord even admitted that Shipley in no way asked him how he was going to vote. Debord also testified that prior to the election he had a conversation with Supervisor Robert Mitchell. Debord stated that Mitchell inquired if he thought the Union would win in the election, and further told Debord that if the Union won it looked to him like the Company "are going to contract all the work and make inspectors out of a few of us." Debord testified that Mitchell then informed him that he (Debord) did not have a thing to worry about. Mitchell denied having any union conversation with De- bord, and the record shows that Mitchell was temporarily transferred to another location between April 18 and June 27. Debord places this conversation about 2-1/2 months before the election. On cross-examination De- bord again dated this conversation as 2-1 /2 months before the election , and later on Respondent's cross-examina- 14 Loar also testified that Allen talked to D L. Snodgrass in a separate conversation and related that when Snodgrass rejoined Loar and the others he stated that he was going to vote against the Union because Allen said he would take care of lurn. 450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion, dated the conversation as a period of time between 1-1/2 or 2-1/2 months before the election, and further agreed that he thought it was in May. Taking any of the dates testified to by Debord, it still places the conversa- tion in a period of time when Mitchell was not physically working at Respondent's plant in West Virginia, prior to April 18 or after June 27. However, even accepting De- bord's testimony to the effect that Mitchell mentioned contracting the work out does not, under the prevailing circumstances here, violate the Act. There is no testimony that this remark was anything but Mitchell's own personal opinion beyond his control and authority and certainly it was not surrounded with any threats of warnings and this is especially true in the admission of Debord that Mitchell also informed him that he had nothing to worry about. Based on the above, and my ob- servations of the witnesses and their demeanor, any other conclusion would be mere speculation and without any adequate foundation. The complaint further alleges the following: "The con- duct of Respondent, on or about May 16 in transferring an employee and a known union adherent from his regular job to a less desirable job and location because of his ex- ercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act." N. R. Lilly has been a welder for the Respondent since 1948. He regular assignment was welding in the Institute plant or shop, but about 2 years ago Lilly was assigned to the job of field welding in connection with Respondent's South Charleston plant. Lilly testified that during the middle of May his field foreman, Boggs, informed him that although there was nothing wrong with his work he had to return Lilly to the Institute plant because Super- visor Allen had told Boggs that Lilly was "agitating" for the Union. Lilly then went back to his regular welding of pipe fabrication and cutting at the Institute plant. Lilly stated that this change was hard on him because he had been out in the fresh air and that the Institute shop was dirty and hot, and also upon his return he was not as- signed to his old welding table by a window but given a table in the middle of the shop. Lilly also related that when welders go out on field jobs they "sometimes" stay a long time and "sometimes" they stay just for one job and then return to their regular work. A day or so after Lilly returned from the field he also had a conversation with Supervisor Allen about his reassignment. Lilly testified that he then asked Allen the reason for the change and that Allen told him he had heard rumors that Lilly had been "agitating up there pretty bad." Lilly further testified that Allen explained to him that since his transfer he had found out differently, that he was having some trouble with Charlie Martin, and that Allen was "beginning to think" that it was not all Lilly's fault. Lilly testified that Allen then informed him that he would see to it that Lilly was returned to the field. Lilly also revealed in his testimony that 3 or 4 weeks later he was asked by the Respondent's assistant director of engineer- ing, Joseph Fallon, if he wanted to go back to the field as a welder, and that he told Fallon he did not wish to do so since he had again become used to working in the shop.15 Respondent's pipefitter foreman, Charles Marcum, 15 There is no allegation or contention that Lilly suffered any loss of pay due to his reassignment back to the shop. 16 It appears that the pipefitters in that area reported to two separate su- pervisors, Eggelton and Marcum. 19 Fallon asked Lilly if he had any more questions or problems and then said he was going to try to straighten out some of the past mistakes the testified that Lilly was working in his area and was as- signed to work for pipefitters working under various foremen. According to Marcum the pipefitters under his supervision were having trouble getting Lilly to do their work. Lilly told his fitters (Marcum's) that he would not perform any of their work unless Foreman Eggelton directed him to do the work. Marcum then reported this trouble with Lilly to Allen. Allen testified that Marcum informed him that he was having trouble with Lilly and that he would not perform his work unless a certain foreman would direct him to do so.16 Allen asked another supervisor, G. A. Roth, to check into the trouble that Marcum was having with Lilly. Allen stated that he then decided that under the cir- cumstances Lilly and Marcum were not getting along, and that Lilly should be brought back to the Institute shop. Allen further related his conversation with Lilly upon his return. According to Allen, Lilly told him that he was being transferred because of his agitating for the Union. Allen testified that he then informed Lilly that this was wrong, and that he was transferred because Lilly was not compatible with Foreman Marcum. Allen also told Lilly that he considered him to be one of his best welders and that anytime he had another field job with any other foreman except Marcum they would be happy to get Lilly. C. A. Jarvis, Respondent's shop superintendent of the pipe fabrication shop, has direct control of all Re- spondent's welders, including Lilly. Jarvis testified that he was aware that Lilly was being reassigned to the-shop. Foreman Boggs informed Jarvis that Lilly was being returned to the shop because he was not performing his work satisfactorily. Jarvis stated he had a conversation with Lilly several days after he returned to the shop. The conversation was about Lilly's assignment to a particular table in the welding shop and not about the transfer in general. Lilly told Jarvis that he wanted his regular table that he had worked on previously. Jarvis indicated there was no particular reason that he could not have his old table and that if it made any difference to him, he could return to his former spot. Lilly indicated that he did desire his former table and it was given to him a day or so after his request. Joseph Fallon testified that in the course of a group meeting in June, Lilly brought up the subject of his transfer to the welding shop from the field. Lilly's question was why management did not review the situa- tions such as his when an employee was transferred because a foreman complained about the employee's work. Fallon and Lilly also had a later private conversa- tion about various complaints Lilly had including alleged favoritism, but they do not involve any specific alleged violation.17 Lilly was identified by Dryden as one of the members of the employees' organizing committee. Lilly also testified himself that while no supervisor ever questioned him as to whether he belonged to the Union, he felt that all knew it or that they should have known it because he did not try to hide the fact that he was on the organizing committee from anyone. Lilly stated, "I think everyone knew it." Supervisor Jarvis stated that Lilly did a lot of Company had made. Fallon also told Lilly that there were several jobs opening up for some of the men in the near future at different sites outside of Charleston. In October, Lilly was asked by Fallon and Jarvis to take a test to become a foreman. Fallon told Lilly that he should have no trouble passing it. This would appear to contradict Jarvis' testimony that Lilly's work out in the field just a few months earlier was unsatisfactory UNION CARBIDE CORP. 451 talking. There can be no serious question but that the Company knew of Lilly's activity for the Union, and the Company actually concedes the same. Briefly, this is a situation where we have an employee who is doing good work, but who becomes actively in- volved in attempts to assist the Union in its organiza- tional campaign, and then suddenly finds himself in the disfavor of management. Lilly may have well contributed to his potential or ultimate transfer by his opposition to the apparent overlapping of supervisor authority and ju- risdiction of the various field foremen, as aforestated, but I am convinced that his open and continued activity for the Union was the real motivating factor which actually triggered his reassignment , and I so find. We have testimony in this record that Supervisor Boggs specifi- cally informed Lilly that his transfer was because of his agitation for the Union. When Lilly confronted Allen with this reason for reassignment, Allen then suggested that he had another man who was causing trouble, and also in- formed Lilly that he would be returned to the field. It is further noted that the best witness to refute the above statement attributed to Allen that Lilly was being returned to the shop because of his agitation for the Union would be Supervisor Boggs, who carried out Al- len's instructions. Boggs did not testify, and Supervisor Eggelton, also involved with Marcum and Boggs as field foreman, gave no testimony whatsoever as to any difficul- ties he might have had in overlapping authority with Lilly's field duties and assignments. The Respondent's conduct in this situation interfered with Lilly's rights under the Act. The last remaining independent 8(a)(1) allegation in the complaint again is in reference to the conduct of Allen, and alleges that Allen violated the Act by the following: "On or about July 13, 1966, in issuing a written discipli- nary reprimand to an employee who was a known union adherent while failing to take similar action against an em- ployee whose union sympathy was unknown to Respond- ent although the lattcr employee had engaged in the same conduct for which the known union adherent received the written reprimand." Marvin McCallister testified that on or about July 13 his foreman, Don Estep, told him to report at 6 the next morning instead of the usual 7:30. McCallister told Estep he could not be there at 6 and the following morning showed up at 7:30. Estep said nothing to McCallister when he arrived but Paul Price, supervisor over the pipefitters, came over and asked why he did not show up. McCallister told him he had informed Estep he would be there at 7:30 and then, according to Price, he "smilingly" said his wife did not set the alarm clock. Price then took McCallister over to an office and called on Allen to ask what they should do with him. McCallister was then permitted to go to work, but that afternoon Al- len, himself, located McCallister on the job and handed him a written reprimand for failing to show up at 6 a.m.'8 Foreman Estep also told the rest of his crew, including Bud Snodgrass, to show up at 6 am. Snodgrass ap- parently told Estep the night before that he had other commitments and he arrived at 7:30. According to Price, Estep made it clear to Snodgrass that he was to report at 6 a.m. However, when Snodgrass reported at 7:30 he was allowed to-go to work and Price did not get around to talk- ing to Snodgrass until late in the day.19 Snodgrass did not receive a written reprimand while McCallister did, as aforestated. Allen testified that he received a call from Price on the morning in question to the effect that McCallister had refused to report for work at 6 a.m. Allen stated he then called Estep and received the same report from him so that afternoon he gave McCallister a written reprimand. Allen stated that on the same day he also learned from Price that Bud Snodgrass, in the same crew, had not re- ported at 6 a.m. Allen testified that Price informed him that the circumstance surrounding Snodgrass were not as "circumvent" as the other involving McCallister-as Snodgrass was not directly instructed to report to work and had not refused to report to work in the same manner, but that Price felt there was reason for some type of discimplinary action. Allen then checked out the Snodgrass situation with Estep, and stated that Estep in- formed him that Snodgrass had told Estep that he had a previous commitment and would like to be excused. Allen testified that a week later he verbally reprimanded Snodgrass and told him that there was some "shadow of doubt" as to whether he was insubordinate or not because of the "casual way" in which his foreman had told him to report. Allen admitted that he asked Snodgrass his side of the story, but did not ask McCallister. Supervisor Price stated that McCallister told him he was late for work be ause of his alram clock. Price replied to McCalliste that he would be more inclined to believe this if he ha not told Estep the day before that he would not be at work until 7:30.20 Price testified that Snodgrass told him he did not report on time because he did not actually understand that he had to report to work early. Price then asked Estep about this and Estep con- firmed that Snodgrass had told him that he had made other commitments, but Estep reaffirmed that he had in- structed Snodgrass to report at 6 am. Price stated that he then so informed Allen. Fallon testified that he talked to Price about this matter on the morning in question, and that he told Price lie did not have enough information so he advised putting them to work and then have Allen look into the situation. The Charging Party points out that the conclusion to be drawn from these facts establishes a case of discriminato- ry treatment against a strong union adherent just prior to the election while the same conduct engaged in by another employee, whose views were not known, was treated differently. Furthermore, the union adherent was given a written reprimand immediately and the nonaligned employee was not even verbally reprimanded by the Company until after the election. I agree, and so find.21 D. Final Conclusions On the record in the instant case, I am unable to con- clude that the Respondent acted in rejection of the collec- tive-bargaining principle or to gain time, in which to un- dermine the Union and dissipate its purported majority. 18 It appears that McCallister was the main employee organizer for the Union Allen admitted that he knew McCallister was one of the "strongest men" trying to help the Union. 19 There is no evidence that Bud Snodgrass was active for the Union. 10 The work crew involved here was attempting to correct a gas separa- tion shut down in the polyethylene area which Price classified as a rush job. 21 It has been long settled that discriminatory treatment against an em- ployee who is a union supporter is unlawful and violates Section 8(a)(1) 452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Since it appears that the violations of the Act here found are not truly inconsistent with a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of the employees, I am una- ble to conclude that the Respondent's refusal to bargain was unlawful. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. As the Board stated in Hercules Packing Corporation, 163 NLRB 264, "The burden is upon the General Counsel to establish that the employer in bad faith declined to recognize and bargain with the Union." Upon consideration of the entire record, I find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden. While an employer's right to a Board election is not ab- solute, it has long been established Board policy that an employer may refuse to bargain and insist upon such an election as proof of a union's majority unless its refusal and insistence were not made with a good-faith doubt of the union's majority.22 An election by secret ballot is nor- mally a more satisfactory means of determining em- ployees' wishes, although authorization cards signed by a majority may also evidence their desires. Absent an af- firmative showing of bad faith, an employer, presented with a majority card showing and a bargaining request, will not be held to have violated his bargaining obligations under the law simply because he refuses to rely upon cards, rather than an election, as the method for determin- ing the Union's majority. This record shows that the Company has a long history of organizational attempts in its design and construction department. The Company introduced exhibits showing that in previous organizational drives the unions involved lost elections. The Charging Party here was involved in a 1957 organizing attempt, in 1962 and 1963 Boiler- makers Local No. 667 was involved, and the Charleston Building and Construction Trades Council, to which the Union is affiliated, was involved in two elections, the latest in 1965. Such background underscores a reason or basis for Respondent's good-faith doubt that exists in this case, to wit, this Union as well as other unions, have lost previous representation elections following written de- mands for recognition and bargaining. Testimony given in the instant case illustrated that experience in similar situations over the years has demonstrated to Respond- ent that a bare written claim by a union of majority status is extremely dubious, including claims by the Charging Party. As previously detailed herein, the IAM in 1966 was also seeking to represent the employees involved here, and several landmark cases lend strong support to the ru that an employer's knowledge of rival union or- ganizational campaigns is ground for good-faith doubt concerning the majority claims of one of the rivals. As pointed out the IAM organizational campaign paralleled the Charging Party's campaign and was a direct challenge for support to many of the employees here involved, and it also appears that the IAM campaign had as a prime pur- pose the change of employee allegiance from the Charg- ing Party to the IAM. The General Counsel attempted to show that the demand letter of July 2 from the IAM had nothing to do with the Respondent's good-faith doubt relative to the demand for recognition made by the Charg- ing Party on March 10. Joseph Fallon openly admitted that the demand letter itself from the IAM had nothing to 22 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 , 1264, enfd. 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D C ), cent. denied 341 U.S. 914 do with the Respondent's good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority because the Charging Party had made their written demand some 3 months earlier. However, the additional testimony by Fallon and the exhibits previ- ously referred to herein, clearly show that early in 1966, and most definitely by March 3, the Respondent was well aware of the organizational efforts by the IAM which were being announced over a well-publicized public telephone number, as aforestated. The most that can be said is that by April 1 the Company knew that the IAM had no interest in the smaller unit involved here as a result of the March 31 representation hearing on the Union's petition (see Charging Party (Exhibit 1)). In the final analysis, however, this cannot seriously detract from the Respondent's contention that it had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority. In addition to the above, it is noted also that the Union's letter for recognition on March 10 did not con- tain any reference to a willingness on their part for a card count by an impartial third person or party. It merely stated that a majority of the employees in the unit had in- dicated that they wished to be represented by the Charg- ing Party (General Counsel's Exhibit 4). To this the Company replied that they had a good-faith doubt and that the matter could best be resolved through the orderly process of the National Labor Relations Act after a representation petition was filed. The Board's efficient machinery for an election was then invoked, and although the representation hearing on March 31 established the unit, and served to notify the Company that the IAM was not interested in the smaller unit, nevertheless, the overall impact from the prior and intensive IAM campaign, possibly resulting in the defection or reduction of em- ployee supporters for the Union, still largley remained. Therefore, even after the March 31 representation hear- ing the Respondent had received adequate prior notifica- tions and knowledge of the IAM campaign to continue its good-faith doubt as to whether or not the IAM had diverted some of the union supporters, and it appears to me that this colorable knowledge by the Company was sufficient to warrant its continued good-faith doubt, espe- cially since the Union had placed in motion the Respond- ent's request to settle the matter by a Board election. See Weather Seal Incorporated, 161 NLRB 1226. Moreover, while the IAM expressed no interest in the smaller unit, there were no indications whatsoever that they were relenting in their organizational drive for all the employees in the department, and this is obviously so because on July 2 the IAM requested recognition. Whether an employer is acting in good faith or bad faith in questioning the Union's majority is a determination which of necessity must be made in the light of all the relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct. Where a company has engaged in substantial unfair labor practices calculated to dissipate union support, the Board, with the courts' approval, has concluded that em- ployer insistence on an election was not motivated by a good-faith doubt of the union's majority, but rather by a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine the union. 23 However, this does not mean that any employer conduct 23 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., supra UNION CARBIDE CORP. found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, regardless of its nature or gravity, will necessarily support a refusal-to-bargain finding. For instance, where an em- ployer's unfair labor practices are not of such a character as to reflect a purpose to evade an obligation to bargain, the Board will not draw an inference of bad faith.24 In the instant case the Respondent engaged in conver- sations with 4 or 5 employees out of a unit of 225 em- ployees, was guilty of one illegal transfer (Lilly), and is- sued a wntten reprimand to McCallister while giving Snodgrass a verbal reprimand. This 8(a)(1) conduct, while unlawful, was not so flagrant that it must necessari- ly have had the object of destroying the Union's majority status. While unfair labor practices committed at or about the time of the employer's refusal to bargain often demon- strates the bad faith of the employer's position, not every act of misconduct necessarily vitiates the respondent's good faith.25 Whether or not the conduct involved adequately reflects on the good faith of the employer requires an evaluation of the facts in each case, and I have concluded that the unlawful 8(a)(1) violations here were not of such serious nature as to warrant a finding that the conduct had the objective of dissipating the Union's majority. The unlawful interrogations by Eggelton, Mitchell, and Allen-along with creating the impression of engaging in surveillance by Allen-were in no way coupled with any threats, warnings, or promises. The transfer of Lilly from the field to the shop had some elements of justifiable grounds, and there is no testimony whatsoever that it directly effected, in any manner, the union sentiments or loyalties of any other employee including Lilly 26 When Lilly asked questions about his transfer at the group meeting in June with Fallon, as aforestated, his testimony was to the effect that he mentioned on this occasion what Foreman Boggs had told him was the reason for his transfer. Lilly admitted, however, that at this June meet- ing Fallon had the employees do most of the talking, and for the most part Fallon only answered their questions. It would seem to me that under these circumstances this isolated incident, merely stemming from a prior event, cannot be successfully classified as unlawful conduct suf- ficient for a finding that the Company was seriously dis- sipating or undermining the Union's majority, as admit- tedly the contents of the subject matters discussed were left largely in the hands of the employees present. There is no allegation or contention that anything said by Fallon at this meeting was violative of the Act, and if any union sentiments or supporters were adversely affected there is no proof in this record of the same. As to the written reprimand to McCallister, the Charging Party argues that the Company was very anxious to reprimand him so that the employees could see what was in store for union ad- herents, and that the message was brought home to the employees when Fallon showed up with Allen at the presentation of McCallister's censure. The reasoning and the theory of the Charging Party is clearly stated, but in my opinion this record will not support it I n the first place there is no testimony that any employee knew any- thing about McCallister's wntten reprimand, or in any way 24 Hammond & Irving, Inc, 154 NLRB 1071 Also see John P Ser- pa, Inc , 155 NLRB 99 25 See Cosmodyne Manufacturing Co, 150 NLRB 96, fn 29 (adopted by the Board without comment) 26 Actually, Lilly was transferred back to his regularjob as a welder in the shop at the Institute, and it was only the timing of his transfer that was discriminatory 453 knew that Bud Snodgrass had not also received a written reprimand. In the second place, the entire crew had been instructed to report at 6 a.m., and I think it can be safely assumed that any employee disregarding this instruction would not be deemed in the highest regard by his fellow employees as certainly 6 o'clock in the morning cannot be classified as the most desirable time to start working. Thirdly, under the usual circumstances, most employees would generally expect a reprimand for being 1-1 /2 hours late on an emergency rush job, and, therefore, even though the Company violated the Act in giving union ad- herent McCallister a written reprimand and Snodgrass a verbal agreement several days later, it cannot be said that such conduct, even combined with the other 8(a)(1) viola- tions, were sufficient to result in the destruction of a vot- ing atmosphere which would materially effect the true desires of the employees at the July 14 election.27 Furthermore, it is pointed out that Fallon only went along with Allen to the place where McCallister was working for the purpose of checking the progress of the shutdown in the gas separation area, and was so engaged at the time Allen gave McCallister his wntten reprimand, and McCallister's own testimony adequately reflects the same. In the concluding summary of this case, there is no evidence that Respondent had completely rejected the collective-bargaining principle or that it refused to recog- nize and bargain merely to gain time within which to un- dermine the Union and dissipate its majority. The Respondent's request for invoking the procedures of the Board and for an election, and the absence of substantial unfair or open gauged conduct, and for all other reasons given herein, are more consonant with the finding that the Company had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirm- ative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 21 The burden is on the party urging that an election be voided to over- come the "strong presumption that the ballots cast in secrecy under the safeguards regularly provided by [Board ] procedures , reflect the true desires of the participating employees " Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc , 64 NLRB 146, 150 308-926 0-70-30 454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em- ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, as found herein, the Respondent has en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The Respondent's refusal to bargain was not viola- tive of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that Union Carbide Corporation, Olefins Division, Engineering Department Design and Construc- tion, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union sympathies and activities or concerning their knowledge as to the union views and activities of other employees. (b) Engaging in or creating the impression of surveil- lance of activities for the Union, or by any other labor or- ganization. (c) Transferring a known adherent for the Union from one job to a less desirable job. (d) Issuing a written reprimand to a known union ad- herent while failing to take similar action for the same of- fense against another employee whose sympathy for the Union is unknown. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing their employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em- ployment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis- closure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plants in the vicinity of Charleston, West Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."28 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Re- gional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by the Respondent or its authorized representatives, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ ing, within 20 days from the date of the recipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.29 29 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board'ss Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amened, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concern- ing their union sympathies and activities or concern- ing their knowledge as to the union views and activi- ties of other employees. WE WILL NOT engage in or create the impression of surveillance of activities for the Union, or in any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT transfer a known adherent for the Union from one job to a less desirable job. WE WILL NOT issue a written reprimand to a known Union adherent while failing to take similar action for the same,offense against another employee whose sympathy for the Union is unknown. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or- ganizations, to join or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir- ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Report- ing and Disclosure Act of 1959. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. UNION CARBIDE CORPORA- TION, OLEFINS DIVISION, ENGINEERING DEPART- MENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407 Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone 684-3663. peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 49 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith."