Goodman Lumber Co.

304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Goodman Lumber Company and Local 12, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 20-CA-3889 June 29, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On October 4, 1966, Trial Examiner Stanley Gil- bert issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and de- sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to those allegations. Thereafter, both the Respondent and the General Counsel filed excep- tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and support- ing-briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein. 1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent did not constructively discharge Freeman Parker, Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. We do not agree with this finding. Freeman Parker, Jr.,' was one of the six em- ployees whose cards were shown to Gelleri, Respondent's general manager, on December 1, 1965, and on the same date he was unlawfully inter- rogated by Gelleri as to his union membership. Sometime later in December, Edward Goodman, Respondent's president, asked him if he signed a union card. Goodman, when told that he had, asked whether he planned to get out of the Union. After Parker, Junior, answered that he did not know, Goodman responded, "Well, I think you will." Freeman Parker, Sr. ,2 also worked for Respond- ent, and the record shows that officials of Respond- ent were aware that Parker, Senior, was opposed to his son's joining the Union. Parker, Senior, 1 Hereinafter referred to as Parker, Junior testified that Goodman called him in the office and told him the boy had joined the Union. "He asked me to get the card back. I told him that he gave the Union $50.00." Mr. Goodman said, "Well, I'll give him the $50.00 back if he gets the card back." The Trial Examiner found the above interrogation of Parker, Senior, to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1), and he further found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising an economic benefit to Parker, Junior, through his father if he would revoke his union authorization card. The foregoing clearly shows that Respondent was intent on coercing Parker, Junior, into revoking his union authorization card and that responsible of- ficials of Respondent ordered Parker, Senior, to pressure his son into such action. The record also shows that the Parkers had numerous quarrels over this issue, making their home life miserable- and virtually unbearable to Parker, junior's mother- and that the dissension in the Parker household measureably increased as the direct result of Parker, Senior's attempts to carry out his superior's instructions to obtain his son' s resigna- tion from the Union. In addition, the record shows that, prior to the failure of Parker, Junior, to return to work, during a discussion between Paul Sant, a supervisor, and Parker, Senior, concerning the problem arising from the refusal of Parker, Junior, to quit the Union, Sant admittedly suggested that Parker, Senior, get his son to resign. Though Sant testified that he intended to suggest only that Parker, Senior, obtain his son's resignation from the Union, the testimony of both Sant and Parker, Senior, concerning the discussion permits the con- struction that the resignation referred to was a resignation from employment with Respondent. It is clear that Parker, Senior, -so construed the reference, and that he told his son not to go back to work because "they don't want you there any- more." Thereafter, Parker, Junior, did not return to work, and when Sant asked Parker, Senior, why his son was not at work, Parker, Senior, told him what had transpired at home. Sant then told Parker, Senior, that he had not meant that Parker, Junior, should resign from work; he did not, however, in- struct Parker, Senior, to correct the allegedly er- roneous impression given to the son, nor did he, or any other official, call Parker, Junior, back to work. Instead, they continued to exert pressure on both Parkers in an effort to obtain Parker, Junior's revo- cation of the authorization card he had given the Union. The foregoing establishes beyond any doubt that Respondent's supervisory oficials instructed Parker, Senior, to obtain his son's resignation from the Union, gave him instructions in this regard which were construed by Parker, Senior, to the 2 Hereinafter referred to as Parker, Senior 166 NLRB No. 48 GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY knowledge of Respondent's supervisors, as instruc- tions to have his son resign his employment, and ratified Parker, Senior's actions by failing to in- struct him or his son that they did not intend that Parker, Junior, should quit his employment.3 We are satisfied that, by the foregoing conduct, Respondent constituted Parker, Senior, its agent, and is legally responsible for his statements to his son relative to the union matter and for the con- sequences of such statements. As Parker, Junior, quit his employment as the direct result of intolera- ble conditions resulting from the unlawful pressures thus exerted upon him by Respondent in its effort to coerce and restrain him in the exercise of Section 7 rights, we find that Parker, Junior, was construc- tively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.4 2. The Trial Examiner also found that Respond- ent by its counsel did not unlawfully interrogate Parker, Senior, a few days before the hearing in this matter when counsel in the course of their conver- sation asked him if he had signed a card for the Union. We do not agree with this finding. The interrogation of Parker, Senior, about his union membership was admittedly not relevant to the Respondent's defense herein. The obvious ef- fect of this conduct, even if not specifically so in- tended, was to intimidate the employee before his testimony was given at the hearing.5 We find such conduct on Respondent's behalf in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, we hereby adopt the present Conclusions of Law, with the exception of Conclusions 5 and 9, and substitute the following as Conclusions of Law 5 and 9: "5. Respondent did discriminate against its em- ployee, Parker, Junior, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by constructively discharging him because he had joined the Union." "9. Respondent, by its counsel, interfered with, restrained, and coerced an employee, Parker, Senior, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by interrogating him as to his union member- ship. 5We note particularly that General Manager Gelleri did not give Parker, Junior, his last paycheck until Gellen had ascertained that Parker, Junior, had not resigned from the Union. 4 The fact that the intolerable conditions were created in Parker, Ju- nior's home life rather than merely in his working conditions , does not, in all the circumstances of this case , preclude this finding. Parker, Senior, had no control or supervision over Parker, Junior's work performance; manifestly, therefore, Respondent, in using Parker, Senior, as an instru- ment of its coercion in regard to his son's union activities, was seeking to utilize the lever of parental control and displeasure to gain its ends Hav- ing interjected itself into the Parkers' domestic affairs for its unlawful ends, Respondent cannot hide behind the claim that its unlawful conduct did not cause Parker, Junior, to quit his employment , simply because Parker, Junior , appears to have quit , at least in part, because of an un- THE REMEDY 305 As we have found that the Respondent has en- gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As we have found that Respondent discrimina- torily discharged Parker, Junior, we shall order him reinstated to his former position, if it still exists, or, if not, to a substantially equivalent position, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his discharge to the date on which he is offered reinstatement, less his net earnings during such period. His backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Com- pany, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest at 6 percent per annum, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Goodman Lumber Company, San Francisco, California, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac- tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order, as herein modified: 1. Delete paragraph 2(a) thereof and substitute therefore the following: "(a) Offer to Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to the jobs they held prior to their discriminatory discharges or to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of Respondent's dis- crimination against them, as provided in the section of this Decision entitled `The Remedy."' derstandable and natural desire to forestall the breakup of his parent's household because of the unnatural stratus and pressures exerted on it by Respondent's conduct. 5 Joy Silk Mills v. N L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, at 743 (C A.D.C.), cert de- nied 341 U.S. 914, the court stated: The Board has held that "an Em- ployer is privileged to interview employees for the purpose of discovering facts within the limits of the issues raised by a complaint , where the em- ployer, or its counsel, does so for the purpose of preparing its case for trial and does not go beyond the necessities of such preparation to pry into matters of union membership , to discuss the nature or extent of union ac- tivity, to dissuade employees from joining or remaining members of a union, or otherwise to interfere with the statutory right to self-organiza- tion " 306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL 2. Delete paragraph 2(b) thereof and substitute therefor the following: "(b) Notify Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker, Jr., if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces." 3. Delete from paragraph 2(e) of the Trial Ex- aminer's Recommended Order the words "to be furnished" and substitute therefor the words "on forms provided." 4. The notice shall be amended by deleting the sixth paragraph thereof and substituting therefor the following: WE WILL offer to Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker, Jr., immediate and full reinstatement to the jobs they held prior to their discriminatory discharges, or to substantially equivalent posi- tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against them. [The notice shall be amended by deleting the note and substituting therefor the following: [WE WILL notify Roger Ruiz and Freeman Parker, Jr., if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon application, in ac- cordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended after discharge from the Armed Forces.] TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE STANLEY GILBERT, Trial Examiner: Based upon a charge filed on December 15, 1965, and amended on March 10, 1966, by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 12, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the complaint herein was issued March 29, 1966. The complaint, which was amended during the course of the hearing,' alleges that Goodman Lumber Company, hereinafter referred to as the Company or Respondent, 1 Paragraph 5 of the complaint was amended to add the names of Robert Levy, Charles Goodman, and Paul Sant as agents and supervisors of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Paragraph 9 of-the complaint was amended to add subparagraph (g) alleging unlawful interrogation of an employee by counsel for the Respondent 2 Respondent amended its answer to admit the allegation in paragraph 5 with respect to Robert Levy and Charles Goodman but it denied the al- legation with , respect to Paul Sant. However, subsequently, Respondent stipulated that Paul Sant was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Respondent further amended its answer to deny the above-mentioned ad- LABOR RELATIONS BOARD violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Respond- ent, by its answer as amended during the course of the hearing,2 denies that it committed the unfair labor prac- tices alleged in said complaint. Pursuant to notice, a heanng was held in San Fran- cisco, California, on June 7 and 9, 1966, before me, the duly designated Trial Examiner. Briefs were received from the General Counsel and Respondent within the time designated therefor. Upon the entire record ' in this case and upon observa- tion of the witnesses as they testified, I make the follow- ing: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, a California corporation, is engaged in the business of selling lumber, hardware, and plumbing sup- plies in San Francisco, California. During the year preceding the issuance of the compalint, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, received gross revenues in excess of $500,000. During the same period, it purchased and received at its aforesaid place of business goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000, which were shipped directly to it from suppliers outside the State of California. As is admitted by Respondent, it is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in com- merce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED As is admitted by Respondent , the Union is, and at all times material herein has been , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES In the early part of the hearing the parties entered into a settlement agreement with respect to the allegation in the complaint of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.4 In view of said settlement agreement, evidence relating to said allegation was received and considered only as background information with respect to the remaining is- sues herein. The settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that the Respondent bargain collectively with the Union, upon request, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described in para- graph 6 of the complaint. Background Information The record discloses that by December 1, 1965, the Union had received authorization cards from six em- ployees in the aforementioned unit of Respondent's em- dition to paragraph 9 of the complaint 3 General Counsel filed a motion with the Trial Examiner, which was unopposed , to correct the transcript of the hearing in this proceeding Said motion is hereby granted and corrections made 4 In view of the settlement agreement , General Counsel requested and was granted leave to withdraw the allegation in paragraph 16 of the com- plaint The Trial Examiner granted Respondent's motion to strike para- graphs 6, 7, 8, and 13 of the complaint, over the opposition of General Counsel, since said allegations were related to the allegation in said para- graph 16 which was withdrawn as above noted GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY ployees (which apparently constituted a majority of the employees in said unit). On said date, December 1, 1965, the Union sent a letter to Respondent advising that it represented a majority of Respondent's "warehousemen" and requesting that Respondent recognize and bargain with it as the collective-bargaining agent for the warehousemen. On the morning of the same date, George Pedrin, secretary-treasurer of the Union, called upon Murray Gelleri, general manager of Respondent, at the office of Respondent, and gave him a copy of the aforesaid letter. Gelleri asked for proof of the claim of majority representation. The six authorization cards were presented to him. Gelleri looked at the cards and copied the names of the employees who had signed said cards.5 Gelleri and Pedrin agreed to meet on December 10. At the meeting on December 10 Pedrin gave Gelleri copies of the proposed union contract and protested the discharge of Roger Ruiz as an "unfair discharge," requesting that Ruiz be put back on the job and paid for lost time. A further meeting was scheduled for December 14, 1965. On said date representatives of the Union, Gel- leri, and Edward Goodman, president of Respondent, among others, attended. Goodman stated, in effect, that he would not recognize the Union as the collective-bar- gaining agent of the employees in the unit in which it claimed to have a majority and that he had no intention of engaging in collective bargaining with the Union. The Issues The following are the issues in this proceeding: 1. Whether on various dates in December 1965 Respondent unlawfully interrogated employees. 2. Whether Respondent discharged Roger Ruiz in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. Whether Respondent unlawfully promised an em- ployee monetary benefits if he convinced a fellow em- ployee to revoke his union authorization card. 4. Whether Respondent threatened an employee with discharge if he did not revoke his union authorization card. 5. Whether Respondent constructively discharged Freeman Parker, Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 6. Whether Respondent threatened an employee with discharge if he did not convince a fellow employee to revoke his union authorization card. 7. Whether Respondent discriminatorily laid off Freeman Parker, Sr., on two occasions. 8. Whether Respondent discriminatorily laid off Carb- by Burwell on one occasion. 9. Whether Counsel for Respondent unlawfully inter- rogated Freeman Parker, Sr. A. The Interrogation (in December) The record discloses that Respondent did engage in various acts of interrogation of its employees during the month of December. Respondent does not contend that it did not engage in interrogation, but rather its defense with regard thereto, according to its brief, is that, while it does not deny any of the testimony of the General Coun- sel's witnesses as to the interrogation: 307 It is adequately made clear by the record that em- ployer was under the good faith belief he could inter- rogate employees concerning their union member- ship, for the purposes of determining the collective bargaining position of the Union, a question no longer an issue in this case. Julia Myers testified that "a few days after December 1st" Gelleri called her into his office. Her testimony as to the conversation which ensued is as follows: Well, he asked me if I had signed a card. First of all, he asked me if the Goodman benefits had been stated to me, and I said, "Yes." It was then that he asked me if I had signed the card, and I said, "What card?" He said, "The Union card," and I said, "Yes." Thomas H. Irving testified that he was called into "the office" by Gelleri on or about December 6 where he held a conversation with Gelleri and Edward Goodman. His testimony with respect to their conversation is as follows: A. Murray [Gelleri] asked me if I knew any of the benefits of Goodman and I told him I didn't and Mr. Goodman asked me, or he told me that I should have known about them, and they explained them to me, and then Mr. Goodman asked me who hired me, and I said, "Charles Goodman, your son," and I told him that he didn't tell me any of the benefits, and then Mr. Goodman asked me if I was hired part time, and I told him, "Yes." And then Murray asked me if I was hired part time, and I told him, "yes." And then Murray asked me if I had signed a card, and I said, "Yes." Then, after explaining Goodman's benefits, he asked me if it changed my mind any, and I said, "No." Q. What card are you referring to? A. The Union card. Freeman Parker, Jr., testified to a conversation he had on December 1 with Gelleri. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: THE WITNESS: I was in the back of the hardware department working, and Mr. Gelleri asked me to come down, and he wanted to talk to me. I came down and he asked me had I joined the Union, had I signed a card for the Union, and I told him, "Yes," and he asked me what they offered me, and I told him they offered benefits and other things, and he said, "O.K.," and he left me. Parker, Junior, also testified to a subsequent conversation he had with Edward Goodman in December. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: A. I was working and he asked me, he made a joke and said, "Are you working hard?" I told him, "Yes," and he told me to come down for a moment, he wanted to speak with me, and we went down there in back of the hardware, where his car was parked, where the parking lot is, and then he asked me had I joined the Union, and I told him I had. 5 The six employees were Julia Myers, Thomas H. Irving, Carbby Lee Burwell, Freeman Parker, Jr , Roger F. Ruiz, and Joseph Pohl. 308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD He asked me do I plan on- TRIAL EXAMINER: If you what? THE WITNESS: Did I plan on getting out of the Union, and I told him I didn't know. Then he said, "Well, I think you will." I said, "O.K.," and I left. Roger Ruiz testified to a conversation he had with Gel- leri on December 1. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: A. On December 1st, as I was leaving warehouse no. 4, Mr. Gelleri approached me and asked me if I had signed a union authorization card , and I told hitr that I had. Q. Can you recall anything further being said? A. Yes. At that particular time, he asked me what sort of deal did the Union offer me, and I told him there was no such deal. Then he also asked me as to what kind of pay did they promise to grant me, and I told him at the time that he would have to discuss this in negotiations with the Union. Gelleri testified, in response to questions by the General Counsel, that he questioned employee Joseph Pohl as to whether he had signed a union card. Gelleri's testimony is as follows: Q. (By Mr. Orenstein) And you asked him [Pohl] if he had signed a card? A. Yes, I did. Q. Did you ask him if he knew the union benefits, or the company benefits, excuse me? A. I did. All of the above-quoted testimony is uncontradicted and is credited. The record does not indicate that the Respondent had had any doubts as to the authenticity of the authorization cards which the Union showed Gelleri on December 1, nor does the Respondent contend that it questioned em- ployees, whose names were noted by Gelleri when he saw their cards, in order to determine whether they had, in fact, signed cards. In the circumstances of this case and in the context of the unfair labor practices of Respondent found hereinbelow, it is concluded that the systematic in- terrogation of all but one of the employees who had signed cards was reasonably calculated to, land did tend to, interfere with, coerce, and restrain said employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. There is no merit to the defense that Respondent had a good-faith belief that it was not unlawful to so interrogate its em- ployees. B. The Discharge ofRuiz Ruiz entered the employ of Respondent as a warehouseman on July 1, 1965, and was discharged on December 9, 1965. His starting salary was $105 a week. In the first week of November 1965, he was transferred from the hardware warehouse and "put in charge of warehouse No. 4 and warehouse No. 2" and was given a raise of $5 a week.6 Although it was stipulated that Ruiz was instrumental in arranging meetings between union representatives and fellow employees in the Union's attempt to obtain their authorization cards, there is no showing, nor is there any basis for inferring, that Respondent was aware of these activities on his part. However, he was one of the six em- ployees whose authorization cards were shown to Gelleri and he was interrogated with respect thereto by Gelleri on December 1, as above indicated. On December 8, Ruiz was told by Charlie Goodman to turn over the keys to warehouse No. 4 and No. 2 and to report to the "hardware warehouse." Ruiz testified that he questioned Gelleri about his transfer to the hard- ware warehouse. His testimony, which is uncontradicted and is credited, is as follows: I asked Mr. Gelleri if this were to be a permanent change, and he told me not to worry about it, that if he wanted me to know, he would let me know. On the following day, at 4:30, Gelleri informed him of his discharge. Ruiz testified to his conversation with Gel- leri (at that point) as follows: A. Yes. Mr. Gelleri said that they were letting me go. I then asked Mr. Gelleri why and he said because they were overstaffed in the hardware warehouse and I questioned this and Mr. Gelleri said the reason they were letting me go was that I was the last person to be hired in the hardware warehouse. I then told Mr. Gelleri that I had not been the last person hired in the hardware warehouse, and he stated that that was all right, because I had at one time given them notice that I was leaving the firm, and this was the end of the conversation. Q. Now, who among the-warehouse people was hired after you? A. Mr. Tom Irving, for one. There was Mr. Carb- by Burwell, who was hired after myself. Also, there was, I think, two parttime people-one that I know of, for sure, and I don't know the other person. Q. Do you know his name, Mr. Ruiz? A. Just by the first name. His name was Terry. Q. Now, you mentioned something in your testimony about a two-week notice to quit. Can you elaborate on that a little bit? A. Yes. At approximately the end of November or the early part-latter part of October to the first part of November, I had been offered a job with the Forestry Department, with the government Forestry Department, and I chose to take this position because I felt at that particular time that it would be better advancement for myself. So, I notified Mr. Charlie Goodman that I had in- tentions to quit to take this other job. Two days following, I received notice from the government that the person who offered me this job did not have the authorization to offer me this par- ticular job and that supposedly my qualifications did not qualify for the position, so therefore I returned to Mr. Charlie Goodman and told him the situation and asked him if I could remain with the firm, to which he said it would be quite all right. 6 It was stipulated that he was not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 309 Gelleri testified with respect to the discharge of Ruiz and the events leading up to it. His testimony is sum- marized as follows: that toward the end of October Charles Goodman told him that Ruiz "had quit"; that he replaced Ruiz in the hardware warehouse with Freeman Parker, Jr., who had previously been working part time; that a day or two later he was informed that Ruiz' govern- ment job had fallen through; that since he had replaced Ruiz by Parker, Junior, he put Ruiz in warehouse No. 4 and No. 2 and gave him an "automatic raise" because the job was more difficult. Gelleri further testified that he notified Ruiz that he was discharged on December 9; that he did not give him a reason therefor; that Ruiz asked him why he was discharged; and that he told Ruiz "that his work was not of a satisfactory nature and we were not going to put him back in the hardware department as we had replaced him ... " Counsel for Respondent elicited considerable testimony from Gelleri and- Paul Sant in support of Respondent's contention that Ruiz was discharged because his work was unsatisfactory. One of the bases for this contention was that Ruiz was excessively tardy. His timecards which were introduced in evidence disclosed that he did report late a number of times but on most of the occasions his tardiness amounted to only a few minutes. His timecards also revealed that on quite a few occasions he also reported some minutes early. A review of the cards did not disclose, in the Trial Examiner's judgment, what reasonably might be considered a record of excessive tardiness. Gelleri testified that he had warned Ruiz about his tardiness which Ruiz denied. However, Gelleri's testimony with regard to the warning was vague and unconvincing and the Trial Examiner credits Ruiz' testimony that he was never warned about tardiness. The other complaint about his work was that he did not fill orders properly. According to the testimony of Sant, on one or more occasions merchandise was returned because Ruiz had not filled an order properly. Sant's testimony with regard to these instances was not impres- sive. Furthermore, Ruiz testified without contradiction, which testimony is credited, that there were two others who filled orders, that the drivers checked the merchan- dise against the orders before making delivery, and that, if there were any mistakes, it could very well have been that the salesman had made out the order improperly. Furthermore, Ruiz testified without contradiction, which testimony is credited, that about 10 days prior to his discharge and just before Respondent learned that he had signed a union card, Charles Goodman complimented him on his work and promised him raises. The testimony with respect thereto, which was uncontradicted and is credited, is as follows: A. Yes. Mr. Charlie Goodman told me that my work was quite satisfactory; that following the month of November that I was to receive a $5.00 a week raise- at the end of November, one at the end of December- Q. How large a raise at the end of December? A. A $5.00 raise per week after the end of December and also a $5 .00 raise at the end of Janua ry, per week. This was a $5.00 a week raise at which time I would be up to $125.00 per week. He also stated that every six months following this particular raise or the establishment of $125.00 per week, that I would be reevaluated and if they saw fit I would be given another raise, and this was the end of the conversation. It does not appear that Goodman would have made the above-quoted statements to Ruiz if his work had been un- satisfactory. In view of all the circumstances, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that Ruiz' testimony as to what was said to him by Gelleri at the time of his discharge should be credited. It is further concluded that the reason advanced by Respondent for the discharge was merely pretextual. Among the factors upon which this conclusion is based are the unconvincing nature of the testimony with respect to dissatisfaction with Ruiz' work performance, the promise of raises just 10 days prior to the discharge, the timing of the discharge, the animus of Respondent toward the Union, the assignment of Ruiz to a new job just a day prior to his discharge, and the efforts of Respondent to dissipate the Union's majori- ty. Therefore, it is found that Ruiz was discharged by Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. C. Events Relating to the Alleged Constructive Discharge of Freeman Parker, Jr. The issues with respect to the allegations in the com- plaint of an unlawful promise of monetary benefits, of a threat of discharge, and of the constructive discharge of Parker, Junior, are so interrelated that the evidence rele- vant thereto will be considered in one context. As above indicated, Freeman Parker, Jr., was one of the six employees whose cards were shown to Gelleri on December 1, 1965. Also as above indicated, Parker, Ju- nior, was interrogated by Gelleri on December 1 and by Edward Goodman sometime in December as to his sig- ning a union card. Goodman not only asked him if he had joined the Union but also asked him, when told that he had, whether he planned to get out of the Union. After Parker, Junior, answered that he did not know, Goodman responded, "Well, I think you will." This statement by Goodman appears to be the only evidence in the record relating to the allegation in the complaint that Respondent threatened an employee with discharge if he did not revoke his union authorization card. Not only is the state- ment too ambiguous to be construed as a threat of discharge, but also it appears reasonable to construe it as a statement of Goodman's opinion that Freeman Parker, Sr., would succeed in his efforts to persuade his son, Parker, Junior, to resign from the Union, of which efforts Goodman was aware. It appears that Parker, Senior, was opposed to his son joining the Union. Freeman Parker, Jr., testified as fol- lows: A. Well, all that time during when the Union was going on, I would go home and argue about trying to get into the Union. I was argtng with my family. They wanted me to get out of tleUnion ... That Edward Goodman was aware'that Parker, Senior, was opposed to his son's adherence to the Union is evidenced by the testimony of Edward Goodman, which is credited, that Parker, Senior, told him that he was "very disturbed about" his son's adherence to the Union. Parker, Senior, also testified that he was opposed to his son's joining the Union. Parker, Senior, testified, "I did not know he joined it, he won't tell me because he knows I would say `no, don't you do that.' That is why he 308-926 0-70-21 310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sneaked and done it ...... Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Edward Goodman threatened Parker, Junior, with discharge if he did not revoke his union authorization card. It is alleged in the complaint that Respondent unlaw- fully promised an employee monetary benefits if he con- vinced a fellow employee to revoke his union authoriza- tion card. This allegation apparently relates to the testimony of Parker, Senior, with respect to a conversa- tion he had with Edward Goodman, which is as follows: A. Well, he called me in the office and told me the boy had joined the Union. He asked me could I get him to get the card back, which I thought I could, and I give him hell every day but it's to no avail, and I would have bet money I could do it, but with this guy talking to him, I couldn't do a doggoned thing with him, so-well, I promised him that I would give him hell, but I didn't have any luck. That was about all that conversation. Q. Was anything said about an initiation fee? A. Well, he said-I told him that he'd give the Union $50.00. That's what the boy told me. Mr. Goodman said, well, I'll give him the $50.00 back if he gets the card back. Goodman denied that he promised to reimburse Parker, Junior, and testified, in effect, that Parker, Senior, in- dicated that he was trying to get his son to resign. The testimony of Parker, Senior, of the offer of reimburse- ment is consistent with the evident desire of Respondent to dissipate the Union's majority representation and is credited. Therefore, it is concluded that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising an economic benefit to Freeman Parker, Jr., if he would revoke his union authorization card.? However, Good- man's testimony that Parker, Senior, indicated to him his intention to get his son to resign is credited, since it is consistent with the above-quoted testimony of his opposi- tion to his son's joining the Union. Parker, Senior, testified to conversations he had with Paul Sant, an admitted supervisor, "around the middle of December." These conversations relate to the failure of Parker, Junior, to report to work, which the General Counsel contends was caused by the constructive discharge of Parker, Junior. The testimony of Parker, Senior, with respect to his conversations with Paul Sant and the action he, Parker, Senior, took with regard thereto, is as follows: A. Well, he [Sant] came up there and told me, he said, "Parker, you get your boy to resign." Well, I said, "All right," because in fact I was fairly glad because I was getting tired of the headache, you know. Q. What kind of headache? A. You know, harassed every day. I wasn't feel- ing good. I was sick anyway. Q. Who was harassing you? A. Well, Mr. Goodman got at me several times. Q. Now, on this occasion when Mr. Sant said to you to tell your boy to resign ,- ° Although it would appear from the wording of the allegation that the promise of a benefit was to one employee if he would induce a "fellow em- ployee" to revoke his authorization card, it is the judgment of the Trial Examiner that the testimony of the promise of reimbursement and the al- A. Yes. Q. - what, if anything, did you say? A. Well, I told him, "All right," and I did. I got him right away. I said, "Little brother,"-I call him "Little brother"-"don't go back down there any more. Don't go no more," I said, "they don't want you there any more," but it didn't do no good. Q. Did you speak to Mr. Sant again? A. Well, the next day. Q. Where did you speak to him the next day? A. About the same spot. Q. In the shed? A. Paul said, "Where's your boy?" I said, "At home." He says, "Did you tell him to resign?" I says, "Yes." He says, "I didn't mean for him to quit." I says, "What else does it mean?" He said, "Well, I thought he was still working." I said "He is at home. That's what I told him. That's what I told him. The boy ain't been back since. " Q. Now, did he say anything further, Mr. Sant, as to why he told- A. Well, he said, "That's what the bosses told me, Parker," because I didn't question him about it. He said, "Well, the bosses told me." He didn't said what bosses. He just said, "The bosses." Sant testified to a conversation he had with Parker, Senior, which testimony is as follows: A. The conversation was that Parker told me, that's Senior, told me that his son-he can't control his son. He said, If I hit him, he might turn and hit me back. I can't control him. He is a big man." I said, "Yes," I said, "well, why don't you-" and furthermore, Parker, Sr., told me that he never wanted his son to work in there. He says, "I don't want him to work where I'm working," so I said, "Why don't you have him get a letter and resign?" and he says to me, "He already quit. He isn't coming back here no more," and that was the end of the question. Parker, Junior, testified to the reason he stopped re- porting to work for Respondent. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: - A. Well, all that time during when the Union was going on, I would go home and argue about trying to get into the Union. I was arguing with my family. They wanted me to get out of the Union and then one day I came in and my mother told me that someone at the lumber company told my father to tell me not to come back to work. I was going to come back to work, but my mother said she was going to leave if I went back to work, and I said, "O.K., I won't go back to work. I will stay home." Q. It is your testimony that your mother told you that your father had told her that you were not to go back to work? A. Yes. legation were sufficiently related as to inform Respondent that the testimony was being elicited in support of said allegation. In any event, the matter was fully litigated GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 311 Q. And that if you did go back to work your mother was going to leave home, is that right? A. Yes. Q. What did you do when your mother told you this? A. I just didn't go back to work. Q. Did you ask your father about it? A. No. A comparison of the testimony of Parker , Senior, and Sant with respect to their conversation about Parker, Ju- nior, and of the testimony of Parker, Senior, and Parker, Junior, discloses a number of conflicts. It is the Trial Ex- aminer's belief that it is reasonable to infer from their testimony that the following are the probable facts:8 That Parker, Senior, did have two conversations with Sant, the first on the day before Parker , Junior, stopped reporting to work and the second on the following day; that in the first conversation Parker, Senior, complained to Sant about the trouble he was having with his son in trying to persuade him to resign from the Union and that he voiced a wish that his son were not working for the Respondent; that Sant suggested that he get his son to resign from his job; that Parker, Senior, seized upon this suggestion and informed his wife that "someone at the lumber company" told him to tell his son to quit ; that his wife was upset by the quarrels that had been going on at home between father and son with respect to the Union and threatened to leave home if her son did not quit his job ; that, when the son did not report to work, Sant questioned Parker, Senior, as to where his son was ; that Parker, Senior, said that he [Sant] had told him to have his son resign; and that Sant replied, "I did not mean for him to quit" which the Trial Examiner construes as an expression on the part of Sant that his suggestion that the son resign was not in- tended as an attempt on his part to have the son "quit." s General Counsel contends that Parker, Junior, was constructively discharged because he was "interrogated" by Goodman and Gelleri , he was "harassed at home by his father who was carrying out Goodman 's orders to get him to resign from the Union ," and his mother threatened to leave home if he returned to work, and that , therefore, Parker, Junior, did not "voluntarily quit." While it appears reasonable to infer that Parker , Junior, ceased working for Respondent because of the dissension at home between him and his father over his joining the Union and that Respondent did encourage the father to persuade the son to resign from the Union, it does not ap- pear reasonable to conclude that the father and mother were agents of Respondent or that Respondent should be held responsible for the dissension in the Parker menage (which had apparently been in progress prior to the time Respondent encouraged Parker , Senior, to use his in- fluence on his son to resign from the Union). Further- more, Sant's suggestion to Parker , Senior, that he get his son to resign appears to have been no more than a sug- gestion of a solution to the problem Parker , Senior, com- plained about, rather than an "order." It does not appear that Respondent imposed such intolerable working condi- 8 Those portions of their testimony which are in accord therewith are credited. 9 Sant's statement to which Parker, Senior, testified appears to be in- consistent with the facts found herein unless construed as indicated. 10 Although there were threats found hereinbelow to have been made by Goodman to Parker, Senior, they were made subsequent to the deci- sion by Parker, Junior, to quit and, therefore, cannot be considered as a factor in his arriving at that decision. tions either upon father or son that it can be found to have constructively discharged Parker, Junior.10 Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent constructively discharged Freeman Parker, Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. D. Re the layoffs of Freeman Parker, Sr. The evidence with respect to threats made to Parker, Senior, is considered hereinbelow in context with that relating to his layoffs. Parker, Senior, testified that shortly after his son quit working for Respondent, he had two conversations with Edward Goodman with regard to his son. His testimony relevant to the first conversation is as follows: THE WITNESS: Well, he [Goodman] asked me had I talked to the boy, and I told his yes. He said, "Well, is he coming down to sign"- TRIAL EXAMINER: Is he coming down to what? THE WITNESS: To sign, to sign a card. What kind of card, I don't know, but to sign a card. He said, "Well, you either get him down here to sign or else." His testimony as to the second conversation, which oc- curred shortly thereafter, is as follows: A. Well, he asked me where the boy was, was he coming down to sign, and I told him, "Well," I says, "I don't know where he is. The boy left home." He said, "He left home?" I said, "Well," I said, "I don't know where he is at," and he said, "if I lay you off a week you will find that boy." "Well," I said, "if I find him, I don't know what the hell I'm going to do with him." I didn't know what I was going to do with him. He said, "All right." Goodman denied having such conversations and that he asked Parker, Senior, to persuade his son to resign from the Union. It is the opinion of the Trial Examiner that the testimony of Parker, Senior, should be credited. He did not impress the Trial Examiner as a witness who was fabricating his testimony out of whole cloth and his testimony is consistent with the efforts of the Respondent to dissipate the Union's majority representation (which efforts the Trial Examiner finds are evident from the record). Based upon the above credited testimony, the Trial Examiner finds it is reasonable to infer therefrom that Respondent threatened Parker, Senior, with economic reprisal 11 in order to have Parker, Senior, exert pressure upon his son to resign from the Union. It is, therefore, concluded that by such threats Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Parker, Senior, testified to being laid off on two occa- sions, for 2 days on January 19 and 20, 1966,12 and for 2 11 By the phrase "or else" and by the threat of a layoff of a week. Although the allegation in the complaint was a threat of discharge, it ap- pears that the above-quoted testimony of threats is substantially related to said allegation. In any event the incidents were fully litigated. 12 It appears that these dates were January 6 and 7, based upon the credited testimony of Gelleri Parker, Senior, gave the impression that he was not certain of these dates. 312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD days on February 1 and 2, 1966. According to his testimony Sant advised him that he was laying him off on instruction from top management, which does not appear of any significance since the record indicates that Sant was a minor supervisor. General Counsel contends that the layoffs were discriminatorily motivated "because of his inability to get his son to withdraw from the Union and as part and parcel of Respondent's campaign to de- feat the Union activity." Parker, Senior, was not a member of the unit which the Union sought to represent and Respondent was aware that he was opposed to his son's belonging to the Union and that he had put considerable pressure upon his son to resign from the Union (to the extent that the son quit his job). It appears that Parker, Senior, had the least amount of seniority among the forklift drivers. Gellert testified that there were a number of layoffs for economic reasons and that the employees were laid off according to their seniority in their "job units." He further testified that Parker, Senior, was laid off a total of 5 days during the period material herein, that he was one of three people laid off on December 29, that he was one of three people laid off on January 6 and 7, and that he was the only one laid off on February 1 and 2. 13 The above testimony of Gelleri was uncontradicted and is credited. It is the con- clusion of the Trial Examiner that in the circumstances outlined above, it does not appear reasonable to infer that Parker, Senior, was laid off by Respondent in reprisal for his failure to persuade his son to resign from the Union or in order to discourage union activity.14 Therefore, it is concluded that the General Counsel has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by its layoffs of Parker, Senior. E. The Layoff of Carbby Burwell Burwell entered the employ of Respondent in July 1965 as a warehouseman at the rate of $1.50 an hour. Around September 1965, he was given the duties of a janitor and a raise of 25-cents per hour. Six weeks later he was given a raise to the rate of $1.90 an hour. Burwell was one of the six employees whose union authorization cards were shown to Gelleri on December 1, 1965. According to Burwell's testimony, which was uncon- tradicted and is credited, he was complimented on his work prior to December 1, 1965, but after that date (when the Respondent was made aware of the advent of the Union and Burwell's adherence to it) it appears that Respondent's supervisors, Robert Levy and Charles Goodman, complained about the quality of his work and gave him additional duties. He was laid off for 3 work- days between December 30, 1965, and January 4, 1966. According to his further uncontradicted and credited testimony, when he returned to work on January 4, Levy asked him if the floor was "dirty" enough for him and stated that it could "get a little dirtier." Burwell further testified to an incident which occurred in the middle of January which testimony is uncontradicted and is credited. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: A. I was sweeping the store and he [Levy] came back and told me to clean the restroom. Q. What floor were you sweeping? A. The main floor out in the store. Q. And he came up to you on that occasion? A. Yes. Q. What did he say to you? A. He asked me to go in and clean the restroom and I did; shortly after I went in and he came in. Q. Into the restroom? A. That is right. Q. Did you speak to him then? A. So, he started to cussing me about leaving the trash out on the floor, so in the meantime he told me to leave everything as it was and start cleaning the restroom. Q. Would you be a little more explicit on that? How did this trash come to be left on the floor? A. He told me to leave everything as it was and start and go in and clean the restroom. Q. I see. Then, when you went in the restroom, he came in and spoke to you? A. Yes. Q. Would you please tell us again what was said? A. He cursed me and I asked him not to because I told him that I didn't talk to him that way and he shouldn't talk to me that way. Q. Did he say anything about the trash on the floor? A. He told me not to ever leave it like that any more. Q. What did you say? A. I told him I just did what he asked me to do. Q. Was there anything else that he said that you recall? A. I don't recall anything, no. Q. Did he say he knew you left it there? A. Yes, he did. I told him I didn't. Q. What did he say? A. He asked me why don't I quit, and I told him that he had to lay me off, he had the authority to lay me off and he should fire me. Q. What, if anything, did he say? A. He said he wouldn't. The record discloses that on May 1, 1966, Burwell received a raise to the rate of $2.50 per hour. Respondent contends that he was laid off for economic reasons. Ac- cording to the testimony of Gelleri, the period over which he was laid off was a "slack" period. It is reasonable to conclude that the period was a slack period insofar as customer traffic is concerned. However, in view of the harassment of Burwell by Respondent after learning of his adherence to the Union, the complaints about his work in contrast to the raises he received, and the state- ment to him by Levy with respect to the dirty floor on his return form layoff, it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex- aminer that the layoff was intended as a reprisal for his adherence to the Union. Therefore, it is concluded that Burwell was laid off by Respondent for 3 workdays in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 13 There is no showing or contention that any of the other people named as having been laid off on the dates Parker, Senior, was laid off, were members of the unit or that their layoffs were discriminatorily motivated. 14 The Trial Examiner has not failed to consider the threats which were found to have been made against Parker, Senior, but is of the opinion that they are not of sufficient significance to outweight the credited testimony of Gellert. GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY 313 F. Interrogation by Counsel for Respondent A few days before the hearing in this matter, Parker, Senior, was called into Gelleri's office and introduced by him to both counsel who entered their appearance on be- half of Respondent. One of counsel, in the course of their conversation with Parker, Senior, asked him if he had signed a card for the Union. He replied that he had signed a card in 1952 and counsel asked him for what Union, to which Parker, Senior, replied "2559." At this point the other counsel stated "he means the other Union." It ap- pears that Parker, Senior, was a member of a union which has represented a unit of Respondent's employees over a considerable number of years. Clearly the question asked of Parker, Senior, as to whether he had signed a card for the Union was neither relevant nor material to the preparation of a defense to any of the allegations in the complaint. There is no showing that counsel asked similar questions of any other employees whom they may have interviewed. In the circumstances, including the fact that Parker, Senior, was a member, of a union which had long represented a unit of employees to which Parker, Senior, belonged and the remoteness of this incident from the unfair labor practices found herein, it is concluded that this isolated interrogation of Parker, Senior, did not interfere with, restrain, or coerce him within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 15 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist froth such un- fair labor practices and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that Respondent discriminated against Roger Ruiz by unlawfully discharging him on December 9, 1965, it will be recommended that Respond- ent be ordered to offer him reinstatement to the job he held before the discriminatory discharge, or to a substan- tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniori- ty or other rights and privileges. It will be further recom- mended that Respondent make said employee whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of said discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum equal to the amount he normally would have earned as wages from December 10, 1965, to the date an offer of reinstatement is made to him together with interest thereon as provided below. The loss of pay should be computed in accordance with the formula and method prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and the interest, payable in accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, should be computed at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the amount due for each calendar quarter (under the Woolworth formula) beginning with the end of the first calendar quarter and continuing with each succeeding calendar quarter until payment of such amount is properly made. It having been found that Respondent discriminated against Carbby Burwell by unlawfully laying him off for 3 workdays during the period from December 30, 1965, to January 4,1966, it will be recommended that Respond- ent make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of said discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum equal to the amount he nor- mally would have earned as wages during the period he was laid off. Inasmuch as the unfair labor practices committed by Respondent are of a character striking at the root of em- ployees' rights safeguarded by the Act, it will be further recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed its employees in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully interrogating them as to their ad- herence to the Union. 2. Respondent discriminated against its employee, Roger Ruiz, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging him on December 9, 1965, because he had joined the Union. 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully promising Freeman Parker, Jr., reimburse- ment for the amount of the initiation fee he paid to the Union if he would resign from the Union. 4. General Counsel did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening an employee with discharge if he did not revoke his union authorization card. 5. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde- rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that Respondent constructively discharged Freeman Parker, Jr., in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening Freeman Parker, Sr., with economic reprisals if he did not convince Parker, Junior, to revoke his union authorization card. 7. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde- rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that Respondent discriminatorily laid off Freeman Parker, Sr., on two occasions. 8. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily laying off Carbby Burwell for 3 workdays during the period between December 30, 1965, and January 4,1966. 9. General Counsel failed to prove by a preponde- rance of the evidence the allegation in the complaint that counsel for the Respondent interfered with, restrained, 15 This finding should not be construed as condonation, however, of counsel's interrogation of Parker, Senior, as to whether he had signed a card for the Union. 314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and coerced an employee within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating him as to whether he had signed a union card. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pur- suant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Local 12, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) Unlawfully interrogating employees with respect to their adherence to the Union. (c) Unlawfully promising employees economic benefits conditioned upon their withdrawal of adherence to the Union. (d) Threatening employees with economic reprisals if they fail to convince a fellow employee to resign from the Union. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to join, form, or assist labor organiza- tions, including the above-named labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is deemed will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Roger Ruiz immediate and full reinstate- ment to the job he held prior to his discriminatory discharge on December 9, 1965, or to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as the result of Respondent's discrimination against him, as provided in the section of this Decision dentitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify Roger Ruiz, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Make Carbby Burwell whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of Respondent's discrimination against him, as provided in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records, and all other records neces- sary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (e) Post at its place of business in San Francisco, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."1fi Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Re- gional Director for Region 20, after being signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be main- tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (1) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it relates to the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint which have been found were not sustained. 16 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommen- dations of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is en- forced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order." 17 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuan t to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local 12, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in any other labor organization of our employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ- ment. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees with respect to their adherence to the aforesaid labor organization. WE WILL NOT promise employees economic benefits conditioned upon the withdrawal of their ad- herence to the aforesaid labor organization. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with economic reprisals if they fail to convince a fellow employee to resign from the aforesaid labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to join, form, or assist labor organizations, including the above-named labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col- lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Roger Ruiz immediate and full reinstatement to the job he held prior to his dis- GOODMAN LUMBER COMPANY criminatory discharge on December 9, 1965, or to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him. WE WILL make Carbby Burwell whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become or remain mem- bers of Local 12, International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, or any other labor organization, or to refrain therefrom, except to the extent that such right may be af- fected by an agreement authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. GOODMAN LUMBER COM- PANY (Employer) Dated By 315 (Representative) (Title) Note: We will notify Roger Ruiz if he is presently serv- ing in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted tor 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 13050 Federal Building, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-03 3 5.