Shenandoah Brick & Tile Corp.

SHENANDOAH BRICK & TILE CORP. Shenandoah Brick& Tile Corp. and Laborers' Dis- trict Council of Washington , D.C. & Vicinity, af- filiated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-3679 November 1, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On July 7, 1967, Trial Examiner David London issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed- ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision together with a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed limited exceptions.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent , Shenandoah Brick & Tile Corp., Winchester , Virginia, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the ac- tion set forth in the Trial Examiner 's Recom- mended Order.2 ' The Charging Party has filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's rejec- tion of its request for a monetary remedy to make the employees whole for losses they may have suffered as a result of the Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain We deem it inappropriate in this case to depart from our existing policy with respect to remedial orders involving violations of Sec- tion 8(a)(5), and therefore deny the said request Delete from paragraph 2(b) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order that part thereof which reads "to be furnished" and substitute therefor "on forms provided TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 53 DAVID LONDON, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed January 9, 1967, by Laborers' District Council of Washington, D.C. and Vicinity, affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, the General Counsel of the Board, on January 23, 1967, issued a complaint against Shenandoah Brick & Tile Corp., hereinafter called Respondent or Employer, alleging that on and since January 4, 1967, Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, has refused to bargain with the Union, the duly elected and certified collective- bargaining representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em- ployment of the said employees. By its answer, Respond- ent admitted the refusal to bargain, denied that a majori- ty of the employees had designated the Union as their representative, and as an affirmative defense pleads that the prior election and certification of the Union was in- valid and void because of alleged unlawful conduct at- tributed to the Union affecting the results of the election. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me at Winchester, Virginia, on March 14, 1967. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs. Since the close of the hearing briefs have been received from the Respondent and the Charging Union and have been fully considered by me. Upon consideration of the entire record in the case, in- cluding the briefs filed, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia with its principle place of business located in Winchester, Vir- ginia, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing building bricks. During the 12 months preceding the filing of the complaint herein, Respondent in the course and conduct of its business operations shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 from its place of business in Winchester, Virginia, directly to customers located out- side the Commonwealth of Virginia. During the same period , Respondent purchased goods valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to its place of busi- ness in Winchester from suppliers located outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein it was and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. it. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 168 NLRB No. 7 54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES On July 11, 1966, the Union filed its petition with the Board in Case 5-RC-5657, hereinafter referred to as the representation proceeding, seeking certification as collec- tive-bargaining representative of Respondent's produc- tion and maintenance employees. Following a hearing on that petition, the Board's Regional Director for Region 5, on August 16, 1966, ordered that a secret-ballot election be conducted among the employees in the unit which he found to be appropriate. At that election, conducted on September 15, 1966, 24 votes were cast for, and 22 against, representation by the Union. Two ballots were challenged, that of Lola Arnold by the Board agent because her name was not on the voting list, and that of Melvin Godlove, challenged by the Union, on the ground that he was not in the unit. On September 23, 1966, the Employer filed with the Board's Regional Director aforementioned the following five objections to conduct of the Union and its authorized agents affecting the results of the September 15 election, alleging, in substance, that: (1) While the election was in progress a representative of the Union "engaged in unlawful electioneering." (2) On the day of the election, a handbill was dis- tributed to eligible voters which contained material misrepresentations and that the Employer had no oppor- tunity to make effective reply thereto. (3) Prior to the election the Union's representatives "made representations that his salary was paid by the Government and that he was acting for the National Labor Relations Board ... and the Company was not able to effectively reply." (4) Prior to August 23, 1966, a representative of the Union made an "unlawful trespass" on the Company's premises and "examined the timecards" of eligible voters at the coming elections. (5) On the morning of the election, representatives of the Union "visited the parking lot of the Employer and spoke to employees eligible to vote," made misrepresen- tations to which the Employer could not effectively reply: That these employees "were approached without their consent ... [and they] had difficulty getting away from said representatives." Upon receipt of the above objections, the Regional Director caused an investigation to be made thereof, pur- suant to which the Employer submitted to the Regional Director, in support of its objections, the written state- ments of 25 persons. Included were the statements of Respondent's executive officials, superintendent, super- visors, its attorney, and employees not eligible to vote. The Union submitted the statements of the two union of- ficials alleged to have engaged in unlawful conduct and of at least 13 employees eligible to vote. On October 28, 1966, the aforesaid Regional Director issued his Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative, overruling all of the Employer's objec- tions and certifying that the Union had been duly selected by a majority of the employees as their collective-bargain- ing representative. i On or about November 10, 1966, the Employer filed with the Board its request for review and stay of the Re- ' In that decision, the Regional Director took note of a prior letter from the Union by which it agreed, "for the purpose of this [representation] proceeding only," that the Board agent's challenge to the ballot of Arnold gional Director's Decision and Certification. On December 28, 1966, the Board denied the aforesaid request for review in its entirety on the ground that "it raises no substantial issues warranting review." On January 4, 1967, Respondent wrote a letter to the Union acknowledging the latter's request of October 31, 1966, for recognition as representative of Respondent's employees, and its request of December 28, 1966, for collective-bargaining information. The Company's letter denied both requests, announced that it would adhere to that position, and characterized its refusal as a "technical refusal to bargain ... in order that review procedures may be initiated." Respondent has steadfastly adhered to that position. On February 21, 1967, after the instant unfair labor practice proceeding was instituted and after it filed its answer herein, Respondent made a request of the Re- gional Director and the Board's General Counsel for a "copy of all reports resulting from the investigation" in the representation proceeding, contending it was entitled thereto by Section 9(d) of the Act. On February 24, 1967, the Board's General Counsel, by letter, denied the request but added: "The formal record in [the representa- tion proceeding] is available to you and it will, of course, be made part of the formal record at the C case hearing. However, sufficient reason has not been shown to war- rant departure from the Board's Rules and Regulations (Section 102.117(b) and 102.118)." It is Respondent's position, as expounded by its coun- sel at the hearing before me and in its brief, that the Union's certification "is invalid because [its] objection- able conduct prevented a free and fair election." That is- sue, however, has already been determined adversely to Respondent by the Board's decision in the representation proceeding. In that state of the record, it is now well established that, absent newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, the issues decided by the Board in the representation proceeding may not be relitigated in this unfair labor practice proceeding. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146, 162; N.L R.B. v. National Survey Service, Inc., 361 F.2d 199 (C.A. 7); Monroe Auto Equipment Company, 164 NLRB 1051. Here, Respondent expressly disavowed any "claim of newly discovered evidence" and made no valid offer of evidence previously unavailable to it. Except for its request next to be considered, its only offer of evidence before me was an offer "to call as witnesses [25 named persons] ... [each of [whom] ...] made an affidavit or a statement which the Respondent submitted to the Board in connection with its request for review and con- sideration by the Board." Respondent's counsel then added: "The testimony which we propose to adduce from these witnesses is the evidence which is contained in those statements and affidavits." By reason of the authority cited above, I sustained an objection to the offer of that evidence. Though Respondent does not expressly say so, its reasoning implies that it was entitled to a hearing in the representation proceeding before the Regional Director ruled on its objections. The first answer thereto is that Respondent never asked the Regional Director to con- be sustained Accordingly, and because the other challenged ballot, that of Godlove, could not affect the results of the election , the Regional Director found it unnecessary to resolve that challenge SHENANDOAH BRICK & TILE CORP. 55 duct such a hearing. It admittedly knew the investigation was in progress and apparently contented itself with the submission of approximately 25 affidavits and state- ments, all of which were duly considered by both the Re- gional Director and the Board. In any event, it was not entitled to a formal, "hearing" in that proceeding. Section 102.68(c) of the Board's Rules and Regula- tions, the validity of which is not challenged, authorizes the Regional Director to rule on the Employer's objec- tions "on the basis of an administrative investigation or, if it appears to the Regional Director that' substantial and material factual issues exist which can be resolved only after a hearing, on the basis of a hearing before a hearing officer, designated by the Regional Director." Pursuant to that rule, the Regional Director conducted an "administrative investigation" in which he invited and obtained participation by Respondent. Respondent in its brief admits that the Regional Director's investigation "included interviews with witnesses suggested by Respondent." The Director's lengthy Supplemental Decision reflects careful and painstaking consideration of all the evidence submitted to him by Respondent. Except for the fact that he did not conduct a formal "hearing," Respondent does not challenge the soundness of the Re- gional Director's determination of Respondent's objec- tions. Section 102.68(c) and (e) of the Board's Rules and Regulations further provide that if exceptions to the Re- gional Director's decision are filed with the Board seeking a review of that decision, the Board likewise is granted discretion to order a hearing on the objections. It may do so, however, only if "it appears to the Board that such exceptions raise substantial and material factual is- sues." Here, the Board has determined that the Em- ployer's request for review "raises no substantial issues warranting review." All that Respondent sought by that review was "an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a substantial and material question of fact. This is a question of law and due process does not require an evidentiary hearing as a prerequisite to a valid determina- tion of a question of law." N.L.R.B. v. Sun Drug Co., 359 F.2d 408, 415 (C.A. 3). By reason of all the foregoing I conclude that Respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to a formal hearing on its objections either before the Regional Director or the Board. O.K. Van Storage, Inc., 127 NLRB 1537, enfd. 297 F.2d 74 (C.A. 5); Macomb Pottery Co v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 450 (C A. 7); N.L R.B. v. National Survey Service, Inc., 361 F.2d 199 (C.A. 7); N.L.R.B. v. Douglas County Electric Membership Corp., 358 F.2d 125 (C.A. 5), N.L.R.B. v. J. R. Simplot Company, 332 F.2d 170 (C.A. 9); Rockwell Manufacturing Company, 142 NLRB 741, 750; Westchester Plastics of Ohio, Inc., 165 NLRB 219. In light of the conclusion 3ast announced, little more need be said concerning Respondent's contention that it was entitled to "copies of statements of witnesses" in the possession of the General Counsel. Section 102.117 of the Board's Rules and Regulations provides that, subject to provisions not relevant herein, "all files, documents, reports, memoranda, and records pertaining to the inter- nal management of the Board or to the investigation or disposition of charges or petitions during the nonpublic investigative stages of proceedings and before the institu- tion of formal proceedings, and all matters of evidence obtained by the Board or any of its agents in the course of investigation, which have not been offered in evidence at a hearing before a Trial Examiner or Hearing Officer or have not been made part of an official record by stipu- lation ... are for good cause found by the Board held confidential and are not matters of official record or available to public inspection, unless permitted by the Board, its chairman, its general counsel, or any regional director." The rule was promulgated pursuant to authori- ty vested in the Board by Section 6 of the Act, to make "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act." N.L.R.B. v. National Sur- vey Service, supra; lntertype Company, A Division of Harris-Intertype Corporation, 164 NLRB 770. Respondent contends, however, that by reason of the "General Counsel's refusal to furnish, or incorporate in the record of the instant proceedings all documents per- taining to the administrative investigation in [the representation proceeding], minimum standards of fair- ness and due process are lacking in these proceedings." Dealing first with the request to "incorporate in the record," the "documents" referred to are not the state- ments or affidavits which the Regional Director and the Board had before them prior to the entry of their deci- sions because those statements and affidavits are all presently a part of the record herein. What Respondent requested, and what was denied in this respect, were "all reports resulting from the investigation made [in the representation proceeding] ... the [entire] investigation file" in the possession of the Regional Director. It con- tends that Section 9(d) of the Act requires "the produc- tion of any statements in the possession of the Regional Director and that they be made a part of the record herein." There is no merit to either contention. Section 9(d) of the Act reads as follows: Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 10(c) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to sub- section (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certifi- cation and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed .... It is the contention of Respondent that "the record of such investigation" referred to in the section must include "all reports resulting from the investigation made" by the Regional Director, in effect, his entire "investigation file." The scope of Section 9(d) in this respect was given ex- haustive consideration in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 209 F.2d 782 (C.A. 7), where a similar request was made to incorporate into the record "reports by agents and investigators . . . all that transpired before the Board, its agents and employees after the filing" of the petition in the representation proceeding. The court, after a searching analysis of the scope of Section 9(d) denied the request. To the same effect, see Texas Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 336 F.2d 128, 133-134 (C.A. 5); N L.R.B. v. National Survey Service, 361 F.2d 199 (C.A. 7); Intertype Company, A Division of Harris-Intertype Corp v. John A. Penello, Regional Director, 269 F. Supp. 573. Respondent further argues that it "is entitled to copies of statements of witnesses relied upon by the General Counsel" for examination by Respondent. It arrives at this conclusion by an extremely circuitous but nonavail- ing route. It argues that if "during the course of the representation proceeding" an appropriate hearing had been held, and "had the various issues raised by Respond- ent during the course of the representation proceeding 56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD been decided after an appropriate hearing, any statements of witnesses upon whom the Regional Director relied ... would necessarily have had [sic ] to have been made available to Respondent . Moreover , had the General Counsel presented witnesses in the unfair labor practice proceeding to support the validity of the certification ... statements of those witnesses , of necessity the same wit- nesses whose testimony was deemed sufficient to support the ruling of the Director in [the representation proceeding], would also have been made available to Respondent " for its possible use in the cross-examination of those witnesses. There are two short answers to this argument . First, as previously pointed out, the law does not require , nor did Respondent request , a formal "hearing" of the Regional Director. Second , at the instant unfair labor practice hearing, the General Counsel called no witnesses. He rests his entire case on the pleadings, the decision of the Board in the representation proceeding , and admissions by Respondent at the hearing before me. There was no need for him to call any witness. Nor is Respondent entitled to the production of state- ments in the possession of the General Counsel "as required by the Jencks rule." That so-called rule, to which effect is given by Section 102.118 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , requires the production of state- ments only "after a witness called by the General Coun- sel has testified in [an unfair labor practice proceeding] .. or after any witness has testified in any post election hearing" in the representation proceeding . No such occa- sion was presented in the instant proceeding. The General Counsel having called no witnesses , the Jencks rule has no application. On the entire record I find that on and since January 4, 1967, Respondent has refused to recognize or bargain with the Union concerning rates of pay, wages , hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employ- ment of its employees engaged in the unit certified by the Board. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3 By refusing , on and since January 6, 1967, to recog- nize and bargain with the Union , Respondent has en- gaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Sections 8 (a)(5) and ( 1) and 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY During the course of the hearing herein , and in its brief, the Union asked that , in addition to the conventional remedy imposed in unlawful refusal to bargain cases, there be imposed a requirement to make the employees whole with respect to "the disparity between what Respondent 's employees are presently receiving in terms of wages, hours and other conditions of employment and what these employees reasonably would have received had the employer met its collective -bargaining obliga- tion." The General Counsel took "no position" with respect to the Union 's request. Respondent opposed the request asserting that what the employees "would have obtained" as a result of collective bargaining is purely speculative. To complicate the issue further, I have been unable to find, nor have I been referred to any Board or court authority dealing with facts similar to those presented here and which sanctioned or provided such a make- whole remedy ,'or provided guidelines pursuant to which it may be imposed. At the hearing, I nevertheless expressed the view that various remedies prescribed by the Board have not adequately remedied the violations found and, if a refusal to bargain be found herein , I would give further con- sideration to the remedy proposed by the decisions of Trial Examiner Josephine Klein in Zinke's Foods, Inc., Case 30-CA-372, and by Trial Examiner Owsley Vose in Ex-Cell-0 Corporation , Case 25-CA-2377, both of which decisions are presently pending before the Board The facts in those proceedings so closely resemble the facts presented here that I deem it unnecessary to other- wise restate them. In Ex-Cell-O, like here, the Respond- ent characterized its admitted refusal to bargain, or to honor the Regional Director's decision and certification, as a "technical refusal to bargain" to be tested by review in the Court of Appeals. After an exhaustive and scholarly review of the score of cases dealing with the remedies provided by the Board in various other situa- tions, Trial Examiners Klein and Vose both concluded that Section 10(c) of the Act warrants imposition of a "make-whole" order such as the Union requests herein.2 In Ex-Cell-O, Respondent was required "to compensate ... each of its employees for the monetary value of the minimum additional benefits, if any, including wages, which it is reasonable to conclude that the Union would have been able to obtain through collective bargaining with the Respondent , for the period commencing with the date of the Respondent's refusal to bargain collectively and continuing until paid ," together with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum , compounded quarterly. Though I am in complete agreement with the views of both Trial Examiners Vose and Klein, and those of the Union herein , that a more effective remedy is necessary than is conventionally prescribed in this type of case, I am nevertheless constrained for the reasons that follow not to require the requested remedy at this stage of the proceeding. I have been administratively advised that on July 12-13, 1967, the Board will hear oral argument in Zinke's Foods and Ex-Cell-O and two other similar cases The 2-day argument will be restricted to consideration of the "remedies adopted or proposed " in those cases and, if adopted , how employee losses are to be determined. The AFL-CIO and the National Retail Merchants As- sociation have been granted leave to participate as amicus curiae , and invitations to similarly participate have been extended to the National Association of Manu- facturers, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Teamsters Union , and United Mine Workers of America. In view of the time allowed for argument and the in- frequency with which the Board grants oral argument it ' Section I0(c) of the Act authorizes the Board to require "such affirm- ative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act " SHENANDOAH BRICK & TILE CORP. is reasonable to assume that the Board considers the problem under consideration both extremely important and one not heretofore fully explored . It may also be as- sumed that the Board 's decision in one or more of those cases will issue before it reviews my decision herein, a review which Respondent has already announced it will undertake . The remedy the Board will apply in the cases to be argued next month , that remedy will apply to Respondent herein and the Board 's subsequent order in this proceeding will, undoubtedly , so require . By reason of all the foregoing I am constrained to only impose the conventional refusal to bargain remedy and leave it to the Board to enlarge thereon as it deems just and proper. Accordingly , upon the foregoing findings and conclu- sions, and on the entire record , I recommend , pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act , issuance of the following: ORDER Shenandoah Brick & Tile Corp., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize or to bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment , with Laborers ' District Coun- cil of Washington , D.C. affiliated with Laborers ' Interna- tional Union of North America , AFL-CIO , as the exclu- sive representative of the employees in the following ap- propriate unit. All production and maintenance employees, in- cluding truckdrivers , employed by Respondent at its Winchester, Virginia , plant , excluding all guards, watchmen, office clerical employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like manner interfering with the efforts of the above-named Union to bargain collectively with Respondent on behalf of the employees in the above- described unit. 2 Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above- named Union as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the above -described unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its offices at Winchester , Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix ."" Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent , shall be posted by it im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. (c) Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision , what steps have been taken to comply herewith.4 57 ' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice in the further event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 4 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 5 , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act , as amended , we hereby notify our em- ployees that' WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request, with Laborers' District Council of Washington, D.C. & Vicinity, affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclu- sive representative of all employees in the certified unit described below, concerning wages, rates of pay, hours of employment , and other conditions of em- ployment and , if an understanding is reached, em- body it in a signed agreement . The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees, including truckdrivers , employed by us at our Winchester, Virginia, plant , excluding all guards , watchmen , office clerical employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union or in any manner interfere with the efforts of the Union to bargain with us on behalf of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit. SHENANDOAH BRICK & TILE CORP. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office , Federal Build- ing, Room 1019 , Charles Center, Baltimore, Maryland, Telephone 962-2909.