169 NLRB 557
Davis Transport, Inc.
DAVIS TRANSPORT
Davis Transport, Inc. and Local Union No. 236, Af-
filiated With International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America. Case 9-CA-4100
January 31, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On June 7, 1967, Trial Examiner Harry R.
Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to
remand the Decision to the Trial Examiner for
further consideration, and also exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion, Respondent's motion, and exceptions and
brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,
and recommendations as modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that 'the Respondent, Davis Transport, Inc.,
Paducah, Kentucky, its officers agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein
modified:3
1. Delete paragraph 1(b) and reletter the remain-
ing paragraphs accordingly.
2. Delete from paragragh 2(f) that part thereof
which reads "to be furnished" and substitute
therefor "on forms provided."
3. Delete from the notice the entire second in-
dented paragraph.
I Respondent filed a motion to remand the proceeding to the Trial Ex-
aminer for a ruling on Respondent's motion to strike certain testimony and
for a further statement as to the extent to which the Trial Examiner relied
upon the testimony. The motion is denied as lacking in merit.
557
2 The record shows that the Union in a letter to Respondent stated that
it represented a majority of Respondent's employees in a bargaining unit
of all truckdrivers in the Paducah terminal, and requested recognition as
exclusive bargaining representative of such employees. Such letter, ad-
dressed to "Davis Transport, Inc , Wade E Davis, Vice-president" was
delivered by registered mail to Respondent's premises on November 4 It
apparently remained unopened until Vice President Davis, the son of
President Davis, on November 7 returned from an absence On this date
Vice President Davis showed the Union's letter to President Davis. On
November 10, 1966, Respondent advised the Union that Respondent did
not believe the Union represented the employees, questioned whether the
unit sought was appropriate, questioned the validity of the cards, and sug-
gested that the matter be referred to the Board.
We do not adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that a demand for
recognition occurred on November 3, 1966, when President Davis met
with the drivers. However, whether the demand was made on November
4, or 7, there was a clear refusal to bargain on November 10, and on all of
these dates, based on our adoption of the Trial Examiner's various unit
placement findings except as modified below, we find that the Union
represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit.
With respect to Thompson, the record shows that although he was for-
merly a regular driver with Respondent, he left Respondent and went to
work for his father when his father obtained a large contract for timber.
After the discriminatory discharges, Thompson "came in," "offered his
services," and "drove for a few days." Under these circumstances, we
unequivocally exclude Thompson from the unit and do not count him in
determining the majority. We do so for two reasons first, because the
record does not establish a reasonable expectancy of his returning to work
for Respondent on a permanent basis after he went to work for his father;
and, second, because he was employed during the relevant period only as
a temporary replacement for a discriminatorily discharged employee. See
Tampa Sand & Material Company, 137 NLRB 1549.
3 While the Trial Examiner in his Recommended Order and notice al-
luded to unlawful interrogation of employees by Respondent, we note that
no such fording was made by the Trial Examiner. In these circumstances,
we hereby strike from the Recommended Order and the notice the
references to unlawful interrogation.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: The complaint
herein was issued on December 30, 1966,1 pursuant to a
charge and amended charges filed on November 14, and
23 and December 14 and 19, by Local Union No. 236,
affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
herein called the Union, and served on Davis Transport,
Inc., herein called the Respondent or Company. The
Respondent is alleged to have engaged in unfair labor
practices by interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, as
well as by the discharge of certain employees because of
union or concerted activities and by its refusal to bargain
collectively in good faith with the Union, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. By answer duly
filed, Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations
of the complaint and the supervisory status of its pre-
sident, Davis, and its general manager, J ody. It denied the
alleged supervisory status of its dispatcher, Powell, but at
the hearing admitted that allegation of the complaint. It
further denied that one James Ward was its agent and de-
nied the commission of unfair labor practices.
A hearing was held before me at Paducah, Kentucky,
on March 7, 8, and 9, 1967, at which all parties were
I All dates hereafter are 1966 unless otherwise noted.
169 NLRB No. 80
558
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
represented and were afforded full opportunity to par-
ticipate,
examine
witnesses,
and adduce relevant
evidence. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel
and Respondent and have been given careful considera-
tion by me.2
Upon the entire record in this case, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I.
JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Kentucky corporation engaged in the
transportation of gasoline, fuel, lime, cement, and other
products from its terminals located at Paducah, Ken-
tucky, and Dawson Springs, Kentucky. During the 12
months preceding the issuance of the complaint, Re-
spondent in the usual course and conduct of its business
operations sold and distributed products the gross value
of which exceeded $500,000. During the same period it
sold and shipped materials in excess of $50,000 from its
terminals in Kentucky directly to points outside the State
of
Kentucky.
The complaint
alleges,
Respondent's
answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is and has
been at all times material herein an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II.
THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges , Respondent's answer admits,
and I find that the Union is now and has been at all times
material herein a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
As noted above, the complaint alleges that the Re-
spondent has committed unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. There are
therefore three primary issues:
1. Whether the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act?
2. Whether
the
Respondent
discriminatorily
discharged nine employees on or about November 3 and
caused one of them, Bobby Griffith, to quit his employ-
ment on or about December 9, because of their union ac-
tivities?
3. Whether the Respondent unlawfully refused to bar-
gain collectively with representatives of its employees?
B. 8(a)(1)
Most of the Respondent's drivers working out of the
Paducah facility testified in this proceeding. From their
testimony, which I credit, it appears that some of them
signed union-authorization cards on November 2 and
others during the early morning hours of November 3.
On the morning of November 3 several of the drivers met
with Respondent's President Davis. According to Davis,
2 Respondent's unopposed motion to correct the transcript by substitut-
ing "November" for "December" at 1 22, p. 24, is hereby granted.
he had been at the Dawson Springs facility that morning
and had received a telephone call from Paducah inform-
ing him of "some trouble" there. Upon his arrival at
Paducah, he was informed that there was " union trouble"
and that some of the boys were trying to sign up for the
Union. He then called the drivers to his office and asked
them what the trouble was all about. The drivers told him
that they had signed up for the Union. Davis expressed
his disappointment but refused to discuss the Union at
that time until he could consider the circumstances. The
drivers then turned to leave whereupon Davis asked them
to turn in their keys, timecards, and credit cards.
The drivers, on the other hand, testified that when
Davis heard they had signed up with the Union, he told
them that he could not pay union wages. Driver Harper
then said that Davis would receive a letter from the
Union and that if Davis had anything else to say he
should say it to the union representatives. At that junc-
ture Davis retorted that if the employees felt that way to
turn in their keys, timecards, and credit cards. With minor
variations, this version of the November 3 meeting was
corroborated by the other drivers present; and I credit
their testimony after considering not only their demeanor
but the implausibility of the version given by Davis. I find
it unlikely that Davis would order the drivers to turn in
their keys, timecards, and credit cards merely because
they were leaving, as he claims, to attend a meeting. It ap-
pears that such an order was never issued to the drivers
in the past despite occasional, absences. I find it more
likely that the order to turn in keys and cards was a
manifestation of Davis' disappointment, if not anger, at
the news of the unionization of his drivers.
A second meeting was held by Davis with the drivers
on November 3. At the second meeting the drivers
discussed complaints they had concerning working condi-
tions as well as their remuneration. According to Davis,
he told them that since they worked on a percentage of
the tariffs received by the Respondent and since the
Respondent was working on raising these tariffs, the
drivers' salaries would automatically, go up when the
Respondent's rates were raised. The drivers, on the other
hand, while confirming that the discussion concerned
working conditions and rates, testified that Davis
promised to try to get rates raised, rather than such objec-
tive being already in process. Moreover, it was unclear as
to whether the raise in rates referred to the Respondent's
rates or to the drivers' rates of pay. Again I credit the
testimony of the drivers in this respect, and, find that the
comments of President Davis created an impression that
he would try to get the drivers' remuneration increased.
Such promises of benefit made so soon after Davis
learned of his drivers' union membership must be deemed
to have been intended to counter the union drive and con-
stitute an interference with the rights of the employees in
violation of Section 8(aa(1). This conclusion is fortified by
additional testimony of the drivers, which I credit, that
during this meeting Davis informed them, that he would
have to close up and go out of business if the Union came
in.
Driver Haley testified that during the second meeting
of November 3
mention was made about some of
Respondent's employees at Dawson Springs having been
fired. After refreshing his recollection by examining an af-
fidavit given by him sometime ago, Haley testified that
Davis said the Dawson Springs' employees were fired
"because they were having wrecks and they were trying
to push the Union in real hard." I credit his testimony and
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find that such language suggested a similar fate for the
Paducah drivers, a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
A similarly thinly veiled threat was made to driver
Langston at a conversation he had with Dispatcher
Powell on November 2. During that evening Powell
telephoned him and told him that he had heard Langston's
name was on a list of those signed up for the Union. He
also asked Langston what "the boys were doing" and told
him that the union activity didn't concern a lease operator
such as Langston. That same night, Powell also phoned
driver Griffith's house and spoke to driver Moffitt there.
He told Moffitt he didn't think the Union would benefit
the drivers a bit, adding, that they "knew what would hap-
pen the next morning when [they] came in to work
because [they] had signed a Union card."
Several days later Powell approached Langston at the
terminal and asked Langston to sign a blank sheet of
paper containing only a date. He also showed Langston
a draft of a letter which had been prepared by Powell and
asked Langston to copy it on the blank sheet of paper.
The letter which Powell asked Langston to copy was a
letter of resignation from the Union. Langston signed the
blank sheet of paper but, being in a hurry, asked Powell
to fill it out and mail it. Langston never saw the completed
letter, if in fact it was completed, nor did he supply Powell
with an envelope or postage.
Powell also solicited driver Haley to withdraw from the
Union on or about November 7. He showed Haley a
letter of resignation which Haley copied. He then told
Haley he would send it by registered mail to the Union.
Haley, himself, however, never informed the Union of
any withdrawal intention.
On November 12, Powell called Moffitt to his home.
Driver Vaughan was also present. On this occasion,
Powell told Moffitt and Vaughan that he wanted them to
forget about the Union and sign a withdrawal card or
letter, adding that "things would go back to the way ...
they had before this Union thing all came up."
Other attempts were made to have the drivers abandon
their union allegiance. Driver Vaughan testified that he
took a load of gas from the Paducah terminal on the morn-
ing of November 3 and on his way back telephoned
Powell to ask if there was anything else to do. Powell
replied that he had a "lot of loads" at Paducah but that the
"other drivers don't want to work, they'd rather have a
Union down here." When Vaughan returned to the ter-
minal, Powell met him and drivers Ward and Angel and
sent them to Davis',office telling them, "See if you all
can't work something out between the company like a
Company Union or something."
In the evening of November 3 Powell telephoned
Vaughan at his home and, said, "here's someone wants to
talk to you ... What he is going to tell you is the God's
truth." Then driver Ward got on the phone and told
Vaughan that Davis had given him authority to call
Vaughan back to work, "to forget thus lTnionTusiness
and come back for the company," adding, "You either
come back for the company or you're out." The next
morning Vaughan saw Powell at the terminal and Powell
told him, "You know you can go back to work like
nothing ever happened if you'll just forget this Union
deal." Similarly, Ward told driver Griffith that he could
come back to work if he forgot about the Union. Griffith
was also asked on November 3 by Manager Jody to talk
to drivers Vaughan, Moffitt, and Williamson to get them
to forget about the Union and come back to work for the
Company.
559
I credit the testimony of these drivers and find the
Respondent's solicitation of these drivers to withdraw
from the Union to be coercive and intimidating, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Phil-Modes Inc., and
Harold Berlin dibia Berlin Coat Manufacturing Co., 159
NLRB 944. Although driver Ward's utterances would or-
dinarily not bind the Respondent since he did not occupy
a supervisory status with the Respondent, special circum-
stances make a contrary conclusion inevitable. Super-
visor Powell altered the ordinary driver status of Ward
when he initiated the telephone conversation between
Ward and Vaughan and clothed Ward with apparent
authority to speak for the Respondent by telling Vaughan
that
Ward spoke "God's truth." Although Powell
testified that he left when Ward took the telephone and
therefore was unaware of what Ward is alleged to have
said to Vaughan, he failed to deny that he introduced
Ward as telling "God's truth." I credit Vaughan's
testimony to that'effect and having found that Powell
made such a statement to Vaughan, the fact that Powell
did not remain to hear what Ward said will not relieve him
and the Respondent from the consequences that
developed.
C. Section 8(a)(3)
Reference has been made above to the meeting of
November 3 between Davis and some of the drivers. The
drivers present at that meeting were Griffith, Williamson,
McClain, Moffitt, Weaver, Harper, and Haley. As found
previously, Davis ordered them to turn in their keys and
cards when he was told that he was to receive a letter
from the Union and to talk to the union representatives if
he had anything else to say. Respondent argues that these
employees were not discharged, citing the fact that Davis
did not use the word "fire" or "discharge" at the
November 3 meeting. I consider this argument without
merit. In view of the fact that similar instructions had
never been issued before to the employees, I find that his
utterances were tantamount to a discharge.
This conclusion is fortified by contemporaneous and
subsequent events. Thus, General Manager Jody told
Langston on November 3 that the other drivers were no
longer associated with the Respondent. On the following
day, November 4, when the drivers came to get their
regular paychecks, other employees were seen driving the
trucks. When driver Lamb told Powell that he was ready
for work, Powell replied that he would call him if needed.
When Harper turned in his timecard, Davis said, "Sorry
to see you boys quit," to which Harper replied, "Quit
hell. We're fired." Significantly, Davis made no response.
Driver Vaughan was not at the November 3 meeting.
That evening, however, Driver Ward, speaking what
Powell called "God's truth," told him he was "out" un-
less he forgot the Union; and the following morning
Powell said virtually the same thing.
Driver Lamb had trouble starting his car on the morn-
ing of November 3. He telephoned Powell and asked
Powell to send the mechanic out. In a few minutes Powell
called back. He asked Lamb if Lamb had signed a union
card. When Lamb answered that he had, Powell told him
"there is no sense in you coming over then." Lamb said
he was going to "turn his fittings and things in" and
Powell said "all right."
There is no doubt _that the Respondent not only knew
that an organizational campaign was underway, Davis
having admitted that he was called from the Dawson
560
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Springs terminal because of "union trouble" at Paducah
on the morning of November 3, but there is also no doubt
that Davis was aware of the union membership of the
seven drivers with whom he had a meeting on the morn-
ing of November 3, having been told by them that he
would receive a letter from the Union shortly and that
further conversations should be held with the union
representatives. His immediate retort to them to turn in
their keys and cards was an effective discharge of these
seven drivers as confirmed by the discharges of Lamb
and Vaughan who were not present at the meeting but
who were discharged immediately after Respondent
learned of their union adherence. I find that drivers Grif-
fith, Williamson,
McClain, Moffitt, Weaver, Harper,
Haley, Lamb, and Vaughan were discharged by the
Respondent on November 3 because of their union mem-
bership, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
On November 10, Davis wrote a letter to each of these
nine
drivers, telling them that they had not been
discharged. It is significant that when Davis made his
position clear, seven of the nine drivers came back to
work, the other two having found other jobs in the mean-
time.
Dispatcher Powell called driver Griffith back to work
on November 8. When Griffith returned on the following
day, he found driver Clark driving the truck which he had
been driving for several months prior to November 3.
Griffith was assigned an older truck which he had driven
for a while in the past. The newer truck, which he had
been driving for several months prior to November 3,
was easier to drive than the one he was assigned on
November 9 because of differences in the gear shifting.
More importantly, the runs assigned to Griffith after his
recall on November 9 were quite different from those
given to him prior to November 3. Although he had been
pulling several loads of gas from Memphis and occa-
sionally running double with another driver on Louisiana
trips, these runs were discontinued for Griffith after
November 9. Instead, he was given shorter runs hauling
lime dust and cement despite the fact that he preferred the
other type of runs and had so informed Powell a long time
ago. Other drivers were given the runs which Griffith had
been given in the past. Although Griffith made approxi-
mately as much money on the shorter runs after
November 9 as he did on the preferable runs before
November 3, there was more work and time expended by
him to accomplish that result. At no point did Respondent
offer any evidence explaining its failure to return Griffith
to the runs he had prior to November 3.
On December 9 Powell assigned Griffith a gas run to
be delivered to Poplar Bluff, then to Memphis, and finally
to Jackson, Tennessee. This run would have taken Grif-
fith from 7:30 in the morning until 10:30 the following
morning with waiting periods in between, unlike his previ-
ous gas runs which went from Poplar Bluff to Memphis
and then back to Paducah without waiting periods. Ac-
cording to Powell, Griffith said, "I'm tired of you
crabbing on me and giving me these loads and I'm not
going to haul it," to which Powell replied, "Well, Bobby,
I don't have anything else for you." Later that same day
Griffith asked Powell if he was fired. To which Powell
replied, "Yes, Bobby, you're fired." Griffith went to the
office to pick up a check and was told by Davis, "Any
time a driver refuses to pull a load for me he automatically
quit."
Respondent argues that Griffith was not discharged
because of his union activity on December 9 but because
of his refusal to take a load. It cites the testimony of its
dispatcher, Powell, that in June or July 1966 he had
similarly discharged another driver for refusing to take a
load. As Powell described that incident the driver said, "I
don't think I'll take this damn load .... It don't pay."
Powell answered, "Well, you can either take that load or •
take your can out the door, either one you want to, it
don't make me any difference." The driver answered,
"Well, I ain't going to take it." Whereupon Powell told
him to "haul his freight out the door." It should be noted
that in that earlier dismissal incident Powell gave the
driver a clear choice between taking the load or being
discharged. No such alternatives were suggested to Grif-
fith. Indeed, once before Griffith had refused to make a
trip ordered by Powell and Powell had simply said OK,
he'd get somebody else. Moreover, I deem it significant
that during the 30-day period from November 9 to
December 9, while Griffith was deprived of his usual and
preferable runs of the immediate past and while Griffith
wore his union button conspicuously and continuously,
Powell once remarked, "Is that thing worth anything?"
At another time he walked up and pulled at the union but-
ton saying, "Everytime I see that damn thing I want to
throw it just as far as I can." These manifestations of union
animus directed at Griffith after he was recalled on
November 9, taken together with the fact that Griffith
complained to Powell about the less desirable runs he was
being given, plus the fact that Powell did not indicate that
Griffith's acceptance of the assigned run was a condition
of his continued employment, lead me to the conclusion
that Griffith's refusal to make the run was seized upon by
the Respondent as a pretext to rid itself of an open ad-
herent after changes in Griffith's working conditions had
failed to result in his quitting. It was not unreasonable for
Griffith to assume Powell had given him the option of ac-
cepting or refusing a run, as he had once before, rather
than to realize that his rejection of a run meant his
discharge. See Memphis Moldings, Inc., Stairway Div.,
164 NLRB 524.
Whether Griffith quit or was discharged becomes imm
material inasmuch as his refusal to accept the assigned
trip was prompted by Respondent's unexplained institu-
tion of worse working conditions for Griffith after his re-
call on November 9.
D. Section 8(a)(5)
As noted previously, Respondent has two facilities,
one at Paducah, Kentucky, which is the subject of this
proceeding, and another at Dawson Springs, Kentucky.
Some of the drivers testified that there were 18 drivers
working out of the, Paducah facility. Davis testified that
he had 42 drivers. The only documentary evidence of the
employee roster is a list compiled by the Respondent and
received in evidence, containing 54 names of employees,
their classifications, their dates of hire, and their dates of
separation. Of the employees on said list, 14 are classified
as drivers and work out of the Paducah terminal:
Moffitt
Lamb
Vaughan
Clark
Griffith
Flood
Weaver
Ward
Haley
Harper
McClain
Angel
Williamson
. Irvan
DAVIS TRANSPORT
Two other drivers, Edmonds and Hutson , have special
runs to Calvert City, but work out of the Paducah ter-
minal and bring their bills there, too.
Of these, all but Irvan, Edmonds, and Hutson signed
union authorization cards on or before the morning of
November 3, which cards were authenticated by the
signers or by others who witnessed the act.3
In addition, the list contains the names of five so -called
lease drivers:
Langston
Mickle
Swinford
Foster
Collins
Of these, Langston and Swinford
signed
union'
authorization
cards
on or before the morning of
November 3.
In addition, the fist contains the names of three em-
ployees classified as drivers, on leaves of absence:
Driver
Date of Hire
Date of Separation
Hall
8/29/66 -
9/29/66
Potter
8/29/66
10/28/66
Whitehead
9/ 8/66
10/28/66
In
addition,
several
employees are listed with
hyphenatedjob classifications , suggesting dual functions:
Buchanan - Driver-mechanic
Finnie - Driver-safety director
Miles - Driver-serviceman
Tapp- Driver-serviceman
In addition, the list includes Pickett and Thompson as
drivers but with starting dates of November 7, 1966.
The list also contains the names of five employees clas-
sified as mechanics, four females as secretaries in the of-
fice, a parts manager, and a dispatcher at each terminal.
Finally, the list contains the names of 12 employees
classified as drivers who work out of the Dawson Springs
terminal under the immediate supervision of one of the
dispatchers.
The complaint alleges that all truckdrivers employed
by the Respondent at its Paducah, Kentucky, terminal
but excluding mechanics, safety men, office clerical em-
ployees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act
constitute an appropriate unit for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act. It appears that Respondent's contention that there
were 42 truckdrivers in his employ rests on the inclusion
of the 16 drivers in Paducah, the 12 drivers at Dawson
Springs, the 5 lease-operators , the 3 drivers- on leaves of
absence, the 2 driver-servicemen, the driver-mechanic,
the driver-safety director, and the 2 who were hired on
November 7. There appears to be no dispute that of the
54 employees listed, 12 employees, the 5 mechanics, the
parts room manager, the 2 dispatchers , and the 4 secreta-
ries, do not belong in the unit. It further appears to be
agreed that 16 employees, the 14 drivers working out of
Paducah as well as the 2 having special runs to Calvert
S Respondent has moved to strike the card of driver Clark as not being
properly authenticated. Driver Harper at first testified that he did not see
Clark sign the card, but upon refreshing his recollection by reading a state-
561
City, properly are included in the unit. What must be de-
cided is whether any or all of the other 26 employees are
properly included in the determination of an appropriate
unit.
1. The Dawson Springs drivers
Respondent argues that the business of Davis Trans-
port, Inc., is "so integrated that all employees whether at
the Paducah, Kentucky, location or Dawson Springs lo-
cation constitute an appropriate unit." I doubt this state-
ment is meant to be taken literally inasmuch as no argu-
ment has been presented for the inclusion of the 12 em-
ployees, such as mechanics and secretaries , in the unit.
Moreover, Respondent's witnesses referred repeatedly
to the employment of 42 drivers in the unit which is the
number of employees after deducting those 12 from the
total of 54 employed. It appears, therefore, that the thrust
of Respondent's argument is to include the drivers, work-
ing out of its Dawson Springs terminal with those work-
ing out of the Paducah terminal.
Record evidence supports the conclusion that Pres-
ident Davis is in charge of operations at both facilities
and that the drivers of both facilities work under the same
terms and conditions of employment. President Davis,
however, testified that coke was the only product handled
regularly at Dawson Springs and that coke is not handled
at the Paducah terminal. Further, each terminal has its
own dispatcher who assigns the trips to the drivers work-
ing regularly out of that terminal. Each terminal has its
own mechanic, although for major repairs, trucks working
out of Dawson Springs are brought into Paducah. In addi-
tion, the terminals are about 60 miles apart. Most impor-
tantly, there appears to be little, if any, interchange of
drivers between the two terminals. President Davis, who,
counsel for the Respondent argues, is the supervisor of
both terminals, testified that he had no idea of how many
employees from Paducah went to Dawson Springs to
work or from Dawson Springs to Paducah. Of the drivers
who testified only two of the Paducah drivers appeared to
have any runs out of Dawson Springs. Driver Harper
stated that, "I would go up maybe and pull one or two
loads, maybe three, then come home." When asked,
"How frequently?" he answered, "I'd say about once a
month, maybe not that many times." Driver Williamson
testified that only twice during the last 6 months had he
hauled coke from Dawson Springs.
I conclude that the single terminal unit of Paducah
drivers is presumptively appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 164
NLRB 1. 1 It appears to be the Board's well-settled rule
that a single plant, or similar facility, is presumptively ap-
propriate absent the showing of such factors as, for exam-
ple, a history of bargaining on a broader basis or the es-
sential loss of identity of a facility through its merger into
an integrated operation. Dixie Belle Mills, Inc.,
139
NLRB 629; Frederickson Motor Express Corporation,
121 NLRB 32. The record does not support the Com-
pany's position that only the broader unit is the ap-
propriate unit, here. There is no history of bargaining on
a broader basis here, nor the loss of identity of either ter-
minal facility. Indeed, on November 3, General Manager
Jody told some of the drivers they should have first come
ment made by him at an earlier date, testified that he did see Clark sign.
Respondent's motion must be denied and I credit Harper's testimony as
modified after refreshing his recollection of the event.
562
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and talked to him about the Union. Harper replied, "And
get fired like those guys did at Dawson Springs." Jody
then asked each of the drivers what Dawson Springs had
to do with them and said that Dawson Springs didn't have
anything to do with them.
Respondent relies on Helms Motor Express, Inc., 107
NLRB 132, but I find that reliance misplaced. In that
case the Board held a unit consisting of 11 terminals to be
appropriate but pointed out specifically "there is in-
terchange of employees between terminals." That is prac-
tically nonexistent here or so slight as to be considered in-
significant.
With the elimination of 12 Dawson Springs drivers
from the total of 42 drivers claimed by the Respondent,
we have at the most only 30 drivers in the unit urged by
the Respondent.
2.
Drivers on leaves of absence
Respondent argues that drivers Hall, Potter, and
Whitehead must be included in the unit because they
were on leaves of absence on November 3 and that such
employees will return to the employment of Respondent
during its peak seasonal period of activity. President
Davis testified that two of these three drivers were
"brand new but a third had worked for the Company be-
fore." He was unable to remember which one that was.
The employee roster prepared by the Company and of-
fered in evidence by it recites that all three of these
drivers were hired in August and September 1966 and
were separated in September and October of the same
year. Since the roster was prepared from payroll records
and in view of the uncertainty of Davis' testimony, I con-
clude that all three of these drivers were "brand'new" in
1966. Davis further testified that before these drivers left
the Company they requested leaves of absence saying
that they would be back in the spring. He did not know,
however, where they were working at the time of the
hearing except that they were working for another firm in
another State.
I do not consider these three drivers to be on leaves of
absence within the ordinary meaning of that term. Their
absence was of indefinite duration and their return was
within their own discretion. Such a loose arrangement
cannot be regarded as a continuing employer -employee
relationship. Sullivan Surplus Sales, Inc., 152 NLRB
132, 155.
The result is no different considering these three
drivers as seasonal employees. Although they worked in
the earlier fall season of 1966, they had not been recalled
as of November 3 and are not properly includable as of
that date which should reflect the actual employment of
a
representative
number of employees,
Madsen
Wholesale Co., 139 NLRB 863, 864; Sullivan Surplus
Sales, Inc., supra.
With the exclusion of these three drivers on so-called
leaves of absence, the maximum number of drivers ar-
guably includable in the unit drops to 27. Union
authorization cards signed by 15 of the 27 drivers were
received in evidence and constitute a majority for bar-
gaining purposes. It would, therefore , appear unnecessa-
ry to decide whether more of these 27 drivers should be
excluded from the unit. Inasmuch as reviewing authori-
ties may differ with my previous conclusions, some com-
ment is appropriate nevertheless.
3. Pickett. and Thompson
According to the Employer's list of employees received
in evidence, both of these drivers were hired by the
Respondent on November 7. President Davis testified
that Thompson had driven for the Company the previous
summer and had left to drive for his father in another
State where he was so employed on November 2. When
the Company found itself without drivers after November
3, President Davis testified that Thompson came in and
offered his services. It would, therefore, appear that
Thompson was not properly includable in the bargaining
unit as of November 3. Davis made some mention of
Thompson being on a "leave of absence" here as in the
case of the three drivers mentioned before. There is no
evidence to indicate the duration of the leaves of absence
nor the certainty of reemployment by the Respondent at
any particular time. As in the case of the three other
drivers, I find this. relationship not within, the: ordinary
meaning of a continuing employee-employer relationship.
As respects Pickett, President Davis testified that that
driver had been in the Army for 2 years and came back to
his job as driver for the Respondent on November 7. As
of November 2 and 3 Pickett was on military leave of
absence. As such he is not properly includable in the bar-
gaining unit. W. W. Holmes, 72 NLRB 3 9.
4. The dual-function employees
Respondent urges the inclusion of four employees who
had functions in addition to those of a driver. These are
driver-mechanic Buchanan, driver-safety director Finnie,
and driver-servicemen Miles and Tapp. President Davis
testified that Finnie was Respondent's safety director
from sometime in the summer of 1966 until November
1966. He further testified that Finnie drove a truck when
the drivers were off after November 3 but, until the
drivers were off, he was a safety director. As safety
director his duties were to check on the Company's
equipment and according to Davis, "try to find out what
was costing us so much money." As safety director he
was paid a salary which was on a different basis than the
drivers who were paid by the trip. It is clear that as of
November 2 and 3, therefore, he was not properly in-
cludable in the unit, having no community of interest with
the drivers of the Respondent.
Buchanan, Miles, and Tapp were basically and primari-
ly servicemen or mechanics working on the trucks but
were also qualified to drive for the Respondent under
ICC rules. According to Dispatcher Powell, during the
first 10 months of 1966, a period of time which amounted
to about 2,000 working hours, Miles spent 61 hours driv-
ing a truck to customers and Tapp and Buchanan only 36
hours each. Percentage-wise, these men spent less than
3 percent of their time driving Respondent's trucks to
customers. In addition, Powell estimated that they spent
25 to 30 percent of their time driving trucks for the
Respondent which trucks were to be loaded or unloaded
but not driven to customers by them. For this latter ac-
tivity they were paid their regular salary as servicemen or
mechanics but, for the 3 percent or less driving loads to
customers, they were paid, as were the other drivers, by
the trip.
Although these three employees were qualified to be
drivers, the test for inclusion in the unit is not qualifica-
tion but the function performed. Respondent argues that
these men should be included in the unit citing Berea
DAVIS TRANSPORT
Publishing Company, 140 NLRB 516, which held that a
dual-function employee devoting less than 51 percent of
his time to unit work may have sufficient interest in the
unit's conditions of employment to be included in the
unit. I cannot conclude that these dual-function em-
ployees, having 3 percent or less of their time devoted to
the type of work done by the drivers in the unit, would
have such a community of interest with them. Although
their other driving comprised more than 25 percent of
their time, it was a type of driving which was different
from that of the drivers in the unit and paid on a different
basis. Under all the circumstances I conclude that these
dual-function employees are not properly includable in
the unit. They do not spend a substantial portion of their
time performing identical functions. Cf. Transway, Inc.,
New Orleans, 153 NLRB 885.
5. The lease drivers
Although the record is not quite clear on the specific
status of the so-called lease drivers, it appears that the
two drivers who signed union cards, Langston and Swin-
ford, were also owners of trucks which pulled the
Respondent's trailers while the other three lease drivers,
Mickle, Foster, and Collins, were merely drivers of
trucks owned by persons other than the Respondent.
Respondent argues that all five lease drivers are indepen-
dent contractors and not employees and should, there-
fore, not be included in the unit.4
Lease drivers owning their own trucks lease such
trucks to the Respondent by a written document which,
among other things, provides that the leased equipment
shall be operated under the Respondent's direction and
control; that the Respondent may discharge, with or
without cause, the driver furnished with said leased
equipment by the owner; and that the lease agreement
runs from year to year but may be canceled by either of
the parties upon 30-day written notice. President Davis
testified that the lease drivers driving trucks belonging to
parties other than the Respondent are subject to the
Respondent's rules and regulations and Respondent may
fire them, lay them off, or tell the owner to get another
driver. In addition, Davis testified that the Respondent
could furnish a driver for such truck. Indeed, Langston
testified that Dispatcher Powell put driver Irvan on his
truck when Langston was on sick leave. President Davis
further testified that the Respondent had the right to fire
any driver whether he is a lease driver or a company
driver and that the Respondent's dispatcher assigns runs
to all drivers regardless,of their status as lease drivers or
company drivers. Furthermore, while these trucks are on
lease to the Respondent they are not used to pick up other
loads but operate only under the authority given to the
Respondent by ICC.
In view of the right of control vested in the Respondent
by the1Iease agreement and the practice of the Respond-
ent in directing the day-to-day activities of the lease'
drivers in the same manner as company drivers are con-
trolled, it follows that these lease operators are em-
ployes of the Respondent and are appropriately included
in the unit. Indiana Refrigerator Lines, Inc., 157 NLRB
539, and cases cited therein. See also The Maxwell Com-
pany, 164 NLRB 713.
4 It should be noted that if Respondent's argument is accepted and the
lease drivers excluded from the unit, the Union would have 13 card
signers of a total complement of 16 drivers in the unit.
563
6. The majority
In summary, the unit includes the 16 company drivers
at the Paducah terminal and the 5 lease drivers for a total
of 21 drivers. As of the morning of November 3, having
obtained authorization cards from 15 of these 21 drivers,
the Union had a clear majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate unit and I so find.
Nor would the result change if I consider the demand
for recognition to have been made on November 7 when
Davis read the union letter (see discussion below). As of
that date, Finnie, Thompson, and Pickett would be in-
cluded in the unit raising the total to 24, of which the 15
signatories still constituted a majority. Although drivers
McClain and Weaver did not return to work on
November 14 when Respondent offered to take all
drivers back, thus reducing the number of signatories to
13, the total complement of the unit was also reduced to
22, thus maintaining a majority for the Union even as of
November 14.
Even the inclusion of the dual-function employees
would not change this result. Of these dual-function em-
ployees, driver-safety director Finnie cannot be included
as of November 3 inasmuch as he had not been doing any
driving for the Respondent until after the Company lost
the services of its regular drivers on November 3. The
other three dual-function employees, if included in the
unit, would raise its number to 24 as of November 3, and
to 27 as of November 7, of which 15 was a majority. As
of November 14, the total would be 25, of which the 13
signatories constituted a majority.
7. The alleged good-faith doubt
I have found that the group of truckdrivers at Paducah
met with President Davis on November 3 and informed
him of their union interest. Moreover, he was told ex-
plicitly that further conversations should be held with the
union representative and a letter was on its way to him
from the Union. A letter in fact was sent by the Union to
the Respondent addressed to "Davis Transport, Inc.,
Wade E. Davis Vice-President" and apparently delivered
on November 4. It allegedly remained unopened because
Vice President Davis, the son of President Davis, was
absent and it came to the attention of President Davis on
November 7 when his son returned. On November 10
President Davis wrote the Union rejecting its claim of
representation
and suggesting an NLRB election.
Respondent argues that the first legal demand for recogni-
tion on behalf of the Union took place on November 7. 1
do not agree. President, Davis knew that there was a
union organizational drive at his Paducah plant when he
was called at Dawson Springs and asked to come in on
the morning of November 3. That same morning he was
confronted by a number of his drivers -he himself esti-
mated that number to have been as high as 12 -who told
him they had signed up for the Union. His only reply was
a statement to the effect that he couldn't afford union
wages at which point he was told to speak to union
representatives. Considered in all of its aspects, this con-
frontation by such a large number of his drivers must be
deemed to constitute, in effect, a demand for recognition.
The letter which he saw on November 7 was only confir-
mation of what he had already been told. In any event, as
noted earlier, the result is the same even if the demand for
recognition be deemed to have been made on November
7 or November 14. It is significant that the Respondent's
350-212 0-70-37
564
L
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'
defense of a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority was
first raised in its letter of November 10, long after the
drivers who presented their demand to him on the morn-
ing of November 3 had been discharged by him and after
he had told his drivers that he would close up if the Union
came in. It was also after he had told these employees
that his Dawson Springs employees were fired partly
because of their union activities . It was also after the ef-
forts were made to have some of the drivers execute let-
ters of resignation from the Union and other attempts
were made to engender disaffection with the Union on the
part of the drivers.
Where a company has engaged in substantial unfair
labor practices calculated to dissipate union support,
the Board, with the courts' approval, has concluded
that employer insistence on an election was not
motivated by a good-faith doubt of the
union's
majority, but rather by a rejection of the collective-
bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within
which to undermine the union.
[Aaron Brothers
Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077.]
Thus, whether Respondent be deemed to have refused
to bargain with the Union on November 3 when, in
response to the drivers' request that Davis speak to their
union representatives,
the
drivers
were summarily
discharged, or on November 10 when Davis formally
refused to recognize the Union, it is clear that such
refusal was not based upon any doubt, good -faith or
otherwise, of the Union's majority but upon Respond-'
ent's desire to avoid the results of its drivers' successful
organizational campaign , a desire which it implemented
by flagrant 8(a)(1) and (3) behavior, both before and after
November 10. Indeed, such behavior after the Union had
secured a majority of the employees in the unit would jus-
tify the issuance of an order requiring Respondent to bar-
gain with the Union even in the absence of an 8(a)(5)
violation. Wausau Steel Corporation, 160 NLRB 635,
enfd. 377 F. 2d 369 (C.A. 7); N.L.R.B. v. Delight Bakery,
Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (C.A. 6); Editorial "El Imparcial"
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 278 F.2d 184 (C.A. 1); Franks Bros.
Company v.'N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend an order directing it to
cease and desist therefrom, and, in view of the flagrant
and widespread nature of these practices , that it cease
and desist from in any manner infringing on the rights of
employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Inasmuch
as it appears that the,nine dischargees have been offered
full and unconditional reinstatement and that all but two
returned to their former jobs within a few days after
November 3, I shall recommend that the Respondent
make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by
reason of the discrimination against each of them by pay-
ment of a sum of money equal to that which each driver
normally would have earned as wages from the date of
discharge to the date of Respondent 's offer of reinstate-
ment or the date of each employee's return to duty,
whichever is earlier,' less any net earnings during said
period (Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440) and in
the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, together , with interest thereon at the rate of
6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heat-
ing Co., 138 NLRB 716. In the case of driver Griffith, I
shall also recommend that Respondent offer him rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion without prejudice to his seniority or other rights.
Finally, I shall recommend that the Company be directed
to bargain with the Union upon request.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, I recom-
mend that Respondent, Davis Transport, Inc., its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Offering or granting benefits to discourage union
activities; provided, however, that nothing in this Recom-
mended Order shalt be construed as requiring Respond-
ent to vary or abandon any economic benefit or any term
or condition of employment which it has heretofore
established.
(b) Unlawfully interrogating employees concerning
their union activities and attitudes.
(c) Threatening to go out of business or to discharge
employees if the plant were unionized or if the employees
joined the Union.
(d) Soliciting the withdrawal of its employees from a
union organization of their choice.
(e) Refusing to bargain with Local Union No. 236, af-
filiated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit:
All truckdrivers employed by the Respondent at its
Paducah, Kentucky, terminal but excluding mechanics,
safety men, office clerical employees , guards, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
(f) Discouraging membership and activity on behalf of
Local 236, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization , by discharging
or refusing to reinstate employees or by discriminating
against employees in any other manner in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or any
other labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Bobby Griffith immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges.
(b) Notify the above-named employee if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(c) Make the following employees or former em-
ployees whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason
of the discrimination against each of them in the manner
DAVIS TRANSPORT
565
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy":
Bobby Griffith
Bobby Moffitt
J. D. Lamb
Donnie L. Weaver
Charles Williamson
Jewell T. Harper
Robert F. McClain
Lelon Vaughan
Ben T. Haley
(d) Upon request bargain collectively with the above-
named union as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the above-described appropriate unit and em-
body in a signed agreement any understanding reached.
(e)
Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll
records,
social
security
payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records relevant and necessary for a determination of
compliance with paragraphs (a) and (c) above.
(f) Post at its terminal in Paducah, Kentucky, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of
said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and maintained by it for a period of 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.6
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, as the exclusive representative of our
truckdrivers at our Paducah, Kentucky, terminal, but
WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with that
Union and embody in a signed agreement any un-
derstanding reached.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in and ac-
tivity on behalf of Local No. 236, affiliated with In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization, by discharging or refusing
to reinstate employees or by discriminating against
employees in any other manner in regard to their hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of your own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer Bobby Griffith immediate and full
reinstatement
to
his
former
or
substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make the following former employees
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of
the discrimination against them:
Bobby Griffith
J. D. Lamb
Charles Williamson
Robert F. McClain
S In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT offer or grant benefits in order to
discourage union activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you unlawfully concern-
ing your union activities and attitudes.
WE WILL NOT threaten to go out of business or to
discharge you if the plant is unionized or if you join
the Union.
WE WILL NOT solicit you to withdraw from a union
organization of your choice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Local No.
236, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Bobby Moffitt
Donnie L. Weaver
Jewell T. Harper
Lelon Vaughan
Ben T. Haley
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any
labor organization, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
Dated
By
DAVIS TRANSPORT, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative )
(Title)
Note: Notify the above-named employee if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407,
Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, Telephone 684-3686.