Martin Theatres of Georgia, Inc.

108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Martin Theatres of Georgia, Inc. and International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators , Local No. 225. Case 10-CA-6892 January 11,1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On September 15, 1967, Trial Examiner Robert Cohn issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that those allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed ex- ceptions with a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the Charging Party's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that Respondent, Martin Theatres of Geor- gia, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents, suc- cessors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.2 ' The Charging Party's request for oral argument and for a time exten- sion in which to file further citations and brief is hereby denied as, in our opinion , the record, the exceptions , and the briefs heretofore filed adequately present the positions of the parties. 2 The address and telephone number for Region 10, appearing at the bottom of the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, is amended to read : 730 Peachtree Street, N.E., Room 701, Atlanta, Geor- gia 30308 , Telephone 526-5760. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended (herein the Act), was heard at At- lanta, Georgia, on June 12 and 13, 1967,1 pursuant to due notice. The complaint, which was issued on May 10, on a charge dated March 24, alleged in substance that Mar- tin Theatres of Georgia, Incorporated, the Respondent herein, engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, by various specified acts of interference, restraint, and coercion in November and December 1966 and January 1967, and by discharg- ing two of its employees (Louie T. Rice and Clifford W. Bryson) because of their union membership and activi- ties.2 The Respondent's answer generally admitted the ju- risdictional allegations of the complaint, but denied en- gaging in any unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my obser- vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS3 I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Alleged Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1) The Respondent operates several motion picture theaters in the Marietta-Smyrna, Georgia, vicinity. On or about November 13, 1966,' approximately seven projec- tionists employed by Respondent assembled at the home of employee Ruby Ryan for the purpose of discussing methods of securing increases in their wages. Present, in addition to the employees (which included the two alleged discriminatees herein), was a Mr. Means, a business agent of the Union. Means told the employees of the ad- vantages of becoming members of the Union, and handed out union cards. All the employees except one, Marvin (Cobble) Miller, signed a card. The following day employee Clifford Bryson met Theater Manager Ben Gossage in the lobby of the theater and the latter said, "I heard about your meeting you had." When Bryson inquired "what meeting," Gossage replied, "you know what meeting." Bryson said "oh, you must be talking about Ruby's birthday party. We had a good tur- I All dates hereinafter occurred in 1967 unless otherwise specified. 2 It was also alleged that an additional reason for the discharge of Bryson was because he gave testimony under the Act in Case I0-RC-6936, involving the Respondent. 3 There is no issue as to the Board's jurisdiction or labor organization. The complaint alleges sufficient facts, which are admitted by answer, upon which I may, and do hereby, find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. At the hearing, it was stipulated that International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, Local No. 225 (herein called the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4 References hereinafter to the months of November and December refer to the year 1966. 169 NLRB No. 22 MARTIN THEATRES OF GEORGIA key draw," to which Gossage responded "you can get in trouble for that. "5 The complaint alleges that the foregoing remarks by an agent of Respondent created the impression of surveil- lance of its employees' union activities and constituted a threat of reprisal if they continued to engage in such ac- tivities on behalf of the Union. I agree, and find that by making the statements heretofore attributed to him, Gossage interfered with, restrained, and coerced em- ployees in the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Near the end of November, the business agent of the Union, Mr. Means, died. This apparently had a signifi- cant effect upon the organizational efforts of the em- ployees, for shortly thereafter a group of them got together and decided to get out of the Union. A petition to that effect was circulated. Bryson signed it on or about December 5, and so advised Gossage in the latter's of- fice. According to Bryson's testimony, Gossage advised that he thought Bryson had done the right thing, and that Martin would take care of him. Gossage corroborated Bryson with respect to the essentials of this conversation except that, in lieu of the last phrase thereof, Gossage claims that he told Bryson that he "really didn't think the Union could help him all that much." The complaint alleges that by this statement, Gossage "promised its employees economic and other benefits if they refrain from joining or retaining membership in, or engaging in activities on behalf of the Union." For reasons heretofore cited, I'm inclined to credit Bryson and agree with the General Counsel's contention that Gossage's statement constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.6 On January 24, a reopened hearing in a representation case involving the Respondent (Case 10-RC-6936) was held in the Board's Regional Office in Atlanta. Bryson at- tended the hearing voluntarily, having been neither sum- moned nor subpenaed by either Company or Union. However, near the close of the hearing, he was called as a witness by the Company and testified as to his work ex- periences with the Company and particularly as regards the training necessary to attain the job of projectionist or operator which he held at the time.7 The following day, according to Bryson's testimony, Gossage told him that he had heard what Bryson had done. He said that Bryson had "really fouled things up for Martin" and that he was "on the bad side of Richard Stanley and James Zimmerman [officers of the Respondent]," and that he could "get into trouble" Gossage recalled that one day Bryson came into his office and advised him that he had attended the hearing, that the company lawyer had put him on the stand, that he had done very well, and that he had learned "how important an operator was at the theater." Gossage did not recall making any remarks during the conversation. The foregoing incident is alleged in the complaint to constitute interrogation concerning union activities in 5 The foregoing findings respecting this conversation are based upon the testimony of Bryson which is credited in this regard. Gossage stated simply that one day about this time Bryson came into his office and told him about going to "ole Ruby's house" to a birthday party and said something about a turkey drawing. However, Gossage denied saying anything to Bryson , stating that about this time the telephone rang and he answered it. While neither Bryson nor Gossage particularly impressed me as witnesses, Gossage appeared quite reluctant with respect to testifying concerning this conversation , and I find that it occurred substantially as Bryson testified. 8 Bryson testified that he, in fact , received a wage raise in January. No 109 violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I do not agree. Giving the conversation as testified to by Bryson its broadest interpretation, I cannot conceive how the lan- guage of Gossage constitutes interrogation under any commonly accepted definition of that word. Clearly, Gossage was made aware that Bryson had testified at the hearing, and nothing Bryson ascribed to him indicated that Gossage was seeking or requesting additional infor- mation. If anything, the language constituted a threat or restraint for testifying; however, for reasons cited infra in the analysis section of this Decision, I have grave doubts that the words were uttered in the manner testified. Ac- cordingly, and since the General Counsel neither sought to amend the complaint to allege a threat nor argued the same in his brief, I will, therefore, recommend that this al- legation of the complaint be dismissed. B. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharges As previously noted, both alleged discriminatees herein were projectionists at the Belmont Hills Theater. Although Bryson was denominated a "projectionist" and Rice was a "relief projectionist," each operated the camera alone in the booth while on duty, and they were the only two projectionists employed at the theater at that time. Each worked a definite schedule of hours which was not reduced to writing prior to December 22. Such schedule apparently provided that on Mondays Bryson worked from 1:45 until 6 p.m., at which time Rice re- lieved him and worked until closing. On Tuesdays, Bryson worked from 1:45 p.m. until closing (Rice not working that day), and on Wednesdays, the Monday schedule was repeated. In addition to his job at the theater, Rice worked for an ice cream company in Atlanta wherein he operated a truck and delivered ice cream on a route. His work for the ice cream company was, in fact, his "regular job," and his employment there was known at all times material by Gossage. His hours on the ice cream job were irregular, however, and this resulted in his being rather consistently late in reporting for work at the theater. Sometimes this tardiness would be only several minutes, but on other oc- casions it ranged upwards to a couple of hours. On these occasions, it was the custom and practice for the operator on duty (Bryson) to continue working in the booth until Rice reported for work It was also apparently the custom and practice for the two men to swap time on occasions; that is to say, when Rice was late on one day during the week, he would come in early on a subsequent day to relieve Bryson so that the total time each man worked would level out over a period of time. Apparently, this practice was agreeable to the management of the Respondent, at least up until the latter part of December, when Bryson complained to Gossage concerning Rice's tardiness. Bryson requested Gossage to make up a written schedule, stating that he could not make personal plans because he was never certain when company records were proffered to confirm or deny this assertion ' The entire transcript of this reopened hearing was proffered into evidence in the instant case, and received as Resp. Exh 2. Part of the critical issue in the matter was the appropriateness of the unit petitioned for. That is, the Union was seeking to represent a unit of motion picture theater projectionists at the five theaters of the Company in the Marietta- Smyrna, Georgia, area. The Employer contended that such a limited unit was inappropriate , and that the appropriate unit should also include other employees of the Employer such as cashiers, doormen, ushers, etc. The Board Decision, which agreed with the position of the Union, issued on May 29, 1967, and is reported at 164 NLRB 1175 110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rice was going to report for work. Gossage complied with this request, and, on December 22, he caused to be, typed a written schedule designating the time of work for each man (which conformed substantially with the schedule they had previously been working) and which stated at the bottom as follows: ' "Tardiness will not be tolerated"8 Gossage gave each of the men a copy of the schedule and posted a copy in the projection booth. Gossage also testified undeniably that he informed each man that there would be no further time swapping unless he approved it, to which they agreed. The written schedule was, by its own terms, supposed to become effective immediately. However, due to the showing of a motion picture at the theater called "Dr. Zhivago," commencing December 25, the schedule had no application during its showing, which ran to February 5. This because "Dr. Zhivago" is termed a "road show," and, unlike the ordinary motion picture which runs con- tinuously from the opening of the theater until closing, a "road show," due to its length, has only one showing in the afternoon9 and one showing in the evening, with a lapse of several hours in between. Accordingly, from December 25 until February 5, Rice did not relieve Bryson on Mondays and Wednesdays as per the schedule, and therefore there was no occasion for him (Bryson) to be required to wait on Rice to relieve him in the booth. However, on Monday, February 6, Rice was, by his own admission, an hour and a half late for work. Gossage spoke to him on that occasion, and advised Rice that he could not tolerate such tardiness any more, that they were going to stick with the schedule and that if Rice could not do the job he would get someone else. Rice did not work on Tuesday, but on Wednesday, February 8, he failed to report to work on time (at 6 p.m.). At 6:10 p.m., Gossage walked by the booth and saw that Bryson was still there. He asked him if Rice had come in , and received a negative response. A few minutes later Gossage saw Rice drive into the parking lot. He thereupon went into his office, prepared a pay envelope, and sent word by the doorman to have Rice report to him. When Rice came into the office, Gossage asked him to sign a pay voucher, which he did, and Gossage asked if there were any questions. Rice said no, unless Gossage wanted to know why he was late, which was, according to Rice, because his clock was wrong. However, that was all that was stated, and Rice left the office and returned to the booth. A few minutes later, Gossage, noting that Rice's car was still in the parking lot, went to the booth. The door was open, and both men were standing inside the booth talking, with their backs to Gossage. Bryson was stating to Rice that "the son of a bitch won't be here much longer and if things don't change I won't either," when Bryson looked up and saw Gossage. Gossage asked Bryson what was wrong. Bryson replied that he was "tired," to which Gossage responded that he was tired of Bryson's "smart mouth and smart ways." At this point Rice left the booth but he heard Bryson tell Gossage that he (Bryson) was not going to quit - that Gossage would have to fire him. Gossage responded that Clifford was not fired - all he had to do was to go back to work and cut out the "smart busi- ness." However, after some more discussion, Rice heard Gossage say that if Bryson was not going to do any better, he might as well "go on with Rice."10 Bryson left, but returned to the theater about 7:30 that evening to get his check. However, there was no sub- sequent discussion with Gossage respecting the discharge. C. Analysis and Concluding Findings Regarding the Section 8(a)(3) and (4) Allegations It is well established that the burden of proof is upon the General Counsel to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the "real reason" for the discharges herein was to discourage union membership, and/or, in the case of Bryson, because he gave testimony under the Act. Respondent's position is that both employees were discharged for cause; i.e., in the case of Bryson, because he cursed his superior and generally depreciated his judgment; in the case of Rice, because he continued his habitual lateness for work after warning. Recognizing that "direct evidence of a purpose to violate the statute is rare- ly obtainable," and that I must therefore "give considera- tion to circumstantial evidence as well as to that which is direct" in reaching a conclusion on this issue," I find, based upon a consideration of all evidence in the record as a whole and the reasonable inferences that flow therefrom, that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden. We may start with the proposition.that a fair inference from the record evidence is that the Respondent was op- posed to the unionization of its employees, and, as found above, made certain threatening statements which were designed to deter union activity. However, it does not necessarily follow that any concurrent discharges were similarly designed. In neither case of alleged discrimination is it shown that the discriminatee was a foremost or leading advocate of the Union. For aught the record shows, the sum total of their activities in this regard was that they attended a meeting called by other employees at which they signed a union card. Since there were no company supervisors or agents present at the meeting,12 it is only by inference and relegation to the "small plant doctrine" 13 that it can be shown that Respondent's management knew of Rice's presence at the meeting; however, Gossage admittedly knew, on the basis of his conversation with Bryson, that the latter had attended and signed a card at the meeting. But Bryson subsequently signed a petition to get out of the Union, and so informed Gossage. Thus the only con- duct of Bryson relating to the Union which occurred between the time of his signing the aforesaid petition and his discharge was his attendance and participation in the representation case hearing on January 24. Perforce, the General Counsel and the Union rely heavily on this ac- See Resp. Exh. 1. The italics appeared in the schedule, as stated. ° There were matinees on Wednesdays , Saturdays, and Sundays. 10 The foregoing findings are based upon a synthesis of the testimony of the three individuals involved. 11 Hartsell Mills Company v. N.L.R.B., I I1 F.2d 291, 293, (C.A. 4, 1940). 13 At the hearing, I allowed General Counsel 's motion to amend the complaint to allege that Marvin (Cobbie) Miller was an agent of Respond- ent. If this could be proved, then, of course, it could be argued that Miller's knowledge of the discriminatees' presence at the union meeting could be imputed to Respondent. However, in my judgment, General Counsel failed to sustain his burden on this issue, and, upon Respondent's motion made at the close of General Counsel's case-in-chief, I dismissed this allegation of the complaint. 13 Cf. Malone Knitting Company, 152 NLRB 643, 647, enfg. 358 F.2d 880 (C.A. 1). MARTIN THEATRES OF GEORGIA 111 tivity as rekindling the Respondent's asserted antipathy towards Bryson. It is to be recalled that Bryson went to the hearing voluntarily, having been neither subpenaed nor otherwise, summoned by either the Respondent or the Union. He was called as a witness by the company attorney ap- parently without prior consultation or interview. Both, parties claimed before me that Bryson's testimony was; favorable to their respective contentions; accordingly, I have carefully read and considered his testimony as given at that hearing. While there are statements in the testimony which an imaginative attorney could argue supported his client's position, I believe, on balance, that the testimony as a whole reflected more favorably towards Respondent's position. 14 Certainly, there was nothing in his testimony so detrimental to Respondent's case which could have reasonably provoked a characterization that Bryson had "really fouled things up for Martin." Accordingly, for this as well as demeanor considerations, I have serious doubts that the conversation occurred as Bryson described it, and therefore discredit him to that extent. But even assuming, arguendo, that one of the officers of Respondent did take umbrage at something Bryson said at the hearing, and uttered the above-quoted remark in the presence of Gossage, as Bryson testified, I do not believe, under all the circumstances, that such was the operative reason for the discharge. Thus, when Gossage approached the projectionists' booth following the discharge of Rice, it cannot be said, on the basis of the evidence in this record, that he had either determined to tire Bryson or was even, indeed, seeking a pretext therefor. He went there simply because, having seen Rice's car still on the parking lot, he wondered whether Rice was preparing to leave the premises. As he entered the booth he heard Bryson (whose back was turned) call him (Gossage) a "son-of-a-bitch,"15 and then state that he (Bryson) was "tired" and intended to quit. After an em- ployee makes these types of abusive and uncooperative statements, it strains credulity to conclude, as the General Counsel and Union argue, that such was not the compelling reason for the discharge, but rather that Gossage simply seized upon this as an excuse to take the action which had been planned ever since Bryson testified at the Board hearing on January 24.16 With respect to Rice, there is grave doubt, as previ- ously noted, that Respondent knew, prior to the discharge, that he was prounion. Admittedly, his only ac- tivity in this regard was attendance at the meeting at Ruby Ryan's house where he signed a union card. How- ever, even assuming company knowledge of this conduct, I would still find that General Counsel failed to sustain his burden on this issue. Thus, we have a case of an employee who was so con- sistently tardy in getting to work that his fellow employee complained to management about it. Whereupon, the manager wrote out the schedule setting forth that "tardi- ,ness will not be tolerated," and so advised both men. Due to concurrent change in the type of motion picture shown, i.e., a "road show," from that time until February 5, which resulted in a change in the employees' working hours from those shown on the written schedule, there was no occasion during this period for Rice to be late in relieving Bryson. However, as soon as the regular schedule resumed, so did Rice's tardiness. After being ap- proximately 2 hours late on Monday, February 6, for which he was remonstrated and warned by Gossage, he was again late on his next working day - Wednesday,, February 8. Rice knew he had erred and was subject to discharge at the time; he made no protest to Gossage when informed of the action.17 In the absence of any more recent evidence of Rice's union proclivities since November 13, which would tend to offset the reasonable presumption that it was Rice's neglect which prompted the discharge, I find unpersuasive the General Counsel's argument that Rice's union activities constituted the real reason therefor. It is true, as the General Counsel and Union argue, that "time-swapping" was a practice which, in the past, had been condoned by the Company. How- ever, such condonation ceased after Bryson complained that Rice abused it, and there is no evidence that it was thereafter condoned prior to the discharge. Accordingly, I find and conclude that General Counsel failed to sustain his burden of proving that Rice's discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. II. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with the interstate operations of Respond- ent, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow thereof. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the record as a whole, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Martin Theatres of Georgia, Incorporated, Respond- ent herein, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Em- ployees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, Local No. 225, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By engaging in certain described conduct referred to in section I hereof, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor 14 For example, the Board found "The projectionists are the most highly skilled and the highest paid employees in the theaters. They are not considered fully competent until they have worked in a projection room for:.: least 2 or 3 years " (164 NLRB 1175.) Yet Bryson testified that he only trained for 4 months before he "took over the booth." 15 While Bryson did not mention Gossage by name, it is clear in the con- text of' the situation that it was he to whom Bryson was referring. Thus Bryson's statement was made to Rice, whom Gossage had just fired It may reasonably be assumed that Rice did not look kindly upon Gossage for taking such action, and had so expressed his sentiments to Bryson prior to Gossage's appearance on the scene . In any event, Gossage's as- sumption that the epithet was directed at him was reasonable in the con- text of the language used and the situation extant. 16 Gossage testified that only a week or so previous to the discharge, he had invited Bryson to leave his office because the latter had , in a "smart manner," questioned Gossage's judgment respecting the scheduling of a motion picture 17 Indeed , there is some evidence in the record that Rice welcomed the discharge since the "moonlighting" job at Martin apparently tended to be a burden upon him. 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The Employer has not violated Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other. than those found in this Decision. 18 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 18 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES RECOMMENDED ORDER Martin Theatres of Georgia, Incorporated, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Promising benefits or more job security to em- ployees to induce them to refrain from joining or support- ing International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, Local No. 225. (b) Leading employees to believe that it knows of their union activities or otherwise creating the impression of surveillance of union activities. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of, collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Marietta, Georgia, theaters and Belmont Hills Theater and Smyrna Drive-In Theater, located in Smyrna, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."18 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after having been duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted immediately upon the receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Recommended Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.19 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT promise benefits or greater job security for not joining or supporting International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, Local No. 225, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT lead our employees to believe that we have knowledge of their union activities, or other- wise create the impression that union activities of our employees are under surveillance. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter- fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex- ercise of their rights to self-organization, to join or assist the aforementioned or any other labor or- ganization, to bargain collectively through represent- atives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of a labor organization of their own choosing. MARTIN THEATRES OF GEORGIA, INCORPORATED (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528 Peachtree- Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street N.E., Atlanta, Geor- gia 30323, Telephone 526-5760.