Painters Local 272

PAINTERS Painters Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, AFL-CIO and Charles R. Curtiss, an Individual. Case 20-CP-322 June 23, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On April 1, 1970, Trial Examiner Louis S. Pen- field issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and de- sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner' s Deci- sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Ordev of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Painters Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paper- hangers of America, AFL-CIO, Seaside, Cali- fornia, its officers , agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE LOUIS S. PENFIELD, Trial Examiner: This proceeding was heard before me in Monterey, ' The complaint issued on September 15, 1969, and is based on a charge filed on July 17, 1969 Copies of the complaint and the charge were duly served on Respondent ' Following the close of the hearing counsel for the General Counsel filed LOCAL 272 933 California, on January 7, 1970, upon a complaint of the National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board , and answer of Painters Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paper- hangers of America , AFL-CIO, herein called Respondent.' The issues litigated were whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein called the Act.2 Upon the entire record , including consideration of briefs_filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, and upon my observation of the witnesses , I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Charles R. Curtiss is an individual proprietor with an office located in Seaside, California, where at all times material he has been engaged in business as a painting contractor in the building and construction industry on the Monterey Peninsula. During the past year, Curtiss, in the course and conduct of such business, rendered services valued in excess of $50,000 to nonretail construction firms in the State of California each of which, in the course and con- duct of its construction business, annually receives directly from, or ships directly to, points outside the State of California goods, materials, supplies, or products valued in excess of $50,000. On the basis of the foregoing, I find that at all times material, Charles R. Curtiss was engaged in a business which affects commerce within the meaning of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction over such business is appropriate. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent disputes the claim that Peninsula Craftsmen and Workers Association, herein called Peninsula, an organization with which the Charging Party had contractual relations under circum- stances to be related below, is a labor organization within the meaning of the statute. Evidence ad- duced at the hearing disclosed that Peninsula has been in existence since 1958 pursuant to articles of association signed by a number of individuals who associated themselves for the purpose of "forming a labor union" whose object was to obtain "better wages, hours, and working conditions" for its mem- bers. The articles of association further provide that membership shall be open to persons "employed in any craft ... who have paid the initiation fee and who pay the dues set forth in the by-laws ... ex- cepting employees engaged in management and su- a motion to correct the transcript in certain particulars Counsel for Respondent signified his accord I have examined the corrections sought and deem them appropriate Accordingly, the motion is hereby granted and the changes requested are to be made 183 NLRB No. 89 934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pervisory capacity." Subsequent to its formation, bylaws were adopted providing, among other things, that Peninsula "shall be the sole bargaining agency for all members in regard to their employ- ment" and that it was authorized to enter into con- tracts with employers on behalf of its members. Evidence adduced at the hearing further disclosed that since its formation Peninsula has functioned for the objectives described, and that it has existing collective-bargaining contracts with various in- dividuals functioning as contractors in the building and construction trades industry on the Monterey Peninsula . The term "labor organization" is defined in Section 2(5) of the Act to mean "any organiza- tion of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which em- ployees participate and which exists for the pur- pose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Upon the basis of the foregoing as well as other evidence adduced in the record concerning the functioning of Peninsula, it is clear that Penin- sula is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and I so find. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The General Counsel alleges that Respondent picketed Curtiss at a construction site, at which he was working, for the unlawful object of obtaining recognition at a time when Respondent was not the currently certified collective-bargaining representa- tive, but when Curtiss was lawfully recognizing Peninsula as the statutory representative of its em- ployees. It is further alleged that such picketing oc- curred at a time when a question concerning representation could not appropriately be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act and the conduct was thus violative of Section 8(b)(7)(A). Respondent denies that Peninsula is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and further contends that in any event its picketing was not for the unlawful object of obtaining recognition, but was purely in- formational, and designed to inform the public and others that Curtiss did not conduct his business so as to meet the area standards with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions. Charles R. Curtiss has been in business as a painting contractor on the Monterey Peninsula for approximately 5 years. Curtiss undertakes private contracts on residential homes as well as commer- cial contracts. The latter are usually done by sub- contract with general contractors engaged in the construction of new homes or buildings. Curtiss usually keeps two regular employees throughout the year, and hires such additional painters as the number of jobs at any given time requires. Charles Jewart is the business representative for Respondent in the Monterey Peninsula area. Jewart has functioned in that capacity since 1966, and his principal duties relate to the enforcement of a master collective-bargaining agreement which for many years has covered employees of members of a painting contractors' association as well as em- ployees of individual contractors who have become signatories to such master agreement. Jewart testified that in the performance of his duties he patrolled jobs to see that the contractors and paint- ers abided by the "terms of our agreement." He stated that in some measure he acted as "a glorified policeman." In addition to his enforcement duties Jewart also stated that he regularly stopped at jobsites to ascertain who was doing the painting, and to discover if nonunion painting contractors were working there . He represented it to be a major concern of his to determine if a job was being done under "union conditions" so that union painters might be kept employed . Jewart also testified that he received frequent complaints from union con- tractors when nonunion contractors got jobs. The union contractors complained that they were una- ble to compete because the nonunion wages were lower than those they were required to pay, and the nonunion painters were subjected to fewer restric- tions in the use of tools of the trade such as spray guns and rollers. Frequently the presence of non- union contractors on jobs was brought to Jewart's attention by union contractors with the query of "what [was he] going to do about it?" According to Jewart he would investigate such complaints and if he deemed it appropriate possibly take steps to "inform the public as to the working conditions." For a short period in 1966 and 1967, Curtiss had been bound by the terms of Respondent's master contract for the area, and had obtained his painters through the local Union. When that contract had expired, however, Curtiss did not become a party to the next one, but remained nonunion for a time. In April 1968, Curtiss once again became a party to a master agreement which was to expire on June 30, 1968. Curtiss himself does not explain the precise circumstances which led to his signing such agree- ment, but Jewart testified that a general contractor for whom Curtiss was working under subcontract insisted that he do so in order to continue on the job. While Jewart seeks to minimize the extent of union pressure on Curtiss at this time, he does represent that Curtiss signed the master contract so "he could do his jobs without a union hassle." In any event the master contract was signed by Curtiss on April 18, 1968, with Respondent at that time making a concession to Curtiss as to spray and roller painting for the jobs to which Curtiss was al- ready committed. The concessions were contrary to the requirements of the master agreement and did not apply to other jobs he might obtain. Upon the expiration of the master agreement on June 30, 1968, Respondent negotiated a new master agreement covering Monterey Peninsula contractors. Jewart testified that he made efforts to have Curtiss become a party to it. Curtiss, however, did not sign the new master agreement, but on Sep- tember 23, 1968, he signed a collective-bargaining PAINTERS LOCAL 272 935 agreement with Peninsula. This agreement con- tained detailed provisions concerning the wages, hours , and working conditions of the painters that Curtiss was to use in his business . By its terms the Peninsula agreement was to be effective until June 30, 1969. On April 12, 1969, Curtiss signed a new agreement with Peninsula which was to supercede the 1968-69 agreement and to expire on July 1, 1970. After Curtiss signed the agreement with Peninsula , Respondent made no further specific requests that Curtiss accord it recognition until the events which transpired the spring and summer of 1969 which are to be related below. The General Counsel contends this conduct to establish a new demand for recognition . Respondent denies it. The first picketing incident which affected Cur- tiss took place on April 10, 1969, and is not alleged in the complaint to be unlawful . Since it serves as a background to the later allegedly unlawful picket- ing, however, it becomes appropriate to relate the circumstances under which it occurred . On April 10, Curtiss was engaged in work at the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company building in Monterey . Upon starting work that day Curtiss noted the presence of Business Representative Jewart and a picket in front of the jobsite. The picket carried a sign reading "Charles R. Curtiss, painting contractor , does not observe the wages, hours , and other terms and conditions of employ- ment for painters in this area . No dispute with any other employer. Painters Local 272, AFL-CIO." Upon seeing the sign Curtiss approached Jewart and asked , "What is the big idea?" Jewart replied that he hoped there would be no hard feelings. Cur- tiss acknowledges that Jewart did not ask him to sign a contract at this time , and states that the picket left the job when Curtiss' employees de- parted . Jewart agrees that Curtiss greeted him and that he responded as the witness states . In addition, however , Jewart states that some 15 or 20 minutes after these initial remarks he again saw Curtiss at the jobsite and that at this time Curtiss told him "that he hadn 't at the present time put his job sign on the Bonifacio Plaza , but that it would be there and that he was going to do that job, and shove it right down [Jewart 's] throat." Jewart replied by saying " Be my guest." The first incident of alleged unlawful picketing occurred on June 26 , 1969. This picketing was preceded by a meeting between Curtiss and Jewart on June 23 at the Bonifacio Plaza jobsite . On that day Curtiss was present at the jobsite with a sub- contractor named Redwine Carroll. They were en- gaged in doing some preparatory work for the painting to be done later . According to Curtiss, when Jewart approached him at the jobsite Curtiss questioned him as to the reason for his presence. When Jewart replied that it was "just a friendly visit," Curtiss answered that he knew "[Jewart] better than that" and that Jewart wouldn 't be there unless he "intended to discuss some union mat- ters." Curtiss testified that at this point Jewart re- marked that Curtiss "couldn 't do this kind of work and that he would stop him." When Curtiss inquired why this should be so , Jewart -replied "because you don't belong to the Union ." Curtiss then reminded Jewart that he had contractual rela- tions with Peninsula . Jewart responded by stating, "we don 't recognize the Craftsmen 's Union, we consider you to be non-union." Curtiss states Jewart then represented that he had sanction from the Monterey Building and Construction Trades Council to picket the job, and then remarked, "Chuck, we wouldn 't have to fight like this or go around like this if you would just sign the agree- ment with us." Following this a discussion ensued between Curtiss and Jewart as to the advantages which might flow from a contractor 's doing busi- ness with Respondent . Curtiss told Jewart that he thought Respondent's working agreement was "un- fair and dishonest since it put too many limitations on the manner in which a contractor could do a particular job." Curtiss stated further that if he signed "[Jewart's] agreement [ his] painters would quit." Jewart 's version of his meeting with Curtiss on June 23 differs in a number of respects . Jewart states that on the afternoon of June 23 when driv- ing past Bonifacio Plaza he noticed the presence of Curtiss' truck . He stopped and went to the jobsite to speak to Curtiss. According to Jewart , Curtiss immediately asked "where was my picket sign?" Jewart responded by saying " remember you said picket I didn 't." Jewart does not deny , however, that he intended to picket Curtiss' job, or that he made this intention clear to Curtiss during the course of the conversation . Curtiss told him that it would be illegal for him to picket, to which Jewart replied that he would not undertake picketing un- less it were legal and sanctioned by the Monterey Building and Construction Trades Council. Curtiss expressed disbelief that Jewart could get such sanction , questioning Jewart's asser- tion that he already had it . Jewart acknowledges that while he was there the master agreement, and particularly the restrictions it imposed on use of tools of the trade , was discussed . He stated that Curtiss told him "that he certainly would not have anything to do with an organization that would bring back the dark ages." Jewart testified that Curtiss elaborated on this by saying " it would be like not being able to use the roller ; it was like tak- ing a scale from a carpenter, and he would have nothing to do with an organization that did those things." According to Jewart this discussion was precipitated not by any demand for recognition but because Jewart noted Curtiss was preparing to spray smooth walls at the Bonifacio Plaza jobsite and had represented to Jewart that he had permis- sion from Peninsula to do so. Jewart acknowledges that he made it perfectly clear to Curtiss that under Respondent's contract such a concession could not be granted. Jewart specifically denied, however, telling Curtiss that signing the master agreement 936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would resolve any controversy that existed between Curtiss and Respondent. Jewart volunteered that in fact he sought no agreement because he felt that Curtiss had not complied with the terms of the agreement which had expired in June 1968 and that he had no desire for Curtiss to become a party to the new one .3 Jewart, while denying that he asked Curtiss to sign the contract, does not assert that he suggested to Curtiss at this, or any other time, any other means whereby Curtiss might resolve the con- troversy in a manner satisfactory to Respondent. On June 26, 1968, a picket appeared at the Bonifacio Plaza jobsite. The picket sign had the identical legend which had appeared in the April picketing at the telephone building. With the ap- pearance of the picket, and the likelihood that em- ployees of other subcontractors would leave the job, the general contractor asked Curtiss to take steps to have the picket removed. Curtiss im- mediately telephoned Mark Puscaric, business agent of the Peninsula, and apprised him of the picketing. Curtiss also notified the attorney who represented Peninsula that there was picketing. Ap- parently employees of the other crafts did not leave the jobsite on June 26, but on the following day when the picket once again appeared workers from other crafts refused to cross the picket line. Curtiss that day inquired of a representative of Monterey Building and Construction Trades Council, and learned that the picketing had been sanctioned by the Council inasmuch as it did not recognize Penin- sula as a legitimate labor organization. Curtiss then telephoned Jewart, and, according to Curtiss, Jewart told him that "all [he had] to do is to come down and sign this agreement and we can end all this." Further picketing with a similar sign occurred once again in late July and on another date in Au- gust. Jewart acknowledges the telephone con- versation with Curtiss on the second day of the picketing. Jewart denies that he represented that signing the agreement would bring about removal of the picket. Jewart states that Curtiss advised him that there would be no painters working that day, and that it would be unlawful for Respondent to picket when he had no workers on the job. Jewart checked this with his attorney and thereafter im- mediately removed the picket. Between July 4 and 10, 1969, Jewart met Frank Hawkins, a permanent employee of Curtiss, at another jobsite at which Curtiss was working. Haw- kins and Jewart engaged in a conversation regard- ing Jewart's Union and its benefits. Jewart represented that if Hawkins would join immediately he could place him on a good job and the initiation fee would be $10. Jewart represented, however, that if he waited for a later date when "[Curtiss] J Jewart cites the failure of Curtiss' employees to become members of Respondent as required by the contract as Curtiss ' breach of his obligation This would appear to be an afterthought since it did not prevent Jewart from soliciting Curtiss to sign the new master agreement prior to the time Curtiss recognized Peninsula had to join the AFL-CIO union himself" then the initiation fee would be "$200 or $250." Discussion of the Issues and Conclusions Section 8(b)(7) of the Act purports to prohibit picketing generally "where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain . . ." with a labor organization. Section 8(b)(7)(A) addresses itself specifically to prohibit- ing picketing in a situation where an employer is al- ready recognizing a labor organization, and a question concerning representation cannot be raised at the time of the picketing. I have already rejected Respondent's claim that Peninsula is not a labor organization within the broad definition found in the Act. The status of Peninsula as a dominated or assisted organization within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act is not an issue in this proceeding, nor is it shown to have been an issue theretofore. Respondent does not claim, and it does not appear, that a question con- cerning representation could have been raised at the time the picketing was initiated. As noted above, Respondent concedes that the picketing ac- tually took place. Thus we find present all the ele- ments needed to establish a violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A) provided it can be found that Respon- dent's picketing was for the unlawful object of forc- ing or requiring Curtiss to accord Respondent recognition as the statutory representative of his employees. As noted above, Respondent denies that such was its object, claiming that the picketing was initiated solely for informational purposes so that the public might be informed that Respondent did not carry on its business in conformity with the area standards established by Respondent through its master agreement. The lawful or unlawful nature of the object thus becomes the sole remaining issue to be considered. It is a statutory right of employees to organize and bargain through unions of their own choosing Once a majority selects a bargaining representative, a duty arises for both the employer and the designated representative to bargain in good faith. Section 9 of the Act embodies machinery designed to determine if such bargaining duty exists by providing a means to define bargaining units and to determine a majority choice by an election process. Section 8(b)(4)(C) and Section 8(b)(7) of the Act were designed to encourage labor organizations to use the statutory machinery in pursuit of their or- ganizational and recognitional ends by proscribing the use of secondary boycotts and picketing to at- tain such objectives. It was the initial view of the Board that the terms "recognize or bargain" in both sections meant that picketing to change "pre- vailing rates of pay and conditions of employment" constituted an attempt to bargain and thus was for a PAINTERS LOCAL 272 937 proscribed object.4 The Board, however, later reconsidered this decision and reversed the initial holding in the same case, finding that, where a union limited its picketing object to inducing the unorganized employer to conform to area stan- dards, it was not necessarily pursuing an unlawful organizational or recognitional end .5 Later the Board found the reasoning with regard to Section 8(b)(4)(C) to be equally applicable to picketing for an organizational or recognitional object under Section 8(b)(7).6 The underlying rationale behind this so-called area standards doctrine is expressed by the Board in the following:' A labor union normally seeks to organize the unorganized and to negotiate collective-bar- gaining contracts with employers; but it also has a legitimate interest apart from organiza- tion or recognition that employers meet prevailing pay scales and employee benefits, or otherwise employers paying less than prevail- ing wage scale would ultimately undermine the area standards. The Board, however, has not given this doctrine unlimited application, but has indicated that, in any case where a union asserts it as a defense to picket- ing, it will carefully scrutinize the announced objec- tive to determine if in fact it may not be a pretext designed to obtain recognition and agreement." it thus becomes necessary in the instant case to con- sider the background against which the controversy arose, the setting in which the picketing took place, and the assertions of purported object, in order to determine the lawful or unlawful character of such object within the meaning of the Board's area stan- dards doctrine. In the instant case it is undisputed that Respon- dent's master contract not only carries a higher wage package, but also that it imposes greater restrictions on the use of tools of the trade than is to be found in the wage package and restrictive clauses in the Peninsula contract. It may be noted that these restrictive clauses have the effect of rais- ing costs, because to the extent they are enforced additional man-hours are required to perform any job. If we fully credit the testimony of Curtiss to the effect that Jewart, on two separate occasions, told him that continued picketing would cease if Curtiss signed the master contract, the recognitional object becomes obvious, and its unlawful nature is established. Jewart, however, denies that he made such assertions to Curtiss or anyone else at any time. Neither witness appeared to be evasive or to be consciously distorting what each claimed had occurred. On the one hand, however, we must note that Curtiss had an obvious and direct interest in establishing the unlawful nature of the object, while on the other hand, we find Jewart with an equally clear and obvious interest in establishing precisely the reverse. I doubt that Curtiss was fabricating in his testimony, but it is perhaps to be expected that his view of the events surrounding the picketing may have been colored by a conviction that Jewart, whatever words he may have used, was in reality insisting that signing the master agreement was the only solution for the problem. This conviction could readily be translated into a belief that Jewart became as specific in the words he used as Curtiss now claims. With the current litigation pointing up the limitations in object to which a union is restricted if the picketing is to be found lawful, it became equally easy for Jewart, in retrospect, to conclude that he could not possibly have made the assertions which Curtiss attributes to him. Under the circumstances neither the specific assertion of Curtiss nor the flat denial of Jewart stand out as the most reliable gauge to determine the real picketing object. A more reliable source may be found in the background and setting of the entire controversy and a consideration of the undisputed aspects of the testimony of Curtiss and Jewart, with an evalua- tion of a whole made in the light of the rationale of the Board's area standards doctrine.9 Jewart testified forthrightly about the nature of his job. Aside from his policing duties regarding parties to the master contract, Jewart made it clear that he regularly visited jobsites to check on the presence of nonunion contractors. As we have seen, Jewart received frequent complaints from union contractors that nonunion contractors were able to underbid them. Jewart is somewhat vague as to his response to such complaints. He indicates no more than that he felt it to be his "duty to inform the public as to the working conditions." Presumably this information was in some instances expressed by picketing. Clearly, however, the ' International Hod Carriers , Building and Common Laborers ' Union of America, Local No 41, AFL-CIO ( Calumet Contractors Association), 130 NLRB 78 5 133 NLRB 512 6 Houston Building and Construction Trades Council ( Claude Everett Con- struction Company), 136 NLRB 321 ' Local Union No 741, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO ( Keith Riggs, Plumbing and Heating Contractor ), 137 NLRB 1125 8 Operative Plasterers ' and Cement Masons ' International Association, Local Union No 44, AFL-CIO ( Penny Construction Company, Inc ), 144 NLRB 1298, Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants Union of Neu York, Local 89, AFL-CIO (Cafe Renaissance, Inc ), 154 NLRB 192, Local 3, In- ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Jack Picoult), 144 NLRB 5, Local 107, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers ' Union of America , AFL-CIO ( Texarkana Construction Company), 138 NLRB 102 , The Building & Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity , AFL-CIO ( Fisher Construction Company ), 149 NLRB 1629, Retail Clerks International Association , Local Union No 899, AFL-CIO (State-Mart, Inc, d/b/a Giant Food ), 166 NLRB 818 ' Respondent points out that Redwine Carroll , a subcontractor doing work for Curtiss, was also present at the jobsite on June 23 , 1969, and was not called by the General Counsel to corroborate Curtiss While it is true that Carroll was present at the outset of the visit , and to a limited extent participated in the conversation with Jewart , it also appears that the parties moved about the jobsite somewhat, and that Carroll was not with Curtiss and Jewart at all times Neither Curtiss nor Jewart assert that Carroll was present at the time when Jewart is supposed to have pressed Curtiss to sign the master contract Thus with respect to this issue it is not possible to draw any inferences from the failure of either party to call Carroll 938 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD problem could be solved most effectively when by one means or another the nonunion contractor could be induced to sign the master contract. Not only would this meet the complaint as to un- derbidding, but it would further the ultimate aim that all unions have to organize completely the en- tire industry in which they operate. While the very existence of the area standards doctrine implies that lawful picketing may take place for reasons other than an ultimate recognitional end, we must never overlook the continuing existence of such ul- timate object, and we must demand that a union seeking to establish an exception thereto must make it abundantly clear that for the time being it has forsworn the ultimate object for a more limited immediate one. The question then becomes whether or not Respondent in the instant case made it sufficiently clear that its immediate object was truly limited. I am of the opinion that it has failed to do so. Jewart and Curtiss had been acquainted for some years during most of which Curtiss had been a nonunion contractor.10 Their acquaintance does not appear to have been a social one, however, and it is fair to assume that their various meetings over the years had been in some manner related to Curtiss' union status. As above noted on two occasions Cur- tiss had been persuaded to become a party signato- ry to the master agreement. The last occasion had occurred within a year of the picketing. At neither time had Curtiss remained under the contract um- brella for any extended period . Jewart, however, continued actively to seek Curtiss ' signature to the 1968-69 current master agreement after the earlier one expired in June 1968 and only abandoned his direct efforts in this regard after Curtiss had signed the contract with Peninsula. Jewart himself testified that Curtiss signed the 1968 agreement because "he wanted to get where he could do his jobs without a union hassle ." Thus it would appear that the relationship between Jewart and Curtiss had al- ways had its principal focus on Curtiss ' sporadic nonunion status, and that in the past Jewart had had at least temporary success in persuading Cur- tiss to abandon such status and sign the contract. Neither Jewart nor Curtiss testified , however, that at any time prior to June 23 had Jewart ever sug- gested any means short of recognition and signing the master contract as a method for solving the continuing controversy. Respondent's principal dispute with nonunion contractors concerned their working on commer- cial jobs as distinguished from individual home repaint jobs . The record does not show the nature of Curtiss' jobs immediately following his signing 10 Although for the purposes of this proceeding Peninsula is found to be a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and Curtiss' collective- bargaining contract with Peninsula to be a valid one, it is clear that Respon- dent viewed all contractors not having a bargaining relationship with it as nonunion , and that it tailored its approach to them in a similar fashion whether or not they had a bargaining relationship with an independent or- ganization the contract with Peninsula in 1968 . Curtiss was working on a commercial job at the telephone building, however, when picketed for the first time in 1969 . Although this picketing is not charged to be unlawful, the picket sign used carried the same legend later used for the alleged unlawful picketing in June . Although signing the master agreement was not affirmatively requested, no other means of resolving the dispute was suggested , and the picket- ing at that time was apparently abandoned before it became a serious issue . The incident serves as a prelude to the alleged unlawful picketing, however, for it was during the course of it that Curtiss told Jewart about the forthcoming commercial job at Bonifacio Plaza , and in effect challenged Jewart to stop him from carrying it through. Jewart and Curtiss are not in substantial disagree- ment as to most of the conversations which trans- pired between them on June 23 and thereafter. Jewart admittedly went to the jobsite on that date to determine if the time was ripe for picketing Cur- tiss. Jewart concedes that he and Curtiss discussed the master contract and compared its terms with those of the Peninsula contract , particularly with reference to restrictions on such tools as spray guns and rollers . Jewart acknowledges that Curtiss ex- pressed an emphatic distaste for the restrictions found in the master contract, and advanced them as a reason for finding the contract unacceptable. Despite the greater detail of Curtiss ' testimony, and minor contradictions which exist between him and Jewart, their only difference of real significance centers on Curtiss ' assertion that on two occasions Jewart told him in so many words that he could ob- viate the picketing by signing the agreement, and Jewart's denial thereof. As set forth above, I do not deem the testimony of either to be wholly reliable in this regard . Significantly, however, neither claims that any discussion ensued between them at any time relating to any means whatsoever whereby the controversy could be resolved and the picketing forestalled by some method other than recognizing Respondent and signing the master contract. I give scant credence to Jewart 's claim that he was not even seeking a contract at the time because Curtiss had not fully complied with the terms of the 1968 agreement. I attach even less weight to Jewart's vaguely enunciated suggestion that he had no authority to sign Curtiss to an agreement. It was Jewart's business to bring all painting contractors possible under the master agreement , and to see that its terms were enforced . Jewart had unsuccess- fully sought to get Curtiss to sign the current agree- ment following the expiration of the 1968 contract presumably with full knowledge of any alleged violations thereof. Possibly Jewart lacked authority to grant Curtiss any special concessions in the use of tools , but I have little doubt that had Curtiss of his own volition signified a willingness to sign the master agreement when Jewart came to the Bonifacio Plaza jobsite, or at any time thereafter, Jewart would have been more than ready to accom- PAINTERS LOCAL 272 modate him and would later have undertaken to have seen that Curtiss abided by the contract terms. Thus we find the alleged unlawful picketing tak- ing place against a background of continuing efforts by Respondent to make Curtiss a union contractor, with any so-called "union hassle" arising therefrom having twice before been resolved by the recogni- tional route. Assuming there were no further direct demands for recognition following Jewart's initial attempts prior to September 1968, it is also true that Jewart took no action and made no statements which would affirmatively signify that the recogni- tional approach had thereafter been abandoned in favor of a more limited immediate object. Nor were there any suggestions as to how any object whatsoever might be achieved by means short of recognition. The picket sign legend itself, while not foreclosing an area standards object, speaks of Curtiss' failing to accord his employees "the terms and conditions of employment" accorded other painters in the area. This scarcely rejects the pos- sibility that such end could also be achieved by the contract route. Other than Jewart's self-serving claim, which I do not credit, that he was not seeking a contract, Jewart in no other way signified that the equivocal language used on the picket sign was limited to pressing Curtiss to raise his standards to meet those which Respondent had negotiated for the area. When a union embarks on picketing for an osten- sible area standards object it should be charged with responsibility to disentangling its purpose from the more obvious and ultimate object of obtaining recognition. If it is to be permitted to preserve the standards it has already negotiated, it should be required to forswear organization or recognition as the immediate object of such picketing in some af- firmative manner . A union 's area standards interest is the economic one of preventing the unorganized employer from undermining standards which it has achieved from the organized employer. The Board has taken the position that a union may not seek from the unorganized employer intangible benefits that ordinarily flow from the bargaining relation- ship. Thus the Board has held that a union may not picket to obtain benefits equivalent to those found in a union contract such as grievance procedures, pension and welfare plans, a vacation plan, and the like." Its efforts must be limited to demanding comparable or equivalent costs in order to cbviate the nonunion employer 's competitive advantage, and it may not undertake to prescribe the precise manner in which the cost items are to be conferred on the employees without engaging in pro tanto bar- gaining . Just as a union cannot be permitted to prescribe the type and manner in which the benefits should be conferred, neither should it be permitted to speak in equivocal terms as to its object. It is reasonable , especially where, as here, there is a " Retail Clerks International Association , Local Union No 899, AFL-CIO (State-Mart, Inc , d/b/a Giant Food), 166 NLRB 818 939 long history of recognitional attempts on Respon- dent's part, that a union should be required to make it clear in unmistakable terms that its im- mediate object is a limited one, and it also must suggest, if asked, methods whereby the employer may fulfill such object by means short of recogni- tion and spina an agreement In the instant case Respondent not only has failed to make its immediate purpose clear, but it un- dertook its picketing against a background and in a context which is properly construed as tantamount to a request for recognition. Under the circum- stances the picketing which ensued was in pursuit of an unlawful recognitional object, and thereby Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Em- ployer's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirm- ative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Charles R. Curtiss , an individual proprietor, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2( 6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent, Painters Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paperhangers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, and Peninsula Craftsmen and Workers Association are each labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act. 3. Respondent by picketing a jobsite of Charles R. Curtiss at Bonifacio Plaza in Monterey with an object of forcing or requiring Curtiss to recognize or bargain with it as the representative of Curtiss' employees at a time when Curtiss had lawfully recognized Peninsula Craftsmen and Workers As- sociation , and a question concerning representation could not appropriately be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act, has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 940 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this proceeding, I recommend that Respondent, Paint- ers Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters, Decora- tors and Paperhangers of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from picketing Charles R. Curtiss at any jobsite where an object thereof is to force or require Curtiss to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the bargaining agent of em- ployees of Curtiss in circumstances violative of Sec- tion 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at the business office and meeting hall of Respondent copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."12 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish the Regional Director for Region 20 signed copies of said notice for posting by Curtiss, if willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director, shall, after being signed by Respondent, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for distribution by him. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision , what steps have been taken to comply herewith.' 1 12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of 4ppeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 13 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read " Notify the Regional Director for Region 20 , in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT picket Charles R. Curtiss at any jobsite at which he is working where an object thereof is to force or require Curtiss to bargain with Painters Local 272, Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paperhangers of America , AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of its employees in circum- stances violative of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. PAINTERS LOCAL 272, BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS, DECORATORS AND PAPERHANGERS OF AMERICA , AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 13050 Federal Building, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-0335.