Taylor's I.G.A. Foodliner

TAYLOR'S I.G.A. FOODLINER 329 J. Taylor Mart, Inc., d/b/a Taylor's I.G.A. Foodliner and Retail Clerks Union, Local 418, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO. Case 14-CA-3990 June 30,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On April 13, 1967, Trial Examiner Horace A. Ruckel issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. ' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HORACE A. RUCKEL, Trial Examiner: This case comes before the Trial Examiner upon an unfair labor practice complaint dated August 30, 1966, issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, through its Regional Director for Region 14 (St. Louis, Missouri), against J. Taylor Mart, Inc., d/b/a Taylor's I.G.A. Foodliner, herein called Respondent, based upon charges filed on June 6 and July 12, 1966, by Retail Clerks Union, Local 418, Retail Clerks International Associa- tion, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. The complaint alleges in substance that Respondent, by its supervisors since the latter part of May 1966, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in their exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, and following), herein called the Act, by (1) promising and granting wage increases to induce employees not to support the Union, (2) interrogating employees concern- ing their support of the Union, (3) on or about May 26, 1966, discharging Margaret Hinderliter because of her union activities, and (4) failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate unit. These activities are said to violate Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, I conducted a hearing at Mattoon, Illinois, on October 25, 26, and 27, 1966, at which all parties were represented. At its conclusion the parties waived oral argument. Subsequently, they filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my obser- vation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or- ders that Respondent, J. Taylor Mart, Inc., d/b/a Taylor's I.G.A. Foodliner, Mattoon, Illinois, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order. 1 These findings and conclusions are based, in part, upon the credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner, to which the Respondent has ex- cepted, alleging that the Trial Examiner was biased and prejudiced After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Trial Examiner's credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all rele- vant evidence Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing those findings, and we reject the charge of bias and prejudice on the part of the Trial Ex- aminer. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3) In addition, we reject Respondent's conclusion that Thelma Duncan is a supervisor. From the record it is clear that her duties of direction and instruction involve no responsible authority beyond that in- herent in the relationship between senior , more skilled employees and those less senior or less skilled I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is an Illinois corporation with its principal office and place of business at Mattoon, Illinois, where it is engaged in the retail sale and distribution of meats, groceries, and related products. During the year ending June 30, 1966, a representative period, Respondent purchased and caused to be transported and delivered to its Mattoon store, meats, groceries, produce, and other goods valued in excess of $50,000, of which goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 were transported and delivered to its Mattoon store, and received from other enterprises located in the State of Illinois, each of which other enterprises had received said goods and materials directly from points located outside the State of Illinois. During the same period Respondent sold and dis- tributed products, the gross value of which exceeded $500,000. Respondent employed 40-45 employees at the time of the events hereinafter related. The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the- meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Retail Clerks Union , Local 418, Retail Clerks Interna- tional Association , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization ad- mitting employees of Respondent to membership. 166 NLRB No. 73 330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES one employee from the bakery because it was his un- A. The Discharge of Margaret Hinderliter; Other Inter- ference, Restraint, and Coercion The Union began organizing Respondent's employees, except those in its meat department, during the middle of May 1966. This came to the attention of Jack Hubbartt, Respondent's store manager, the first or second week in May. Hinderliter came to work in December 1965 in the bakery department, under the immediate supervision of Ralph Sherman, bakery foreman. About six employees worked in the bakery. Hinderliter's duties were to stock the shelves, wrap and box bakery products, wash pots, fry doughnuts, make icing, and decorate cakes. In general these duties were similar to those of the other bakery em- ployees, except that Hinderliter came to do most of the cake decorating and most of the icing. Cake decorating, on the average, took from 2 to 4 hours a day, or less than half her time. Her uncontradicted, credited testimony is that she was not told at the time she was hired that she was to perform any specific task. Her weekly wage was comparable to that of other employees in the bakery and the kitchen.' Hinderliter was one of the first to sign up in the Union, and she obtained the signed union designation cards of various other employees. On May 23 or 24, according to the uncontradicted, credited testimony of Virginia Frye, an employee of several years' standing who worked in the kitchen, Charles Morrical, assistant store manager, came up to her where she was working and asked her if Hinder- liter had ever spoken to her about the Union. Frye replied that she had. Two or three days later, on the morning of May 26, Hinderliter, who had that morning seen Morrical conferring with Sherman and Hubbartt, called on Hub- bartt in his office and asked him if it was true that she was to be discharged. Hubbartt said that it was. Asked why, he said that he no longer needed a cake decorator. Hin- derliter reminded him that she did other things, and pointed out that there were other girls with less seniority than she. Hubbartt responded that she was the one who was chosen, and that she was terminated "as of now." Hinderliter, however, returned to the bakery depart- ment to finish some cakes she had started, and before leaving the store asked Hubbartt for a letter of recom- mendation to which, it is not controverted, he replied that he would "absolutely not" give her such a letter. A few minutes after this second conversation with Hubbartt, Hinderliter encountered Howard Cordts, supervisor of the meat department, who told her, still according to her undisputed, credited testimony, that he had heard that she had "got her ass fired," adding that no one in the meat department was "going to sign any cards for the union." Also, within a few minutes after Hinderliter was ter- minated, her own supervisor, Sherman, who testified that he was "all kind of shook up" by Hinderliter's termina- tion, asked the bakery employees in a group who of them had signed cards for the Union. I view this as a cause and effect. Sherman himself, believing that a cause of Hinder- liter's termination was her activity in the Union, wished to know to what extent the union contagion had spread. Hubbartt, while testifying, advanced as a reason for Hinderliter's termination that it was necessary to lay off derstanding that with the advent or summer the bakery sales would fall off. He had been in Respondent's employ only since February 1966, although he had had extensive experience in other food stores. Hubbartt had not, how- ever, so far as the record reveals, discussed with anyone the possibility of laying off any employee until the morn- ing of the day of Hinderliter's termination when in the conversation with Sherman and Morrical, previously referred to, Hubbartt, according to Sherman, said that they "needed a reduction" in the grocery-bakery depart- ment of one person and that he had chosen Hinderliter for lay off. This, too, is the substance of Hubbartt's testimony. I find it unconvincing. Summer was still some time away. Moreover, there is no showing that any bakery employee had been laid off during any previous summer. Assuming, without finding, an economic necess- ity, Hubbartt's testimony as to why Hinderliter was selected to remedy it is implausible. He readily admitted while testifying that Hinderliter was an efficient em- ployee who had always done her work well, and who would "never have an ounce of trouble" in getting another job. Actually, according to Hubbartt, this was the real reason he chose her instead of Virginia Richeson, an employee who had been employed only 3 weeks. Riches- on was incompetent: "She isn't overly intelligent. She can't add two and two together and get four three times in a row, and for her to go out on the street and get a job, I think would be a pretty difficult task." In fact, pity motivated him. He was, he stated, just a "soft hearted slob." In the next breath, he said, "I never let my heart rule my pocketbook," from which I take it he meant the Company's pocketbook. Hubbartt's further testimony is that it had been hoped that cake decorating would become quite profitable, but that when it did not he determined to abolish the classifi- cation of cake decorator. The classification having been abolished, it followed that Hinderliter should be abolished. Hubbartt admitted, however, that the classifi- cation of cake decorator existed only in his mind, and in a memorandum book he carried in his pocket, which was not offered in evidence. It does not appear on Respond- ent's payrolls or on any other records in evidence. Nor, according to Hubbartt, was there any other job classifica- tion of employees. Hubbartt's further testimony as to his selection of Hinderliter for discharge or layoff was as fol- lows: TRIAL EXAMINER: You did away with the classifica- tion and then what was your next step? THE WITNESS: Well, then I had a choice between two people, Margaret Hindlerliter and Virginia Richeson. Now, Virginia Richeson has been there a shorter period of time than Margaret Hinderliter had. TRIAL EXAMINER: But you abolished the classifica- tion. There was only one person in that classification at that time? THE WITNESS: Well, this is true, but, again I am not presuming that Margaret Hinderliter was incapable of performing other work. TRIAL EXAMINER: Well, in fact, she did perform other work -what I am trying to get at, how did it come about that the decision got down to just these two people? Why not some other person in the kitchen or in the bakery? I The record shows that employees in the kitchen and bakery were lar- gely interchangeable. Hubbartt, while testifying , characterized the em- ployees in the two departments as one "conglomerate mass." TAYLOR'S I.G.A. FOODLINER 331 THE WITNESS: Well, I guess this kind of goes back to the fact that in my own mind all other things being equal, I kind of treated people on a seniority basis because I have always been under a union contract,2 and I did have an employee in the store with less time on the job than Margaret Hinderliter [Richeson]. In sum, after stating that Hinderliter was terminated because her classification as cake decorator (the only classification in the store with even a theoretical exist- ence) 3 had been terminated, Hubbartt then says that the choice got down to Hinderliter or Richeson, who, since she had no job classification and certainly was not a cake decorator, was not in competition with Hinderliter. But, because he is used to treating people on a seniority basis, he also selects for consideration Richeson, who had been employed only 3 weeks and, in the bargain, was so im- competent that she "can't put two and two together and get four three times in a row." Having got to the point where he is considering Hinderliter and Richeson together on the basis of seniority, he makes another de- parture. He bases the layoff neither on the ground of the doing away with a job classification,4 or on seniority, but on a ground advanced for the first time on cross-examina- tion; namely, that he is sorry for Richeson. I do not believe it. Respondent, through Assistant Store Manager Morrical, 2 or 3 days previously had questioned employee Frye as to whether Hinderliter had spoken to her about the Union; Cordts, supervisor of the meat department, within minutes following her discharge said that she "got her ass fired," and that no employee in his department would sign a union card; and Respondent, as is hereafter found, increased the wages of its em- ployees so as to discourage union activity. Finally, as will be seen, subsequent to Hinderliter's discharge Respond- ent refused to bargain with the Union. If any doubt remained in my mind as to the real cause of Hinderliter's discharge it would be removed by consideration of Hub- bartt's emphatic and unexplained refusal to give her a letter of recommendation, in spite of his acknowledge- ment that she was a thoroughly competent employee. I find that Hinderliter was discharged not for any legiti- mate business reason, but because of her union activity. B. Further Interference, Restraint, and Coercion; The Wage Increases It has been found that on May 23 or 24, shortly before Respondent discharged Hinderliter, Frye told Morrical, assistant store manager, in response to his inquiry, that Hinderliter had signed her up in the Union. The record also shows that about the middle of May, on the day fol- lowing a union organizer's solicitation of David Bauer, a service boy, Bauer reported the solicitation to Store Manager Hubbartt. Hubbartt's own testimony is that he had heard talk about the Union the first or second week in May.5 The record shows that the campaign reached its height about the middle of May. At this point Respondent granted wage increases to all but one of its approximately 40 employees, to go into effect on May 29. This was in addition to a 10-cent-an-hour raise given to nine em- ployees shortly after Hubbartt took over as store manager, during the week of February 6 and before the appearance of the Union. Hubbartt testified that the earli- er raises were given to these employees to equalize their wages with those of other employees. As to making the across-the-board increases on May 29, Hubbartt gave as his reasons that he "knew that federal minimum wage [sic] was almost a foregone conclusion," and that he "wanted to be certain that virtually all my employees ex- cept the most recent hires would be at least $1.40 an hour." Therefore, he says, he formulated a new pay scale, but did not reduce it to writing except to make some nota- tions in a 2 by 3-inch pocket notebook. He admitted that he did not consult with any of his supervisors until shortly before he put it into effect, although he testified he did mention it once with Jack Taylor, a stockholder in Respondent. Taylor was not called as a witness. Nor did the general raise become known to the employees until May 29, the day it went into effect. Respondent urges that the correspondence between the date of the general raise and the peak of the Union's ac- tivity, was only a coincidence. I cannot credit it. I find that the raise of May 29 was effectuated with the purpose of thwarting the Union's efforts to organize the em- ployees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. C. The Refusal To Bargain The complaint alleges that the following constitutes a unit appropriate for collective bargaining: All full-time and part-time selling and non- selling em- ployees of J. Taylor Mart, Inc.'s facility on Route 45, Mattoon, Illinois, excluding meat department em- ployees, office clerical, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. while Respondent's answer denies that the above em- ployees constitute an appropriate unit, Respondent at the hearing suggested no other unit, and in its brief accepts this unit as appropriate, contending only that the Union did not represent a majority within it. I find that the above-described unit is an appropriate unit for the pur- poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act. The Union's Majority in the Appropriate Unit It is agreed that the appropriate unit, as above described, consists of 40 employees. The General Coun- sel offered in evidence 22 authorization cards, including that of Hinderliter, in the following form: At previous places of employment, that is. On this point Hubbartt testified as follows: TRIAL EXAMINER: Are there classifications under the department heading? THE WITNESS. Not under department headings, no, sir TRIAL EXAMINER Well, are there classifications that appear on the payroll such as cake decorator and baker, or THE WITNESS No. . TRIAL EXAMINER No classifications such as produce boy, produce manager9 THE WITNESS. No ... 4 If the classification of cake decorator ceased to exist in Hubbartt's mind, cake decorating itself did not, and continued to be done after Hin- derliter's termination, by Marie Fonner, who had previously helped decorate cakes when there was a rush or when Hinderliter was absent. I Although he later testified that he did not "know of any attempt to or- ganize them" until he received notice of the filing of the charge with the Board. 332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA- TION (affiliated with the AFL-CIO) AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION Desiring to enjoy the rights and benefits of collec- tive bargaining, I, the undersigned employee of the I.G.A. Foodliner Store address South Rt. 45 Store No. Employed as Dept. Home address Phone hereby authorized Retail Clerks International As- sociation , AFL-CIO, or it chartered Local Union to represent me for purposes of collective bargaining, respecting rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, or other conditions of employment , in accordance with applicable law. Date Signature of Employee Respondent, in its brief, seeks to disqualify the cards of the following 15 employees on the following grounds: 1. On the ground of lack of authentication of signature Joe Maddox, Janelle Lawrence, Charles Brooks, and Robert Elmore: Hinderliter, who solicited the signature of Maddox, and Marie Former, who solicited the other three employees, did not see them sign, and were not previously acquainted with their signatures. In Lawrence's case Former filled out the information called for relative to the name and address of the store, the em- ployee's address, and the nature of her work. The uncon- tradicted testimony of both Hinderliter and Fonner is that in each case the employee took the card when presented with it and later returned it to them, signed. I find it im- material that they were signed outside the presence of Hinderliter and Fonner, and that they were not previ- ously acquainted with the signatures. 2. Misrepresentations; other grounds Marie Fonner: This card is objected to because Former, as she testified, filled it out and signed it before reading the language on the card authorizing the Union to represent her for collective bargaining. She did read it some time after the Union had requested Respondent to bargain with it, and made no attempt to withdraw the card. On the contrary she kept several cards at the store and solicited and obtained the signatures of several other employees, including Hinderliter's. It is clear that she knew the purpose of the cards and approved of it at the time she signed.6 Tom Boney: Hinderliter on two occasions had talked to Boney about signing up for the Union, and on the 6 Respondent also urges that Fonner's card should not be counted be- cause in July 1966 , when Sherman , foreman of the bakery, left Respond- ent's employ Former was promoted to his place . I find no merit in this, contention It is not controverted that Former was a rank-and-file em- second occasion she suggested during a break that he get a card from Marie Fonner. Boney saw Former, who gave him a card, and he filled it out and signed it in her presence, but without, he testified, reading the single- spaced wording authorizing the Union to represent the signer for the purpose of collective bargaining. Phil Wilhelm: Wilhelm testified that he was handed a card by a fellow employee who suggested that he read it over, sign it, and give it back to him. Wilhelm took the card with him but did not sign it on this occasion. About a week later he was visited at his home by Phillip Romo, organizer for the Union, who gave him another card. Wil- helm again said he would like to think it over. Romo visited him the last time, according to Wilhelm, "about the middle of June or maybe three weeks in June" (the card is dated June 8) when he finally signed the card. On this occasion, according to Wilhelm, Romo said the card gave the Union the right to represent employees without an election, and Romo replied that it "just gives us the right to hold an election." Romo testified that he told every employee whose signature he solicited, including Wilhelm, that there could be an election but that, depend- ing upon how many cards were signed, the Union might become the bargaining representative without an election upon the basis of the cards themselves. Wilhelm was a nervous and hesitant witness. I credit Romo's account of the conversation. I further note that Wilhelm over a period of several weeks had discussed the Union's representation with several persons, had been given two or more cards which he took with him to consider, and that he further testified that he had read thoroughly the card he did sign and understood it. Virginia Frye: Frye's signature to a union card was ob- tained by Marie Fonner who testified that Frye asked her to fill out the blank spaces in the card because Frye did not have her glasses with her. Former did so and Frye signed the card. Frye's testimony is to the same effect. She did not read the card at the time but she had heard the Union discussed previously. She knew the card she signed was a union card. She added, however, that she understood the Union "would come into the store" by an election, and that the cards were "to call an election." David Bauer: Bauer testified he was asked several times to sign a card and finally he took it home and talked it over with his parents, that they and he read it, and that later he signed it "because I wanted to," that on one occa- sion a "union organizer," whom he did not name, told him that the signed cards would be used "just to get a vote to see if they wanted the Union or not." Thelma Duncan: Duncan testified that when she signed her card she was told that "they'd have to have over half the employees sign the cards to get the union in, but he said there would be an election at the store-" and that it "was necessary that half the people sign cards to have an election." Larry Gwinn: Gwinn, called by Respondent, testified that Romo called on him at his home on three occasions and described the advantages of a union to him and his family, that his mother thought it was a good thing, and that on Romo's third and last visit he signed the card which had been given him on the first visit, and which he ployee within the appropriate bargaining unit both at the time she signed her union card and in June when the Union, as is hereinafter related, requested Respondent to bargain with it. TAYLOR'S I.G.A. FOODLINER 333 had read. On redirect examination he stated that he signed the card so as to get the benefits of a union. Asked by counsel for Respondent, "Did you sign the card to get an election so you could get the benefits," the witness an- swered in the affirmative. Betty Sorenson: Romo, according to Sorenson's testimony, called on her and her husband at their home and talked with them for about 2 hours about the Union and asked her to sign a card. She did so. According to Sorenson her husband was quite "insistent" that she sign. Her further testimony is that Romo said that the purpose of the card was to bring about an election. Carl Ellis and Lois Mathias: Ellis, called by Respond- ent, testified that Romo called at his home twice to discuss the Union and that he signed the card on the second occasion. Romo, according to Ellis, said that the card did not have anything to do with the Union, although he described its advantages. Ellis finally signed just to help Romo who said that he wanted to "show his boss" that he had solicited Ellis' signature. Ellis was a con- tradictory, shifting witness. I do not credit the reason he advanced for signing a union card. Romo's testimony is that after Ellis had signed the card he said to him in jest that it would show that he had not just been sitting on his heels in Mattoon. I credit Romo's version. As to Mathias, Romo called at her home three times and discussed the Union with her. On the last visit, with her husband and her brother present, she signed a card. Romo, according to Mathias, asked her to sign so he "could show his boss he had been to my house," so she signed. Janet Whalen: Romo called on Whalen twice to obtain her signature to a union card. Before she signed, Romo, she testified, said that he needed a number of signed cards and the cards were "just to get them to come in and let them vote in the store for the Union." She could not re- member his saying anything about a card check. Conclusions Romo testified that in addition to discussing the ad- vantages of the Union with those employees whose signa- tures he sought, he told them specifically, in each in- stance, that the Union could proceed in two ways: it could ask for recognition on the basis of a check of the cards, or it could petition for an election, and that if the first course were pursued the Union would have to have the signed cards of a majority, of the employees. I do not find any convincing evidence that he, Hinder- liter, or Former represented that the only purpose of the cards was to bring about an election. The only evidence of this is found in the testimony of Wilhelm that Romo stated that the cards "just give us the right to hold an elec- tion," in that of Frye that she "understood" that the Union "would come into the store" by an election, in that of Bauer that Romo said the cards would be used "just to get a vote," and in that of Whalen to the same effect. I am convinced that though these employees may not have fully understood what Romo was trying to tell them, this was not due to misrepresentation on his part. The cards themselves are unequivocal. The signer authorizes the Union "to represent me for the purposes of collective bargaining, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, in accordance with applicable law." The employees them- selves are wholly literate and, it is my impression, of at least average intelligence. In each instance the employee had sufficient opportunity to read the card, and in the one or two instances where he did not have his glasses with him it is clear that he knew that the card was "for the Union." In no instance did any employee seek to repu- diate his authorization or to retrieve his card from the Union. In no instance is it asserted that any signature was fraudulent. As to dates, no contention is made that any card, with the possible exception of that of Wilhelm, was not ex- ecuted prior to June 20, the date of the Union's request for recognition. The suggestion that this card might have been signed after June 20 is without substance. The criti- cism that various signers did not themselves fill in the blank spaces on the cards, calling for the addresses of the store and the signer, I find frivolous. The cards are so unambiguous, and show so clearly an unqualified designation of authorization to represent the employees for purposes of collective bargaining, that it would require a stronger showing than is here made to establish that they were executed merely for the purpose of obtaining a Board-conducted election.7 I find that on June 20, and thereafter, the Union had in its possession the signed, valid authorization cards of 22 of the 40 employees in the appropriate unit, a majority. 3. The refusal to bargain On June 20, 1966, the Union wrote Respondent advis- ing it that it represented a majority of the employees in the unit set forth above, but including the employees in the meat department. On the following day the Union wrote Respondent amending the suggested unit so as to exclude these employees. On June 23, Respondent, over the signature of Hubbartt, replied as follows to the letter of June 20. We have received your letter stating that you represent our employees. We do not believe that you lawfully represent our employees, so we do not feel the law requires us to meet with you. On June 28 Respondent answered the Union's letter of June 21, as follows: This is in answer to your letter of June 21, 1966. To restate, we don't believe you lawfully represent our employees. In the absence of any further word from Respondent, the Union on July 12, 1966, filed an amended charge to include an allegation that Respondent refused to bargain with it. Respondent's letters of June, in my opinion, con- stitute a blanket refusal to bargain with the Union, and constitute, in effect, a rejection of the principal of collec- tive bargaining. Respondent did not, and does not now, question the appropriateness of the bargaining unit set forth in these two letters; nor did it express any doubt, in good faith or otherwise, when it replied to the Union's letter that the Union represented a majority of the em- ployees in the unit. On the other hand, by discriminatorily discharging one of the Union's principal proponents, by granting wage raises to its employees in an attempt, as found above, to undermine the Union, by interrogating employees as to their union activity, and, finally, by refus- ing to meet with its representatives, Respondent evinced 7 See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., etc., 143 NLRB 848. 334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD its determination not to deal with the Union as the collec- tive-bargaining representative of its employees. In thus refusing to bargain with the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes bur- dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of the Act, I shall recommend below that, it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Margaret Hinderliter, I shall recommend that it offer her immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent employment, without preju- dice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against her by payment to her of a sum of money equal to that which she normally would have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of rein- statement, less her net earnings during said period. Such backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294, and with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Discrimination against employees for seeking to bar- gain collectively, and a refusal to bargain with the majori- ty representative of its employees, go to the very heart of the Act and demonstrate such an opposition to its policies that it is reasonable to assume that the Employer, under similar circumstances in the future, will interfere with its employees' statutory rights. Accordingly, I shall include in my Recommended Order a provision directing Respondent not to interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in any manner in the exercise of their statutory rights. Because it is clear that Respondent's conduct was motivated by opposition to all union activity among its employees and to the principle of collective bargaining generally, my Recommended Order will prohibit dis- crimination because of or interference with the exercise by the employees of their statutory rights on behalf of the Union or any other labor organization. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. J. Taylor Mart, Inc., d/b/a Taylor's I.G.A. Food- liner, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging employee Margaret Hinderliter, Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. Since June 20, 1966, the Union has been and now is the statutory bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the following appropriate unit for collective bargaining: all full-time and regular part-time selling and nonselling employees of J. Taylor Mart, Inc.'s facility on Route 45, Mattoon, Illinois, excluding meat department employees, office clerical, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 5. By refusing on June 23 and 28, 1966, when requested, to recognize the Union as the representative of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit and to bargain with it, Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By interrogating employees as to their union activi- ty, and by raising wages with the object of discouraging union activity, Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The unfair labor practices set forth above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing finding of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend that the Respondent, J. Taylor Mart, Inc., d/b/a Taylor's I.G.A. Foodliner, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union or in any other labor organization, by discharging or otherwise dis- criminating against employees because they or some of them engage in union activity and/or seek to bargain col- lectively. (b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em- ployees by granting them wage raises or by changing the terms or conditions of their employment provided, how- ever, that nothing in this Recommended Order shall be construed as requiring the Respondent to vary or aban- don any wage raise or wage schedule which it has hereto- fore established. (c) Refusing to bargain, on request, with the Union as the statutory bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit for collective bargaining: all full-time and part-time selling and nonselling em- ployees of J. Taylor Mart, Inc.'s facility on Route 45, Mattoon, Illinois, excluding meat department employees, office clerical, professional employees, guards and super- visors as defined by the Act. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any such activity. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Offer Margaret Hinderliter immediate and full rein- statement to her former or substantially equivalent posi- tion, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any losses she may TAYLOR'S I.G.A. FOODLINER 335 have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Bargain collectively , on request, with the Union as, the bargaining representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment , and;" if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under this Recommended Order. (d) Post in its store on Route 45, Mattoon, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by Respond- ent's representative , shall be posted by Respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.9 9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond- ent has taken to comply herewith " WE WILL NOT interfere with , restrain, or coerce our employees by raising wages so as to discourage their union activities provided , however, that nothing in these recommendations requires us to vary or abandon the wage raises or wage schedule which we have heretofore established. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form,join, or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu- tual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL offer to Margaret Hinderliter immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniori- ty or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any losses she may have suffered as a result of her discharge. WE WILL bargain collectively, on request, with Retail Clerks Union , Local 418, Retail Clerks Inter- national Association, AFL-CIO , as the exclusive representative of employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All full-time and part-time selling and, nonselling employees of J. Taylor Mart, Inc.'s facility on Route 45, Mattoon, Illinois, excluding meat de- partment employees, office clerical, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining , members of the above-named or any other labor organization, except to the extent that such a right may be affected by an agree- ment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Retail Clerks Union, Local 418, Retail Clerks Interna- tional Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discharging or otherwise discrimi- nating against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. J. TAYLOR MART, INC., D/B/A TAYLOR'S I.G.A. FOODLINER (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly' with the Board 's Regional Office, 1014 Boat- man's Bank Building, 314 North Broadway , St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 622-4167.