Standard Oil Co. of California

STANDARD OIL COMPANY Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns Operations, Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union , Richmond, Califor- nia, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO. Case 20-CA-3663 June 30, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING, AND ZAGORIA On November 2, 1966, Trial Examiner Marion C. Ladwig issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had not en- gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. Thereafter the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Deci- sion and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed a reply brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and finds merit in the exceptions. Accordingly, the Board adopts the findings of the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are con- sistent with the following. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had not violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to furnish the Union a list of the unit employees' home ad- dresses. In making this finding the Trial Examiner noted that the General Counsel had made no effort to prove bad faith on the part of Respondent, and he concluded that the relevance of the requested infor- mation to the Union's bargaining and contract ad- ministration responsibilities had not been established. We find, however, that the data sought is relevant to the Union's performance of its func- tion as collective-bargaining representative and that Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested infor- mation, was therefore unlawful. The reasons for our disagreement with the Trial Examiner are set forth below: Respondent operates an oil refinery complex at Richmond, California, which employs approximate- ly 2,600 persons in an area covering 4 square miles on San Francisco Bay. The Union is the bargaining representative for a unit of production and main- 343 tenance employees in the manufacturing, purchase, and stores departments of this complex, including the San Pablo Tank Farm. The Union has occupied this position since 1950. The collective-bargaining agreement in effect at the time of the events in question had no union-shop clause, but did contain a maintenance-of-member- ship provision which permitted members of the Union to leave it during an annual 30-day "escape" period. The production and maintenance unit consists of 1,500 employees. Union membership therein has varied: At the time of the hearing in this case ap- proximately 50 percent of the unit employees were members. Recently, Respondent has experienced considerable personnel turnover in the unit. In 1965 it hired 155 new unit employees to fill job vacan- cies. In 1966, to the date of the hearing in July, it added 150 employees to the payroll, or at the rate of approximately 20 new employees per month. The refinery complex is composed of machinery units, called "plants," which range in size from operations requiring the oversight of a single person to those attended by 400 employees. Employees enter the refinery through four guarded gates. Most of them come to work by au- tomobile; many start their daily journey from points in a five- or six-county area in the vicinity of the plant. New employees attend a number of orientation meetings conducted by one of Respondent's labor relations representatives. At these meetings infor- mation concerning work rules, hours, wages, benefits, and company history and policy is commu- nicated to the employees. In addition, the represen- tative makes a statement about the Union. He tells them the Union's name, that there is a copy of the collective-bargaining contract in the packet dis- tributed to all new employees, that membership in the Union is not a condition of employment, and that employees will not receive any benefit or suffer any detriment because of membership in the Union. At one of the meetings new employees are exposed more fully to Respondent's general outlook, includ- ing its labor relations philosophy. At this time the company representative reads the contents of a 23- page booklet prepared by Respondent and entitled "What We Believe." The -section on labor relations states: We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential em- ployee needs fulfilled through sound manage- ment administration without the necessity of employee organization and representation. We respect an employee's right to present his grievances, regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization. Whenever a group of employees does desire organization and representation, we are willing to discuss with individual employees or with representa- 166 NLRB No. 45 344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tives of the group any pertinent matters affect- ing them. We are opposed to any provision requiring that an individual either join or refrain from joining any labor organization as a condition of employment. We willingly ac- cept the obligation to bargain with any bona fide labor organization legally selected by the employees as their agent, and we intend to make every effort to maintain the best possible relationship with the elected representatives of a bargaining unit. In any agreement reached, however, we feel management must retain the rights and authorities necessary to direct and control the Company's operations effectively and efficiently. New employees also receive, through the mail, a 50-page booklet, styled "You and Your Company," which contains several paragraphs under the head- ing, "What about Unions." These paragraphs state, inter alia: ... Your Company's wages, hours, and working conditions are among the best in the industry, and its employee relations policies are designed to promote fair play and mutual respect. Policies like these are essential for 43,000 people to work together effectively. This also requires a great deal of cooperation and understanding, and a healthy regard for the rights of others. As for union membership, it is your Com- pany's belief that representation by an outside organization is not necessary in order for em- ployees to enjoy fair treatment and good work- ing conditions. However, this is something that all employees should decide for themselves after careful consideration of all the facts. While your Company recognizes your right to join a union, it does not believe that you should be forced to join a union as a condition of em- ployment and is opposed to all forms of com- pulsory unionism. No part of the second booklet is read to em- ployees at any of the orientation meetings. Regular employees also hear Respondent's labor relations philosophy in the course of annual training pro- grams. The Union does not participate in the orien- tation or training sessions. Union access to unit employees has been pro- vided to some extent by contract and to some ex- tent by the Union's efforts. The recently expired contract required Respondent to furnish seniority lists to the Union "at reasonable times." This list did not include home addresses of unit employees and was supplied to the Union twice a year. Although the effective dates on the lists were January 15 and July 15, the lists have not actually been available to the Union until 1 to 6 months after their compilation. The longest delays occurred for the most recent lists because Respondent had some difficulty while switching compilation of the lists to a computer. Another provision of the collective-bargaining agreement allowed the Union to appoint "at least one steward for each unit in each section." Pur- suant to that contract, the Union designated 72 stewards who were concentrated in areas with a high proportion of union members. The contract also permitted the Union to have bulletin boards at locations approved by Respondent, if the Union bore the expense of construction, installation, and maintenance. All these boards were placed in regu- lar locker rooms, but, because other locker rooms are available in work areas where there are no union bulletin boards, and because of the small amount of "change time" allowed employees who use the regular locker rooms, this is not an effective means for communicating with the unit employees. Respondent has its own bulletin boards spread throughout the refinery. Apart from the avenues of communication whose source is the contract, the Union endeavored to reach its unit employees by handbilling at two of the four gates through which both unit and nonunit em- ployees enter the refinery. The handbilling efforts were limited to two gates because of the danger to distributors from cars passing too close to them. These efforts were further impeded because the Union had no way of knowing who, among the em- ployees going through the gates, were the em- ployees it represented. On April 5, 1965, the Union made its first written request for home addresses of unit employees. The request was a broad one, asking for the names and addresses of all employees. It referred to the Respondent's ability to talk to employees about the Union at orientation programs and the Union's need to "at least ... counter the company propaganda by mass mailing," in support of its request. On April 14, the Union asked Respondent for the opportunity to appear at the orientation meetings. The next day the Union made its second written request for addresses. It cited Respondent's mailing to employees of the booklet "You and Your Company" and asked for a "complete mailing list of Standard Oil employees so that we may send them counter documentation and statements." On April 15, Respondent rejected the Union's in- itial request. Respondent stated that its contractual and legal obligations were satisfied by furnishing the Union with periodic seniority lists showing the name, classification, and seniority date of all unit employees. Eleven days later Respondent rejected the Union's second request for the reason previ- ously stated. The next day Respondent denied the Union's request to appear at the orientation meetings.. In May 1965, the parties began to bargain over certain amendments to the collective-bargaining contract proposed by Respondent. After four bar- gaining sessions, the parties entered into an agree- ment in July. Prior to the execution date, Respond- STANDARD OIL COMPANY ent distributed to all unit employees a statement of its position on the subject of the negotiations. At- tached thereto was a summary of Respondent's proposed changes and a statement expressing its hope that an agreement could quickly be reached. The statement was read to the Union at one of the bargaining sessions. The Union did not circulate to the unit employees a reply to Respondent's account of its position. Thereafter, in February 1966, the collective-bargaining agreement was renewed for another year, On March 8, 1966, after the renewed agreement went into effect, the Union made its final written request for a list of addresses. This time the Union's request was limited to the addresses of unit em- ployees. On March 16, Respondent rejected the request upon the ground that the collective-bargain- ing agreement did not require anything more than seniority lists. The complaint alleges that from April 5, 1965, the Union has requested "and is requesting" Respondent to furnish the names and addresses of the employees in the unit, and that this information is "relevant to collective bargaining and the ad- ministration of the current collective bargaining contract," and that by refusing to make the requested information available to the Union, Respondent has not bargained in good faith with the Union. Respondent contends that there is no obligation under Section 8(a)(5) to furnish informa- tion where the sole purpose of the request is to ena- ble a union to propagandize employees on the vir- tues of belonging to the union. Although in its letters to Respondent requesting the names and addresses of employees in the unit, the Union said that it needed this information to counter Respondent's antiunion propaganda, the complaint alleged that the Union had requested and was still requesting this information because it was relevant to collective bargaining. At the hearing and in the brief to the Trial Examiner, the General Counsel explained that the information was neces- sary if the Union was to perform its duty as statuto- ry representative of the employees in the ap- propriate unit. An official of the Union gave testimony as to why the Union needed the address list if it was to properly perform the duties it owed to employees in the unit. Notwithstanding the i American Boilers Mfrs Assn v. N.L R.B, 366 F.2d 815, 821 (C A. 8). 2 (A) Individual earnings, Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd. 217 F.2d 593 (C.A. 4); (B) Job rates and classifications, Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. N.L R.B., 234 F 2d 227 (C.A. 7); (C) Merit in- creases, N.L.R B. v. J. H. Allison & Company, 165 F 2d 766 (C.A 6); (D) Pension data, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 101 NLRB 360; (E) Timestudy data, Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 NLRB 1582, enfd. 399 F.2d 801 (C.A. 2); (F) Incentive earnings, Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 NLRB 654, enfd. 180 F.2d 173 (C A. 6); (G) Piece rates, Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 NLRB 1116, enfd. 179 F.2d 504 (C.A. 5); (H) Opera- tion of incentive system, Dixie Mfg. Co., supra, (I) Administration of pen- sion plan, Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v N.L.R.B., 223 F.2d 58 (C.A. 345 foregoing developments at the hearing, Respondent refused and continues to refuse to furnish the requested information. We find, therefore, that the issue of whether the information requested is rele- vant to the Union's performance of its statutory duty is properly before the Board for determina- tion.' Both the Board and the courts have found viola- tions of Section 8(a)(5) in unsatisfied requests for information which has a direct bearing on the negotiation of wages and fringe benefits or the bar- gaining representative's ability to administer the agreement.2 Such information is "presumptively relevant" to the performance of the Union's functi- ons.3 Some information is not so obviously related to the Union's bargaining and contract administra- tion responsibilities. Where this relationship is not clear, the Union is obliged to produce more precise evidence of its relevance.4 Once the relevance of the information sought is established, the Em- ployer's good-faith refusal to supply it is not a defense. A statutory violation is committed by the refusal to furnish relevant information. In this case the relevance of the unit employees' address list is apparent from a comparison of the Union's statutory duty of fair representation 5 with the difficulties it faced in attempting to reach those to whom it owed such duty. The Union's duty ex- tends to nonunion unit employees as well as to union members. Because of the relatively low union membership in the unit, the absence of a union- security clause in the collective-bargaining agree- ment, the residential dispersion of unit employees over a five- or six-county area, the apparent ineffec- tiveness of the steward system, the lack of adequate exposure of unit employees to union bulletin boards, and the inefficiency of handbilling efforts, the Union could not in any effective manner com- municate with the beneficiaries of its statutory obligation. On the other hand, the possession of an address list would enable the Union to poll the unit employees as to their preferences and priorities in contract negotiations, their experience and recom- mendations with respect to the operation of the grievance-arbitration machinery, and their thoughts on the wisdom of striking over a particular issue. In this sense, and in the context of this case, including the Employer's failure to furnish a reasonable 1). See also N.L R.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 313 F 2d 260, 265 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 375 U.S. 834; John F Swift Company, 133 NLRB 185, enfd. 302 F 2d 342 (C.A 7); J. I. Case Co. v N L.R.B., 253 F.2d 149 (C.A. 7). 3 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v N.L.R.B , 347 F.2d 61, 69 (C,A. 3). 4 Ibid. 5 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U.S 192; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman 345 U S. 330, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S 171 (decided February 27, 1967); Miranda Fuel Com- pany, Inc., 140 NLRB 181, enforcement denied on grounds not here material, Hughes Tool Company, 147 NLRB 1573; Local 12, Rubber Workers v. N L.R.B., 366 F 2d 821 (C.A. 5), enfg. 150 NLRB 312. 346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD justification for withholding the information," we find that a unit employee address list was relevant to the Union's performance of its responsibilities in collective bargaining and contract administration. We are unable to agree with our dissenting col- league that an 8(a)(5) finding is foreclosed in this case because the Union initially based its request on its desire to "counter the company propaganda." As we have already noted, it was alleged in the complaint, and the Union at the hearing made clear, that the address list was needed by the Union to aid it in properly performing its collective-bargaining duties. Nevertheless, Respondent has continued to refuse to provide the requested information, insist- ing that the Union has no right to such information regardless of the purpose for which it is sought. Moreover, we find that the fact that the Union's initial request for the names and addresses revealed that it would use this information to counter the Respondent's propaganda did not eliminate Respondent's obligation to furnish the information. As we have indicated above, the names and ad- dresses of unit employees were needed by the Union to assist it in properly performing its collec- tive-bargaining duties. As bargaining agent, the Union had the statutory duty not only to represent all employees in the unit, but to seek to do so effec- tively. The Union's effectiveness as an employee representative was necessarily dependent on its bargaining strength, and this in turn was dependent on continued employee adherence and support. The company appeals, which the Union desired to answer, sought to persuade employees that union representation was not needed by them to assure fair treatment and working conditions. Respondent was of course privileged thus to express its view. But the Union was justified in inferring that Respondent's purpose was to weaken employee support of the Union and thereby to reduce, if not indeed to destroy, the Union's strength and effec- tiveness as a bargaining agent. The Union, there- fore, in the discharge of its representative responsi- bilities to all employees in the unit whom it was statutorily required to serve, had a legitimate in- terest in responding to Respondent's arguments by communicating to the unit employees its side of the bargaining story- to attempt to show, for example, why the employees needed the Union, how the Union had served them in the past, and how it might in the future, why its contract adminstration actions and its bargaining proposals deserve their backing, and why it was in the employees' interest to provide membership and other support to their bargaining agent. But in order to be able effectually to counter Respondent's repeated statement of views, the Union needed first to know which employees were 6 The Respondent offered no evidence that compliance with the Union's request would be unduly burdensome Indeed, the record reveals that it had an address list and used it for sending mailings to its employees. in the bargaining unit and where they could be reached. As the full information thus required lay exclusively in Respondent's possession, and was not otherwise available to the Union for reasons earlier stated, the Union had a right to demand this information from Respondent, and Respondent, we hold, had a correlative obligation to furnish it. Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Ex- aminer, that by its refusal to provide such a list upon request, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7 THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirm- ative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns Operations, Inc., is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna- tional Union, Richmond, California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees on the classified payroll of the manufacturing and purchase and stores departments in the Employer's Richmond refinery, including San Pablo tank farm, but excluding sheet metal workers, their ap- prentices and head and lead mechanics; carpenters, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics; can- vassmen, saw filers; bricklayers, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics; plumbers and pipefit- ters, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics and regularly assigned pipefitters' helpers and lead burners; employees covered by contract with the International Association of Machinists, Boiler- makers Union, and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; and employees covered by separate contracts with the Independent Union of Petroleum Workers; guards, groundsmen, and gatemen; and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. Since July 1950, and at all times thereafter, the above-named labor organization has been and is the bargaining representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of 7 Compare Kenai Packers, 144 NLRB 1122, with McCulloch Corpora- tion, 132 NLRB 201. STANDARD OIL COMPANY -347 collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on or about April 15, 1965, and at all times thereafter, to furnish the above-named labor organization, upon request, a list of home ad- dresses of employees in the appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respond- ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced, and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing, employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby en- gaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respond- ent, Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns Operations, Inc., Richmond, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac- tion set forth below: Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the aforesaid- Regional Director, in writing, within, 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. Member Zagoria, dissenting: I agree with the Trial Examiner that the facts of this case do not establish a violation of Section 8(a)(5) by Respondent. The Union's request for the list of employees' names and addresses was based solely on its desire to "counter the company propaganda." The Union's stated reason thus negates any suggestion that the list was sought for bargaining purposes. My colleagues apparently rely on the allegation in the complaint to the effect that the list was requested "because it was relevant to collective bargaining" as supplying the essential in- gredient to a violation of the Act. But the General Counsel's post hoc rationalization scarcely suffices, in my opinion, to give the Union a reason it did not advance, and which was not before the Respondent when it refused the Union's request. Indeed, the Respondent does not claim that such a list is never required to be furnished, only that on the facts here it was not sought for bargaining purposes. As I agree that it was not, I would dismiss the complaint. 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and con- ditions of employment, with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Richmond, California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO, by refusing to furnish it, upon request, a list of unit employees' home addresses. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization by furnishing it, upon request, a list of home addresses of employees in the ap- propriate unit. (b) Post at its plant premises in Richmond, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms pro- vided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. 8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to an Order of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Richmond, California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO, by furnishing it, upon request, a list of unit employees' home addresses. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em- ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance em- ployees on the classified payroll of the manufacturing and purchase and stores de- partments in our Richmond refinery, in- cluding San Pablo tank farm, but excluding sheet metal workers, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics ; carpenters, their Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, En- forcing an Order." 348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD apprentices and head and lead mechanics; canvassmen, saw filers; bricklayers, their apprentices and head and lead machanics; plumbers and pipefitters, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics and regularly assigned pipefitters' helpers and lead bur- ners; employees covered by contracts with the International Association of Machin- ists, Boilermakers Union, and Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; and employees covered by separate con- tracts with the Independent Union of Petroleum Workers; guards, groundsmen, and gatemen; and supervisors as defined in the Act. Dated By (Title) STANDARD OIL COM- PANY OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERNS OPERATIONS, INC. Employer (Representative) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-0335. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARION C. LADWIG, Trial Examiner: This proceeding was heard before me at San Francisco, California, on July 7 and 8, 1966, pursuant to a charge filed by the Union (Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Richmond, California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO) on June 28, 1965, and amended on May 5, 1966, and a complaint issued on May 6, 1966. The case involves primarily the issue whether the Respondent (also called the Company) violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to furnish the Union a list of the bargaining unit employees' home addresses. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses , and after due considera- tion of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR OR- GANIZATION INVOLVED The Company is a Delaware corporation, which is en- gaged in the refining and sale of petroleum and petroleum products at its Richmond, California, refinery from which it ships annually goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside that State. The Company ad- mits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A Requests for Employees' Home Addresses On April 5, 1965, about a month after the Company and the Union signed a new collective-bargaining agree- ment, the Union wrote the Company, requesting a list of the names and addresses of the bargaining unit em- ployees. Citing the Company's "orientation" programs (in which the Company talked to employees about unions without a representative of the Union being present), the Union requested the mailing list "so that the Union at least can counter the company propaganda by mass mail- ing." Again on April 15, the Union requested the names and addresses. Quoting a provision in a company brochure (that unions were considered unnecessary in the refinery), and pointing out that the Company had mailed the booklet to the employees, the Union requested a complete mailing list "so that we may send them counter documentation and statements." The Company answered both requests by letters, stating that the semiannual seniority lists (without addresses) fulfilled the Company's contractual and legal obligations. About a month later, the Company proposed some im- provements in its benefit plans (incorporated by reference in the agreement), and began negotiating with the Union concerning the changes. Although the Company mailed each employee a letter, outlining the changes proposed by the Company and advising the employees of the current status of the negotiations, the Union did not again request the mailing list, nor advise the Company that the list was needed in connection with the bargaining. (The parties reached an agreement on the benefits in July.) Thereafter, in February 1966, the collective-bargaining agreement was renewed for another year, without the Union requesting the employees' names and addresses for pur- poses of assisting it in negotiations. Finally, on March 8, 1966, after the renewed agree- ment went into effect, the Union wrote the Company another letter, repeating the request for "a list of all the names and addresses of the employees in the collective bargaining unit," without stating any further reason for the request. The Company again answered that the agree- ment did not require home addresses on the seniority list, and refused to furnish the addresses. A company witness credibly testified that at no time did the Union express any reason for requesting the mail- ing list other than the stated purpose of wanting to mail out counter propaganda. B. No Issue of "Good Faith" The General Counsel contends that the refusal to furnish the home addresses is a per se violation of Section 8(a)(5), asserting that "the issue here transcends good faith because fundamental rights of employees are in- volved, so that whether or not Respondent denied the Union the list in good faith is irrelevant." Because of this position , the General Counsel does not rely on what evidence there is in the record which might indicate bad faith on the part of the Company. This testimony (largely given by the Union's financial secreta- STANDARD OIL COMPANY 349 ry when cross-examined by company counsel) concerns some of the Company's purported conduct, in the context of the Company's year-round efforts to persuade em- ployees that union representation is unnecessary, and its actions in publicizing the contractual rights of employees to withdraw from union membership. The union representative asserted: (1) the Company, for pretextual reasons, repeatedly delayed furnishing all and/or a large part of the seniority lists for months,'thereby depriving the Union of even the names of the bargaining unit em- ployees. (2) The Company interfered with the Union's use of the steward system for obtaining employee ad- dresses and contacting employees, by intimidating the stewards, thereby precluding full union representation in the refinery. (3) The Company has undermined the Union's contact with employees through the use of union bulletin boards, first, by refusing to allow union bulletin boards to be placed inside the plants (although the Com- pany denied such a prohibition at the hearing), and secondly, the Company has quoted the price of $45 or $50 to the Union for inexpensive ($4 or $5) bulletin boards, thereby making the cost prohibitive (although a company witness indicated that the Company has agreed to permit the Union to build its own bulletin boards, if certain reasonable specifications are met). In view of the failure of both the General Counsel and the Union (whose counsel withdrew from the hearing because of a conflicting commitment) to develop this evidence or to rely specifically on it, the Company presented little evidence in contradiction, and the matter was not fully litigated. Therefore, I do not make any findings thereon. C. Contentions of the Parties The General Counsel contends that the Company is legally obligated to furnish a list of the employees' home addresses to the employees' collective-bargaining representative in order for the representative to fulfill ef- fectively its statutory duty to represent the employees. In making this contention, the General Counsel relies primarily upon the reasoning of the Board in its recent decision in Excelsior Underwear Inc., and Saluda Knitting Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, in which the rule was an- nounced that the failure of the employer to furnish the names and addresses of the eligible voters before a representation election would be grounds for setting aside the election. The General Counsel argues that "clearly the principles annunciated in that case would apply afor- tiori to a union that, as here, is designated as the bargain- ing representative of employees, because this union now owes responsibility to employees, whereas in a union or- ganization campaign no such obligation is owed.... By its requests for home addresses of employees it represents, the Union is only asking permission to carry out its function as a representative of Respondent's em- ployees. It can hardly begin to effectively and intel- ligently represent these employees unless it can establish and maintain a dialogue with them." "Of similar concern is the right to seek employees' support for the statutory bargaining representative by, in effect, maintaining its or- ganizing effort among the employees. The Union is thus attempting to strengthen its position in the interest of em- ployees.... Providing the Union with a list of home ad- dresses ... does afford the Union a better opportunity for communicating its reason for joining to the employee." The likelihood of reaching all the employees with other methods of communication is "problematical," as in Excelsior. The Company, on the other hand, argues that under the facts of this case, the Company's statutory obligation to bargain in good faith does not require the Company to furnish the home address "(a) where at no point did the Union indicate to the Company that the list of home ad- dresses was necessary to enable it to bargain intelligently or to administer the collective-bargaining agreement, and (b) where the Union's sole stated purpose for requesting the information was to enable it to make a mass mailing to company employees to counter what it believed to be company `propaganda' in employee orientation pro- grams." Later in its brief, the Company adds • "Nor do we say that an employer could not be required, in a proper case, to furnish a union with employee home addresses where this information was demonstrated to be relevant and necessary to meaningful collective bargaining con- cerning wages, hours and working conditions." Intriguing as such a question might be, the Company contends, "There is not a shred of evidence that the Company in this case was presented with a request for information which the Union indicated it needed for bargaining purposes." D. Concluding Findings Where no effort has been made to prove bad faith on the part of the Company in refusing to provide the Union with the home addresses of the bargaining unit em- ployees, the issue of whether the Company violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish the addresses turns on a question of relevancy. Under the decided cases, the requested information must be relevant to the Union's role as bargaining representative in the negotia- tion or administration of a collective bargaining agree- ment. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 61, 68 (C.A. 3); The Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 750 (C.A. 6). The only reason the Union gave the Company for requesting the home addresses was to answer the Com- pany's propaganda by mailing the employees "counter documentation and statements." At no time did the Union seek the addresses in connection with -negotia- tions, or in connection with policing or administering the agreement. Although the complaint asserts that the requested information "constituted information relevant to collective bargaining and the administration of the cur- rent collective bargaining contract," I agree with the Company that "There is not a shred of evidence that the Company in this case was presented with a request for in- formation which the Union indicated it needed for bar- gaining purposes." I also agree that "the legal obligation to bargain in good faith under Section 8(a)(5) does not ex- tend to union requests which seek information, not for bargaining purposes, but solely for the purpose of propagandizing employees on the virtues of the Union." CONCLUSION OF LAW The Company did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by refus- ing the Union's requests for the employees' home ad- dresses where the requests were not made in connection with the negotiation or administration of a collective-bar- gaining agreement. RECOMMENDED ORDER The complaint herein should be, and hereby is, dismissed.