Holley Woodworking Co.

630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Darrel Craft and John Thiesen, Co-partners doing business as Holley Woodworking Co. and Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2791, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Case 36-CA- 1890 June 19, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On January 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Stanley Gilbert issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain af- firmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision. Thereafter, Respondents filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondents, Darrel Craft and John Thiesen, Co-partners doing business as Holley Woodworking Co., their agents, successors , and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex- aminer's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE STANLEY GILBERT , Trial Examiner : Based upon a charge filed May 29, 1969 , as amended July 2, 1969, by Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2791, United Brotherhood of Carpen- ters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union , the complaint was issued on July 7, 1969. The complaint, as amended during the course of 183 NLRB No. 73 the hearing, alleges that Darrel Craft and John Thiesen, Co-partners doing business as Holley Woodworking Co.,' hereinafter referred to as the Respondents, engaged in conduct violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Respondents by their answer, as amended during the course of the hearing, deny that they committed the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint except as to one allegation indicated hereinbelow. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Albany, Oregon, September 23, 24, and 25, 1969, before the duly designated Trial Examiner. Appearances were entered on behalf of General Counsel and Respondents, but no appearance was entered on behalf of the Charging Party. A brief was received from the Respondents within the time designated therefor; General Counsel filed no brief but elected in lieu thereof to present oral argument at the end of the hearing. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and upon by oberservation of the witnesses as they testified, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS Darrel Craft and John Thiesen are, and have been at all times material herein, copartners doing business under the trade name and style of Holley Woodworking Co. At all times material herein, Respondents have maintained their principal office and place of business in Sweet Home, Oregon, and are, and have been at all times material herein, en- gaged at such plant and location in the manufac- ture, sale, and distribution of wooden moldings and cleats for boxes. Respondents commenced opera- tions at said plant and location in January 1969, and during the second calendar quarter of 1969, which period is representative of all times material herein, manufactured, sold, and shipped from said plant and location wood products valued in excess of $75,000, of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were sold to Western Wirebound Box Company in Oregon, which company annually produces and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly outside of Oregon. As is admitted by the Respondents, they are now, and have been at all times material herein, an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED As is admitted by Respondents, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. ' The name of Dan Butterfield was deleted from the title by amendment of the complaint withdrawing the allegation that he is a copartner in the Holley Woodworking Co HOLLEY WOODWORKING CO. 631 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The issues to be resolved herein are as follows: (1) Whether or not Respondents by the conduct of Dan Butterfield, their plant superintendent, vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on May 23, 1969, by unlawfully interrogating employees2 and by threatening employees with discharge if they refused to withdraw from the Union; and (2) whether the discharges of Delores Bingham, Jer- rene Hyde, Nellie Strumenski, and Margaret Guthary on May 24, 1969, were discriminatorily motivated. Hyde, one of the employees who was discharged on May 24, testified, and her testimony is credited, that on May 21 she obtained union authorization cards from Dean Davis, a union representative; the next day, May 22, she distributed the cards to other employees prior to working hours and during the lunch period; a number of the employees signed them and gave them back to her; she, hereself, signed a card about that time; and in the evening of May 22 she turned over to Davis the signed cards she had obtained. The record discloses that the other three of the above-named employees who were discharged were also among the employees who signed cards. The Interrogation and Threats on May 23 Butterfield testified that he did interrogate most of the employees as to whether they had signed union authorization cards and that the interrogation occurred "the first part of the week" in which the above-named employees were discharged. (They were discharged on Saturday, May 24.) The record, however, clearly demonstrates that the interroga- tion occurred near the end of the week, Friday, May 23, just the day before the discharges. Butter- field, himself, testified that he did not know of the union activity until sometime after lunch on May 23. The General Counsel elicited testimony from four witnesses as to the contents of their conversa- tions with Butterfield in which the interrogation oc- curred. These four witnesses were the discharged employees. Each testified, in essence, that, in the course of her conversation with him, Butterfield made a statement to the effect that he would lay off anybody who refused to withdraw his adherence to the Union. Butterfield denied that he made such a statement and testified that he made a "canned" speech to the employees whom he interrogated. Respondents elicited testimony from several wit- nesses who were interrogated by Butterfield osten- sibly in support of the contention that, since he made a canned speech and did not threaten them, he did not threaten the above-mentioned four wit- nesses produced by General Counsel. This conten- tion is of little merit, particularly in view of the fact that the testimony of Respondents' witnesses shows that he did not follow the same pattern in con- versing with them. For example, Arlene Curtis testified that he told her that if the Union came in the plant would have to close. Curtis further testified that in his conversation with her and another employee (who was not called as a witness) Butterfield held a paper in his hand which he in- dicated contained a list of those employees who had signed cards. None of the other witnesses called by the parties made any reference in their testimony to such a list. Winona Ogbin, another of Respondents' witnesses , testified that Butterfield stated to her that the Company "could not afford to go Union" and that if "the people forced it, he would have to be forced to bring in nonunion wor- kers to run the mill." On the other hand, another of Respondents' witnesses , Ruth Horn, testified that Butterfield told her that "if the mill did go union, that he would have to shut the mill down because they just were not financially able to meet the union wages." Hyde testified that, in the course of her conversa- tion with him, Butterfield told her that he knew that she brought the union cards to the mi113 and asked if she would sign a retraction of her union authorization card to which she responded that she would think about it . In his testimony of the con- versation with Hyde, Butterfield made no mention of whether or not he stated that he knew she had brought union cards into the mill. He testified that when he asked her if she would consider withdraw- ing her card (after she had informed him that she had signed a card) she said that "she would."4 Bingham testified that, when Butterfield asked her if she had signed a card, she told him that she had, and that when he asked her if she would sign a retraction she told him that she would not. This testimony of Bingham was not contradicted by But- terfield. Strumenski testified that when Butterfield asked her if she had signed a union card she denied hav- ing done so . There is some contradiction in her testimony, in that she testified that at the beginning 2 Respondents admit that they violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the conduct of Butterfield in inquiring of most of the employees as to whether they had signed union authorization cards but contend that this conduct was merely a technical violation of the Act. Although this unlawful conduct is admitted , the testimony with respect thereto will be reviewed to some ex- tent since it demonstrates that the violation was not merely "technical", it is in the same context as the testimony with respect to unlawful threats, and it is material to a resolution of the issues with respect to the discharges 3 Bingham testified without contradiction , and her testimony is credited, that in the course of her conversation with him on May 23 Butterfield asked her if she knew who brought the cards into the plant and that she in- formed him, after some reluctance, that it was Hyde who had done so It also appears from Butterfield's testimony that he learned from one of the employees that cards were being distributed, and it appears reasonable to assume that at the same time he was also informed that Hyde was the per- son engaging in such activity ' It is unclear from Butterfield's testimony whether she agreed to con- sider withdrawing or agreed to withdraw the card Since it is her testimony that she told him she would think about it, it appears that the first in- terpretation was intended by his testimony 632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the conversation with her he threatened to fire anyone who had signed a card and she told him that she had not because she was afraid he would fire her. However, according to her testimony which preceded this explanation his threat to fire anyone who signed a card came after she had been asked if she had signed a card. However, it appears that Butterfield also contradicted himself in his testimony as to when he posed the question to em- ployees as to whether or not they would withdraw from the Union. First, he testified that he asked them if they would withdraw from the Union only after he had explained to them the financial posi- tion of the Company (and presumably the dire ef- fects of having a union), and subsequently he testified that it was the first thing he asked them when they came into the office. Guthary testified that when he asked her if she had signed a card she told Butterfield that she had not. She further testified that later in the day he again asked her if she had signed a card and that she responded in the negative. Butterfield did not contradict this testimony. With respect to their conversation with Butter- field on May 23, Hyde, Bingham, Strumenski, and Guthary were more convinving witnesses than was Butterfield. The major conflict in their testimony as opposed to that of Butterfield is whether or not he threatened to discharge anyone who refused to withdraw his adherence to the Union. The Trial Ex- aminer is convinced that the testimony of the four above-named employees should be credited as to the contents of their conversations with Butterfield. It appears to be Respondents' position that their testimony was manufactured by them to bolster the General Counsel's case. It did not appear that they were fabricating this testimony.' In their brief Respondents point out that two employees testified that they admitted to Butterfield that they had signed cards and that he did not threaten them. However, both also testified that they informed him that they would withdraw their cards. In any event, the Trial Examiner is not convinced that it is ap- propriate to infer that because he did not threaten some employees he did not threaten any of them. Consequently, it is concluded that the Respon- dents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw- fully interrogating employees as to whether they had signed union authorization cards,' and by threatening employees with discharge if they did not withdraw their adherence to the Union. The Discharges on May 24 On Saturday, May 24, the day following the above-described conduct found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Butterfield discharged ' The Trial Examiner has not overlooked consideration of the evidence that no reference was made to such threats in testimony of three of them in a state unemployment compensation hearing Bingham, Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary. There is little material conflict in the testimony with respect to the events of the discharges. Discharge of Bingham: It appears that at the end of the previous day Bingham asked Butterfield if she could leave at noon on May 24. At noon on May 24, when she told Butterfield that she was leaving, he called her into his office. Her testimony with respect to the conversation in his office is as follows: A. He said that he didn't need me any more, that I didn't need to come back Monday. Then I asked him how come and he just said, "Well, because your work is not satisfactory." I said, "How come it was satisfactory yesterday and it isn't today?" He said, "I have only been here a couple of months or so and I'm just now getting around to thinking them out." Then he asked me who it was that, what appointment it was that I was going to so I told him my eye doctor. Q. What prompted your question of Mr. Butterfield how come your work was satisfac- tory yesterday and not today? A. The reason I did was because the day be- fore when he asked me about the union I had asked him about my work and he said it was fine, so I couldn't figure out why it wasn't the next day. Butterfield testified as follows: A. I had her come in the office and I told her that I didn't need her any more. Of course, she asked why, and I told her her job was un- satisfactory. She said, "How come unsatisfac- tory all of a sudden after two years?" I don't know if it was two years or one year, however long she had been there. I told her it was not all of a sudden after two years, I said, "It is un- satisfactory all of a sudden after two months," the length of time I had been there. I had had time to observe her work and make a decision. I was very, very busy when I first came there because I had replaced several people. The only conflict in their testimony is that Butter- field testified that she asked him how it happened that her work was unsatisfactory "all of a sudden after two years," and she testified "How come it was satisfactory yesterday and it isn't today?" In her testimony with respect to the contents of her conversation on the previous day (when he asked her if she had signed a union card and if she would sign a retraction), she testified that she asked him if her work was satisfactory and he told her that it was. Her testimony as to the contents of her con- ' In light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurred, it ap- pears that it was more than a mere technical violation, as contended by Respondents, but, rather, that it had a coercive effect on the employees HOLLEY WOODWORKING CO. versation with him on May 23 has been credited in- cluding the reference to her job performance.7 Consequently, her version of the conversation on May 24 is credited. Butterfield testified that he discharged Bingham "specifically" because of an incident on the wood- pile and that "There were other things prior to this that kind of led up to it." When asked of the date of the woodpile incident, Butterfield testified that it was within the same week that he discharged her, "probably in the middle of the week." However, another of Respondents' witnesses, Curtis, who was involved in the woodpile incident, testified that it occurred on the Friday of the previous week. Bingham testified that it was "quite a while" before her discharge. Her estimate was that it might have been as long as a month prior thereto. While she was unable to fix the exact date, she categorically denied that it happened within the same week she was discharged. Curtis was very confused about dates as indicated in her cross-examination by General Counsel as to the date of the woodpile in- cident. (She testified that it occurred 2 to 3 weeks after Butterfield interrogated her about signing a union card.) It appears from an analysis of her testimony that it was her recollection that the in- cident did not occur during the week in which Bingham was discharged but, rather, on the Friday of the preceding week. It is concluded that the in- cident must have occurred at least 8 days prior to Bingham's discharge. Although considerable testimony was adduced as to the woodpile incident, it does not appear of suffi- cient consequence to analyze said testimony. Based on a study of said testimony, the incident is sum- marized as follows: Bingham and two other em- ployees were detailed for part of the day to work on cleaning up the woodpile; it was an undesirable job because of exposure to the sun and heat and the manual labor involved; Bingham objected to the as- signment because of the undesirable character of the work and because she believed that other em- ployees who had less seniority than she had should have been given the assignment; Curtis, who regu- larly worked on the woodpile, complained to But- terfield about the amount and quality of the work that the three girls did and also that one of them, Mary, in carelessly tossing some wood, struck her on the head with it; and a part of the time they were supposed to be working on the woodpile Bingham and one of the other girls were in some other part of the plant. Butterfield testified that on the day of this incident he decided to discharge Bingham . He further testified that he did not discharge either of the other two employees who were involved with Bingham in the woodpile in- cident. Butterfield also testified at quite some length as ' It is noted that Butterfield neither affirmed nor denied her testimony with respect to their conversation on May 23 concerning the quality of her work 633 to other reasons for his dissatisfaction with Bingham 's job performance which he summarized as the "hog incident, the stacker incident and the pallet incident." The hog incident related to his testimony that on a number of occasions she cleaned out the hog ( a machine which grinds waste wood into sawdust) contrary to his instructions to her. The stacker incident referred to his testimony that she did some work with a forklift truck which she had been told was not part of her job. The pal- let incident referred to his testimony that a pallet broke, spilling the wood pieces stacked on it, because she had improperly stacked them on the pallet. Said three incidents occurred prior to the woodpile incident, according to his testimony. Although testimony was introduced by General Counsel contradicting certain aspects of Butter- field's testimony with respect to the above three in- cidents, it does not appear to be necessary to resolve these contradictions. The Trial Examiner is convinced that Butterfield's testimony cannot be credited that said incidents were factors in his deci- sion to discharged Bingham. It is concluded that said three incidents were merely afterthoughts and that the testimony concerning them was introduced to buttress Respondents' contention that Bingham was discharged for cause. Butterfield's testimony that he decided to discharge Bingham at the time of the woodpile in- cident is not credited. Rather, it is concluded that Butterfield decided to discharge her because she admitted she had signed a union card and refused to accede to his request that she retract it. The discharge occurred at least 8 days after the wood- pile incident and on the very day after Butterfield extracted the information from her that she had signed a union card and would not retract it. Had Butterfield arrived at a decision to discharge her at a time prior to obtaining said information , it is in- ferred that he would not have taken the time to in- terrogate her as to whether she had signed a union card or made the effort to get her to retract it. If she were going to be discharged for cause, he would have had no reason to do so. The fact that he did do so is wholly inconsistent with Respondents' contention that Butterfield had decided to discharge Bingham in the previous week. Consequently, in view of the above findings, the timing of the discharge, Butterfield's evident animus toward the Union, and the other three discharges, considered hereinbelow, it is concluded that Bingham's discharge was discriminatorily motivated in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The discharges of Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary: At 3:30 p.m. on May 24, which was the "quitting time" for Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary, Butter- field called them into his office and notified them that they were discharged. There is no material conflict in the testimony as to the event. It appears that Butterfield notified them that their services 634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were no longer required and that their job per- formance was unsatisfactory. It appears that Guthary called him a liar and used some obscene language in doing so. It further appears that the three employees them summarily left or were or- dered out of the office. The said three employees worked on the "cleat line" at which two other employees also worked. In his testimony, Butterfield described the operation of the cleat line and the tasks performed by each of the five employees. His testimony with respect thereto is as follows: A. Well, the first position on the cleat line is the rip saw. Larry Gatliff feeds this rip saw. He puts the little short boards through and it rips them for width. It rips into three-quarter inch wide strips. Then they come out of this saw and the next person to get them right in front of the saw is Josephine Rice. She grades them, throws out the bad ones, throws them in a box or down the hog. Then, they continue on down the belt. The next person to receive them is Jerrene Hyde. She picks them up and places them on this pusher chain that takes them through the cleat machine. The cleat machine cuts the beveled edges on them. When they come out of the cleat machine, Nellie Stru- menski was working in this position, and she would take the cleats and stack them in a bun- dle, twelve, or ten wide and ten high. Sort of a little bundle about a foot square. Margaret Guthary was the next position on the line. She would tie a string around this bundle and take the bundle and put them on a pallet. Q. Did Jerry Hyde, Nellie Strumenski, and Margaret Guthary change around in their jobs? A. Yes, they did, occasionally. Q. How would the lumber be gotten to Larry who fed the rip saw? A. It was brought in on a pallet and placed on the floor right beside him. Q. Now, could he-reach it from there, or was it necessary to have it moved over closer to him? A. It was necessary to have it moved closer to him, you know, so it would run steady. We would have one of the girls from time to time come from the end of the cleat line, come up and work beside him and take some of the limber off of these pallets that were sitting on the floor and place them on the table beside Larry. They call it the stacking of the line. Q. What is the total length of the cleat line? A. Twenty-five to thirty feet, the whole cleat line altogether. Q. How far is it between the spot where Jerry Hyde would work when she was placing the cleats into the cleat machine, and where Nellie Strumenski would be working, when she was placing the trimmed cleats into bundles? A. I would say six or seven feet. Q. And how far was it from the point where Nellie Strumenski would be working when she was doing that job to where Margaret Guthary would be working when she was tying the bun- dles and placing them on the pallet. A. Probably two or three feet apart. When asked why he discharged such employees, Butterfield testified as follows: A. Well, their work was unsatisfactory. They wouldn't do what I told them to do because they was playing around on the job and interfering with production. He further testified that he observed them "playing around on the job" (which is also refered to in the testimony as "horseplay " and "swamping") on three occasions. According to his testimony, the first occasion in which he observed the horseplay was about a week after he started on the job which would place it on or about March 24, 1969.8 His testimony as to the horseplay he saw on the first oc- casion (from the doorway leading into his office) was as follows: THE WITNESS: Well, I saw Jerry Hyde had a big stack of cleats on the table rather than through the saw where they ought to be. And she was placing them on the machine as fast as she could go, and Nellie was over at the end,_ and Margaret down at the other end by herself. And Margaret became swamped, and this thing [the cleats] exploded up in the air like this (in- dicating). TRIAL EXAMINER: YOU stood there and watched this happen? THE WITNESS: Yes. Then, this stopped the production. They had to stop the line to clean up the mess and start all over again. He further testified that as a result of this horseplay the drive shaft was bent. He further testified that he said nothing to any of the employees about their horseplay but he added, "I let them know I didn't like it by my presence." Butterfield testified that the second occasion he observed their horseplay was "somewhere in the middle" of the period between the first occasion, March 24, and the date the employees were discharged, May 24, which would place it on or about April 24. Butterfield further testified that on that occasion he was coming into the plant through the same door from which he had observed them on the first occasion, and that he saw them engaged in the same conduct as he described on the first oc- casion with the same results. He also testified that the drive shaft was bent "more yet." However, he further testified that it had not been repaired up to the time of the hearing. According to his testimony, he did speak to them about their conduct on this occasion. His testimony with respect thereto was as follows: A. I went over there and told them that we could not have this horseplay. I told them that " Butterfield testified that he entered the employment of Respondents in the capacity of plant manager on March 17, 1969 HOLLEY WOODWORKING CO. we was having enough trouble as it was trying to stay in business without that sort of thing. I told them we just couldn 't have it. Q. What was their response? A. No answer; they just nodded their heads and went to work. Butterfield testified that the third occasion he ob- served the three employees engaging in horseplay was "a week to a week and a half before I fired them." It is noted that in a later portion of his testimony, he was asked when he decided to discharge the three employees and he testified that it was on this third occasion of horseplay . When he was then asked to place the date , he testified as fol- lows: THE WITNESS : I would say it was a week be- fore , or less than that. It was within that week [the week they were discharged ]. It was the time of that third blowup. Q. (By Mr. Scott) When was the third blowup? A. I believe it was in that very week. If it wasn't within that very week, it was the one be- fore that, sir. His testimony with respect to the third occasion was as follows: THE WITNESS: This time I was in a different position. I was out on the back porch. A. Well , I observed Nellie Strumenski up by Larry where she would be working if she was stacking the line . However, I observed the line had already been stacked abnormally high, so there was no need for her being there, and nevertheless she was there standing behind a pallet of lumber , just watching. Jerry Hyde was in the process of, she had one of these big piles of cleats on the table and was in the process of putting them through the machine as fast as she could . And Margaret Guthary was on the end stacking them just as fast as she could, but she wasn't fast enough, and they caught up to her and blew up in the air again , as I told be- fore. Q. How long was it from the time you first observed what was going on till they blew up in the air? A. Very short time. TRIAL EXAMINER : I don't know what you mean by "very short time." THE WITNESS : Well, less than a minute. Q. (By Mr . Scott ) And then what hap- pened? A. Well, I stepped in at that point. Well, at that point they thought it was a big joke, and I especially remember Margaret and Nellie both holding their stomachs and bending over in laughter . The machine had been shut off then and they were standing there laughing. And I stepped in through the doorway and told them that this was just too much . I says that we just 635 couldn 't have that sort of thing at all. Q. Well, why had the machine been turned off? A. Well, because the thing had blew up in the air you see, and all the cleats fall on the floor, so when this happens they shut the thing off, have to clean it up. Q. What was their response when you made the comment to them? A. Well, again the response , there wasn't much of a response there. They just kind of shook their heads and there wasn't much of a response. Butterfield was questioned as to why , on any of the three occasions he observed the horseplay, he made no attempt to stop it . He testified that he did not have sufficient time to do so. He testified that on the first occasion he observed them about I minute and on the other occasions just a few seconds. Gatliff who worked on the saw at the head of the cleat line was called as a witness by the Respon- dents and testified as to three occasions he saw But- terfield observing horseplay. However, his testimony contradicts that of Butterfield in three important details. First , he testified on all three oc- casions Butterfield was standing at the end of the cleat line, instead of in a doorway or on the porch as Butterfield testified ; second, he estimated that Butterfield observed the horseplay for about 5 minutes and that the range of time Butterfield ob- served them was somewhere between 2 to 10 minutes, instead of a minute on the first occasion and a few seconds on the other two as Butterfield testified ; and, third , the three occasions were within the span of 3 weeks before the discharges, instead of 2 months, as Butterfield testified. On direct examination , Gatliff testified that the drive shaft can be seen "if you are just standing there" and that he has observed that it is bent. However, on cross-examination , he further testified that he did not become aware of the fact that it was bent until after the three above-named employees were discharged. It cannot be determined from his testimony how long it was after their discharge that he did become aware of it. Hyde, Strumenski , and Guthary denied that they engaged in horseplay (described hereinabove in Butterfield's testimony). All three testified to an oc- casion when the cleats came too fast for Guthary to handle and ascribed as the reason therefor that Guthary was distracted by Butterfield who was talk- ing to her at the time. All three further testified that they were never reprimanded on their job per- formance and Hyde testified that she was compli- mented on her work a few days before her discharge and that she received a 5-cent raise 2 or 3 weeks prior to the termination of her employ- ment . Hyde was questioned on cross-examination with respect to " playing games" on the line, par- ticularly that of feeding the cleat machine as fast as possible so as to "swamp" the girls at the end of the 636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD table. Her testimony with respect thereto is as fol- lows: Q. Did you ever play any games out there on the cleat line? A. We would fill the line as fast as they would come through. Yes. That's what they were wanting. Q. Did you ever play any other kind of games out there on the line? A. No. 0. None at all? A. No. 0. Your testimony here under oath is that you played no games on the line other than filling the cleat machine at the same speed that the machine line was operating, is that right? A. I would fill the line as it was operating, yes. Q. What do you mean by that? A. I would fill-the line, put the cleats on the line as fast as they would come through and if they come through fast I put them on the sideboard and stacked them until I could get caught up or the.girls down at the end could get caught up. Q. Did you ever play any games doing what you just described now? A. Well, yes, we used to. Q. Now you say you did play games? A. But they could keep up. Q. Now, explain the games. A. It wasn't a game. Q. Well, what did you do? A. Well, when they were coming too fast I would stack them on the back boards and then I would take them off and fill the lines as I could catch them. 0. (By Mr. Scott) Now, your testimony here under oath is that you never set any of these cleats aside for any reason other than because you couldn 't keep up, is that right? A. Not because I couldn't keep up with them . I was afraid the girls down at the other ends couldn't keep up with them coming through . Sometimes they would pull one of the girls off to stack the cleat line and one of them was working alone at the end and when they were coming too fast I would stack them so that when they got through to the other end the girl working by herself could handle it. Q. That's the only reason that you set the cleats off to the side was to help the girls at the other end so that they would come slower to her at the other end, is that right? A. This is right. The two other employees who worked on the cleat line testified as to the practice of Hyde, Stru- menski, and Guthary engaging in the horseplay described hereinabove . Rice testified that they played the game of "swamping" about once or twice a week , whereas Gatliff testified that they did so two or three times a day. Another of Respon- dents' witnesses , Winona Ogbin , testified that she observed them doing this almost every day. As stated hereinabove , Butterfield was not a con- vincing witness . His testimony of the three occa- sions on which he observed the horseplay is not credited . In addition to the appraisal of him as a witness , it is noted , as detailed above , that there were substantial discrepancies between his testimony with respect to the three occasions he observed the horseplay and that of another of Respondents' witnesses, Gatliff. Other factors con- tribute to the discrediting of his testimony, such as the fact that, even though, according to his testimony, Butterfield believed that the drive shaft was bent because of the horseplay, apparently a serious matter, he said nothing about it to the three employees involved. Furthermore, although both he and Gatliff testified that he spoke to Gatliff of his dissatisfaction with the job performance of the three employees , he made no mention to him of the bent drive shaft. It appears reasonable to assume that had Butterfield held them responsible for the damage to the shaft, he would not have failed to mention it to Gatliff or to the three employees. Ac- cording to Gatliff's testimony, he was not even aware of the fact that the drive shaft had been bent until sometime after the three employees had been discharged. Trial Examiner is of the opinion , however, from an analysis of the testimony , including that of Hyde quoted hereinabove , that the three employees did occasionally engage in playing the game of "swamp- ing." in view of the fact that it must have added to their work by requiring them to clean up the wood thrown on the floor as a result of playing the game, it does not appear likely that they would have engaged in such conduct with any degree of frequency. It is noted that the testimony of Respon- dents' witnesses as to the frequency varied con- siderably (from that of one or two times a week to that of two or three times a day). Also, the testimony of Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary is credited that they were not reprimanded for their work, as is that of Hyde that she received a raise just 2 or 3 weeks prior to her discharge. Con- sequently, it is inferred that, if their horseplay was known to Butterfield prior to their discharge, he considered it of little or no significance. Collateral issues were raised by Respondents (through cross-examination of the said three em- ployees and conflicting testimony of a number of witnesses called by Respondents) with respect to various types of conduct of the three employees ex- tending over a period well before Butterfield en- tered into the employ of Respondents. This testimony was adduced ostensibly for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the three em- HOLLEY WOODWORKING CO. ployees,s and to indicate their attitude toward their jobs. The Trial Examiner has considered all of such testimony, but, nevertheless, is of the opinion that the General Counsel has proved by a preponde- rance of the evidence that the discharges of the three employees were discriminatorily motivated. Butterfield testified as to additional reasons for his dissatisfaction with their job performance (in addition to the horseplay), including such matters as failing to move pallets in and out of the area and failing to measure cleats. A study of the testimony with respect to the various other faults he found with them leads the Trial Examiner to the conclu- sion that they were not actually factors in arriving at his decision to discharge them, but, rather, af- terthoughts which were introduced into the hearing for the purpose of bolstering Respondents' defense. According to Butterfield, his decision to discharge them was arrived at prior to his learning of the union activity. It is noted, however, that on the day before he did discharge them, he inter- viewed all three for the purpose of interrogating them as to whether they had signed union cards, with the evident purpose of attempting to get them to retract their cards if they had signed them. Although Hyde indicated to him that she would consider withdrawing her card, nevertheless, it ap- pears that Butterfield must have been aware of the fact that she was the employee who was soliciting authorization cards for the Union. Although Stru- menski and Guthary told him that they had not signed union cards, it is inferred that he entertained a strong suspicion that they had, in view of their relationship with Hyde. That he did entertain such a suspicion is supported by the fact that he was not satisfied with Guthary's denial that she had signed a union card (when he first interviewed her) but, ac- cording to her credited testimony, later in the day he again asked her if she had signed a union card. If he had intended to discharge them prior to his learning of the union activity, it appears reasonable to assume that he would not have spent the time and effort to ascertain if they had signed union cards or to obtain Hyde's retraction of her card. The fact that he did so is wholly inconsistent with Respondents' contention that Butterfield had de- cided to discharge said three employees prior to his learning of the union activity. It is the opinion of the Trial Examiner that the horseplay and other faults ascribed by Respondents as reasons for the discharges were merely pretextual or afterthoughts. Consequently, in view of the above findings, the timing of the discharges, Butterfield's evident animus toward the Union, and the findings with respect to the discriminatory discharge of Bingham, set forth hereinabove, it is concluded that Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary were also discriminatorily e Said collateral issues, even if resolved in favor of Respondents, would not, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, affect their credibility as to mat- ters material to the issues herein 637 discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with their operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY It will be recommended that the Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found herein and take certain affirmative action, as provided in the Recom- mended Order below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that Respondents dis- criminatorily discharged Delores Bingham, Jerrene Hyde, Nellie Strumenski, and Margaret Guthary, it will be recommended that Respondents be ordered to offer said employees immediate and full rein- statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and reim- burse .them for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-293, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, I make the follow- ing: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondents are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully interrogating them as to whether they signed union authorization cards. 4. Respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening discharge of em- ployees who did not withdraw from their adherence to the Union. 5. Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging Bingham, Hyde, Strumenski, and Guthary. 638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the en- tire record in this proceeding, it is ordered that Darrel Craft and John Thiesen, Co-partners doing business as Holley Woodworking Co., their agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating any employee with respect to his protected concerted activity. (b) Threatening any employee with economic reprisal should he continue to adhere to the Union or any other labor organization. (c) Discouraging membership of their employees in Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2791, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discriminating against them in re- gard to hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Delores Bingham, Jerrene Hyde, Nellie Strumenski, and Margaret Guthary im- mediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered by them by reason of their discriminatory discharges in the manner set forth in the section hereinabove en- titled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (c) Post at their place of business in Sweet Home, Oregon, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 36, after being duly signed by an authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondents im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 36, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 11 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings , conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 36, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate any em- ployee with respect to his protected concerted activity. WE WILL NOT threaten any employee with economic reprisal for his adherence to Lumber and Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2791, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor or- ganization. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the aforesaid Union, or any other labor organiza- tion, by discriminating against any of our em- ployees in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition thereof. WE WILL offer to Delores Bingham, Jerrene Hyde, Nellie Strumenski, and Margaret Guthary immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi- tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered by them by reason of their discriminatory discharges. HOLLEY WOODWORKING Co. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. HOLLEY WOODWORKING CO. 639 This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- pliance with its provisions may be directed to the tive days from the date of posting and must not be Board's Office, 310 Six Ten Broadway Building, altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. 610 SW. Broadway, Portland, Oregon 97205, Any questions concerning this notice or com- Telephone 503-266-3361.