Local 4012, CWA

166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 4012, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Michigan Bell Telephone Co.) and Kenneth R. Crawley Communications Workers of America , AFL-CIO and its District No. 4 (Michigan Bell Telephone Co.) and Kenneth R. Crawley. Case 7-CB-2029 and 7-CB-2029(2) June 30, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS FANNING, MCCULLOCH, AND JENKINS On March 19 , 1970, Trial Examiner Benjamin K. Blackburn issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent Local 4012, Communications Workers of . America, AFL-CIO, had engaged in and was engaging in cer- tain unfair labor practices , and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action , as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision . He also found that the Respon- dents had not engaged in other unfair labor prac- tices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed . Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision and a supporting brief ; and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions,2 and recommen- dations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Local 4012, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Pontiac, Michigan, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not found herein. ' Although the issue was irrelevant to his ultimate determination, the Trial Examiner found in passing that Respondents did not depart from their uniform procedure for the administration of the maintenance -of-member- ship provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, since , according to the Trial Examiner , Crawley was "more than 30 days delinquent in his dues obligation when he was discharged " However, if we were to assume the relevance of the uniform procedure, the amount of time Crawley was in ar- rears on the date he was discharged would not be the critical time period, since the uniform procedure clearly provides that a discharge will not be requested until an employee is 30 days in arrears, and then a 15-day grace period is provided Here, as found by the Trial Examiner, Crawley was only 22 days in arrears when his discharge was requested However, this minor error by the Trial Examiner had no bearing upon his ultimate finding that Respondents did not violate Section 8(b)(I)(A) and ( 2) by requesting Crawley's discharge, since we agree with the Trial Examiner that Respon- dents have no legal obligation to follow the uniform procedure in the situa- tion where an employee, like Crawley, has once been accorded such procedure after he cancels his dues checkoff authorization and then becomes current in his dues obligation for a time but becomes delinquent again thereafter ' We adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Respondent Local 4012 violated Section 8(b)(1 )(A) by adopting a resolution requiring that all members pay their dues by checkoff authorizations Without passing on the Local's right to require employee Crawley to pay his dues in this manner,] the resolution clearly was improper, applying as it did not only to Crawley but to all members Since the remedy would not be affected by findings with regard to the July 10 and 29 letters to Crawley, we shall dismiss the Trial Examiner's findings relative thereto The Examiner's conclusions of law are amended accordingly TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BENJAMIN K . BLACKBURN , Trial Examiner: On September 5, 1969 ,t Kenneth R Crawley filed an unfair labor practice charge against Local 4012, Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as Respondent Local. On Oc- tober 16 he filed an amended charge in Case 7-CB-2029 and an original charge, Case 7-CB-2029(2), against Communications Workers of America , AFL-CIO , and its District No. 4, referred to collectively herein as Respondent Inter- national . The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , by the Regional Director for Region 7 (Detroit, Michigan ), issued a con- solidated complaint on October 23 in which he al- leged that Respondents violated Section 8(b)(I )(A) and (2) of the Act by causing Michigan Bell Telephone Company, referred to herein as Michigan Bell or the Company , to discharge Crawley on August 29 and that Respondents vio- lated Section 8(b)( I )(A) by various other conduct. Respondents ' answer , duly filed , admitted certain allegations of the complaint and denied others, in- cluding the allegations that they had committed un- fair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice , hearing was held before me in Detroit on December 8 and 9 and on January 6, 7, 8, and 9 , 1970. The prin- cipal issue litigated was whether Respondents requested Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley pur- suant to the maintenance -of-membership clause in their contract or because Crawley had canceled his dues checkoff authorization. ' Dates are 1969, unless otherwise specified 184 NLRB No. 20 LOCAL 4012, CWA 167 All parties appeared at the hearing and were given full opportunity to participate, to adduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record, including briefs filed by Respon- dents and the General Counsel,' and from my ob- servation of the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying under oath, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF MICHIGAN BELL Michigan Bell is a Michigan corporation engaged in the operation of a telephone system. During 1968 it grossed more than $500,000 and purchased goods valued at more than $50,000 which were shipped directly to it in Michigan from points out- side that State. On the basis of these facts, admitted by Respondents, I find that Michigan Bell is en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ll. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. IIi. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts 1. Background In 1968 Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, staged a national telephone strike. Pat- tern-setting negotiations were conducted with Western Electric Company. When agreement was reached, CWA ordered its members to return to work prior to their ratification of the terms. CWA is organized on a district basis District 4 comprises the States of Ohio and Michigan, headed by an international vice president. At the time of the 1968 strike, the Michigan segment of District 4 was comprised of 36 local unions, headed by a dis- trict director. When the order to return to work was received, 34 of the locals complied. Locals 4000 and 4016, both located in the metropolitan Detroit area in southeast Michigan, did not. Respondent Local, located in Pontiac, did. Pontiac is approximately 35 miles northwest of Detroit. Michigan initially rejected the national agreement. However, nationally the vote was in favor of the agreement. Michigan contracts were open at that time under a wage reopener provision, thus giving rise to the local issues which prolonged the dispute in that State. CWA conducted a second vote in Michigan, this time by mail ballots sent directly to the homes of the members. The result favored the national agreement. As a result of these events, Locals 4000 and 4016 remained on strike without the authorization of Respondent International for 2 weeks after the other 34 Michigan locals had returned to work. Pursuant to its contracts, Michigan Bell abrogated checkoff for Locals 4000 and 4016. Michigan Bell remits checked off dues directly to CWA's office in Washington, D C. CWA then returns to each local that portion of the amounts it receives which represents the local's share. In- cluded with the Company remittal each month is a so-called "reconciliation sheet." On it are listed employees added to or dropped from checkoff each month. CWA in turn sends this information back to the Michigan director. However, there is a delay of approximately 4 months between the time an em- ployee cancels his checkoff authorization and receipt of the reconciliation sheet by the Michigan director. Michigan Bell informs the Michigan director directly each month which employees have canceled their checkoff authorizations in the preceding month. Both reports indicate how many weeks the employee was on checkoff and how many he was off in the month in which he canceled. Locals 4000 and 4016, on the one hand, and Respondent International, on the other, fell out as a result of the unauthorized continuation of the strike. Dues money was a sore point between them. Since Michigan Bell was no longer checking off dues, Local 4000 sought to institute a plan in which employees would authorize payment through their credit union. To this end it solicited its members to cancel their dues checkoff authorizations and sub- stitute for them authorizations for the Company to deduct amounts equal to their weekly dues from their pay and send them to the credit union. It publicized this scheme extensively. One of the media it used was recorded telephone messages. Employees were urged to call a certain number and listen to instructions on how to go about supporting the local in its fight with Respondent International in this manner Respondent International obtained an injunction. Litigation, the details of which are not germane to this case, followed. However, as of the fall of 1968, more than a thousand employees in the metropolitan Detroit area had canceled their dues checkoff authorizations and were delinquent in their dues. In August 1969, when Kenneth Crawley was discharged by Michigan Bell, the number was approximately the same By January 1970, when this case was heard, it had dwindled to something over 500. Contracts between Respon- dent International and the Company contained checkoff provisions prior to 1966. However, the contract which was effective October 2, 1966, was Y The General Counsel 's motion to strike Respondents ' Exhibits 49, 50, and 51, police records pertaining to Crawley , is hereby granted Other mo- tions contained in the General Counsel 's brief to strike other portions of the record, including Respondents ' Exhibits 56 and 57, Michigan Bell's personnel records pertaining to Crawley, are hereby denied 168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the first to contain a maintenance-of-dues clause. It reads, in pertinent part: Each employee who is a member of the Union: 2. on or after the effective date of this Agree- ment, or whichever is later, shall, as a condition of em- ployment pay or tender to the Union an amount equal to the periodic Union dues .... In April 1967 Respondent International's execu- tive board adopted a uniform procedure for ad- ministration of this clause. It provides for the fol- lowing steps: 1. Notification of the local by Respondent Inter- national that a member has canceled his checkoff authorization. 2. Personal contact of the member by the local to check on the situation and explain his obligations to him. 3. Certification by the local to its district vice president that the member is 30 days in arrears, with copy to the delinquent member. 4. Request by Respondent International to em- ployer for discharge of the delinquent employee, with notice to him. Following receipt of the request for discharge, Michigan Bell, with Respondent In- ternational's concurrence, provides the employee a 15-day grace period in which to pay up before discharging him. Following this uniform procedure, Respondent sought the discharge of all employees who were in violation of this provision of the con- tracts. Michigan Bell refused. At the time of the hearing in this case, that issue had reached arbitra- tion but no hearing had been held. The fight between Local 4000 and Respondent International took other forms than the litigation over money Prior to the 1968 strike, both plant and switching department employees in Michigan were included in one bargaining unit and were covered by one contract between Respondent In- ternational and Michigan Bell Effective July 30, 1968, Respondent International transferred Detroit plant employees to a newly formed Local 4001. In late August 1968 it entered into a separate contract with the Company covering a separate unit of switching department employees in Detroit. Plant employees in Detroit continued under the statewide contract covering plant and switching employees. During the period in 1968 relevant to this case Local 4001 was the loyal local in Detroit, Local 4000, the dissident. In 1969 the dissident ex-leaders of Local 4000 began a campaign to unseat Respondent Interna- tional in Michigan. To that end they formed an or- ganization called United Telephone Workers on July I and called a meeting in Detroit July 7. At this meeting they launched a statewide campaign to get a sufficient showing of interest to be able to petition for Labor Board representation elections in the various bargaining units in the State. A second rally was held in Detroit on July 21 Show-of-in- terest cards were distributed at these rallies. A deadline of August 1 was set for return of the cards. The campaign did not succeed in eliciting enough interest to permit the new labor organization to challenge Respondent International in the statewide unit. However, UTW was able to file Case 7-RC-9542 for an election in the Detroit switching department unit covered by the contract Respon- dent International and Michigan Bell executed in late August 1968. That petition was pending at the time of the hearing in this case. In August UTW launched a campaign to per- suade more employees to cancel their checkoff authorizations as part of its drive to topple Respon- dent International.' In its propaganda it stressed the fact that hundreds of employees who had canceled their authorizations the year before and been delinquent ever since had not lost their jobs despite Respondent International's best efforts to get them fired pursuant to the maintenance-of-dues provision of its contract. Local 4001, the loyal local, con- ducted a countercampaign in which it resorted to taped telephone messages, dust as Local 4000 had done the year before when it urged employees to cancel their checkoff authorizations as part of its drive to switch to the credit union plan. Upshot of this phase of the Battle of Detroit is Case 7-UD-82, a petition for a deauthorization election in one Michigan Bell plant. It, too, was pending at the time of the hearing in this case. 2. The Kenneth Crawley story Kenneth Crawley, a Michigan Bell station in- staller, transferred to Pontiac in 1956. He became a member of Respondent Local. He authorized checkoff in 1962. He ran for the presidency of the local in 1964, 1966, and 1968. Each time he was defeated by Joseph Veresh. After the 1966 and 1968 elections he protested, without success, that Veresh or his supporters had engaged in objec- tionable conduct affecting the outcome. In 1966, when all other Michigan locals obeyed an order to return to work at the end of a statewide strike, he led a wildcat extension by Respondent Local. The strike collapsed when Veresh ordered the members Michigan Bell had resumed checkoff in Locals 4000 and 4016 in the in- terim between summer 1968 and summer 1969 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 169 back to work. Crawley was the last employee to drift back He was censured by a trial board of the local for bringing it into disrepute by letters to the editor of a Pontiac newspaper in which he criticized Veresh for ordering members of the local back to work against their will. In 1968 he filed Case 7-CB-1833 in which he charged that Respondent Local had violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act by failing to represent him properly. Gravamen of this charge was a grievance which Crawley claimed Veresh had allowed to die by failing to take the necessary action to carry it to the next step of the grievance procedure in the time allowed even though the grievance had merit. The Regional Director found no merit to Crawley's charge. As a result of all these experiences Crawley was not an admirer of Joseph Veresh. By March 1969 he was, to put it mildly, a dissident member of Respondent Local. On March 21 Crawley wrote Michigan Bell, as follows: Pay-Roll Accounting Mgr: Effective as soon as possible, from this day forward, please stop deducting union dues from my pay checks He did so because he was aware of the situation in Detroit and wanted to create a similar test case of the maintenance-of-dues provision of the contract in Pontiac.' The Company obliged him. It deducted weekly dues of $1.15 from the check which he received on Tuesday, March 25 The wages were earned in the week ending Saturday, March 15. Crawley's name was included among five on a notice of employees who had canceled checkoff which the Company sent to Respondent Interna- tional's Michigan director, Herman Shelton, on April 24. Shelton implemented Rspondent Interna- tional's uniform procedure for administration of the maintenance-of-dues clause in Crawley's case by notifying Respondent Local under date of May 2. Soon after receipt of Shelton's letter, Veresh went to the garage out of which Crawley worked in order to talk to Crawley, the next step in Respondent in- ternational's uniform procedure. He asked William Osborne to accompany him as a witness.' Veresh said he understood Crawley had canceled his checkoff authorization. Crawley replied that he had. Veresh said he thought Crawley should pay his dues. Veresh said he would hate to see anything happen to Crawley if he did not. Crawley said he was not going to pay them. Veresh said he had known Crawley for a long time and he would be better off if he paid up. Crawley repeated that he was not going to pay. Veresh asked Crawley if he was sure that was the way he wanted it. Crawley said it was not the way he wanted it, but it was the way it was going to be. At no time did Veresh say that he would get Crawley discharged if he did not reinstate his checkoff authorization. The only impli- cation of what Veresh did say was that Crawley was putting his job in jeopardy if he insisted on not pay- ing in the face of the maintenance-of-dues clause in the contract. On May 12 Respondent Local sent the requisite certificate to Shelton, with copy to Crawley, that Crawley was more than 30 days in arrears. It stated that he owed $9.20 as of that date, or eight times the $1 15 set by Respondent Local as its weekly dues. On May 15 Shelton requested Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley pursuant to the contract Under the heading "Date of Delinquency" on the form letter Shelton used was filled in "March, 1969, Monthly Ded $5.75, Uncollected $2.30." On the same day Shelton sent Crawley a letter which read. This is to advise you that, on the above date, the Michigan Bell Telephone Company has been requested to terminate your employment because of your failure to pay or to tender periodic Union Dues or equivalent as provided in the current contract with CWA. On May 28 D. E. Blank, supervising foreman of the garage out of which Crawley worked, took Crawley to the office of Blank's boss, H. W. Hart- son. Crawley was handed a typed letter signed by Blank which reviewed the situation and warned Crawley that ". . . if you should decide to continue in your present status and not abide by ... the cur- rent agreement the Company will be forced to ac- cept your resignation." He was told he had until 5 p.m. on Monday, June 2, to pay his dues. Crawley asked Hartson to put it in writing. Hartson wrote on a memo pad, "Should you not abide by . . the working agreement by paying your dues delinquen- cy before the close of business on June 2, 1969, your resignation will be considered accepted." Hartson signed the paper and handed it to Crawley. Crawley contacted the Detroit office of the Labor Board. He was informed that he could be discharged for failure to pay union dues when a proper collective-bargaining agreement provided for such a condition of employment. Crawley next This finding is based on the testimony of William Osborne, a fellow em- ployee, that Crawley "wasn't too happy with a clause in the contract and he said he would quit taking out dues to see whether it was valid or not " I do not credit Crawley's explanation that he canceled his checkoff authoriza- tion because he "was in hopes this would bong to the attention of higher people in my union, would come to me and approach me why I done this, outside of my local, where I could tell them exactly what was going on I didn't intend to quit the union but I thought this would get action outside of Pontiac local and have somebody come down into Pontiac [i e , from Lansing, headquarters of the Michigan director] and see what in the heck was going on " Crawley spent the better part of 3 days on the witness stand in this protracted hearing He was so evasive on cross -examination that his testimony is worthless John Livingstone, one of the leaders of UTW, di- vided dissident employees into three categories His third category struck me as a particularly apt description of Crawley as of March 1969, viz, " and there were others who were paying dues, who if it was safe not to pay dues, they wouldn't pay dues, because they hated the CWA " " The General Counsel, relying on Crawley 's version of this conversation, has alleged a violation of Section 8(b)(I)(A) in that Respondents " . coercively threatened [Crawley they ] would have [ him] discharged if he did not reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card " My findings are based on the testimony of Osborne, as corroborated by Veresh I do not credit Crawley for the reason already stated 170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contacted his friend, Michael Shelley, chief steward for Respondent Local He asked Shelley to find out how much he owed so that he could pay up Shelley contacted Robert Parker, treasurer of Respondent Local. Parker told Shelley that Crawley owed $12.65, or 1 1 times Respondent Local's weekly dues. On May 29 Crawley met Shelley at Salfi's Bar, a hangout for telephone men not far from the garage where Crawley worked. Crawley gave Shelley $12.65 in cash. Shelley gave Crawley a receipt "for Union Dues up to 6-2-69." Crawley wrote on the bottom of the receipt, "In protest of this transac- tion I remain Ken Crawley." Shelley immediately called the Company to inform it that Crawley had paid his dues. Shelley turned the $12.65 in to Parker. On June 2 Daniel Carr, the international representative employed by Respondent Interna- tional to service Respondent Local as well as several other locals in the Detroit area, informed Shelton by telephone that Crawley had paid his dues. Shelton instructed Carr to keep him posted on whether Crawley continued to keep his dues current. On July 7 Crawley attended the first rally held by UTW in Detroit. He asked and was informed about the situation in Detroit with respect to the hundreds of Michigan Bell employees who had stopped pay- ing dues without being discharged. That same day Crawley met Shelley again in Salfi's Bar and paid him $5, or 40 cents more than four times Respon- dent Local's weekly dues. Again Shelley gave Crawley a receipt. This time Crawley wrote on it, "Due to the NAZI procedure I had to pay Ken Crawley " Shelley turned this $5 in to Parker also Respondent Local's executive board held its 'regular monthly meeting on July 10. Parker, a member of the board, was annoyed that Crawley was harassing Respondent Local and, especially, him by canceling his checkoff authorization and paying his dues belatedly and irregularly in cash He moved that "... no more cash dues be collected and ... all dues be by payroll deduction . . also, that anyone not complying be referred to the inter- national." The motion carried unanimously. The secretary was directed to send notices ". . . to those involved," namely, Crawley. On July 19, pursuant to the new policy, Shirley Reeve, Respondent Lo- cal's secretary, wrote Crawley, ". . . All dues col- lected by this Local in the future must be by payroll deduction. In order for you to comply with this decision, a signed dues-deduction authorization card must be in my hands no later than August 11, 1969." When Carr learned of the motion and the letter a day or two later, he told Veresh he thought that refusing to accept cash dues was contrary to Respondent International's policy and probably il- legal. He said he would check with Shelton. He did. Shelton confirmed his first impression. Carr told Veresh that Shelton said Respondent Local should not carry out its new policy. Veresh instructed Mrs. Reeve to undo her first letter to Crawley with a second. Mrs. Reeve missed the point On July 29 she wrote Crawley, "This is to insure that you received my letter of July 19, 1969, concerning cash dues. Enclosed is a copy of that letter, and a Dues Deduction Authorization card. I may also add that until dues deductions have been resumed to comply with the Executive Board decision, dues must be kept up to date by cash payment." In the meantime, on July 21, Crawley had at- tended the second UTW rally in Detroit. Again he brought up the subject of fighting CWA by cancel- ing checkoff authorizations. On July 30 Crawley paid Shelley $1.15, or I week's dues, in cash at Sal- fi's Bar Once again Shelley gave Crawley a receipt. This time, however, Crawley merely added his signature. Shelley forgot to turn this payment in to Parker. On August 7 Crawley mailed Respondent Local a check for $2.30, or two times his weekly dues. Respondent Local received it on August 8. It did not deposit the check until September 9.6 Pursuant to his instructions, Carr reported Crawley's $5 payment of July 7 to Shelton shortly after it was received. Carr did not report the $1.15 payment because no one connected with Respon- dent Local, other than Shelley, knew anything about it at the time. Carr reported the $2.30 pay- ment shortly after August 8. Whether this was be- fore or after August 12 is uncertain in the record. In any event, on August 12, Shelton again requested Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley for failure to pay his dues. He used the same form letter he had employed on May 15. This time, under "Date of Delinquency" he entered "Can- celled payroll deduction authorization March, 1969." He sent a copy of this notice to Crawley the same day, rather than a separate letter as he had done on May 15. On the morning of August 29 Blank told Crawley that, unless Crawley could show him a receipt for dues up to that moment, he would not let Crawley go to work. Crawley replied that he had no receipt but that he was only 2 or 3 weeks in arrears. Blank discharged Crawley as requested by Respondent International. Crawley asked Blank to put the reason for his discharge in writing. Blank refused. The Kenneth Crawley story immediately became a cause celebre in the Battle of Detroit Local 4001, the loyal local, publicized Crawley's discharge in its recorded telephone messages as proof that failing to pay CWA dues could, indeed, cost dissident em- ployees their jobs. UTW countered with leaflets in- ' This finding is based on a dated endorsement on the canceled check, which is in evidence Veresh and Parker testified that the check lay around Respondent Local's office a few days because of the nature of their opera- tions Both are full-time employees of Michigan Bell and carry out their du- ties as union officers at odd hours The General Counsel sought to elicit ad- mission that Veresh wanted to tear the check up rather than accept it, without success I make no such finding I attach no significance to the fact that Respondent Local held the check for a month before depositing it LOCAL 4012, CWA tended to reassure its supporters. One such, dated September 18, read, in pertinent part: Here are the facts on the Pontiac splicer' referred to on the tape who was allegedly fired for non payment of dues. 1- He was not thirty days delinquent as required (and he has the receipts to prove it). 2- The procedure outlined above was not in- itiated or carried out. 3- The company would not give this employee a written statement as to why he was being ter- minated. 4- This man has filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against MBT and CWA. The NLRB is presently investigating the charges. 5- Legal opinion is that he has a perfect case and we are confident that he will be returned to the payroll with back pay. Shelley did not remember receiving $1 . 15 from Crawley on July 30 until he read a copy of Crawley's affidavit to the Labor Board in connec- tion with this case sometime after September 5. Osborne also read the same affidavit . Officials of Respondent International and officials of Respon- dent Local other than Chief Steward Shelley did not become aware of the $ 1.15 until Osborne told them what he had read at a trial preparation con- ference a few weeks before this hearing opened on December 8. As of the time of the hearing Shelley had still not turned in the $1.15. B. Analysis and Conclusion 1. The amount of Crawley's delinquency A threshhold issue, since both the General Coun- sel and Respondents predicate their arguments, in part, on their own calculations, is just how far Crawley was behind in his dues on August 12, when Shelton asked Michigan Bell to discharge him, and on August 29, when it did. The General Counsel contends that Crawley's $12.65 payment on May 29 put Crawley 2 weeks ahead; Respondents con- tend that it left him nearly 2 weeks behind. I find that it brought him just up to date. The General Counsel bases his calculation on a position that the last weekly deduction made by the Company paid Crawley's dues for the week ending Saturday, March 29, the week in which he received his paycheck, and not for the week ending Satur- day, March 15, the week in which he earned the money. He relies on the fact that Crawley was on checkoff at the time maintenance of dues became a 171 condition of employment in early October 1966, and argues that, since Crawley's contractual obliga- tion began in that week, the money withheld from his wages in that week met his obligation for that week. There is no evidence of what week Crawley's first payroll deduction back in 1962 was credited to. All witnesses who were queried on the point agreed that the question of whether dues deducted from wages meet an employee's obligation for work week or pay week has never come up before. I think the General Counsel is wrong for a number of reasons. First, it is more logical that the $1.15 taken out of the check Crawley received on Tuesday, March 25, was, as part of a continuing pattern, intended to cover the week for which, not in which, he was being paid. I would find it difficult to believe that, when Crawley went on checkoff in 1962, he continued to pay his weekly dues in cash for 2 weeks after he signed the authorization because the first deduction was not made until 2 weeks later. Such precision in meeting this kind of obligation does not comport with normal human behavior Therefore, it seems more reasonable to infer that Crawley's first payroll deduction went to pay his dues for the week he was being paid for and this pattern continued without interruption until March 1969. More important, however, is the fact that Crawley, Company, and Respondents all treated his obligation as if this were so March 1, 1969, fell on Saturday. There were five Saturdays that month, but only four Tuesdays. When Michigan Bell told Respondent International that Crawley had canceled his authorization in that month, it did not report that it had last taken dues out of his wages on Tuesday, March 25. Rather, it reported that it had deducted for only 3 of the 5 dues weeks which fell in that month. Thus it was, in effect, reporting that Crawley, through payroll deductions, had met his obligations for the weeks ending March 1, 8, and 15, but not for the weeks ending March 22 and 29. Similarly, Crawley acted as though he understood his obligation, if any, to keep his dues current though cash payments began with the week ending March 22. I was singularly unimpressed with Crawley's efforts to persuade me that calculation of how much he owed was a task beyond his skill and that he was constantly asking his friend, the chief steward, to find out how much so that he could pay up. Multiplying $1.15 by the number of weeks which have elapsed since a par- ticular date in the past is within the capability of fifth graders. Crawley is better educated and more intelligent than that. There are 11 Saturdays from March 22 to May 31. When Shelley inquired of Parker how much Crawley owed in the week end- ing May 31, Parker told him $12.65, the precise amount of 11 weeks' dues. Crawley paid that amount without haggling. Shelley gave Crawley a receipt which specified that he was now paid up to ' Crawley went to Pontiac as a splicer's helper However, in 1959 he was demoted to station installer 172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL June 2; i.e., to the beginning of the week ending Saturday, June 7. Crawley only protested the fact that he had to pay union dues to keep his job, not the amount he was told he owed or the period the receipt indicated it covered. He knew full well that the period he was in arrears on May 29 was I I weeks, the 1 1 weeks beginning with the week end- ing March 22 and ending with the week ending May 31. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the last payroll deduction did not pay Crawley's dues through the week ending March 15 because he owed an additional $2.05 at that time. It charges him for 90 cents not paid in the spring of 1965 when, apparently, his earnings were insufficient for a proper deduction and for I week's dues unpaid in the spring of 1968. As to the latter, the strike which took place at that time lasted 4 weeks. When it was over, Michigan Bell, for a reason unexplained. in this record, deducted dues for only three of those weeks from all employees who were on checkoff. There is no evidence that Respondents have ever sought to collect that week's dues directly from any of their members or that they have claimed it as an obligation due and owing from any member other than Crawley. Moreover, the manner in which Respondent Local calculated the amount Crawley owed as of Saturday, May 3 1, already alluded to, and the fact that Respondent Local stated in its May 12 certificate to Shelton that Crawley then owed $1.15 times eight, the precise number of weeks from the week ending March 22 to the week ending May 10, leave no room to believe that Respondents' effort to tack an extra $2 05 onto what Crawley owed is anything other than an af- terthought. I agree with the General Counsel that Respondents had forgiven Crawley the $2.05 long before he canceled his checkoff authorization. Respondent also contends that Crawley should not receive credit for the $1.15 payment of July 30 which Shelley pocketed on the ground that Shelley was acting beyond the scope of his authority as chief steward. However, Respondents accepted the other payments of $12.65 and $5 which Crawley made through Shelley. By so doing, Respondents cloaked Shelley with apparent authority to receive dues from Crawley. Therefore, Shelley was acting as Respondents' agent when he took the $1 15 even though he failed to turn it in, and Crawley's ac- count must be credited with it. When Crawley handed Shelley $12.65 on May 29, he paid his dues through Saturday, May 3 1. With that as a firm starting point, the calculation of how far behind he was on August 12 and on August 29 is simple. The $5 he paid on July 7 equaled dues for 4 weeks and, approximately, 2 days. Therefore, it paid his dues for the weeks ending June 7, 14, 21, and 28 and for Sunday, June 29, and Monday, June 8 Shelton , of course, had no way of knowing about the $1 15 payment and may not, in fact, have been told about the $2 30 payment at that time Therefore, the smallest number of days' delinquency which Respondents LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 30. The $1.15 he paid on July 30 paid his dues for I week through Monday, July 7. The $2.30 check he mailed to Respondent Local on August 7 paid his dues through Monday, July 21. Therefore, as of August 12, when Shelton wrote to Michigan Bell, Crawley was 22 days in arrears." On August 29, when Michigan Bell discharged him, he was 39 days behind. 2. The August 12 request as violation I have bothered to figure out Crawley's dues status on August 12 and 29 with such precision because "30 days" have such significance in the minds of the participants in the Battle of Detroit, Crawley included As point I in the portion of the UTW leaflet quoted above indicates, UTW's tactics are predicated on the notion that no employee can be discharged pursuant to the contract unless and until he is 30 days delinquent in his dues In fact, the part of the leaflet just before the section about Crawley already quoted sets forth UTW's un- derstanding of the procedure, thus- Legal counsel has indicated that these steps must be followed before members can be ter- minated under the Maintenance of Member- ship clause: 1- Members must be delinquent at least thirty day in paying their dues. 2- Local should personally contact member to determine whether the member plans to pay his or her dues on a -cash basis (this when member cancels his or her dues deduction authorization). 3- If member declines to pay, the Local notifys International and requests termination of em- ployee. A copy of the certificate of delinquen- cy and the request for termination should be mailed to the member, registered mail, with a return receipt requested. 4- The International, in writing, notifys the company by registered mail, return receipt requested, to terminate the employee A copy of this request shall be transmitted to the em- ployee who shall have 15 calender days after the date of the request to pay up his or her dues.' It is apparent from the above that a member has to be personally contacted , receive two letters, and then has an additional 15 days to decide if he or she is going to pay up dues before the company could terminate an employee. This idea that he was safe so long as he did not can be charged with predicating their request on is 29, the largest they may claim they acted on is 43 As discussed below, I think the point is unimpor- tant LOCAL 4012, CWA 173 fall more than 4 weeks behind in his dues and would always have a chance to escape by paying up even if he did, and the idea that Michigan Bell would consider his case the same as the hundreds of dissidents in Detroit and refuse to honor the con- tract explain Crawley's rashness in persisting in his campaign to harass Respondent Local. It also lies at the heart of the General Counsel's theory. The precise wording of that part of Respondent International's uniform procedure which gives rise to the 30-day syndrome is, "When a member is in arrears in the payment of his or her periodic Union dues for a period of 30 days, the Local should certi- fy to the appropriate Vice President (or National Bargaining Unit Director) the name of the member, who has failed to pay or to tender to the Local an amount equal to the periodic Union dues, the amount of the delinquency, and a request for ter- mination of the employment of the member. A copy of this certificate and request for termination should be mailed to the member in question, re- gistered mail, with a return receipt requested." The General Counsel's theory is two-pronged. First, he contends that Respondents violated the Act when they brought about Crawley's discharge regardless of their motive for doing so because they did not follow their own procedure, a per se ap- proach. Alternatively, he contends that they are guilty because they were motivated not solely by Crawley's failure to pay his dues but by his dis- sidence and, especially, his refusal to go back on checkoff following Respondent Local's executive board resolution of July 10 and Mrs. Reeve's letters of July 19 and 29. Respondents deny that they were motivated by anything other than Crawley's dues delinquency and argue that, even if they were, such a motive is legal since they were only trying to pro- tect themselves from Crawley's efforts to destroy them. Under the General Counsel's per se theory, he calculates Crawley's dues were paid through the week ending August 2, with 40 cents change left over. Thus, he argues, Crawley was less than 2 weeks behind when Shelton requested his discharge, less than 4 weeks behind when Michigan Bell complied Therefore, he concludes, Crawley was discharged when he was less than 30 days in ar- rears, and Respondent International's uniform procedure was not complied with in that respect. Since I have found that the General Counsel's cal- culations are based on an incorrect premise and that Crawley was, in fact, more than 30 days delinquent when he was discharged, it follows that Respondents did not depart from the uniform procedure in this respect even if the point is now considered important. An integral part of the General Counsel's 30-day position is the additional fact that Crawley did not receive a copy of a certification from Respondent Local to Respondent International that, in August, he was more than 30 days behind. The General Counsel's position is predicated on a misun- derstanding of the uniform procedure and the facts at the time complaint was issued. The complaint al- leges, and the answer denies, "On a date ... falling within the first two weeks of August, 1969, Respon- dent Local, in writing, notified Respondent Interna- tional that the Respondent Local was requesting `termination of employment of ... [the Charging Party] ... who ... [has] ... failed to pay or tender to the Local an amount equal to the periodic union dues.' Said written communication further stated that the Respondent Local was certifying `that the above members are in arrears in the payment of Union dues for a period of 30 days or more."' As found above, this is simply not true. Respondent Local sent such a certificate, with copy to Crawley, as required by Respondent International's uniform procedure in May but not in August. This fact brings the General Counsel's 30-day theory into the focus of one simple question. Once Respondents had accorded Crawley the full due process of the uniform procedure in May, were they legally bound to repeat the process in full in August when Crawley continued his harassing tactics? I find that they were not. The procedure worked out by Respondent Inter- national and Michigan Bell for administering the maintenance-of-dues provision of their contracts is eminently fair. An employee who does not meet his obligations gets two written notices from Respon- dent International, not to mention a personal con- tact by an official of his local. The notices are sent registered mail, return receipt requested, so that there can be no doubt that the employee has, in fact, received them. At any time prior to a request for his discharge the employee can forestall it by simply paying what he owes, the condition of em- ployment established by the contract Even after the request the Company still gives him 15 days in which to pay, and Respondents have no objection to his retaining his job if he does meet his obliga- tions even at that late date. Herman Shelton, Michigan director for Respondent International, testified, and I find, that there has been no prior in- stance in which an employee has, like Crawley, per- sisted in refusing to pay his dues regularly and on time after falling behind and then paying up once within the framework of the uniform procedure." The hundreds of dissident employees in Detroit are not like Crawley. In their cases, Respondent Inter- national has followed its uniform procedure, just as ' The General Counsel stated on the record that he was not relying on a disparate treatment theory Respondents contend that this concession precludes any finding against them since , if Crawley has been treated like everyone else , in that Respondent International requested his discharge for failing to pay his dues, he cannot have been discriminated against I reject Respondents ' argument. The General Counsel did not intend to concede, and 1 do not interpret his remark as reasonably susceptible of being held to concede, that there are other employees of Michigan Bell who have been treated as Crawley was treated without an unfair labor practice resulting The General Counsel was, rather, referring to the fact that Crawley is the only employee among the hundreds in Michigan who have canceled their checkoff authorizations and whose discharges have been requested by Respondent International who has paid up once, fallen behind again, and had his discharge requested a second time 174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD it did in May in Crawley's case, they have refused to pay up at all, and Michigan Bell has failed to abide by the contract for reasons unexplained in this record and having no relevance to this case The whole procedure is obviously designed to cover an employee who falls behind once and protect him if he wants to meet his obligation thereafter. It has no bearing on employees who, like Crawley and the Detroit dissidents, are attempting to withhold their dues as part of a continuing campaign to subvert CWA as bargaining representative for Michigan Bell employees A contrary holding would turn Respondent International's fair and reasonable uniform procedure into a potent weapon to be used against it What is important about the August phase of the Kenneth Crawley story is not whether Crawley was 29 or 31 days in arrears on August 12 or 29, or whether he had another personal confron- tation with Joseph Veresh or some other official of Respondent Local, or whether he received a copy of a certificate from Respondent Local to Respon- dent International that he was 30 days behind in his dues before Shelton requested his discharge in his August 12 letter to the Company. What is impor- tant is whether he did receive some reasonable notice at that time of what was happening to him so that he was accorded the process due a dissident in Crawley's unique position. He did get a copy of Shelton's August 12 request that Michigan Bell discharge him. He did receive a reasonable grace period thereafter before the Company discharged him on August 29 The computation of how much he owed was not so complicated that he was in- capable of figuring it out and paying up between August 12 and 29. When he did not and lost his job as a result, Crawley had no one to blame but him- self The General Counsel's reliance on Krambo Food Stores, Inc., 114 NLRB 241, and IBT, Local 85 (Pacific Motor Trucking Company), 175 NLRB No. 112, is misplaced. Both are distinguishable on their facts. In the former, the question was whether dis- criminatees had paid their dues within the grace period provided by the union. Here, Crawley was not discharged until a grace period following Michigan Bell's receipt of the request for his discharge had expired. In the latter, the union not only accepted and retained dues tendered by the discriminatee but even waived his delinquencies. The second facet of the General Counsel's theory, i.e., that Respondents were not motivated solely by Crawley's dues delinquency when the Au- gust 12 request was sent, is predicated on the same misconception as the first. In addition to the mistaken paragraph already quoted, the complaint specifically alleges that Respondents requested Crawley's discharge because of Crawley's " failure to execute a written authorization permitting Michigan Bell to check off dues or assessments ... and activities as a dissident member ...." There can be no doubt in this record that Respondent Local was motivated by Crawley's cancellation of and refusal to renew his checkoff authorization. Treasurer Robert Parker's frank admission of his reason for proposing the resolution adopted by the executive board on July 10 and the still-hostile wording of Secretary Reeve's second letter to Crawley on Julyy 29 despite the fact, as Parker so revealingly phrased it, Respondent Local got its "fanny chewed no end" by Respondent Inter- national for acting contrary to CWA policy make this point crystal clear. In the General Counsel's theory this motive is the controlling motive. In the complaint he traces it to Respondent Interna- tional by assuming that the step which followed Mrs. Reeve's July 29 letter was an early August certificate from Respondent Local to Respondent International that Crawley was 30 days in arrears. Once again, the key fact is that there was no such certificate. The General Counsel's theory falls because he has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the motive which animated Respon- dent Local was the motive which animated Respon- dent international when the August 12 request for Crawley's discharge was sent to Michigan Bell. Shelton was the official responsible for sending that request. Therefore, his motive for doing so is the determinative one. The only contact between Shel- ton and Respondent Local was through Carr, the international representative, during the period when the local was so busily engaged in trying to force Crawley back onto checkoff because it felt it was being harassed by him. I credit Carr's and Shel- ton's denials that they had anything at all to do with or even knowledge of that activity at the local level. I credit their testimony that the only discussion they had about Crawley just before August 12 was Carr's 'informing Shelton, pursuant to Shelton's standing instructions, that Crawley was behind in his dues. I credit Shelton's testimony that he acted on his own initiative in sending the August 12 request and not because Respondent Local had requested him to do so in any way. I attach no sig- nificance to the coincidence that Shirley Reeve's letter of July 19 set August 11 as a deadline by which Crawley must authorize checkoff while Shel- ton's request to Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley is dated August 12. I find that Shelton was motivated solely by Crawley's dues delinquency when he caused Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley The General Counsel's improper motive theory falls for a second reason. Even if he had succeeded in establishing that Shelton acted at Respondent Local's request, whether express or implied, because Crawley refused to go back on checkoff, Respondents would still have been requesting the discharge solely because of Crawley's delinquency in dues within the meaning of Board precedent. As is pointed out in General Motors Corporation, Packard Electric Division, 134 NLRB 1107, 1117, "Employees do not have a protected right to refrain LOCAL 4012, from paying union dues lawfully required under a valid union-security contract or to be continually or willfully delinquent in such respect ." In this case as in that, checkoff is merely incidental to Respon- dents' right to timely receipt of dues. Therefore, a motive growing out of Crawley's efforts to subvert Respondents ' rights is not one proscribed by the Act. Respondents accepted dues tendered by Crawley after the May request for his discharge. However, he did not tender any after the August request. Thus, the exception laid down in Colgate-Palmolive Company, 138 NLRB 1037, and reiterated in State Sand and Gravel Company, 155 NLRB 273, to the general rule of General Motors-Packard, supra, has no application here. Therefore, since Respondents requested the discharge of Kenneth Crawley pur- suant to a valid union-security contract solely because of his delinquency in dues, they did not thereby violate Section 8(b)(I )(A) and (2) of the Act. 3. The ancillary 8(b)(1)(A) allegations As I have already indicated in footnote 5 above, I do not credit Crawley's story that ". . Veresh notified me that [canceling checkoff] was a viola- tion of the contract, and that if I did not get back on the payroll deductions I could lose my job. I'm quite sure he said he would pet my job." Therefore, I find that Respondents did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to have Crawley " discharged if he did not reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card." The complaint also alleges the July 10 resolution by Respondent Local's executive board and the secretary 's letters of July 10 and 29 as violations. Respondents rely on General Motors-Packard, supra, in which the Board adopted the Trial Ex- aminer's finding that , ". . . in the circumstances of this case, [ a checkoff requirement ] was both reasonable and necessary to a fair administration of the contract with due regard for the rights of all parties concerned, namely, the Company, the [Un- ion], and the employees." However, the better view and one more appropriate to the circum- stances of this case , is that ". . dues checkoff authorizations must be made `voluntarily ' and ... an employee has `a right under Section 7 of the Act to refuse to sign checkoff authorization cards."' IUE, Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corpora- tion ), 180 NLRB No . 168. Respondent Local's ac- tions were directed only against Crawley and were intended to restrain and coerce him in his right to fight CWA. While a strong argument can be made that Rspondent Local had a right to protect itself against Crawley 's harassment in this manner, thus bringing this case within the ambit of General Mo- tors-Packard, I am persuaded to the contrary, first, by the fact that Respondent International itself con- sidered Respondent Local's action illegal and, second , by the fact that Respondent Local, not- CWA 175 withstanding , has never officially revoked the of- fending resolution . To the contrary, the last action it took in this area even after being informed that it was acting illegally was Mrs. Reeve 's letter of July 29 to Crawley. That letter clearly implies that the new procedure is still in full force and effect. Therefore, I find that Respondent Local, but not Respondent International , violated Section 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act when it adopted a resolution and informed Kenneth Crawley that dues could only be paid through checkoff. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Michigan Bell Telephone Company is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, its District 4, and its Local 4012 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By adopting a resolution and informing Ken- neth Crawley that dues can only be paid through checkoff, Local 4012, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 (b)(I )(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The allegations of the complaint that Commu- nications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its District 4 , have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act have not been sustained. 6. The allegations of the complaint that Local 4012, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act have not been sustained. 7. The allegation of the complaint that Local 4012, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to have Kenneth Crawley discharged if he did not reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card has not been sustained. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Local has en- gaged in unfair labor practices by adopting a resolution that dues can only be paid through checkoff, I will recommend that it cease and desist from giving any force or effect thereto and that its executive board adopt a new resolution rescinding the old one . I will not recommend that Respondent Local officially notify Kenneth Crawley of its return to its old policy on payment of dues since, in view of my other findings in this case, such a remedy would be pointless. 176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, con- clusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Local 4012, Communications Workers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving any force or effect to a resolution adopted by its executive board on July 10, 1969, that no more cash dues be collected and all dues be by payroll deduction (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees of Michigan Bell Telephone Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Adopt, through its executive board, a resolu- tion rescinding the said resolution of July 10, 1969. (b) Post at Respondent Local's office or union hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix. "10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent Local's representative, shall be posted by Respondent Local immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Local to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 7 copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" for posting by Michigan Bell Telephone Company at its places of business in Pontiac, Michigan, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted, if the said employer is willing to do so. Co- pies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, shall, after being signed by a representa- tive of Respondent Local, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for said posting. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges the commission of any unfair labor practices by Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and/or its District 4, and insofar as it alleges that Local 4012, Com- munications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, vio- lated Section 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act by threatening to have Kenneth Crawley discharged if he did not reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card. i" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board - ii In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT require you to pay your union dues through payroll deductions. All our mem- bers are free to pay their dues directly to the local in cash rather than execute a checkoff authorization if they so desire. LOCAL 4012, COMMUMICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or com- pliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Region 7, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.