168 NLRB 153
Standard Oil Co. of Cailfornia
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
153
Standard
Oil
Company of California,
Western
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
Operations, Inc. and Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers International Union, Richmond Local No.
1-561, AFL-CIO. Case 20-CA-3944
November 8, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On May 31, 1967, Trial Examiner David F.
Doyle issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent has not en-
gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. Thereafter, the General Coun-
sel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the
Decision and supporting briefs, and Respondent
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision,' the exceptions, the
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, except as herein
modified. I
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
I On the facts presented by this record, we cannot say, as urged by the
General Counsel and the Charging Party, that the maintenance and en-
forcement of the Respondent's rule against adornment of the safety hats
violated Section 8(a)(1) or (3), simply because the decorations in issue
were union emblems The Respondent established that it had a legitimate,
longstanding, and not unwarranted concern about the threat to safety
posed by the use of unauthorized decorations on work hats Furthermore,
the evidence shows that employees were freely permitted to wear em-
blems signifying union affiliation on any part of their clothing except their
safety hats. But while we agree with the Trial Examiner that the complaint
should be dismissed for the foregoing reasons, we do not adopt or rely on
his alternative finding that because no union organizational campaign was
in progress at the time the rule was enforced, this in itself is a separate
reason for finding that no protected purpose could be served by the em-
ployees who wore the union decals
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID F. DOYLE, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,
with all parties represented by counsel, was heard by me
at San Francisco, California, on January 31 and February
1, 1967, on complaint of the General Counsel and asnwer
of the Respondent. I
The complaint dated July 8, 1966, was based on a
charge filed by the Union on February 16, 1966, and a
first amended charge filed on July 7, 1966.2 The com-
plaint alleged in substance that the Company had violated
Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by discriminatorily
suspending employees Willie F. Anderson and Danny L.
Cates because they displayed emblems in the form of de-
cals on their safety hats.
In its answer the Company denied the commission of
any unfair labor practices and alleged as an affirmative
defense that for many years prior to 1966, the Company
had issued to employees working in its Richmond,
California, refinery, safety hats of a special design and
had for many years a policy, rule, and instruction which
stated that "no other painting or marking of safety hats is
permitted unless approved by proper authority." The
answer alleges that supervisors of the Company for good
reasons pursuant to this instruction ordered employees
Anderson and Cates to remove certain union decals from
the safety hats supplied to each by the Company and
upon the refusal of the employees to comply with the
order the employees were relieved of duties for the
balance of the shift without deduction from pay.
At the hearing counsel for the parties were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues, to
argue the issues orally upon the record, and to file briefs
and proposed findings. The General Counsel and counsel
for the Company have filed scholarly briefs which have
been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record of the case and upon my obser-
vation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The pleadings establish that the Company is a
Delaware corporation engaged in the refining, sale, and
distribution of petroleum products at its Richmond,
California, refinery. In the course and conduct of its busi-
ness, it annually sells and ships products valued in excess
of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State
of California.
It is found, therefore, that the Company at all times
material herein has been an employer engaged in com-
merce and in operations affecting commerce within the
' In this Decision, Standard Oil Company of California, Western
Operations, Inc , is referred to as the Company or the Respondent, Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Richmond Local No
1-561, AFL-CIO, is referred to as thi. Union and its parent organization
as the International , the General Counsel of the Board and his representa-
tives at the hearing as the General Counsel; the National Labor Relations
Board as the Board , and the Labor-Management Relations Act, as
amended, as the Act
2 All dates in this Decision are in the year 1966 unless specified other-
wise
168 NLRB No. 28
154
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
It is also admitted in the pleadings that the following
named persons occupy the position set opposite each
name and are supervisors acting on behalf of the Com-
pany within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act: T.
M. Sheehy, general manager, Richmond refinery; Jim
Leder, superintendent; Jules
Mayer, superintendent;
Mervin Miller, assistant superintendent; Charles Dixon,
foreman.
II.
THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings likewise establish, and I find, that the
Union at all times material herein has been a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III.
THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A.
Undisputed Facts
The Refinery
The site of the alleged unfair labor practices is the
Richmond Refinery of the Company. At this city of
Richmond, California, on the shore of San Francisco Bay
the Company maintains and operates an oil refinery,
which is reported to be the largest in the western States of
the United States and one of the largest in the world. The
complex of buildings and giant chemical constructions are
spread over more than 3,000 acres of land. The force of
employees operating the refinery is approximately 3,000
persons, which may fluctuate to some extent according to
the nature of the Company's operations.
In essence the refinery is a chemical laboratory
operated on a vast scale with specific buildings and equip-
ment to perform certain tasks which bring into being the
many petrochemical products of the Company, some of
which are highly volatile. From crude petroleum the
refinery manufactures low volatile kerosene, automobile
gasoline, aviation gasoline, and missile and rocket fuels of
the highest volatility. In the primary manufacturing
process, the refinery also manufactures many types of
petrochemicals
and such items as lubricating oils,
greases,
waxes, and many types of dangerous and
hazardous gases. Some of the gases are intentionally
manufactured, and some are the undesired but natural
phenomena which result from the refining process. The
refinery's safety practice booklet lists the following
hazardous gases as potentially harmful if inhaled:
hydrogen sulphide, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide,
carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide, ammonia, hydrofluoric
acid, and petroleum gases of many varieties.
The Safety Rules; the Safety Hat Issued to Employees
As might be expected the safety of employees and of
those coming into the refinery on business and the safety
of the people who reside in neighboring communities
present a problem to the Company which it has attempted
to solve by a series of safety regulations. It has installed
equipment and devised procedures to deal with accidents
such as fire, explosion, and the leakage of harmful gases.
It has issued to its employees various items of protective
clothing and safety hats made of metal, commonly called
"hardhats," which are designed to protect employees.
Among the safety provisions is a safety scheme whereby
certain portions of the refinery are specified as places in
which "hard hats or safety hats must be worn by all per-
sonnel." Even visitors to the refinery and those of its per-
sonnel who go only occasionally into these areas are
required by the safety rules to wear the type of hardhat
which is issued to each employee. The Company retains
ownership of these hardhats at all times but after one is is-
sued to an employee he retains it until such time as he
leaves the employ of the Company or until the hat is
replaced for some reason. At night each man on the day
shift usually places his safety hat with his work clothes or
other protective covering in his locker. The initiation of
the practice of issuing hardhats to its employees is an un-
disputed fact in this proceeding. At the hearing, counsel
for the Company produced a series of "Refinery Instruc-
tion 314," beginning with one issued on December 7,
1954, and the last of the seven documents being that,
dated March 10, 1966.3
The Rule
At the hearing counsel for the parties stipulated that the
seven documents established the inception of Refinery
Instruction 14 and its subsequent amendment. The docu-
ments also established the rule pertaining to the wearing
of "hard" hats, and the prohibition of the Company
against painting or marking the safety hats with material
not "approved by proper authority." Refinery Instruction
314 as first promulgated on December 7, 1954, in per-
tinent part reads as follows-
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT
FOR ALL PARTS OF THE BODY
HEAD PROTECTION
1. The following articles must be worn for head pro-
tection, as indicated.
(a) Regular Safety Hat or Cap, where there is a
possibility of being struck by falling or flying objects,
and there is no likelihood of contacting electrical cur-
rent. Colors of Safety Hats, to be worn by certain
personnel is indicated below. No other painting or
marking of Safety Hats is permitted unless approved
by proper authority.
(1) For Safety Operators: white crown, green
brim; "Safety Operator" stenciled on crown.
(2) For
Fire
Protection
personnel:
white
crown, red brim. (Those worn by PP&CS per-
sonnel have distinguishing metal badge in front;
those worn by other "Fire Fighting Organiza-
tion" personnel have "Fire Dept." stenciled on
crown.)
(3) Plain for general use; no color identification
is required.
S These documents are dated as follows December 7, 1954, January
14, 1957; May I, 1959; June 9, 1959, September 28, 1962 ; January 13,
1965; and the last one dated March 10, 1966
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
155
Thereafter at various dates, according to the stipula-
tion, Refinery Instruction 314 underwent a series of
amendments and in the course of time it evolved into a
system of visual identification of certain classes of em-
ployees by the specific colored markings placed on the
hats. In 1954, distinctive visual identification on a hard-
hat was used only for safety operators and fire protection
personnel but as the system grew and the instruction was
revised it included more and more separate classes of em-
ployees with separate distinctive color markings. In the
revision of the instruction in 1965 the Company added
yellow stickers to the side of the hardhats which by their
symbols and color designated the operating division or
department in which the employee worked. In January
1966, the Company ordered the placement of a decal
of the company hallmark, a red, white, and blue chevron
on the front of the hardhat of all refinery employees and
underneath the company hallmark a 1/2-inch "dymo"
label tape with the employee's name.
The testimony of company officials established the fact
that at the time this controversy arose there were 3,000
company employees on the premises of the refinery and
because of huge construction projects enlarging the
refinery, there were approximately 2,000 employees of
other companies on the property. The hardhats which the
employees of the contractors wore were in some in-
stances similar to the Company's and in other instances
dissimilar, but the Chevron decal on the front of the hard-
hat immediately identified employees of the Company as
distinct from the employees of the contractors who did
not display the Chevron hallmark on their hats. In addi-
tion to the contractors' employees who were on the
premises, there were large numbers of employees of other
employers who came in the course of their business to
bring material to the refinery or to take away products or
to perform special repairs or services. In the refinery
areas these employees of the suppliers or customers were
required to wear hardhats, and in many instances their
hats too, were similar to the hats worn by the company
employees except for the distinctive markings.
By early 1966, Refinery Instruction 314 had specific
paragraphs for head protection; face and head protection;
eye protection; body protection; arm protection; and pro-
tection against highly corrosive and toxic chemicals. At
this time, Refinery Instruction 314 listed the following
markings in use for protection and identification of com-
pany employees:
1. White crown, green brim, "Safety Operator" sten-
ciled on crown.
2
White crown and brim, with distinguishing metal
badge in front, and red "Fire Dept." sticker on each side
of crown (fire protection personnel). These men are com-
pany employees specially trained to fight refinery fires
and should not be confused with the usual fire depart-
ments in cities, etc.
3. Fluorescent red crown and brim (fire fighters). Per-
sonnel specially trained as above.
4. All white (ambulance drivers).
5. White with black stripes crossing on crown (public
relations representatives).
6. Metallic green crown and brim (refinery engineers).
7.
Dark blue crown and brim ( equipment inspectors).
8.
Dark red crown and brim (riggers).
9. Cream crown and brim (head mechanics and main-
tenance district foremen).
10. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Thermal Division on each side of crown
(operators in Thermal Division).
11. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Catylitic Cracking Division on each side
of crown (operators in Catylitic Cracking Division).
12. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Isomax Division on each side of crown
(operators in Isomax Division).
13. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Lube Oil Division on each side of crown
(operators in Lube Oil Division).
14. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Light Oil Division on each side of crown
(operators in Light Oil Division).
15. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Chemical Division on each side of crown
(operators in Chemical Division).
16. Plain aluminum with yellow divisional identifica-
tion sticker for Utilities Division on each side of crown
(operators in Utilities Division).
17. Yellow plastic with yellow divisional identification
sticker for appropriate division on each side of crown
(designated operators working near corrosive acids).
18. Plain aluminum with Safety Engineer decal on
each side of crown (safety engineers).
19.
Plain aluminum (general use).
20. Orange (boilermaker welders).
21. Gray plastic (electricians).
22. Gold (safety inspector).
23. Green (motor transport employees).
In this system of marking, the Company had used 14
different colors and 9 different types of identification
stickers or decals in carrying out its visual identification
system for company hardhats.
The Union Leaflets and Letters
It is the contention of the General Counsel and the
Union that in the month of July the Union launched a
campaign to increase its membership at the refinery. Part
of this campaign was a series of leaflets, admitted in
evidence, which were mailed to union members and non-
members in the appropriate unit. There are 13 of these
leaflets or letters which were mailed to employees
between August 17, 1965, and January 8, 1966. Some of
these leaflets or letters were issued a second or third time.
The initial letter to the employees stated that the or-
ganizing program of the Union had been temporarily inac-
tive but that it was being revived. It urged members to
sign up fellow employees and to have pride in the Union.
Subsequent leaflets or letters stressed the importance of
solidarity and stated that a series of pamphlets entitled
"Did You Know" would be issued to acquaint employees
with facts of the company-union relationship. The
remainder of the leaflets discussed some of the aims of
the Union in handling grievances and in future contracts.4
B.
Testimony on Controverted Issues
Dwight Horne, chairman of the Stewards Council of
the Union, was called to testify, among other things, that
the series of leaflets were posted on the Union's bulletin
board maintained pursuant to the company-union labor
agreement, but could only identify 4 of the 13 exhibits in
' The senes of leaflets and letters are G C Exhs 3(a)-3(q)
156
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the series as having been posted on the union bulletin
board. Thomas M. Sheehy, general manager of the
refinery, who was also questioned on this subject, stated
that he remembered that a leaflet concerning one partticu-
lar incident was posted on the union bulletin board, but he
could not identify any of the exhibits as having been
posted. He admitted that he knew that there were various
communications posted on the bulletin board from the
Union to members and employees, but that he was not
aware of their particular nature.
The Wearing of the Union Decal; the Discussion Con-
cerning the Decals; and the Suspension of Two Union
Officers
Gale T. Jacobs, secretary-treasurer of the Union,
testified without contradiction that during the latter part
of December 1965 the officers of the Union received
from the International and distributed to their members
in the refinery about 500 union decals. These decals are
the emblem of the Union, and are round and about 2
inches in diameter. The union officers told the members
to put the decals on windshields, lunch buckets, hardhats,
or things of that nature.
It is undisputed that on January 19, 1966, Thomas M.
Sheehy, general manager of the refinery, issued an order
which was posted on the bulletin boards that notified all
employees that the Company desired to have the
Chevron hallmark on all employees' safety hats on the
center front with its bottom edge three-quarters of an inch
above the break for the brim. Underneath the hallmark,
the employee's name was to be placed with self-adhesive
"dymo" tape. This directive included the following,
"Please note that unauthorized colors, decorations, or in-
signia are not to be placed on safety hats. Refinery In-
struction 314 is being revised to include the Chevron de-
cals and division identification decals as authorized
markings."
At approximately this time, Jacobs, the secretary-trea-
surer of the Union, phoned Cannon, senior employee
relations representative of the Company, and asked him
if the bulletin concerning the placement of the Company's
hallmark and the banning of unauthorized material on the
hats applied to the union insignia. Cannon answered that
the union insignia on the hardhat was not authorized.
Jacobs asked why the Company had decided that
unauthorized material should not be worn on the hard-
hats. Cannon replied that the Company wanted to identi-
fy the property of the Company by the decals and to
identify the wearers as employees of the Company.
Jacobs replied that the union members had no intention
of claiming the hardhats as their property by the decals,
but merely wanted to show their affiliation with the
Union. The men then discussed the fact that other kinds
of material had been placed on the hardhats, such as panic
buttons, wisecracks, pornographic pictures, etc. Jacobs
said that the Union did not condone the wearing of such
things on the hardhat, but felt that union members had a
right to identify themselves with the Union by wearing a
union decal on the hat. Jacobs asked if an employee could
buy his own hardhat and place the union decals on it.
Cannon said that he would check on that, and a little later
he phoned back to Jacobs, saying that an employee could
not buy and wear his own hardhat, that the Company
required that he wear the hardhat provided by the Com-
pany.
Jacobs further testified that on February 16, 1966,
Sheehy, general manager , and Le Duc, of the Company,
met with Jacobs in Sheehy's office. At this meeting,
Jacobs told Sheehy that the negotiating committee of the
Union understood that the president of the Local was
going to be confronted on his return to work with a de-
mand that he remove the union decal from his hat, and the
president of the Union and the negotiating committee of
the Union had agreed that if the union president was
going to be "attacked" in this manner, that the Company
would have to "attack" them all in the same manner,
because they were going to back up the president and
they would all refuse to remove the union decal. Jacobs
asked the management representative for time to "iron
the thing out."
On the next morning Jacobs met with Sheehy and Le
Duc again and handed to Sheehy a copy of the original
charge herein, which had been filed by the Union with the
Regional Office, Region 20 (San Francisco), on the
preceding day, February 16. Jacobs said that the Union
wanted to avoid a confrontation in the matter. Sheehy
replied that Le Duc would tell department heads not to
seek a showdown in the matter, but if a confrontation oc-
curred he would instruct the foreman to offer to "trade
hats with the employees," and the meeting ended on this
note.
In the afternoon, Jacobs again saw Sheehy and told
Sheehy that he had learned that Willie F. Anderson, pres-
ident of the Union, and Danny Cates, chairman of the
negotiating committee of the Union, had been suspended,
and Jacobs asked why the understanding reached that
morning had not been kept. Sheehy expressed amaze-
ment, so they both went to Sheehy's office. Sheehy con-
ferred with Le Duc privately and then he told Jacobs that
the
Company had complied with the agreed-upon
procedure. Jacobs left at that point.
Jacobs also testified without contradiction that most
union members paid their dues by the checkoff, so the
Company knew about increases in membership.
In the course of his examination by union counsel,
Jacobs testified that he did not mention the Union's or-
ganizational campaign in any of the discussions he had
with
management representatives in regard to the
removal of the union decals.
The Suspension of Cates and Anderson
Danny Cates, the chairman of the negotiating commit-
tee and an officer of the Union, testified that at one time
he had painted his hardhat yellow and that at another time
he placed a picture of Mickey Mouse on it. When the
union decals were issued he placed one on the front of his
hat, but later changed the position of the decal so that he
had a union decal on each side of his hat over his ear. He
first learned that he might have trouble with the manage-
ment about wearing the union decal on February 5 when
Dixon, his plant foreman, told him that no unauthorized
material was permitted on hardhats. Dixon said that no
one was pushing the instruction at that time and until they
did he wouldn't say anything about Cates' wearing the de-
cal. However, on February 7, Dixon came to Cates and
showed him a letter which said that the hardhats were to
be cleaned up and all unauthorized material taken off
them. Dixon then said, "I expect you to adhere to the
terms of this letter." Cates inquired what would happen
if he refused to remove the decals from his hat. Dixon
replied that the Company would take disciplinary action
against him.
Cates heard no more of the matter until February 17,
when Carlock, a foreman, called Cates from his post and
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
told him that he had been instructed to ask Cates to
remove his decals. Cates told Carlock that he wished he
would not ask him to do that at this time, because a meet-
ing had been scheduled for Monday with management to
try to settle the issue without anyone being confronted.
Cates asked Carlock if he would check with the assistant
superintendent ,
Mr.
Miller, before he asked him to
remove the decals, and Carlock said that he would, and
left. About 1:20 p.m., Cates received a phone call from
the head operator , Ralph Freeman , who directed him to
go to the plant superintendent's office with Anderson, the
president of the Union. When Cates and Anderson
reached the office of Leder, plant superintendent, Ander-
son was admitted to Leder's office first and then Cates.
When Anderson emerged from the superintendent's of-
fice he told Cates that he had been suspended. Cates was
then ushered into Leder's office. Inside were Foreman
Carlock, Miller, and Superintendent Leder. Leder said
Cates had been summoned to his office for the purpose of
asking Cates to remove his decals . Leder then said, "I am
asking you to take those decals off." Cates replied that he
couldn't at this time , and asked Leder if he would check
with General Manager Sheehy as there had been arrange-
ments made for a meeting the following Monday to try to
settle the issue amicably . Leder replied that he was not
concerned with any arrangements between the Union and
Sheehy, that he was running the lube oil division and he
was asking Cates to take off the decals. Cates told him
that he could not at that time. Leder replied , that in that
case Cates was suspended with pay. Leder told Cates that
he had been treated in the same manner as had Anderson.
Just before Cates left the room , Leder told him that there
were some yellow hats in the filing cabinet in the office,
and if Cates would take one of them he could, and he
wouldn't be suspended . Cates told him that he couldn't do
it at that time.
Cates testified
that on the following morning he
returned to work at 7 a.m. He returned to work due to a
telephone call which resulted from a conference of the In-
ternational representative of the Union, Secretary-Trea-
surer Jacobs, and Sheehy ,
general
manager of the
refinery. It is undisputed that on this morning , February
18, Anderson and Cates returned to work wearing the
union decals on their hats. Anderson and Cates were then
asked to exchange their hardhats containing the Union's
decals for two new hardhats which did not contain the
union decals but did contain the Chevron hallmark. They
complied with this request and returned to work.
Willie F. Anderson, president of the Union, testified
that on February 17 he was wearing his safety hat with
union decals on both , the right and left sides. Foreman
Carlock came to him and told him that he had been in-
structed to ask Anderson to remove the union decals. An-
derson replied that he wished Carlock would not ask him
to remove them at that time. Carlock replied that his or-
ders were to, "Go see Anderson and order him to remove
the decals." Anderson
asked Carlock to wait until
February 21
when the Union and Mr. Sheehy had
scheduled a meeting. Carlock said that his orders were
specific and he had to ask Anderson to remove the decals.
Anderson asked if he could wear a safety hat of his own.
Carlock replied in the negative. Then Anderson asked
Carlock if he could exchange his hat . Carlock said he
could not. Later in the afternoon Anderson and Cates
157
were summoned to Superintendent Leder's office. Ac-
cording to Anderson, Leder told Anderson that he had
been asked to take the decals off his hat and had refused
and that he (Leder) would have to suspend him. As An-
derson left the office, Leder said he had a few days to
think it over and to call him if Anderson decided to
remove the decals.
The Incident of Employee Horne
Employee Dwight Horne , who holds the offices of
committeeman and chairman of the Stewards Council,
also encountered difficulty concerning his wearing of the
union decals but he was not suspended . Home testified
that sometime prior to the issuance of the union decals
somebody had written the words , "road runner" on his
hardhat. Also, on another occasion someone had put the
words "OCAW Mounted Police " on his hat.5 No one
ever told him to remove any of these things from his hat.
When the union decals were issued he put one decal on
the front of his hat and one on the back. During the first
week in January , Joe Keck , his shift foreman, in a conver-
sation said that he felt the business of union decals was
kind of silly, with the Company telling the employees to
take the decals off their hats and the employees saying
that they wouldn't. Keck told Horne he was going to give
him a Chevron decal and if Horne wanted to put it on his
hat he could , but Keck wasn't going to order him to do so.
Horne testified that on February 16 he was summoned
to the office of Jules Mayer , chemical division superin-
tendent. When he reached Mayer 's office, Mayer told him
that the decal situation was getting out of hand , and that
he would like Horne to take his decal off and go out into
the plant and tell the rest of the employees in the division
to take theirs off. Mayer said he asked Horne to do that,
because Horne was recognized as the leader among
the union men and they would probably follow his exam-
ple. Home asked Mayer if Mayer realized his position,
and had heard that the negotiating committee that morn-
ing had taken the position that if action was taken against
the president of the Union in the matter of the decals, the
Company would be required to take the same action
against all the members of the committee because they
had decided on a joint course of action. Mayer said that
he had heard that and asked Horne if he was aware that
the Union had filed charges with the Regional Office of
the Board. Mayer said that the decals would have to come
off the hats and he didn 't want to have trouble about it.
Horne then asked if Mayer would wait either until the
Board rendered a decision or the scheduled meeting with
Sheehy on the matter occurred. Mayer replied that he
would not wait , that the matter was far too pressing, and
he told Horne that he would give him 24 hours to think
about it , with pay. On the following day, Mayer phoned
Home at his home and asked him if he had made any
decision in the matter. Home said that it was his day off,
and he didn't have to be at work until Saturday, and he
was going to think about it until then . On Saturday,
Horne went to work and about 10 o'clock in the morning
the foreman in the plant came to him and asked Horne to
step outside . The foreman asked him if he was ready to
take the decal off his hat and he replied in the negative.
Then the foreman asked him , if the foreman got him a
new hat would he exchange hats? Horne replied that the
5 OCAW are the initials of the Union.
158
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hat was the Company's property, and if it wanted to
reclaim it , the Company could , so the foreman went to the
office and brought back a new hat and took Horne's old
hat away with him.
The Many Emblems, Insignia, and Buttons Worn by the
Men Without Objection by the Company
All the employee-witnesses were cross-examined by
counsel for the Company as to whether there were not
numerous insignia and emblems of the Union which the
men wore in the plant without objection by the Company
ever having been made . Horne readily admitted that he
and the other stewards of the Union routinely and daily
wore a steward 's button of the Union in the refinery.
Horne admitted he had a union decal on his briefcase and
on his lunch bucket which he brought into the refinery on
a daily basis. He also stated that he wore a large union in-
signia made of cloth on the back of his coveralls. This
union insignia is of the type worn on the back of bowling
shirts and is exactly 8-1/2 inches in diameter.6 Home said
that many of the union members also wore a pencil clip on
their coveralls which displayed the union insignia. This
insignia was about three quarters of an inch or button-size
in diameter. Horne stated that no one in management had
ever objected to the men wearing or displaying any of
these insignia in the plant , except the decals on the safety
hat. Horne also admitted that he knew the rule forbade
unauthorized decorations on the hardhats but he knew
that the rule had not been enforced.
In the course of his cross -examination, Horne also
testified that there was a "continuous campaign" to enlist
new employees in the Union and to enlist those men who
were working in the plant , and who had not yet joined the
Union.
Anderson, president of the Union, in the course of his
cross-examination , stated that he had seen safety hats
painted different colors by the men and decorated with
such things as Chiquita Banana stickers , cartoons, num-
bers, etc. He knew that there was a rule stating that
unauthorized decorations could not be worn on the hard-
hats, but he did not know what was authorized, and he
made no inquiry about the rule, even when the question
arose between management and the Union . When asked
what the purpose of wearing the insignia was, he stated
that the decal was to identify the members to nonmem-
bers within the plant.
On cross-examination , Cates also testified that the
stewards of the Union wore a steward's button and that
many of the men wore the pencil clip with the Union's in-
signia on the pencil clip. Many of them had union decals
on their lunch boxes and several of them wore the large 8-
1/2 inch bowling-like emblem on the back of their
coveralls. He also admitted that he knew of no instance
in which any of the employees were told to take off any
union insignia, except the union decal on the safety hat.
The General Counsel also called as witnesses some
members of other unions . Neil Anderson, of Carpenters
Local 642, testified that his union had 45 members in the
refinery. At one time many of them had worn an emblem
6 Some witnesses testified that this union insignia worn by some em-
ployees on the back of their coveralls was 9 - 12 inches in diameter This
testimony is incorrect One of the cloth emblems which is the seal of the
Union is in evidence as Resp Exh 6 It is exactly 8-1/2 inches in diame-
on their hardhats of the United States and hands clasped;
this was an emblem which had been placed on United
States overseas aid shipments . He had also seen cartoons
and numbers worn on hardhats . He estimated that about
4 percent of the men employed in the refinery had
unauthorized decorations on their hats.
Robert Hammond , Boilermakers Union , testified that
his union had 250-300 men employed in the refinery. He
had seen safety hats marked with the numbers 007 and
had seen the Machinists emblem displayed on some hard-
hats.
Ransome F. Cannon, Jr., testified that he is a pipefitter
and a member of Plumbers Local 159. There are approxi-
mately 160 pipefitters employed at the refinery of which
approximately 80 are members . He has seen the Machin-
ists decal and the Union 's decal and many different
painted markings on the hardhats in the past.
Gilbert L . Hail, chief steward and a member of the ex-
ecutive board of the International Association of Machin-
ists, testified that his union had approximately 150 mem-
bers in the refinery and that many of them wore the
Machinists emblem on the front of their hats. He esti-
mated the size of this emblem at 5-1/2 inches in diameter.
These emblems were worn up to February of this year.
He testified that in February one of the foremen asked
him for his hardhat and when it was returned to him it was
a new one with the company hallmark on it and his name
under the Chevron sticker. He asked why the Company
gave him a new hat and his foreman told him that "they
couldn't put the Chevron sticker on it so they had to get
me a new one."
The Testimony of Company Witnesses
Thomas M. Sheehy, general manager of the Richmond
refinery, called as a witness for the Company , testified
that Refinery Instruction 314 had contained a prohibition
against unauthorized markings on hardhats for many
years. At that point, counsel for the parties agreed to the
stipulation previously set forth on the original promulga-
tion of Refinery Instruction 314, and successive amend-
ments. Sheehy also identified a booklet entitled "General
Instructions and Safe Practices " issued by the Company
to each employee , when the employee began employ-
ment. This booklet had an imprint of the employee's
name and contained general instructions for his employ-
ment. On page 4, this booklet states to the employee,
"You are expected to be familiar with all written Instruc-
tions, Standards and Daily Orders that concern your job.
After an absence you should promptly read any material
that was issued while you were away." 7 Sheehy testified
that at each control room in the refinery or at a central lo-
cation in each department an employee 's manual was
maintained in which all instructions , standards , and or-
ders were filed and maintained on a current basis for
reference by all supervisors and employees.
Sheehy testified that the last revision of Refinery In-
struction 314 was initiated by receipt of a letter from N.
T. Bogert , vice president of manufacturing of the Com-
pany, dated August 27, 1965, which suggested placement
ter The smaller decal is 2 inches in diameter Both insignia are the seal of
the Union portraying oil derricks , oil tanks, and electrons , with the name
of the Union around the perimeter of the circle
' This booklet is Resp Exh. 3.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
159
of the Chevron hallmark on safety hats which was a
procedure followed in other refineries.8 After receipt of
this letter, a routine meeting of management personnel,
held September 28, 1965, on the subject of safety,
discussed this and other safety measures, and initiated the
placement of the hallmark on the hardhats. The minutes
of this meeting have the following entry.
IV.
CHEVRON DECALS ON SAFETY HATS.
To implement N. T. Bogert letter of 8-27-65, Secre-
tary was directed to work with Training Section and
Division Heads to develope plan for use of Chevron
insignia on all safety hats.9
Sheehy testified that he first learned of a possible incident
in_regard to the hardhats on the evening of February 16,
when Jacobs phoned him at home and said that he had
heard a rumor that when Anderson and Cates came to
work, they would be confronted with the instruction, if
they were wearing their hardhats with the union decal.
Sheehy said he told Jacobs he would tell the supervisors
to soft-pedal the situation until they had a chance to work
out compliance with the rule, except if the men took ac-
tion in defiance of the Company. In that event, the Com-
pany would be forced to take disciplinary action against
the men involved.
Sheehy further testified, that on the next morning, he,
Le Duc, and Jacobs met and again discussed the situa-
tion. Jacobs asked what action would be taken if the men
defied the Company's supervisors. Sheehy told him that
if forced the Company would take disciplinary action.
They all agreed to go slow and he told Jacobs he would
pass the word to supervisors to take no aggressive action
in the matter for a time, but Jacobs again asked if the
Company would take action if, the rule was defied.
Sheehy again replied that in that event, the supervisors
would be backed up. Jacobs said that the wearing of the
decal was a matter of pride with some men and if the rule
was enforced too abruptly a "sort of minor rebellion"
might take place which would be embarrassing to both the
Union and the Company. Jacobs did not mention any
union organizing campaign in connection with the decals.
The final agreement of Jacobs, Sheehy, and Le Duc was
that the management officials would pass the word to the
supervisors and foremen to treat the whole situation with
kid gloves and not provoke any incident. Sheehy attended
the morning meeting of supervisors on February 17 and
told them the substance of the union-management un-
derstanding.
Sheehy testified that the Company had two reasons for
desiring the placement of the company hallmark on the
hardhats: (1) The Company wanted its employees readily
identifiable by the hallmark, because there were approxi-
mately 2,000 employees of other companies on the
refinery property and the Company sought to restrict its
employees to their places of work and restrict the em-
ployees of the other companies from wandering around
the refinery, in places where they had no business. Also,
(2) the Company had its own trained firefighting force
who could tell from the insignia on each man's hat, which
one was capable of rendering assistance in, for example,
the chemical or lube plant, and which men would know
where and how to turn off or turn on certain valves, for
gases, oils, gasolines, etc. Each of the employees was a
specialist to some extent in his department. In an emer-
gency the trained firefighters knew who was capable of
performing certain tasks. Sheehy said the Company felt
that unauthorized decorations cut down the visibility of
the Company's distinctive identifying markings.
Sheehy testified flatly that during conversations with
union representatives regarding the hardhats that no one
claimed or said that the Union was engaged in an organiz-
ing campaign, and therefore did not want to remove the
decals for that reason.
W. A. Cannon testified that he holds the position of
senior employee relations representative at the refinery
and he is assistant to the personnel manager, which gives
him general responsibility in all the company-employee
labor relations activities. Among his duties is the in-
vestigation and adjustment of grievances with union and
company personnel. Cannon identified an exhibit which
shows a picture of the refinery and explained its operation
in general. He stated that this document was prepared for
presentation to visitors to the refinery such as school chil-
dren, service clubs, and interested groups. From the
document Cannon identified the mass areas in which
hardhats were required to be worn by the rules of the
Company. He also explained many of the safety features
and protective gear furnished to the employees who did
particular jobs such as safety glasses, safety clothing, par-
ticular clothing which was nonconductive of electricity,
etc.
Cannon stated that in addition to the Union the Com-
pany had at the refinery seven other unions with whom it
had labor relations. He corroborated the testimony of
Sheehy as to the working of the safety system and he out-
lined at great length the different markings for each type
of employee in the plant; these have been set forth previ-
ously under the heading "Undisputed Facts." He ex-
plained that visual identification of certain employees is
needed in case of emergency, such as riggers who work in
crews and are especially trained to handle large pieces of
equipment. As another example of specialists and their
designation
he
explained
that
the
"yellow
cap"
designated those employees who were exposed to, and
experienced in, the handling of corrosive chemicals and
acids.
Cannon testified that the only sure way the Company
had of identifying an employee was by the hallmark on
the front of his hat and the departmental markings on the
side. Cannon also explained that there was one hardhat in
the refinery which was unique which was called the "gold
hat." Each week this hat was assigned to a qualified
craftsman who spent the next 2 weeks as a safety inspec-
tor traveling any place in the refinery to inspect the possi-
bilities of fire, accident, or other emergency. This hat is
marked "safety inspector" and by virtue of the hat the
employee had access to any place in the refinery. When
he finished his tour of inspection he furnished an overall
report on his findings to the safety authorities of the Com-
pany.
Cannon testified that most of the union stewards of the
various unions wore steward buttons. In some of the par-
ticular crafts the employees wore a button which in-
dicated that their payment of dues was current. He had
seen decals of both the Machinists Union and the Union
N This letter is Resp Exh 5
' This minute is Resp Exh 4
160
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on lunch buckets, the windshield of automobiles, brief-
cases, etc. He had observed the 8-1/2 inch sunburst
bowling type of union insignia worn by various members
of the Union in various places in the refinery.
Cannon testified that he is the person who investigates
violations of company rules which involve the members
of the various unions, and in his experience no one had
ever been told to remove any of these insignia, except the
union insignia on the hardhats only. In his experience he
had dealt with violations of the rule against having
unauthorized material on hardhats. The most prevelant
violation was one involving pornographic or distasteful or
vulgar decorations. There had been several of these, the
naked woman type of thing, which the Company asked
the men to remove because many of the visitors to the
refinery were school children on educational tours or
women from community groups.
Cannon also stated that on an occasion in 1959 and
1960, the Company had been forced to take action
against some employees, because rank-and-file em-
ployees had painted their hats the colors of supervisory
employees which confused many persons. To correct
these violations the hats which the employees had painted
were exchanged for new hats with the proper markings.
Cannon corroborated the testimony of Sheehy that the
program for putting the Chevron hallmark on the front of
the safety hats originated because of the letter of Bogert.
The safety committee sought to insure uniformity of the
placement of the decal by ordering that it be on the front
of the hat and that the other identifying marks be on the
side and Instruction 314 was changed to accomplish this
program. Cannon identified two typical hardhats, one
which was exchanged by W. F. Anderson, president of
the Union, and a second one by an unidentified person.
On cross-examination, Cannon admitted readily that he
knew how many persons in each union had signed
checkoff authorizations because these documents were
kept in his department. He said the only way he knew
who was a union member was by the checkoff authoriza-
tion cards which were kept on file in his office. He readily
admitted that he was aware that from August of 1965 to
February 1966 that the Union had increased the number
of employees who were on checkoff. He said that he was
not aware of any particular organizing campaign put on
by the Union. He explained that the unions were always
trying to recruit new employees as they came on the job
and those employees were working but had not yet joined
the Union. He said that these efforts were common to all
the unions. Cannon was asked if he could produce the or-
ders for the placement of the order for the company de-
cals. He said that he could, and it was produced, but the
General Counsel did not choose to put it in evidence.
The above narrative of testimony is not designed to be
an exhaustive treatise; it is merely a summary of the
highlights of the testimony and documentary evidence
presented by counsel for the parties. All testimony and all
documents presented have been considered by me in
making my concluding findings. Because some facet of
the case has not been mentioned in this summary does not
mean that it has not been carefully considered.
Concluding Findings
There is a minimum of conflict in the testimony of the
sets of witnesses presented by the General Counsel and
the Respondent. I credit fully General Manager Sheehy
and Senior Labor Relations Representative Cannon.
Both of these men testified in a forthright and candid
fashion. In general, I also credit the testimony of the wit-
nesses presented by the General Counsel such as Jacobs,
Cates, Anderson, and Home, except on two features of
their testimony. They were all fair and precise in their
testimony as to the various meetings of management and
union representatives prior to the suspension of Cates
and Anderson. However, when Jacobs testified as to the
importance of the alleged union organizing campaign, his
testimony became very general, unspecific, and unper-
suasive. Some of the other employee-witnesses, notably
Horne, tried to explain why it was impossible for them to
be informed of Instruction 314, but at that point the
testimony also lost much of its reliability. It appeared
patent to me that the witnesses were consciously trying
to inflate the routine conduct of union officials in trying to
recruit members into the Union into some kind of special,
large-scale organizing campaign. The testimony falls
short of the mark. In his testimony, W. A. Cannon stated
that the unions were routinely engaged in a continuous ef-
fort to sign up new employees and to sign up those who
were employed but who had not yet joined the Union. In
his testimony Horne also admitted that the campaign to
enlist members was a continuous effort. This effort on the
part of the General Counsel's witnesses to build the rou-
tine conduct of the Union into a "campaign" is clearly
exposed by the undisputed fact that in all the meetings
and discussions, which occurred between representatives
of management and the important officers of the Union,
not one union representative claimed at any conference,
that the Union did not want to remove the decals from the
safety hats because the Union was engaged in an organiz-
ing campaign. The union representatives asserted in these
conferences that the men "had pride in the Union em-
blem," did not want to deface the emblem by "scraping"
it off the hats, and that the union members wished to
identify their fellow workers, both union and nonunion.
But, no representative ever claimed that the Union had an
organizational campaign in progress at that time, which
would be adversely affected by taking off the union de-
cals. From all the evidence, I conclude that the "Union
campaign" was more fancied then real and was an af-
terthought seized upon as a justification for refusing the
Company's reasonable request to remove the decals.
Some of the General Counsel's witnesses were guilty
of some slanting of their testimony in regard to the fact
that they knew there was a company rule which forbade
unauthorized adornment of the hardhats. One witness
stated that the rule was lost in the operating manual of the
refinery and compared it with trying to find a specific
passage in the Bible. In most large organizations, whether
they be governmental, industrial, or mercantile, there is
a set of written rules for the guidance of supervisors and
employees which is usually called operating instructions,
or employees' manual , and one of the hackneyed expres-
sions used to designate this volume is "the Bible." Em-
ployees are told usually that, "this is the Bible for their in-
structions," and usually they are volumes of many pages,
but employees either immediately or in the course of time
learn those portions of the manual, which affect their jobs
such as standing orders, or daily routine procedures, and
they learn to refer to the "Bible" on questions which are
unusual. Some of the employees readily admitted a
general knowledge of the instructions governing hardhats
even if they were not acquainted with specific details of
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA
161
the rule. From all the evidence I must conclude that they
all knew, at least in a general way, that the safety hat was
not to be covered with unauthorized decorations. Except
on these two points, I deem the testimony of the em-
ployees reliable and I credit it.
With the conflicts of testimony resolved as stated
above, we may turn our attention to the main question
presented by the case. The General Counsel in his brief
places heavy reliance on a line of cases10 which seem to
hold that the wearing of union insignia at work is an un-
conditional and absolute right of an employee under Sec-
tion 7.
Counsel for the Respondent places his reliance in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
N.L.R.B. v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 179, which
states a modification of the older cases. In Harrah's Club,
supra, the Ninth Circuit wrote as follows:
The Supreme Court has held that the wearing of
union buttons comes under the heading of "other
concerted activities." However, we do not think that
the Supreme Court intended to erect this into a rule
which makes the wearing of union buttons per se a
guaranteed right. We think there must be evidence of
a purpose protected by the act-i.e., collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.
. The
Board has cited several cases to show that the wear-
ing of union buttons is a right guaranteed by the sec-
tion 7, but it has cited no case where there was not at
least some evidence of a purpose which it is the pol-
icy of the act to protect. [Emphasis supplied.]
At a later point in the decision the court pointed out
that the record failed to show that the wearing of union
buttons by the employees was part ofany concerted cam-
paign to organize the employees , to promote collective
bargaining , or to gain better hours, wages, or working
conditions .
I find that the same is true here . The em-
ployees at Harrah 's Club in the prior case , as the em-
ployees here, were already organized, the Employer and
the Union for many years had maintained collective-bar-
gaining agreements and there appears to have been no in-
harmonious relations between the parties at the time that
this controversy first arose . Furthermore , there is no
evidence in this case that the wearing of the decals on the
safety hats was in any way directly connected with the
Union's routine procedure of trying to sign up new em-
ployees and former employees . Thus the evidence is void
of any connection between the display of union decals on
the safety hats and the Union 's routine procedures to en-
list members , or any other purpose protected by Section
7 of the Act. As previously mentioned , none of the union
officers who were called by the General Counsel testified
that the display of the decals had anything to do with the
Union's organizing efforts and none of them mentioned
the Union's organizing efforts as a reason for their
reluctance to remove the decals . Therefore , upon the
authority of the court's decision in Harrah's Club, supra,
I find that the General Counsel has failed to establish that
the display of the union decals was for a purpose pro-
tected by Section 7 and that therefore the Company vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by its prohibition against the
display of the decals on the employees ' safety hats.
Furthermore , as the entire evidence is considered, the
unrealities and the impracticalities of the General Coun-
sel's contention come clearly into focus. Here, there is
abundant proof that the rule prohibiting the wearing of the
union decals on the hardhats had no effect of interfering
with or restraining the employees in the exercise of their
statutory right to organize. Here the Company prohibited
the wearing of the union decals in only one place - on the
Company's safety hats. The witnesses presented by the
General Counsel all testified that members of the Union
displayed the union decal in the refinery on their lunch
buckets, briefcases, pencils, and automobile windshields.
Also, the union stewards wore their customary union
stewards' buttons or badges. In addition, many of the
union members wore the 8-1/2 inch diameter cloth em-
blem on the back of their shirts or coveralls. This is a
large brightly colored seal of the Union, which is com-
monly referred to as a "sunburst" emblem, which is about
the size which baseball players wear on their shirts, and
which can be recognized at a considerable distance. All
the officers of the Union who testified admitted that com-
pany officials never forbade them to wear these insignia.
With the Company permitting all of these various sizes
and kinds of insignia to be worn , it cannot be maintained
that the Company's rule prohibiting the wearing of decals
on the safety hat deprived the employees of the right to
identify themselves with the Union for purposes of or-
ganizing other employees. Here, the Company's rule
limiting the decoration of its safety hats only distinguishes
this case from some cases in which the employer imposed
a severe limitation on the size or number of union insignia
which employees could wear." Certainly, the rule in this
case did not restrain or interfere with any employee's
right to show his allegiance to other employees under
Section 7 of the Act.
Consideration of all the evidence also establishes that
the Company had well-founded and legitimate business
reasons for the prohibition of the decals on the safety
hats. The United States Supreme Court in Republic A via-
tion Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 797-798
(1945), stated that it was the task of the Board to work
out a balance of conflicting rights under Section 8(a)(1)
and the rights of employers to manage their businesses
efficiently and safely, and find:
... an adjustment between the undisputed right of
self-organization assured to employees under the
Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of em-
ployers to maintain discipline in their establishments.
Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited
in the sense that they can be exercised without re-
gard to any duty which the existence of rights in
others may place upon employer or employee.
Also, in Fabri-tek, Inc. (supra), the Board stated that
in
determining
whether an employer has lawfully
restricted the wearing of union buttons, "what is basically
involved in each case arising in this area is the necessity
of striking a proper adjustment between conflicting rights
against the background of particular fact situations."
Here the rights which must be balanced are the un-
disputed right of employees to identify themselves as
union members for the purpose of organizing their fellow
10 Republic Aviation Corporation v
N L R.B , 324 U.S 793 (1945),
Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc, 137 NLRB 1484, enfd. 318 F.2d 545
(C A 5, 1963), Harrah's Club, 143 NLRB 1356; Webb Furniture Cor-
poration, 158 NLRB 102, Serv-Air, Inc, 161 NLRB 382
11 Fabri-tek, Incorporated, 148 NLRB 1623 , enforcement denied 352
F 2d 577 (C A 8, 1965), Serv-Air, Inc, 161 NLRB 382
162
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees and the equally undisputed right of the Com-
pany to control its property and to maintain an effective
spot identification system in the interest of the safety of
all employees, the preservation of the Company's proper-
ty, and the safety of the community in which the refinery
is located. Here the rights of many persons are involved
because of the serious danger which attends all such
highly volatile manufacturing operations at this refinery.
The safe management of such a large operation is a heavy
responsibility on the Company which it may not shirk. As
the court said in Harrah's Club, supra, in regard to a
similar decision of management:
This is a valid exercise of business judgment, and it
is not the province of the Board or of this court to
substitute its judgment for that of management so
long as the exercise is reasonable and does not inter-
fere with a protected purpose.
It appears from a consideration of all the evidence that
the General Counsel has failed to prove that the Com-
pany's rule banning all unauthorized decoration of hard-
hats was discriminatorily motivated to discourage union
membership or the enlistment of members into the Union.
In cases such as this the crux of the situation is the "true
purpose or real motive" of the employer. In N.L.R.B. v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287-288, the Court stated that,
where as here, "the tendency to discourage union mem-
bership is comparatively slight, and the employer's con-
duct is reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate business
ends or to deal with business exigencies, we enter into an
area where the improper motivation of the employers
must be established by independent evidence." In this
case the General Counsel asks that an improper motive
on the part of the Company or union animus be concluded
from knowledge attributed to the Company, which was
not established at the hearing. It is true that the Union
gained some additional checkoff authorizations about this
time and that the 30-day escape period in the labor-
management agreement between the parties became ef-
fective on approximately February 15, but these circum-
stances are a flimsy foundation to support a finding that
the Company was motivated by union animus or acted
because it faced the Union's growing strength. In view of
the number of employees in the unit, approximately
1,500, an increase of 15-18 checkoff authorizations must
be considered negligible. In this connection it must be re-
membered that in this entire record there is not one iota
of evidence that any company official, supervisor, or
representative made one statement which was disparag-
ing or critical of the Union, its officers, or its members.
In the light of all the evidence in this case, improper or
unlawful motivation of the Company simply cannot be
found.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
For the reasons stated, I find that the Company's con-
duct in maintaining the prohibition against unauthorized
adornment of the safety hats is not a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and the Company's conduct in
suspending Willie F. Anderson and Danny Cates is not a
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Therefore, I find
that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the Company has committed
the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. The
complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety.