United Buckingham Freight Lines

684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD United Buckingham Freight Lines and General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America. Case 18-CA-2315 December 5, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND ZAGORIA On July 21, 1967, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mul- lin issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner only to the extent con- sistent herewith. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's grant of certain benefits was not violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. There is no exception to these findings. The Trial Ex- aminer also found, and it is undisputed, that the Union represented a majority in an appropriate unit of the Respondent's clerical employees. Finally, the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent refused to bargain with the Union as the representative of these employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Respondent excepts to this finding. For the reasons set forth below, we find merit in these exceptions. The relevant facts are for the most part not in dispute. They show that the Respondent is a com- mon carrier engaged in the transportation of freight throughout the United States. Its general adminis- trative office is in Spokane, Washington, but the of- fice clerical employees here involved are located at the Respondent's systemwide and terminal opera- tions offices in Rapid City, South Dakota. The Union has been the contractual representative of the Respondent's over-the-road drivers for a number of years, and meets with the Respondent at regional and area conferences as such representa- tive. In July 1966 the Union notified the Respondent's Spokane office and its labor relations adviser in Chicago, John Bridge, that it was seeking recogni- tion as the representative of the clerical employees in the Rapid City offices. In a letter of July 29 Bridge acknowledged this request and noted that the Respondent would be required to negotiate a contract if Board certification was obtained. Thereafter, at several regional and area meetings at which the Union discussed with motor carriers covered by its contract, including the Respondent, matters regarding other employee units, the Union also raised with the Respondent the question of recognition of the Union as the representative of the Rapid City clerical unit, and proposed a card check to resolve the question of majority status. Although the Respondent indicated its willingness to have a card check, no definite agreement was reached at these meetings. In a letter dated August 10, Weber, the union business representative, again urged Bridge to agree to a card check to determine the Union's represen- tation of the Rapid City clerical employees. On Au- gust 29, Weber held a telephone conversation with Bridge and, in a follow-up letter of the same date, indicated that there would be discussions of a con- tract for these clerical employees at a meeting per- taining to other unit employees scheduled to be held in Chicago. In his reply letter to Weber, dated Sep- tember 2, Bridge agreed to discuss the matter, "subject, of course, to evidence by you indicating that you have sufficient cards signed to authorize such representation." On September 20 and 21, during a quarterly con- ference between the Union and various motor car- riers in Chicago, the Union and the Respondent again discussed representation for the Rapid City clerical employees. In one such meeting Weber of- fered a number of cards for examination, but Hen- ry, the Respondent's vice president, refused to in- spect them because he had no payroll list against which the cards could be checked. In a later discus- sion, Weber admitted to an associate of Bridge that he did not know whether or not some of the cards offered to show a majority in the Rapid City clerical unit had been signed by watchmen, janitors, and other employees who normally would be excluded from such a unit. Finally, on September 21, Bridge agreed to recommend to the Respondent that it start negotiations if the Union's cards showed a majority in the unit, and promised to get in touch with the Union to schedule such a meeting. Bridge notified one of his assistants to arrange such a meeting. Ap- parently satisfied that such arrangements had been made, the Respondent's representatives on Sep- tember 22 went to the hotel room where the parties 168 NLRB No. 90 UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 685 had been regularly conferring, but the union representatives had left Chicago, apparently unaware that the meeting had been scheduled for that time and place. The Trial Examiner attributes the collapse of this meeting to a "breakdown of communications." In early October, the Union telephoned Bridge, requested to meet and negotiate a contract, and was assured by Bridge that the Respondent would be in- formed and a meeting arranged. On October 19 Bridge informed the Union that the Respondent wanted the question of representation resolved by an election. The Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Respondent refused to bargain in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act is based in part on his finding that there was a delay of many weeks during which the Union was seeking recognition. The record clearly shows, however, that this delay was ascriba- ble in large part to the Union's practice of raising the subject of recognition for the Rapid City clerical employees while the parties were meeting in other cities for other purposes, and when pertinent em- ployee lists were not available. The Trial Examiner further holds that the Respondent at no time expressed any doubt as to the Union's majority in the unit here involved. It is apparent, however, from the entire record, that the Respondent at all times conditioned recognition on the Union's showing of its representative status by cards or, finally, by an election.' The Trial Examiner's Decision also points to the fact that the union representatives failed to appear at the meeting on September 22 because of a misun- derstanding, and that, when the card check was not accomplished on that date through no fault of the Union, the Respondent "thereafter failed to take the initiative to set another time and place for such a meeting ...." There is no evidence, however, and the Trial Examiner does not find, that the mis- understanding as to the meeting was the fault of the Respondent. Under the circumstances, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner that the burden was necessarily on the Respondent to seek another meeting. Although the Union knew that Bridge wanted, and had agreed to, a card check, it took no steps after September 22 to arrange for another meeting for a card check, but, instead, demanded a meeting for the purpose of contract negotiations. Finally, the Trial Examiner, on the basis of his findings that the Respondent, on September 21, agreed to a card check, and on October 19, repu- diated this agreement and demanded an election, concludes that "the Respondent's conduct sub- sequent to September 21, 19,66, constituted a refusal to bargain with the Union after the majority status of the latter in an appropriate unit had been established." The cases2 which the Trial Examiner cites are clearly distinguishable, however, as card checks had actually been made in those cases establishing that the unions were the majority representatives, and the employers thereafter repu- diated the results of the card checks. In the present case, on the other hand, a card check was never made, the Union's majority status was never in fact demonstrated to the Respondent, and the record does not show that the failure to do so was at- tributable to a rejection by the Respondent of the collective-bargaining principle or a desire to gain time to undermine the Union's representative status. 3 On the basis of the foregoing considerations, par- ticularly the fact that the Respondent has main- tained a contractual bargaining relationship with the Union for a number of years on behalf of other em- ployees; the Respondent has continually indicated its willingness to recognize the Union as the representative of a unit of Rapid City clerical em- ployees after its majority status was demonstrated; the Union never in fact did demonstrate to the Respondent its representative status; the Union's demands for recognition were generally made at other locations than the one involved; as the Union had conceded, some of its cards might have been signed by employees not includable in the unit; and there is a complete absence of other unfair labor practices by the Respondent, we conclude that the General Counsel has failed to establish that the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union and its insistence on a Board election were motivated by bad faith.4 Accordingly, we find that the Respond- ent has committed no violations of the Act, and we shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. i The Respondent , in its brief, explains its shift from a demand for a card check to one for an election on the ground that the Union had shifted its position of seeking an opportunity to demonstrate its majority status to demanding negotiations. 2 Snow & Sons, 134 N LRB 709, enfd. 308 F.2d 687 (C.A 9); Jem Mfg. Inc., 156 NLRB 643; Kellogg's Mills, 147 NLRB 342, enfd. 347 F.2d 219 (C. A. 9). 3 John P. Serpa, 155 NLRB 99, reversed and remanded sub. nom. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179 v N.L R.B., 376 F.2d 186 (C.A. 9), con- clusions of court adopted on remand, John P Serpa, Inc., 166 NLRB 336 The Trial Examiner's Decision refers to this case but holds it to be distinguishable because the Respondent initially agreed to a card check and subsequently repudiated this agreement We find, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above, that Serpa is clearly applica- ble. See also Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert, denied 341 U.S. 914; Aaron Brothers of California, 158 NLRB 1077 4 While an employer's right to a Board election is not absolute, it has long been established Board policy that an employer may refuse to bargain and insist upon an election as proof of a union's majority unless its refusal and insistence were not made with a good -faith doubt of the union's majority. Aaron Brothers of California, supra. 686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT E. MULLIN, Trial Examiner: This case was heard in Rapid City, South Dakota, on April 11, 1967, pursuant to charges duly filed and served at various times in 1966,1 and a complaint issued on December 19, 1966. The complaint, as amended at the outset of the hearing, presents questions as to whether the Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Charging Union (herein called Teamsters, or Union), and whether it engaged in various other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended. In its answer, the Respondent conceded certain facts as to its business operations, but it denied all allegations that it had committed any unfair labor practices. All parties appeared at the hearing, with counsel, and were given full opportunity to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses , to introduce relevant evidence , to argue orally at the close of the hearing, and to file briefs. The parties waived oral argument. At the conclusion of the hearing, a motion to dismiss the complaint, made by the Respondent, was taken under advisement by the Trial Examiner. It is disposed of as appears hereinafter in this Decision. On May 31, 1967, the General Counsel and the Respondent submitted thorough and comprehensive briefs on the issues. Upon the entire record in the case, including the briefs of counsel, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a common carrier engaged in the transportation of freight throughout the United States, has its general administrative office in Spokane , Washing- ton. During a representative 12-month period it had gross revenues in excess of $50 ,000 derived from the transpor- tation of goods between various States of the United States. Only the employees in its systemwide and ter- minal operations located at Rapid City, South Dakota, are involved in the present proceeding. Upon the foregoing facts, the Respondent concedes, and the Trial Examiner finds, that United Buckingham Freight Lines is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent concedes, and the Trial Examiner finds, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction For a number of years the Respondent's drivers have been represented by the Teamsters. In the spring of 1966, the Union initiated an organizational campaign among the clericals employed at the Respondent's offices in Rapid City, South Dakota. In the latter part of July, it requested recognition as the bargaining agent for a unit of office clericals. Thereafter, the parties met several times to discuss this request and engaged in an exchange of letters and telephone calls on the question. On October 19, 1966, the Respondent informed the Union that it would insist on an election before according recognition. The General Counsel and the Union contend that the Respond- ent's course of conduct constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain. They further contend that a wage increase granted in the latter part of June 1966, and a dental in- surance plan announced to the employees in September of that year constituted further violations of the Act. All of these allegations are denied in their entirety by the Respondent. B. The Appropriate Unit The General Counsel contends that all of the Respond- ent's office clerical employees in its systemwide and ter- minal operations at Rapid City constitute an appropriate unit. In its answer, the Respondent entered a general denial as to this allegation. At the hearing, however, it of- fered no evidence to demonstrate that the above- described unit was inappropriate. Nor did it make any ar- gument to this effect either at the hearing or in its brief. In the latter, the Respondent contended that certain in- dividuals should properly be included within the forego- ing unit and it also conceded that two other individuals, as temporary employees, should be excluded. At no time in its brief, however, did the Respondent attack the ap- propriateness of the unit described in the complaint. Under these circumstances, and in view of prior Board holdings, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that all office clericals in the Respondent's systemwide and ter- minal operations at Rapid City, excluding all other em- ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within' the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Santa -Fe Trail Transportation Company, 119 NLRB 1302. In their briefs, both the General Counsel and the Respondent are in agreement that there were 84 em- ployees in the unit during the week ending July 30, 1966. Although an issue in this case is the precise date on which the Union initially requested recognition, in a letter dated July 29, 1966, the Respondent acknowledged receipt of a demand for recognition by the Union as bargaining agent for the office workers at Rapid City. For that reason, for present purposes, and as counsel obviously assumed in their briefs, the critical period with respect to the issue of majority in an appropriate unit is the week of July 24 to 30, 1966. By stipulation of the parties, a payroll listing the office workers for the week in question was received in evidence. This had 85 names. Included on this list were Cheryl Agostino and Sheryl Schneider. The General Counsel contends that both were temporary employees, hired only for the summer months. In its brief, the Respondent concedes that this is correct and that both of these individuals should be excluded. In view of the foregoing facts, neither Cheryl Agostino nor Sheryl Schneider will be counted as members of the unit. ' The Union filed the onginal charge on October 25 , and an amended charge on November 1 UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 687 Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 NLRB 611, 612; Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation, 118 NLRB 454, 455. The General Counsel contends that Jean Miller should be included in the unit. Miller was an employee who was hired in 1965. On June 27, 1966, she became ill and was hospitalized for some time, eventually returning to work on September 27, 1966. Her name does not appear on the payroll list for the week in question. In its brief, the Respondent contends that Miller should not be included within the unit because she was on leave of absence throughout July. The Respondent further contends that it is not customary to hold an employee's job open while she is on sick leave and that upon her recovery she is rehired only if a position is available at that time. It was conceded by Donald Agostino, secretary-treasurer of the Company, that no termination notice was ever sent to Miller and that during her absence she drew all the hospitalization and sick benefits to which she was enti- tled. Under these circumstances, and in view of the foregoing facts, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that at the time in question Jean Miller was on a leave of absence due to illness and that she should be considered a member of the unit during the week ending July 30. At the hearing, the General Counsel endeavored to establish that William J. Aberle, another individual on the payroll, had a supervisory status. The Respondent con- tends that Aberle did not become a supervisor until Au- gust 15 and that prior thereto he was no more than a rank- and-file employee. In his brief, the General Counsel makes no reference to Aberle and appears to have aban- doned his contention, made at the hearing, that Aberle was an acting supervisor for some while prior to his promotion. In any event, on the record evidence as to Aberle's duties, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the Respondent is correct and that Aberle's name should be included with the other employees in the ap- propriate unit during the week ending July 30. Leona Tomassi is the secretary to Donald Agostino. In one of the exhibits received in evidence, she is listed as a confidential secretary. At the hearing, however, Agostino testified that he did not consider her duties of a con- fidential nature, as that term is generally used, and that he felt that she should be included within the unit. Since, from his testimony, it is apparent that this individual per- forms work of a routine secretarial character, it is my con- clusion that Leona Tomassi should be included within the unit. With the addition of the name of Jean Miller and the deletion of the names of Cheryl Agostino and Sheryl Schneider, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that there were 84 employees within the appropriate unit for the week of July 24 to 30,1966.2 C. The Union's Organizational Campaign and the Majority Issue. Early in June 1966,3 Jean M. Miller, coding clerk in the rate audit department, contacted Clem Weber, business representative for the Teamsters, and asked his assist- ance in organizing the office clericals at the Respond- ent's systemwide headquarters and terminal in Rapid City. Thereafter, Weber supplied Miller with authoriza- tion cards which she solicited her coworkers to sign. Later, Donald E. Barbour and Shirley Ann Soucy, two of her associates , joined in the campaign to organize the clerical employees for the Union. On June 23, Business Agent Weber held a meeting at the union hall for the Respondent's employees and during the course of this meeting he endeavored to secure their support by telling those present that if enough of the employees signed authorization cards the Company would have to negotiate with the Teamsters immediately and no election would be necessary. The General Counsel offered in evidence the authorization cards of 47 individuals who were employed within the appropriate unit during the week of July 24 to 30, 1966.4 All of these cards were dated from June 8 to July 22. The authorizations were in the conventional form. The Respondent does not question the authenticity of the signatures on 29 of these cards which were identified at the hearing by the one who witnessed the signing of the card, or, in a few instances by the signator herself. These were the cards of: Marie Brauer, Sandra K Cox, Norma Freeman, Gladys Hagemann, Kathleen Hatcher, Dorothy Huff, Erma Kulhavy, Jean Mc- Dermond, Edna Meyer, Jean M. Miller,5 Katherine Parks, Beulah Roth, Jo Ann Holcomb, Frances M. Malimanek, Dorothy Owens, Phillip Roth, Jr., Donald E. Barbour, Marilyn M. Carlson, Anita B. Gorsuch, Terry Hamaker, Noel C. Kingsbury, Rose J. Schlaffman, Betty M. Sewell, John Hatzenbuhler, Sally Huber, Shirley A. Soucy, Joyce E. Anderson, Charlene J. Kelly, and George Whitaker. The Respondent objects to the remaining 18 cards which were received in evidence on the ground that no proper foundation was laid for their introduction. These were cards which were received after testimony was of- fered as to the circumstances under which the employee received the card and thereafter returned it to the solici- tor. In each instance, however, the solicitor did not ac- tually see the employee sign the card. Thus, Miller testified that after she had given authorization cards to the below-named employees, the individual returned the card to her shortly thereafter, completely filled out and signed: Marshall Brownlee, Bernice Clawson, Betty Lou Gasseling, Janice Karlson, Rawleigh G. Mardis, Dale R. Paulson, Diann H. Stanley, Gordon K. Stanley,6 Roxy Ann Stevens, and Leona Tomassi. Similarly, Donald E. Barbour testified that cards which he had given to the fol- lowing named employees were returned by the individual soon thereafter, or the next day, completed and bearing the employee's signature: Dale J. Anderson, Odean Deutsch, Gary B. Ferguson, Tyler C. Hooker, Vivian M. Larsen, Esther E. McNabb, Betty Taylor, and Lanny J. Tennyson. The Respondent contends that these 18 cards should s The names of these employees appear in the attached Appendix A. All events here involved occurred in 1966 unless otherwise specifi- cally noted. ' Two other authorization cards, those of Patricia Maslack and Jean Trople, were rejected after the General Counsel conceded at the hearing that both Maslack and Trople had left the Respondent's employ prior to the week in question. The card of a third employee, that of Reymond T. Kinstad, was also rejected after the General Counsel conceded that this individual was a janitor and, therefore, not eligible for inclusion within the unit. 5 The Respondent's sole objection to the inclusion of Miller's card has been discussed earlier. Respondent had no objection to the authenticity of the signature on Miller's card since this employee appeared as a witness at the hearing. 6 Miller testified that in the case of Gordon and Diann Stanley , husband and wife, respectively, Mrs. Stanley returned both her own and her husband's card shortly after Miller had given them the cards. 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not be counted on the ground that they had not been properly authenticated. In its brief it cites Colson Cor- poration v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 128, 134 (C.A. 8), for the proposition than an authorization card should not be received in evidence unless a witness at the hearing is able to testify that he observed the execution of the card. However, an examination of both the opinion of the court in Colson and the Board decision in that case which the court enforced (148 NLRB 827, 840, fn. 5) does not sup- port the narrow construction of the court's opinion which the Respondent would place upon it. In any event, there is authority, more directly in point, which holds that the foundation offered for the introduction of the 18 cards in question was sufficient here. Thus, in N.L.R.B. v. Howell Chevrolet Company, 204 F.2d 79 (C.A. 9), affirmed 346 U.S. 482, the court held that a card was properly received where the signer handed the card to a fellow worker after its execution and at the hearing only the latter employee testified. The court there stated "no matter who wrote . [his] name on the card ... [he] clearly adopted it as his own signature." (Ibid, p. 86.) Moreover, the Board has held that the act of giving a signed card to an appropriate person is sufficient to per- mit the introduction of the card as evidence of the em- ployee's desire to have the union represent him. Don The Beachcomber, 163 NLRB 275 fn. 2 (petition to review pending in Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit); Dolores, Inc., 98 NLRB 550, 554. Finally, and of equal sig- nificance here, it has been held that authorization cards were properly received in evidence when the witness on the stand concededly had not been present at their execu- tion, but had received them through the mail and it was established that at the time there were corresponding names on the employer's payroll. N.L.R.B. v. Hunter En- gineering Company, 215 F.2d 916, 922, 923 (C.A. 8). In view of the foregoing authority, and the facts present here, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the 18 cards received in evidence upon the testimony of Miller and Barbour must be counted along with the other 29 as to which there was no dispute. The Union, therefore, had authorization cards from 47 of the 84 employees in the appropriate unit during the last week of July when it first sought recognition from the Respondent. With cards from approximately 56 percent of the employees in the unit, the Union plainly had a majority. was the statement of counsel for the Respondent, made at the hearing, that a diligent search of the files in the cor- porate headquarters had failed to locate the original of the letter to Manlowe. According to John Bridge, labor rela- tions advisor for the Respondent, during the week prior to July 29 he had telephone conversations with either Clem Weber or Jack Mcllvenna, both business agents for the Union, in which recognition for Local 749 was discussed. Bridge testified that thereafter he wrote the letter of July 29 to Weber. This read as follows: July 29, 1966 Mr. Clem Weber Local 749 Box 1533 Rapid City, South Dakota Dear Clem: We recognize the fact that United Buckingham office workers at the general office in Rapid City may exer- cise their right to become members of the union and that you have the right to represent them if you are the union of their choice. Further if NLRB certifica- tion is obtained the company will be required to negotiate a contract arrived at through free and col- lective bargaining. You must be aware that the company presently has a new terminal and general office quarters that have been under construction for the past year in Spokane which they expect to be ready for occupancy by this October. Also, in the negotiation of any office worker contracts we have always reserved the right to include a provision providing for the centralization of any accounting and general office administration that is more efficiently handled from such location. We wish to point out that these conditions have ex- isted and have been a matter of record for the past two years. Therefore, any future office workers con- tract which could be negotiated would specifically in- corporate an article which would preserve com- pany's rights as outlined herein. D. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain There was no dispute that at some time during the latter part of July 1966 the Union sought recognition from the Respondent as the bargaining agent for a unit composed of the clericals at the Rapid City office and terminal. By letter dated July 29, the Respondent acknowledged that a demand for recognition on behalf of such a unit had been made and that if the Union represented a majority of the office clericals the Company would be required to negotiate a contract. On the other hand, neither the General Counsel nor the Union ever established precise- ly when it was, prior to July 29, that the Union first made such a demand for recognition. Business Representative Weber testified that during "the last part of July" he mailed a request for recognition letter to John Manlowe, president of the Respondent, at the corporate headquarters in Spokane, Washington. Weber was completely credible in his testimony in this re- gard. However, he was unable to produce a carbon copy of the letter about which he testified. Equally credible Yours truly, MOTOR CARRIER LABOR ADV ISORY COUNCIL JOHN BRIDGE, Execu- tive Chairman JB: John Manlowe Don Manlowe H. Buckingham On the basis of the foregoing evidence, most particu- larly the letter to the Union from Bridge, the Trial Ex- aminer concludes and finds that, nothwithstanding the lack of documentation as to the exact date when the UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 689 Union made a demand for recognition, it is clear that such a request was made on behalf of the office clericals at Rapid City and that this demand was made at some point shortly before July 29, the date when the Respondent mailed the foregoing response to the Union's request. During the week of July 24 to 30, as found earlier herein, the Union had a majority within the appropriate unit. On several occasions subsequent to July 29, the union and company representatives discussed recognition and bargaining for the unit here involved. Since the Union had a contract with the Respondent which covered the over- the-road drivers, the parties were accustomed to meeting at various area and regional conferences in connection with grievance matters and other issues arising out of that collective-bargaining relationship. While at two of these meetings the Union pressed its claim for recognition and bargaining as to the proposed unit of office clericals at Rapid City. Thus, on August 4, in Omaha, Nebraska, at a meeting held to consider contractual matters involving other em- ployees, Weber and Mcllvenna met with John Bridge, his son and associate, Frank Bridge, and James Henry, the latter being a vice president of the Company. According to Weber, at this meeting he told the company representa- tives that the Union represented the office workers at Rapid City and that because of a provision in the current contract covering the drivers' any questions as to majori- ty could be solved by a card check rather than by resort to an election. Weber testified that at the close of their discussion of this subject, John Bridge and the other com- pany representatives present told him that they would be involved in a card check on the office worker matter in the near future. At the hearing John Bridge testified that he could not recall any of the discussion on this subject at the Omaha meeting. Frank Bridge did not appear as a wit- ness at the hearing. Henry, who was called to the stand, was not asked any questions about this conference. In a letter dated August 10, addressed to John Bridge and signed by Weber, the latter wrote, in relevant part: Dear John: Thank you for your letter of July 29, 1966 with reference to United Buckingham office employees. I am aware of the issues you point out in your letter regarding the moving of the office elsewhere. I would be willing to negotiate into an agreement, "provisions for centralization of accounting, etc.," similar to all other office contracts now in force and which are a matter of record. In accordance with Article II, Section 111, of the Na- tional Motor Freight Agreement, this Local Union is willing to participate in a card check by a party to be agreed upon. I'm asking if United Buckingham is willing to follow this agreement? I can't emphasize the importance of your answer to this question, of the company agreeing to a card check, too much. I'm sure you are aware of the feel- ing of this Local Union on this matter. On August 29, Weber had a telephone conversation with Frank Bridge. According to the business agent, he and Bridge discussed the delay that he had encountered in getting a date for the card check mentioned in the earli- er correspondence. In a letter of that same date, ad- dressed to John Bridge, Weber referred to this conversa- tion and wrote as follows: Dear John: In reference to the Tele-con on August 29, 1966, re- garding United Buckingham's office employees at Rapid City, South Dakota. It was my understanding from this conversation that we would be discussing a contract for these people in Chicago at the J.A.C. Meeting in the week of September 19th thru Sep- tember 23, 1966. Weber received a reply to this letter dated September 2. It was signed by Frank Bridge, as secretary-treasurer of the Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council, and read as follows: Dear Clem: Thank you for your letter of August 29th. I agree to meet with you to review the possibilities of recognizing Local #749 as the representative bar- gaining agent for the United Buckingham office em- ployees at Rapid City subject, of course, to evidence to be furnished by you indicating that you have suffi- cient cards signed to authorize such representation. During the period from September 20 to 22, 1966, representatives of the Teamsters and the motor carriers met in Chicago at what was known as a Joint Area Com- mittee Meeting. During the course of that week represent- atives of the Union and of the Respondent held several brief conferences to discuss the question of representa- tion of the office clericals in Rapid City. In each of these meetings the Union was represented by Weber and Mcli- venna. The composition of the company delegation varied somewhat, but at one or more of the meetings, John Bridge, Frank Bridge, Gloria Bridge," and Henry were present. The first meeting was held on September 20 when the union representatives met with Frank Bridge and Henry. Weber testified that he opened the discussion at this con- ference by asking Henry when a card check could be ar- ranged, and that Henry answered him with the statement that John Bridge would handle that matter. Weber further testified that Henry then asked whether the Union had a majority and that he answered in the affirmative. Accord- ing to Weber, several times during the course of their meetings that week he invited Henry to sit down with him and examine the cards against a list of employees on the payroll. Henry conceded that there was an exchange of this character and that at a meeting on either September This was a reference to a controversial provision in the National Master Freight Agreement with respect to the manner in which recogm- tion could be secured for units not specifically covered by the terms of that contract ' Gloria Bridge, the wife of Frank Bridge, was also an official of the Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council. 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 21 or 22, Weber held in his hand a collection of cards and suggested that Henry examine them. Henry testified that he told Weber that he wanted to do this, but that he would also want to check the signatures against the list of people actually employed in the unit. According to Henry, Weber then asked him whether he would also want an election and when he (Henry) replied that he would not forego any rights provided by Labor Board procedures, Weber withdrew the cards and concluded the conversa- tion with the statement "You are not going to see them [the cards]." On the morning of September 21, Weber and Mcllven- na held a short discussion with Gloria Bridge as to the composition of the unit involved and whether any of the cards which the Union had were from janitors, watchmen, and others who should be excluded. Accord- ing to Mrs. Bridge, Weber told her that at that time he did not know the answer to her question. Mrs. Bridge further testified that she, in turn, told the union representatives that she would be unable to determine the answer to that question either since at that time she did not have a list ,of the employees in the unit involved.9 The crucial meeting was a luncheon conference held on September 21. In attendance were Weber and Mcllvenna for the Union and John Bridge for the Company. Accord- ing to Weber, early in the meeting he held up the authorization cards which the Union had secured and told Mr. Bridge "Here are the cards." Weber testified that thereafter Mr. Bridge asked him "Clem, do you have a majority?" and when he answered in the affirmative, the latter commented "Clem, you never lied to me," and then stated, "All right, if you have a majority I will recommend to Buckingham to start negotiations with you." Accord- ing to Weber, Mr. Bridge thereupon asked whether he would come to Chicago for the collective-bargaining con- ferences and after he agreed that he would, Bridge promised that he would contact him with respect to the date for such a meeting. John Bridge testified at some length with respect to this meeting. Much of his testimony was in accord with that given by Weber. He stated that during the course of their discussion he told the union representatives that if they had a majority, subject to a check of the cards, he would recommend that the Company waive an election. He also testified, however, that at no time did he agree to negotiate without checking the cards. Gloria Bridge testified that subsequent to the luncheon meeting which John Bridge had with the union represent- atives, the latter instructed her to get in touch with Henry so that she and Henry could meet with Weber and Mcllvenna the next morning to check the union authorization cards against the payroll records. She further testified that, on the morning of September 22, and pursuant to these instructions, she and Henry were prepared for such a metting and stayed in the Respond- ent's conference room for over an hour awaiting the ar- rival of Weber and McIlvenna, but that the latter never came. Weber denied that John Bridge had ever suggested at 9 Weber testified that before leaving Rapid City for Chicago he had asked Leo Orner, comptroller of the Respondent, whether he had for- warded a list of the employees on the payroll to the Company's labor rela- their luncheon conference that he and Mcllvenna meet the following day with Mrs. Bridge and Henry to conduct a card check. Whereas John Bridge testified, credibly, that he suggested that the union representatives should meet with Frank or Gloria Bridge and Henry for the pur- pose of checking the cards,1° he conceded that he could not recall whether the actual arrangements for such a meeting were ever settled during his luncheon with the business agents. Vice President Henry testified that he did not really know whether Weber had ever been notified of the time and place for the meeting which he and Gloria Bridge presumed that the union representa- tives would attend. Similarly, Gloria Bridge conceded that she did not see, or talk with, Weber between the time on September 21 when John Bridge told her that she and Henry should arrange to check cards the following morn- ing. From all of the foregoing and from the general demeanor of the witnesses who testified with respect to the events on September 21 and 22, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that Weber's testimony as to the luncheon meeting was a substantially accurate account of what occurred, except that, contrary to Weber, John Bridge never waived the Respondent's right to have a card check before the start of negotiations. On the other hand, it is obvious that there was a misunderstanding as to the time when such a card check would be had. From the testimony of both John Bridge and Mcllvenna it is clear that he suggested that a meeting with Gloria Bridge and Henry be held. However, there is no evidence that John Bridge asked the union representatives that they at- tend such a meeting the following morning. John Bridge apparently did tell Gloria Bridge that such a meeting was to be held and she, in turn, arranged to have Henry in at- tendance. However, neither Gloria Bridge nor Henry saw the union representatives during the course of the follow- ing hours of that day and no attempt was made to contact them by telephone to confirm the arrangements. From all of this, it is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the nonappearance of the union representatives at the con- ference proposed for the morning of September 22 arose from a breakdown of communications for which the Union was not at fault. In fact, on the morning of September 22, both Weber and Mcllvenna, oblivious of the fact that Gloria Bridge and Henry planned to meet with them, left Chicago on the return journey to South Dakota. Mcllvenna testified that early in October not having heard any further word from the Respondent, he telephoned John Bridge. According to Mcllvenna, in this conversation he told Mr. Bridge that the Union wanted to meet and negotiate with the Com- pany as soon as possible and, that in response to his request for action, Mr. Bridge assured him that he would endeavor to arrange a meeting for the following week and that in the meantime, he would keep in touch with them. At the hearing, John Bridge conceded that he had had such a telephone conversation with McIlvenna during this period and that subsequent to his conversation with McIlvenna he telephoned the corporate headquarters in bons counsel in Chicago and that Orner assured him that this had been done. 10 John Bridge's testimony in this regard was corroborated by McIlven- na. UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES Spokane on one or two occasions to remind them that the matter had to be resolved." On October 17, Weber received a telegram from John Bridge requesting that he contact him by telephone on October 19. On the latter date, Weber telephoned Bridge, and at that time was informed that the Company would ask for an election among the employees in the office cler- ical unit. Weber concluded the conversation with the declaration that the Union would file an unfair labor prac- tice charge. At the time of the hearing there had been no further contact between the parties with reference to the unit in question. CONCLUDING FINDINGS In the event an employer has an honest doubt as to the union's purported majority, or the unit which the Board would find appropriate, it is well settled that he may insist on a formal representation proceeding and a Board-con- ducted election to resolve such doubt before being obligated to bargain. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 741-742 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914; Hammond & Irving, Incorporated, 154 NLRB 1071, 1073. On the other hand, "There is no absolute right vested in an employer to demand an election." N.L.R.B. v. Trimfit of California, Inc., 211 F.2d 206,209 (C.A. 9); United Mine Workers of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72. It is clear that the Union here involved was, at all times relevant, ready to demonstrate its majority status to the Respondent's officials. From a time early in August, and shortly after the initial demand for recognition, the union representatives, on numerous occasions, offered to sub- mit to a count of the authorization cards. John Bridge conceded that subsequent to July 29, when he first acknowledged the Union's request for recognition, both Weber and McIlvenna "offered to show their cards to anyone." Whereas there is some question as to whether the Union proposed a card check within the first few days after its initial request for recognition, in its letter to the Company on August 10, it plainly set forth this proposal. Later that month this request was renewed, and, in his letter to Weber, dated September 2, Frank Bridge acknowledged the Union's demand and stated that recog- nition would be dependent on the "evidence to be furnished ... indicating that you have sufficient cards signed to authorize such representation." Later, at their meeting on September 21, when Weber and Mcllvenna conferred with John Bridge, the latter, after questioning Weber as to whether the Union had a majority and receiving an affirmative reply, volunteered his own faith and confidence in the business agent's in- tegrity with the statement that Weber had never lied to him. Thereafter, according to Bridge's own testimony, he assured the union representatives that, subject to a check of the cards, he would recommend that the Company begin negotiations. He further testified that he suggested 11 Thus , Mr. Bridge testified with respect to his conversations with Pres- ident Manlowe during this period . "I talked to him with reference to the advisability of commencing negotiations with the Teamsters at Rapid City. At no time did we think in terms or discuss it in terms without a card check, but I did suggest to him, and I repeat it , that I would recommend if the cards were checked and found to be in a majority it might be advisable to consider waiving the election." Later, on cross-examination, Mr. Bridge stated that in connection with these same conversations with the corporate headquarters "I suggested that they take action on the matter." 691 that Weber and Mcllvenna meet with Gloria Bridge and James Henry for the purpose of checking the cards. The next day, according to the testimony of the latter wit- nesses, they were prepared to conduct such a card check on behalf of the Respondent, but were unable to do so because neither Weber nor Mcllvenna ever appeared. It is the conclusion of the Trial Examiner, as set forth earli- er herein, that the nonappearance of the union representa- tives resulted from the fact that they had never been notified of the time and place for such a meeting, whereas Gloria Bridge and Henry apparently assumed that this had been done the day before by John Bridge. At the hearing the Respondent endeavored to establish that, but for the absence of the union representatives, a card check could have been completed on September 22. On the other hand, it is of some significance that no explanation was offered as to why, when, through no fault of Weber or McIlvenna, the card count was not accomplished on the latter date, the Respondent thereafter failed to take the initiative to set another time and place for such a meeting that would be mutually convenient for the parties. From the foregoing sequence of events, the Trial Ex- aminer finds that, after many weeks, during which the Union sought recognition and offered to establish its majority on the basis of a card check, on September 21, John Bridge, on behalf of the Respondent, agreed to ac- cept the results of a card count, and if the results bore out Weber's claim to a majority, commence negotiations on behalf of the Company. Nothwithstanding this background, almost a month later, and with no explana- tion, John Bridge informed Weber that the Respondent would demand an election. On this record it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex- aminer that at no time, subsequent to the initial demand for recognition, did the Respondent manifest any objec- tions as to the appropriateness of the unit proposed by the Union, or express any doubt as to the Union's majority. It is the further conclusion of the Trial Examiner that at the meeting in Chicago on September 21, the Company agreed to a check of the signature cards. Thereafter, the Respondent repudiated this agreement when, on October 19, it informed the Union that it would insist upon an election after all, to resolve the issue as to the Union's standing among the employees. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the Respondent's conduct subsequent to September 21, 1966, constituted a refusal to bargain with the Union after the majority status of the latter in an appropriate unit had been established. By this course of action the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Fred Snow, Harold Snow and Tom Snow d/b/a Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709, 710-711, enfd. 308 F.2d 687, 693-694 (C.A. 9); Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 NLRB 643, 644-645; Kellogg's, Inc. d/b/a Kellogg Mills, 147 NLRB 342, 346, enfd. 347 F.2d 219 (C.A. 9). Cf. H & W Con- struction Company, Inc., 161 NLRB 852.12 12 The situation here involved differs from that in the Serpa case which is discussed at length in the Respondent's brief, John P Serpa, Inc., 155 N LRB 99, reversed and remanded sub nom. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 1179 v N L R.B., 376 F.2d 186 (C.A. 9); on remand, conclusions of the court adopted by the Board , John P. Serpa, Inc, 166 NLRB 336 Since the Respondent here, after initially agreeing to a card check, sub- sequently repudiated this agreement and sought a Board election, the present case is governed by the Board decision in Snow & Sons, cited above. See John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99, fn. 6. 336-845 0 - 70 - 45 692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD E. The Grant of Economic Benefits to the Employees; Conclusions with Respect Thereto 1. The wage increase In the latter part of June 1966 the Respondent an- nounced that, effective July 1, its employees would receive a 5-cent pay increase and that on January 1, 1967, an additional 5-cent raise would be granted. The exact date that this increase was announced was never established at the hearing. Two of the witnesses for the General Counsel'3 testified that the announcement was made in a memorandum given to the employees shortly before the union meeting on June 23. Another witness,14 however, testified that the memorandum was given to the employees after the union meeting. The memorandum it- self was never offered in evidence. Nor was there any evidence as to whether the raise was applicable only to the employees in the office clerical unit here involved, or to all of the unorganized employees of the Respondent. Donald Agostino, secretary-treasurer of the Respond- ent, testified that the pay raise in question had been under consideration for several months, that it had been discussed as early as the preceding February or March and that the announcement had been delayed because Harold Buckingham, the corporate official who handled such personnel problems had been preoccupied with his duties as a member of the South Dakota legislature and had been unable to dispose of the pay increase matter until late in June. The General Counsel contends that the wage raise was granted for the purpose of interfering with the Union's organizational campaign among the office clerical employees and that, for this reason, its effectua- tion constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is, of course, well established that a wage plan con- ceived, or accelerated, to thwart an organizing campaign, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405. Here, the announcement of the wage raise coincided so closely with the date of the union meeting for the Buckingham employees, that its timing tends to support the General Counsel' s allegation. On the other hand, even more crucial in establishing that the Respondent violated the Act, as alleged in this respect, is evidence that at the time the wage announce- ment was made, the Respondent knew that the Union was endeavoring to organize the office clericals. This, however, was not established. Jean Miller, the most ac- tive employee organizer for the Union, did not sign an authorization card until June 8. Thereafter, and before the union meeting was held she secured a substantial number of signed authorization cards from her cowor- kers. On the other hand, Donald Barbour, the other em- ployee most active in the organizational campaign, did not sign a card, or become active in his efforts to secure signed cards, until the meeting on June 23. Whereas the extent of employee organizational activity might, to some extent, support an inference that the Respondent must have known about the employee interest in the Union during the middle of June, this record is barren of any af- firmative evidence that the supervisory personnel or management officials had actual knowledge of union ac- tivity by the office clericals prior to the announcement of the wage increase. Since this critical piece of evidence is lacking, the Trial Examiner must and does conclude that the Respondent's decision to grant this benefit was based upon lawful economic considerations . Accordingly, the Trial Examiner further concludes that the complaint must be dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the wage increase in question. The Brearley Company, 163 NLRB 637, fn. 2; Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300, 306; Derby Coal & Oil Co., Inc., et al., 139 NLRB 1485, 1486; True Temper Corporation, 127 NLRB 839, 842-844. 2. The dental insurance plan On or about August 1, 1966, the Respondent notified all employees throughout its system who were not then in organized bargaining units that, effective on September 1, 1966, they would be the beneficiaries of a dental in- surance plan, the premium for which would be borne by the Company. It was undenied that this employee benefit was effectuated without notice to, or consultation with, the Union. The General Counsel contends that this ac- tion by the Respondent constituted a unilateral act, in derogation of the Union's status as the bargaining agent for the office clerical employees, and that, for this reason, the institution of this plan constituted a violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Secretary-Treasurer Agostino testified that the plan in question had been under consideration for almost a year prior to its effective date. According to Agostino, the Respondent had, for many months, been in contact with insurance companies and had under study various plans that would provide an insurance benefit for those em- ployees who were not then covered by the Teamsters health and welfare program. Agostino could not recall precisely when the decision had been made to put the pro- gram into effect. He testified, however, that he was cer- tain that it had been a considerable period prior to Sep- tember 1, because the policy providing for the plan had a clause requiring a waiting period so that it could not become effective until 2 months after the Respondent and the insurance carrier agreed on the final terms. Agostino did not testify as to whether the latter date was July 1, an earlier date, or a later date. A copy of the contract, or the insurance policy providing for the dental plan in question, was never offered in evidence by the General Counsel, or by any other party. As a result, the record here is lacking in a critical piece of documentation as to the precise time when the Respondent made its decision to grant the em- ployees a dental insurance benefit and executed an agree- ment with the insurance company for the effectuation of such a plan. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Agostino's testimony, which was credible, stands unde- nied in the record, it is the conclusion of the Trial Ex- aminer that the Respondent finalized its agreement for the dental benefit to its employees on or about July 1, 1966. At that point, almost another month would elapse before the Union would make its initial demand for recog- nition. Thereafter, as found earlier herein, it was not until September 21, that the Respondent's conduct with respect to the Union's demand for recognition and bar- gaining constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5). On the present record, the Trial Examiner must conclude that a plan to provide dental insurance was under active con- 13 Jean M. Miller and Shirley Ann Soucy. 11 Donald E. Barbour. UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES 693 sideration by the Respondent's management many months before the Union began organizing the office cler- icals and that final arrangements for the plan were reached before the Union made its first demand for recog- nition. In the light of these findings, which are compelled by the present record, the Trial Examiner concludes that the establishment of the dental insurance program by the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Cutter Boats, Inc., 127 NLRB 1576, 1585. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the Union is a labor organization, all within the meaning of the Act. 2. All office clericals in the systemwide and terminal operations of the Respondent in Rapid City, South Dakota, excluding all other employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 3. At all times since July 29, 1966, the Union has been the exclusive representative, for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. 4. By refusing, since September 21, 1966, to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the majority representative of the aforesaid unit, the Respondent en- gaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 5. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain with the Union, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 7. The General Counsel has not proved by a preponde- rance of the evidence that the Respondent interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights established by the Act, except by the specific conduct found herein to have been violative. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, the Trial Examiner will recom- mend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, the Trial Examiner hereby issues the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER United Buckingham Freight Lines, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith con- cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the fol- lowing appropriate unit: All office clericals in the system- wide and terminal operations at Rapid City, South Dakota, excluding all other employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above- named Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its terminal in Rapid City, South Dakota, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B"15 Copies of the said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being duly signed by the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, where notices are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 18, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges any unfair labor practices other than as herein specifically found. APPENDIX A Employees in appropriate unit during week of July 24 to 30, 1966 William J. Aberle Norma E. Freeman Joyce E. Amerson Mary L. Fuqua Carmel Anderson Betty Lou Gasseling Dale J. Anderson Dominica C. Goc Donald Barbour Connie J. Gurley Marie J. Brauer Darla Haefs Marshall J. Brownlee Gladys D. Hagemann Noelle C. Brown Terry Hamaker Helen M. Brubaker George E. Harrison Anna L. Chastain Kathleen Hatcher Bernice Clauson John D. Hatzenbuhler Sandra K. Cox Jo Ann Holcomb Laura M. Erickson Tyler C. Hooker Sharon S. Ervin Frankie N. Hudnall Gary B. Ferguson Sally Huber Mary Ann Fernen Dorothy Huff Irma E. Foster Daniel F. Irmen " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 'S In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond- ent has taken to comply herewith." 694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL James L. A. Johnson Janice K. Just Janice L. Karlson Charlene J. Kelley Noel C. Kingsbury Ann M. Kinsella Ruth A. Koopal Erma Kulhavy Marjorie V. Mahan Rawleigh G. Mardis Jeane McCermand DeLaine McLaughlin Esther E. McNabb Edna Meyer Jean Miller Florence L. Mittelstaedt Dorothy Owens Katherine J. Parks Dale Paulson Diann Stanley Glennita Reeves Nancy L. Richards Phillip Roth, Jr. Beulah L. Roth Marrylyn K. Russell Tommye S. Santos Betty M. Savoy Rose Schlaffman Donald P. Schmidt Jeanne F. Schmidt Bette M. Sewell Janice Snow Shirley A. Soucy Roxy Ann Stevens Linda J. Stuckey Bette E. Taylor Lanny Tennyson Leona Tomassi Dorothy Van Alstyne Leona Van Schoonhoven Donna Zens George Whittaker Carlene A. Beebe Marilyn Carlson Odean G. Deutsch Anita Gorsuch Vivian M. Larsen Frances Malimanek Jacqueline M. Moore Gordon K. Stanley APPENDIX B Notice to All Employees Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain with General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 749, International LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as the exclu- sive representative of all the employees in the bar- gaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employ- ment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bar- gaining unit is: All office clericals in the systemwide and ter- minal operations at our location in Rapid City, South Dakota, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter- fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex- ercise of their right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named or any other labor or- ganization, to bargain collectively through represent- atives of their own choosing, to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. UNITED BUCKINGHAM FREIGHT LINES (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 316 Federal Building, 110 South Fourth Street, Minneapolis, Min- nesota 55401, Telephone 344-2611.