Cast Optics Corp.

CAST OPTICS CORPORATION I Cast Optics Corporation and Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 22-CA-3879 and 22-CA-3932 June 30, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On March 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Thomas F Maher issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case' and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.3 2. Substitute for the sixth indented paragraph of the Notice to Employees the following: WE WILL offer to the employees whose names appear on the attached list immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any individual hired since the beginning of the strike on June 30, 1969. ' As the record , exceptions , and briefs in our opinion adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties , Respondent 's request for oral ar- gument is hereby denied ' The Charging Party notes that the Trial Examiner's Decision , in sec IV, A, I, states that Hernandez was discharged May 20 whereas this occurred on May 22 This is an obvious inadvertence which does not affect his con- clusion , and we hereby correct that date ' In agreeing with the Trial Examiner that Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(5), (3 ), and (I) of the Act, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Union instigated and approved the illegal work stoppage which occurred during the period of May 23 through 26, 1969 Whether or not the Union instigated that stoppage , when Respon- dent hired back the strikers , they retained their right under the Act to be represented by the Union as their bargaining representative There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that Respondent had reasonable cause to believe that the strikers had repudiated their bargaining represen- tative , indeed the record , considered as a whole, points to the opposite con- clusion Accordingly , Respondent 's withdrawal of recognition from the Union and its refusal to deal with it violated Sec 8 ( a)( 5) of the Act Member Brown would commence the backpay for the striking em- ployees on July 3 , 1969, the date on which the Respondent sent to each employee a letter informing him that he was discharged , rather than from October 3 , 1969, the date on which the employees unconditionally applied for reinstatement See his dissent in Sea - Way Distributing , Inc , 143 NLRB 460,461 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Cast Optics Corpora- tion, Hackensack, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified. 1. Substitute for paragraph 2(b) of the Trial Ex- aminer's Recommended Order the following: "Offer to the employees whose names appear on Appendix A attached to the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub- stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any individual hired since June 30, 1969." THOMAS F. MAHER , Trial Examiner: Upon charges filed on August 14 and October 6, 1969, by Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO, against Cast Optics Corporation , Respondent herein, the Regional Director for Region 22 of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, is- sued complaints on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board on September 22 and October 23, 1969, respectively , and an amended complaint on October 23, 1969, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and ( 5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended (29 U.S.C., Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. Contemporaneously with the filing of charges in this matter charges were filed in Cases 22-CB-1535 and 1577-1 and 2 on July 28 and Oc- tober 6 , 1969, respectively , by Cast Optics Cor- poration , the Respondent herein , against Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, Passaic- Bergen Joint Board , and Local 656 , Textile Wor- kers Union , AFL-CIO. A complaint was issued on September 5, following the filing of the first charge and an amended complaint was issued on October 184 NLRB No. 1 2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 23, 1969. Previously, on September 23, Case 22-CB-1535 was consolidated with a complaint is- sued on the previous day in the instant case, Case 22-CA-3879. Thereafter, on October 23, upon the issuance of an amended complaint in the instant proceeding, all cases were consolidated for hearing. At the commencement of the trial of these cases before me counsel for the General Counsel moved to sever the amended complaint against Respon- dent Union from the amended complaint against Respondent Cast Optics for the reason that a settle- ment agreement had been executed in Cases 22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2. Upon considera- tion of the diversity of issues in the cases con- solidated for trial, the conflicting interests of the parties joined as Respondents, and my view that an excess of confusion would result I granted counsel for General Counsel's motion and severed Cases 22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2 over Respondent Cast Optics' objection. I then refused to rule upon General Counsel's motion to withdraw the amended complaint in the case which I had ordered severed, ruling that such a request would be proper only when the case was before me. Upon Respon- dent's request to the Board for permission to appeal my severance of these cases the Board denied by order of December 4, 1969 Subsequently, on December 8, 1969, I heard the severed Cases 22-CB-1535, 1577-1 and 2 and after due con- sideration of the settlement agreement which the Charging Party, Cast Optics Corporation, had refused to accept, I granted counsel for General Counsel's motion to withdraw the complaint. Such rulings as I have made in the severed Cases 22-CB-1535, and 1577-1 and 2 1 do not consider to be before me as part of the instant case and will make no further reference to them herein. In the instant case Respondent duly filed its answer wherein, while admitting certain allegations of the amended complaint, it denied the commis- sion of any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to notice the trial referred to above was held before me on various dates in November and December 1969 in Newark, New Jersey, where all parties were present, represented by counsel, and afforded full opportunity to be heard, present oral argument , and file briefs. All parties filed briefs. Upon consideration of the entire record, includ- ing the briefs filed with me, and specifically upon my observation of each witness appearing before me,' I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Cast Optics Corporation, Respondent herein, is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office ' I have considered the testimony of all witnesses , including those whose testimony 1 neither accept nor refer to In evaluating the testimony of each witness I have relied specifically on his demeanor and have made my findings accordingly and, while apart from consideration of demeanor I located in Stamford, Connecticut, and a plant located in Hackensack, New Jersey, where it is en- gaged in the manufacture , sale, and distribution of acrylic , plastic sheets, and related products . During the 12 -month period immediately preceding the is- suance of the amended complaint Respondent manufactured, sold, and distributed at its Hacken- sack plant goods, products , and materials valued in excess of $50,000, of which goods, products, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped in interstate commerce to States of the United States other than the State of New Jersey. Upon the foregoing facts, stipulated to by all parties, I conclude and find the Respondent to be an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is stipulated among the parties and I ac- cordingly conclude and find that Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ISSUES 1. The employee status of individuals who strike in violation of a no-strike contract provision. 2. The employee status of individuals who strike in violation of the provisions of Section 8(d). 3. The continuing representative status of a union authorizing a strike in violation of Section 8(d). 4. Condonation as an element is assessing the employee status of returning strikers 5. Unilateral grant of wages and benefits. 6. The nature of an unfair labor practice strike. 7. The obligation to accede to strikers' uncondi- tional request for reinstatement. IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of Events Bargaining relations between Cast Optics and the Union have existed for a number of years, the Union being recognized, by the terms of a contract executed November 7, 1966, as the exclusive bar- gaining representative in a bargaining unit consist- ing of all Respondent's production and main- tenance employees at its Hackensack plant and ex- cluding office employees, salesmen, technical and professional employees, watchmen, guards, foremen, and all other supervisors. This I conclude and find to be a unit of Respondent's employees ap- propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. The Company's assets were purchased by the present management from its previous owners on have taken into account inconsistencies and conflicting evidence, my failure to detail each of these is not to be deemed a failure on my part to have fully considered it Bishop and Maloc , Inc , d/b/a Walker's, 157 NLRB 1159,1161 CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 3 January 2, 1969. Included in this transfer of owner- ship was the current bargaining agreement referred to above, together with two adenda signed by the parties prior to the transfer date, all of which were thereafter assented to by the parties. In the course of its development of a new management policy the Company's officials in- cluded Paul Daddona, the chief executive officer and the Respondent's principal spokesman at the trial , and B . Edwin Sackett, the newly appointed president whose function appears to have been to organize the operation. Sackett, an industrial con- sultant, has since resigned his position as president and continues his relation only in a consultive capacity. 1. The May work stoppage Upon the reorganization of the Company an in- ventory was taken of its assets and a reevaluation made of the duties and responsibilities of superviso- ry and rank-and-file employees. In the course of this study, and also based presumably upon unidentified reports, the work performance of one Gregorios Hernandez, an inspector in the plant, a member of the Union and secretary-treasurer of its Local 656,2 became the subject of special attention. As a result it was determined on May 19 that Her- nandez be transferred from his job of inspector in the quality control department to inspector in glass department. This transfer was executed on Tuesday, May 20, by Director of Manufacturing Chris Masterson at Daddona's direction. This did not meet with Hernandez' approval and he refused to accept the assignment. It was then decided that on Wednesday, May 21, Hernandez would again be directly assigned his new duties and if he again refused them he would be discharged.3 He again refused and on May 20, after consultation with Union's business agent, Germinal (Tony) Vargas, and subsequent official notification to him, Hernan- dez was discharged for the stated reason of "his refusal to obey or carry through orders." The reaction of the employees, all members of the Union, to Hernandez' discharge was unfavora- ble.' On the following morning the employees re- ported for work but upon reaching their work sta- tions refused to perform their assigned duties. They were all informed of the disasterous consequences of their refusal to work, with particular reference to the premature hardening of the liquid plastic material, Monomer, used in the manufacture of the Company's product. Nonetheless, all of them ada- mantly refused to work but remained in the plant. Meanwhile, to avoid the destruction of machinery and equipment which would result from the hardening of unpoured Monomer, the supervisory staff performed the necessary production opera- tions calculated to dispose of the prepared or "cooked" material on hand for the day's production. It appears that there was resulting damage but the record does not reflect its extent. On the next workday, Monday, May 26, the em- ployees who had engaged in the Friday work stop- page appeared for work at the usual starting time. As the men appeared at the plant entrance each was informed that he would be admitted to work only if he agreed to perform his usual duties, and failing to so perform their duties after having agreed to do so they would be discharged. Only 2 or 3 of the plant's 200 employees agreed to work and were admitted. The remainder milled around outside the plant talking to union officials who were present. Meetings were held between representa- tives of management, employee officials of the Union, and Business Agent Vargas for the purpose of returning the men to work, the employees insist- ing that Hernandez be reinstated and that the cer- tain economic demands submitted to management in early May be met. The Company, however, while seeking to have the men return, rejected their de- mands as a condition of ending the work stoppage and finally designated Thursday, 7:30 a.m., May 29, as the deadline by which they could return to their work upon agreement to perform all their duties. Failing to conform by this date the employees would be discharged for participating in an illegal work stoppage. All of the employees complied with Respondent's conditions and returned to work be- fore the Thursday deadline.' There is conflicting testimony as to the Union's connection with this work stoppage and as to the inferences to be drawn from the Union's earlier efforts to effect changes in wages, rates, Local 656, TWU-AFL-CIO, is the local of the Charging Union which services the contract Its headquarters, located in Union City, New Jersey, are shared with Passiac -Bergen Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO ' The uncontradicted testimony of Paul Daddona Although for reasons that will be set forth hereafter I do not rely on Daddona's testimony generally, I do accept it of necessity in instances such as this where transac- tions are peculiarly within his sphere of activity as executive officer of Respondent ' The testimony of Respondent 's executive director , Paul Daddona, is replete with factual details suggestive of pilferage , collusion , and a general aura of unsavory behavior among the employees within the plant , particu- larly as it affects their relationship with their union during this period While I rely on Daddona 's testimony within the limitations noted above (fn 3), 1 do not do so generally , having had full opportunity to observe his demeanor at the hearing , to consider his testimony in full, and to evaluate it against gratuitous remarks and statements he volunteered throughout the hearing Moreover , I have considered his frequent evasions, including a studied effort to avoid identifying the stationery of his own corporation and the signature of his associate , Masterson I accordingly reject his uncor- roborated testimony concerning the widespread misfeasance among the employees , and the inferences of wrongdoing which he attributes to union officials and to public officials, specifically the personnel of the police de- partment of Hackensack, New Jersey , and the staff personnel of the Board's Regional Office ' The foregoing findings concerning the work stoppage is a summariza- tion of the credited testimony of Edwin Sackett To the extent that union officials have testified to the contrary concerning their knowledge of or participation in these events, I do not credit them Elsewhere in this deci- sion the Union 's responsibility for this stoppage will be considered further At that time I shall have further comment on the testimony of these in- dividuals 4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and other contract provisions. Because con- sideration of these elements contribute little to a detail of the sequence of events, insofar as they constitute background for the alleged un- fair labor practices, I shall refrain from further consideration of the Union's conduct during this period. I shall consider it hereafter in rela- tion to Respondent's defense to the actions which it took (infra, Sec. IV, B). 2. The exclusion of the Union Following the employees' abandonment of the work stoppage which Respondent claims to have been of union instigation, a contention which General Counsel and the Union dispute, Respon- dent took a series of actions which it candidly ad- mits to have been in derogation of the Union's ex- clusive representative status First it was determined by Executive Officer Daddona that upon the men's return there were to be no reprisals taken against any of them in the form of harassment, bad assignments, transfers, or discharge Furthermore, because of what he con- sidered a complete failure of cooperation and a breakdown of communications, he decided that "he was not dealing with a labor organization in the true sense of the word" and on June 7 resolved Respondent's employees. Instead, he determined that henceforth he would deal with them on a "management-employee" basis. Daddona's determination, as he explains it, was immediately manifest by instructions he gave Respondent's disbursement department on June 9 that the union dues were no longer to be deducted from the employee's paycheck, as provided by the contract, and that no checks were thereafter to be issued to the Union to cover dues or welfare fund payments. As part of the same determination Chris Masterson, the director of manufacturing, was in- structed by Daddona to have no further dealings or communications with the Union. Furthermore, according to Union Representative Frank Cuccio's undenied testimony, 6 not only were the dues not sent to the Union as required by the contract but the payments to the Union's welfare fund, also a contract obligation, were withheld, and no payments have been made since this time. In- deed, when Cuccio sought a meeting with Respon- dent's management on this matter Gaudio refused him stating that if Tony Vargas, the Union's representative, came onto Respondent's property he would have him arrested for trespassing and concluded the conversation by stating, "Frank Cu- cio, we don't recognize your union." It also appears that the International 's office communicated with " I rely on Cuccio's testimony only to the extent that it is undemed, is contrary to the Union's interests herein or is corroborated by the testimony of credible witnesses ' There is confhctung evidence as to whether the firemen and painters- maintenance employees-joined in the strike 1 have already concluded, the Respondent concerning the delinquent pay- ments but received no reply. Thereafter, on June 20, the then general manager, Gaudio, posted on the company bulletin boards and enclosed in each employee's pay en- velope a notice reading as follows: The new management of Cast Optics is pleased to grant you a $ .05 an hour increase. Gaudio testified that he took this action without consulting with the Union or any of its officials. Meanwhile, in mid-June, Respondent took per- sonnel action with respect to maintenance em- ployees, firemen, and painters, which, it is claimed, was calculated to remove them from the bargaining unit covered by the contract. Thus these people who were by contract paid on an hourly scale were placed on a regular salary. The distinction sought to be drawn here between salaried and hourly em- ployees evaporates upon analysis. Union Represen- tative Cuccio simply testified that the changeover occurred-which it did. General Manager Gaudio testified he did not know if this group of employees were salaried or hourly paid. But employee Ken- neth Pereira, called as a witness by General Coun- sel, would seem to have scuttled any suggestion of impropriety in the action. He testified that he was in fact notified by Supervisor Joe Ulato that he was being placed on salary basis, and that he and the other maintenance people thereafter received a paycheck of a different color from the check received by hourly paid employees. This they im- mediately reported to the Union. The money he received as salary was identical, however, to what he received on the hourly basis, and under both bases of compensation he was paid for the numbers of hours he worked. Speaking for himself, Pereira testified he joined the other employees in a strike which followed shortly thereafter. Under the cir- cumstances described by this witness, the only maintenance employee called to testify concerning his alleged change of status, it is doubtful that a meaningful withdrawal of maintenance employees from the bargaining unit was ever accomplished 3. The protest strike On June 29 a meeting of the Local's membership was called to consider Respondent's actions taken against the Union. By a vote of the membership a strike was called for the following day, June 30, in protest of Respondent's action The employees struck on the following morning and picket lines were established at the plant ate .7 Thereafter, on July 3, each striking employee was sent a letter by Respondent informing him that he was being discharged. The strike continued as of the date of for lack of adequate proof, that these were not removed from the unit Their participation in the strike is not a significant fact, particularly in view of a stipulation of the parties to the names of the individuals who did par- ticipate and in whose behalf reinstatement was later sought " A list of these employees appears as Appendix A to this Decision CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 5 the hearing. Interim activities on the picket line bear further significance to the issues presented here. 4. The assault on the pickets On July 23, 1969, during the course of picketing, it appears that 25 or 30 pickets were walking in front of the plant premises on South Newman Street, Hackensack, with a considerable additional number of employees congregated on the opposite side of the street. Patrolman Lewis Canestrino credibly corroborates employee Ramon Bango's ac- count of an outpouring of workers from the plant, presumably replacements for the strikers, setting upon the pickets with sticks, pieces of plastic, and stones, under the amused and watchful eye of Respondent's supervisors. Thus Canestrino testified to what occurred during the afternoon of July 23: Well, there were about twenty-five, thirty picketers walking up and down in front of Cast Optics on South Newman Street. On three-on two or three different occasions all the em- ployees of Cast Optics, which for the most part were under twenty, all came out of the building holding pipes and pieces of plastic and, all dif- ferent objects, two by fours. And they came out and they harassed the picketers by pushing past them and making believe they were picking up garbage and pushing them over. Then they would go back in the building, we would tell them to go back into the building and ten or fifteen minutes later, they would come out again and -do the same thing re- peatedly over. He also described two additional incidents occur- ring on the same afternoon. One involved the push- ing of a "dipsy dumpster [sic]"-a garbage con- tainer-into the pickets and another was the driving of a forklift down into the crowd. Canestrino could not identify who was responsible for either "prank" or who directed it. I am not disposed to accept Respondent's dis- avowal of responsibility or even knowledge of the mass altercation described by the patrolman Specifically I reject as incredible Gaudio's explana- tion that an anonymous phone message generated a bomb scare at the plant and that, after summoning fire department officials, management was then in- structed to evacuate the employees, thus account- ing for the melee when the employees reached the street. Gaudio did not impress me as a reliable wit- ness, engaging as he frequently did throughout his testimony in generalizations and exaggerations when asked specific questions. This and his penchant for avioding answers by protesting lack of knowledge on subjects a general manager should be expected to know" requires me to accept his testimony only when it constitutes an admission against Respondent's interest or is corroborated by the testimony of credible witnesses. With respect to employee Bango's account of this incident I reject it as a highly emotional account which did not com- port with the accurate testimony of the patrolman. I do accept Bango's testimony as evidence that the event did occur, however, and that an assault on the pickets was perpetrated by the working em- ployees in the presence of company officials and supervisors. 5. Company-established benefits Finally, in late August Respondent took one final action to seal off its relationship from the Union. Thus a document signed by George Faline, the newly hired personnel manager, was posted at the plant and sent to every employee. Described by Gaudio at the hearing as "a statement for grievances its a statement on hospital coverage that I directed the personnel manager to make. And also holidays," this document consisting of three typed pages was introduced as an outline of company benefits available to all employees after 30 days' employment. It contained procedures for hospitalization and medical insurance; it specified the eight paid holidays and the criteria for vaca- tions; and finally, it outlined a multistep grievance procedure available to the individual employee. Gaudio testified that in promulgating these benefits he did not discuss them with the Union. 6. The striking employees' request for reinstatement In October the Union called a meeting of all the striking employees and informed them of the futili- ty of the strike so far and the Union's inability to deal with the Company. Thus Business Representa- tive Cuccio testified: October we held a meeting of all the strikers and we appraised [sic] them of the problem we are faced with and we asked them if they were willing to return to work unconditionally. That would mean without the union, without any rights to grievances, etcetera, and wages or any other issues that may resolve around the con- tract provisions, and they says we would agree if we asked them to, and I do so accepted [sic] a letter to the company offering our people to return to work unconditionally. I think the date of that letter went out around October the third. The letter sent by the Union on October 3, 1969, on behalf of the striking employees requested of the Respondent their unconditioned reinstatement, and read as follows: Textile Workers Union of America, the " For example, he did not know if maintenance employees were salaried or hourly paid 427-835 0 - 74 - 2 6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD authorized representative of the employees whose names are appended to this letter, hereby, on their behalf, unconditionally offers that they will immediately return to work at their same of [sic] substantially similar jobs. If you find that there are any mechanical problems incident to their immediate reinstate- ment, I am available at the above address to meet with you for that purpose. The list of employees whose reinstatement was requested appears as Appendix A of this Decision. Although Respondent admits to receiving the letter, Gaudio, who by that time had become president of Respondent, testified that he did not know whether or not the letter was answered. Cuccio testified, however, that there was no reply. There is no evidence that any striker has been reinstated, the men were still on strike as of the date of the hearing in December 1969, and the pickets were still on ac- tive patrol. B. The Respondent's Defense It is Respondent's position that the actions which it admittedly took in derogation of the Union's claimed majority status and the outstanding agree- ment were completely justified by the terms of judi- cial precedent and the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act." Specifically it is claimed that by the Union's efforts in early May to obtain certain changes in a contract that was not scheduled to ex- pire until 6 months thereafter, in November 1969, and by engaging in a strike in violation of an ex- pressed no-strike provision of the contract for the purpose of forcing these concessions, the Union thereby forfeited its representative status and thereby justified Respondent in conducting its af- fairs with its employees in the manner in which it did, without recourse to or interference from the Union. Implicit in this contention is the more basic one that the May 23-26 strike considered above (supra, Sec. IV, A, I) was called at the direction of the Union and for the dual purpose of obtaining contract concessions and procuring the discharged employee Herenandez' reinstatement. And further that the strike was not, as claimed by General Counsel and the Union, an unauthorized or "wild- cat" strike engaged in by the employees solely for the purpose of aiding Hernandez. To properly evaluate the Respondent's defense to its refusal to deal with the Union and to its July 3 discharge of the employees who went on strike a second time (supra, sec. IV, A, 3), it becomes necessary to make certain additional findings and conclusions which are not necessarily relevant to the allegations of the complaint, albeit they do re- late to Respondent's defense, regardless of its ulti- mate merits. These findings and conclusions follow. 1. The May work stoppage On May 13, 1969,11 Tony Vargas of the Union mailed a document entitled "Contract Proposals" to director of manufacturing, Chris Masterson, with a letter of transmittal stating: Enclosed please find contract proposals for Cast Optics Corp. When you are ready to com- mence discussions, at your earliest possible convenience, please let us know. Included among the proposals were substantial wage increases, improvements in vacations, sick pay, and death and holiday benefits, the addition of a dental plan to the existing health benefits, and the institution of a profit-sharing plan. A review of the contract between the parties dis- closes that section XXVIII of that document establishes November 7, 1969, as its expiration date and that the only provision for modification is one that permits of such action upon its expiration, fol- lowing at least 60 days' notice of intention. Nothing in the contract permits of modification at any other time or under any other circumstance. Upon the receipt of Vargas' proposals, Master- son, who had dealt with the Union under the previ- ous management, referred the matter to the then president, Edwin Sackett, who thereafter had sig- 10 The following are portions of Sec 8 ( d) upon which Respondent relies (d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of employment , or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder , and the execution of a written contract in- corporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession Provided, That where there is in ef- fect a collective -bargaining contract covering employees in an indus- try affecting commerce , the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification- (4) continues in full force and effect without resorting to strike or lockout , all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whchever occurs later Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employees shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer " The letter bore the date of April 13 but Vargas testified that this was a clerical error and it should have been May 13 No one disputes this cor- rection CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 7 nificant conversations with union officials and representatives. 12 It will be recalled from earlier findings that a number of meetings were held between manage- ment and the union officials in an effort to get the men back to work (supra, sec. IV, A, 1). Sackett represented the Company at these meetings and testified at length concerning them . He also produced notes of what transpired at the meetings which were made contemporaneously with the meetings by a member of his staff and verified by him.t3 Throughout the meetings Vargas protested that it was the men who were protesting the discharge of Hernandez and the negotiation of more favorable working conditions, but he agreed that he would urge them to return to work. Indeed at the May 26 meeting Vargas became most specific, not only that the Union did not approve the stoppage , but it was the employees who insisted as a condition of their return that (I) Hernandez be reinstated, (2) that they be "treated with respect and fairness," and (3) that the contract be reopened and the Company discuss the contract proposals submitted by Vargas. Sackett was ada- mant in his refusal to bargain with the employees, or Vargas, in this manner and informed them that they had to return to work first. He referred them to the grievance procedures of the contract for set- tling the Hernandez matter and any other com- plaints they might have, and he informed them that this was not the proper time to negotiate a new contract. That time would be the fall. Vargas said he would urge the men to return but no one appeared on the following day. Respondent then notified the men that unless they returned and worked by May 29, they would be discharged. Upon Vargas' instructions to them they then aban- doned the strike and returned to work. 2. Conclusions concerning the May work stoppage A reading of the several accounts of the strike of the employees which began when the men refused to work at their places on May 23 persuades me that this was not a spontaneous action on the part of the employees but something promulgated by Union Representative Vargas who then made him- self scarce and unavailable to management in its ef- forts to settle the matter. Vargas in his testimony was much too vague and "uninformed" about the stoppage to give any other impression but that he was manipulating the whole affair. Thus, all wit- nesses testifying concerning the stoppage place him at the scene on numerous occasions, telephone calls were made to him and never returned by him, and -he was present in meetings with management in its efforts to settle the strike. These appearances of a ranking union official at an explosive labor dispute cannot be equated with the casual bystander, and I refuse to so equate them. Vargas initially made contract proposals, asked at a meet- ing that they be discussed, and, as the work stop- page drew to a close, was the one who stepped in and ordered the men to return. I reject the conten- tion that he was not otherwise involved in the stop- page. Upon facts less obvious than those presented here the Board has held that a strike may be called "informally in a manner which is understood by the initiated," stating that "the critical question is not how the [Union] gave the strike call but whether, no matter how they did give it. 1114 I accordingly conclude and find that the only reasonable in- ference to be drawn from all the evidence that I have relied on is that the strike is one approved by the Union.15 As the contract under which the Union and Company operated specifically forbids such a strike I find that the work stoppage of May 23-26 was an illegal one and not an activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.16 C. Analysis of Issues and Ultimate Conclusions Basic to the issues presented in this case is the representative status of the Union during the period when Respondent admittedly refused to recognize or bargain with it, and thereafter. Thus, if, as Respondent claims, the Union 's conduct during and after the May 23-26 strike and its failure to comply with the provisions of Section 8(d) in the presenta- tion of contract demands served to divest it of its representative status, then Respondent 's dealings " The account of the transactions between Respondent and the Union during this period is based exclusively upon the testimony of Sackett whom 1 credit for this purpose Vargas testified at length concerning the contract proposals, the discharge of employee Hernandez , and the subsequent work stoppage which began on May 23 1 do not credit him except where he has been cor- roborated by credible witnesses A review of his testimony discloses nu- merous contradictions , unexplained lacks of knowledge of what occurred during the strike , and a continuing effort to evade answering questions put to him For these reasons and upon my observation of him 1 do not accept his testimony Nor do I accept the testimony of Paul Daddona , Respondent's executive officer, who testified at length concerning events in this area as well as in other resepcts Consistent with reasons previously stated (fn 4) 1 have re- lied on Daddona only to the extent that his testimony constitutes an admis- sion against Respondent 's interest herein, or is within his own peculiar knowledge , or where he has been corroborated by credible witnesses i i 1 accept as a substantially accurate report of these meetings Sackett's testimony and notes, and 1 reject as unreliable Vargas' testimony of the same incidents , and, in particular, 1 reject his denial that he asked that the contract proposals be considered " Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (A F L ), Local No 421 (The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 81 NLRB 1052, 1057 , citing United States v International Union, United Mine Workers, 77 F Supp 563, 566 (D C D C ), affd 177 F 2d 29, 35 (C A D C ), cert denied 338 U S 871 , wherein the lower court stated [Tlhese men, it is contended , did as individuals what they had a right to do, work or not work, and they decided not to work Now we have to consider the validity of that claim objectively If a nod or wink or a code was used in place of the word "strike" there was just as much a strike called as if the word "strike" had been used " See also Deaton Truck Line, Inc , 152 NLRB 1531, 1546, enfd 389 F2d163(CA 5) i" N L R B v Sands Manufacturing Co, 306 U S 332 8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would not be an unfair labor practice strike en- titling them to reinstatement.[' 1. The status of employees engaged in an illegal strike So that the facts may appear in their proper per- spective, certain absolutes must be established. First, the employees have at no time herein lost their employee status. Respondent suggests the contrary in its brief, relying on the provision of Sec- tion 8(d) which states: Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsec- tion shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of section 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employees shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. [Emphasis supplied.] Clearly what occurred here was condoned by Respondent, Daddona having testified that when the men returned to work by May 29 it was then determined that no reprisals of any kind would be taken against them (supra, sec. IV, A, 2). As such action comports with the Board's established stan- dards of condonation,[' I would conclude and find that within the terms of Section 8(d), quoted above, any jeopardy to the employment status that the employees may have suffered by virtue of the May work stoppage, whether it be a union authorized strike in violation of the contract, as I have found, or a "wildcat" or unauthorized strike as General Counsel and the Union claim, has been vitiated by Respondent's forgiveness. 2. The legality of the May work stoppage Having thus established that the employees have retained their employee status throughout May and June, it remains to be determined if and when the Union ceased to represent them. It is true, of course, as Respondent claims, that one of the objectives of the May 23-26 strike, which I have found to be union authorized, was to force acceptance of the Union's demands submitted on May 13. The evidence of this has been credited (supra, sec. IV, B, 1). Clearly these demands were not and could not be made in accordance with any reopening or modification provision of the con- tract. They were, therefore, highly improper. There was no provision in the contract for midterm modification. Consequently the 8(d) requirement that notice of modification be given would apply only to period approaching the November 7 expira- tion date. Therefore on May 13, by anticipating by 4 months a demand for modification which Section 8(d) precluded the Union from making, the Union clearly failed to comply with Section 8( d). But in any event if a modification date prior to expiration could possibly be read into the contract the May 23 strike was still illegal , for it did not, as Section 8(d)(4) requires, provide an interval of 60 days between the notice of modification and the beginning of the strike. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above I conclude and find that the demand for or "notice" of modification and the proposals submitted were improper and the strike in support of them clearly violated Section 8(d)(4). 3. The continuing representative status of the Union In the face of what I have found and concluded to be improper contract demands supported by an illegal work stoppage, the Union's disputed status as representative of the employees now comes into focus. Respondent then and now claims that because of the strike the Union lost its representa- tive status. By a process of circuitous reasoning which completely baffles me Respondent argues that because the Respondent has violated Section 8(d) by striking for modifications without following its requirements (a conclusion with which I agree) and because employees are divested of their employee status by engaging in such strike (be it authorized or "wildcat"), the Union thereby loses the right to represent them. The argument, as I understood it, places this moment of transition at the time when the strike occurs, the employees' status not being regained until the employee "is reemployed by such employer." 19 Thus, in the period between May 23, the date of the beginning of the work stoppage, and May 27, the date upon which Respondent took back the employees "without reprisal," it is claimed that an "instant decertification" of the Union took place. In support of this distortion I am referred to Graham v. Boeing Airplane Company,20 a decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Therein the court held that because a union failed to observe the contract modification and strike notice procedure required by Section 8(d) the employees who engaged in the strike were, by the terms of the statute, no longer employees. And, accordingly, in the absence of em- ployees to be represented "the statute does not require [the employer] to recognize [the union] as their representative." The reliance upon this deci- sion is misplaced. There, unlike here, the em- ployees remained on strike even to the date of the " Mastro Plastics Corp and French-American Reeds Mfg Co , Inc v NLRB,350US 270 " "Condonation necessarily contains the elements of forgiveness and an intention of treating employees as if their misconduct had not occurred " Dubo Manufacturing Corporation , 148 NLRB 1114, 1119 "Sec 8(d) 20 22 LRRM 2243 ( 1948), 15 Labor Cases §64, 604 CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 9 court's decision, and it is understandable that those whom the union claimed to represent were not em- ployees by operation of Section 8(d). Here, how- ever, except for a 3-day period the employees were at work with the Company's blessing. So unless the decision stands for the narrow proposition that an immediate metamorphosis takes place it has no ap- plication here.21 I am likewise referred to Boeing Airplane Com- pany v. N.L.R.B.,22 an outgrowth of the dispute which formed the basis of the earlier Boeing case cited above and involving the same striking em- ployees. The court stated (at 991): The Company was not guilty of an unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain with the Union [after the calling of the strike]. The Union had lost its standing as the collective- bargaining agent and the Company was at liberty to treat the employees as having severed their relations with the Company because of their breach of contract, and it was further at liberty to consumate [sic] their separation from the Company's employ by hiring others to take their places. [Emphasis supplied.] In that case, as previously considered, the employees went on strike, as did the employees here, in violation of Section 8(d). But there, unlike here, they remained out, and the court simply reiterated the District Court's view that illegal strikers who during their strike lost their em- ployee status were not individuals eligible for representation, therefore the offending union lost its representative status. That is not this case. These employees resumed work at the Company's invitation. Here, unless it is to be held that any breach of Section 8(d), or any strike in violation of it or any "wildcat" strike, however brief, serves to decertify a union , Respondent has no standing to renege on its obligation to recognize and bargain. It would seem that the converse of this proposition would best illustrate its failing. Thus, if we are to say that by the simple expedient of unprotected employee misconduct their bargaining representative's status is placed in jeopardy we are, by such a ruling, providing a most expeditious vehicle for recal- citrant, unscrupulous, or dissident employees, ob- stinate union officials, or indeed a likeminded em- ployer, to destroy an established bargaining rela- tionship. I know of no law or policy of the Board or decision of the courts that would provide such a disorderly substitute for the statutory decertifica- tion processes. On the contrary, based upon the foregoing facts and considerations, I conclude and find that at all times relevant herein the Union represented the employees of the Respondent. 4. The unlawful rejection of the Union Premised upon the foregoing conclusions the ac- tions which Respondent took after June 6 are clearly proscribed as being in derogation of its obligation to bargain with the established bargain- ing representative of its employees.23 Thus its posi- tive statement that it no longer recognized the Union conclusively establishes its refusal to bar- gain. In addition, the unilateral action which it took in raising wages, and its failure and refusal to checkoff union dues and to remit them and em- ployee welfare payments to the Union are classic examples of refusals to bargain. Upon the foregoing conduct, therefore, I conclude and find that Respondent has refused to bargain with the established bargaining representative of its em- ployees thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 14 5. The unfair labor practice strike A review of the credited findings made above dis- closes, and no one seriously disputes, that the June 30 strike of its employees called by the Union fol- lowing the June 29 meeting was in protest of the Respondent's stated refusal to bargain and its ac- companying actions which it took to underline that refusal-all of which I have found to constitute un- fair labor practices. Such a strike is most certainly an unfair labor strike whose participants are in- sured unqualified reinstatement by their employer upon their unconditional request for reinstate- ment.25 Nor is it significant at this point in time that the contract still outstanding, however repudiated by Respondent, contained the very no-strike provi- sion so vital to determinations elsewhere in this matter (supra, sec. IV, C, 1). Here, unlike the May 23-26 strike, the employees were striking in protest of employer conduct alleged and found to be viola- tions of the Act. It is well established that em- ployees' right to strike in protest of unfair labor practices is not waived by a contractual agreement to forego "any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement."26 I accordingly reject the 21 Respondent mistakenly relies on the testimony of employees that they returned from the strike " not as members of the Union ," thus suggesting abandonment of the Union As the pertinent section of Sec 8 ( d) refers only to the loss or acquisition of employee status, I do not see the relevance of the employees' union membership Nor am I disposed to view the in- dividual decisions of union members not to remain union members suffi- cient, of itself, to divest a union of its representative status Sec 9(c)(I)(A)(it ) of the Act provides all of the machinery necessary for such a determination - 22174F2d988(CADC) 23 In the posture of the case wherein I have found the Union to have con- tinued its representative status I find it unnecessary to consider the legal ef- fect of notification to the Union by Respondent, through Masterson , during June of certain discharges that had been effected Y' In further defense of its action Respondent sought to establish by ab- sentee records a slowdown campaign in June which it would attribute to the Union I find it unnecessary to determine if such a condition existed But if indeed it did exist Respondent 's remedy for such improper conduct, either by the employees or by the Union, would not include resort on its part to a violation of the Act es Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B, Supra , 278, N L R B v Samuel J Kobritz, dlbla Star Beef Company, 193 F 2d 8, 16-17 (C A I ) t" Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra , 279-284 10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD suggestion that the unfair labor practice strike which began on June 30, 1969, was controlled in any manner by the outstanding contract between Respondent and the Union. Respondent's unfair labor practices having pro- vided adequate grounds for the employees' strike in protest of them, "the striking employees do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with backpay, even if replacements for them have been made."27 Nor is it of consequence that other causes, economic in nature, also contributed to the calling of the strike, so long as it has been established that the unfair labor practices "had partly caused the strike." 28 6. The unconditioned request for reinstatement As noted above, rights to reinstatement and backpay are fixed upon the strikers' unconditional request to be taken back 29 As the facts demon- strate the Union, by letter of October 3, 1969, requested unconditionally in their behalf the rein- statement of all of the strikng employees, a list of whom was sent to Respondent and a copy of which appears as Appendix A of this Decision. Respond- ent admits the receipt of this request but its pres- ident, Gaudio, had no knowledge of what action was taken with respect to it. There is no evidence of any striker's reinstatement before or since, and the strike still continues. It may thus be presumed that the requests for unconditional reinstatement have been rejected, and I so conclude and find. Nor am I disposed to place any significance upon Respondent's action of July 3, purporting to dis- charge its striking employees. Whether the purpose of the attempted discharge letter was to effectively terminate the employees, or was a "tactical maneu- ver" meant to "intimidate the strikers into return- ing to work," 30 or that it was merely "applying pres- sure"31 is really of no consequence. The status of unfair labor practice strikers has long been held to be absolute and impervious to employer assault .32 I accordingly reject the suggestion that these em- ployees have been terminated, and perhaps replaced. On October 3, the date upon which rein- statement was requested in their behalf, each striker's right to immediate reinstatement vested, regardless of whether or not he had been replaced.33 Having then refused the strikers their jobs Respondent thereby discriminated against them in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and I so conclude and find. 7. The illegal assault on the pickets One more episode must necessarily be disposed of-the violence on the picket line on July 23 (supra, Sec. IV, A, 4). The evidence which I have credited discloses that on the afternoon in question a group of replacement employees were loosed upon the strike pickets and other nearby striking employees and that in the process sticks, stones, and fisticuffs were thrown about indiscriminately. It is also clear from the evidence that this occurred under the watchful eye, if not the outright approval, of Respondent's officials and supervisors. As no satisfactory explanation for this altercation has been supplied me, the obvious inference is to be drawn. I therefore conclude and find that Respondent, by permitting its working employees to leave their work stations and attack the strikers en masse, thereby sought to harass and intimidate them. Cita- tion of authority is hardly necessary to conclude and find as I do that such conduct on Respondent's part interferes with, restrains, and coerces em- ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by the Act, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I would also conclude and find that such conduct by Respondent could not but solidify the protest of the striking employees and serve to further encourage their determination to continue their strike. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company set forth in section IV, above, occurring in connection with the opera- tions described in section I, above, have a close, in- timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VI. THE REMEDY I have found that Respondent by numerous acts and statements has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, has refused to bargain with their duly selected bargaining representative, has sought to discharge them for striking in protest of its unlawful conduct, has harassed and coerced them as they continued their protest, and has failed and refused to reinstate them to their jobs upon their unconditional request therefor; such conduct being in violation of Section 8(a)( 1), (3), and (5) of the Act. I shall accordingly recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and because of the gravity of Respondent's conduct shall also recom- mend that it cease and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the rights of the employees guaranteed by the Act.34 " Supra, fn 25 N L R B v Samuel J Kobritz, dibla Star Beef Co , supra, 16-17, General Drivers and Helpers Union , Local 662, Teamsters (Rice Lake Creamery)v NLRB,302F2d908(CADC) Ibid Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas, Inc , 119 NLRB 41, 42 Englewood Lumber Company, 130 NLRB 394, 396 Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc , 139 NLRB 748, enfd 323 F 2d 956 (C A 2) " N L R B v Express Publishing Company, 312 U S 426, 437 CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 11 I shall also recommend that certain affirmative action be taken in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to continue recognition of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em- ployees; it continue in full force and effect the col- lective agreement which was in effect in June 1969, the date of the Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union; it continue bargaining collectively with the Union concerning the terms and conditions of any new contract to supercede the existing one;35 if agreement be reached that it embody such agreement in writing; and in the meantime it be ordered not to vary or abandon such benefits it may have given its employees since the date of its initial refusal to recognize this Union.36 I shall recommend that with respect to the em- ployees whom Respondent sought to discharge while they were engaged in a strike in protest of Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain, and whose names appear as Appendix A of this Deci- sion, that they be offered reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to seniority or any other rights and privileges, terminating, if necessary, any person hired since June 30, 1969, the date upon which the unfair labor practice strike began, to make room for them,37 and that they be made whole from Oc- tober 3, 1969, the date on which unconditional request for reinstatement was made in their be- half.'3' The backpay to which they are entitled shall be computed in the customary manner, with in- terest at 6 percent per annum 39 It will also be recommended that Respondent post appropriate notice of compliance with the Board Order. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I recommend"' that Case Optics Corporation, Respondent herein, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully harassing, assaulting, and other- wise restraining and coercing its employees while they are engaged in concerted activities protected by the Act. (b) Discouraging membership in Textile Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any of its subsidi- ary or component organizations or in any other labor organization by terminating the employment of their employees and thereafter refusing their un- conditional request for reinstatement because they have engaged in the aforementioned concerted ac- tivities. (c) Refusing to bargain with Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its production and maintenance employees, by withdrawing its recognition of said Union, by the withholding of dues and welfare pay- ments for employees as required by contractual obligation, and by unilaterally granting employees wage increases and related benefits. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees, or unlawfully discriminating against them in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer reinstatement to the employees whom it terminated and to whom it thereafter failed and refused to reinstate upon their unconditioned request, dismissing, if necessary, any individual hired since June 30, 1969; said employees to be of- fered reinstatement being those whose names ap- pear on Appendix A attached to this Decision and Recommended Order. (b) Make whole the aforesaid striking employees for the period from October 3, 1969, until the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, to be com- puted in the manner set forth in "The Remedy." (c) Continue to recognize Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of all its production and maintenance employees as designated in the con- tract most recently in force. (d) Upon request, continue to bargain collec- tively with the aforesaid union concerning the wages and working conditions of its employees and, if an understanding is 'ached, embody such un- derstanding in a new F ,red agreement. (e) Continue in full force and effect such benefits and emoluments as it may have granted its employees during the period of its unfair labor practices and the pendency of these proceedings. (f) Post at its Hackensack, New Jersey, plant co- pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."41 a Tidewater Express Lines , Inc, 142 NLRB 1 1 1 I, 1 122 ' The Bassick Co , 127 NLRB 1552 " Hock and Mandel Jewelers , 145 NLRB 435, 444 `" N L R B v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co , 304 U S 333, 346 Mastro Plastics Corp v N L R B , supra y F W Woolworth Company , 90 NLRB 289 40 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words " RECOMMENDED " shall be deleted from its caption and wher- ever else it thereafter appears , and for the words "I recommend" there shall be substituted , " the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders " 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re- gional Director for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.42 " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX A Felix Sanjurjo Pablo Alejandro Ramon Alejandro Jose Alejandro Armando Guzman Fernando Llamas Juan Riguelme Francisco Quinones Jaime Rivers Eduardo Morales Antonio Soto Isaac Roduguez Firmo Salvador Felix Medina Severo Merlo Jose Acosta Terdoro Villazon Carmelo Flores Angel M. Cruz Federico Vasguez Ramon P. Bango Ciro Latre Ernesto Diaz Francisco Andrade Felix Villalobos Onofre Carrillo Bernardino Banga Enrigue Carmona Pedro Rosado Carlos Cupeles Federico Caceres Francisco Perez Bernardo Soto Rafael Estevez Leonardo Valdivieso Cruz Cruz Milan Segarra John Almodovar Molme Gaona Ruben Suinones Salvador Justiniano Rafael Justinano Julio M. Rosello Ramon Heinandez Lutgardo Mova Manuel Cangas Francisco Arnero Arnaldo Morales Lucas Hernandez Leonardo Morales Angel Pastrana Emilio Martinez Ildefonso Flores Luis Santana Alfredo Ortiz Manuel Diaz Victura Peralta Pedro Galan Jose Cruz Jose Hernandez Ciro Lara Ramon Espinal Juan Estevez Miguel Garcia Juan Martinez Gregorio Mendoza Alfredo Garcia Pedro Rodriguez Alberto Rasonez Cesar Mava Galo Carrion Emilio M. Acevedo George Ramentol Antonio Diaz Juan A. Garcia Ernesto Alisea LABOR RELATIONS BOARD German Gomez Benigno Mirando Alverto Lopez Oscar Fernandez Nestor Pages Manuel Benitez Agustin Checo Jose Estevez Julio Martinez Angel Rodriguez Fortunato Garcia Felipe Gonzalez Jose Ugarte Orestes Ugarte Domingo Cabello Juan Pagan Cosine Suarez Baldemiro Rodriguez Guillesmo Estevez Gonzalo Del Corral Jose Santana Jose Ramon Checo Juan Prieto Justa Negron Berto A. Ale' Carlos Estevez Rafael Bisono Jose A. Espinel Serafin Echevarria Idalberto Valdes Gustavo Suarez Yvon Mercier Antolin Rodriguez Angel S. Sanchez Manuel Castellanos Juan Nunez Gilberto Valdes Manuel A. Benitez Jose Menendez Jose Navarro Francisco Carballeira William Green Benigno Hernandez Jorge Gustines Hipolito Fontanez Servio Pofanco Kenneth Pereira Wayne Davis Serafin Eahevarria Felipe Inoa Jose Colombos Jose Montes Fionisio Cruz Sanabria Antonio Perez Roberto Vazguez Segundo Sales Humberto Rojas Francisco A. Garcia Cesar Agular Jose A. Munoz Ramon Hernandez Gerardo Estevez Narciso Pena Sam Kadish Juan Silverio Matias Roberto Colina Santiago Cruz Tomas Perez Manuel Garcia Claudio Crespo Prudencio Vidal Garcia Maria Lopez Rosario Rendon Leora Ramirez Rafael Encarnacion Ramona Encarnacion Carmen Checo Oscar Diaz Adalio Gandara Fausto Martinez Miguel Villalabos Jose Moran Rogue Cruz William A. Checo Angel Martin Saturnino Mederos Francisco Perez Jesus Perez Jose Prieto Marcos E. Torres Andres Diaz Moises Colon Jose Suazo Manuel Meilan Luis Herrera Gloria Arias Alberto Faunde Oscar Fernandez Jose Lopez Roberto Cardenas Jose Pinzon Mickey Villalobos Silvio Volta Michael Torres Michael Acevedo Ceferino Perez Gustavo Rodriguez Francisco Seisdedos Oedio Mercado German Espinosa Amilkar Franco Pablo Nunez Baldomero Rodriquez Francisco Suarez Mary Penton CAST OPTICS CORPORATION 13 Romon Calrera Adolfo Tapis Domingo Morell Carlos Pena Miguel A. Gonzalez Ramon Nunez Jose Martinez Ambrosio Nevarres Jose Battle Miguel Garcia APPENDIX B NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT harrass, assault, or otherwise restrain or coerce you when you are engag. d in concerted activities protected by the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any of its subsidiary locals, or in any other labor organization by discharging you for en- gaging in concerted activities protected by the Act, and by refusing to reinstate you when you have unconditionally requested to return to work. WE WILL continue to recognize Textile Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our production and maintenance employees, and upon its request WE WILL bargain collectively with it, and if we reach an agreement we will put it in writing in the form of a signed contract. WE WILL NOT, in the meantime, withhold the payment to the Union of your dues or welfare payments as required by our contract with it. WE WILL continue in full force and effect the pay raise and any other benefits we have granted you since June 1, 1969. WE offer to reinstate any and all of the em- ployees whose names appear on the attached list and , if necessary to find a job for any of them , we will discharge any employee whom we hired since the beginning of the strike on June 30, 1969. WE WILL make you whole for the period beginning with the date on which you first un- conditionally requested to be reinstated, Oc- tober 3, 1969. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce any of you or unlaw- fully discriminate against any of you in your exercise of your rights guaranteed by the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. All of you , our employees , are free to remain or become, to withdraw from or to refrain from becoming , members of the Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any of its locals, or of any other labor organization. CAST OPTICS CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, 16th Floor, 970 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey 07102, Telephone 201-645-2100.