G & A Truck Line, Inc.

846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD G & A Truck Line, Inc. and Local 7, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind. Case 7-CA-5955 December 12,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On September 1, 1967, Trial Examiner Eugene F. Frey issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. The Trial Examiner also found that Respon- dent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom- mended dismissal as to them. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, with the following addi- tions and modifications: 1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employees about their union member- ship, sentiments, and activities, persuading em- ployees by promises of benefits and threats of reprisal to withdraw their union authorization cards and applications for membership, and assisting them to withdraw such cards. 2. The Trial Examiner, though finding that Respondent after receiving the Union's demand for recognition embarked on an unlawful campaign to dissipate the Union's representative status, nevertheless dismissed the 8(a)(5) allegation of the complaint on the ground that the Union did not represent a majority of employees in the ap- ' See e.g., Merrill Axle and Wheel Service, 158 NLRB 1113, 1114-15; N.L.R.B. v. Sagamore Shirt Company, 365 F.2d 898, 908 (C.A.D.C.), enfg. 153 NLRB 309; N.L.R.B. v Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755, 760, fn. 8 (C.A. 5), enforcement denied 134 NLRB 1254. propriate unit when it requested recognition. While we agree with the Trial Examiner that the denial of recognition was not based on a good-faith doubt, we disagree with his conclusion that the Union was not the majority representative, and accordingly find merit in the General Counsel's exception to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that there were nine employees in the appropriate unit when the Union demanded recognition. However, he concluded that at this time the Union had only four valid authorization cards from unit employees. In so concluding, he rejected as "void, ab initio" the signed authorization cards of employees Anderson and Salisbury because these men executed cards in reliance on what the Trial Examiner considered to be the "substantial and critical misrepresentation" that everyone else had already signed. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, the Board has held, with court approval, that statements of this type are immaterial in determining the validity of authorization cards, even when signed in reliance thereon.' Such statements are harmless sales talk or puffing,2 which do not operate "to overcome the ef- fect of [the employees] overt action in signing."3 As the cards of Salisbury and Anderson were properly authenticated, and not otherwise con- tested, we find that they effectively delegated bar- gaining authority to the Union and we shall include their cards in determining the Union's majority status. With these cards the Union represented a majority of employees in the appropriate unit when it made its demand for recognition and bargaining. Accordingly, and as we agree, for the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner, that Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bar- gain with the Union.4 In the circumstances, we shall issue the customary order requiring the Respondent to bargain with the Union. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Delete paragraph No. 3 from the Trial Ex- aminer's Conclusions of Law and substitute the new paragraphs Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 therefor: "3. Respondent has not violated the Act by its discharge and failure to reinstate Michael Hart- sox." "4. All mechanics and garage employees at Respondent's Three Rivers and White Pigeon ter- minals, excluding office clerical employees, truckdrivers, guards, and supervisors as defined in 2 Harris Epstein, dlbla Top Mode Manufacturing Co., 97 NLRB 1273, 1296; N.L.R.B. v. Sagamore Shirt Company, supra. 3 N.L.R.B. v. Cactus Petroleum , Inc., supra, 760. 4 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914. 168 NLRB No. 106 G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. 847 the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act." "5. Since January 3, 1967, the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of all of the Respondent's employees in the aforesaid ap- propriate unit." "6. By its refusal to bargain with the Union with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respond- ent, G & A Truck Line, Inc., Three Rivers, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating any of its employees regarding their union membership, sentiments, and activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, trying to persuade, or persuading, its em- ployees by promises of benefits or threats of reprisal, such as discharge, layoff, or diminished benefits, to withdraw their union authorization cards or applications for membership in the above- named Union or any other labor organization, and assisting them to withdraw such cards or applica- tions in writing, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of any right guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its em- ployees in the following appropriate unit: All mechanics and garage employees at Respond- ent's Three Rivers and White Pigeon terminals, excluding office clerical employees, truckdrivers, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees in the unit found ap- propriate with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its terminals in Three Rivers and White Pigeon, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations not found herein. 5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En- forcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate any of our em- ployees regarding their union membership, sen- timents, or activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT try to persuade, or persuade, our employees by promises of benefits or threats of reprisal such as discharge, layoff, or diminished benefits, to withdraw their union authorization cards or applications for mem- bership in Local 7, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind., or any other labor organization, or assist them to withdraw such cards or applications in writing. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfer with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed to therm by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent such right is affected by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. , WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and will em- body in a signed agreement any understanding reached. The bargaining unit is: All mechanics and garage employees at Respondent's Three Rivers and White Pigeon terminals, excluding office clerical employees, truckdrivers, guards, and su- pervisors as defined in the Act. 848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named Union or any other labor or- ganization, except to the extent that such freedom is affected by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Re- porting and Disclosure Act of 1959. G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washington Bou- levard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 226-3200. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE EUGENE F. FREY, Trial Examiner: The issues in this case are whether or not Respondent, G & A Truck Line, Inc., (1) coerced employees at its Three Rivers and White Pigeon terminals in Michigan, by interrogation about their union activities and sentiments and threats of various types of reprisal if they joined or assisted the above Union and solicited them by threats and otherwise to withdraw their designation of said Union as their bar- gaining agent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., herein called the Act, (2) discharged and refused to reinstate Michael Hartsox because of his af- filiation with the Union and other concerted activity, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and (3) by the above and other conduct tried to undermine and destroy the Union's status as exclusive bargaining agent of em- ployees in an appropriate unit, and refused thereby to bar- gain in good faith with it as such agent, in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act. The issues arise on a complaint is- sued April 7, 1967, by the Board's Regional Director for Region 7,1 and answer of Respondent admitting jurisdic- tion but denying the commission of any unfair labor prac- tices. A hearing on the issues was held before me at Three Rivers, Michigan, on May 31 and June 1, 1967, in which all parties participated through counsel or other represent- ative. All parties waived oral argument at close of the testimony, but General Counsel and Respondent have filed written briefs which the Trial Examiner has carefully considered in preparation of this Decision. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my obser- vation of all witnesses on the stand, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS, AND STATUS OF THE UNION Respondent is a Michigan corporation, with its prin- cipal office and terminal in White Pigeon, Michigan, and another terminal in Three Rivers, Michigan, where it is engaged in the transportation of freight by motor vehicle. These terminals are the only facilities involved in this case. In the calendar year 1966 Respondent in its busi- ness performed transportation services valued in excess of $1 million, of which gross revenue in excess of $500,000 was derived from transportation of commodi- ties in interstate commerce, and in the same period Respondent had direct inflow to its Michigan terminals valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is and has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The above Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Union's Campaign and Demand for Recognition Respondent's drivers at both terminals have been unionized since about 1940, and since February 1964, Respondent has recognized the Union as bargaining agent of its drivers, operating under a contract which was effective from February 1, 1964, to March 31, 1967. At the times mentioned herein, driver Herman Frain was the union steward for drivers at Three Rivers terminal, and driver Francis Schneider, a former union steward and of- ficer, also worked there. Early in December 1966, Michael Hartsox, a night mechanic at Three Rivers, asked Frain how mechanics could join the Union, and Frain gave him membership application cards for the Union2 and also to William Speese and Floyd Marciniak, the other mechanics on the same shift. Frain also invited any mechanics at both terminals who were interested in the Union to attend a driver's grievance meeting to be held in a local tavern on December 31, 1966. Mechanics Clifton Salisbury and Larry Anderson signed cards at that meeting, and on January 2, 1967, mechanics Speese, Marciniak, and Donald and Michael Hartsox signed similar cards. The circumstances and aftermath of the sol- icitation and execution of the cards will be discussed below.3 On January 3, 1967, Vice President Jack Brand of the Union, with Frain and Schneider, presented the six signed cards to John P. Jones, secretary of Respondent, at its White Pigeon office. Jones examined them and wrote down the names of the signers and dates of execu- tion. Brand then cited to him the driver's contract, saying that under the interpretation of article 2, section 3 thereof by its attorney, the Union claimed that when the em- ployer examined the membership applications he was legally recognizing the Union as bargaining agent for the I The complaint issued after Board investigation of charges filed by the above Union on March 3 and 9, 1967. 2 Each card was not only an application for membership in the Union, but also purported to designate it as the signer's representative for pur- poses of collective bargaining. 3 The Union procured a signed card from mechanic Steven Russey on January 2, but does not rely on it to prove its majority status. G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. 849 mechanics;4 he also suggested that if Jones had any questions about this interpretation, he could contact the secretary of the Motor Carriers Employer Association. He asked Jones if Respondent would sign a "recognition" agreement with the Union covering the mechanics. Jones replied he could do nothing about it, but would talk to Respondent's president, Glenn MacNamara.5 Brand told him the union agents would return that afternoon with a form of recognition agreement. Brand returned in the af- ternoon with that agreement, and presented it to Jones and Vice President Thomas MacNamara, asking them to execute it in accordance with the contract clauses previ- ously mentioneds They replied that they would discuss it with their attorney that week. During the discussion, Glenn MacNamara walked in and told the union agents bluntly Respondent was not signing anything, as he had serious doubts whether the Union represented a majority of the mechanics. Respondent repeated this refusal when the Union made the same request on January 19, 1967, at a grievance conference between the parties under the drivers' contract.' B. Respondent's Reaction to the Demand Immediately after Jones secured the names of the card signers on January 3, he gave the information to the Mac- Namaras. Thomas MacNamara at once talked to all the mechanics, either personally or on the telephone, asking each if he signed cards, and when some admitted they had, he asked each of them if they really wanted the Union and why. Jones also questioned Speese and Mar- ciniak about their reasons for signing cards, at the same time telling them they had a right to join or not to join any union; their answers to Jones do not appear in the record. In questioning Marciniak, Thomas MacNamara com- mented that the signing was a "blow," or surprise, to him. When asked why he signed, Marciniak replied he did it because "everybody else was going in," so he might as well do the same, as he "did not want to be left out." Several days later, Jones called Marciniak at home, told him about a pension plan which Respondent was con- sidering for the mechanics, suggested that Marciniak might withdraw his membership application to the Union, gave him the Union's address, and told him what to say in his withdrawal request. Marciniak said he would think it over. About a week later Thomas MacNamara asked Marciniak in the Three Rivers garage if he had written the letter. Marciniak replied, no, he was still thinking it over. Shortly after this, MacNamara remarked to him in the garage that if the Union came into the shop, the Company would have to cut down on the hours of work for the men and hire more help to compensate for it. A day or so later, when Marciniak reported for work about 5 p.m., he was called to the telephone to talk to MacNamara, who asked if he had written the letter. He said, no. MacNamara said he wanted him to write it and mail it out at once. Mar- ciniak said he did not know if he would, that while he did not care to join the Union, he would "go along with the rest of the men," because it would be hard to get a job at his age, and he "had to hold onto my job and do what is right." He also explained he could not write any letter then, as he had just come in to work. MacNamara replied that that was "all right," he should still write it and mail it at once, adding that it was up to him to do what he wanted. Marciniak never withdrew his application from the Union.8 Thomas MacNamara talked to Speese at his home on January 3 or 4, and after Speese admitted on query of MacNamara that he had signed the card, the latter asked why he did so, and he replied "for protection," that "things should all be in writing." MacNamara said he could not stop Speese from joining the Union. He asked Speese for details of the Union's pension plan, and Speese replied that he thought it was better than Respond- ent's plan. On Friday, January 6, Speese had a talk with Jones, who asked if he knew all the advantages of Respondent's pension and insurance plans. Speese said he thought he did, but felt the Union's plan was better y Thomas MacNamara called Anderson and Salisbury to the White Pigeon office from their homes about 10 am. on January 3, where both MacNamara and Jones talked to them. Salisbury apparently arrived first, and Glenn MacNamara asked him if he was unhappy at the garage, and why he wanted to join the Union; Salisbury's answer does not appear. Glenn MacNamara also said he wished that Salisbury had talked to him first before signing the card, and that he was sorry to hear the mechanics were not satisfied with their jobs. He also asked Salisbury if he did not appreciate the favor Respondent did him by lend- ing him money. When Anderson came into the meeting, Thomas MacNamara asked him if he had signed a card, and he said, yes. Thomas said he wished Anderson had talked to him first. Anderson replied "they said everybody signed cards but Salisbury and me," and that as he had been in unions before, it made no difference to him whether he signed or not, and might as well join up again. Jones then showed Anderson the list of card signers, with dates on the cards, which indicated that An- derson and Salisbury were the first to sign up. Anderson commented "What the heck, they told me we were the last to sign." Salisbury also expressed annoyance at hear- ing they were the first, not the last, to sign, and both he and Anderson said they would like to do something about it. Jones suggested they could write letters to the Union asking for return of their cards. Anderson then said to 4 This provision of the contract, entitled "Non-Covered Units," reads as follows: This Agreement shall not be applicable to those operations of the Em- ployer where the employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement with a Union not signatory to this Agreement or to those employees who have not designated a signatory Union as their collec- tive bargaining agent. At such time as a majority of such employees in an appropriate bargaining unit designate, as evidenced by a card check, a signatory Union as their collective bargaining agent, they shall automatically be covered by this Agreement and applicable Sup- plemental Agreements. In such cases the parties may by mutual agreement work out a wage and hour schedule, subject to Joint Area Committee approval. The record shows that, while Jones assisted Respondent in negotia- tion of labor contracts and also was its main representative in handling grievances with the Union under the drivers' contract, Glenn MacNamara was the only company official who had the final say on Respondent's posi- tion in labor matters, with sole authority to sign contracts. 6 The agreement was short, merely providing for recognition of the Union as bargaining agent of the mechanics, and was effective for only 90 days, contemplating negotiation of a formal bargaining contract in that time. ' The facts above are found on credited and mutually corroborative testimony of Brand , Frain, Schneider, Jones , and both MacNamaras Testimony of any of these witnesses at variance therewith is not credited. 8 These facts are found on uncontradicted and credited testimony of Marcimak. 9 These findings are based on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Speese. 850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Salisbury "in that case, I'll just write a letter and tell them to cancel me out, I want to withdraw." Glenn Mac- Namara then asked both men if they would give him co- pies of any letters they wrote, and they said they would. The next day Anderson privately had his wife write a letter to the Union indicating that "at this time" he did not want to join the Union and would like to have his applica- tion back, and mailed it to the Union, giving a copy to Respondent. Salisbury sent a similar letter to the Union, with copy to Respondent.10 On January 3, Don Hartsox, an elderly mechanic at Three Rivers, who had signed a union card with his son, Michael, the day before, called Glenn MacNamara's home to tell him about it. As Glenn had already left for the office, Don told Mrs. MacNamara that he had signed up, and that he wanted Glenn MacNamara to know about it, as he did not like to "do something behind their backs without telling them what we were doing." He also men- tioned his talk with the union agents when he signed his card. Mrs. MacNamara relayed this information to her son, Thomas, at the office, and he told his father, who then called Hartsox and mentioned he knew Don had signed a card. Don admitted he had. Glenn MacNamara said Don was not hired as a mechanic, that he was only a part-time worker because he did not work all the time in the garage, and that Glenn could not classify him as a qualified, "Class A" mechanic. Glenn suggested that Don send a letter to the Union withdrawing his member- ship application and send a copy to Respondent. Hartsox replied that he would, explaining that he had signed the card without telling Glenn about it, because he could not contact Glenn. He also explained to Glenn that he had understood everyone in the shop had signed application cards, and that it would be a closed shop, which meant that everyone would have to be a union member or could not work at the garage. On January 4, Don Hartsox sent the Union a letter stating he wished to withdraw his mem- bership application, and gave a copy to Respondent.'' On January 3, Thomas MacNamara called Michael Hartsox at home, and asked why he joined the Union. Michael replied "because everyone else did." That night or the night of January 4, while at work, Thomas Mac- Namara again asked him why he joined the Union, and also whether, if a vote were taken or cards passed out again, he would vote or sign for the Union. Michael said he would. Thomas MacNamara then commented that Hartsox was the lowest man on the seniority list and would be the first one laid off in any layoff. Thomas also commented that the mechanics were playing a "dirty trick" on the Company by asking the Union to come in, and that he would have appreciated it if Michael had come to Respondent first before signing the card, and that Michael was "not trying to co-operate with us." He also said that Michael had a chance to go to Galesburg (another garage) to work on diesel tractors, if the Union did not come into the garages. He then asked Michael if he would write the Union a letter withdrawing his appli- cation. Michael replied that he might. When Michael got "These facts are based on credited and mutually corroborative testimony of both mechanics, as corroborated generally by both Mac- Namaras. 11 These facts are found on credited testimony of Don Hartsox and documentary evidence , as corroborated in part by testimony of both Mac- Namaras Testimony of any of the three in conflict therewith is not credited. home on the 4th, he talked to his father about his discus- sion with Thomas MacNamara, and they also discussed his father's talk with management. On January 5, Michael Hartsox sent the Union a letter withdrawing his applica- tion for membership and sent- a copy to Respondent. Within the next day or so, he talked to steward Frain about retracting the letter and, on January 7, with the help of Frain, prepared, executed, and sent a letter to the Union retracting his request for withdrawal of his card. Shortly after Russey, an 18-year-old high school stu- dent, signed his card, Foreman Krepel asked him in the garage if he had signed, and when he admitted he had, Krepel expressed doubt whether he was doing the "right thing," saying he did not know what would happen to his job, because Russey was working for Respondent in a job created for him by Respondent as part of a local govern- ment job program, under which employers created jobs for students, who received some credit in their schooling for the time spent working; Krepel told him "if you join the Union, I don't know whether they will discontinue your job or not," and suggested that he talk to his father about it, although he could do as he wished about joining the Union. About a week later Thomas MacNamara asked Russey if he had filled out the "form," referring to a letter of withdrawal of his application to the Union. Russey said he had, and MacNamara asked if he would give the Company a copy if he mailed the letter; he added that the decision was up to him, and he should think about it, but he should let MacNamara know his decision by the following Thursday. On an unidentified later date, Krepel told Russey at the garage that his job might be canceled out if he did not send the letter, and that if he intended to send it, he should do it that night. Russey mailed it to the Union that night and left a copy at the White Pigeon office.12 Respondent argues that its interrogation of the mechanics after learning who signed cards, and when, was not coercive because the MacNamaras were trying "principally" and bona fide, to find out if any of them had been pressured or misled by the Union into signing cards. This purpose is indicated by testimony of Thomas Mac- Namara and Don Hartsox that: Don Hartsox' was ap- parently troubled by signing the card and tried to contact Glenn MacNamara at home on January 3 about it, but when he found Glenn was not there, he still unburdened himself to his wife. Thomas MacNamara gathered from his mother's report of Don's conversation that he had been advised by the union men when he signed the card that he had to sign up or would lose his job with Respond- ent. On this information the MacNamaras decided to question all the mechanics to learn the circumstances under which they signed cards. If the questions had been confined to this subject alone , and assurances against reprisals had been given, there would be merit in Respond- ent's contention.13 However, the questions as to the mechanics' reasons or motives for signing the cards, and whether they really wanted the Union to act for them, went beyond any issue of reliability of the cards or possi- 12 The above findings are based on credited testimony of Russey, which is not directly contradicted by Krepel or Thomas MacNamara. 13 It is well settled that an employer who has a reasonable and bona fide doubt of the majority status of a union may conduct a poll of employees, with certain safeguards, about the circumstances under which they signed union authorization cards , where the intent and purpose of the interroga- tion is only to ascertain whether the Union actually represented a majori- ty. See Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB No. 102. G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. 851 ble fraud or duress in their execution, but probed into the motives or sentiments of the workers about the Union. Under settled precedents this amounted to coercive inter- rogation, and I find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent's followup of such interrogation of Marciniak by immediate and repeated suggestions or requests that he make a written request for withdrawal of his card, with advice as to how to word the request and suggestion that he could write it on company time, and the warning that Respondent might have to cut his hours if the Union came into the garages (without any explanation as to how this action might be forced on Respondent), amounted to plain coercive threats of possi- ble economic reprisal if Marciniak did not withdraw from the Union, and further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent exercised similar unlawful coercion on the elderly Don Hartsox when Glenn MacNamara asked asked him bluntly to send a withdrawal letter, after re- minding him that he was not a full-time or fully qualified mechanic, which could only have led Don Hartsox to be- lieve that his tenure was not secure and could be affected by Respondent if he did not withdraw from the Union. His promise to do so, and later mailing of the withdrawal letter to the Union, can only have been motivated, at least in part, by what Glenn MacNamara said to him. 14 Again, Respondent imposed similar coercive pressure on the son, Michael, both by implied threats of reprisal and promise of benefit, when Thomas MacNamara asked him to withdraw his card, after noting his low position on the seniority roster, and indicating that Michael might be given diesel tractor work (which Michael admits he desired) if the Union did not come into the garages. This coercion was initally effective, since Michael sent his withdrawal letter the day after the talk with Thomas Mac- Namara. Finally, Russey was subjected to unlawful im- plied and direct threats by Krepel that he might lose his job at the garage, under the workstudy program, if he joined the Union and did not withdraw from it.15 The widespread unlawful interrogation, and the specific un- lawful coercive pressure put on four of the mechanics to induce them to withdraw their union authorizations strongly negates the claim that Respondent had any bona fide doubt about the Union's majority status on and after January 3, and as strongly supports the conclusion that Respondent acted promptly after the Union's demand to dissipate the majority status indicated by its cards. C. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain 1. The appropriate unit The parties agree, and I find, that all mechanics and garage employees at Respondent's Three River and White Pigeon terminals, excluding office clerical em- ployees, truckdrivers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for collective-bar- gaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act, and that on January 2, 1967, the following nine em- ployees were in the unit: Anderson, Salisbury, Speese, Marciniak, Donald Hartsox, Michael Hartsox, Russey, Verland Spence, and Paul Hamlin.'6 2. The demand for recognition, and Respondent's reply I find that the Union on January 3, 1967, made a proper demand for recognition as bargaining agent for the employees in the unit aforesaid, and that at that time it showed Respondent signed cards from six employees in the unit, which gave it pro forma majority status. I also find that Respondent on the afternoon of that day refused to execute a formal recognition agreement with the Union, and to bargain with it as such agent. Respondent's main justification for that refusal is that it had a bona fide doubt of the Union's majority status. I have already con- sidered testimony relating to the information Respondent received right after the Union's demand on January 3, and its ensuing unlawful conduct, from which I have con- cluded that it acted promptly in efforts to dissipate the Union's plainly indicated majority status. However, Respondent's specific justification for its refusal to recog- nize the Union is based on what it heard from Don Hart- sox early on the 3rd, and its ensuing discussions with An- derson and Salisbury on that morning which it claims led its officers to believe in good faith that these two men had been induced to sign cards by substantial misrepresenta- tions of union agents, and this caused both to announce to company officials that they intended to withdraw their authorization cards, which they did shortly after, leaving the Union with only four cards out of a unit of nine workers. I have already found that Anderson and Salisbury told Respondent on January 3 that the union agents had told them they were the last to sign cards, that every other mechanic had signed, so they signed on this representa- tion, and that when management showed them facts secured from the Union indicating this was not true, both men angrily indicated their desire to withdraw their cards on the premise that they had been misled by the Union. While this discussion was initiated by Respondent's un- lawful inquiries about the reasons why they signed cards, it is noteworthy that when both MacNamaras expressed regrets that they had done so without advising Respond- ent beforehand, and Glenn MacNamara reproached Salisbury for acting thus in response to Glenn's specific favors to him, this elicited Anderson's explanation of the 14 That the president's remarks were bound to carry great weight with Don Hartsox is also indicated by the fact that an undefined portion of his income came directly from Glenn MacNamara, when he worked frequently for him at the MacNamara farm. Is Russey testified without contradiction that continued work was es- sential to credit toward his high school diploma, and that he would be una- ble to graduate if his job was canceled. 16 I do not accept Respondent's claim that Charles Krepel is an em- ployee to be included in the unit, for while it appears that Krepel regularly performs repair work himself at Three Rivers on day shift and at times into the night shift, it is clear from the record that after the death in February 1966 of Richard Modert, foreman in charge of operations at both terminals, Krepel was offered that job, but declined, and was then in- formally assigned to handle Modert's duties at Three Rivers, with a notice posted from March 1966 to at least May 29, 1967, that all employees must call Krepel at his home telephone "for mechanical needs or direction" during the early morning hours when Three Rivers was closed; Respondent made no arrangement, and has no practice, which requires or permits drivers or other employees to contact other officials of Respond- ent, such as the MacNamaras or Jones, during these hours for any pur- pose. In this period and up to the present time, Krepel has given orders about repairs and other work to day and night mechanics at Three Rivers, gives orders on the telephone to drivers about disposition of breakdown problems on the road, and also has authority effectively to recommend discharge of employees, which he exercised once in the fall of 1966, and also in the case of Michael Hartsox considered herein. I find that Krepel is a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act. 336-845 0 - 70 - 55 852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union representations on which both had signed the cards, and it is significant that the two apparently decided on their own to withdraw their cards after Respondent had only shown them the true facts gleaned from the Union itself; there were no threats or promises by Respondent which would indicate that they were per- suaded by coercive actions of Respondent to withdraw their cards, and in this respect the withdrawal of their cards stands on a different footing from similar actions of other workers found above. Glenn MacNamara testified that his expression to Brand of doubt about the Union's majority status was based on the remarks and apparent intentions of both men to withdraw their cards. In view of their remarks found above, I credit his testimony, and must conclude that Respondent was entitled to rely upon their statements about the union representations and their own voluntary decision to renounce the Union, whether or not those representations were made or were in fact false. However, in support of the reasons for signing they gave to Respondent, Anderson testified, with general cor- roboration by Salisbury, that at their December 31 meet- ing with Union Agents Brand, Frain, and Schneider, the latter told them they were the "last two to be signed up," and that all the Three Rivers mechanics were already signed, so they both signed cards at the request of the agents. 'While Frain and Schneider denied that this specific representation was made, and claimed they told the two mechanics they were the first to sign, and that all other mechanics had contacted them and wanted or promised to join the Union, Brand vacillated on the exact representations, pleading lack of memory after a lapse of 5 months since the meeting, but finally admits he and Schneider told the mechanics that "some cards had been signed" by workers whom the agents "had seen," and that all others had committed themselves to sign. Since the record shows no mechanic had actually signed up be- fore December 31, this admission indicates that the Union made some misrepresentation about the number who had signed, and tends to support the mechanics' story that they were told they were the last to sign. Since both were former union members and thus union minded,17 I am sure that this representation was a critical factor in their decision to sign up and thus "go along" with the other mechanics, for it indicated to them that the Union already had a majority of the men signed up, which would convince them that the Union under the law was 17 Anderson had belonged to a union in California, where he had been a union steward, and presently held a withdrawal card from it. Salisbury had formerly been in this Union about 9 years, and in a Chicago local of the Teamsters for 3 years. I have also considered carefully uncontradicted testimony of Frain that Salisbury, before signing his card, expressed dissatisfaction with some discipline he had received from Respondent, and indicated he wanted to sign up to avoid being "pushed around" further , but this only shows that Salisbury was union minded , as found above, and does not detract from the conclusion that the efficient cause of his execution of the card was the flat misrepresentation that the Union already had majority status. 1s I am also satisfied that the union agents knew of the former union af- filiation of both mechanics and therefore made the misrepresentation to induce them to sign up first, so that they could cite their example to induce others to sign; Frain testified at one point that he told Salisbury that his card would be the "lead card that would take care of it ," hence I am con- vinced they considered it important to get both signed up at the outset by whatever means. 19 Anderson's sincerity in withdrawal is also shown by his uncon- tradicted and credited testimony that at some later date he justified his ac- already entitled to act as the bargaining agent for all mechanics.18 On these facts, I find that the union agents in fact made the statement found above, that it was a sub- stantial and critical misrepresentation, and that both mechanics were induced thereby to sign their cards.19 On all these facts and circumstances, I must conclude that the Anderson and Salisbury cards were void ab initio, independently of any contemporaneous coercive conduct by Respondent, and are not reliable proof toward majori- ty status, even though they were not actually repudiated by the signers until after the Union made its demand.211 As the Union did not in fact have a majority of the mechanics in the unit aforesaid signed up by legitimate means on January 3, 1967, and this lack was not caused by action of Respondent, it follows that it was not on that date entitled to recognition as the statutory bargaining agent of employees in said unit, and Respondent did not violate the Act by its refusal to recognize it as such at that time or later. I shall recommend that complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges an unlawful refusal to bar- gain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Cf. A. W. C. Inc., 162 NLRB 119. D. The Discharge of Michael Hartsox Michael Hartsox,2i a young man in his twenties, was first hired by Respondent to work as a general main- tenance man at Three Rivers Terminal in July 1965. He quit in February 1966 to work elsewhere. He was rehired in November 1966 in the same capacity at the same garage, working on the 5 p.m. to 3 a.m. shift with Speese and Marciniak until his discharge on February 10, 1967. Michael intitiated the Union's organization of the mechanics early in December 1966, in the manner found above, and signed an authorization card for Agent Jack Brand at his home, along with his father, Don, on January 2, 1967. I have found that Respondent violated the Act by unlawful interrogation of Michael in the next 2 days, coupled with coercive threats of reprisal and promises of benefit to induce him to withdraw his union card, which caused him to do so at the same time as Don withdrew his card, but that he retracted this withdrawal by letter to the Union dated January 7. On Saturday, January 14, Michael attended a union meeting at which he discussed this letter with Agent Brand, following which Brand telephoned Mr. Cavanaugh, Respondent's attorney in tion to a union driver at a meeting by explaining his prior union affiliations and his determination to rejoin the union movement in the future when "there would be a union all over the country." The impact of the union misrepresentations on the two was also far greater where they were made by two present officials and one former officer of the Union , whose word the mechanics would undoubtedly accept as good union men . This, plus the fact that the misrepresentation was no mere puffing statement giving an estimate of progress or probability of achievement of majority status, but a flat assertion of majority status at a time when in fact the Union had no signed cards at all, shows that the misrepresentation was flagrant, seri- ous, and deliberately designed to induce the card signing, and thus vitiates these cards. N.L.R.B. v. H_ Rohtstezn & Co., 266 F.2d 407 (C.A. 1). 20 In view of these facts , I conclude that cases cited by General Coun- sel such as E. H Sargent and Co., 99 NLRB 1318; Harold W. Koehler, dlbla Koehler's Wholesale Restaurant Supply, 139 NLRB 945; N.L.R.B. v. Harris Epstein, d/bla Top Mode Manufacturing Co., 203 F.2d 482 (C.A. 3), enfg 97 NLRB 1273; and N.L.R.B. v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2), are not apposite on the facts, hence not con- trolling. Si I will refer to him as "Michael ," for brevity , to distinguish him from his father, Don Hartsox, who will be called "Don." G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. Detroit, and read the whole of Michael's retraction letter to him, advising that the Union had other such letters from mechanics, and criticizing the "tactics" he claims were used by Respondent to procure the withdrawals of union cards. While there is a conflict between Brand and Schneider on the one hand and Michael on the other as to whether Brand read his name to the attorney, Thomas MacNamara admits that, in discussing this conversation with the attorney, he learned that one mechanic had retracted his letter of withdrawal of his card, and it is a fair inference that the attorney (who did not testify) must have reported the contents of the letter, if not giving a verbatim account, to MacNamara, and from that wording of the letter which mentions the mechanic's father (it ap- pearing that the Hartsoxes were the only father-son team in Respondent's employ as mechanics) I also infer that MacNamara could only have gathered that the signer of that retraction was Michael.22 On the night of January 23-24, 1967, Michael was working on repairs of tractors in preparation for their trips later next morning. Tractor 45 had been brought in the night before with the notation on the driver's daily re- port that the emergency brake was bad and the fifth wheel was "sloppy." Michael fixed the emergency brake with some help from Speese, while Speese checked and cleaned the fifth wheel, and Michael then certified to completion of the repairs in the usual manner on the driver's daily report 23 Driver Schneider was assigned to take tractor 45 out that morning, but when he started up the engine he discovered from its sound that the exhaust manifold was leaking , so he inspected it and discovered that the manifold was cracked. As this was a safety hazard because it might allow deadly exhaust gases to seep into the driver's cab, Schneider refused to drive the tractor, as was his duty both under the contract and ICC regulations, and reported the condition to Foreman Krepel, making a pretrip inspection report on it. Krepel examined the engine and gave him another tractor. When Hartsox reported for work at 5 p.m. on the 24th, Krepel told him about the cracked manifold, and said Hartsox could work the rest of that week, but would be terminated Saturday, because the Company could not stand for "this sort of stuff," that it was "against company policy." Hartsox did not reply, but became upset and went home without permission. He returned about 9 p.m., and krepel put him to work, repeating that he would work until the end of the week. He worked through Satur- day, and received his final paycheck when he reported for work Monday night, January 30. Respondent's defense is that Hartsox was discharged for general unsatisfactory performance and failure to im- prove, culminating in the serious failure to find and remedy a safety defect in truck 45. General Counsel's rejoinder is that Respondent "over-reacted" to a mere "oversight" in his work, and that the drastic penalty of discharge of a known union adherent for such cause shows that Respondent was seizing on a minor matter, which normally did not result in discharge of workers, as a pretext on which to discharge Michael, and that the true motive lay in its general antiunion feelings and particu- 22I do not credit Thomas MacNamara's formal denial of any knowledge of the identity of the signer of this letter. 23 Under the drivers' contract and regulations of the Interstate Com- merce Commission, drivers must note on the daily record of a trip any de- fects which have shown up on tractor and trailer, and the night mechanic crew is required to make these repairs, with the mechanic doing that work certifying on the report the work that was done. At this time, the three 853 larly hostility to Michael for reasserting his union ad- herence after withdrawing it at Respondent's behest. Although the record shows that Respondent had been dealing with a union covering its drivers for over 25 years, and with this Union since 1964, it also appears that Respondent indicated present antiunion feeling by (1) its interrogation and other coercive conduct toward em- ployees immediately after the Union's demand for recog- nition, and (2) the circumstances that when the Union de- manded recognition, Glenn MacNamara was so exer- cised that, when turning it down, he even threatened to refuse to continue operations under the existing drivers' contract or any new one negotiated.24 This attitude plus Respondent's particular coercive attempts to cause Michael to rescind his union authorization impels a care- ful scrutiny of its handling of his discharge and requires Respondent to come forward with cogent proof that his alleged failure to repair the truck was the true motive for discharge, and that discharge therefor in the circum- stances was not an unusual penalty. In support of Respondent's action, the record clearly shows, and Michael himself admitted, that when working on equipment repair it was his duty, not only to repair the specific defects written on the driver report, but also to check over the whole tractor or trailer, or both, and cor- rect any other defects or malfunctions which he discovers, in order to put the whole equipment in proper and safe running order for its next trip. While Michael did the specified work properly on truck 45, with the help and oversight of Speese, he clearly did not catch the leak in the exhaust manifold, which he admitted would be noticeable from the sound of the motor exhaust when it was started up and driven only a short distance. The record shows that this type of defect is readily audible to an experienced mechanic or driver, and was quickly noticed by both Schneider and Foreman Krepel the morning after Michael had worked on the tractor. The failure to correct this defect was serious because the leak would have permitted noxious fumes to seep into the trac- tor cab, with possible harm to the driver and obviously the whole equipment while on the road. General Counsel intimates that the leak probably did not exist when the day driver brought 45 in, because it was not listed on his daily report as a defect, and even if it existed, it was probably not readily noticeable either to the driver at or before the time he brought the tractor in, or to Michael when he worked on it, because neither of the more experienced night mechanics appeared to notice it when Michael moved the tractor around that night. However, General Counsel did not produce the day driver to testify in support of his daily report, and to show the nonexistence of the leak, although he was a member of the Union. Further, both older mechanics testified credibly that unusual motor noise from such a leak would not readily be apparent to them, while they were working some distance away in the garage on other equipment, but it should be immediately apparent to an alert mechanic when he drove the tractor and sat over the running motor. I find from credible testimony of Michael and Speese that Michael had to start up the motor and move the tractor night mechanics at Three Rivers Terminal were rotating alternate shifts between lubrication and general inspection, and repair work, and on the night shift of January 23-24 Michael had the repair detail. 24 These facts appear from credited testimony of Brand and admissions of Glenn MacNamara It also appears that Respondent was at the time having disputes over vacation pay with the drivers , which may also have engendered Glenn MacNamara 's general resentment of the Union. 854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD several times that night while working on it. Foreman Krepel, with 21 years of truck maintenance experience, testified credibly that the exhaust manifold on trailer 45 was leaking exhaust gas because it was burned out, and that this type of defect does not develop quickly, as dur- ing a short drive of the tractor in or around the garage, but comes on gradually, which supports the inference and testimony of the other mechanics that the noise from it should have been readily audible to Michael when he started up the cold motor within the few hours before Krepel and Schneider heard it. I am satisfied from this testimony, and find, that the leak existed when Michael began work on trailer 45, and that the unusual noise from the leak was readily noticeable to Michael if he had been alert, though not to the other two mechanics. While Michael admits that noise from the leaking manifold would be readily noticeable, he asserted that he did not notice any unusual sound when he ran the motor, but this testimony is weakened by his admission that, after mak- ing the specific repairs listed on the driver's report, he made only a casual inspection of the tractor, limited to lights and tires, but did not lift the engine hood and in- spect the engine itself. As the exhaust manifold is con- nected to the engine and located under the hood, and the burnt condition of that component was readily noticeable to the eye, it is a fair inference that a visual check of the engine would have disclosed this condition, and the noise from the leak would have been apparent to the mechanic if he had the hood up and his head near the motor, while this would not have been noticeable to mechanics work- ing 10 feet or more away. Michael does not explain why he did not raise the engine hood to check the motor while shut off and while running;25 but as he admits he worked on 45 near the end of his shift that night, it is inferable that he may have been lax in his safety check due to fatigue or the lateness of the hour. This inference is generally sup- ported by Speese's uncontradicted testimony that, after the first 2 or 3 weeks of his reemployment, Michael's work became poor, because he began to leave repair work unfinished, so that both Speese and Marciniak often had to go over it, to tighten down bolts properly and do other things left undone. All of this testimony presents cogent proof that the manifold leak existed when Michael began work on the tractor, and the defect was serious and so noticeable that Michael should have caught and remedied it in the normal course of his job, if properly and completely performed. Respondent's proof further tends to show that its reac- tion to this oversight by discharge was reasonable and not unusual , in light of Michael's past work performance. Testimony of Krepel and Thomas MacNamara is to the effect that: As soon as Krepel noticed and verified the de- fect, he gave driver Schneider another truck. MacNamara later that morning noticed Schneider's rejection of trailer 45 when checking over the drivers' reports in the usual course, so asked Krepel about the manifold and why it had not been repaired. Krepel replied that Michael should 25 Anyone with even slight familiarity with present day automobile en- gines would know that operation of the fan, fan belt, and water pump on the engine, as well as water and oil leaks , would be a vital point of casual inspection, to see if the cooling and lubrication system was operating properly. have caught the defect and repaired it. MacNamara then said Michael's poor work had been going on too long, and told Krepel to discharge him at the end of the week, but to let him do minor maintenance work on tires, etc., in the meantime . MacNamara testified that Michael had long been doing inferior work since his reemployment, without improvement, and that this last omission was the "straw that broke the camel's back," so he decided not to tolerate it any longer, and discharged him. On his work performance during his present employment, testimony of Thomas MacNamara, Speese, and Krepel shows that: When MacNamara rehired Michael, he told him that he was doing so only because he had trouble finding mechanics, and that he was giving Michael another chance with Respondent, but he would have to improve his work. Michael replied that he had learned much since his prior work with Respondent, had matured a lot, and would be a better mechanic. After he worked about 3 weeks, Speese reported to Thomas MacNamara that Michael had started off well, but was beginning to lose in- terest in his work, and was not completing it, so that Speese and Marciniak had to check his work and at times redo it, tightening bolts, etc., which delayed the work of the night shift. MacNamara cautioned Michael about this. When MacNamara asked Speese in December why the night shift was slow in getting its work out, with three men working, Speese reported that he and Marciniak were slowed down when they had to check Michael's work continually and at times complete it. Both Speese and Krepel talked to Michael about getting his work out properly and on time , and MacNamara again talked to Michael about it early in January, suggesting that he should ask the other mechanics for help if he had trouble with his repair work. Despite this, Michael's work did not improve and culminated in the incident on January 24, which caused MacNamara to order his discharge. All of this testimony presents a cogent picture of an employer who, while clearly antiunion and knowing Michael was still a union adherent, was nevertheless attempting to bear with his deficiencies and help him to improve his work,26 and finally discharged him only after his work did not improve but culminated in the serious work oversight found above which was the immediate and efficient cause of his termination. I conclude that this proof is adequate to rebut the prima facie case of discharge made by General Counsel. It is well settled that known union ad- herence and activity does not immunize an employee from discharge for cause such as bad work, and while Respondent may have welcomed this chance to get rid of Michael, as an active union adherent, Respondent still had the clear right to discharge him for cause, when Michael did not perform his work properly; and the evidence here strongly supports the conclusion that this motivated the discharge, so as to balance and negate any inference of discrimination from mere union membership and even the agressive union hostility shown by other un- fair labor practices. See Republic Cotton Mills, 101 NLRB 1475; Baltz Bros. Packing Co., 153 NLRB 1114, 26 This proof far overweighs pro forma general testimony of Michael that in his second employment he was never criticized or reprimanded about his work, nor warned he might be discharged for bad work, nor even given suggestions about improving his performance. G & A TRUCK LINE, INC. 1122; Fort Smith Broadcasting Company v. N.L.R.B., 341 F.2d 874, 878 (C.A. 8).27 Considering all the circumstances pro and con, I con- clude that while the issue is a close one on the facts, General Counsel has not sustained the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of substantial testimony in the record as a whole that Respondent discharged Michael I-Iartsox for his union adherence or activity. I shall recommend dismissal of the complaint insofar as it alleges that his discharge was unlawful. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and de- sist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Since the violations of Section 8(a)(1) included promises of benefits 27 General Counsel tries to impugn this cogent proof by the argument that the proof of past unsatisfactory performance was vague, with no specific instances of bad performance cited. While testimony of this type is often a suspicious circumstance , it is not significant here. Although Thomas MacNamara admitted that Respondent in the past has not fired mechanics for one such mistake as charged to Michael , it is clear that Respondent hired Michael the second time on a conditional basis, and that it leaned over backward to try to help him improve his work, and discharged him only when his failure to improve culminated in the failure to repair the leaky manifold , which was far from an arbitrary or abrupt ac- 855 and threats of reprisal such as discharge or layoff, in cir- cumstances indicating Respondent was motivated by a desire to dissipate a claimed or suspected majority status, I shall recommend a broad order. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By interrogating employees regarding their union membership, sentiments, and activities to the extent found above, trying to persuade, and persuading, em- ployees by promises of benefits and threats of reprisal to withdraw their union authorization cards and applications for membership in the above-named Union, and assisting them to withdraw such cards in writing, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices af- fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not violated the Act by its refusal to recognize the said Union as bargaining agent of its em- ployees in the unit found above, or by its discharge and failure to reinstate Michael Hartsox, or by any other con- duct alleged in the complaint, except as found above. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] hon. Its lenient and reasonable attitude is also shown by Speese's testimony that while he reported to management several times on Michael's deficiencies, he made allowances for his age, admitting "most of these young fellows don't get their work out right," which required checking by the experienced mechanics, so Speese did not "bear down" on Michael, but tried to help him and "bring him along. " However, even a lenient and long-suffering employer is not required to put up with bad work indefinitely, even from a known union adherent . See Fort Smith Broadcasting Company v. N.L R.B., supra.