Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570,

LAWRENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 570 Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570 , affiliated with the International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO and Kansas Color Press, Inc. Case 17-CP-58 January 23, 1968 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On June 6, 1966, the National Labor Relations Board issued,it Decision and Order' in the above- entitled proceeding. The Board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of Trial Examiner Louis Libbin as contained in his Decision and in his First Supplemental Decision. Thus, the Board agreed with the Trial Examiner that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by picketing with an object of recognition or bargaining within a year of a valid decertification election in Cases 17-RD-235 and 17-RD-236. The Board or- dered the Respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and to take certain af- firmative action to remedy these unfair labor prac- tices, as had been recommended by the Trial Ex- aminer. In its Decision the Board also upheld the Trial Examiner's rulings at the hearings including his rejection of certain proffered evidence whereby Respondent sought to prove its allegation that the election in Cases 17-RD-235 and 17-RD-236 was invalid for the reason that the Employer had offered superseniority to strike replacements prior to the time the petitions in those cases were filed. Subsequently, the General Counsel filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir- cuit a petition for enforcement of the Board's Order. Thereafter, on April 28, 1967, that court denied enforcement of the Board's Order,2 for the reason, the, court stated, that the Board erred in upholding rulings which precluded the Respondent from litigating its allegations in respect to promises of su- perseniority to strike replacements. The court stated that such promises, if made, would have had a long lasting coercive impact and could have af- fected the election, even though such promises might have been made prior to the filing of the elec- tion petitions . The court, accordingly, on June 28, 1967, issued a mandate, dated April 28, 1967, re- manding the case to the Board for further hearing in respect to the superseniority allegation. 158 NLRB 1332. 2376F2d643 3 Respondent claims that its current activities in front of the Employer's plant do not constitute picketing within the meamng of Section 8(b)(7)(B) and that it had ceased picketing within the meaning of that Section in Sep- tember 1966. 279 Respondent then filed a motion on. July 5, 1967, requesting that such further hearing also include litigation of the following question: "If it is again found that Respondent violated the Act, whether the Board's Order of June 6, 1966 [directing Respondent to cease-and-desist picketing the Em- ployer for recognition or bargaining and to take cer- tain affirmative remedial action] should be modified in the light of intervening circumstances."3 On July 28, 1967, the Board issued an order re- manding the proceeding to the same Trial Examiner and directing him to receive evidence, in ac- cordance with the court's opinion, bearing on Respondent's claim that the election in Cases 17-RD-235 and 17-RD-236 was invalidated by reason of the Employer's alleged offers of super- seniority to strike replacements. In the same order the Board directed the Trial Examiner to receive evidence bearing on the possible modification of the Board's Order of June 6, 1966,,and to make such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as were warranted. After holding a hearing pursuant to the order of remand, Trial Examiner Libbin issued his attached Second Supplemental Decision, dated November 3, 1967, in which he found, contrary to Respond- ent's contention, that the Employer did not make a per se offer of superseniority to any strike replace- ment. The Trial Examiner further found that what- ever offer of superseniority might be implied from the employment interview of the Employer's assistant manager, Black, with one strike replace- ment, Hufford, in September 19614 was completely withdrawn or dissipated by a subsequent statement to Hufford and other strike replacements by the Employer's president, Zimmerman. Thus, the Trial Examiner found that Zimmerman informed these employees at a meeting in about April 1962 that reinstatement of the strikers was imminent but not definite at that time; that the strikers had lost no seniority while on the picket line; that upon rein- statement the strikers would enjoy all their previ- ously earned seniority and that, if the strikers were reinstated, the replacements, and not the strikers, would have no seniority. The Trial Examiner also found that since the replacements knew, as early as April 1962, that there was no operative offer or promise of superseniority to them, the prior state- ment by Black to Hufford could in no event serve as a continuing inducement to the filing of the decertification petitions in Cases 17-RD-235 and 236 in January 1963 or have any continuing coer- cive impact upon the election which was held in Au- gust 1963. The Trial Examiner concluded that the 4 The Trial Examiner noted that this was the only incident involving an alleged offer of superseniority to a strike replacement as to which testimony was given at the reopened bearing. The Trial Examiner further noted that the only replacement involved in this incident - Hufford - voluntarily terminated his employment with the Employer in April 1963. Hufford's termination thus occurred 4 months prior to the election in Cases 17-RD-235 and 236. 169 NLRB No. 65 280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD election was not therefore invalidated by any offers of superseniority to strike replacements prior to the time the petitions were filed. The Trial Examiner also found, contrary to Respondent, that Respondent has continued to picket with an object of recognition or bargaining within the, meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act on and since September 19, 1966. The Trial Ex- aminer, accordingly, recommended that the Board reaffirm and adhere to its prior remedial order. The Employer (Charging Party) has filed excep- tions to the Trial Examiner's Second Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent has also filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Second Supplemental Decision, a supporting brief, and a brief in answer to the Employer's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at this hearing on remand and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Second Supplemental Decision, the exceptions5 and briefs,6 and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclu- sions, and recommendations of the Trial Exam- iner.7 ORDER It is ordered that the Board's Order of June 6, 1966, in this proceeding be, and it hereby is, reaf- firmed. S Respondent has also filed a motion to reopen the record to receive certain evidence which , it claims, is newly discovered and allegedly bears on certain issues which were resolved at earlier stages of these proceedings. Respondent's motion is denied on the ground that it is beyond the scope of the remand order of the court and on the further ground that the evidence it proffers is in any event insufficient to warrant reversal of the Board's prior findings. 6 Seeking to avoid the effect of the Trial Examiner's finding that the statement by Zimmerman to the employees in April 1962 effectively withdrew any possible prior offer of superseniority , Respondent advances a contention, not heretofore made in this case . Thus, Respondent argues that Zimmerman's statement was an inducement to the replacements to petition for Respondent's decertification in order to protect theirjobs, and that as such, Zimmerman's statement constituted an unlawful interference with the election. This argument by Respondent goes beyond the scope of the remand order of the court of appeals and is, in fact, directly contrary to the conten- tion upon which Respondent obtained that remand order. Respondent's argument to the court was that the Employer's alleged offer of super- seniority to strike replacements invalidated the election. The thrust of Respondent's present argument is that the Employer's denial that the replacements had superseniority invalidates the election. We accordingly reject this new contention as being beyond the scope of the remand. However, if it were necessary to dispose of this contention we would, in any event, reject it as lacking in merit. For the effect of the statement by Zimmerman was to make clear that the strikers would enjoy all their seniority, if they were reinstated , and that the replacements would not have superseniority over the strikers. Zimmerman thus did no more than put the replacements on notice - at least as of the time he spoke - that they were in the same position as any lawful replacements of strikers in an economic strike. That is, the replacements had no greater seniority rights than the strikers , and the employment interests of both groups were in direct conflict. It may well be that upon hearing Zimmerman 's statement the replacements felt - in the interest of self-preservation - a desire to seek decertification of Respondent to thwart Respondent's efforts to bargain for the reinstatement of the strikers. For Respondent's success in that ef- fort might have the direct result of putting the replacements out of work. But lawful strike replacements in any economic strike have the very same interest in protecting themselves against the very same consequences. In these circumstances , we are unable to conclude that Zimmerman's mere clarification of the seniority rights of strikers and of replacements was either an unlawful inducement to the replacements to file decertification petitions or an unlawful interference with the election. 7 We hereby correct certain inadvertent errors of the Trial Examiner in his Second Supplemental Decision. At I. 22, p. 9, the word "striking" is hereby inserted after the word "pressing." In the second line of the para- graph entitled "Recommendation" on p. 11, the word "June" is sub- stituted for the word "January." TRIAL EXAMINER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Louis LIBBIN, Trial Examiner: On July 28, 1967, the Board ordered "that the record in the above-entitled proceeding be reopened and that a further hearing be held before me for the purpose of permitting Respondent to adduce evidence, in accordance with the court's opinion,' bearing on Respondent's contention that the election in Cases 17-RD-235 and 236 was invalidated by reason of the Employer's alleged offers of superseniority to strike replacements prior to the filing of the petition in those cases; and that Respondent also be allowed at that hear- ing to adduce evidence and present arguments bearing on any proposed modification of the Board's Order-2 of June 6, 1966, in the light of subsequent events." The Board further ordered "that, upon conclusion of such further hearing, the Trial Examiner shall prepare and serve upon the parties a Second Supplemental Decision containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations based upon the evidence received pursuant to the provi- sions of this Order." Pursuant to due notice, a remand hearing was held be- fore me at Kansas City, Missouri, on September 14, 1967. All parties were represented at, and participated in, the hearing. Thereafter, all parties filed briefs, which I have fully considered. For the reasons hereinafter stated, I find that the election was valid, and recommend no modification of the Board's Order. Upon the entire records in the remand hearing and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: ' This has reference to an opinion entered on April 28, 1967, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, remanding the case "for a hearing on the respondent's charge that the Company offered super- seniority to its strike replacements ." 376 F.2d 643, 654. 2 158 NLPB 1332, 1342. Based on findings that Respondent had vio- lated Section 8 (b)(7)(B) of the Act, the Board ordered Respondent, among other things, to cease and desist from picketing the Employer for a proscribed object, "such picketing not to be engaged in for a period of 12 months following the termination of the picketing found unlawful." 3 On October 6, 1967, Respondent filed a motion to correct the typewritten transcript of testimony in designated specific respects. In the absence of objections , I hereby grant said motion , make the document a part of the record in this proceeding, and place it in the official exhibit folder as Resp. Exh . 25. I also hereby note and correct the following addi- tional obvious errors in the typewritten transcript of testimony: On p. 55, 1. 3, the words "Trial Examiner" are corrected to read "Mr. Herzog"; and on p. 63, I. 25, the words "I want you" are corrected to read "If you want." LAWRENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 570 281 FINDINGS OF FACT A. The Superseniority Issue 1. The Facts The only evidence offered by Respondent on this issue is the testimony of George Hufford, a former company employee and now an I.T.U. member of another local. Hufford testified in this respect as follows: In late September 1961 Hufford saw an advertisement placed by the Company, Kansas Color Press, Inc., in a newspaper. In response to this advertisement, he telephoned the Company, and learned that he was speak- ing to Jim Black, a company official, with whom he ar- ranged to have an interview in Lawrence, Kansas. In the course of the interview by Black, they talked about the I.T.U. strike, and Black stated that "the picket line wouldn't last out there six months, if it ever did come back in that they didn't have any seniority because they had lost it all when they went out because it wasn't a legal strike." Black at that time offered Hufford a permanent job, providing he survived a probationary period. Black told Hufford to go home, think about it over the weekend, and call Black again the following Monday. Hufford did not accept the job as a result of this conversation because he did not want to move his family when the job was con- tingent on a trial basis. However, the following Monday, Black telephoned Hufford, offered him $100 a week and promised to raise him to $119 a week or put him on an ap- prenticeship basis if his work proved to be satisfactory. Hufford accepted the offer and began working for the Company on October 16,196 1. His employment with the Company was voluntarily terminated in April 1963. About 6 months after he started working for the Com- pany, Dick Zimmerman, the president of the Company, called a plant meeting of the composing room employees at shift change. The meeting, which was attended by all the composing room employees, including Hufford, lasted about 30 minutes. During this meeting, Zimmer- man stated that the purpose of the meeting was to tell them that he was negotiating with the Union, the I.T.U., that they were thinking about taking back the strikers, that if the strikers were reinstated, they would resume their jobs "with full seniority," that "when the Union came back in that they were going to keep their seniority, that they hadn't lost their seniority on the line," that "we'd [the composing room employees] lose all our seniority" and that none of us should run out and get another job over the weekend "because nothing had ac- tually been settled yet with the I.T.U." About a week later, Zimmerman called another meeting of the em- ployees, and told them that the Union was coming back in. Black, treasurer a'nd assistant general manager of the Company, admitted having had a prehire interview with Hufford during that period, that he offered him per- manent employment at that time on condition that he start on a probationary basis, that he told Hufford "we were looking for permanent employees in the composing room, that the other unions in the plant were continuing to work and did not recognize the picket line set up by the T.T.U. in front of the plant,' and that in the opinion of our attor- neys the strike was illegal." He denied ever telling Huf- ford that if the the strikers came back to work they would have no seniority, or that the subjects of the strikers returning to work and of seniority were ever mentioned. Zimmerman did not testify, and the statements attributed to him are undenied. Hufford candidly admitted on cross-examination that his memory of these events was hazy because "it had been a long time back," and that the statements attributed to Black and Zimmerman were not direct quotes but con- stituted his recollection and understanding of what they said. However, the substance of his testimony was not shaken in any significant respect upon cross-examination by counsel for the General Counsel and the Company. On the other hand, Black did not impress me as a candid and forthright witness; his testimony is inconsistent and contradictory in many other significant respects. Upon consideration under oath, I do not credit Black's denials, credit Hufford's testimony, and find that Black and Zim- merman, in substance, made the statements attributed to them by Hufford, as hereinabove set forth. 2. Conclusions Counsel for Respondent relies solely on Black's state- ment to Hufford in the prehire interview, to which Huf- ford credibly testified and which is set forth again in the margin,4 as establishing, without more, an offer of super- seniority to a strike replacement which invalidated the decertification election, in accordance with the circuit court's opinion in this proceeding. I do not agree. There is considerable doubt in my mind as to whether this statement by Black per se constitutes an offer of su- perseniority to Hufford or that Hufford reasonably could so construe it. Counsel for Respondent presumably recognizes that the words themselves do not constitute a clear and unambiguous offer of superseniority when he states in his brief that "we think, however, that we should show briefly that what the company offered Hufford was indeed superseniority . . . . " In any event, any offer of superseniority which these words may have tended to convey, was clearly and unequivocally repudiated and withdrawn by the Com- pany's highest official about 6 months later and about 9 months before the filing of the decertification petitions.5 Counsel for Respondent has completely ignored in his brief the fact that about April 1962, long before the filing of the decertification petitions, President Zimmerman bluntly explained in plain and unambiguous words to all the composing room employees, including Hufford who understood what was said, at a plant meeting called for that purpose, that the strikers did not lose any seniority on the picket line, that upon reinstatement the strikers would enjoy all their previously earned seniority, that the replacements rather than the strikers would lose their seniority in that event, and that reinstatement of the strikers was imminent but not definite. As the replace- ments knew as early as April 1962 that there was no operative offer or promise of superseniority, the prior statement of Black could in no event have any "continu- ing coercive effect" or serve as "a continuing induce- ment" to the filing of the decertification petitions in January 1963, and to the rejection of the striking union in 4 "First we talked about the I.T.U. strike and he was telling me that the picket line wouldn't last out there six months, if it ever did come back in that they didn't have any senionty because they had lost it all when they went out because it wasn't a legal stake " 5 These were filed on January 15 and 23, 1963. 282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the decertification election of August 1963 (376 F.2d at 652, 653). 1 find that the election conducted on August 28, 1963, was not invalidated by any asserted offers of super- seniority by the Company to strike replacements prior to the filing of the decertification petitions in this case. B. The Issue of Modifying the Board's Order The Board's Order, which has been approved by the circuit court of appeals in this very case (376 F.2d at 654), among other things, enjoins the Respondent from engaging in picketing violative of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act for a period of 12 months. Counsel for Respondent contends in his brief (1) that Respondent has not been picketing. since September 19, 1966, and (2) that since October 25, 1966, its objective has been one which is not proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(B). He therefore argues that, as there has been compliance with the Act for a 12- month period, the Board's Order should now be modified to allow Respondent to resume picketing. 1. As to picketing a. The facts The facts relating to the conduct of the strikers in front of, or nearby, the Company's premises both before and after September 19, 1966, are not seriously in dispute. The front of the Company's plant is located about 75 feet from Haskell Avenue. Two driveways, about 125 feet apart, lead from Haskell Avenue to the parking lots and to the plant's office . Across the street and about 70 feet south of the south side of the plant , the Respondent parked a small travel trailer which has a coffeemaking machine, a bulletin board, a bed, and other pieces , of furni- ture. Next to this trailer, which is called the "Komfy Korner," there is a portable toilet . On the side of the trailer facing the plant, Respondent hung a sign, about 4 by 8 feet in size, which reads as follows: LAWRENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 570 I.T.U.-AFL-CIO PROVIDES A KOMFY KORNER FOR ITS MEMBERS ON STRIKE AGAINST KANSAS COLOR PRESS, INC. Konditions ! Konsideration! Kindness! Different lines are in different size type. All but the last line can be read from the place where the strikers nor- mally parked their cars in front of the plant, from a nearby telephone pole in front of the plant, and from directly in- side or outside the front door of the plant. The sign is also visible to persons approaching the plant by automobile. From the commencement of the strike in 1961 until September 19, 1966, the strikers engaged in the following 8 Although the record shows that this sign was removed at an un- specified date by agreement of Respondent and the Board, counsel for Respondent states in his brief that "we do not rely on this fact " S No handbills were offered to deliverymen, strike replacements, or management personnel 8 This finding is based on the testimony of Black that he personally ob- served such incidents I credit Black's testimony in this respect because pattern of picketing: Two striking employees patrolled at any single time in front of the plant premises clear across from driveway to driveway, wearing signs which stated that Respondent was "on strike against Kansas Color Press." A third picket who was present at the same time used a clipboard to keep a record of all persons who en- tered the Company's premises, and noted the license numbers of their automobiles. A fourth picket was also present to spell any of the other three who might be on a break at the Komfy Korner or the adjoining toilet. The pickets regularly parked their automobiles, two in number, on county property on the plant side of Haskell Avenue, between the two driveways and adjacent to the Company's property parallel to the street. One was parked a few feet from a telephone pole, to which pole was also attached a large picket sign publicizing the strike, and the other was parked directly behind the first one. At times pickets, instead of patrolling, rested their signs against their automobiles or the nearby telephone pole while they sat in or stood near their automobiles. From time to time, as the need arose, pickets crossed Haskell Avenue to use the facilities of the trailer or the portable toilet next to it. This pattern of picketing was continuous, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, with a picket being assigned to various shifts and spending a total of about 30 hours a week in front of the plant premises. After September 19, 1966, the same strikers who en- gaged in the previously described picketing activities, four at any single time, continued to arrive each morning, park their automobiles in the exact same manner and lo- cation, and spend their entire shift sitting in their automo- biles, standing in the vicinity, making trips to the trailer and the toilet as the need arises, walking in front of the plant and across its south entrance. One of the strikers continued to have a clipboard in his possession and to make an entry whenever anyone visits the plant, taking down the license numbers of their automobile. The "ON STRIKE" sign continued to be maintained on the trailer.6 The following changes have occurred since September 19, 1966: The picket sign was removed from the telephone pole. Strikers no longer walked back and forth in front of the Company' s premises wearing "On Strike" signs. Instead, they had in their possession handbills which they offered to all strangers and visitors entering the Company's premises.7 The handbills, in large bold type, contained the exact same wording as the previously described picket signs, that Respondent is "ON STRIKE AGAINST KANSAS COLOR-PRESS." When a visitor or stranger comes to the plant property and parks his car, the striker gets out of his own automobile and, while standing near it, asks the visitor or stranger who is getting out of his parked car whether he would like one of their handbills which has been folded over. At that point, the parties are about "a car's length or so" apart. The person so solicited either refuses or comes over to the striker and accepts a handbill, whereupon the striker thanks him. On occasion a striker entered on the Company's premises in order to offer a handbill to a visitor who had parked his car." If the visitor happened to enter the plant before he it is undenied The strikers who distributed handbills were not called as witnesses by Respondent, and no claim of unavailability was made Although Picket Captain Schutz testified that the'strikers were instructed not to go on the Company's premises and never did so in her presence, her testimony discloses that she was not present the major portion of the time after October 25, 1966. LAWRENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 570 could be solicited by the striker , they watched for him to come back out and made the same solicitation as he returned to his parked car. The strikers also keep notes on who has accepted and who has refused a handbill. On occasions , the strikers who are seated in their parked au- tomobiles placed the handbill against-the inside of the right front car door window so that they-can be seen and read by a person entering the plant premises. These strikers continued to conduct themselves in the foregoing manner on a regularly assigned schedule from 7 a.m. until 45 minutes after midnight every day except Sunday, with each striker still spending about 30 hours a week in this manner. b. Conclusions In support of his contention that after September 19, 1966, the strikers engaged, not in picketing, but "in lawful and, indeed, constitutionally protected conduct," counsel for Respondent states in his brief that "In our view, what matters is that there is no patrolling with placards." How- ever, the Board and- the courts have held that patrolling, in the common parlance of movement , and the carrying of placards, are not a sine qua non of picketing. Thus, in Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797, (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156 NLRB 388, 394, the Board notes that the definitions of the words "pickets" and "picketing," set forth in Black's and Bouvier's Law Dictionaries and in Webster's New International Dic- tionary (2d ed.), do not include "patrolling or the carrying of placards [as] a concomittant element." And Mr. Justice Black, in speaking of "picketing ... in 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)," describes the concept of "patrolling" as encompassing "standing or marching back and forth or round and round ... generally adjacent to someone else's premises . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.) N.L.R.B. v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 [Tree Fruits], 377 U.S. 58 at 77 (concurring opinion). In N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBT [Woodward Motors], 314 F.2d 53 (C.A. 2), the court of appeals agreed with the Board that a union picketed when its representatives sta- tioned themselves in automobiles parked on the shoulder of a highway adjacent to a struck plant and placed picket signs in a snow, bank, explained the merits of the dispute to inquiring persons, and occasionally got out of their cars to stop deliverymen from coming on the premises. What the court said in rejecting the Union's contention that its agents' conduct did not constitute picketing , is precisely applicable to the instant case. Thus, the court stated (314 F.2d at 57-58): Webster's new International Dictionary (2d Ed.) says that the verb "picket" in the labor sense means "to walk or stand in front of a place of employment as a picket" and that the noun means "a person posted- by a labor organization at an approach to the place of work...... Movement is thus not requisite, although here there was some. The activity was none the less picketing because the Union chose to bisect it, placing the material elements in snow banks but protecting the human elements ... by giving them comfort of heated cars .... So in the instant case, Respondent's conduct was no less picketing because it placed a sign on the Komfy Korner which indicated the purpose of the gathering of the strikers in front of the Company's premises or made that purpose apparent by handing out "On Strike " handbills to all strangers entering the Company's premises or on 283 occasion by placing these handbills (which were the equivalent of the picket signs reduced in size) against the window of their parked car so as to be visible to those en- tering the premises , and placed the pickets in, or around the automobiles adjacent to the Company 's premises. Equally applicable is the decision of that court in N.L.R.B. v. United Furniture Workers, [Jamestown Ster- ling Corp.], 337 F. 2d 936 (C.A. 2). There , after picketing in the conventional fashion , union representatives placed "On Strike" signs on nearby poles and trees each day at 6 a.m., 5 days a week. The pickets sat in their cars in a parking lot across the street from the struck premises until 3 p.m. each day until they removed the signs. In re- manding the case to the Board, the court stated that it could not sustain the Board's finding that the Union was picketing because there was no evidence that the pickets were identifiable as union representatives or that they were seen by employees , customers, or suppliers. The case , said the court, might therefore be analogous to a situation in which a union posted signs but its representa- tives stayed in a house nearby. In the instant case, the facts missing in United Furni- ture Workers are present. Employees , customers, and other persons entering the Company 's premises could recognize the pickets both because they -had seen them personally before and because the pickets parked their cars in the same place where they had parked them in the past when they had patrolled. Moreover, the pickets did not remain in their cars the entire time, but occasionally walked to the trailer where the sign , announcing that the Respondent maintained the facility for the convenience of strikers, identified them and on occasion entered the Company's premises to distribute a handbill. In addition, the "On Strike" handbills identified the persons distribut- ing them. Furthermore , because there was evidence in United Furniture Workers that the union representatives had locked their signs to the trees and poles to which they were affixed, the court there said that it was possible that the union representatives had remained in the automo- biles as a precaution against the signs being stolen. In the instant case , there is no evidence from which one could reasonably infer that the pickets were present at the Com- pany's premises to protect Respondent's property, and Respondent makes no such claim or contention. In United Furniture Workers, the court regarded the following test as being applicable in that case , stating (337 F.2d at 940): Although we do not consider it necessary or ap- propriate at this time to attempt to define the precise boundary of what the Board may consider to be "picketing," the test here would seem to be whether the presence of the representatives in the car was in- tended to and did have substantially the same sig- nificance for persons entering the employer's premises as if they had remained with the signs. In the Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union case, supra, the Board applied the following test (156 NLRB at 394): The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor organization or by strikers of in- dividuals at the approach to a place of business to ac- complish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from work or keeping customers away from the employer's business. The criterion under either test is satisfied in the instant case. The facts in Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, supra, 284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD are strikingly similar to those in the instant case. There, after a court enjoined continued picketing, some of the persons who previously carried picket signs, and other union members, parked their cars near the company's of- fice, stood in front of access roads leading to the com- pany's office, and prepared to and did distribute leaflets to the occupants of any cars entering the premises. In ad- dition, there, as in the instant case, union representatives continued to record the license numbers of the cars with which they were unfamiliar. Instead of placing an "On Strike" handbill against the window of the pickets' parked cars, as in the instant case, the union there taped handbills on a hood of one of the parked cars and attached another to a piece of plywood standing near another car (156 NLRB at 391). The Board held in that case that the union was picketing in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act (156 NLRB at 394-395). The distribution of handbills to persons entering the premises of the struck employer (rather than to persons driving by), the recording of license numbers, and the union's prior conduct, demon- strated that the handbilling substituted for the conven- tional picketing which had preceded it. So in the instant case, Respondent's previously described conduct as a whole, of which the handbilling was merely a part,9 constitutes picketing. Encompassed in this conduct was "confrontation" and "communica- tion," which counsel for Respondent describes in his brief as being "indispensable" characteristics of picketing. Fol- lowing in the footsteps of the conventional picketing which had preceded it, this conduct was intended to have, and could reasonably be regarded as having had, substan- tially the same significance for persons entering the Com- pany's premises as Respondent's preceding picketing; namely, to persuade persons entering the Company's premises not to enter or do business with the Company and thereby advance Respondent's cause. This was par- ticularly true in the case of salesmen and customers enter- ing the Company's premises, as Respondent admitted that it made a notation of the license numbers of automo- biles of strangers entering the premises and whether the occupants accepted a handbill so that it could persuade them not to do business with the Company. To hold that Respondent's conduct, under the circumstances and in the context and setting previously detailed, is not picket- ing, would be to exalt form over substance. I find that at all times after September 19, 1966, Respondent has continued to picket the Company or to cause the Company to be picketed within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7) of the Act.10 2. As to the proscribed object a. The undisputed facts On October 25, 1966, Respondent's attorney, Kauf- mann, telephoned Company's attorney, Ellison, about settling the strike. Kaufmann explained that the Respond- ent "was not pressing for an exclusive recognition agree- ment" but that he "just wanted to sit down and negotiate a strike settlement agreement" which would provide for 9 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Milk Drivers, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Company), 132 NLRB 901, 905, relied on by Respond- ent, is therefore distinguishable, as it involved "mere handbilling," without more. 1° Contrary to Respondent's contentions in its brief, this finding does not raise constitutional issues , as Respondent has no constitutional right the reemployment of the strikers and the "conditions under which the strikers themselves would be working." Ellison stated that if as a result of the returning strikers the Respondent were to represent a majority in the unit, it would want to be recognized again as exclusive bargain- ing representative. Kaufmann replied that "that wasn't the point" and that it was a matter of getting the strikers "back in and discussing ... the terms they would come back in under." Kaufmann again telephoned Ellison on November 8, 1966 , and renewed his request to "bargain about the reinstatement of the strikers ." By letter dated November 8, 1966, Ellison advised Kaufmann that "because of the NLRB decertification the Company is unwilling to enter into any kind of negotiations with ITU." At no time did Ellison or any company representative advise Kaufmann that they were willing to negotiate a strike-settlement agreement with Respondent. b. Conclusions In its Decision of June 6, 1966, the Board found that "an object of Respondent Union 's picketing after August 3, 1964, was to force or require the Company to recog- nize or bargain with it as the representative of its em- ployees within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act (158 NLRB 1332, 1339). Respondent concedes that beginning with October 25, 1966 , its objective was to have the Company recognize and bargain with it as the representative of the Company 's striking employees con- cerning the settlement of the strike, the return of the strikers to work, and the working conditions of the strik- ing employees . It contends that this was its sole objective at least from October 25 on, and that this objective is not proscribed by Section 8(b)(7) of the Act because that sec- tion must be construed as proscribing recognition and bargaining with a labor organization as the exclusive bar- gaining representatives. I do not agree. In the first place, Respondent has never formally or publicly disclaimed its prior unlawful objectives. As the statute is violated if only one object falls within its proscription, it is immaterial that there may also exist ad- ditional lawful objects. i i In any event, the Board has held that picketing to com- pel an employer to hire a group of employees and to bar- gain with the Union about their working conditions vio- lates Section 8(b)(7) of the Act even if the employees would not constitute a majority if hired . Thus, the Board stated in Hoisting and Portable Engineers Local 101 (Sherwood Constr. Co.), 140 NLRB 1175, 1178: [F]orcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa- tive of his employees is an object within the scope of Section 8(b)(7), even though exclusive recognition for all employees in an appropriate unit is not also being sought. Indeed, Section 8(b)(7) of the Act prohibits picketing for recognition by a union which represents a majority of employees. Dayton Typographical Union [Greenfield Printing] v. N.L.R.B., 326 F.2d 634 (C.A.D.C.). A for- to continue its conduct at the Company's premises merely because the distribution of handbills is part and parcel of the conduct which con- stitutes picketing . See, e.g. , Cox v Louisiana, 379 U S. 559, 564, Martin v. Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 148-149. " National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO (Weyerhaeuser Lines), 147 NLRB 1317, 1325, enfd. 342 F 2d 538 (C.A. 2) LAWRENCE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 570 tiori, picketing to compel an employer to recognize a union as the representative of a minority of its employees - which the employer is not obligated to do under the Act - is barred. I find that on and after October 25 , 1966, Respondent continued to picket with an object proscribed by Section 8(b)(7) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The election conducted on August 28, 1963, in Cases 17-RD-235 and 236, was not invalidated by any offer of superseniority from the Company to strike replacements prior to the filing of the petitions in said cases. 2. At all times on and after September 19, 1966, 285 Respondent has continued to picket the Company and has caused the Company to be picketed with an object of forcing or requiring said Company to recognize and bar- gain with it as the representative of the Company's em- ployees within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7) of the Act. 3. At all times since August 4, 1964 , Respondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(B ) of the Act. 4. Respondent has failed to prove the existence of any circumstances to warrant a modification of the Board's outstanding Order. RECOMMENDED ORDER I hereby recommend that the Board reaffirm and ad- here to its Order of January 6, 1966.