Dollar Rent-A-Car

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Laclede Cab Company, d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car and Automotive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Em- ployees Union, Local 618, affiliated with Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 14- CA- 10379 May 19, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On January 6, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Robert W. Leiner issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Laclede Cab Company, d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car, St. Louis, Missouri, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. ex- cept that the attached notice is substituted for that of the Administrative Law Judge.2 Respondent has excepted to certain credlibilit) findings made hy Ihe Administrative Law. Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to o,er- rule an Administrative L.aA Judge's resolutions with respect to credlhilit, unless the clear preponderance of aill of the relevant evidence con ice. us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr,' IWall Products. Inc , 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd, 188 F.2d 362 ((',A. 3, 1951). We have cairefull examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 The Administrative L.aw Judge inadvertently failed to cionforlt his nuo- tice to his recommended Order. We shall correct his notice accordingly APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity to give evidence, it has been decided that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and we have been ordered to post this notice and to com- ply with its terms. The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as employees, certain rights, including the right to self-organization and to bargain collectively through a representative of your own choosing. Accordingly, we give you these assurances: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with Auto- motive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Em- ployees Union, Local 618, affiliated with Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE Wil. NOI in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of these rights. WE WIIL withdraw the petition we filed with the National Labor Relations Board for a repre- sentation election (Case 14-RM-506). WE WILL bargain, upon request, with Automo- tive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Employ- ees Union, Local 618, affiliated with Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all em- ployees in the unit described below, and shall embody in a signed agreement any under- standing reached. The bargaining unit is: All employees employed by the Respondent at its Lambert Field, St. Louis County, Mis- souri, facility, excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervis- ors as defined in the Act. LA(CLEDE CAB COMPANY. D/B A DOLLAR RENI -A-CAR 236 NLRB No. 25 206 DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR III THE ALLEGED) tUNFAIR LABOR PRACTIC(ES STATEMENT OF FACTS ROBERT W LEINER. Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard in St. Louis, Missouri, on July 28 and August 30, 1977. The complaint, issued on July 12, 1977. is based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on June 6, 1977, by Automotive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Employees Union, Local 618, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union or the Charging Party. The complaint alleges that Laclede Cab Company, d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car, herein called Re- spondent, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs were filed by all parties and have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent, a Missouri corporation, maintains sev- eral facilities in the State of Missouri including one at Lambert Field, St. Louis County, where it is engaged in the retail rental of automobiles. During the year ending De- cember 31, 1976, a period representative of its operations. Respondent performed services in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received delivery of goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Mis- souri. Respondent concedes and I find that it is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II THE L ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Automotive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Employ- ees Union, Local 618, affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, has been and is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent operates two other car rental facilities in addition to lhe Lambert Field facility which is the only one in issue. Par 4 of the complaint alleges that: All employees employed by the Respondent at its Lambert Field. SI Louis County, Missouri, facility. excluding office clerical and profes- sional employees, guards and supersisors as defined in the Act constl- tute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. It was stipulated, at the hearing. (I) that the Lambert Field unit constituted a unit appropriate for bargaining within the meaning of the Act; (2 that. on February 4. 1977. a significant dale herein, Respondent employed nine em- ployees eligible for inclusion in that unit and (3) that on May 4. 1977 A. Background Respondent commenced actual operations of its car rental agency at the Lambert Field facility ' outside of St. Louis. Missouri, in autumn 1976. Chief supervisor of Re- spondent is A. J. Cervantes who, a former mayor of St. Louis, was actively seeking a further mayoral nomination in a primary election to be held in St. Louis on March 8, 1977. The only other supervisor employed by Respondent on this record was Frank Podraza, with the title of city manager. Respondent's answer admits both Cervantes and Podraza to be supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and agents of Respondent. Podraza has the power to hire and fire and performs a bookkeeping function for Respondent's operations at its three locations. The actual bookkeeper is also a counter rental agent, Laura Rimmer. There are two types of employees in the Lambert Field unit: ( 1) rental agents who work behind the counter on the main level of the terminal and deal with Respondent's cus- tomers; and (2) "Hikers," or car preparation and cleanup employees, who work on a lower level beneath Respon- dent's counter. When a car is ready for service, the hiker initials (but does not otherwise sign) a "ready" slip. Simi- larly,. the customer rental agreements, executed by the rental agents, are only initialed by each agent. Thus, Po- draza, who sees about 1.000 initialed ready slips and rental agreements per month is not familiar with, nor would he recognize. Respondent's employees' signatures on docu- ments notwithstanding the employees have executed their signatures on both Respondent's employment applications and Internal Revenue W-4 forms. The Union represents employees of other employers en- gaged in the car rental business (Hertz, Avis, Budget) at Lambert Field. Around mid-January 1977, Union Vice President Charles Hermann attempted to organize 2 Re- spondent's l.ambert Field employees. On the first of three occasions when he left about a dozen union membership application cards with employees of Respondent at Lam- bert Field. he gave them to two counter agents, Laura Rim- mer and Helen Hoppe When he returned about a week later, Rimmer told him that some of the cards were miss- ing. He left her additional union membership application cards. Before again returning to Respondent's Lambert Field counter, he spoke by telephone with an employee, hiker Mike Rafert. Rafert told Hermann that he would get the cards signed if cards were left with him. Hermann then visited Respondent's counter a third time and left further cards with Rafert and Rimmer. From time to time, the Union's blue and white membership application cards were kept in a cubbyhole behind the counter and seen there by Podraza. Respondent filed a petition In Case 14 RM-56 alleging Ihat a request for recognition by the Uinion had been made in the Lambert Field unit ' The facts as hereafter found, regarding the events of February 4. 1977, are hased on Ihe testimony of tlermlan. Podraza. Rimmer, and Helen Hop- pe. the latter threc being emplyecs .,f Respondent An) testimlon Ito the c intrars as found ahove is discredited DECISION 207 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Events of February 4, 1977 I. Collection and display of the union membership application cards In the morning of February 4, Hermann came to the counter where he found hiker Van Schultz standing next to the counter with rental agent Laura Rimmer. Podraza was standing nearby and had already seen Rimmer and tHoppe sign union cards on that day.3 Schultz had eight signed cards, two or three of which Mike Rafert had given him. Schultz then gave the eight cards to Hermann. Podraza, who had been watching hiker Schultz standing at the counter for some time, called him over and, in a loud voice, accused him of loitering and not doing his job. lle told Schultz he was fired. Hermann then walked over to Podraza, showed hire a union card, identifying it as signed by Schultz, and said that he was Schultz' bargaining agent. He asked Podraza to reinstate Schultz. Hermann had the other union cards in his hand and told Podraza that the Union represented all of Respondent's employees at L am- bert Field. Podraza, who knew by the end of January that Hermann had left union cards for Respondent's employees and had seen the union cards in the cubbyhole behind the counter, saw the stack of cards in Hermann's hand (which cards Hermann then fanned out) and said that he saw that Hermann "had the cards." 4 Hernann's testimony does not demonstrate, nor does the Union's brief assert that at this time Hermann requested recognition for the Union as col- lective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employ- ees in the Lambert Field unit. While Podraza and Hermann were discussing the dis- charge of Schultz and Hermann's desire to have Schultz reinstated, Hermann invited Podraza to lunch in order to discuss the reinstatement matter and to calm down Podra- za. Laura Rimmer saw and heard the discussion and told Hermann she wanted her card back if there was going to be a strike to get Schultz reinstated.5 Hermann did not return the card to Rimmer. While Hermann and Podraza continued to discuss Schultz and prepared to leave for lunch, Rimmer telephoned coemployee Helen Hoppe. who was at home, told her of the Schultz firing, of her fear of a The HIoppe and Rimmer cards (G.C. Fxhs. 2G and 211 hbeal the dLire January 27 and January 28. 1977. 4 Hermann testified thiat he gac four signed cards to Podra;la and nlied the remaining four cards while Podraza was exanmnilng Ihe first fiour. IPodr,- za testified that ihe never had any of the cards in his possesshin alth!,i:ih Vt saw IHermann holding a bunch of cards. In spite of Hermann's silomewhat elaborate and specific reclounting of how Podraza inspected each of the four cards for albout a half-minute each, I credit Podraza's abose linmited denial and conclude that Podraza neer hfield. itluch less inspected. the cards. I also do not credit Herran's ies ilnl s :hat he asked Podraza to check the signatures so thut P'odraza either minspect- ed the signatures or agreed to their genuineness. I conclude thai PI'dl.ila said that tHermann "had the cards" rather than that he saw thlat the card, were "signed" Flermiann's testimony on the point saried oiln htheir tile word "signed" was used in describing what Podrai'a said ti him ahliIl lth cards I do not credit Rimme-'s testlmonv insofar as she said she told Ilel manln she wanted her card and other cards back solely hecause she hcheiedl that there had been no authority from the other employees to surrender Th. cdlls to Hermann Ratlher. I find that she first asked for her card Ihsk f Ihr Union ias going to strike to effect Schultz' reinstatement. and that. ilfle al telephone call to emplhsee Hioppe. asked for return of the cards. strike to gain Schultz' reinstatement, and requested Hoppe to authorize Rimmer to ask for the return of their cards. Hoppe did so. Rimmer then asked Herma;nn to return all the cards because the employees had not authorized their surrender to Hermann. Ilermann refused. No evidence was adduced supporting any authority in Rimmer or Hoppe to oversee the surrender of the cards to H-ermann or any limi- tation on Van Schultz who gave the cards to Hermann. I conclude that Rimmer and Hoppe had no authority to de- mand, on behalf of other employees, return of the cards. 2. The February 4 luncheon tlermann and Podraza then drove to lunch at a nearby restaurant. At lunch. I credit Hermann's testimony that they not only discussed job descriptions of several of the card signers, settling who were hikers and who were rental agents, but also that Hermann requested Podraza to set a time to commence negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement covering these employees and that Podraza told him that Cervantes was "the onls guy that could really talk [for Respondent] hut let me see if I can't set up a meeting with Mr. Cervantes." Hermann answered, "Fine." I conclude that Hermann's lunch time request for an im- mediate commencement of negotiations for the execution of a collective-bargaining agreement constituted a request for recognition and bargaining in it unit of all Respon- dent's employees at Lambert Field. and that such a request for recognition and bargaining was as made at this time, and not before.6 N.1. R.B. v. (olurrmian Enameling and Stamping Company, Inc., 306 U.S. 292, 296 299 (1939); 4i on (onvalescent (Center, 209 Nl RB 937. 939 (1974). While Hermann credibly testified that at the lunch meet- ing, he took the membership application cards out of his pocket and went "through the cards one at a time," placing a few of them on the table in front of Podraza, there is no evidence to support the Union's conclusion that Hermann showed Podraza all of the cards at that time, one at a time. At most. Podraza saw 2 or 3 of the cards. Podraza testified. and I credit him, that in no event did he scrutinize, much less recognize, an, signatures on any union cards. While it is clear that Podraza had no authorits to bar- gain 'with, or to extend recognition to. the Union as statu- tory representative. Podraza did convey the Union's de- mand for recognition to Ccrvantes and meetings of the parties thereafter occurred. I therefore conclude that. as of this time, February 4. 1977, contrary to the ailegation:. of the complaint,' no rec- ogiiition was granted bh Responldent because: (a) nothing Podraza said could be construed t( suggest his recognition of the Union notwithstanding he said that the UJnion "had the cards:" (b) Hermann agreed that onlN Cervantes could speak for Respondent: and (c) even if wshat Podraza said or ( ilntratrs to, the ( eic r [ ( oull-l a d id t. t [1lili ls , ssertllli, llrtrn;lilnf s request to P-dliZla at .1 li Ierl i leid. ilarher tha nlrllg. ! iase sk hilltz reinstuted does 1,[ cortlsiluite as request to bargain ln hithal off m IhC t i['ii litn 2]5,v, fIln i irnal ml[ [INiil . l iI -ilturn, l il . 4r. t , tii alnd {tysi/lo .r.. t lh/dcmcnlllor r w ! 4tin-, , ' t [ ' f II. 41t. ( 10 Jf'In'lh t-ard Sa/l i rl ; ' ', 1 N RB 1 468 IS I. }'ai 7,,[ the cOimplainli acllegs. iilr 1i/i, that (in fcbrutar} 4. Rcpoe n deni "agreed ithat loca l ,i 8 f , t the hlrgalininig representatise ef the irn pil>,ecs it silld unit " 208 DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR did could otherwise be construed as a grant of recognition. Podraza, notwithstanding his supervisory status, had no ex- press, implied, or apparent authority to bind Respondent to a grant of recognition.8 Before proceeding to subsequent events, however, in- quiry must first be directed to the question of whether, on February 4, when the Union requested recognition and bargaining, it was the representative of a majority of unit employees. The critical date for determining the Union's majority status is the date on which the bargaining request is received by the employer. Franks Bros. Compana' v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702 (1944); Henr, Spen & Co., Inc., 150 NLRB 138, 139 (1964); Pre-Engineered Building Products, Inc., 228 NLRB 841 (1977): First Lakewood A.ssociate., et al., 231 NLRB 463 (1977). In the absence of the demon- stration of majority status. even Respondent's bad faith in failing to recognize the Union would not give rise to a violation of an obligation by Respondent to bargain. N.L.R.B. v. S. E. Nichols Compant?, et al., 380 F.2d 438. 441-442 (C.A. 2, 1967). Once a unit majority on the date of demand is established, however, it is no defense that only a bare majority of unit employees signed membership appli- cation cards in support of the Union as their bargaining representative. N.L.R.B. v. Empire Corporation, 518 F.2d 860 (C.A. 6, 1975). C. The Union Applic'ation Cards in Evidence As above noted, it was stipulated that on February 4, the above appropriate unit consisted of nine employees. While there is testimony in the record that Respondent thereafter hired additional employees some time in the first week of March 1977, there is no evidence concerning the actual number of employees employed in the unit at any time other than February 4. In any event, the complaint alleges (pars. 5 and 6), inter alia, that on February 4, a majority of unit employees designated the Union as their collective-bargaining representative and, commencing on that date, the Union requested bargaining. In support of its majority claim. the Charging Party 0 The fact that all mIorne matters Il future har;ainini. iaccrding to, Pto- draza, would have to be negotiated onl v with (Cervantes daoes norl Imp1. contrart to General Counsel. that PoidrTza had the power to gralit re.lignl- tion 9 General Counsel' position is th.a it need Tliti demniiltri:l Ithe F. nion', majority on Fehrua:ry 4. the "critical d;lte." It. the dat.e ;./n iwhich the UInion's request fur bhargtiling wais recei' ed h, the empilu er: rilher. thait ; presumption of majorityi arises upon ia showing that the emploser de- termined to its own satlsfaction that the I rion reprcsenlted ia lajourlt . and . commenced hargalining. Such a theior? appealrs to he inconsistent with the complaint (pars 5 and 7 of the iolrmpl;aint allere that on Fehruars 4 the designation of the lnion's majoriti wa:s dlerlted from aiiutlhri/,;tion cards) General (Counsel replied principalls on the activlties if Pohdr;i/a im support of its theory that his activitles reprr-sented a recogniloll orf the Union as collectile-bargaiing aiCenit I h. e found, ahosec. Ihat Podraza. did not in fact recognize the inion aindt. i ainv erent. h.ld llo auithorit It) recognize the Union on behalf -of Respondent I hu(ieneri ( outinsel', reli- ante. with regard it( the activities of Podria o; n i ebru.lrx 4. u n li,tii A( Son IrikAing, In(. 197 NIRH 198 ( i972) and I /Rani ,itt/ ( ',,m/i n of. SioSth gi,/'. Inr , 213 NlRH 74t, (1974), cnfd. 524 .2d i 148 (' A 6. 1W975 i misplaced In MN.isi. the Ih niloll had formcrls beehn the *t.irltior\ represeint: tive. The union filed and withdrew a subsequent petition for certification after the employer made a voluntary agreement ito recognize the union. Ihe employer. alter recogmnillon. ctilltitted unilrlill ihir priactces hb direct decal- introduced seven cards into evidence. The seven cards in evidence, all of which were authen- ticated are those of unit employees Sam F. Rumbaoa (G.C. Exh. 2A), Laura Rimmer (G.C. Exh. 2H), Helen Hoppe (G.C. Exh. 2G), Michael M. Rafert (G.C. Exh. 2F), David M. Lancaster (G.C. Exh. 2E), Van Schultz (G.C. Exh. 2D), and David Buchanan (G.C. Exh. 2C). Respondent disputes only three of the seven cards and urges that with only four remaining vital cards, proof of majority status necessarily fails since only on February 4 is the size of the unit known (nine employees) and the remaining four cards fail to make a majority. The cards, all the same, are entitled "Application for Membership" and carried the following statement above spaces for name, address, employer, age, etc., and signa- ture: IN FERNATIONAL BROTHtERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAU FFEURS. A:kRttHOUSSEMEN AND HEi PERS OF AMERI(CA TEAMSTERS LOCAL UINI()N N() 6IS 1, the undersigned, hereby apply for admission to membership in the above Union of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America and voluntarily choose and designate it as my representative for purposes of collective bargaining, hereby revoking any contrary designation. If admitted to membership, I agree to abide by the Constitution of the International as well as the local Constitution and By-Laws which are not in conflict with the International laws. The three cards which Respondent disputes are those of David M. Lancaster. Laura L. Rimmer, and Helen Hoppe. I. David M. Lancaster Lancaster testified that coemployee Mike Rafert gave him the above membership card. Union Vice President Hermann had given union application cards to Rafert after two batches of cards given to Rimmer and Hoppe had not produced signed cards from some of the unit employees and after Rafert assured Hermann that if Hermann gave Ing with unit employees The union dealt only with the employer's presi- dent in MlSot Thus, even though the union refused to show authorization cards tI denmonstrate its majoritl status, in Moisti. Respondent's president, In fact, there stated that he had no doubt as to the Union's majority and volunt.lrils reclagniled the Union Nothing like the facts in Moisi is present here lHere. Puodrazal was not Respoundent's president and neither in fact, nor in law. did he ior could he satisfs himself that the Union was the majority representatlie Siitliirls, Rice is distinguishable. In Rice there was a card check b, in impartial third person In the instant case, not only was there no impartial checker. hut there was no card check. lit ans esent. I perrmiledl the ('harging Party, over Respondent's objec- t11n. tio participate in the hearing insofar as the Charging Party desired to demonnstrate the existence. in fact, of a card majority at the time the Union requested resognition on February 4. Participation of the Union to that extent ie. In ialdlucing proof, consistent with the complaint, which General Counsel failed tI adduce. was not an abuse of discretion. Internuational I rlit,,. I nii'd ttii/ptihlla. -Ierorapuue & 4griculrural Implement WorAers of rimt ull IT. c l . ( I., al .58a / ltirionsin Motor Corporation] v. Russell Sl ,eld, ial. 382 L: S. 205 ( 1965): .pr'l tior Freight Svrrem, Inc.. 141 NLRB 1:10 11903) I' An eighth card, that ofi Ma;lr L Rice (G(.C. Exh 2B) was offered and rejected .ia uniulthentlcaited. A further card, that of Michael May (G.C. Exh 8) was not signed until April 28, 1977. and is therefore not includable to pros, .a uniti.tn ln.tJorits on Febhruars 4 209 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD him the cards, he would get them signed. The evidence is unclear whether Hermann solicited Rafert for the purpose of getting signed cards or whether Rafert volunteered his services. Rafert did not address the subject when called as a witness of the Charging Party. Lancaster, employed by Respondent on the date he testi- fied, testified that he was employed by Respondent for sev- eral weeks as a hiker, when, on January 26, he signed the card after reading it. He was given the card by Rafert from a pack on the counter at Lambert Field. Rafert told him the "purpose" of signing the card:" [Rafert] told me it was an application for a membership for 618 and we were ail going to fill them out and vote on whether or not we want- ed to be union." " He testified that Rafert made the state- ment to him 3 days to a week before he signed the card and that he read it before he signed it. Lancaster was still em- ployed by Respondent when he testified and was called by the Charging Party as its witness. It was only on cross- examination that the Rafert statement was revealed and I did not observe that Lancaster was unfriendly to Respon- dent. Yet, since Rafert was a witness in the case, having testified immediately before Lancaster, and was available to contradict Lancaster's testimony and was not called to do so, I accept Lancaster's testimony regarding what Ra- fert told him concerning the purpose of signing the card. In the instant case, the Rafert statement to Lancaster was not solely to the effect that the cards would be signed so that all the employees would vote to see if they wanted a union; rather, it was accompanied by a statement that the card was "an application for membership for 618." Even courts of appeal apparently unsympathetic to the use of signed membership application cards for the purpose of demonstrating a union's majority (N.L.R.B. v. S. E. Ni- chols Co., 380 F.2d 442, supra, fn. 4) note that where the union card contains language demonstrating that it was "an application for membership" in the Union, such a statement in the card was "one thing an employee could readily understand" and militated in favor of holding that the signing of such a card by an employee indicated that the employee was accepting union representation and dis- cipline. In the instant case, not only were the membership application cards on their face solely applications for union membership, but Rafert's statement to Lancaster would, appear to me, indicate that Lancaster, when he signed the card, was applying for union membership as well as and, in addition to, the opportunity to gain an election. Such a situation, it seems to me, negatives any argument that the H It is unnecessary to determine whether Hermann, by designating Rafert to get signatures on union cards, impliedly or apparently granted authority to Rafert to explain the consequences of the signer's signature on the card. While it is true that the Union is not responsible for misstatements and rumors started by rank-and-file employees, Jas. H. Mathews & (Co. v. N. L.R.B. 354 F.2d 432. 437-438 (C.A. 8, 1965), cert. denied, 384 Li.S 1004 (1966), it is unnecessary to define the scope of any Rafert "agency": it is enough to bind the Union if he is a "union adherent," N.L.R.B. v (Gisrel Packing Co.. Inc. et al., 395 U.S. 575, 606608 (1969). Whatever the rnean- ing of "union adherent" in Gissel. Rafert, the Union's instrument in the distribution of the cards to the unit employees, under the instant facts, was no mere rank-and-file employee as mentioned in Jas. H. Mathews & (o., supra. I conclude he was a "union adherent" and that the Union was re- sponsible for statements made by Rafert to unit employee Lancaster regard- ing the consequences and purposes of signing union cards. Union misrepresented its intention to Lancaster when it used his card, and others, to seek recognition without an election. Where, therefore, as here, the card is a "single-purpose" card (i.e., a card relating only to the use by the Union for collective bargaining rather than for both collective bar- gaining or an election), and where, as here, the solicitor states that the purpose of the card is for union membership and to get an election, and then, several days later, the em- ployee again reads the card and signs it, and absent a showing that Lancaster was unable to read or understand, it is unquestionably the Board rule that the card may be included with other cards to demonstrate union majority status, Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 (1963), enfd. 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6, 1965); Levi Strauss Co., 172 NLRB 732 (1968). In Levi Strauss, the Board held that where, as here, the card indicated that the signer wished to be represented by a particular labor organization and that the card solicitor did not say that the only purpose of the card would be for use in gaining an election, thus negating the very language of the card, there is no misrepresentation and the card would be counted toward ascertaining the majority. Thus, Lancaster's card should be counted in as- certaining the Union's majority. 2. The cards of Laura Rimmer and Helen Hoppe Hoppe. The evidence shows that prior to delivery of the cards to Union Vice President Hermann on February 4, Helen Hoppe, a rental agent (a "supervisor" at the time of her testimony) signed her card (G.C. Exh. 2G) in blank and Laura Rimmer, prior to the delivery of the cards to Union Vice President Hermann on February 4, filled out the bal- ance of the card. Hoppe knew that Rimmer filled out the card and made no objection to the card before it was deliv- ered to Hermann. As delivered to Hermann on February 4, the card was includable as part of the Union's proof of majority, even though it was signed in blank. S. E. Nichols Co., et al., 156 NLRB 1201, 1208 (1966); Henry Spen & Co., 150 NLRB 138, 149. Rimmer: Rimmer testified, she signed her card (G.C. Exh. 2H) as an application for membership in the Union. The card, which has at its top, in large letters, "Application for Membership," is thus admissible to prove union majori- ty, Levi Strauss & Co., supra; and see N.L.R.B. v. S. E. Nichols Co., supra, fn. 4; N.L.R.B. v. Southland Paint Com- pany, Inc., 394 F.2d, 717, 728 (C.A. 5, 1968), since the em- ployee thereby has manifested an intention "to designate the Union as her bargaining representative," Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394, 395 (1961). An applica- tion for membership is regularly understood as standing for that purpose. N.L.R.B. v. S. E. Nichols Co., supra. Respondent nevertheless attacked counting the Hoppe and Rimmer cards because Hermann was asked for the return of the cards prior to requesting recognition from Podraza on February 4. The evidence shows that in the morning of February 4, 1977 (before Hermann made his lunchtime request for recognition of the Union), while Her- mann was discussing with Podraza the reinstatement of Schultz, Rimmer, a few minutes after having been unsuc- cessful in having Hermann return her card if there was 210 DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR going to be a strike over Schultz' reinstatement, telephoned Helen Hoppe and received Hoppe's permission to get her card back. Rimmer's reason to get them back, as stated to both Hoppe and Vice President Hermann, was that the employees had not first authorized surrender of the cards to the Union. Where, as here, there have been no employer unfair la- bor practices prior to the employee's request for return of signed authorization cards, and where, as here, the request is made prior to the time the Union demands recognition, the card should not be counted in determining the union's majority status because the requests for revocation are val- id. S. E. Nichols Co., supra at 1211 (Gladys Hourihan), and cases cited therein. Hoppe previously authorized Rimmer's requested return of her card. Rimmer's subsequent request to Hermann (couched in terms of return of all cards) on the morning of February 4, effectively revoked their two authorization cards. General Counsel's citation of Reeder Motor Compa- ny, 96 NLRB 831 (1951), is not to the contrary. All that Reeder holds is that the withdrawal of the card must be evidenced by clear and unambiguous conduct. I conclude that Hoppe's grant of authority to Rimmer and Rimmer's subsequent request for the return of the cards were clear and unambiguous. Whether the reasons advanced by Rim- mer to Union Vice President Hermann were reasonable, or even truthful, is quite beside the point. Hoppe's permission to Rimmer and Rimmer's subsequent request to Hermann were clear and unequivocal for the return of the cards. I conclude that Rimmer's and Hoppe's cards should not be counted and that of the seven cards in evidence, which demonstrated membership in the Union on and after lunchtime on February 4, five may be counted to prove majority: Lancaster, Rafert, Schultz, Buchanan, and Rum- baoa. I further conclude that, on the afternoon of February 4, 1977, Respondent represented a majority of the nine union unit employees by virtue of the five valid authoriza- tion cards, supra. D. The Events of February 28, 1977 Prior to February 28, Hermann sorted out and received from employees certain economic demands which would be presented to Respondent. On February 28, he tele- phoned Cervantes and told him he desired immediate ne- gotiations. I credit his testimony, and discredit Cervantes' denial, that Hermann and Cervantes discussed various eco- nomic demandv of the employees and that Cervantes said not only that he wanted the union contract demands re- duced to writing, but that any negotiations should await the outcome of a primary election in which Cervantes was a candidate. Cervantes told Hermann on February 28, that if he won the mayoral primary, Cervantes might have to divest himself of Respondent. Indeed, Cervantes told Her- mann that Cervantes had been speaking with a local auto- mobile dealer to purchase Respondent. I also conclude that he told Hermann that the $5.10-per-hour demand that Her- mann had suggested was "impossible" and that when Her- mann sent written proposals to him, Hermann should in- clude a proposed wage figure which Cervantes could "live with." Cervantes admitted that in that conversation Her- mann had made a forthright statement that "he repre- sented the people." Immediately after the phone conversation, as Cervantes had requested, Hermann mailed to Cervantes the Union's written minimum contract proposals for a 3-year contract commencing February ,1 1977 (G.C. Exh. 4). The primary elections were held March 8, and it does not appear that Cervantes was successful. Union Vice President Hermann thereafter telephoned Cervantes on several occasions but Cervantes was out of town and did not return the calls. Hermann thereafter reached Cervantes by phone but no witness at the hearing could establish with certainty the date of the phone call or of the face-to-face discussions between the parties which occurred on the following day. Hermann placed the dates as March 21 (the phone call) and March 22 (face-to-face discussion) although he admitted he originally thought that the meeting had occurred in the first week of April. He testified that his notes of the meeting (not produced) point- ed to those dates. Cervantes remembered nothing of the dates and Podraza placed them in mid or late April be- cause he allegedly filed the "RM" petition a few days later, on May 4. I credit Hermann with regard to the March 21 and March 22 dates, since the dates of mid- or late-April suggested by Podraza were essentially the result of leading questions put to him by counsel and, in any event, very late April is inconsistent with Podraza's original testimony of mid-April. Obviously, if the face-to-face meeting occurred in mid-April, as Podraza at one point testified, his filing of the May 4 petition would have not occurred a mere couple of days after the face-to-face meeting. Except for the perti- nency of the filing of the RM petition, I do not find the exact date of the phone call or the subsequent meeting to be material. In any event, I conclude that in or about late March, and particularly on or about March 21, Hermann spoke with Cervantes and they agreed to hold a bargaining discussion the following day. March 22. E. The Discussions of March 22 The following day, March 22, Podraza, Cervantes, Her- mann, and Matthews (assistant business representative of the Union who did not testify at the hearing) met in Cer- vantes' office. Hermann presented and analyzed a union contract with one of Respondent's competitors, National Car Rental Company, as a basis of negotiating a similar agreement with Respondent and gave the contract (G.C. Exhs. 6A, 6B) to Cervantes.'2 Hermann went through the items in the National Car Rental Company contract and said that each of the first or five items were "musts." He then read to the group the first of the "must" items the recognition" clause,'3 to which Cer- 12 Actuall,. there are two separate agreements in the National Car Rental Aqreement: One covering the "hikers." the other the "rental agents." 3 G ( Exhs 6A and 6B containing "recognition" clauses are the same except for the unit description For the purpose of collectire bargaining with respec tt )rates of pas hours of employment and other conditions of employ ment, the emploser recog- nizes the Union as the exclusive representative of the following classifica- tions of employees in the St. ouis, Missouri area 211 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD vantes said,' 4 "1 see no problem with that." Hermann then read the union security and "new employee" clauses from the National Car Rental agreement and Cervantes similarly stated: "I see no problem with this." Before Hermann proceeded further, Cervantes told Her- mann that Respondent was not in competition with Avis, Hertz, or National, i.e., the large car rental companies, but with Budget Rent-A-Car. He then said he would "give" the Union a Budget Rent-A-Car contract. At that moment in the discussion, Podraza handed Cervantes the Union's ex- isting agreement with Budget Rent-A-Car and Cervantes said to Hermann as he handed the Budget agreement to Hermann: "Here, this is what we will give you." Cervantes said Respondent had only 72 cars in its fleet and could not compete with employer fleets of 700 or 800 cars.'5 Hermann admitted that the Union had the collective- bargaining agreement with Budget but told Cervantes that that agreement had only I year to run and that its wage rates ($4 per hour maximum) were not only exceptionally low but, that at the expiration of the agreement, Budget would have to come up to the other local car rental agree- ments wage terms. When Hermann said he did not think Respondent's employees would accept the Budget wage rates, Cervantes said that the terms of the Budget agree- ment was all he could offer to the Union. I credit Podraza who testified that Hermann then tore up the Budget agree- ment and threw it on the floor. The Budget agreement (G.C. Exh. 7) contains the same recognition clause as that which appears in the National agreement, supra. Around April I I and April 18, Hermann again spoke with Cervantes on proposed modifications of the Union's substantive wage demands. Cervantes persisted in his posi- tion regarding the Budget contract even though, on April 18, Herman offered Respondent a I year contract with the Budget terms except slightly higher wage rates. At no time during any of the bargaining did Hermann give the union authorization cards to Podraza or ask for verification of signatures, or offer a third party check of the cards. I do not credit Podraza's testimony that he "be- lieved" he told Hermann that he was not sure the Union represented Respondent's employees in view of his subse- quent testimony that he could not specifically recall telling Hermann that he doubted the Union's majority. Further, in view of this resolution with regard to Podraza's testi- mony, I discredit Cervantes' extensive testimony on this point: that at the March 22 meeting, and at other times commencing February 4, Podraza told Hermann that he was not sure ,he Union represented Respondent's employ- ees in view of his subsequent testimony that he could not specifically recall telling Hermann that he doubted the 14 I do not credit Cervantes' testimony to the extent that it contradicts the above version presented by Hermann. Not only did the evidence show that at the meeting Cervantes was being continuall) distracted during the con- versation with Hermann by telephone calls and other interruptions during the discussions but his testimony at the hearing reflected a consistent lack of precise recollection of events. 15 To the extent that the transcript indicates that Cervantes used Ihe expression seven or eight cars without the use of the word "hundred." it is hereby corrected union's majority. Further, in view of this resolution with regard to Podraza's testimony, I discredit Cervantes' exten- sive testimony on this point: that at the March 22 meeting, and at other times commencing February 4, Podraza told him of a running conversation and contradiction between Podraza and Hermann on the question of whether the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees. Not only did Podraza not substantiate Cervantes, and ac- tually contradict him, but if Cervantes entertained any doubts of the Union's majority based upon Podraza's sev- eral conversations with him, and if these doubts existed, as Cervantes said, since late January or early February, there would be no reason why Cervantes waited until May 4 to cause Podraza to file the RM petition. Discussions and Conclusions I have already concluded that, on February 4, the Union was the majority representative (five out of nine authorization cards) of the unit employees and, on that day, conveyed to Respondent, through Podraza, a demand for recognition and bargaining as statutory bargaining agent. Respondent, which had committed no unfair labor practices, could have lawfully refused to accede to that demand, or done nothing, or filed an RM petition, or awaited the union's petition for certification. Linden Lum- ber Division, Summer and Co., 419 U.S. 301 (1974). Instead, it did three things: (a) it stated, about 6 weeks after the February 4 union demand for recognition, that it would "give" the Union the same terms as those which appeared in the Budget contract (which contained a "rec- ognition" clause): (b) in response to the Union's minimal "must" demands, as read from the National Car Rental collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent, through Cer- vantes, said that it "saw no problem," with such recogni- tion: (c) Respondent entered into detailed bargaining ne- gotiations with the Union, appearing to agree on all terms except wage rates. On the above facts, I conclude that on or about March 22, rather than February 4, Respondent recognized the Union.' 6 Recognition can be accomplished other than by executing a written recognition agreement. Broadmoor Lumber Company, 227 NLRB 1123 (1977). The Cervantes' statement of "seeing no problem" with Hermann's mini- mal request for recognition and union security, alone, constitutes evidence of recognition. When added to such conduct Cervantes' continual counter offers of the Budget contract, which contract included the identical recognition clause which Hermann demanded in his reading of the Na- tional agreement, the parties, in contractual terms, had a meeting of the minds on "recognition," and, in any event, Cervantes granted voluntary recognitions '7 In an'y event, recognition can also be inferred because the parties there- 61 I do not find the sariation between allegation and proof misled or in any way prejudiced Respondent in its defenses Its defenses. factual and legal. were full) litigated and were directed to the conclusion that recogni- tion never occurred rather than that it did not occur. as alleged, on Febru- ary 4. The Contrait Knitter. Inc, 220 NL.RB '58 (1975). 17 Here. unlike prior dealings between the ULnion and Podraza. Hermann was dealing with an agent of Respondent, (ervantes. who had the piower to confrr. and, in haec verba, did confer recognition on the Union as collective- hlargalining agent tIsi & Son Trl)wiu ., I,1 , 197 NI RB 198. 212 DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR after clearly bargained on, and discussed, wage rates. General Counsel correctly argues, and I find, that such conduct makes nonexecution of a written recognition agreement "inconsequential," Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 NLRB 643, 645, fn. 5 (1966). It is not entirely clear, nor do I find it necessary to dis- cover, on what basis at the March 22 meeting Cervantes said (1) he saw no problem in recognizing the Union and entered into collective bargaining with the Union, and (2) counteroffered the execution of an agreement inter alia containing the same recognition clause offered by the Union in the National agreement. Where, as here, the Charging Party, in fact, had a card majority on February 4 at the time it requested recognition; and thereafter, Re- spondent, on March 22, without questioning the Union's majority, recognized the Union as the majority representa- tive and commenced unconditional bargaining with the Union on the merits of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, General Counsel proved a primafacie case. The burden of then going forward to rebut this prima facie case shifted to Respondent, Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 NLRB 643, to show that, in some way, the Union was not the majority representative when it demanded recognition, or that Re- spondent had been misled in agreeing not only that there was "no problem" in recognizing the Union but in offering to execute a collective-bargaining agreement one of whose terms was the recognition of the Union as statutory repre- sentative, or that, on March 22, the Union lost its majority status. It should be noted that Respondent did not attempt to prove that the Union, whatever its majority status on Feb- ruary 4, the date of its request for recognition, was not the majority representative when Respondent granted recogni- tion on March 22 or that it believed on March 22 that the Union was not the majority representative. Rather, Re- spondent's principal defense with regard to the Union's majority status was that the Union was not the majority representative on February 4. Respondent, through Podraza, knew that at least some of its employees had executed union membership cards as early as the end of January and the beginning of February 1977. It is significant, it seems to me, that Respondent did not demand to see the cards when, on March 22, it con- ferred recognition on and commenced bargaining with the Union. Here, unlike Moisi & Son Trucking, supra. where the Board nevertheless issued a bargaining order on a find- ing of a 8(a)(5) violation, the Union did not refuse to show the employer its cards; here, on March 22, Respondent failed to ask for their production, conferred recognition, and entered into bargaining on the merits.'8 "s The Board, in Jem . g.. Inc, supra at 645, distinguishing John P Serpa. Inc. 155 NL RB 99 (1965). notes that in Serpa. as here. the Uniomn, on Febru- ary 4. merely spread the authorization cards in front of the Emploser Here. a supervisor, without authority to confer recognition saw. only one-half of the signed cards But, here, on March 22, unlike Serpa. as the Board empha- sized in Jnm Mfg. rupra at 645. fn. 6. Respondent (bh (ersantes' statemnients concerning "no probleln" in union recognition aind his counteroffers) dem- onstrated that it beliesed the ltimon represented a ma.lorit. conferred rec- ognition. and commenced bargaining. Similarly. the Board's rule an- nounced In 4rrhur Dere,. Sr. Prelidcni. landi l dler ti( (,,, In,. 149 NL RB 998, 999 (1972). is noit toi the colntrars There. in holding that Board election was the preferred method of resolving questions concerning repre- I agree with General Counsel that it is against the na- tional labor policy to permit Respondent, having recog- nized and bargained with the Union as the majority repre- sentative of the unit employees, to withdraw recognition and thereafter to allege, by filing its RM petition on May 4, the existence of a question concerning representation, only because Respondent is not satisfied with the substance of contractual terms which the Union's bargaining offer en- compassed. Broadmoor Lumber Co., supra. After conferring recognition and engaging in collective bargaining with the majority representative, Respondent is forbidden under Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act to with- draw recognition and, without more, refuse to bargain. Rather, it is under an obligation to bargain for a reason- able time during which the relationship can be given a fair chance to succeed. Franks Braos. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 102. 705: N.L.R.B. v. Broad Street Hospital and Medical Center. 452 F.2d 302, 303 (C.A. 3, 1971); N.L.R.B. v. San Clemente Publishing Corporation; Coastline Publishers, Inc., 408 F 2d 367, 368 (C.A. 9. 1969). Those cases stand for the proposition that a bargaining relationship established by voluntary recognition, even if oral and never reduced to writing, is irrebutably presumed to continue for a reason- able time. and the effect of such recognition is no different from that achieved as a result of a Board election. N.L.R.B. v. Broad Street Hospital and Medical Center, supra. To hold that only a Board conducted election is binding for a rea- sonable time would place a premium on the Board con- ducted election and would hinder the use of less formal procedures that, in certain situations, may be more practi- cal and convenient and more conductive to amicable labor relations. N. L. R.B. v. San Clemente Publishing Corp., supra; Toltec Metals, Inc., 201 NLRB 952, 954 (1973). Based on the foregoing factual and legal determinations, I reject Respondent's arguments that General Counsel was required to prove that the Union represented a majority at the time Respondent withdrew recognition and refused to bargain, Jetm Mfg., Inc., supra; Toltec Metals, Inc., supra at 955; that the Union never requested bargaining; that Re- spondent did not grant recognition; and that Respondent may demand an election absent commission of unfair la- bor practices, Snow & Sons, supra.l9 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. sentaion, it expressls excepted cases where the employer's unfair labor practices foreclosed effective utilization of the election procedures or where the parties voluntaril, entered into agreed on methods of settling the ques- tion of the union's majority status. such as a card check, Fred Snow. Harold Snow- and 7Tom Snowii d h a Sno. & Sons, 134 NLRB 709 (1961), enfd. 308 F 2d 687 (C(.A 9. 1962). Here. Respondent relieved the Union of its burden of demonstrating majorits status and voluntarily conferred recognition. Re- spondent, byh ts conduct. effectisels mooted the problem of the union's marjorits status which, in fact, it enjowed when it requested recognition. I particularls direct Respondent's attention to the Decision of Adminis- traltie I.as Judge Paul Bisgyer in Irseose Familv Shoe Store, JD-790-77 (issued Nosernher 10. 1977) wherein Administrative Law Judge Bisgyer dismnlssed the complaint alleging siolation of Sec 8(a)(5). In that case. where there are surface factual similarities to the instant case, the employ- er's conduct demonstrated that no recognition or bargaining had occurred noltwithstalndini that the labor organiz.ation was the majority representative. 213 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Automotive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Em- ployees Union, Local 618, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining with- in the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All employees employed by the Respondent at its Lambert Field, St. Louis County, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. At all times since February 4, 1977, the Union has been and is the exclusive representative of all the employ- ees within said appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. On March 22, 1977, Respondent recognized and com- menced bargaining with the Union as the exclusive repre- sentative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. 6. By withdrawing recognition of the Union and by fil- ing the petition in Case 14-RM-506 on May 4, 1977, and since that time refusing to meet and bargain with the Union as exclusive representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Such affirma- tive action will include the requirement that, upon request, Respondent bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the above appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. I shall also recommend that Respondent be required to withdraw the petition filed in Case 14-RM-506. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 20 The Respondent, Laclede Cab Company, d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car, St Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with Automotive, Petroleum, and Allied Industries Employees Union, Local 618, affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of its employes in the following appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, embodying in a signed agree- ment any understanding reached: All employees employed by Laclede Cab Co., d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car at its Lambert Field, St. Louis County, Missouri, facility, excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of the above-named labor organization to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the above-de- scribed unit or interfering, restraining, or coercing said em- ployees. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, meet and bargain with the above- named labor organization, as the exclusive representative of all of its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and em- body in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Withdraw the petition filed in Case 14-RM-506. (c) Post at its place of business at Lambert Field, St. Louis, Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- pendix." 21 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, shall be duly signed by Respondent's representative, posted by Respondent imme- diately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 2i In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United Slates C'ourt of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 214