Ohio Car & Truck Leasing, Inc.

198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL Ohio Car & Truck Leasing , Inc. and General Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 92, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 8-CA-4383 January 17, 1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On September 20, 1967, Trial Examiner Eugene F. Frey issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,' the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, as modified below. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified below and hereby orders that the Respondent, Ohio Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., Canton, Ohio, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order, as herein modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) If requested to do so by the Union, honor and comply with all terms of the contract executed by Respondent on July 12, 1966, and recognize and deal with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the ap- propriate unit in the administration of said contract, for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966, and as part of such compliance furnish to the Union, upon request, all information relevant to the administration of the contract including an up-to-date list of all em- ployees in said unit, with their addresses and LABOR RELATIONS BOARD telephone numbers; check off union dues in ac- cordance with current checkoff authorizations as may be provided to Respondent by employees in said unit pursuant to the union-security clause in said contract; and make payments into the Ohio Highway Drivers Insurance Fund, in accordance with the Health and Welfare Benefits clause of said contract. 2. Delete from paragraph 2(d) of the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision that part thereof which reads "to be furnished" and substitute therefor "on forms provided . . . ." 3. The address and telephone number for Region 8, appearing at the bottom of the Notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision, are amended to read: Federal Office Building, Room 1695, 1240 East 9th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 522-3738. ' We do not adopt so much of the Trial Examiner's Decision as rrequires Respondent to check off union dues of employees who revoked previously executed checkoff authorizations and did not thereafter ex- ecute any new checkoff authorizations 2 We hereby correct the following inadvertent errors made by the Tnal Examiner in his Decision. (a) In Section II,A, the termination date of the collective-bargaining agreement should be corrected to read October 31, 1963, not October 3, 1963, as stated (b) In Section II,B,2 , in discussing the General Counsel's third argu- ment, the date of the revocations of checkoff authorizations should be cor- rected to read July 1964, not July 1944, as stated. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION Statement of the Case EUGENE F. FREY, Trial Examiner: The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Ohio Car & Truck Leas- ing, Inc., has refused to recognize and bargain with the above-named Union as the statutory bargaining agent of its employees in an appropriate unit, by refusing to en- force a union-security clause in a contract executed in July 1966, between Respondent and the Union, refusing to give the Union current data regarding its employees and their present health and insurance benefits, and by other conduct, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. (herein called the Act). A sub- sidiary issue is whether the Union represented a majority of employees in said unit between July 1966, and November 1, 1966, the date of expiration of said con- tract. The issues arise on a complaint issued April 25, 1967, by the Board's Regional Director for Region 8, and thereafter amended before and at the hearing,' and answer of Respondent which admitted jurisdiction but de- nied the majority status of the Union and the commission of any unfair labor practices. A hearing on the issues was held before me at Canton, Ohio, on June 13, 1967, in which all parties participated fully through counsel or other representatives. Respondent presented oral argu- ment at close of the testimony and all parties have filed 1 The complaint issued after Board investigation of charges filed by the Union on October 10 and November 1, 1966 169 NLRB No. 37 OHIO CAR & TRUCK LEASING, INC. written briefs which have been carefully considered by me in preparation of this Decision. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my obser- vation of all witnesses on the stand, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS, AND THE STATUS OF THE LABOR ORGANIZATION. Respondent is an Ohio corporation with its principal office and place of business in Canton, Ohio, where it leases motor vehicles to other business enterprises. In this business it annually provides services to such enter- prises valued in excess of $100,000, and specifically it provides such services valued in excess of $50,000 to The Canton Provision Company, which company has an- nual direct inflow of goods and materials valued over $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. H. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background History In 1961 the Union was certified by the Board as statu- tory bargaining agent in an unit consisting of mechanics and utility men at Respondent's shop, including such other employees of Respondent as are under the jurisdic- tion of the Union, but excepting employees who are mem- bers of other labor unions until such employees shall be assigned to the jurisdiction of the Union. Thereafter Respondent and the Union negotiated and executed a col- lective-bargaining agreement which expired October 3, 1963. After negotiations beginning in that month which ended in a 1-year contract executed on December 20, 1963, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges against Respondent, on which the Board issued its com- plaint in February 1964, in Case 8-CA-3375, charging Respondent with a refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union in various respects in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. After a hearing before a Trial Ex- aminer, that official issued his decision on July 16, 1964, finding such violation, the Board on December 8, 1964, filed its decision adopting the findings and recommenda- tions of said Trial Examiner, and ordering Respondent to sign an agreement reached with the Union on December 10, 1963, if requested, otherwise to bargain in good faith with the Union, upon request, and ordering it to cease and desist from making any unilateral changes in terms or conditions of employment of employees in said unit.2 On petition by the Board for enforcement of its Order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on May 26, 1966, issued its decree enforcing said Order.3 On the Union's request of June 8, 1966, for execution of the contract aforesaid, Respondent on July 12, 1966, ex- ecuted said contract, and on June 30, 1966, also posted a notice embodying the terms of the Board's Decision and 2 149 NLRB 1423. 3 361 F.2d 404. 4 Article 2, paragraph I of the contract was a clause providing for main- tenance of union membership by all present employees who were union 199 Order, all in compliance with the court decree. Upon notice of such compliance , the Regional Director for Re- gion 8 on September 2, 1966 , closed Case 8-CA-3375, conditioned upon continued observance of the Board Order. B. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices 1. Sequence of events On July 21, 1966, the Union mailed to Respondent authorization cards for deduction of union dues, and forms to be used by Respondent in making payments to the Ohio Highway Drivers Insurance Fund, requesting Respondent to "obtain authorizations and make deduc- tions for all employees on the current payroll for the month of July." Referring to a list of employees furnished to the Union by Respondent about June 7, 1966, in a suit in the United States District Court by the Union against Respondent, the Union requested a list of deletions or ad- ditions to the list. On August 19, 1966, the Union received a letter from Respondent dated August 16, stating that Respondent desired to terminate the existing contract. On August 25, 1966, the Union wrote Respondent, acknowledging the termination notice, noting no reply to its July 21 letter, and requesting Respondent to furnish the Union (1) infor- mation whether employees were presently covered by hospitalization, surgical, accident, sickness, and life in- surance policies, and the nature and extent of such cov- erage, with names of the insurance carriers and (2) a cur- rent list of employees in the unit, with names, addresses, and telephone numbers, so that the Union could notify them that their failure to comply with the union shop clause in the contract' would allow the Union to demand their discharge under that clause, and requesting com- pany "co-operation" in giving employees the current checkoff authorization cards. It further advised that the Union desired to meet with Respondent to negotiate a new contract, and suggested an early start of negotiations. It demanded a reply to this letter by September 6, 1966. Respondent replied by letter of September 22 (1) ad- vising that employees "were covered by hospitalization and insurance," (2) refusing to furnish current names and addresses of employees on the ground that they had not signed union authorization cards, and because no court order required this, (3) refusing to have employees sign the insurance fund authorization cards, or dues checkoff authorization cards, or to collect initiation fees from new employees, because the contract did not require such ac- tion, and then employees had specifically ordered Respond- ent not to deduct union dues, and (4) citing Section 302 of the Act as authority for its refusal to deduct union dues and withhold insurance fund payments. It also stated its willingness to consider any "improvements" which the Union desire to make in the existing contract, saying it had some changes of its own for consideration by the Union. On September 27, the Union replied, rejecting the Company contentions of September 22, advising that the information was requested to enable the Union to carry out its duties in administering the present contract, and members, and requiring that employees who were not union members, and all new employees, should become members of the Union after the statu- tory period of 31 days. There is no contention by Respondent that this clause was illegal. 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD demanding, on the basis of the union shop clause, the discharge of any employee employed more than 31 days, within 5 days from date of demand, except as to em- ployees regarding whom the Union gives prior notice that they "have complied with their obligation to maintain their membership." Respondent did not reply to this letter. On October 10, 1966, the Union filed its original charge herein. On October 31, 1966, Respondent notified the Regional Director that it had not met with the Union because it believed the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees, and enclosed a petition for an election. The Regional Director filed this November 2, 1966, in Case 8-RM-468, but later dismissed it. The Union filed an amended charge herein on November 1, 1966. After due investigation, on November 25, 1966, the Regional Director declined to issue a complaint herein on the ground that the Union had not represented a majority of employees for at least a year prior to filing of the original charge, and that no presumption of con- tinuance of such status could be inferred after November 1, 1966, when the current contract expired. On appeal by the Union from that decision, General Counsel of the Board on April 7, 1967, directed issuance of the com- plaint on the ground that the 8(a)(5) allegations "presented issues warranting Board determination on the basis of record testimony." 2. Contentions of parties, and concluding findings In testimony and argument, Respondent admits its refusal to furnish all the data requested by the Union be- fore expiration of the contract aforesaid, as found above, on the basic ground that the Union no longer had majority status among employees in the unit aforesaid, and ex- pressed its willingness to recognize and bargain with the Union if and when the employees chose it as bargaining agent in a secret-ballot election.5 The claim of lack of majority status is based on uncontradicted oral and docu- mentary testimony adduced by Respondent to the effect that: On or about July 10, 1964, it received from nine em- ployees in the unit signed letters addressed to the Com- pany, revoking the signers' authorizations for deduction of dues payable to the Union, and on July 20, 1964, it received due notice of a decertification petition filed by employee James Kirkpatrick on said . date in Case 8-RD-327, on the claim that substantial number of em- ployees no longer wanted the Union as their bargaining agent. The Union received notice of filing of this petition in due course. The Regional Director thereafter dismissed it due to pendency of the charge in Case 8-CA-3375. The Union received specific notice of the employees' revocations at least on April 17, 1965, when it received copies of their letters from Respondent in answer to interrogatories filed by the Union in a damage suit pending in the United States District Court.The Union set up a picket line at Respondent's plant on November 1, 1966, when the contract aforesaid expired. However, none of Respondent's employees in the unit joined the picket line, but all ignored it and continued to work on November 1 and 2, while the picket line was operating. There is no specific proof that the execution and presentation of the checkoff revocation letters were induced by Respondent, or were other than voluntary ac- tions of the employees who signed them, or that Respond- ent by any specific conduct improperly induced Kirk- patrick to file the decertification petition. Further, I must credit testimony of company officials that all employees in the unit on November 1, 1966, refused to join the picket line, and this included seven older employees who had long before joined the Union and had authorized deduction of dues by Respondent under prior contracts with the Union.6 Since it appears from testimony of Dawson that the picket line contained between 300 and 350 people, many of them workers in Canton Provision Company, largest customer of Respondent with a plant adjoining that of Respondent, the refusal of Respondent's whole work force to honor the line is some evidence in- dicating that all of them, including seven who were still listed on the Union's rolls as members' but who had revoked their dues authorizations, were not union ad- herents or even sympathetic to its activities.8 It is also noteworthy that the initial antiunion action of the seven union members in 1964, as well as their consistent action in November 1966, occurred after the close of the hearing in the prior unfair labor practice case, hence these facts have never been before the Board in formal fashion prior to this case, although I must assume that the Regional Director became aware of them in his investigation of the charges herein, that they weighed in his dismissal of the charges, and that General Counsel also knew of them when he ordered issuance of the complaint herein on the ground that the case involved "issues warranting Board determination." General Counsel makes three arguments in reply to these cogent facts: (1) The Union must be considered as having con- tinued majority status until expiration of the contract on November 1, 1966, because (a) no employee in the unit who had been in fact a member of the Union is shown to have repudiated that membership at any time, (b) mere revocation of the checkoff authorization did not amount to a repudiation of membership, and (c) mere filing of the RD petition by one employee does not prove that it was supported by a majority of the employees in the unit; neither of the latter events tends to rebut the presumption of continued majority status arising from the prior certifi- cation of the Union as bargaining agent, and of continued recognition of that status in the first contract between the parties, as well as the negotiations of late 1963 on terms of the second. (2) The failure of employees in the unit to honor the Union's picket line at expiration of the second contract, in light of Respondent's continued hostility toward the ' Respondent does not directly challenge the unit alleged in the com- plaint, which is the same one found by the Board in the certification of 1961, and in its Decision and Order of December 1964. I therefore find that all mechanics and utility men at Respondent 's shop in Canton, Ohio, including such other employees as are under the jurisdiction of the Union, excepting, however, employees who are members of other labor unions, until such employees shall be assigned to the jurisdiction of the Union, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 8 I do not credit vague and evasive testimony of Union Official Robert E. Dawson to the contrary , for while he admits he talked to Respondent's workers going through the picket line on November 1, he could not state that any of them joined in the picketing. ' Jerome Arnold, Rudolph W. Barber, James T. Clark, Stanley Melott, Stephen C. Oravetz, John A. Beck, and James Law. 8 Henry Colder Company, 163 NLRB 105; cf. Palmer Asbestos & Rubber Corporation, 160 NLRB 723. OHIO CAR & TRUCK LEASING, INC. 201 Union, prior unfair labor practices, and continuing refusal to honor the second contract after execution thereof, can- not overcome the presumption of continuance of majority status for a reasonable period to enable the Union to carry out its duties under that contract. (3) Even if it appears that the Union lost majority status by the revocations of checkoff authorizations in July 1944, and never regained that status, Respondent's unfair labor practices from 1963 onward contributed to that loss of status, so that it cannot now assert a good- faith doubt as to the majority status, under the doctrine of Joy Silk Mills, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732, cert. denied 341 U.S. 914. As to claim (1), it is well settled that majority status once lawfully achieved by a union through choice of the employees is presumed to continue for a reasonable period in order to give the bargaining relationship thus established a fair chance to succeed. Franks Bros. Com- pany v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 706. Where the status arises from a certification issued after a Board election, that status cannot be challenged for a year after certifica- tion, Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96. The presump- tion continues after the year but can be rebutted by a showing that majority status has in fact been lost. Gulfmont Hotel Company, 147 NLRB 997. Here, of course, the initial year had long since expired when Respondent executed the latest contract by court`nrder in July 1966, so the majority status was normally open to proof of its loss. However, since Respondent resisted the Board's Order to sign that contract or recognize the Union during court litigation until May 23, 1966, and both the Board's Order and the court decree enforcing it required Respondent to remedy its refusal to bargain with the Union as of December 1963, when the Board found that the Union had majority status, any loss of majority status prior to compliance with the court order would not affect Respondent's duty to bargain with the Union. After Respondent complied with that order by signing the con- tract, the presumption of majority status arising from both Board and court order continued only for purposes of enabling both parties to administer that contract accord- ing to its terms under both orders (the Union having elected under the Board Order to operate under the con- tract terms settled in December 1963, and not to bargain anew). See Squirrel Brand Co., Inc., 104 NLRB 289,29 1; Northwestern Photo Engraving Co., 106 N LRB 1067. It follows that for the remaining life of the contract, July 12, 1966, to November 1, 1966, Respondent is debarred from attacking the Union's majority status on the basis of any prior actions of employees affecting that status, but was required to recognize and bargain with the Union as the statutory bargaining agent of all employees in the unit in order to administer the terms of that contract.9 Hence, for this purpose, the exact nature and extent of em- ployees' repudiation of the Union in July 1964 are im- material, and those employee actions are no defense to Respondent's admitted failure and refusal to check off dues on the basis of checkoff authorizations executed by employees prior to the term of the November 20, 1963, contract, its refusal to advise new employees of the requirements of the union-security clause of the contract, and their obligations thereunder, and its refusal to give the Union an up-to-date list of employees in the ap- propriate unit so that the Union could take steps of its own to enforce that clause.10 I find that by such refusals Respondent failed to comply with and administer the con- tract during its remaining life as required by its terms" and thereby failed in good faith to recognize and bargain with the Union as the statutory bargaining agent of the employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 12 In addition, Respondent's refusal to honor the two con- tract clauses noted above amounted to a unilateral change of wages of employees who would apparently become beneficiaries of the insurance plan under the contract, and in that respect violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.13 Since Respondent in August had taken steps under the contract to indicate its intention of terminating it, thus opening the way for negotiation of a new contract, its failure to give the Union, upon request, details of the in- surance coverage presently provided for employees in the unit was likewise a refusal to bargain with the Union in good faith, both during administration of the contract and in anticipation of negotiation of a new contract, for such data was reasonably necessary to enable the Union to po- lice the existing contract during its term and also to ena- ble it to prepare for negotiations on a new contract. I find that Respondent by such failure further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. See Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., supra; Oliver Corporation, 162 NLRB 813. As to claims (2) and (3), under some Board precedents it would appear that if Respondent had bargained fully and in good faith with the Union until November 1, 1966, the uncontradicted proof indicating the probability of a secession from the Union by a majority of employees, in- cluding seven known, union members, on November 1 and 2, 1966, might be sufficient to sustain the defense that Respondent is presently not required to recognize the Union due to loss of majority status.14 But where Respondent has continued to display hostility toward the Union and a rejection of the fundamental purposes of the Act by engaging in new refusals to comply with the con- tract terms, and thus continuing to refuse to recognize the Union's statutory status, all following its begrudging com- 0 See also Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 NLRB 583; San Clemente Publishing Corporation, 167 NLRB 6. 10 In argument during the hearing, Respondent specifically disclaimed any contention that the 1964 withdrawals of checkoff authorizations amounted to withdrawal of membership from the Union, and Union Agent Dawson testified that the Union considered members who may have writ- ten such withdrawals as still members of the Union, though delinquent in dues. 11 Dawson's uncontradicted testimony shows that. Under prior con- tracts containing similar clauses, Respondent had "co-operated" with the Union by handing out checkoff authorization cards furnished by the Union to new employees as hired, and advising them of the terms of the union-security clause, by making payments to a jointly operated em- ployers-union insurance fund on forms supplied by the Union , giving co- pies thereof to the Union, and by affording the Union an equal chance under the "Additional Help" clause of article 2 to supply new workers as Respondent had need for them. The insurance payment report forms received by the Union from Respondent showed the current name and ad- dresses of all employees for whom payments were made , and from this data the Union was enabled to mail each employee a booklet explaining his benefits and rights under the insurance fund 1' N.L.R.B. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 U S. 938, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R B., 138 NLRB 15, enfd. 325 F.2d 746 (C A 6); Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 154 NLRB 1756, 1760, 1761 13 George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc, 153 NLRB 1209 (fn. 1), enfd 373 F.2d 762 (C.A 5). 14 See Squirrel Brand Co., Inc., supra, Northwestern Photo Engraving Co., supra, Armco Drainage and Metal Products, Inc., 116 NLRB 1260, 1262, and Darlington Veneer Company, Inc, 123 NLRB 197 202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pliance with the court order,15 I must conclude that such conduct establishes Respondent's bad faith sufficiently to preclude it from asserting and relying on the employees' alleged repudiation of the Union at or after the expiration of the contract, even if I assume that such repudiation was entirely voluntary and unaffected by actions of Respondent.However, I cannot make that assumption here, for while Respondent posted the notice required by the Board's Order in Case 8-CA-3375 which notified the employees that it would sign the contract negotiated with the Union, or negotiate with it anew if requested, and that it would not interfere with employee rights, its failure to carry out the terms of the contract by resuming the checkoff of dues or handing out membership applications to new employees as in the past or giving the Union up- to-date lists of workers to that it could police the contract itself were clearly calculated to indicate to employees that Respondent would do nothing to affect their status as required by its contract in these respects, and thus to en- courage present employees to renounce the Union if they were already members, and to induce new employees to resist any union overtures toward membership under the union-security clause. Respondent's omissions in this respect were thus calculated to encourage employees to reject the Union, as by their apparent refusal to honor the picket line of November 1 and 2. The inference of coer- cive inducement toward antiunion action is also sup- ported by Treacy's admission that, on the day before the hearing herein, he secured signatures of 10 employees (in- cluding 6 apparent union members) on a statement of present renunciation of the Union, by asking them to ex- press their opinion about the Union by signing the state- ment , and suggestion that "if you want to start a new union, pick out another one, I will back it one hundred percent and go with you. If you want to form your own union , I will go with you on that." This plainly told them Respondent would accept any labor organization they chose or formed, except the Union above named; the coercion inherent in this statement of its preferences is not mitigated by the later claim that Treacy would deal with any union that a majority of them chose." Since Treacy admits he talked in the same vein to his em- ployees various times in 1966 and 1967, it is inferable that this coercion had its effect on them even after Respondent signed the contract and posted the notice required by the Board, thus negating the purpose of the notice and execution of contract in freeing the employees of the coercion inherent in Respondent's past unfair labor practices. I must conclude that, despite its reluctant 15 Respondent executed the contract on July 12, 1966, specifically "by order of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals," and Respon- dent still contended at the hearing that the Board's Order finding the Union to be the exclusive bargaining agent "does not make it so," even though enforced by the court decree. Respondent also intimated that the proper remedy for its conduct during the remaining life of the contract was an application to hold it in contempt of the court decree. This not only shows its unwillingness to deal with the Union under any circumstances (cf. Herron Yarn Mills, Inc., 165 NLRB 553), but in addition the claim has no merit in law, because the availability of a contempt proceeding is no bar to further Board proceedings for new violations of the Act based on conduct occurring after the court decree which might also be contempt of that decree. See Thompson Products, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 133 F.2d 637, 640 (C. A. 6). 18 1 admitted the document of June 12, 1967, in evidence as properly authenticated, but I reject it as reliable proof of renunciation of the Union because of (1) the coercive circumstances under which Treacy admittedly procured it, and (2) Respondent's failure to bring in the signers to testify to any facts relating to their failure to cross the picket line which might formal compliance with the Board Order and court decree, Respondent continued to exercise coercion upon its- employees by its additional unfair labor prac- tices and other conduct found above, with the infer- able purpose and necessary effect of dissipating any sentiment or desire for adherence to the Union which may have existed among the present work force, and restraining new employees from making a free choice between the Union or any other labor organization as their bargaining representative. Such conduct clearly amounted not only to a repudiation of the existing con- tract but a plain announcement to the employees that Respondent would not in the future recognize or deal with the Union as their agent. In these circumstances, Respondent cannot be heard to claim that the Union lost any bargaining status on or before November 1, 1966, by free action of the employees.17 For the same reasons, Respondent's present request for an election is likewise made in bad faith, for under Board policy and precedents an election would be appropriate only if and when the at- mosphere in the plant had been cleared of all vestiges of coercion arising from Respondent's recent and continuing unfair labor practices. I therefore find and conclude on all the pertinent facts that Respondent has failed and refused since July 21, 1966, to bargain in good faith with the Union as the statu- tory bargaining agent of employees in the unit aforesaid, by its conduct found above, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 1 8 III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and the Union is a labor organization, all within the mean- ing of the Act. 2. All mechanics and utility men employed at Respond- ent's shop in Canton, Ohio, and such other employees of Respondent as are under the jurisdiction of the Union, tend to indicate that their action in November 1966 and June 1967 was voluntary aand not influenced by Respondent's unfair labor practices or other conduct in the months immediately preceding the strike, to rebut the inference of continuing coercion from such unfair labor practices. Further, lacking a recent deauthorization election under Board auspices in which the employees could affirmatively show their desires regarding con- tinuance of the prior union checkoff authorizations, the facts here fall short of the type of situation where outstanding checkoff authorizations might be considered vulnerable to later revocation by employees. See W. P. /brie & Sons, 165 N LRB "Joy Silk Mills, supra; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687; cf. Kohler Co., 148 NLRB 1434, 1435, et seq. 18 See also Kohler Co., 148 NLRB 1434, 1440-44; General Electric Company, Battery Products, Capacitator Department, 163 NLRB 198. I have considered carefully other collateral arguments made by Respon- dent during the hearing, some of which are implicit in the lines of examina- tion pursued by Respondent during the hearing, and I find them without merit. OHIO CAR & TRUCK LEASING, INC. 203 excepting, however, employees who are members of other labor unions until such employees shall be assigned to the jurisdiction of the Union, constitute a unit ap- propriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 3. For several years, including all times material herein, the Union has been the exclusive representative, for purposes of collective bargaining, of all employees in the unit aforesaid, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. By refusing to give the Union, on request, various types of data concerning employees in said unit, and their benefits and working conditions, refusing to pay moneys into insurance funds and to check off dues as required by terms of the contract executed July 12, 1966, and by other conduct found above, Respondent has failed and refused to bargain in good faith with said Union as such bargaining agent, and has thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, thereby en- gaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5), (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I will recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Although the contract executed by Respondent with the Union after protracted litigation had only a little over 3 months to run by its terms, at the time Respondent ex- ecuted it in accordance with the court decree, it is clear that Respondent's continued unfair labor practices found above prevented the Union from administering the con- tract in that period, which was its right and duty as statu- tory bargaining agent, and also prevented the Union from making reasonable preparations to negotiate a new agree- ment following Respondent's termination of the old con- tract. Thus, although the contract expired November 1, 1966, by its terms, simple equity and effective implemen- tation of the fundamental principle of collective bargain- ing stated in the Act require that Respondent and the Union be placed in the position in which they would have been after Respondent's execution of that contract but for Respondent's unfair labor practices. Hence, I shall recommend that Respondent be directed to recognize and deal with the Union as the exclusive bargaining represent- ative of its employees in the unit found above, by honor- ing the contract executed by it on July 12, 1966, in all its terms, if requested to do so by the Union, for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966; in honoring said contract, Respond- ent should be required on request by the Union to furnish to it a current list of employees in said unit, with their addresses and telephone numbers, and forthwith to deduct and forward union dues to the Union for those who authorized it under the union-security clause said contract, and to make payments into the insurance fund specified in said contract, in such sums as would have been checked off and paid thereunder in said period, ab- sent Respondent's refusal to honor the contract in said period. 19 If the Union does not request that the contract be so honored, Respondent should bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as agent aforesaid with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an un- derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Since Respondent's total conduct found above demon- strates a continuing rejection of the fundamental principle of collective bargaining inherent in the Act, I shall also recommend a broad cease-and-desist order. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Sec- tion 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Ohio Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize and deal with the above- named Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit found above by disregarding or refusing to carry out any of the terms of the collective-bargaining contract ex- ecuted by Respondent on July 12, 1966, if the Union requests that said contract be honored for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966, or failing or refusing to give to the Union in said period, upon request, an up-to-date list of employees in said unit, with their addresses and telephone numbers. (b) If no request to honor such contract is made by the Union, refusing to bargain collectively with said Union, upon request, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the unit aforesaid with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an un- derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (c) If the Union requests that said contract be honored, making any unilateral changes in wages of em- ployees established under said contract by refusing to check off union dues or make payments into the in- surance fund mentioned in said contract, as required by its terms. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em- ployment, as authorized by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) If requested to do so by the Union, honor and comply with all terms of the contract executed by Respondent on July 12, 1966, and recognize and deal with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit aforesaid, in the administration of said contract, for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966, and as part of such compliance furnish to the Union, upon request, an up-to-date list of all employees in said unit, with their addresses and telephone numbers, 19 Hyde's Supermarket, 145 NLRB 1252, enfd 339 F 2d 568, 572 (C.A. 9), George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 153 NLRB 1209, enfd. 373 F.2d 762, 768 , 770 (C A. 5) 204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD check off union dues pursuant to checkoff authorizations previously given to Respondent by employees in said unit, in accordance with the union-security clause in said contract, and make payments into the Ohio Highway Drivers Insurance Fund, in accordance with the "Health and Welfare Benefits" clause of said contract. (b) If no request to honor such contract is made by the Union, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclu- sive bargaining representative of employees in said unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (c) Post at its shop in Canton, Ohio, copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix. 1120 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify said Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith .21 20 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice . In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 41 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respon- dent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to The Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or deal with General Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 92, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of all our em- ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit stated below, by disregarding or refusing to carry out any of the terms of the collective-bargaining contract ex- ecuted by us on July 12, 1966, with said Union, if said Union requests us to honor said contract, for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966, or by failing or refusing to give to said Union in said period, upon request, an up-to-date list of our employees in said unit, with their addresses and telephone numbers. WE WILL, if requested to do so by General Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 92, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, honor and comply with all terms of the contract executed by us on July 12, 1966, with said Union, and deal with it as the exclusive bargaining representative of all our em- ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth below, in the administration of that contract for a period equal to the period between July 12, 1966, and November 1, 1966; and as part of such com- pliance with the contract WE WILL, (1) on request by the Union, give it an up-to-date list of our employees in said unit, with their ad- dresses and telephone numbers, (2) check off and forward to said Union in ac- cordance with the union-security clause in said con- tract union dues for those employees who have previously given checkoff authorization to us, and (3) make payments into the Ohio Highway Drivers Insurance Fund on behalf of all employees in said unit, according to the "Health and Welfare Benefits" clause of said contract. WE WILL, if no request to honor the above con- tract is made by said Union, bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of all our employees in the bargaining unit stated below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment, and, if an understanding is reached, em- body such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All mechanics and utility men employed in our shop in Canton, Ohio, and such of our other employees as are under the jurisdiction of said Union, excepting, however, employees who are members of other labor unions until such em- ployees shall be assigned to the jurisdiction of said Union. WE WILL NOT, if said Union request us to honor the above contract, make any unilateral changes in wages of employees established under said contract by refusing to check off union dues or make pay- ments into the Ohio Highway Drivers Insurance Fund, as required by the contract. WE WILL NOT by refusing to bargain in good faith, or in any other manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment, as authorized by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. OHIO CAR & TRUCK LEAS- ING, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Federal Office Building, Room 1695, 1240 East Fourth Street, Cleve- land, Ohio 44119, Telephone 522-3715.