Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc.

SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. 777 Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1531. Case 11-CA-3336 February 13,1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND ZAGORIA On November 27, 1967, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above- entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommend- ing that it cease and desist therefrom, and take cer- tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Re- spondent filed ';a statement of exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel.' The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the statement of excep- tions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, t conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., Charlotte, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. The Trial Examiner did not decide the question of whether the dispatchers were supervisors as alleged in the complaint. We find, on the basis of the facts in the record, that the dispatchers have authority to as- sign, transfer, suspend, and discipline drivers, and that they responsibly direct them in a manner requiring the use of independent judgment. We find, therefore, that the dispatchers are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. In concluding that Wells' employment was ter- mtnated for discriminatory rather than disciplinary reasons, we rely not only on the circumstances of the discharge, as described by the Trial Ex- aminer, but also on the statements made by the dispatchers indicating union animus, and especially the statements made by Jones to Wells at the time of the discharge TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case, tried at Charlotte, North Carolina, on October 3, 1967, pur- suant to a charge filed the preceding June 9 and a com- plaint issued July 31, presents the question whether Respondent, herein called the Company, discharged one Edgar L. Wells, a busdriver, on January 18, 1967, because of his union activity or for lawful cause. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Company, a North Carolina corporation engaged in the operation of an interstate busline, annually derives over $50,000 in the course and conduct of the interstate portion of its operations, and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Charging Party, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Employment History and Union Activity of Edgar L. Wells Edgar L. Wells, whose discharge on January 18, 1967, gave rise to this litigation, was a busdriver who had worked for the Company in that capacity since 1946, ex- cept for a brief hiatus of about a year , from 1950 to early 1952. In his 20 years of service for this Employer, Wells had driven well over 1 million "safe" miles, and his record was apparently unblemished in any respect until May 1966 , when the Company received a report from a private investigator that Wells had been speeding on an interstate highway. Wells denied the charge , but was placed on a year's probation. During the years 1965 and 1966, Wells had been an ac- tive supporter of the Union in its efforts , eventually suc- cessful, to obtain the right to represent the employees. In 1965, it was Wells who first got in touch with union representatives and urged them to organize the men, and Wells talked to all but 3 of the 30 drivers in the Atlanta Division, urging them to sign cards. The Union lost the election in 1965, but won an election early in December 1966. The record is clear that the Company opposed the ad- vent of the Union. For example, Wayne Wright, the divi- sion manager in Atlanta , in discussing Wells' union activi- ty or lack thereof, testified that Wells "led me to believe that he was for the Company," i.e., against the Union. Vincent Batts, supervisor of drivers and equipment, used the same expression , stating that he told Wells "during the union campaigns ... that when [Wells] voted [Batts] hoped that he would see fit to support the company...." Much less clear, however, as the foregoing quotations suggest, is whether the Company had knowledge of Wells' union activity or sympathies. According to Wells, the only witness called by General Counsel, the Company was well aware of his prounion views. As already noted, he signed up a large number of employees for the Union. Wells further testified that between the two elections he told Division Manager Wright that the Union would win the second election because the Company had reneged on promises made to the men prior to the first election. After the second elec- tion, according to Wells, he told Wright that he wanted 169 NLRB No. 114 778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Wright to know that he (Wells) was "going to belong to the Union one hundred percent." Wells also testified to certain conversations with dispatchers, whose alleged supervisory status is placed in issue in this connection. Early in November 1966, an At- lanta dispatcher, Ray Scism, told Wells that if Wells did not "leave this union alone" he was "going to get run off," as "Wayne Wright is not going to let you nor nobody else come in here and tear up what it has took him his life to make." The next day Wells was conversing with several other men, including Charlotte Dispatcher Herman Jones, when the Union was discussed, and Jones said, speaking of Wells, "he won't [vote for the Union], he knows better." On November 17, according to Wells, Jones in the presence of Supervisor Batts told Wells he "had better go upstairs and turn [his] union card in," at which point Batts said, "you had better not have a union card in your pocket." A few days later, according to Wells, Jones told him that if he "joined up with that union bunch" Jones "was going to kick [Wells'] butt," adding that "you boys don't have any business in the union ... you will only lose your good runs to Charlotte, and some of you are going to get fired." Wells also testified that a few minutes after he was discharged on January 18, 1967, he saw Jones, who said that he knew Wells "was going to be fired," and asked him, "Wells, don't you wish you had took five hundred dollars for your union card? ... You know Hutto [a driver discharged some 10 or 12 days earlier] wouldn't take five hundred dollars for his." Cornpany witnesses Wright, Batts, and Jones substan- tially contradicted Wells' testimony concerning his al- leged conversations with them. Wright testified that in his conversations with Wells concerning the Union, Wells had indicated his opposition to the Union, and Wright specifically denied that after the Union won the election Wells had said he was a union supporter. Batts testified that he also thought Wells was "for the Company" and not for the Union, and Batts specifically denied telling Wells that he had better not have a union card. Finally, Dispatcher Herman Jones denied the statements at- tributed to him by Wells, admitting only that he and Wells "kidded about the Union a lot, just ragging each other," and averring that he never knew Wells had a union card. Indeed, Jones testified that Wells had said he was against the Union. As usual, the credibility issues raised by these conflicts in testimony are both extremely difficult and extremely important . I have little hesitancy in crediting Wells over Jones, for although Wells' memory in some respects was faulty (see infra), I formed the distinct impression that he was trying to tell the truth as he remembered it. Jones' demeanor, however, was that of an employee determined to testify in the way best calculated to injure Wells and help the cause of Jones' employer, without regard for the truth.' I credit Wells over Jones, particularly with respect to what Jones said when he heard Wells was discharged, and also with respect to Jones' threats and comments to Wells as to what would happen if Wells "joined up with that union bunch." I have more difficulty in assessing the credibility of Batts and Wright , as against Wells, than I have in the case I This is a harsh judgment , and the Trial Examiner is well aware that he, like Jones and everyone else, is a fallible human being. I may be in error, but my considered judgment based on my observation of the two men as well as on the content of the testimony is that Wells tried to tell the truth and Jones did not. of Jones. That is to say, I am less certain of my ultimate judgment that Wells testified truthfully, and Wright and Batts testified falsely. I note and credit Wells' testimony that union representatives advised him to make notes in his logbook of any conversations he had with company representatives about the Union. Wells did make such notes, and used them at the hearing to refresh his recollec- tion., Of course, this does not settle the matter, for if Wells testified falsely he could just as easily, or even more easily, have invented the episodes and entered them in his logbook. It is also possible in any conversation that the parties to it-even at the time, to say nothing of months later-do not carry away identical impressions of what was said. But upon considering the entire record, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the details of the in- terview as described by Wells, I am satisfied that on or about December 8, 1966, Wells told Wright in unequivo- cal terms that he (Wells) was for the Union. In the light of this finding that the Company knew at the time of Wells' discharge of his support of the Union, I see no need to go into the question of the alleged super- visory status of the dispatchers in general. The role of Dispatcher Jones in Wells' discharge is discussed below. B. The Discharge of Wells On January 18, 1967, when Wells was getting ready for his scheduled departure on the Charlotte-to-Atlanta run, he received a message to see Batts in the latter's office. Upon Wells' arrival there, Batts said to him: "I am going to have to let you go.... Your work is not satisfactory, any more." To quote Batts' testimony, Wells "made the statement that he didn't know why [his services] were unsatisfactory, and I believe he asked me if I could tell him why they were unsatisfactory, [to] which I replied I could not."3 Wells, leaving Batts' office, encountered Dispatcher Jones. Wells (whose version I credit over Jones' denial) testified as follows concerning their conversation: I turned around, and I said, Herman, did you know that I was going to be fired? And he said, yes, didn't you? And I said, no. He said, I will tell you, Wells, he said, we have had several heart attacks in the last year or two. And he said, they are going to get shed of all of you old folks, and get some young ones. And of course , he laughed, see, as if he was joking. Q. Was there anything said in that conversation about why you were being fired? A. No, I can't recall right now. I do remember when I left out of there, Herman Jones came over to the bus, and driver Phillips took the bus to Atlanta, the schedule that I rode, which was my schedule, up until then. And he walked over to me, and he said, Wells, don't you wish that you had took five hundred dollars for your union card? He said, you know Hutto ' The notes themselves are not in evidence as I sustained the Com- pany's objection when General Counsel offered them as exhibits. ' The Company has a rule against telling anyone why he is discharged. The rule was adopted , Batts testified , "to avoid all unpleasantries" includ- ing "threatened suits." SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. wouldn't take five hundred dollars for his, and, of course, I was already mad at Herman. And I said, let me tell you something, Herman, I said, this is a free country, and I said, I am going to keep my union card. I said, no, I wouldn't take five hundred dollars for it right now, even if I am fired. I said, as a matter of fact, you couldn't buy it for a thousand dollars. So, that was about all that was said. Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Jones had any knowledge that you were going to be terminated before you were terminated? A. Well, I don't know. I don't know. Q. Well, did you ever have a conversation with him about that? A. Oh, yes, when I came back after I was dismissed, I asked him, and he said, yes, he knew that I was going to be fired. Q. All right. A. And he asked me, said, didn't you? And I said, no, I haven't done anything to be fired over. Q. And now, who is Hutto? A. Hutto was another driver that was dismissed about ten or, twelve days maybe -maybe before I was. Wells (and the Charging Party and the General Coun- sel) did not know until the afternoon of the trial before me (i.e., after General Counsel had concluded his direct ex- amination of his only witness) in what respect the Com- pany considered his work was "unsatisfactory." Further, if the Company's own witnesses are to be credited, Wells was never informed at any time before his discharge that the Company regarded any conduct of his as ground for discharge, or was investigating him in anyway. At the hearing, however, it developed that the Company was re- lying on the events of January 10, 1967, as the "un- satisfactory work" for which Wells was discharged, and it also developed that the Company had made some "in- vestigation" of the matter between January 10 and 18, although never discussing it with Wells. We turn, there- fore, to the events of January 10, and the subsequent in- vestigation. C. The Episode Alleged as the Ground for the Discharge On Tuesday, January 10, 1967, Wells was about to de- part on his regular 11:15 a.m. run from Charlotte to At- lanta. This scheduled departure coincided with the scheduled arrival of a Carolina Coach bus from Raleigh. Under standard procedures, of which Wells was fully aware, the departure of his bus was often delayed as much as 30 minutes to permit passengers on the incoming bus to connect with his bus. Several other buses also "connected" with the 11:15 a.m. to Atlanta, but the Raleigh bus just mentioned was the "closest" connection. On the day in question, Wells asked Dispatcher Jones sometime between 11:15 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. if Wells' bus could leave. Jones, in the hearing of two other men, Sales Representatives Tom Davis and C. W. Spratlin, told Wells, "You have one more connection," or "You 4 The record does not indicate what investigating if any was done by Ray. 5 Italics supplied in all cases. 779 have got another connection to come in." The connection to which Jones referred was the Raleigh bus mentioned above, for Jones had been informed earlier by one Purser, the dispatcher for Carolina Coach, that that bus would be 25 minutes late. About 11:30 a.m. Wells left with his bus, and a number of incoming passengers on the bus from Raleigh missed their connection and had to be rerouted at considerable inconvenience to themselves. Wells testified that he never left the Charlotte terminal without being told to go by the dispatcher, and that the latter would be of assistance in helping guide the bus out of the somewhat cramped conditions prevailing at the ter- minal. He also testified that he did not leave until 11:45 a.m. that day, but I am satisfied from an examination of the company records that Wells left about 11:30. Wells further testified that he saw another driver, Phillips, getting ready to take the Raleigh bus out on the continua- tion of its run, so that he (Wells) knew the bus had come in. Phillips did sign out on that run as of 11:45 a.m., the scheduled departure time. It is thus highly unlikely that the bus was 25 minutes late, and arrived as late as 11:40, although it is possible Phillips signed out some minutes before he left. In any event, the record is reasonably clear, and I find, that Wells did leave that day before the incoming passengers had made their connection with his bus. Dispatcher Jones reported to Supervisor Batts that Wells had left without being dispatched, and upon Batts' inquiry told him that Davis and Spratlin were witnesses to the fact that Wells had been instructed to wait. During the next few days, Batts and Company Counsel Ray "in- vestigated" the matter. The investigation began with Batts' interviewing Jones and concluded with his inter- viewing Davis and Spratlin. They did not in their in- vestigation speak about the episode to Wells. Davis and Spratlin confirmed Jones' report that he had told Wells a connection was not in. They both told Batts that they did not know whether that connection had come in at the time hat Wells left, and they did not know whether the dispatcher had in fact given Wells a release to go. According to Batts, Ray told him on January 16 that "as far as he was concerned the investigation was completed." 4 Batts and Ray then "sat down and dis- cussed all of the things that we had before us, and then ]Batts] took all of this into consideration ... and decided that Mr. Wells would be discharged." As stated above, Wells was discharged on his next visit to Charlotte 2 days later, but was not told the reason for the action until the hearing before me. In failing to interview Wells about the episode, Batts apparently departed from his usual practice. Testifying in Case 11-RC-2376 on June 1, 1966 (the transcript of record of which was introduced into evidence before me), Batts was attempting to support the Company's position in that case that dispatchers were not supervisors. The following excerpts from his testimony 5 suggest that Batts' investigation in the Wells case differed from that which he usually undertakes in discharge cases 6 Of course, if the dispatcher knows why he didn't go, I would expect him to tell me, but I mean, I don't assign him to investigate the reason for it. I just get 6 Two of the four cases discussed in Batts' testimony were discharge cases, and the other two (Young and Bridges) were probation cases 780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a statement from him as to what occurred, and then I will talk to the driver-driver and get what oc- curred. And then I will make my own decision. But, I assume that I would be in a position to make some sort of decision to hold him off, until I did get back, or to allow him to go back on his run, until I got back, at which time, I would talk to him, depending on the circumstances. * * * * * Q. Well, would there be circumstances on which you would rely on a dispatcher's report? A. I don't know of any, without just taking his re- port, and then taking any action without talking- without talking to the employee involved. * * * * * Q. All right, now, excluding the case of Young, regarding the other three, the dispatcher reported the conduct leading to the discipline in each case, is that correct? A. Yes sir. Q. And did you participate in the discipline or ad- minister the discipline in each of these three cases? A. I did. Q. And what procedures, sir, did you follow in each of these cases? Once the dispatcher reported to you. A. Investigation was made. Q. Now, when you say an investigation was made- MR. ALEXANDER: I object, let him finish his answer, please sir. Q. Surely, excuse me. A. Statements were taken or made by, I talked with each one of the drivers involved. And received a statement from them. As to what took place. Another driver was also talked to in one case for in- formation. Q. Dispatchers in none of these three cases par- ticipated in your investigation? A. None other than me talking with them to get the facts, and then I talked with the other driver in- dividually, and the dispatcher was never present, in any of these discussions. Q. But you did talk to the dispatchers in each of these three cases after the first report was made to you? A. I am sure that I did. Q. Did you rely upon the facts that they reported to you in any way , in deciding on the discipline to be administered? A. I relied on all of the facts, theirs, the drivers or any one else -else that was connected with it, or had any information on it. Q. What weight, if any, did you give to the dispatcher's report to you in these three cases? ' Batts at the hearing testified that "it might could have been " a misun- derstanding between Wells and Jones as to whether the signal to go had been given. He felt that it was primarily the driver's responsibility to make A. Actually none - none because they just re- ported the incident that happened, and really the in- formation that we received from other sources in- cluding the drivers was considered and governed the decision. D. Concluding Findings I have found that Wells left Charlotte about 11:30 a.m. on January 10, 1967, and that several passengers missed their connection to his bus. Dispatcher Jones testified that he did not tell Wells to go; Wells testified that he never left Charlotte without being dispatched. As Wells put it on the witness stand: "Yes, I got dispatched. If I hadn't, I would have still been there." I find it unnecessa- ry to resolve the conflict between Jones and Wells on this issue. I have no doubt that Jones told Batts that Wells left without being dispatched. Obviously, the Company could lawfully discharge an employee for the offense of which Jones accused Wells. The fact that Wells was a union member, that the Com- pany knew it, and that the Company opposed the Union would not establish a violation of the Act in Wells' case if the Company discharged him for leaving the terminal without being dispatched. Even if Wells was in fact told to go by Jones, or by some other dispatcher, or even if Wells honestly misunderstood some word or signal from Jones or someone else,7 the discharge would be lawful if the Company was not motivated by union animus but by its belief that Wells had transgressed. And yet, why would the Company fire a man after 20 years of service without even an inquiry of him as to why or how he happened on this solitary occasion to leave without being dispatched? Why would the Company de- part in this instance from its regular practice of talking to the employee involved? What was there in Wells' case that produced this discriminatory treatment? The Com- pany suggests that he was on probation, as some 8 months before he had been accused of speeding. But the Company admits that it does not automatically discharge a man for an offense merely because he is on probation. And in a sense this defense begs the question, for how did the Company know that Wells was guilty of the new "of- fense." True, it knew that he had left the terminal early. But only Jones - not Spratlin and not Davis - said that Wells had not been told to go. The Company's readiness to accept Jones' version without ever giving Wells a chance to explain suggests that the Company was looking for a ground to discharge Wells, and had no desire to let this longtime employee explain, or even to know of, his isolated dereliction. Does the unusual treatment of Wells - the apparently unprecedented failure to get his version before firing him-establish that a motivating force in the Company's action was its desire to eliminate a union adherent? Such an inference would seem appropriate under the language of the Ninth Circuit in Shattuck Denn Mining Corpora- tion v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470. To what did Batts refer when he said that he and Ray "discussed all of the things that we had before us" when they decided to discharge Wells? Dispatcher Jones, whose role in this was far from passive, told Wells that Jones knew the sure all connections were in and all passengers so desiring had been trans- ferred. SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. 781 discharge was imminent, and also said, "Wells, don't you wish you had took five hundred dollars for your union card." This is not an easy case. It is no business of the Labor Board if an employer chooses not to tell employees, even those of 20 years' service, why they are being fired. To discharge such an employee without giving a reason and without giving him a chance to explain the episode on which (unknown to the employee) the employer is relying may offend common decency, without offending the statute. But on the other hand we have been repeatedly told that the issue in these cases is not whether the con- duct complained of is ground for discharge but whether the employer acted not "upon it [but] for reasons prohibited by the Act." D. W. Onan & Sons v. N.L.R.B., 139 F.2d 728, 730 (C.A. 8). "The existence of some justifiable ground for discharge is no defense if it was not the moving cause." N.L.R.B. v. Wells, Incorporated, 162 F.2d 457, 460 (C.A. 9); N.L.R.B. v. Texas Independent Oil Company, Inc., 232 F.2d 447, 450 (C.A. 9). In Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 138 F. 2d 86, 90-91, the Third Circuit sustained a finding of unlawful discharge after observing the employee in question. "If ever a workman deserved summary discharge, it was he." Little purpose is served in proliferating examples; each case must stand on its own facts. In brief, Wells' offense was grave (unless, of course, he misunderstood Jones or thought he had received a later order to go). The Company could lawfully fire him for it. But on this record I am constrained to find that the Com- pany in this case departed from its usual practice of getting a statement from the employee involved before deciding to discharge him. The sole reason I can find for this departure from practice is the Company's desire to weed out a union adherent. I therefore conclude that in discharging Wells without making any effort to get his version of the alleged offense, the Company violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By discharging Edgar Wells because of his union activi- ty, the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice af- fecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY ' I shall recommend that the Company cease and desist from its unfair labor practices, that it reinstate Wells with backpay (computed'under the methods set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716), and that it post an ap- propriate notice. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I therefore recommend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, is- suance of the following: ORDER Respondent, Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee because of membership or activity in Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1531, or any other labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing any employee in the exercise of his right to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to reinstate Edgar Wells to his former or sub- stantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole in the manner described in the portion of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. (b) Notify Edgar Wells if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Post at its terminals at Charlotte, North Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."8 Copies of such notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to in- sure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.9 8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond- ent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex- aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em- ployees that: WE WILL offer Edgar L. Wells his former job and pay him for wages lost since his discharge in January 1967. 782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All our employees have the right to join or assist Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1531, or any other union. They also have the right not to join or assist any union. WE WILL NOT take or threaten to take any action against them for engaging in union activity or in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce them in their exercise of those rights. SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) NOTE: We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 16th Floor, Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston- Salem , North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-2911.