Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69

LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union No. 18; Los Angeles Ster- eotypers' Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographical Union No. 174; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94; General Warehousemen's Union Local 598; Building Service and Maintenance Employees Union No. 399; Los Angeles Mailers' Union No. 9; Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No. 3; and Newspaper and Periodical Drivers' and Help- ers' Union Local 921 and San Francisco Examiner, Division of the Hearst Corporation; and Los Ange- les Herald-Examiner, Division of the Hearst Cor- poration San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52 of the American Newspaper Guild and Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division of the Hearst Corporation ; and San Francisco Examiner Division of the Hearst Corporation . Cases 21-CC-1043 and 21-CC-1043-2 August 27, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN, MCCULLOCH, AND JENKINS On March 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that certain of the above Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action. He also found that these Respondents did not engage in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and that Warehousemen's Union engaged in no unfair labor practice. Thereafter the General Counsel, Charg- ing Parties, and certain of the Respondents filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, together with supporting briefs. The Charging Parties filed a supplemental brief in support of their exceptions and a brief in answer to the Respondent's exceptions, and the Respondents filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's and Charging Parties' excep- tions. The National Labor Relations Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case,' and hereby The Respondents in the instant case and the respondent in Baltimore News American Division, The Hearst Corporation, 185 NLRB No 26 issued this day, have filed a joint motion to consolidate these two cases for purposes of Decision The Charging Parties and the General Counsel 303 adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, with the following addi- tions and modifications.' At all times material herein, the Respondent Los Angeles Unions' represented employees of The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor- poration in separate units at Los Angeles, California, and were engaged in an economic strike in Los Angeles against The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner. In further- ance of this strike, all the Los Angeles Respondents, except the Warehousemen's Union, formed and became members of the Los Angeles Strike Council and picketed various premises of The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, The San Francisco Chronicle Publishing Company, and The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. The Respondent San Francisco Unions are Newspaper and Periodical Drivers' and Helpers' Union Local 921, which represented employees of the Printing Company, and San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52, of the American Newspaper Guild, which represented employees of the Printing Compa- ny, The San Francisco Examiner, and The San Fran- cisco Chronicle in a multiemployer unit. During the picketing by the Los Angeles Unions, the San Francis- co Unions asked employees who were their members at the Printing Company to honor the picket line. That request was honored, causing a stoppage of work by the Printing Company and the suspension of publication of the San Francisco newspapers. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that eight of the Respondent Los Angeles Unions' picketed, or caused to be picketed, The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, The San Francis- co Chronicle Publishing Company, and The San Fran- cisco Printing Company, Inc. in furtherance of their dispute with the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Divi- sion of The Hearst Corporation, and thereby induced and encouraged employees of, and coerced, the three in both cases have filed oppositions thereto We hereby deny the Respond- ents' joint motion, as the parties are different in each case, there are some different issues in the instant case, and no useful purpose would be served by consolidation at this stage of the proceedings The building at 5th and Mission Streets, San Francisco, where, among other places, picketing occurred, is owned by The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation and The San Francisco Chronicle Publishing Company, and not solely by The Chronicle Publishing Company as the Trial Examiner stated ' Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union No 18, Los Angeles Stereotypers Union No 58, Los Angeles Typographical Union No 174, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No 94, General Warehousemen's Union Local 598, Building Service and Maintenance Employees Union No 399, Los Angeles Mailers' Union No 9, and Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No 3 We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons stated in his Decision, that the Warehousemen's Union was not responsible for the picketing Accordingly, we adopt his recommendation that the complaint be dismissed as to it 185 NLRB No. 25 304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD picketed companies, for the purpose of causing a cessation of business between such companies and their customers and suppliers, and each other, in order to bring pressure to bear on The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner to accede to the Union's demands. 1. We disagree, however, with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that eight of the Los Angeles Respondents did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by picketing The San Francisco Division of The Hearst Corporation. The Trial Examiner based that conclusion on the ground that the San Francisco Division and the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division are not separate persons. We believe that this record, and our decisions in similar cases, require the contrary conclusions. Section 8(b)(4) forbids unions to (i) induce individ- uals employed by any person to strike, or (ii) coerce any person, with an object of (B) forcing any person to cease doing business with any other person. Thus, if each division is a person, the picketing was pro- scribed by Section 8(b) (4)(B) as secondary. Section 2(1) provides that "the term `person' includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trus- tees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." The Board has held with court approval that sepa- rate corporate subsidiaries are separate persons, each entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4)(B) from the labor disputes of the other, if neither the subsidiar- ies nor the parent exercises actual or active, as opposed to merely potential, control over the day-to-day opera- tions or labor relations of the other.' It is clear that no such active or actual control is exercised here. The Hearst Corporation is a Delaware corporation engaged in a conglomerate of business activities con- ducted through some 20 divisions, of which 7 are newspapers, and through 31 separately incorporated subsidiaries.' As to the two divisions here involved, the president of the Corporation appoints their heads and delegates to them the responsibility for the day- to-day operation of the divisions, including the formu- lation and implementation of labor relations policies. ' Knight Newspapers, 138 NLRB 1346, enfd 322 F 2d 405 (C A D C), Poole's Warehousing, 158 NLRB 1281 Compare J G Roy and Sons Company v NLRB, 251 F 2d 771 (C A 1), NLR B v Bachman Machine Co , 266 F 2d 599 (C A 8) The Hearst divisions are engaged in such diverse businesses as the publication of newspapers and magazines, the manufacture of specialty paper, the operation of ranches and timberlands , a newspaper syndicate, a newsprint brokerage , and a purchasing service , a real estate investment enterprise , and the collection and display of art objects and antiques The corporate subsidiaries are engaged in such activities as advertising representative , movie making, the acquisition and sale of musical composi- tions, the distribution of publishing equipment and supplies , and the processing of photographs He may remove them for "an unsatisfactory job," meaning unfavorable earnings. Each division manager determines the size and salaries of his staff whom he hires, discharges, and promotes. There is no transfer of employees among divisions. Although the Corporation makes available to the divisions certain insurance, pension, and salary- continuation programs, each division may accept such programs or not as it sees fit. Each division manager has final authority to formu- late and effectuate news, editorial, production, adver- tising, and circulation policies. He decides whether or not to use Corporation-owned services and features. Thus, the Herald-Examiner purchases its newsprint from the Hearst Enterprises Division, but the San Francisco Examiner does not. Each division maintains its own financial system, subject to uniform reporting requirements for tax purposes. The divisions retain "a comfortable cash balance" as "operating profits" and remit the surplus to the Corporation. Although corporate approval is required for expenditures of more than $10,000, such approval has never been withheld. These facts establish that the authority exercised by the Corporation over the divisions is limited to certain financial matters inherent in common owner- ship, and amounts only to potential control over their operations. The Corporation does not exercise actual, or active, control over these divisions which operate independently of the Corporation and each other as separate autonomous newspaper enterprises. It is apparent, therefore, that if these two divisions were corporate subsidiaries instead of divisions, they would be entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4)(B) from each other's labor disputes. To deprive them of the protection of the statute on the technical ground that they are merely divisions of the Corpora- tion would exalt from over-substance, a result which we are convinced is not required by the statute. Cf. Alexander Warehouse, 128 NLRB 916, where the Board found that three geographically proximate warehouses of the same corporation could not be regarded as separate employers under a comparable statutory provision because the day-to-day operations of each warehouse, including their labor relations policies, were subject to the corporation's actual con- trol, and were operated in the same manner as allies. By contrast, the divisions here involved are not subject to actual control by The Hearst Corporation, serve different newspaper advertisers and readers in widely separated geographic areas, and thus, under the princi- ple of that case, are neutral employers. Section 2(1) on its face does not state that only the entities specifically enumerated therein are to be considered "persons" to the exclusion of all others. LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 It states, instead, that "person" includes those entities enumerated. Therefore, where, as here, a virtually autonomous division of a corporation has all the relevant attributes of a person excepting only separate incorporation, logic dictates that it too be considered a person.' Moreover, we believe this interpretation conforms with the intent of Congress when in 1959 it amended the Act by substituting the word "person" for "employer" in Section 8(b)(4). Although we do not find the legislative history particularly helpful in resolving the issue before us, it is generally recognized that this amendment was intended to reduce the impact of labor disputes by expanding the protection afforded by this Section. As the Supreme Court stated in Local 1976 Carpen- ters, (Sand, Door and Plywood Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 94, 100, Congress' purpose in enacting the Taft- Hartley Act amendments was "to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious widespread and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement of the employ- ees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods." As observed, under the principles established in Alexander Warehouse and Knight Newspapers, each of these divisions would be treated as a separate employer, both before and after the 1959 amendment. Not to treat them as separate persons would result in widening, instead of narrowing, labor disputes and contracting instead of expanding the coverage of Sec- tion 8(b)(4)(B) contrary to the intent of Congress and the mandate of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the General Counsel has issued and the Board and courts have found merit in complaints against divisions of corporations under Section 108, ' See Local Union 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al, v New Y o r k , N e w Haven, and H a r t f o r d Railroad Co, 350 U S 155, cited in the legislative history to the 1959 amendments, in which the Supreme Court held the railroad was protected against secondary pressures by virtue of the definition of "employer " The Court stated that since "railroads are not excluded from the Act's definition of `person,' they are entitled to Board protection from the kind of unfair labor practice proscribed by Sec 8(b)(4)(A) See also Local No 24, International Brother- hood of Teamsters (A CE Transportation) v NLR B, 266 F 2d 675, 680 (C A D C) where the court stated that whether a violation of 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) has occurred "cannot be reached by the use of any legalistic word or phrase." ' See, e g, NLR B v The Bendix Corporation (Research Laboratories Division), 299 F 2d 308 (C A 6) cert denied 371 U S 827, NLR B v Dan River Mills Incorporated, Alabama Division, 274 F 2d 38i(C A 5), N.L.R.B. v General Electric Company, Specialty Control Department, 383 F 2d 152 (C A 4) International Union of Electric al Radio and Machine Worbers AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801 [General Motors Corporation, Frigiduire Division] v N L R B 307 F 2d 679 (C A D C) cert denied, 371 U S 936 N L R B v Insulating Fabricators, Inc Southern Division. 338 305 which provides under (a) that "the Board is empow- ered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair laobr practice . . ." and under (b) that "whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in, or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board . . shall have the power to issue a complaint." Indeed Congress must have recognized that such practice was extant when it enacted the 1959 amendments Accordingly, as the Los Angeles Unions' picketing of the San Francisco Examiner had the effect of coercing it and inducing its employees to strike, both with an object of causing a cessation of business between the Examiner and its customers and suppliers, we find that such picketing violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) of the Act.' 2. As we have found the San Francisco Examiner to be a neutral person, we also find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the eight Los Angeles Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)( ii)(B) of the Act by picketing The Chronicle Publishing Company and The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. in furtherance of their dispute with The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor- poration because these companies are also neutrals to the dispute and separate persons within the meaning of the Act. 3. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the two Respondent San Francisco Unions violated Section 8(b)(i)(B) of the Act by inducing employees of The San Francisco Printing Co., Inc. to strike in support of the Los Angeles Unions' dispute with the Herald-Examiner. We also find that these two Unions violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as their induce- ment of employees of the Printing Company was successful in causing them to refuse to continue to work, thus coercing or restraining the Printing Compa- ny. 10 THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondents, with the exception of the Warehousemen's Union, have engaged in additional unfair labor practices within F 2d 1002 ( C A 4), international Uniim, United Automobile Workers of America U A W [Wooster Div of Borq - Warner Corp ] v N L R B 236 F 2d 898 ( C A 6), latertipe Conipani, a Division of Harris-Internpe Corporation v V L R B , 371 F 2d 787 (C A 4) Los Angeles Mailers Union y9 J T U 135 NLRB 1130 Hilhoro Newspaper Publishmq Printing Compani Division of the Hearst Publishing Compani Fin , 127 NLRB 591 Divisions are considered to be employers in representation case proceedings-Genera/ Motors Corp ( Detroit Diesel Eng Div ), 51 NLRB 457 ' Accord , Penello v American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 291 F Supp 409 (U S D C Md), and Kennedy v San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild (U S D C, N D Calif ), affd 412 F 2d 541 (C A 9) "Interstate Employers Association, 139 NLRB 550, 551, fn I 306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the meaning of the Act, we shall recommend that the Respondents cease and desist therefrom and take appropriate affirmative action. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, and the Los Angeles Herald- Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The above Divisions, The San Francisco Chroni- cle Publishing Company, and The San Francisco Print- ing Company, Inc. are persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. The Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. By inducing individuals employed by The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corpora- tion, The Chronicle Publishing Company and The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to perform services, with an object of forcing said persons to cease doing business with each other and with their customers and suppliers, the Los Angeles Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. By threatening, coercing, and restraining the above persons with an object of forcing said persons to cease doing business with each other and with their customers and suppliers, the Respondent Los Angeles Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. By inducing individuals employed by The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to perform services, with an object of forcing said person to cease doing business with The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, with The Chronicle Publishing Company, and with its customers and suppliers, the Respondent San Francis- co Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and Section 2(6)(7) of the Act. 7. By coercing, and restraining The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., with an object of forcing said person to cease doing business with the other persons described above, the Respondent San Francis- co Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that: A. The Respondents Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union No. 18; Los Angeles Stereotypers' Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographical Union No. 174; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 94; Building Service and Mainte- nance Employees' Union No. 399, Los Angeles Mail- ers' Union No. 9; and Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No. 3, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed by The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Publishing Com- pany, and The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce with whom they have no primary labor dispute, to engage in a stnke or refusal in the course of their employment to perform services, where an object thereof is to force or require the above-named persons to cease doing business with each other or with their customers and suppliers, under circumstances prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. (b) Threatening, restraining, or coercing the above- named persons or any other person engaged in com- merce or in an industry affecting commerce with whom they have no primary labor dispute, where an object thereof is to force or require the above- named persons to cease doing business with each other or with their customers and suppliers, under circumstances prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 2.Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at their business offices and meeting halls in Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."'t Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by the above Respondent Unions, be posted by them immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be " In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 taken by the Unions to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail to the Regional Director for Region 21 sufficient copies of said notice, on forms provided by him, for posting by the San Francisco Examiner, the Chronicle, and the Printing Company, if willing. (c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. B. Respondents Newspaper and Periodical Drivers' and Helpers' Union, Local 921, and San Francisco- Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52 of the American Newspaper Guild, their officers, agents, and represent- atives shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed by The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce with whom they have no primary labor dispute to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to perform services, where an object thereof is to force or require said person to cease doing business with The San Francisco Examiner or Chronicle under circumstances prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. (b) Threatening, restraining, or coercing The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other per- sons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce with whom they have no primary labor dispute, where an object thereof is to force or require said persons to cease doing business with the San Francisco Examiner or Chronicle under circumstances prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at their business offices and meeting halls in San Francisco, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B.s12 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by the above Respondent Unions be posted by them immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Unions to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail to the Regional Director for Region 21 sufficient copies of said notice, on forms " in the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 307 provided by him, for posting by The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., if willing. (c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. MEMBER BROWN, concurring in part, dissenting in part: Contrary to the majority, I would affirm the Trial Examiner's finding, for the reasons more fully stated in his Decision, that Respondents' picketing and relat- ed appeals to employees of the San Francisco Examin- er constituted lawful primary activity outside the ambit of Section 8(b)(4)(B). The Unions' conduct with respect to the San Fran- cisco Examiner, a separate operating division of the Hearst Corporation, was merely designed to impose economic sanctions upon the Hearst Corporation, in support of basic contract demands during negotia- tions with the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, another operating division of the Hearst Corporation. Thus, the question presented is whether a labor organization is precluded, by virtue of Section 8(b)(4)(B), from applying direct economic pressures to a single corpo- rate enterprise in support of its dispute with a separate operating segment of that enterprise? An affirmative answer to this question is not supported by a literal reading of the statute; for, separate operating divisions of a single corporate enterprise, such as the San Francisco Examiner and the Los Angeles Herald- Examiner, are not within the definition of the term "person" set forth in Section 2(1) of the Act. Further- more, to extend, by interpretation, the secondary boy- cott provisions to restrict the scope of the Union activity involved here, not only insulates the "offending employer" from the effects of what essen- tially is its own dispute, but runs counter to a consist- ent line of precedent cautioning against application of Section 8(b)(4)(B) in a fashion which condemns direct pressures in primary labor disputes." As stated in N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, at 672-673: . . . Congress did not seek to interfere with the ordinary strike . . . . This is emphasized in Section 13 as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided herein shall be construed so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. " See, e g Local 1976, Carpenters v N.L.R B (Sand Door & Plywood Co), 357 U S 93, 99, Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Worbers [General Electric Co ] v N L R B 366 U S 667, 672. National Woodnorl ers Mfrs 4vsn v N L R B 386 U S 612, 625-627 308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD By Section 13, Congress has made it clear that Section 8(b)(4), and all other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to interfere with, impede or diminish the union's traditional right to strike may be so read only if such interference, impediment or dimunition is "specif- ically provided for" in the Act. [Footnotes omit- ted.] In my opinion, the majority's position represents a departure from traditional concepts of primary activ- ity, and extends the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(4)(B) to protect the very "person" made "fair game" through enactment of Sections 13, 2(1) and 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 14 14 I disagree with the Trial Examiner's failure to dismiss the allegation based upon the direct appeals to employees of the San Francisco Printing Co The Printing Co is half-owned by the San Francisco Examiner and performs various services in the latter's behalf, including the printing of the newspaper These activities are a vital step in the publication and sale of the Examiner and are duties which, as a matter of practice, are normally performed by employees of the newspaper In these circum- stances, I deem immaterial the fact that the Printing Co is operated by Hearst as a joint venture with the Chronicle and am of the opinion that the lawful pressures directed at the Examiner were also lawfully extended to employees of the Printing Co APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER DIVISION OF THE HEARST CORPORATION, THE CHRONICLE PUBLISH- ING COMPANY AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PRINTING COMPANY, INC. TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOS ANGELES NEWS- PAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69; LOS ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN'S UNION NO. 18; LOS ANGELES STEREOTYPERS' UNION No. 58; LOS ANGELES TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORK- ERS, DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAILERS' UNION NO. 9; AND LOS ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS' UNION NO. 3 Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board, an agency of the United States Government: WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encour- age any individual employed by The San Francis- co Examiner Division of the Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Publishing Company, The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of such individual's employ- ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, arti- cles, materials or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Pub- lishing Company, The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., to cease doing business with one another or with their customers or suppliers; or to force or require any other person to cease doing business with The San Francisco Division of The Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Pub- lishing Company or The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. WE WILL NOT coerce or restrain The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor- poration, The Chronicle Publishing Company, The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other person for such an object. Dated By Los ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) Dated Dated By By Los ANGELES WEB PRESSMEN 'S UNION No. 18 (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) Los ANGELES STEREOTYPERS' UNION No. 58 (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, DISTRICT LODGE No. 94 (Labor Organization) LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 309 Dated By Dated By Dated Dated By By Dated By (Representative) (Title) BUILDING SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES UNION No. 399 (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) Los ANGELES MAILERS' UNION No. 9 (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) Los ANGELES PAPER HANDLERS' UNION No.3 (Labor Organization) TO ALL MEMBERS OF NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS' AND HELPERS' UNION LOCAL 921 and SAN FRANCISCO- OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 52, OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board, an agency of the United States Government: WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encour- age any individual employed by The San Francis- co Pnnting Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of such individual' s employment to use, manufacture, process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other person to cease doing business with The San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation or The Chronicle Publishing Company; or to force or require any other person to cease doing business with The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. WE WILL NOT coerce The San Francisco Print- ing Company for such an object. (Representative) (Title) Los ANGELES TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 174 (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communi- cate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone 213-688-5200. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO PRINTING COMPANY, INC. Dated By NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL DRIVERS' AND HELPERS' UNION LOCAL 921 (Labor Organization) (Representative)' (Title) SAN FRANCISCO- OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD , LOCAL 52 OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other matenal. If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communi- cate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone 213-688-5200. 310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION OF THE TRIAL EXAMINER STATEMENT OF THE CASE HERMAN MARX , Trial Examiner: The complaint ' alleges, in material substance, that The Hearst Corporation (herein Hearst or the Corporation), an enterprise engaged in the newspaper publishing business , "maintains" a number of newspaper publishing divisions, including one known as Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, Division of The Hearst Cor- poration (herein the Herald-Examiner), which publishes a daily newspaper in Los Angeles, and another called San Francisco Examiner , Division of The Hearst Corpora- tion (herein the Examiner), which publishes a daily newspa- per in San Francisco; that a corporation called The Chronicle Publishing Company (herein the Chronicle) similarly pub- lishes a daily newspaper in San Francisco ; that a corporation known as The San Francisco Newspaper Printing Company, Inc (herein the Printing Company) performs newspaper printing and other services for the Examiner and the Chroni- cle; that the Examiner and the Herald -Examiner, as well as the Chronicle and the Printing Company, are "employers" and "persons" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended' (herein the Act); that eleven labor organizations (herein the Respondents or Respondent Unions) "in furtherance and support of a labor dispute" between some of them and the Herald -Examiner have induced and encouraged individuals employed by the Exam- iner, the Chronicle, the Printing Company, and others, "to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to .. perform services , and have threat- ened, coerced or restrained the Examiner, the Chronicle, the Printing Company," and others, with objects of forcing or requiring the said Examiner, the Chronicle, the Printing Company, and others, severally, to cease doing business with other persons , and such persons to cease doing business with the Examiner, the Chronicle, the Printing Company, and others; and that by such conduct the Respondent Unions have violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act ' ' The complaint was issued on January 19, 1968, and is based on a charge filed in Case 21 -CC-1043 on January 5, 1968, an amendment thereof filed on January 6, 1968, and a charge filed in Case 21-CC- 1043-2 on January 10, 1968 The cases have been duly consolidated for hearing Copies of both charges , the amendment of the first charge, the complaint, the order of consolidation and a notice of hearing have been duly served on all parties entitled thereto The hearing opened on June 3 , 1968, in Los Angeles, California, continued there on various dates thereafter , and closed on September 9, 1968, in San Francisco, California '29USC,Sec 151,etseq ' Sec 8(b)(4)(B) provides , in relevant part It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manulacture process, transport, or other- wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials , or commodities or to perform any services, or (u) to threaten , coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in any object thereof is forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling , handling, transporting , or otherwise dealing in the products of any other produc- er, processor, or manufacturer , or to cease doing business with any other person , Provided , That nothing contained in this clause Each of the Rest, 'ndent Unions has filed an answer denying in material substance , that it has committed the unfair labor practices attributed to it in the complaint. All parties appeared, through counsel, at a hearing held before me, as duly designated Trial Examiner, on the issues in this proceeding, and have been afforded a full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and submit oral argument and briefs. Each party has submit- ted a brief since the close of the hearing Upon the entire record, from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having read and considered the briefs. I make the following findings of fact FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Chronicle is a Nevada corporation, maintains an office and place of business in San Francisco , California, where it is engaged in the business of publishing a daily newspaper called the San Francisco Chronicle , employs individuals in the operation of its business, is, and has been at all material times, a "person " within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, and an "employer" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act; in the course and conduct of its business, subscribes to, and uses, "several interstate news services and annually purchases and receives goods, services, materials and supplies originating outside the State of California valued at a substantial amount"; and is, and has been at all material times, engaged in commerce , and in operations affecting such commerce, with- in the meaning of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Hearst is a Delaware corporation, maintains its principal office in New York, New York; and is engaged, among other ventures in the business of publishing daily newspa- pers, doing so through seven divisions, including the Herald- Examiner and the Examiner . The Herald-Examiner, with headquarters in Los Angeles, produces a newspaper there called the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, and the Examiner, which is located in San Francisco, publishes a newspaper in that city known as the San Francisco Examiner Hearst and the Chronicle combine their respective San Francisco publications in a Sunday edition which they publish jointly under the name of San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle The Printing Company is a Nevada corporation; maintains its principal office and place of business in San Francisco, California, employs individuals in its business operations, is, and has been at all material times, a "person" within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, and an "employer" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act; in the course and conduct of its business "purchases and receives goods, materials, and supplies originating outside the State of California valued at a substantial amount"; and is, and has been at all material times, engaged in commerce, and in operations affecting such commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 As the Chronicle and the Printing Company are "persons" and "employers" engaged in operations in and affecting interstate commerce, the Board no doubt has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding as it pertains to them, but, in addition, the General Counsel would have the Board predicate jurisdiction over the subject matter, as it relates to Hearst's Los Angeles and San Francisco divisions, not on the basis of Hearst's status as a "person" and "employer" engaged in activities in or affecting inter- state commeice, but on the premise that each of the two divisions is, as the complaint alleges in effect, a separate "person" and "employer." As is evident, this approach stems from the General Counsel's position that the divisions are separate "persons" and "employers," apart from each other and from Hearst, for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(B) The position, reflecting a major problem in this proceed- ing, is opposed by the Respondent Unions,and the conflict perhaps accounts for some ambiguity in a written stipulation of the parties (G.C. Exh. 3), upon which the General Counsel relies, in the main, for commerce facts supporting the Board's jurisdiction Paragraph 5 of the stipulation states: "In connection with the publication of the San Francisco Examiner, goods, materials and supplies valued at in excess of $100,000 are annually purchased and shipped directly to the San Francisco Examiner, Division of The Hearst Corporation, from points and places located outside the State of California; several interstate news services are subscribed to; and gross volume of business in excess of $1 million is had" Paragraph 4 is couched in the same language, except that it relates to the Los Angeles division and Hearst's Los Angeles newspaper, instead of to the San Francisco division and the San Francisco Examin- er. The stipulation does not tell us, in terms, who or what entity purchases the commodities shipped to either division, or subscribes to the "news services", nor who or what entity receives the revenue from the business volume that "is had." Judging by the commerce allegations of the complaint, the thrust the General Counsel would give the relevant provisions of the stipulation is that each division has the gross business volume, and makes the purchases and subscriptions to "interstate news services," set forth in the stipulated paragraph applicable to it, but as each division is, in effect, an operational device by which Hearst does business, the end result of the reading the General Counsel would give paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation is that Hearst makes the purchases and subscriptions4 and does the gross business volume mentioned in the stipulated paragraphs. In any case, finding the matters set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation as facts in this proceeding, I defer a disposition of the General Counsel's claim that the two divisions are "persons" and "employers" for the purposes of invoking the Board's jurisdiction until a determi- nation, at a later point below, of the General Counsel's parallel position that the divisions have that status for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. A decision 4 Hearst directly supplies some of the "interstate news services" through one or another of its enterprises (C P Exhs 5 and 8) 311 on the latter position will, in my view, dispose of the former 5 II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The names of the Respondent Unions, and abbreviated designations by which they will be respectively referred to here, are set forth in the margin below.' Nine of them (herein collectively called the Los Angeles Unions) are located in Los Angeles or its vicinity, and the other two, the San Francisco Drivers Union and the San Francisco Guild, maintain their headquarters in San Francisco Each of the Respondent Unions is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Prefatory Statement A description of various aspects of Hearst's business, its corporate structure, and its relationship to its Los Angeles Herald-Examiner and San Francisco Examiner Divisions, the Chronicle, and the Printing Company is appropriate to a resolution of the issues. The Corporation's chief executive is its president, Richard Berlin, whose functions include the appointment of all divisional heads who, in the case of the newspapers, have the title of "publisher." The chairman of the Corporation's board of directors is William Randolph Hearst, Jr., who is a son of the founder of the Hearst newspaper chain; has the title of "Editor-in-Chief" of the Hearst newspapers (or a closely similar variant of the title which appears in differing forms in the record); heads an "Editorial Board" centered in New York, which prepares editorials and feature stories for the use of the newspapers, and writes or sponsors the preparation of a column entitled "The Editor's Report" which appears under his name and editorial title weekly, usually on Sunday, in Hearst news publications.' The Hearst Corporation is indubitably a "person" and "employer" engaged in interstate commerce, within the purview of the Act, but in view of the General Counsel's jurisdictional position, I see no need to determine, and do not decide, whether that status may be used here as a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction The names of the Respondent Unions, each followed by a parenthetic name by which it is on occasion referred to here, are Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (Los Angeles Guild), Los Angeles Stereotypers' Union No 58 (Stereotypers' Union), Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union No 18 (Pressmen's Union), Los Angeles Typographical Union No 174 (Typographical Union), International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No 94 (Machinists' Union), General Warehousemen's Union Local 598 (Warehousemen's Union), Building Service and Maintenance Employees Union No 399 (Building Service Union); Los Angeles Mailers' Union No 9 (Mailers' Union), Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No 3 (Paper Handlers' Union), Newspaper and Periodical Drivers' and Helpers' Union Local 921 (San Francisco Drivers' Union), and San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52 of the American Newspaper Guild (San Francisco Guild) I dispense with details of the ownership of the Corporation's capital stock, which is governed by the will of the late William Randolph Hearst, Sr , founder of the newspaper chain The titular and beneficial interest in the stock, and the terms of the will, at least as developed in this record, do not materially affect the results here 312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Punting Company is a joint venture of the Corpora- tion and 'the Chronicle, having been formed in 1965 to function as the "agent" of Hearst and the Chronicle for the performance of a variety of operations required by each principal for its newspaper enterprise in San Francisco Hearst and the Chronicle supplied all of the Printing Compa- ny's initial capital; own all of the latter's stock in equal proportion; through equal contributions, provide funds for the Printing Company, as it may require; and, in equal proportion, own all of the plant and other facilities used by the Printing Company for the performance of its func- tions. Its board of directors consists of six persons, three designated by, and "representing," Hearst, and three desig- nated by, and "representing," the Chronicle. Upon its forma- tion, the Printing Company's executives were chosen by agreement between Hearst and the Chronicle from personnel on the staff of one or the other of the principals. The business of the Printing Company, in which it employs some 2,600 persons, consists substantially of its agency functions, which include the printing, mechanical, distribution, accounting, revenue collection, advertising, and subscription processing services required by the Chronicle and Hearst for their respective San Francisco dailies and their joint Sunday edition. With the exception of about six clerks who prepare advertising layouts exclusively for one or the other of the two newspapers, all of the Printing Company's employees work in varying measure for both publications, some doing so daily in the regular course of their duties, and others interchangeably,working for given shifts or periods for one publication, and then for the other, as required. The agent performs no work for Hearst's Los Angeles newspaper, and no editorial or reporting serv- ices for the Hearst or Chronicle publications in San Francis- co, each of which has an editorial staff (which includes reporters). The Printing Company hires and discharges employees independently of Hearst and the Chronicle, and formulates its labor relations policies and purchases its newsprint and other materials it requires, without directions from either of its principals. But it is dependent upon Hearst and the Chronicle for funds for capital expenditures, drawing upon them jointly, since its formation, for some millions of dollars for the acquisition of building and equipment facilities for use in its agency functions. Hearst's contribu- tions came from its general corporate funds. Collecting all advertising and circulation revenue due the Chronicle and the Examiner, the Printing Company deducts therefrom what it requires to defray its operating expenses, retains 5 percent of the excess as compensation for its agency services, paying dividends therefrom to its two stockholders, Hearst and the Chronicle, and remits the balance of its revenue to the Chronicle and the Examiner. From its share of the revenue, that division defrays its operating expenses , retains a portion "for emergency purpos- es," and periodically remits the balance to Hearst's New York office where the remittances become part of the Corporation's general funds. In addition to the seven newspaper divisions, The Hearst Corporation has a variety of enterprises which it operates under names it applies to them, some bearing the label "Division," and others note Many of the enterprises are unrelated to newspaper publishing, while others perform services for Hearst newspapers, or supply features to them. The latter include "King Features Syndicate Division," which supplies comics, columns and other features to all Hearst newspapers, and many not published by Hearst; "Hearst Enterprises Division," which, to effect economies resulting from large purchasing volumes, buys newsprint, as purchasing agent, for all Hearst newspapers, except the San Francisco Examiner; "Puck, The Comic Weekly," which prints Sunday comics and sells advertising space for Hearst and other newspapers, and performs printing services for commercial enterprises unrelated to the Corpora- tion; "Key Market Advertising Service," which sells adver- tising space for Hearst and other newspapers; and "Hearst Headline Service," "Hearst Wire Service," and Hearst's "Washington Bureau," which variously supply news or news features or commentary to Hearst newspapers. The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner carries William Ran- dolph Hearst, Jr 's column, "The Editor's Report," and uses services of King, Hearst Enterprises, Puck, Key Market Advertising, Hearst Headline and Wire Services, and the Washington Bureau The newspaper transmits no funds in payment for any of these services, but like other Hearst publications, is charged on the Corporation's books for various of the services under centralized accounting proce- dures to be described later. The Herald-Examiner also utilizes a substantial volume of wire news services and features provided by facilities other than Hearst's 9 Of a total of approximately $22 million of operating expenses in 1967 for "materials, supplies and services," the Herald- Examiner spent about $14 million for newsprint which was purchased for it by Hearst Enterprises, as its agent.10 The division paid nothing for the work of the purchasing agency in conformity with the Corporation's policy of ren- dering such services to its newspapers free of charge The San Francisco Examiner does not use all the Hearst facilities utilized by the Los Angeles publication. It purchas- es no newsprint itself, for this is done by the Printing Company as joint agent for Hearst and the Chronicle as part of the agent's function of producing both San Francisco newspapers. The San Francisco Examiner, like the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, carries "The Editor's Report," and uses services or features supplied by King and Hearst Headline Services, and by enterprises other than Hearst facilities. Most of the Examiner's comic strips are supplied by a Hearst syndicate, but the greater protion of its other features and its wire news service is furnished by enterprises other than Hearst. I In addition to its divisional and other operating segments , Hearst has over 30 separately incorporated subsidiaries As these have no connec- tion with the newspapers involved here, I dispense with further reference to them ' C P Exh 5 reflects the comparative cost in 1967 or wire news services and features supplied to the Herald-Examiner by Hearst and "non-Hearst" sources It is enough to say here that the volume from each source was substantial 10 An exhibit offered by the Charging Parties (C P Exh 5) shows that the newsprint was purchased from "non-Hearst" sources, but does not reflect the fact that a purchasing instrumentality of the Corporation bought the product for the Herald-Examiner's account LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 The Herald-Examiner and Examiner maintain separate payrolls and bank accounts. There is no interchange of employees between them, nor does either perform any work for the other, except on relatively infrequent occasions such as when one secures assistance from the other in covering facets of a news story in the other's locality. The chief executive of each division chooses his staff subordinates, and has the responsibility for direction of the day-to-day operations of the newspaper he publishes. He or divisional staff members under his direction decide the advertising, circulation, personnel and labor relations policies of the newspaper, its advertising and circulation rates, with whom to do business and whether to use services of any other Hearst enterprises; purchase equipment, sup- plies, features and services from sources of their choice; make capital expenditures within a limitation to be described later; negotiate and enter into collective-bargaining agree- ments without instructions from the home office; and deter- mine the content and editorial positions of the newspaper, except, as Charles Gould, publisher of the San Francisco Examiner, testified, that in certain "specific areas" such as editorial support of a Presidential candidate, the "final decision" rests with the "Editorial Board," which consists of William Randolph Hearst, Jr. and some of his aides, after consideration of recommendations made by the chief executives of the various Hearst newspapers. The Herald-Examiner and Examiner are, moreover, sub- ject to various policies and procedures of the Corporation applicable to all its operating divisions, some explicitly established by it, and some by customary practice or necessi- ty. Thus the Corporation, under the supervision of its treasur- er, Frank Massi, who is its "senior financial officer," main- tains a centralized accounting system for all its enterprises at its "home office" in New York, and "procedures and regulations" that require each division to submit to the treasurer, on prescribed forms, monthly reports reflecting such information as "cash report and cash forecast", and "a financial statement which incorporates . . a profit and loss section and a balance sheet section " The treasurer periodically consolidates and submits the information to the board of directors, so that they may be kept abreast of the Corporation' s financial condition, and have sufficient information for "the ultimate large decisions" that they make for the Corporation's various enterprises. Hearst enterprises that do business with each other exchange no funds, but payment for whatever charge is made by one such enterprise to another is effected through a "clearance" system maintained by the home office. Under the procedure, a division such as King Features Syndicate, for example, that supplies features to the San Francisco Examiner sends an "inter-company invoice" covering the services to the latter, and a copy to the treasurer's office in New York, where the Corporation makes bookkeeping entries debiting the newspaper, and crediting King, with the puce of the services. The charges are also reflected as liabilities or credits, as the case may be, in the "profit and loss section" of the monthly report submitted by each division involved. Each operating division maintains "a comfortable cash balance," treats surpluses beyond that as "operating profits," 313 and periodically remits such surpluses to the home office. They become part of the Corporation's general funds, and, as such, available for use, and are used, by the Corporation for investment, capital improvements for its various enter- prises; its operating expenses, dividends; and payment of balances due under the "clearance" procedure to a division for services rendered to another. If a division's financial situation, as reflected in its monthly reports, does not permit a discharge of its "inter-company obligations", such as for services rendered by another division, the indebtedness is carried as an interest-free "loan" or "down-stream advance" to the obligated division. Should such "deficien- cies" take on "serious" proportions, they become "a matter for the concern" of the board of directors. The publishers of Hearst's Los Angeles and San Francisco newspapers, like other division heads, may make capital expenditures up to $10,000 without consultation with higher corporate authority, but for capital outlays in excess of that figure, they must secure approval of the board of directors or its finance committee, depending on the amount involved." The reason for the requirement is of no large moment, but it is worth noting that although_ there is testimony that its purpose is to provide the home office with an opportunity to induce division heads to make equipment purchases in excess of the limitation from an inventory of used equipment maintained by the Corporation, it is evident that the policy is also rooted in necessity, particularly in the light of evidence of capital expenditures by the Corporation for divisional plant construction, as well as for equipment. As Massi, the corporate treasurer, testified, the "cash balance" maintained by any division does not exceed $250,000, and if it lacks sufficient money for a capital outlay, the division head "gets it from the Hearst Corporation." There is no indication that any such executive has standing authority from the Corporation to pledge its credit for capital expenditures in excess of $250,000 (or, indeed, exceeding $10,000), and one may fairly conclude from the relevant evidence as a whole, as I do, that there is none. Thus at least in the case of capital outlays of more than $250,000, a division head would have to look to the Corporation for the required funds, quite apart from any corporate preference that he purchase equipment from the Corporation's inventory. The necessity is by no means hypothetical, for the Corpo- ration has in recent years made substantial capital expendi- tures for facilities for its Los Angeles and San Francisco newspapers, spending an unspecified, but obviously large, " in his testimony, Publisher Gould refers to divisional requests for such approval as a "practice," but the "practice" is clearly a corporate requirement Thus Corporation President Berlin alludes to the corporate policy as a restraint on "top executives" (the work "restrain" is erroneously transcribed as "retrain" at the relevant place in the transcript), and subsequently refers to it as "the best method of having a control" over equipment expenditures in order to induce division heads to purchase equipment they may need from an inventory of used equipment maintained by the Corporation, rather than in the open market It may be noted, too, that in a decision, dated January 27, 1969, in American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Baltimore News American Division), Case 5-CC-446, Trial Examiner Samuel M Singer found that capital expendi- tures in excess of $10,000 by Hearst division heads require the Corpora- tion's approval 314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sum for construction of a plant for the former, and in excess of a million dollars for the San Francisco publication. Moreover, as Gould testified, although he initiated discus- sions with the Chronicle for the formation and functions of the Printing Company, he deemed it necessary that the then chairman of the Corporation's board carry on the talks because the arrangements "involved expenditures . . . in the neighborhood of five to ten million dollars . . (and) it was beyond my area of responsibility as I saw it " The decision to join with the Chronicle to form and finance the Printing Company was made for Hearst by the latter's board. The Corporation provides a retirement program, free of cost to the beneficiaries , and group life insurance for all divisional and home office personnel for whom such benefits are not provided by collective-bargaining arrange- ments. There are no company -wide provisions , however, for hospitalization and medical plans, each enterprise making its own arrangements on "a local level" for such benefits where they exist. In practice, at least, the seniority status of "white collar" employees such as editorial personnel is unaffected by transfer from one Hearst newspaper to another. B. The Strike and the Allegations of Misconduct At the times material to the issues here, each of the Los Angeles Unions represented one or another category of employees on the staff of the Los Angeles Herald- Examiner, the San Francisco Drivers' Union had a contract with the Printing Company affecting drivers employed by that enterprise; and the San Francisco Guild had an agree- ment with the Chronicle, the Printing Company and the Examiner affecting individuals in the employ of one or another of these enterprises. 1I On December 15, 1967, the Los Angeles Unions, as an outgrowth of a labor dispute between them and the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, commenced a strike against the newspaper, which was still in progress at the time of the hearing in this proceeding . Details of the dispute which led to the strike are not material here. Eight of the nine Los Angeles Unions formed a "unity committee" prior to the strike "to consider common prob- lems" relating to negotiations with the management of the newspaper, and continued to function after the strike began as a group under the name of "Herald-Examiner Joint Strike-Lockout Council" (herein the Council). The ninth, the Warehousemen's Union, has not held membership in either the "unity committee" or the Council at any time material to the issues " Pending a determination of the issue whether the Examiner and Herald-Examiner are separate "persons" within the purview of the Act, references to employees as those of either division or of the newspaper with which it is identified are intended only as a means of convenient description, and should not be taken as a determination of the relevant issue Also , as the divisions filed the charges upon which the complaint is based, I refer to them as the Charging Parties, without implying that either is a "person" as that term is used in the Act Although the Council functions without formal rules of order, at least one of its underlying purposes is to provide the participating unions with a vehicle for coordinat- ing their strike activities Thus the Council holds meetings of its members from time to time to discuss point strike activites; maintains standing committees to engage in specified strike activities, and a "publicity department" to publicize the Council members' strike positions; and prepares and distributes literature such as leaflets and a daily "official publication" of the Council called "On The Line", dealing with the strike and related matters. Toward the end of December 1967, the "strike director" of the Los Angeles Guild, Robert Rupert, who is also a representative of the American Newspaper Guild, of which the Los Angeles and San Francisco Guilds are local affiliates, telephoned Fred Fletcher, the executive secretary of the San Francisco Guild, and told him that "officials" of the striking unions were thinking of sending pickets from Los Angeles to picket the Chronicle, Examiner, and Printing Company in San Francisco Neither the San Fran- cisco Guild nor the San Francisco Drivers' Union had a dispute with either of the San Francisco newspapers or the Printing Company at any time material to the issues. At a meeting held on or about Janaury 3, 1968, the unions constituting the Council decided to engage in picket- ing activities in San Francisco in support of the strike in Los Angeles, leaving it to "each participating union to decide how many people (pickets) it could afford" to send." On January 4, 1968, six of the Council members, the Los Angeles Guild, and the Pressmen's, Typographical, Stereotypers', Mailers', and Machinists' Unions, dispatched individuals (herein the Los Angeles group or pickets) to San Francisco for such picketing , each of the six separately designating pickets and paying their traveling expenses. On January 4, also, Jack Goldberger, president of the San Francisco Drivers' Union, at a meeting in Los Angeles attended by a Federal mediator and representatives of each side in the Herald-Examiner dispute, stating that he had come to the meeting because of concern that the dispute would spread to San Francisco, and that he desired its settlement, said that members of his organization would observe "a picket line (in San Francisco) ... irrespective of whose it was." Upon their arrival in San Francisco on January 4, the Los Angeles Guild's picketing representatives, under Rupert's instructions, notified Fletcher of their presence. Later in the day, at a meeting with Fletcher and other San Francisco union functionaries connected with the news- paper industry in that city, members of the Los Angeles " Rupert's testimony is vague as to the dates of Council meetings when the San Francisco picketing project was discussed, and as to the identity of the unions represented at the meetings , but piecing together various aspects of his testimony and other parts of the record, it is fair to infer that all members of the Council agreed to the picketing decision In that regard , it is noteworthy that the issue of the Council's "official publication " for January 3, 1968, notes that "the Council recruited pickets for informational duty in San Francisco " LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 group announced their intention to picket the San Francisco "newspaper plants"; and at a subsequent meeting that ended about 2 a in on January 5, the Los Angeles pickets informed Fletcher and other local union representatives that the picketing would begin at 6 a m that morning Shortly before that hour, Fletcher assembled various officers and members of his union at his office and informed them of the picketing intention Starting at about the scheduled hour, members of the Los Angeles group picketed premises of the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Francisco Examiner, and the Printing Company, carrying or displaying signs and distributing leaflets. The latter had been prepared by the Council's "publicity department," and approved by all Council mem- bers, and the text of the signs had been prepared by Rupert One set of leaflets (G C Exh 2) set forth alleged grievances against the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, fol- lowed them with the Council's name, and below that listed abbreviated versions of the names of all nine Los Angeles Unions, although one of them, the Warehousemen 's Union, was not a member of the Council. Another set (G.C. Exh. 8) similarly listed abbreviated variants of the names of all nine unions. The picketed sites were a Hearst-owned property (herein the Hearst Building) at 3rd and Market Streets, which housed the Printing Company's classified advertisement department, another Hearst building at 36 Annie Street (located behind the 3rd and Market building), the work place of several Examiner accounting employees and Print- ing Company employees variously engaged in accounting functions and production of sections of the Sunday Chronicle & Examiner; a Hearst property at 860 Howard Street, where personnel of various Printing Company departments normally worked; a Chronicle-owned building (herein the Chronicle Building) at 5th and Mission Streets, which housed physically separated editorial departments of both newspapers, the Printing Company's headquarters, most of its printing facilities, and a loading dock ; and a garage at 200 Brannan Street used by the Printing Company's newspaper delivery trucks. Picketing of the Chronicle Build- ing and of the premises at 860 Howard Street, at least, continued on January 5 as late as about midnight. The duration of the picketing by the Los Angeles group at any other site on that day or thereafter does not clearly appear, but there is no claim that their picketing in San Francisco continued beyond January 6.1' " I find no materiality in evidence that a labor organization identified in the record as the San Francisco Mailers ' Union began a strike against the Printing Company, with which it had been having contract negotiations, on the evening of January 5 and started to picket premises of the Printing Company at some point that evening , its pickets mingling with some from Los Angeles The material fact, established by undisputed testimony of Joseph Kolder, the Printing Company's industrial relations director, is that members of the Los Angeles group were picketing the 5th and Mission premises and the Howard Street building as late as about midnight on January 5, and were then carrying signs similar to those he saw them displaying before the local union's pickets appeared According to Kolder, too, at or about 8 30 a in on January 6, he saw "a few of the same (Los Angeles) people" picketing with such signs, and some with signs on which references to Los Angeles had been "taped over," but he does not clearly identify the location of such picketing beyond a generalization that he visited the premises of the 315 With two exceptions , the picketing signs carried or dis- played at any of the picketing sites contained slogans identi- fying or alluding to a labor dispute between the Herald- Examiner or Hearst in Los Angeles and one or more unions in that city. Typical of these slogans were the following. "Hearst Imports Strikebreakers in Los Angeles" (carried in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building and 860 Howard Street); "Machinists On Strike Against Los Angeles Herald- Examiner" (displayed at the Chronicle Building site15); "Pressmen Locked Out By Los Angeles Herald- Examiner" (displayed in the vicinity of the Chronicle and Hearst Buildings ); and "Hearst Imports Professional Scabs in Los Angeles" (near the Hearst Building) The signs in the vicinity of 36 Annie Street were similar to those used at the Hearst Building picketing site, all referring to a dispute in Los Angeles The two exceptions noted above were a slogan "All Scabs Must Go" (vicinity of the Chronicle Building and 860 Howard Street) and "Teamsters Support Guild" (near the Chronicle Building) Most Chronicle, Examiner, and Printing Company employees did not report for work on January 5 after the picketing began, although scheduled to do so, and the operations of both newspapers and the Printing Company substantially shut down on the morning of that date and remained that way for at least the balance of the day, causing a cessation in the business of each newspaper with its customers for a period of time 16 The absentees on January 5 included some 200 to 300 Printing Company drivers who were members of the San Francisco Drivers' Union and subject to its contract with the Printing Company, and had been scheduled to report at the loading dock at the 5th and Mission premises between 9 and 10 a in . on January 5 preparatory to delivering the San Francisco Examiner which is distribured during daylight hours. (Several hundred drivers, assigned to delivery of the San Francisco Chronicle , which is distributed during the early morning hours, had reported before the picketing began, and completed their shift on January 5.) Clearly, these absentees, like others on the staff of each newspaper, and of the Printing Company, failed to report for work that day because of the picketing , but there is also evidence that Goldberger had directed the members of his union to respect the picket lines . He admitted as much to the Printing Company 's circulation director, Ken- neth Hobson , at or about 10 :30 a.m . on January 5 while the Howard Street premises , where about 75 drivers custom- arily report for work , were being picketed . On that occasion, Hobson, encountering Goldberger at the entrance to the Printing Company's parking lot adjacent to the Howard Printing Company , Examiner and Chronicle" and saw such picketing in any event, his testimony as to picketing on the morning of January 6 adds nothing of substance to this case " Other slogans used in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building were "Stereos Locked Out by Los Angeles Herald -Examiner", and "Mailers Locked Out By Los Angeles Herald-Examiner " 1' Operations at the two newspapers and the Printing Company were suspended for some period after January 5 as a result of a labor dispute between the Printing Company and the San Francisco Mailers' Union That dispute and the related shutdowns are not material here 316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Street building, asked Goldberger "to allow his men (drivers represented by the San Francisco Drivers Union) to go to work," and Goldberger declined, stating that he had "instructed (them) not to cross the picket line." He also rejected a similar request that morning by another Punting Company executive, Joseph Kolder. Goldberger had predict- ed at the Los Angeles meeting he had attended on the previous day that the drivers would observe the picket lines, and I am persuaded that he helped fulfill his prediction by instructing them to do so His conduct in that regard is imputable to the San Francisco Drivers Union Fletcher, too, gave similar instructions to two Printing Company employees, both members of the San Francisco Guild and subject to its contract with their employer One such employee, Lola Sainsbury, a member of the San Francisco Guild, arriving in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building, her place of employment, shortly after the picket- ing there began, asked Fletcher "what kind of picket line it was," and he told her not to "cross it." As a result, she did not report for work that day. The other employee, Donald Mason, observing pickets in front of 860 Howard Street upon his arrival for work there at about 8 o'clock that morning, asked a Guild functionary, Dorothy Bedjani- an, who was in the area, what employees "were supposed to do." Bedjanian, who was then a member of a Guild policy-making body called the "representative assembly," and had recently been elected vice-president of the union (although not yet inducted), replied that "we are supposed to respect the picket lines," stating, also, that "Guild offi- cials" had decided earlier that morning (at the meeting in Fletcher's office, as I infer) to request employees to do so. Learning from Bedjanian that Fletcher was in the 5th and Mission area, Mason went there, and asked Fletcher, who was in the midst of a group of employees, "what we were supposed to do," and Fletcher replied: "We are asking you to respect the picket lines. Go home. Report back to your next tour of duty, and if the picket lines are there, go home again. Then come back and report when your next tour of duty is " As a result of Fletcher's remarks, Mason went home and did not work that day Fletcher's instructions to Mason and Sainsbury are imputa- ble to the San Francisco Guild." C Discussion of the Issues,- Concluding Findings Passing the issue of the legality of the picketing for later disposition, a threshold question is whether all the " I have based findings as to Mason 's conversations with Bedlanian and Fletcher on Mason's testimony , and as to Sainsbury's discussion with Fletcher, on Sainsbury's testimony Fletcher testified that he has no "present recollection" of having talked either to Mason or Sainsbury, although also claiming that "it is not possible" that he made the remarks Mason imputes to him Fletcher frequently professed an inability to recall pertinent matters, including details of his meetings with members of the Los Angeles group and representatives of San Francisco unions on January 4 and the early morning hours of January 5 preceding the picketing, and I formed the impression from his demeanor and text that he knew more than he was willing to say in response to pertinent interrogation In short, I am unable to accept his disclaimer that he made the remarks Mason attributes to him , and, instead , credit Mason , as well as Sainsbury Respondent Unions may be held accountable for the activity, as the General Counsel claims. Clearly, all eight members of the Council are chargeable with it, although only six actually dispatched pickets to San Francisco All eight functioned as a group, through the instrumentality of the Council, to coordinate their strike activities, and decided at a Council meeting the facilities in San Francisco be picketed; the Council's "publicity committee," plainly the joint instrument of the Council members, prepared the leaflets used in conjunction with the San Francisco picketing; and all Council members approved their content. In short, the San Francisco picketing activities were a joint venture of all eight members of the Council, and all are thus chargeable with them 1e That is not the case, however, with the Warehousemen's Union. That organization was not a member of the Council, and there is no substantial evidence that it either participated in the picketing decision or in the picketing itself. It is not established that the term "Teamsters", as used in some of the picketing signs, referred to the Warehousemen's Union which is an affiliate of an international labor body commonly known as the "Teamsters," for the reference could as readily have been an allusion to the San Francisco Drivers Union, which is also a local affiliate of the "Team- sters " There is no evidence that the Warehousemen's Union authorized the use of any of the picketing signs, or any reference to it in any of the leaflets, and, indeed, there is undisputed testimony that "neither [the Warehousemen's Union] nor any of its officers became aware of the use of its name on . . . Council . . . literature until [the Warehousemen's Union] was served with certain papers on January 12, 1968" in a proceeding involving the picketing, brought under Section 10(1) of the Act." The fact that the Warehousemen's Union "has not (since) disavowed the use of its name on said literature " does not make it responsible for an activity which had ended prior to its knowledge. The sum of the matter is that the record does not establish that the Respondent Warehousemen's Union participated in any of the activities alleged as miscon- duct in the complaint, and for that reason, without regard to the issue of the legality of such activities, I shall recom- mend dismissal of the complaint as to that Respondent. Nor is there sufficient warrant for a holding that the San Francisco Drivers' Union and the San Francisco Guild are chargeable with the picketing There is much ground for suspicion that both San Francisco Respondents were participants in the planning of the picketing enterprise, taking into account the presence of Goldberger and Fletcher at picketing sites on January 5; their respective instructions to employees not to report for work while the picketing " Local Freight Drivers, Local No 208 (Les Brockman), 150 NLRB 1016, 1022 , International Longshoremen 's Union v Juneau Spruce, 189 F 2d 177, 190 (C A 9), Smith Cabinet Mfg Co, 81 NLRB 886, 890, Retail Fruit ClerAs v N L R B 249 F 2d 591, 597-598 (C A 9) " A stipulation in the record that the "chief executive officer" of the Warehousemen 's Union, if called , would testify that the organization did not "expressly authorize" the use of its name on Council literature or the picket signs does not establish such an authorization by implication There is simply no evidence of such authority , but, on the contrary, affirmative proof that the Union was unaware of the use of its name until some days after the picketing in question ended LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 was in progress ; Rupert's advance notification to Fletcher (and to Goldberger also) of the possibility that picketing would take place in San Francisco ; Goldberger's prediction at the Los Angeles meeting of January 4 that the members of his union would respect the picket lines; and Fletcher's testimony to the effect that he and other San Francisco union functionaries met with members of the Los Angeles group for some hours on the night of January 4 and into the early morning of January 5 (although Fletcher gives few details of what was said in all that time) But the fact remains that there is no solid evidence that either Goldberger or Fletcher or any other representative of either of the San Francisco Respondents counselled or participated in the picketing decision or activities 20 It is clear, however, that both these Respondents, through the instructions given by their respective agents, Goldberger and Fletcher, to Printing Company employees to respect the picket lines, induced and encouraged such employees not to perform services for their employer Findings as to the legal propriety of this conduct will be made at a later point. There is no reason to doubt that Examiner and Printing Company employees and operations were targets of the picketing, but the Respondents maintain that picketing of the Chronicle Building, which housed employees of the Chronicle, as well as Printing Company and Examiner personnel, did not constitute picketing of the Chronicle because the activity "complied with the common situs picket- ing requirements of Sailors ' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547," which include the condition that "the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer" (in this case, Hearst). I disagree with the contention . The leaflets distributed in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building and most of the picketing signs in the area met that standard, but one of the signs, bearing the slogan "Teamsters Support Guild," did not identify any dispute with Hearst , whether in Los Angeles or San Francisco . Bearing in mind that the Chronicle's employees are members of the San Francisco Guild and that Printing Company drivers, who use the loading dock at the Chronicle building, are members of the San Francisco Drivers' Union , which is affiliated with the "Teamsters," the sign could reasonably lead the Chroni- cle employees to believe that their union or the San Francisco Drivers Union , or both, were enmeshed in a labor dispute with the Chronicle , or that the Los Angeles strike had escalated to an involvement of the Chronicle in a dispute with one or both of the San Francisco unions. To cap the matter, the record warrants an inference, and I find, that the picketing was intentionally directed at the Chronicle , as well as the Examiner and the Printing '° There is some warrant for the General Counsel's view that Goldber- ger's prediction at the Los Angeles meeting, which had been called to negotiate strike issues , was, in the context of events there , a threat to force the Herald-Examiner's management to come to terms with the striking unions , but it is conceivable that the prediction was intended as no more than a forecast of the attitude of the drivers , and that Goldberger's purpose was to avoid an escalation of the strike to San Francisco rather than to implement the position of the striking unions His conduct at the meeting , in other words , does not necessarily mean that his union was either then or thereafter a member of the joint venture that sponsored the picketing 317 Company. Rupert, director of strike activities for the Los Angeles Guild, an active participant in Council affairs, and admitted author of the slogans on the signs, notified Fletcher, chief executive of the San Francisco Guild, a few days before the picketing began that "the Los Angeles union officials" were contemplating picketing the Examiner, the Chronicle and the Printing Company Moreover, as Fletcher testified, the Los Angeles pickets notified him shortly before the picketing began that they were going to picket "the newspaper plants " And a conclusion that the reference to "plants" included the Chronicle, as well as the Examiner and the Printing Company, is bolstered by the fact that an edition of "On The Line," the Council's strike organ, issued about two days after the picketing began, referred to one of the Los Angeles pickets, who had been dispatched by the Los Angeles Guild, as "[p]icketing the old San Francisco Chronicle." Passing the issue of the legality of the picketing for later disposition, there is ample reason to conclude, and I find, that the picketing induced and encouraged employees on the staff of each of the three picketed enterprises not to work on January 5, 1968, contrary to their scheduled duties, and was a coercive measure aimed at bringing about a cessation of business between each picketed newspaper and its customers, between each such newspaper and the Printing Company, and between the Printing Company and its customers and suppliers, in order to bring pressure to bear upon the management of the Los Angeles Herald- Examiner to accede to terms sought by the striking Los Angeles Unions 'i The picketing of the San Francisco Examiner raises a problem of construction of Section 8(b)(4)(B) not present in the activity as it affected the Printing Company and the Chronicle. The section forbids unions "( i) to . . . induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce" to engage in a strike or refusal to perform services, or "(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . where in either case an object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . doing business with any other person." A proviso to these prohibitions expressly excludes an otherwise lawful "primary strike or primary picketing" from their reach. As is evident, a finding that the picketing against Hearst's Examiner in San Francisco in support of a "primary" strike against the Corporation's Herald- Examiner in Los Angeles was an unlawful one would have to hold, as the complaint alleges, that the division in San Francisco is a "person " within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), and that the picketing of its operations was not "primary" and thus not protected by the proviso The only definition of "person" in the Act is contained in Section 2(1) which provides: "The term `person' includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, " i find no materiality in evidence that after the San Francisco picketing, the Los Angeles group continued on to Seattle where "some of them visited the premises of the Seattle Post-Intelligence ," a Hearst newspaper, "in connection with the labor dispute" in Los Angeles There is no evidence that the Seattle publication was picketed 318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD associations, corporations, legal representatives , trustees, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers " Hearst's "divisions" are unincorporated departments of its business enterprise; are not within any of the express inclusions of the statutory definition of the term "person," nor within any of the dictionary usages of the term ; and it is thus evident that what the General Counsel and the Charging Parties seek is an expansion in the meaning of the term beyond any given by the dictionary or the statutory inclusions.22 In that regard, I disagree with the interpretation the Charging Parties place upon a comment by Senator Goldwa- ter, a proponent of the amendment (effected in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Land- rum-Griffin) Act) by which the phrase "individual employed by any person ," now in Section 8(b)(4)(i ), was substituted for the words "employees of any employer" in what had been Section 8(b)(4)(A) prior to the amendment. The Sena- tor's comment, which, incidentally , was made after passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, was: ". . . by substituting the term `person' for the term `employer,' it broadens the scope of the latter term to its full dictionary meaning" (11 Legis. His , L.M R & D A 1857) Harnessing this state- ment to a dictionary definition of the term "employer," which includes such usages as "the owner of an enterprise that employs personnel for wages," "such an enterprise itself," and "an agent acting for such an enterprise in employing persons,"" the Charging Parties assert that a Hearst newspaper division is an "employer," and interpret Senator Goldwater's remark to mean that the term "person" includes such a division as an "employer " One would think that if a Hearst division is an "employer" for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4), it surely had that status before the replacement of the term "employer" by "person," and the position of the Charging Parties that the amendatory substitution of "person" for "employer" had the effect of expanding the latter term "to its full dictionary meaning" would appear to be superfluous, but " Webster's Third International Dictionary, Unabridged ( 1963), includes some archaic or theological meanings of the term "person " Omitting these and illustrations of the various uses, Webster's defines the term as follows 1 a an individual human being c a human being as distinguished from an animal or thing d an inferior human being 4 a an individual having a specified kind of bodily appearance b the body of a human being as distinguished from the mind c the body of a human being as presented to public view 5 a the individual personality of a human being b bodily presence 6 a human being, a body of persons, or a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties-see Juristic Person 7 any one of the three relations underlying discourse that are distin- guished by certain pronouns and in many languages by inflected forms of the verb-see First Person 8 a, a being characterized by conscious apprehension , rationality, and a moral sense b a being possessing or forming the subject of personality 9 a living individual unit, specif a single zooid in a compound animal I do not read the phrase "a body of persons" in Item 6 of the foregoing usages as referring to a conception such as a Hearst "division " The phrase is used in a "juristic " sense, that is, "a legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties " A Hearst "division" is not "a legal entity ," but, rather, a departmentalized method by which the Corporation , which is "a legal entity ," does business " Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary , 3rd ed 1961, cited by the Charging Parties in any case, it is unnecessary to deal at this point with the question whether it is Hearst , rather than such a division, that is the "employer" of the divisional personnel, for it is enough for present purposes that the Charging Parties read into the Senator's remarks more than he meant. The quoted comment is but a small portion of what he said on the subject of the amendment , and reading the statement it the context of remarks that immediately followed it, it is clear that his meaning was that the substituted language was designed to close what he termed "loopholes" in Section 8(b)(4), as it then stood , resulting from express exclusions from the terms "employer" and "employee", as defined in the Act, and that the substitution of "the term `person' for the term "employer" would have the effect of bringing the excluded categories within the reach of Section 8(b)(4).24 There is no indication in the Senator 's remarks that the amendment was designed to give the term "person" any meaning beyond that given to the word by the dictionary or the express terms of Section 2(1) 25 The Board has had occasion in only one case, Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co., 128 NLRB 916, to consider the legality of picketing of an employer's premises where there is no dispute in support of a strike by the picketing union against the employer at another situs, but the opposing sides on the comparable issue here are not in accord as to the reach of the decision, each seeing in it support for its position. i' The following is the full paragraph of the Senator's remarks in which the statement cited by the Charging Parties appears Secondly, by substituting the term "person" for the term "employer," it broadens the scope of the latter term to its full dictionary meaning instead of the limited meaning which it has under the definition of "employer"-in Taft-Hartley ' Employer' is defined in Taft-Hart- ley to exclude employers subject to the Railway Labor Act, agricultural employers, all governmental agencies, bodies or corporations, Federal Reserve banks, and nonprofit hospitals "Employee" as defined does not include employees of the above excluded employers (II Legis His,LMR & DA 1857) The Charging Parties place emphasis on a remark by the Supreme Court , made prior to the Landrum-Griffin amendment of the former Sec 8(b)(4)(A), that "since railroads are not excluded from the Act's definition of 'person ' they are entitled to Board protection from the kind of unfair labor practices proscribed by 8(b)(4)(A)"(Teannteri Local 25 v New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co, 350 U S 155, 160) As a "railroad" is a "person ," so the Charging Parties contend in effect, so is a Hearst division The issues in the cited case, which centered on a question of preemption arising under Sec 8 (b)(4) from exclusion of rail carriers from the definition of "employer " contained in Section 2(2) of the Act , are so clearly ungermane to any issue here that I deem it unnecessary to comment on the case beyond noting my view that the Court's allusion to "railroads" in the particular context was intended as a generic reference to the type of business in which the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company , is engaged, and not as a redefinition of the term "person" to include "railraods" without regard to any corporate or other status that meets any meaning of the term as' defined in the dictionary or Sec 2 ( 1) Nor do I see any pertinency in Plumbers Union, Local 268 v County of Door, 359 U S 354, cited by the Charging Parties, involving a "political subdivision" (a county) which , like a railroad, is expressly excluded from the Act's definition of "employer " A political subdivision such as a county is "a legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties," and is thus a "person," in a "juristic " sense at least, as defined in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary For much the same reason, I find no relevancy in Local Typographical Union No 6 (Gavrin Press), 141 NLRB 1209, 1212 , fn 2, cited by the General Counsel , holding that a municipality, although not an "employer" within the statutory meaning of that term i'.i person iiit hin the readh of ticL s(h)(4)(Hi LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 In the case, which arose under Section 8(b)(4)(A) prior to its amendment in 1959, an employer , Alexander, operated three warehouse'. respectively located in Joliet , Peoria, and Urbana, Illinois. A union called an economic strike of the Joliet employees , and in support of its strike demands, sponsored picketing of all three warehouses by the Joliet employees The union requested the employees of the Peoria and Urbana warehouses to join the strike, but they refused The picketing induced employees of customers and suppliers of Alexander to refrain from making pickups and deliveries at the three warehouses. The picketing of the Joliet warehouse , the dispute situs, was admittedly lawful, and the material question was wheth- er the picketing of the two other warehouses was "sec- ondary" and thus violated Section 8(b)(4)(A). Holding that such picketing, like that of the Joliet establishment, "was lawful pnmary activity," the Board said (at 918-919, omit- ting footnotes). Though the economic dispute with Alexander direct- ly involved only Alexander's Joliet employees, Respond- ents [the union and its agents] had the right to bring pressure upon Alexander at each and every one of its warehouses . The Peoria and Urbana warehouses are no more to be considered neutral premises for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 8(b)(4)(A) than are the premises of an employer who "allys" [sic] himself with a pnmary employer. Under the "ally" doctrine a union may engage in picketing at the operations of a pnmary employer and at all operations of employers who "ally" themselves with the primary employer, under the same conditions as govern its picketing at the pnmary employer 's premises . . A fortiori if an "ally" is not sufficiently neutral to permit a distinction to be drawn between it and the primary employer for purposes of applying the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, Alexander's Peoria and Urbana warehouses cannot be regarded as premises of a neutral employer here . Those premises, together with the Joliet warehouse , are operated under common general supervision , their purchases are made by a central purchasing office; they participate in pooled shipments of supplies in order that Alexander my [sic] receive the benefits of lower freight charges, and there is some interchange of inventories between the three warehouses Thus, the continued operation of the Peoria and Urbana warehouses during Respondents' strike at the Joliet warehouse constituted , because of their proximity to, and integration with, the Joliet warehouse, a factor which conceivably could have been decisive in determining the outcome of the dispute, and Respondents could legitimately extend their picket- ing to those premises. Stressing the Board's discussion of the warehouses' com- mon supervision , their centralized purchases , pooled ship- ments and interchange of inventories, the General Counsel and the Charging Parties in effect read the decision as meaning that but for the evidence of integration of the warehouses , the Board would have held each to be a separate "employer," and thus the picketing of the Peoria and Urbana premises to be "secondary" and unlawful. 319 The Respondent Unions, in contrast, read the decision as holding "that a single corporation should, as a matter of law, be subject to picketing wherever it does business," and that the reference to the "ally" doctrine and operational integration were "dicta," aimed at demonstrating that if an "ally" of a picketed primary employer could not be considered "neutral," then "a fortiori, " because of such integration, the Peoria and Urbana warehouses could not "be regarded as premises of a neutral employer " Whether the Alexander decision requires clarification is, of course, a matter for the Board , and it may wish to make such a determination should it have occasion to review the findings and conclusions made here. In any event, the case is not dispositive of the relevant issue It did not involve a construction of the term "person" as used in Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), and needless to say, that determination should be made against the background of the economic and other facts of this case and not of those in Alexander. The General Counsel maintains in his brief that Hearst's right to control the operation of its Los Angeles and San Francisco newspaper divisions is immaterial to the question whether each is a "person," and that "the rule is that for two separate business enterprises [the two divi- sions] to constitute a single person so as to deprive the alleged secondary person of the protection provided by Section 8(b)(4)(B) for an, unoffending person there must be actual, as distinguished from potential , common control of both enterprises." Applying this "rule"and his reading of the Alexander case, the General Counsel casts each division in the image of a "person" on the basis of the autonomy exercised by the local head of each in determining the content of the newspaper he manages , its labor relations, news, editorial and advertising policies; its subscription and other charges, and what services and supplies to pur- chase for its day-to-day operations. The Examiner, so the position runs, was the "secondary " and "unoffending per- son," and thus the picketing of its premises was "secondary" and unlawful." The "rule" urged by the General Counsel does not precisely encompass the relevant issue, for the question is not whether the two divisions constitute "a single person," but whether each division is a "person " Moreover, the "actual control" test for which the General Counsel contends is more easily stated than applied If weight be given to autonomy in the areas where it exists, why not to those where it does not, as in editorial support of a candidate for the Presidency; compliance with the 26 The Charging Parties take much the same view of the -ileiander case as the General Counsel, but assert that the status of the Examiner as a "person" is immaterial , and that what matters is the autonomy of the Herald-Examiner, which, in the Charging Parties' view, makes it a separate person It is unnecessary to deal here with the reason why the Charging Parties view the Examiner's status as immaterial, for the fact is that the complaint alleges that each of the two divisions in question is a "person " and "employer" and that in "furtherance and support of the labor dispute with the Herald-Examiner" the Respondents "induced and encouraged individuals employed by the Exam- iner to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to perform services, and have threatened , coerced or restrained the Examiner," all for prohibited objects, and by such conduct have violated Sec 8(b)(4)(B) The complaint and the answers shape the issues 320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Corporation's "procedures and regulations" that subject each division to a home office central accounting system, governing the payment of Inter-divisional obligations, and require each to make periodic reports used by Hearst's board of directors as a basis for "large decisions" such as significant expansions of divisional plant facilities or changes in operational methods involved in the agency functions of the Printing Company; the requirement that division heads receive approval of the board or its appropriate committee for outlays in excess of $10,000, and the periodic transmission of "operating profits" to the Corporation which uses them as it sees fitfl The ultimate destination of divisional "profits" and the $10,000 limitation on capital outlays are plainly large restrictions upon the local management of Hearst's Los Angeles and San Francisco newspapers, particularly taking into account the millions of dollars in capital outlays made by the Corporation for both newspapers in recent years As is evident from Gould's testimony, he was no free agent even for completion of the talks with the Chronicle management that led to formation and financing of the Printing Company The amount involved was beyond his "area of responsibility," and thus he deemed it necessary that the then chairman of the Hearst board carry on discussions that led to the board's decision in the matter But the autonomy of local divisional management, or the lack of it, is beside the point, for each division is not a "person" for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), with or without the evidence of autonomy That conclusion is impelled not only by the dictionary and statutory definitions of "person," previously mentioned, but by legislative history of unquestioned weight, and the legally permissible role of strike activity in collective bargaining. Senator Taft, who sponsored the former Section 8(b)(4)(A), said of its purpose: This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees [emphasis sup- plied] 27 Judge Learned Hand took much the same view of the legislative design, stating "The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in It "28 And the Supreme Court, speaking of the former Section 8(b)(4)(A), after citing Senator Taft's statement and similar views of the legislative purpose, has pointed out . Congress likewise meant to protect the employer only from union pressures designed to involve him in disputes not his own [Footnote omitted ] Judicial decisions interpreting the broad language of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act uniformly limited its application to such 'secondary' situations. [Footnote omitted ] This limitation was in "conformity with the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on " 93 Cong Rec 4323, It Leg Hist L M R A 1106 ° bit Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v NL R B, 181 F 2d 34, 37 (C A 2) offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own " (National Woodwork Mfrs Assn v NLRB , 386 U S 612, 625-627 ) The Court also noted that in the Landrum-Griffin conversion of Section 8(b)(4)(A) into the present Section 8(b)(4)(B), Congress, by means of the proviso to the amended section, "took pains to confirm the limited application of the section to such `secondary' conduct" (id 632). The two divisions are but segments of the same corporate person, Hearst, or put another way, departmentalized methods by which it does business, the employees on the staff of each division are employees of the same employer, Hearst, the labor dispute in Los Angeles is with Hearst since the local management is its instrument, and, in the face of these facts, to say that Hearst at its premises in San Francisco is "a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement" it has with its Los Angeles employees is as much as to reject the clear meaning of Senator Taft's statement, and of authoritative judicial expressions to the same effect Moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan has made clear, "the use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining" (N L R B v Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U S. 477, 495) The "operating profits" made by the Hearst divisions are fuel for the total corporate body and, together with other economic resources of the Corporation, are available at its will to sustain any division in a contest of legitimate economic pressures involved in a labor dispute between a union and the management of the division or, in other words. with Hearst. The right and power of the Corporation to muster its economic resources to such an end, irrespective of their divisional source, underscores the need for recognition of a correlative right in the union to engage in "otherwise" lawfui picketing of premises of the Corporation other that the dispute situs Such recognition gives balancing effect to 'ie "dual congressional objectives," reflected in the harnessing of the proviso of Section 8(b)(4)(B) to the prohibitions of the section, of preserving the right of employees to bring economic pressure to bear upon their em loyer in a dispute they have with him, while shielding other employers "wholly unconcerned" in the dispute from such a tactic The Supreme Court has cautioned against blunting the right in the absence of clear congressional warrant Noting the organizational and bargaining guarantees in Section 7 of the Act, and the express preservation of the right to strike in Section 13 "except as specifically provided for" in the Act, the Court said that "[i]n the absence of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary, these provisions (Sections 7 and 13) caution against reading statutory prohibitions as embracing employee activities to pressure their own employers into improving the employees' wages, hours and working conditions" (National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. N. L. R. B., supra at 643). LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUI! D, LOCAL 69 Heeding the caution , I find nothing in the Act to justify a scaling down of the rights guaranteed Hearst's Los Angeles employees in Sections 7 and 13 by prohibiting them from bringing "economic pressure" to bear upon their employer, Hearst, in the form of the picketing directed at it in San Francisco. That view is not negated by Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen 's Local No. 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 NLRB 1346, enf. 322 F.2d 405 (C.A D.C.), upon which the General Counsel and Charging parties place heavy reliance The case arose from an economic strike by employ- ees on the staff of a Miami newspaper, which is published by a Florida corporation , Miami Herald Publishing Compa- ny, the stock of which is wholly owned by an Ohio corpora- tion, Knight Newspapers , Inc, which publishes a newspaper in Detroit. In support of the strike against the Miami newspaper, the union representing the striking employees picketed the premises of the Detroit newspaper , with which it had no dispute, and the ultimate issue in the case was whether the picketing was "secondary " and in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B). Finding that notwithstanding Knight's ownership of the stock in Miami Herald "and the existence of some common officers and directors of the two corporations," both were "operated in substance as separate and autonomous corpora- tions," and that each publication had a separate managing head who independently managed it and set its policies, the Board concluded that "Knight Newspapers, Inc was entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4) in connection with Respondent's (the union's) dispute with the Miami Herald Publishing Company "29 The General Counsel and the Charging Parties claim a compelling resemblance between the Miami Pressmen's case and this one, in effect analogizing the Examiner and the Herald-Examiner to the two corporations which the Board described "as separate autonomous newspaper enter- prises." The cases are far apart . In the cited case, the purported "secondary" employer, Knight Newspapers, Inc., was indu- bitably a "person," by both dictionary and statutory stand- ards, as was the Florida enterprise , the purported "primary" employer. Knight was entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4)(B) unless it was so interwoven in common ownership and operation with the other employer as to make them, in practical effect, a single employer, thus precluding treat- ment of Knight as a neutral in the Miami dispute. The Board will inquire into the unitary status of two employers in a variety of situations ,30 and the fact that Section 8(b)(4)(B) shields only "secondary" or neutral employers was the underlying reason for the inquiry in the Miami Pressmen 's case . Making such an inquiry the Board found " The Board treated as inconsequential the fact that three employees of Miami Herald formerly worked for a Knight newspaper, that Miami Herald credits such service for its pension plan purposes, and that approxi- mately two per cent of the supplies used by the Detroit and Miami newspapers are purchased from a wholly owned subsidiary of Knight '° See, among others , Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 639, Teamsters (Poole's Warehousing, Inc), 158 NLRB 1281, NLRB v Calcasieu Paper Co, 203 F 2d 12, 13 (CA 5), NLRB v National Shoes, Inc, 208 F 2d 688, 691 (C A 2), and NL R B v Business Machines and Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F 2d 553 (C A 2) 321 that Knight and Miami Herald were "operated in substance as separate and autonomous corporations" and thus, by evident implication , gave effect to each as a "person" as that term is used in Section 8(b)(4)(f) and (u) Here the inquiry is not whether two "persons" should be treated as one in the light of the underlying purpose of Section 8(b) (4)(B), but whether there is any warrant for treating two parts of a single "person," Hearst, as separate "persons" for the purpose of applying the section On that score , unless one resorts to definitional invention, the day-to-day operational autonomy exercised by the local divisional management does not provide for each division a status as a "person" that the dictionary and statutory definitions withhold ; and to give the effect sought by the General Counsel and Charging Parties to such autonomy would be as much as to carve out of Hearst's status as a single "person" and common employer of both division- al labor forces an image of the Corporation as both a "primary" disputant in Los Angeles and "a third person" in San Francisco "wholly unconcerned in the disagreement" it has with its Los Angeles employees. I find no warrant for such a dual image either in the language of Section 8(b)(4)(b) or in its purpose , particularly when measured by the proviso. It will not do to say that this is a hypertechnical concentra- tion on form at the expense of substance , and to undertake to prove the point with a hypothesis that a different result would follow , on the basis of the Miami Pressmen's case, had Hearst chosen to publish each newspaper through a subsidiary corporation . This is an idle assumption. The economic facts of the relationship between the divisions and Hearst differ substantially from those of the relationship between the two corporations in the cited case . Without passing on the legal effect of the differences, or attempting to list them all, one may recall the $10,000 capital outlay limitation on the local divisional management, an obvious restriction on its power to make independent determinations regarding divisional growth and the acquisition or expansion of facilities, the pooled purchasing of newsprint through a Hearst agency by all Hearst 'newspaper divisions, except the Examiner for which the Printing Company purchases newsprint as agent for both Hearst and the Chronicle; the wire services, features, and news and editorial commen- tary by the chairman of Hearst's board under the title of Editor-in-Chief of the Hearst newspapers , made available for use by the Corporation 's newspaper divisions , the central- ized pension and insurance program made available by the Corporation for all its nonunion employees , whether employed in divisional work or at the home office, and the centralized accounting system by which the Corporation monitors the financial condition of its divisions , and oversees the payment and collection of interdivisional obligations. In short, it will be time enough to determine the applicability of the Miami Pressmen 's case should the hypothesis, har- nessed to the economic and other facts of the relationship between Hearst and its divisions , become a reality. I hold, for the reasons stated, that neither the Examiner nor the Herald-Examiner is a "person" within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B); that the Corporation is the common employer of the employees on the staff of each division; 322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and that the picketing to the extent that it was directed at Hearst's enterprise, the Examiner, was in support of a "primary" strike against Hearst , was "primary" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(b), and thus did not violate the Act " With respect to the picketing of the Chronicle, unlike the Respondents, I see no significance in this proceeding in the fact that that enterprise is joined with Hearst in the agency relationship with the Printing Company. The Chronicle is a separate "person" from Hearst, publishes a newspaper that is wholly independent of Hearst, although using the facilities of the common agent, and has no part in the dispute between Hearst and the Los Angeles Unions. Nor does it matter that the Chronicle does no business with the Herald-Examiner. It is enough that disruption of its business with others was an object of the picketing." The sum of the matter is that by picketing the Chronicle, each of the eight Respondent Unions identified above as members of the Council violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, and coerced and restrained the Chronicle in viola- tion of Section 8(b) (4)(n)(B) of the statute. The picketing directed at the Printing Company presents problems stemming from its agency relationship to the Chronicle and Hearst. One could argue with some reason that at least as it affected Printing Company functions for Hearst that were unrelated to any for the Chronicle (for example, drivers' deliveries of the Hearst newspaper only), the picketing activity was lawful, and, correlatively, unlawful as it affected separable functions for the Chronicle. The basis for such an argument is the elementary doctrine of agency law that one who acts through another acts for himself, or, in other words, Printing Company functions performed by the agent for Hearst were those of Hearst itself There is, moreover, some surface resemblance between such agency functions and the performance of "struck work" by an "ally" for a "primary" employer, but I think the analogy strained." In the "ally" situation , the "primary" 91 I have given consideration to the Court's decision in Penello v American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (D C Md Civil Action No 19942), a 10(1) proceeding, and to the subsequent decision of my colleague, Trial Examiner Samuel M Singer, in American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Baltimore News American Division, The Hearst Corporation), Case 5-CC-446 Both proceedings involved the legality of picketing of a Hearst newspaper division in Baltimore in support of a strike against a Hearst television and radio division in that city The Court, although not required by Sec 10 to make definitive determination whether the Baltimore divisions are "persons" intimated the view that they have that status, and Trial Examiner Singer concluded that each is a "person" within the meaning of Sec 2(2), and for the purposes of Sec 8(6)(4)(6) For the reasons I have given, I respectfully disagree with that holding and the similar view intimated by the Court to the extent that they are contrary to the conclusion reached here on the relevant issue I note, also, that the picketing involved here has been the subject of a 10 injunction pendente hie in Kennedy v San Francisco Oakland Newspaper Guild, 69 LRRM 2301 (D C , Calif) The Court did not pass on the question of the status of the Examiner and Herald-Examiner as "persons", and had no occasion to do so in view of the limited nature of the 10 proceeding " Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local No 46 v NLRB, 322 F 2d 405,410 (C A D C), and The Kroger Co , 119 NLRB 469,479 33 See Alexander Warehouse and Sales Co, supra at 919, and fns 3, 4, and 5 for a discussion of the "ally" doctrine and its legislative and judicial history dispute follows the "struck work," causing a loss of separate personality for the "ally" for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(B), but there is no transfer of "struck work" involved here, and what is more the image of independence of the Printing Company goes much beyond that of a mere instrument of Hearst Its situation is closer, it seems to me, to a "secondary" employer's enterprise, which has business dealings (not involving "struck work") with a "primary" employer's enterprise, which is owned in common with that of the "secondary" employer, but not actually under common control, although potentially subject to it. In a number of .cases involving such related employers, the courts, either because of the absence of "actual" common control, or its insufficiency, held picketing of the "secondary" employer to be unlawful 34 Here, the picketing of the Printing Company was a fortiori unlawful. In addition to the fact that the chief executive of the enterprise independently manages its day- to-day affairs, including its labor relations, one principal, the Chronicle, is a neutral in Hearst's Los Angeles dispute, and the other, Hearst, sharing the capital stock of the Printing Company with the Chronicle in equal measure is not in a position, by force of its proprietory interest alone, to control the Printing Company's affairs. The fact that three members of the Printing Company's board "repre- sent" Hearst does not alter the matter, for the other three members "represent" the Chronicle, and are in a position to prevent any actions of the board, including those pertain- ing to labor relations, whether these relate to employees performing functions for Hearst's newspaper or that of the Chronicle The Printing Company in short, has a sufficient "sec- ondary" status to place it beyond the boundaries of the dispute between Hearst and its employees, and beyond the reach of the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B). Thus by picketing the Printing Company, each of the eight Respond- ent Unions identified above as members of the Council violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, and coerced and restrained the Printing Company in violation of Section 8(b)(4) (ii)(B) of the statute." Finally, the conduct of the San Francisco Drivers' Union and San Francisco Guild in inducing and encouraging employees of the Punting Company to absent themselves from work was unlawful . Both San Francisco Respondents 31 JIG Roy & Sons Co v N.L R B, 251 F 2d 771 (C A 1), reversing a Board order (118 NLRB 286), and NLRB v Bachman Machine Co, 266 F 2d 599 (C A 8), also reversing a Board order (121 NLRB 1229) The Board has since applied the "actual control" test See Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local No 639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc), 158 NLRB 1281 "There is testimony that construction work on a property jointly owned by the Chronicle and Hearst, located about a half block from the Chronicle Building, stopped while the picketing was in progress The building under construction was to be used by the Printing Company upon completion The record does not identify the employer of the construction workers, and it may be something of a guess to say that the picketing caused cessation of the work In any case, even if the picketing was directed at the construction employees and caused the stoppage, a finding to that effect would add nothing to the remedy to be recommended below LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 were under contract to the Printing Company and had no dispute with its, and it is evident that an object of their conduct was to bring about a cessation of the Printing Company's business with Hearst, the Chronicle, and others such as customers of each newspaper enterprise, in order to bring pressure to bear upon Hearst in support of the striking Los Angeles Unions By such inducement and encouragement of employees, the San Francisco Drivers' Union and San Francisco Guild violated Section 8(b) (4)(i)(B) of the Act.36 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent Unions, except the Ware- housemen's Union, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Chronicle and the Printing Company, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent Unions, with the exception of the Warehousemen's Union, have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, I shall recommend that each Respondent so found cease "' Service Trade Chaullears ca/es men and Helpers Local 145 (Hon land Dri Goods Compant) 85 NLRB 1037 1038 remanded on other ,rounds 191 F 2d 65 (C 1 2) and later enld 199 F 2d 709 (C \ 2) Sea/area bmun (Hanrmermrll Paper Compass ) 10(1 NLRB 1176 1177-8 323 and desist from such practices, and take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following conclusions of law: 1. The Chronicle and the Printing Company have at all times material here employed individuals , and are, and have been at all such times, persons engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u) of the Act. 2 Neither the Examiner nor the Herald-Examiner is a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 3. Each of the Respondent Unions is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. Each of the Respondent Unions found above to have induced and encouraged employees of the Chronicle and the Printing Company to cease work for an object proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act has, by such conduct, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act 5. Each of the Respondent Unions found above to have coerced and restrained the Chronicle and the Printing Com- pany for such an object has, by such conduct, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act 6 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act. 7 The record does not establish the commission of any unfair labor practices except those found above. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]