Martin Electronics, Inc.

66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL Martin Electronics, Inc. and Laborers 1101, Laborers International Union , AFL-CIO.. Case 12-CA-4472 June 8, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS On October 30, 1969, Trial Examiner Robert L. Piper issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac- tion, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup- porting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda- tions.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Martin Electronics, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ' We find no merit in Respondent's contention that each employee who signed an authorization card must appear in person at the hearing and authenticate his own card See Don the Beachcomber, 168 NLRB 275, fn 2 In addition , we find no record evidence to support Respondent's claims in its brief that at 9 30 a in those unreplaced employees were offered work or that the employees, either at 9 30 a in or when they again returned at 11 30 a in , to any way placed conditions upon their requests for reinstate- ment 4 While we agree with and adopt the Trial Examiner's recommendation that Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Charging Party, we do not rely or pass on the Trial Examiner's conclusion that even if Respondent had not committed any unfair labor practices, independent of its refusal to bargain, Respondent violated Sec 8 (a)(5) of the Act when it refused to bargain with the Union LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT L. PIPER , Trial Examiner: This proceed- ing, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Tal- lahasee, Florida, from July 8 through 11, 1969,1 pursuant to due notice. The complaint, which was issued on May 14, on a charge filed March 11, al- leged in substance as amended that Respondent en- gaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Sec- tion 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by (1) various specified acts of interference, restraint, and coer- cion; (2) discriminatorily discharging 50 named striking employees and discriminatorily refusing to reinstate said employees after their unconditional application for reinstatement; and (3) refusing to bargain with Laborers 1101, Laborers International Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called the union), on and after March 3. Respondent's answer denied the alleged unfair labor practices. None of the parties filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Respondent is a Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of grenade fuses with its principal office and place of business located in Perry, Florida. During the past year it sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Florida and held contracts with the United States Department of Defense for providing grenade fuses valued in excess of $500,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction and Issues This proceeding involves an alleged refusal to bargain with the Union after its request based on the possession of signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit, subsequent alleged interference, restraint, and coercion of employees, alleged discriminatory discharge of striking employees, and alleged dis- criminatory refusal to reinstate such employees after their unconditional application therefor. ' All dates hereinafter refer to 1969 unless otherwise indicated 183 NLRB No. 4 MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 67 The issues as framed by the pleadings are: (1) refusal to bargain on and after March 3 with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative designated by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit; ( 2) after the request to bargain, interference , restraint , and coercion by (a) uni- laterally instituting an increased production quota and threatening employees with discharge if such quota was not met, (b) contrary to past practice forbidding employees to talk, eat candy, or chew gum while working, ( c) threatening never to let the Union in the plant and to close or move the plant if the union movement was successful , ( d) advising employees that Respondent would not permit the plant to go union and threatening to close the plant, (e) requiring employees to pick up handfuls of ex- plosive detonators at one time and work faster in this dangerous manner, ( f) advising employees that there was no union and warning them that there was not going to be any union in the plant , and (g) interrogating employees concerning their union ac- tivities and warning them that Respondent was not going to take such activities sitting down ; ( 3) dis- criminatorily discharging 50 named employees for striking ; ( 4) discriminatorily refusing to reinstate 51 named striking employees after their uncondi- tional application for reinstatement; and (5) whether the strike was caused by and/or prolonged by the aforesaid unfair labor practices. B. Chronology of Events Respondent commenced production of its fuses for hand grenades for the Defense Department in October 1968 . Most of its production employees were women . Because the fuse detonator contained an explosive, there was an element of danger in the production work and safety precautions had to be taken . In the latter part of February , because of dissatisfaction with working conditions , primarily safety , some of the employees contacted a representative of the Union with a view to organiz- ing the employees and joining the Union. As a result Herbert Hendry, a business representative of the Union , scheduled a meeting of all interested employees on Saturday evening , March 1, at a restaurant in Perry , Florida. Hendry explained the purposes and desirability of union organization, what benefits could be sought , that if more than 30 percent of Respondent 's production and main- tenance employees signed authorization cards the Union could petition for an election , and that if more than 50 percent of the employees signed cards the Union could request recognition and bar- gaining of Respondent . The meeting was attended by 34 employees all of whom signed cards authoriz- ing the Union to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining . A number of the employees took additional blank cards to seek additional signers. From March 1 to and including March 3, an ad- ditional 16 employees in the hereinafter found ap- propriate unit signed authorization cards. The record establishes that as of March 3, the Union had secured 50 signed cards . On March 3 the Union sent Respondent a telegram advising it that a majority of its production and maintenance em- ployees had designated the Union as their bargain- ing representative , requesting recognition and a meeting to commence contract negotiations, and offering to present proof of majority status at such meeting to any mutually agreeable impartial party. Respondent received this telegram March 4, at which time the Union had secured 58 signed authorization cards . Between then and March 10 the Union received an additional 5 signed cards for a total of 63. Respondent did not reply to or acknowledge the Union 's telegram until March 17. On the morning of March 6 , Jess H. Meadows, Respondent's plant manager , assembled and ad- dressed all of the employees , approximately 65, in Respondent's assembly department . Louise Pitt- man, Respondent 's only supervisor below the management level, was present. Meadows informed the employees that Respondent had contractual committments with the Defense Department, that they would have to increase their production of fuses to approximately 35,000 a day, that they had done it in the past and could do it again, that he was rough and could get rougher, that if they did not meet such production quotas he would replace all of them with a crew that could, and that they had 1 day within which to so increase their produc- tion . He also informed the employees that , contrary to past practice, they would have to stop talking, chewing gum, and eating candy while working. The record establishes that the average daily production of fuses prior to March 6 was between 17,000 and 20,000, that the highest number previously produced in a single day was 21,400 , and that the employees had never approached a figure of 35,000. Production increased that day to 20,125 and the following day to 21,275. The foregoing findings are based upon the composite testimony of numerous employees present at the meeting, whom I credit. Pittman 's version of Meadows ' speech was similar, except that she could not recall his saying anything about what would happen if the em- ployees failed to meet such increased production quotas, could not recall any specific figures, and could not recall his mentioning talking , chewing gum, or eating candy . Meadows admitted telling the employees that they would have to produce at the rate of 35,000 fuses a day in order to meet Re- spondent's contractual committments , that they had produced at that rate in the past, per operator, and that if they did not do so he would get another crew that would. Meadows admitted that production had never approached 35,000 fuses a day, but con- tended that he was referring to an individual production rate achieved by some of the best operators which, if multiplied by and applied to all of the operators, would total 35,000 fuses a day. 427-258 O-LT - 74 - 6 68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Meadows admitted threatening the employees with discharge if they did not achieve such increased production . Meadows denied saying anything about how much time the employees would have to meet such production quotas or making any reference to talking , chewing gum , or eating candy while work- ing. To the extent that his testimony was incon- sistent with the above findings , I do not credit Meadows. During the workweek of March 3 to 7 , Pittman asked Mavis Weekly, an employee , if she had signed one of the Union 's authorization cards. When Weekly replied that she had , Pittman said that she did not know what to do about the Union and that DiRubio ( Respondent 's vice president) was not going to "take this thing sitting down." Pittman did not specifically deny such interrogation and threat, instead testifying that she could not re- call such a conversation . I credit Weekly. On Sunday evening , March 9, the employees held a union meeting at a cafeteria in Perry presided over by Earl Niccum , business manager of the Union , a Mr. Collins , the Union 's International representative for the State of Florida, Frank Hamilton, the Union's attorney, and Hendry. Fifty employees who had signed authorization cards at- tended the meeting . The employees were informed that Respondent had not replied to the Union's telegram of March 3 requesting recognition and bargaining , and discussed what steps should be taken . It was unanimously agreed that the em- ployees would assemble the following morning be- fore 8 a .m., their work starting time , accompanied by Niccum and Collins, in front of the building where they punched the timeclock , request Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union as their representative, and refuse to work, or strike , until 8 : 30 a.m . unless Respondent agreed to recognize the Union as their representative. The employees elected Doris Stephens as their em- ployee spokesman . The following morning, Mon- day, March 10, as agreed, at approximately 7:45 a.m. the 50 employees named in Appendix A at- tached hereto , substantially the same as those who attended the meeting the previous evening, met Niccum and Collins at the plant and assembled in front of the building which housed the offices and the timeclock. Meadows arrived at the plant about 7 :55 a.m. Niccum approached him, attempted to introduce himself and Collins. and informed Meadows that Niccum was the Union' s business manager. There- upon Meadows advised Niccum and Collins that they were on private property and ordered them to get off, which they did, proceeding to the road out- side the plant. Meadows then went to the porch in front of the office building. Stephens, the employee spokesman , informed Meadows that the employees wanted Respondent to recognize their Union and that they were going to strike and not clock in until 8:30 a .m. unless Respondent agreed to do so. Meadows replied , "no," informed the employees that work started at 8 a.m., that everybody who was not punched in by then would be penalized , and en- tered the building . At 7:58 a.m., the customary warning buzzer alerting the employees to the im- minence of 8 a.m. sounded . Meadows came out and again informed the employees that they should punch in or they would be penalized . Stephens again informed Meadows that the employees would not go to work until 8:30 a.m . unless Respondent recognized the Union . When the 8 a.m. starting bell rang Meadows returned and informed the em- ployees that if they were not going to go to work then , they were on private property and to get off. When there was no immediate reaction, he in- structed William Bolton , Respondent 's purchasing agent, to call the sheriff. The employees thereupon left the property and joined Niccum and Collins in the road . Meadows followed them there and or- dered them to remove their cars because they were blocking Respondent's access road. They all drove to downtown Perry and met at the cafeteria where they had met the previous evening . All of the strik- ing employees signed a register at that meeting. After conferring they decided to return to the plant and unconditionally offer to return to work. The same group of employees, without Niccum and Col- lins, returned at 9:30 a .m. Respondent regularly had applicants for employment in its office Monday mornings and between 8 a.m. and 9 :30 a.m. hired five employees. Meadows again met them in front of the office building. Stephens informed him that they had returned and were ready to go to work. She also told him that the reason they had refused to work and struck at 8 a .m. was to let him know that the Union in fact represented the employees . Meadows replied that they no longer had jobs and that they were all fired and to get off the property, at the same time making a brush off gesture with his arm. All the employees got in their cars and returned to the meeting place at the cafeteria . About 10 a.m. Hamilton called Meadows to request that the em- ployees be returned to work. According to Meadows, he replied that he had replaced some of them , but to send them back to the plant and he would talk to them . Hamilton advised the em- ployees to return to the plant, informing them that those who had not been replaced would be returned to work. The same group of employees returned to the plant at 11 : 30 a.m., this time entering the office building where the timeclock was located, where- upon they discovered that their timecards had been removed from the rack. They again informed Meadows that they were ready to go to work. Meadows replied that they no longer had jobs and were through, that he had already replaced 50 per- cent of them and did not need the others, that they should advise Respondent's office if their telephone numbers had been changed , and not to call him, he would call them. The entire group again left. MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 69 In addition to the 5 new employees hired between 8 and 9 : 30 a.m ., Respondent hired 12 more employees March 10, or a total of 17. The record establishes that on March 10 the 50 em- ployees named in Appendix A participated in the strike at 8 a .m., were fired by Respondent at 9:30 a.m., and were refused reinstatement by Respond- ent at 11 : 30 a.m. Contrary to Meadows' statement at 11:30 a.m. to the employees when rejecting their offer to return to work that he had replaced 50 per- cent of them and did not need the others, record stipulations and Joint Exhibit 1 offered by both parties establish that Respondent hired 17 new em- ployees on March 10, not 50 percent, and thereafter employed 33 additional employees to and including March 24 , for a total of 50, substan- tially the .same number as the total of striking em- ployees. The foregoing findings are based on the com- posite testimony of numerous employees, whom I credit. The conversation between Meadows and Niccum shortly before 8 a .m. on March 10 was sub- stantially undisputed . Much the same was true with respect to the conversation between Stephens and Meadows immediately before 8 a . m. Meadows ad- mitted that he recognized the group were his em- ployees, that there were approximately 50 present, and that he understood from Stephens that they were requesting recognition of their Union and refusing to work until 8:30 a .m. unless Respondent would recognize the Union . He admitted telling them to clock in and that if they wouldn't do so to get off the property . He conceded that it was clear to him that the employees were trying to demon- strate the strength they had because of wanting Respondent to recognize the Union , and that it was entirely possible that they had so stated to him. While he did not concede telling the employees that they would be penalized, the balance of his testimony makes clear that Meadows believed that the employees had lost their right to employment by refusing to start working at 8 a.m. With respect to the conversation at 9:30 a.m. when the employees returned to work and Meadows told them they were all fired and to get off the property , there was some variance in Meadows' testimony , but he conceded that the em- ployees informed him they wanted to return to work and that he told them they were no longer employed by Respondent . The 11:30 a .m. conver- sation between the employees and Meadows when they again returned and unconditionally requested reinstatement is substantially undisputed . Contrary to what Meadows then told the employees and con- trary to what he had told Hamilton , Meadows had not replaced over 50 percent of the striking em- ployees, having hired only 17 employees, had not filled his total employment requirements and did need additional employees , as demonstrated by Respondent 's continuing to hire employees until 50 of the strikers had been replaced. About 10:30 p.m. on March 11, Hendry and two of Respondent 's employees , Ann Tomlinson and Layfern Ratliff, entered Bill's Lounge , a local bar, for some refreshments. Vincent DiRubio, Respond- ent's vice president, and Bolton were already in the bar , having arrived around 6 p .m. Hendry, Tomlinson , and Ratliff occupied one of the booths and Bolton , who was acquainted with all of them, joined them . Both men bought several rounds of drinks. The conversation ultimately turned to the Union , the strike , and the employees ' termination the prior day. Bolton asked the girls why they had not come to him with their complaints and grievances since he was a friend , had legal training, and could have given them better advice than the Union . Bolton insisted that the employees had quit their jobs and the girls insisted that they had not. Bolton then said it didn 't really make any dif- ference because DiRubio was going to close the plant anyway and write it off as a tax loss, because he did not need the employees and had plenty of money . Bolton also asked the employees why they wanted the Union and why they had started such activities in Perry because it had happened before and they could not win . The conversation ap- parently was not acrimonious but remained on a friendly plane . Bolton admitted telling the girls that because he was a friend and had had legal training he was disappointed in them for not seeking his ad- vice with respect to their complaints and problems rather than going to the Union . Bolton denied mak- ing any reference to DiRubio closing the plant because of the union activities or writing it off as a tax loss. I credit Tomlinson and Ratliff . As will be noted hereinafter , there was substantial discrepan- cies in Bolton 's and DiRubio 's testimony concern- ing the incidents of that evening. Hendry left the group about 11 p.m. The two girls and Bolton remained in the booth . Shortly be- fore midnight , closing time , DiRubio joined the group in the booth . He was not present in the booth during the prior conversation among Bolton, Hendry, and the two girls . When the bar closed at midnight , DiRubio suggested to Bolton and the two girls that they continue the party at DiRubio's home . Ratliff knew DiRubio quite well and had been at two parties at his home previously . DiRubio and Bolton drove to the former 's home and Tomlin- son and Ratliff followed in Tomlinson's car. DiRu- bio as host provided the drinks and like many good parties this one wound up in the kitchen. Bolton and Tomlinson left the party about 2 a.m. Ratliff and DiRubio continued talking and drinking until daylight . During the course of their conversa- tion after the others left they discussed what had happened at the plant. DiRubio told Ratliff that he was sorry the Union had come in , that he had had ,no trouble in his other plants , that it would not hap- pen again, and that before he would go union he would shut the plant down. Patently DiRubio and Ratliff were friendly because he lent her his car to 70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD drive home, she being without transportation after Tomlinson left. DiRubio admitted meeting the girls in the bar, in- viting them to his home to continue the party, the fact that Tomlinson left earlier, and a conversation with Ratliff until about daylight. However, DiRubio denied discussing the Union or threatening to close the plant. According to DiRubio their only discus- sion concerning the plant dealt with safety factors, primarily the type of explosive used by Respondent in its detonators. I credit Ratliff. There are a number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of DiRubio and Bolton. Contrary to the testimony of Ratliff, DiRubio claimed that prior to that evening he did not know where she worked, yet the record established that they were well acquainted. According to Bolton, DiRubio never joined the group in the booth at Bill 's Lounge, con- trary to the testimony of all the others including DiRubio. According to DiRubio, Bolton was not in the group in the booth or present at the party at DiRubio's home, contrary to the testimony of all the others including Bolton. On March 12 Annie Howell, an employee who had not joined the strike on March 10 and had worked March 10, 11, and 12, signed an authoriza- tion card. On March 14 the striking employees began picketing Respondent's plant. The picket signs contained the names of Respondent and the Union and the legend, "Unfair Labor Practices." The picketing continued through March 28. On March 14 Howell joined the strikers by refusing to cross the picket line from then through March 28. On March 17 Respondent for the first time replied to the Union 's telegram of March 3 requesting recognition and bargaining by a letter from Meadows stating, inter alia , that Respondent had a "good faith" doubt that a majority of the em- ployees had designated the Union to represent them, suggesting an election, and asking which if any of the striking employees desired to return to work. On March 24 all of the striking employees ex- cept Howell, Monroe, and Mosley sent registered letters to Respondent unconditionally requesting reinstatement and renewing their continuing appli- cations for employment. On March 28 the Union made another continuing unconditional application for reinstatement by telegram on behalf of 52 em- ployees set forth in an accompanying list. (One ad- ditional employee was apparently included therein by mistake. On March 31 Respondent recalled 19 of the striking employees, 3 more between April 2 and 6, and the balance of the 51 employees on April 7. Joint Exhibit 1 lists the respective dates of reinstatement. Respondent recalled employee Mary L. Branch April 1. On April 2 Pittman transferred Branch to the job of putting detonators on fuses. She had previously done this only a few times and was not familiar with the task. Her regular job was putting on washers and packing. Connie Sands, another employee who had been working on the detonators, continued working with Branch that day and was picking the detonators up by the handful to place them on the fuses. Pittman told the girls that they would have to speed up their-work. Branch knew that Pittman was referring to Branch because she was placing the detonators on the fuses one at a time. Branch knew that it was dangerous to pick up more than one detonator at a time because of their explosive nature. Pittman told Branch that if she would take a handful at a time like Sands, Branch could put them on the fuses faster, but that she should not let the boss catch her doing it. Neverthe- less Branch continued to place the detonators on the fuses one at a time and warned Sands that it was dangerous to pick them up by the handful. Shortly thereafter Pittman transferred Branch back to the job she had previously been performing. Both DiRubio and Meadows conceded that it was dangerous to pick up more than one detonator at a time and that Respondent had instructed the em- ployees not to do so. In fact, the employees were required to perform this function with a plastic safety screen between their hands and faces. Pitt- man denied telling Branch to pick up more than one detonator at a time, but admitted telling her to work faster. I credit Branch. Near the end of that day, Meadows summoned Branch to his office. Meadows accused her of spreading untrue rumors about the Union during working hours, and told her that it was contrary to Respondent's rules to talk about the Union during working hours. Branch replied that she did not know that there was such a rule. Meadows then told her that the Union could not help the em- ployees, that they were in a big mess, that they did not have any union and that there was not going to be a union. Branch admitted that the untrue rumor which Meadows had referred to concerned the fact that she had discussed the Union with Sands that day, had extolled its advantages to her and had in- formed her that those who joined the Union in 31 days would only have to pay $20 but those who joined later would have to pay $100. Branch in- formed Meadows of Pittman's instruction to her to pick up a handful of detonators at a time in order to speed up her work. Meadows replied that he did not believe that Pittman had told her that but that he would check with Pittman about it. Meadows admitted summoning Branch to his office because he had received a complaint from Sands through Pittman about Branch trying to get Sands to sign an authorization card. Meadows stated that Branch conceded that she had talked to Sands about the Union during working hours and that he had in- formed her that this was contrary to the rules and that Respondent did not allow solicitation during working hours. Meadows denied that there was any other discussion about the Union. I credit Branch. Contrary to Pittman's testimony, Meadows ad- mitted the discussion with Branch about Pittman in- MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. structing Branch to pick up a handful of detonators at one time, and admitted that that was contrary to Respondent's policy and that he said he would take that matter up with Pittman. There is no evidence in the record that he did so. C. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion The complaint alleged that on or about March 6 Meadows, in retaliation for and to discourage union activity, unilaterally instituted an increased produc- tion quota, threatened employees with discharge if such quota was not met, and instituted a new policy forbidding employees to talk, eat candy, or chew gum while working. As hereinabove found, on March 6, 2 days after the receipt of the Union's telegram requesting recognition and bargaining and informing Respondent that a majority of its em- ployees had selected the Union as their bargaining representative, Meadows informed all of the em- ployees in the assembly department that by the next day they would have to produce 35,000 fuses a day, substantially more than not only the prior average production but than the maximum ever produced, or he would discharge them and replace them with another crew. During the same speech, Meadows ordered the employees not to talk, eat candy, or chew gum while working, contrary to Respondent's prior practice and custom. Under all of the circum- stances I am satisfied and find that Respondent, by such statements, demands, orders, and threats, in- terfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint as amended at the hearing alleged that during the week of March 3 Respondent by Pittman interrogated an employee concerning her union activities and stated that Respondent's vice president was not going to "take this matter sitting down." As hereinabove found during the workweek from March 3 to 7, Pittman asked Mavis Weekly if she had signed a union authorization card. When Weekly replied affirmatively, Pittman stated that she did not know what to do about the Union and that DiRubio was not going to take this thing sitting down. I conclude and find that by such interroga- tion and threat, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint alleged that on or about March 11, Respondent, by Bolton, threatened employees that it would never let the Union in the plant and that it would close or move the plant if the union movement was successful. As hereinabove found during the evening of March 11 at Bill's Lounge Bolton asked two employees why they had not come to him with their complaints and grievances because he could have given them better advice than the Union, asked them why they had started such union activities because it had happened be- fore in Perry and they could not win, and told them that it made no difference in any event because if the Union won Respondent would close the plant 71 and write it off as a tax loss. I am satisfied and find that by such statements Respondent threatened its employees that it would never let the Union in and that Respondent would close the plant if the union movement was successful, thereby interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. The complaint alleged that on or about March 11, Respondent, by DiRubio, told an employee that it would not let the plant go union and threatened to close the plant. As hereinabove found in the early morning hours of March 12, DiRubio at his home told Ratliff that he was sorry the Union had come in, that he had had no trouble in his other plants, that it would not happen again , and that be- fore he would go union he would shut the plant down. I am satisfied and find that by such state- ments and threats, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint alleged that on or about April 2, Pittman required an employee to pick up handfuls of explosive detonators at one time and work faster in such dangerous manner because the employees had engaged in union activities. As hereinabove found, on April 2 Pittman told Branch that she would have to work faster and that if whe would pick up a handful of detonators at a time she could put them on the fuses faster, but that she should not let the boss catch her doing it. Branch, who knew that it was dangerous to pick up more than one detonator at a time because of their explosive na- ture, continued to work in the same fashion and later that day was transferred back to her regular job by Pittman. While the record establishes that Pittman did suggest to Branch that she work faster by picking up a handful of detonators at a time, it is clear that Pittman did not require Branch to do so and that Pittman's suggestion was contrary to Respondent's established policy and practice. Moreover, there is no reliable, probative, or sub- stantial evidence in the record that Pittman made such suggestion because Branch or the employees had engaged in union activities. Accordingly, I con- clude and find that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof with respect to this allegation. The complaint alleged that on or about April 2, Meadows told an employee that there was no union and warned that there was not going to be any union in the plant. As hereinabove found at the end of that same workday Meadows summoned Branch to his office and warned her about soliciting for the Union during working hours, based upon a com- plaint from Sands through Pittman. Branch ad- mitted talking to Sands about the Union during working hours and told Meadows that she was. unaware of any company rule against such solicita- tion. Branch also informed Meadows of Pittman's request to pick up detonators a handful at a time, which Meadows admitted was contrary to Re- spondent's policy. During the course of the conver- 72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sation Meadows told Branch that the Union could not help the employees , that they were in a big mess, that they did not have any union , and that there was not going to be any union . I conclude and find that by such statements and warning, Respond- ent interfered with, restrained , and coerced its em- ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. D. Discrimination in Hire or Tenure , Terms, or Conditions of Employment The complaint alleged that on or about March 10 Respondent by Meadows discharged all of the strik- ing employees named therein and since then, after their unconditional offers to return to work on March 10 , 24, and 28 , respectively , failed and refused to timely reinstate said employees , because of their union or concerted activities and/or par- ticipating in the strike commencing March 10. As hereinabove found , shortly before 8 a.m. on March 10 the 50 employees named in Appendix A hereof assembled in front of Respondent 's office building, having agreed to strike or not work until 8:30 a.m. unless Respondent would recognize the Union pur- suant to its request of March 3 . The employees in- formed Meadows that they were striking and would not go to work until 8:30 a .m. unless Respondent would recognize their Union . It was self-evident and Meadows knew that a substantial majority of his employees were present and requesting such recognition . He ordered them to start working at 8 a.m., told them they would be penalized if they did not and when they refused to do so ordered them to leave the property . At 9:30 a. m. they all returned and unconditionally offered to return to work. Meadows thereupon fired all of them and again or- dered them off the property. There can be no question but that this discharge was for engaging in a protected concerted activity, namely, striking, and therefore constituted discrimination in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Thus it follows that the strike became an unfair labor practice strike at 9:30 a.m. if it was not one prior thereto . The record establishes that between 8 and 9 : 30 a.m . Respondent employed five "replace- ments" for the striking employees . It is of course elementary that unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon their un- conditional offer to return to work , regardless of replacements employed after the commencement of such a strike, and thus the replacements em- ployed by Respondent after 9 : 30 a.m . are immateri- al with respect to the reinstatement rights of the un- fair labor practice strikers , and at least 45 of the 50 strikers were then and there entitled to im- mediate reinstatement to their former positions. In addition , all of the striking employees again returned at 11:30 a.m., again unconditionally requested reinstatement, and Respondent again refused to reinstate any of them , although admit- tedly engaged in seeking employees to fill their jobs both then and thereafter until it ultimately hired the same number of employees as the striking group. Assuming that the strike was economic in its incep- tion and did not become an unfair labor practice strike until the discharge at 9:30 a .m., with respect to the five employees "permanently replaced" between 8 and 9 : 30 a.m . (whom Respondent failed to identify ) it is now well settled that employees en- gaging in an economic strike , upon their uncondi- tional and continuing application for reinstatement, retain the status of employees and are entitled to reinstatement as vacancies occur , absent substantial economic or business justification for a refusal to reinstate them with respect to which the burden of proof is upon the employer , and a refusal to rein- state them without such justification constitutes an act so inherently destructive of employee rights as to be an unfair labor practice without reference to intent or improper motivation . The Board , pursuant to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its Fleetwood and Great Dane decisions,' was held: Similarily , we are guided by Fleetwood and Great Dane in our consideration of the strikers whom Respondent terminated and did not re- call after their application for reinstatement on February 11 and thereafter . As in the case of Massey, they remained employees , and their right to reinstatement did not expire on the date they first applied , even though replace- ments filled most of the positions at the precise time they sought reinstatement . As employees with outstanding unconditional applications for reinstatement at the time the strike changed into an unfair labor practice strike, these strikers were entitled to full reinstatements as vacancies arose in their old positions.... Furthermore, we would so hold even if we did not concur in the Trial Examiner 's finding that the strike was converted from an economic to an unfair labor practice strike on February 11. As economic strikers their situa- tion would have been essentially the same as Massey 's; i e., they remained employees who had offered to abandon the strike and who were available to fill openings as such arose. As Respondent brought forward no evidence of business justification for refusing to reinstate these experienced employees while continuing to advertise for and hire new unskilled em- ployees, we find such conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights. This right of reinstatement continued to exist so long as the strikers had not abandoned the employ of Respondent for other substantial and equivalent employment . Moreover, having sig- nified their intent to return by their uncondi- tional application for reinstatement and by their continuing presence , it was incumbent on Respondent to seek them out as positions were 2 N L R B v Fleet,, ood Trailer Co , 389 U S 375, and N L R B v Great Dane Trailers , 388 U S 26 MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 73 vacated. Having failed to fulfill its obligation to reinstate the employees to their jobs as vacan- cies arose , the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. [Citations omitted.]' Thus it follows, with respect to the five strikers who had been replaced and whose applications for reinstatement were continuing and unconditional, that, assuming the strike was economic from 8 until 9:30 a.m., Respondent was obligated to reinstate them as vacancies occurred, absent proof by it of substantial economic or business justification for not doing so. Respondent not only offered no proof of such justification, but admittedly employed inex- perienced applicants from any available source while not recalling said strikers and indeed specifi- cally refusing to reinstate them upon their applica- tion. After their unconditional application for rein- statement, Respondent hired 12 new and inex- perienced employees the same day and during the following 2 weeks 33 more without reinstating any of the striking employees, including the 5 "economic" strikers. Because of Respondent 's unfair labor practices prior to the strike , including its refusal to recognize the Union just prior thereto when confronted by a self-evident majority, the strike could be concluded to have been an unfair labor practice strike from its inception, in which event the "replacement" of five of the strikers between 8 and 9:30 a.m. would have been immaterial . However, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue , inasmuch as the order and remedy would be the same, because as found above the same morning Respondent discriminatorily refused to reinstate said five strikers to admittedly available jobs. The record establishes and I find that on March 10 Respondent discriminatorily discharged the 50 employees named in the complaint and set forth in Appendix A attached hereto for engaging in a pro- tected concerted activity, and that day and thereafter until their respective reinstatements between March 31 and April 7 discriminatorily refused to reinstate said strikers upon their uncon- ditional applications for reinstatement because of their union and concerted activities, including strik- ing, thereby discriminating against said employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In addition to the 50 employees named in Appen- dix A hereof, the complaint alleged that another employee, Annie Howell, joined the strike on or about March 14. As hereinabove found Howell worked March 10,11, and 12 and joined the strike on March 14. Accordingly, Howell was not among the applicants for reinstatement on March 10, and the record establishes that she was not one of the employees who applied for reinstatement in writing March 24. Her first and only application for rein- statement was made March 28. Inasmuch as Respondent reinstated Howell on March 31, the ' Laidlax Corp, 171 NLRB No 175 first working day and available opportunity to do so after her application, I conclude and find that the record establishes no discrimination by Respondent with respect to Howell. E. Refusal To Bargain 1. The appropriate unit The complaint alleged , Respondent stipulated, and I find the following to be a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act: All production and maintenance employees employed by Respondent at its Perry, Florida plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. The majority designation The complaint alleged that on or about March 3, a majority of Respondent's employees in said ap- propriate unit signed authorization cards designat- ing the Union as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent , that on and since march 3 the Union was and is the exclu- sive representative of all the employees in said ap- propriate unit for the purposes of collective bar- gaining , and that on March 3 by telegram and orally on March 10, the Union requested and con- tinued to request Respondent to bargain collective- ly with it as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in said unit. The parties stipulated and their Joint Exhibit 1 establishes that on March 3 there were 78 employees in the appropriate unit, on March 4 there were 81, and on March 10 there were 85. The record establishes that on March 3 the Union had signed authorization cards from 50 of the employees in the appropriate unit, on March 4, 58, and on March 10, 63, all of which were properly authenticated and identified on the record. The authorization cards were both single purpose and unambiguous, of substantially the same type and language as those recently approved by the Supreme Court in its Gissel decision.' They merely designated the Union as the employees' col- lective-bargaining representative and applied for membership in the Union, just as the cards ap- proved by the Supreme Court. There is no evidence in the record that any of said cards were secured by misrepresentations made to the signers with respect to the use or purpose of the cards. Thus they clearly comport with the criteria of the Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine, also approved by the Supreme Court in Gissel.s The record establishes that the Union's telegram requesting recognition and bargaining was received by Respondent March 4 and that the Union's oral 'NLRB v G:sse! Packing Co , 395 US 575. ' Fn 4, supra 74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD request for recognition and bargaining was trans- mitted to Respondent on the morning of March 10 shortly before the strike. On March 4 the Union had signed authorization cards from 58 of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit, then consisting of a total of 81 employees, and on March 10 the Union had signed authorization cards from 63 employees in the appropriate unit, then consisting of a total of 85 employees. I conclude and find that at the time of the original request for recognition and bargain- ing received March 4, and thereafter, including the oral request for recognition and bargaining on March 10, the Union was designated by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit as their bargaining representative and was then and thereafter the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. 3. The refusal to bargain The complaint alleged that on and after March 3 and continuing to date Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with 'the Union as the exclu- sive representative of the employees in said ap- propriate unit. In the light of the Supreme Court's recent Gissel decision,6 it must now be considered well settled that the majority status of a union under the Act may be established by methods, other than certification by the Board after an elec- tion, including the securing of a majority of unam- biguous authorization cards. However, the Court also approved the Board's current practice of not requiring an employer to bargain with a union requesting same based upon the possession of such cards, absent substantial unfair labor practices either making the holding of a fair election unlikely or so coercive in nature as to justify a bargaining order even without a finding of a refusal to bargain. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the well- established doctrine, previously approved by the Board and the Court, that an employer, even though he has committed no unfair labor practices, may not reject a request to bargain when he has in- dependent knowledge, aside from authorization cards, that the Union in fact represents a *majority of the employees. The Court stated (395 U.S. at 596-597): Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it was recognized that a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could establish majority status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision of § 8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support, for instance, by a union-called strike or strike vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent them for collective-bargain- ing purposes. [Citations omitted.] Fn 4, supra The Court (395 U.S. 591) approved and noted that the Board's current practice includes: When confronted by a recognition demand based on possession of cards allegedly signed by a majority of his employees, an employer need not grant recognition immediately, but may, unless he has knowledge independently of the cards that the union has a majority, decline the union's request and insist on an election . . .. [Emphasis supplied.] In this connection the Court further noted (395 U.S. at 594): The Board pointed out, however, (1) that an employer could not refuse to bargain if he knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of his employees supported the union, ... . In construing the Supreme Court's holding in Gissel, the Board recently observed: Insofar as relevant here, the Supreme Court in Gissel, supra, approved the Board's authority to issue a bargaining order to redress unfair labor practices "so coercive that, even in the absence of a Section 8(a)(5) violation, a bar- gaining order would have been necessary to repair the unlawful effect of those [unfair labor practices]." Additionally, in circumstances where the unlawful conduct is less flagrant in nature, the court held that the Board may find an 8(a)(5) violation and issue a bargaining order where "the possibility of erasing the ef- fects of [the] past practices and ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of tradi- tional remedies . . . is slight and ... [therefore] employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order [Citations 'omitted. ]7 As hereinabove found, on March 4 Respondent received the Union's first request for recognition and bargaining, at which time the Union represented a substantial majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. Instead of replying thereto (Respondent never replied until March 17), 2 days after its receipt Respondent engaged in serious un- fair labor practices: unilaterally increasing its production quota to a patently unreasonable level, threatening its employees with discharge for failing to meet such quota within one day, and rescinding its past policy of permitting its employees to talk, chew gum, and eat candy while working, all because of their union activities. During the same week Respondent interrogated an employee about her union activities and threatened that Respondent was not going to take the union activity without retaliation. On March 10 Respondent discharged all of the employees who engaged in the protected concerted activity of striking in support of their request for recognition of the Union. On March 11 7 Garland Knitting Mills of Beaufort, South Carolina, Inc., 178 NLRB 396 MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC 75 and 12 Respondent warned the employees that it would never let the Union in and that Respondent would close the plant if the union movement was successful. On April 2, Respondent informed its employees that they had no union and there was not going to be any union. Thus the record establishes that after the Union's request for recognition and bargaining, at which time it clearly represented a substantial majority of the employees, Respondent promptly engaged in a series of serious and coercive unfair labor practices tending to destroy the Union's majority. As the Board further observed in Garland, after its above- quoted statement with respect to the Supreme Court's holding in Gissel: In our opinion, a bargaining order is war- ranted on the facts of this case under either of the above standards. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent included a half- dozen discriminatory discharges or layoffs of employees, in addition to serious 8(a)(1) viola- tions. These unfair labor practices tended to destroy the Union's majority and in the ag- gregate were so flagrant and coercive in character as to require, even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining order to repair their effect. Moreover, it is unlikely that the lingering coercive effect of these unfair labor practices could be neutralized by con- ventional remedies so as to ensure a fair rerun election. We therefore find that the employee sentiment expressed through the cards is a more reliable measure of employee desires and that statutory policies are better effectuated by issuing a bargaining order than directing a rerun election. Based upon substantially similar facts substantially the same considerations apply here. Accordingly I conclude and find that under either of the applica- ble standards a bargaining order is required. In ad- dition, a preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the entire record con- vinces me, and I find, that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Assuming arguendo that Respondent had not en- gaged in any unfair labor practices, independently of its refusal to bargain, or that such unfair labor practices were not of sufficient gravity to support an 8(a )(5) finding or bargaining order,' as noted above, the Board and the Supreme Court have held that an employer , sans unfair labor practices, nevertheless is required to bargain with a union when he has independent knowledge that the union in fact represents a majority of his employees. The record establishes that on the morning of March 10 Meadows knew that the group of employees was requesting recognition of their Union and intended not to work or strike unless Respondent granted such recognition, that he recognized the employees as his, and that the group totalled approximately 50, patently a substantial majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. Thus the Union, as noted by the Supreme Court in Gissel, supra, had shown convincing support and a substantial majority by a union-called strike and Respondent knew, indepen- dently of authorization cards, that the Union in fact represented a majority of its employees. I further conclude and find that under such circumstances, regardless of any independent unfair labor prac- tices, Respondent was obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union, and by refusing and failing to do so, refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce, and the Union is a labor organization, within the meaning of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. By discharging the 50 employees named in Appendix A attached hereto because of their pro- tected concerted activity, namely, striking, and thereafter refusing to timely reinstate said em- ployees upon their unconditional application for reinstatement because of their union or concerted activities, Respondent engaged in discrimination to discourage membership in the Union, thereby en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. All production and maintenance employees employed by Respondent at its Perry, Florida, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. At all times on and after March 3, the Union has been and now is the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of the em- ployees in the above unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after March 4, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. Respondent has not, as alleged in the com- plaint, required its employees to pick up handfuls of explosive detonators and work in such dangerous manner because they engaged in union activities, or in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and " Poughkeepsie Nenspapers, Inc., 177 NLRB 972, and Gissel , fn. 4, supra . (7) of the Act. 76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided in the Recom- mended Order below, which I find necessary to remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because of the character and scope of the un- fair labor practices found, I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order.' Having found that Respondent reinstated all of the striking employees between March 31 and April 7, the customary rein- statement order will not be included. The customa- ry backpay order, making the employees named in Appendix A hereof whole from March 10, the date of Respondent's refusal to reinstate them, to the date of their respective reinstatements between March 31 and April 7 is included.Upon the forego- ing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the en- tire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Martin Electronics, Inc., its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unilaterally instituting unreasonable produc- tion quotas or threatening its employees with discharge for failure to meet them, in retaliation for their union activities. (b) Changing its established practices concern- ing talking, eating candy, or chewing gum by its employees while working, to discourage union ac- tivities. (c) Coercively interrogating its employees con- cerning their union membership or activities. (d) Warning its employees that it will not take their union activities sitting down. (e) Threatening its employees that it will never let a union in or that it will close the plant if a union movement is successful. (f) Telling its employees that they have no union or warning them that there is not going to be any union in its plant. (g) Discouraging membership in Laborers 1101, Laborers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging employees, refusing to reinstate striking employees upon their unconditional application for reinstatement, or in any other manner discriminat- e N L R B v Express Publishing Company, 312 U S 426, N L R B v Entx istle Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532 (C A 4), Consolidated Industries, Inc, 108 NLRB 60, and cases cited therein 10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be ing against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ- ment. (h) Refusing to bargain collectively with the aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclusive represent- ative of its employees in the appropriate unit found herein. (i) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exer- cise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclusive represent- ative of its employees in the appropriate unit found herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and all other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Make each of the employees named in Ap- pendix A hereof whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned from March 10, 1969, the date of Respondent's refusal to reinstate him, to the date of his reinstate- ment, less his net earnings during said period (Cros- sett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440), said backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Com- pany, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum (Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716). (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its plant in Perry, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."10 Co- pies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 12, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 77 Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX A Eunice Allen Jeanette Aman Dutchella Benton Elease Bodiford Mary Branch Howard Chester Ella Mae Clark Norma Clark Sandra Counce Katie Sue Denmark Verdie Denmark Geneva Ellison Edna Franch LaVerne Gunter Margaret Heartsfield Teresa M. Heartsfield Betty Hill Irene Hill Jewel Horton Margree Hunter Frankie Jerrells Erna Kinsey Peggy Lee Vonceil Marchand Ola G. Mauldin Charlie Mae Monroe Ola Mae Mosley Memorie Padgett Kay Parker Pearlie Beatrice Peeples Stella Eloise Peppers Berdine Poppell Thelma C. Ragans Layfern Ratliff Mary Nell Roberts Dorothy Rodgers Roger Sadowsky Ella Virginia Sheffield Ruby Sistrunk Mary Skinner Mamie Slaughter Doris Stephens Frances Spradley Ann Tomlinson Wanda Walker Mavis Weekly Mae Frances White Sherry Lee Wilson Barbara Wise Jo Ann Wise APPENDIX B NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Laborers 1101, Laborers International Union , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representa- tive of our employees in the appropriate unit noted below with respect to wages, hours, or any other terms or conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the aforesaid Laborers 1101, or any other labor or- ganization of our employees , by discharging employees , refusing to reinstate striking em- ployees upon their unconditional application for reinstatement , or in any other manner dis- criminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi- tion of employment. WE WILL NOT unilaterally institute un- reasonable production quotas or threaten our employees with discharge for failure to meet them, in retaliation for their union activities. WE WILL NOT change our established prac- tices concerning talking, eating candy, or chewing gum by our employees while working, to discourage union activities. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em- ployees concerning their union membership or activities. WE WILL NOT warn our employees that we will not take their union activities sitting down. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we will never let a union in or that we will close the plant if a union movement is success- ful. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they have no union or warn them that there is not going to be any union in our plant. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclu- sive representative of our employees in the ap- propriate unit noted below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and all other terms and conditions of employment and, if an un- derstanding is reached, embody such un- derstanding in a signed agreement. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance em- ployees employed by us at our Perry, Florida, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL make each of our employees named in the list attached hereto whole for any loss of pay he or she may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him or her. All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization. MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 706, Federal Office Building, 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida 33602, Telephone 228-7711.