Bricklayers, Local Union No. 6

756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO and Linbeck Con- struction Corporation Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America , AFL-CIO ( Dee Brown Masonry, Inc.) and Richard A. Arentz. Cases 16-CB-467 and 16-CB-492 September 28, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On April 21, 1970, Trial Examiner David S. David- son issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed- ing, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examin- er's Decision, and a supporting brief, and the Respond- ent filed exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor. Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here- by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' Inter- national Union of America, AFL-CIO, Denton, Tex- as, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order, as herein modified: 1. Insert as paragraph 1(b) the following and reletter existing paragraph 1(b) to read 1(c). "(b) Threatening employees with fines for working with a suspended member of the Union." 2. Insert the following as the second indented para- graph of the Appendix: WE WILL NOT threaten employees with fines for working with a suspended member. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Trial Examiner: Pursuant to a charge in Case 16-CB-467 filed on July 15, 1969, by Linbeck Construction Corporation against Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO, a complaint issued on September 30, 1969, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening employees of Linbeck with imposition of fines if they continued to work for Linbeck and by causing or attempting to cause Linbeck to discriminate in regard to the employment of Richard Arentz because of his failure to discharge his membership obligations to Respondent. On October 21, 1969, the charge in Case 16-CB-492 was filed by Arentz against Respondent. There- after an order consolidating cases and consolidated com- plaint issued restating the allegations of the original com- plaint and adding a further allegation that Respondent further violated Section 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by causing or attempting to cause Dee Brown Masonry, Inc, to discriminate against Arentz because of his nonmem- bership in the Union. In its answer Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. A hearing was held before me on December 18 and 19, 1969, at Denton, Texas. At the close of the hearing oral argument was waived and the parties were given leave to file briefs. Briefs have beeii received from the General Counsel, Linbeck Construction Corporation, and Respond- ent. Upon the entire record in this case including my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor I make the follow- ing: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Linbeck Construction Corporation, is a Texas corporation engaged in the construction industry with general offices in Houston, Texas In the 12 months prior to the hearing in this case, a representative period, Linbeck purchased supplies and materials outside the State of Texas, which were shipped directly into the State of Texas and were valued in excess of $50,000. Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., is also a Texas corporation engaged in the construction industry with its principal business office in Dallas, Texas. In the 12-month period prior to the hearing in this case, a representative period, 185 NLRB No. 94 BRICKLAYERS, LOCAL UNION NO 6 Brown purchased supplies and materials outside the State of Texas, which were shipped directly into the State of Texas and were valued in excess of $50,000. I find that Linbeck and Brown are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Brick- layers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. IiI. THE FACTS A. Case 16-CB-467 1 The facts At all times material Linbeck was engaged in a construc- tion project at Denton, Texas, referred to as the North Texas State Library job The value of the job was approxi- mately $2,600,000 Linbeck directly employed bricklayers at the jobsite to perform required masonry work. As a member of the Associated General Contractors Linbeck operated pursuant to an agreement between the Associated General Contractors and Respondent. The agreement con- tained no union-security provisions. On April 21, 1969,' Richard A Arentz was hired by Linbeck to work as a bricklayer on the library job. He worked part of that day but left because of back trouble and did not return until April 28. Arentz at that time was a member in good standing of Local 5, a sister local affiliated with the same International Union as Respondent. On the day of his return to the library job, Respondent's steward, Pnse, spoke to Arentz about the need for payment of so-called foreign dues to Local No 6 and obtaining a work permit. Arentz took the position that he wished to transfer from Local 5 to Respondent rather than follow the course mentioned by Prise. The details as to the ensuing conduct of Arentz and Respondent with respect to the payment of foreign dues and Arentz' right to transfer are in dispute but are not material to the resolution of the issues in this case It is clear that Respondent took the position that Arentz would have to obtain a work permit for the month of April before he could transfer his membership, while Arentz insisted that he was entitled to transfer his membership as of his start on the job As a consequence of Arentz' refusal to pay foreign dues and obtain a permit, charges were filed with Respondent against Arentz and a union trial was held in May. As a result Arentz was fined $25 and required to obtain permits and pay foreign dues to Respondent for the months of April and May 1969. Arentz complied with the decision of the trial board, but thereafter he refused to pay additional foreign dues for the months of June and July, again on the grounds that he was entitled to transfer to Respondent. Respondent ' Unless otherwise indicated all dates mentioned below fell in 1969 757 apparently disputed his right to transfer at that time because Arentz had become delinquent in payment of his dues to Local 5. As a consequence of Arentz' refusal to pay the foreign dues for June and July, he was again charged. On the night of July 7, Respondent held a second trial. Arentz did not appear for the trial, and Respondent found him guilty as charged in default. On the morning of July 8, Respondent's business repre- sentative, James Gurley, came to the library jobsite at approximately 7 30 At that time Linbeck employed approxi- mately 16 to 17 bricklayers at the jobsite, and a substantial amount of masonry work remained to be performed on the job. Upon his arrival at the jobsite, Gurley Went to the trailer used as an office by Linbeck and conversed casually for about 20 minutes with Job Superintendent A. J. Strobel and Bricklaying Foreman L. A Berguron and Roy Kruemcke As Berguron left the trailer to arrange to get mortar on the scaffold for the start of work, Gurley followed him out of the trailer mentioning as he left that there was a problem or trouble on the job that morning.' Gurley then went to the yard outside the trailer where most of the bricklayers were gathered waiting to start work. He waited there with them for Arentz to arrive on the job. When Arentz arrived, Gurley spoke to him with most of the other bricklayers standing nearby behind Gurley. Gurley informed Arentz of the trial and the fine and asked Arentz if he was going to pay the fine and dues Arentz reaffirmed his view that Respondent was treating him improperly and said that he would not pay Gurley told Arentz that he was delinquent . Arentz asked Gurley if he was telling him that he could not work. Gurley told Arentz to be his guest and congratulated Arentz for having the longest one-man job in the country. Gurley then turned to other bricklayers who had been listening to his conversation with Arentz and who started to ask questions. He told them that he was not there to tell them whether they could or could not work, but that they knew the bylaws as well as he did.' The bylaws ' Both Strobel and Berguron testified that Gurley said that they had a problem or trouble on the job that morning According to Gurley the subject came up when in response to some teasing about his appearance at the jobsite that early in the morning he replied that he had a problem and might have trouble According to Gurley as he had not yet conveyed to Arentz the outcome of the trial the previous night he did not know what Arentz' response would be and therefore did not know whether he had a problem or not Nonetheless I find it more likely that the version of Strobel and Berguron is accurate as Gurley knew Arentz had taken an adamant position with respect to the payment of dues to Respondent despite his previous trial and fine and Arentz had not appeared for the trial on the previous night. ' Six witnesses, including Arentz and Gurley, testified as to what was said at this time Although Arentz testified that Gurley told him he could not work and told the other bricklayers that they were not allowed to work with Arentz, his testimony on this regard was corroborated only by that of Howard , who is hard of hearing , and was contradicted by that of Foreman Berguron as well as that of Respondent's witnesses Moreover, Arentz also testified that he could not recall Gurley's exact words but that Gurley implanted the notion that the other bricklayers could not work with a "conglomeration " of words I have credited Gurley in these circumstances. The testimony is also in dispute as to whether Gurley went beyond a general reference to the bylaws and (cont'd) 758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to which Gurley referred provided that a fine of $25 shall be levied against any member in good standing found guilty of working with a suspended member. After talking with Arentz and the other bricklayers, Gurley spoke further with Foreman Berguron and returned to the trailer to speak with Superintendent Strobel.' Gurley told Strobel that he had a delinquent man on the job and that the bricklayers would not go to work because they were union men and knew they would be automatically fined $25 if they worked with a delinquent member.' Strobel asked who the delinquent member was, and Gurley replied that it was Arentz. Strobel asked Gurley to try to get the matter straightened out and suggested that he seek assistance from an International Union representative because all the bricklayers were at the jobsite, Linbeck was behind schedule, and he wanted the matter settled as soon as possible. Gurley placed a call to an International Union representative from Strobel's telephone, but apparent- ly failed to reach him. Gurley then left the trailer and the jobsite. At the normal starting time for the bricklayers only Arentz went up on the scaffold to start work. The other bricklayers remained standing in the yard. Berguron informed Strobel that only Arentz was ready to work. Strobel decided it was not practical to work with a single man, and instructed Berguron to call Arentz off the scaffold and to have the laborers remove the mortar from the scaffold before it set.' There was a total of 15 bricklayers, other than Arentz, who reported to the jobsite that morning but did not work.' No bricklaying was done on the job that day stated that there would be a $25 fine for any bricklayer who worked with Arentz, as Arentz, Berguron , and Howard testified Although the conflict in this regard is more substantial, it is apparent that all the bricklayers were aware that there was a $25 fine for working with a delinquent member, and I am persuaded that the witnesses who testified that Gurley specifically mentioned a fine were giving their interpretation of Gurley's reference to the bylaws rather than the precise words which Gurley used In addition , there was one further conflict in the testimony According to Arentz, Gurley told Steward Trotter to record the names of any bricklayers who worked with Arentz Gurley and Trotter specifically denied that this instruction was given, and no witness corroborated Arentz I have credited the denials In sum, I have concluded that , the testimony of Gurley and Respondent's other witnesses as to what Gurley said at the jobsite is essentially accurate However, I do not accept as equally accurate Gurley's self-serving and argumentative explana- tions during his testimony as to what was in his mind or his reasons for his visit to the jobsite that morning Although Berguron testified to a further conversation with Gurley, Strobel, and Kruemcke before Arentz' arrival at the jobsite, both Strobel and Gurley placed their further conversation after Gurley's talk with Arentz and the other bricklayers I find that it occurred at that time In substance, however, the statements attributed to Gurley by Berguron differ little from those attributed to him by Strobel Gurley's testimony as to his further conversation with Strobel was brief, and he testified that he did not recall exactly what was said at that time I have credited Strobel's testimony as to their second conversation Gurley testified that there was no such thing as an automatic fine since charges and a trial were required before a fine could be levied Nonetheless, as the provisions of the bylaws dealing with working with delinquent members were clear, I find that Gurley used the term "auto- matic" in the sense that the bylaws clearly stated the offense and the penalty for it The laborers had previously put mortar in place for the bricklayers to use One of them, Crow, testified that he came to the jobsite only to inform Linbeck that he was leaving the job to start work on another From Wednesday, July 9, through Friday, July 11, a number of bricklayers reported to the jobsite each day Arentz also appeared each day, and no work was performed by the bricklayers. On each day some of the bricklayers asked Berguron if Arentz had appeared and if anything had been settled Each time Berguron told them that he heard nothing and the situation was the same. No records were kept of the identity or number of those who came to the jobsite but Berguron estimated that on July 9 eight or nine bricklayers came, on July 10 five or six appeared, and on July 11 four or five appeared. They remained at the site for varying lengths of time from an hour up to the whole morning but then left. On Monday, July 14, five bricklayers came to the jobsite at the start of the workday. Arentz did not appear, and Strobel told the foremen, Berguron and Kruemcke, to start work because Arentz was not on the job. The five bricklay- ers, including Steward Trotter, then started work. At or around 3 in the afternoon Arentz appeared at the jobsite and also started to work. The other five bricklayers, includ- ing Steward Trotter, continued to work with him until 4:30, the normal quitting time. On July 15 Arentz reported for work at the start of the workday The five bricklayers who had worked the previous day also reported, but only two of them went to work with Arentz Trotter informed Berguron that he was not going to work. He told Berguron that he had gone to the union hall the night before and had been told that he should have left the previous day when Arentz appeared and could not work with Arentz.e Trotter took his tools and left the jobsite. He did not return to work for Linbeck until early in August. The remaining two bricklayers stayed at the jobsite but did not start work. Arentz worked for approximately 3 hours. During the morning, Arentz approached Berguron and told him that it looked as if Linbeck could not go on the way things were and that he would be willing to enter into an agreement to the effect that if Arentz were right in his dispute with the Union Linbeck would pay him for wages lost and that if he were wrong Linbeck would owe him nothing.' Berguron told Arentz he lacked authority to make any agreement with Arentz, and then informed Strobel of Arentz's suggestion. Strobel asked to see Arentz, and Bergu- ron brought him to the office. Arentz told Strobel that the job couldn't go on the way it was and that Linbeck would not be able to man the job as long as he was on it. He said that it was unfair to him and the other bricklayers who were losing a lot of time and that Linbeck was falling behind schedule. Arentz volunteered to leave the job if Strobel would sign a statement. Strobel replied that he would sign a statement if Arentz would stay away job However, there is no indication that any of the other bricklayers who reported but did not work that morning had any intention of leaving the job until the problem with Arentz arose ' Although Trotter testified that he had no contact with union officials, between the time he left work on July 14 and the morning of July 15, he also testified that he could not recall whether he attended the union meeting on the night of July 14 1 have credited Berguron as to this conversation ' Arentz' testimony is vague as to the source of this proposal, but both Berguron and Strobel testified that it originated with Arentz, and Iso find BRICKLAYERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 6 from the jobsite during working hours, but that he was not laying Arentz oflff.'° Arentz then left the job to prepare a statement for Strobel to sign. He returned later with the statement which Strobel signed, adding a notation that it was subject to approval by Linbeck's attorney. 11 The statement as signed provided: I, Richard A. Arentz, in the interest of prudence, equity and good conscience, subject to the laws of the fair labor standards act and the state right to work laws, submit to the demands of local #6 of Texas and enter this agreement with Linbeck Construction Company. No 1 Arentz to cease to frequent the job site from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday thru Friday. No. 2 Linbeck to place in escrow by the 15th of each succeed- ing month any unpaid earnings of the preceding month, from the 8th day of July 1969 to the conclusion and disposal of this matter. No. 3 Arentz to supply Linbeck, in Houston with a statement of earnings and transportation cost less five dollars each month by the 10th of each succeeding month. Although the statement does not set forth the ultimate disposition to be made of the money placed in escrow, it appears from Arentz' testimony that it was to be given him if he prevailed in his dispute with Respondent on appeal and otherwise not. At some point either at the time Arentz volunteered to leave the job or earlier, Strobel asked Arentz to pay the fine and dues under protest so that the other bricklayers could work, but Arentz refused. At 12:30 after Arentz left the job, the two remaining bricklayers at the jobsite joined the two who were working. and worked for the rest of the day. On the next day six bricklayers reported and worked. By the start of the next week there were nine bricklayers working regularly on the job, and the complement slowly increased thereafter. There were no further interruptions to the job 2. Concluding findings The General Counsel and Linbeck contend that Respond- ent caused and attempted to cause Linbeck to discharge Arentz because of his dispute with Respondent over payment of foreign dues thereby violating Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. The complaint does not attack Respondent' s rules pertaining to work with suspended members, but it attacks their enforcement through a work stoppage and threats of a work stoppage, which the General Counsel and Linbeck would attribute to Respondent, as a means of forcing Arentz' removal from the job. Respondent contends that the work stoppage was merely the result of the decisions of individual 1° Strobel also testified that he told Arentz he would not give him his money or pay him off In view of the statement which Strobel signed, I construe that to mean that he would not pay him anything until his dispute with Respondent was resolved and then would pay him only if Arentz' position was sustained " In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is assumed herein that the statement was approved 759 bricklayers to abide by Respondent's bylaws and that it engaged in no unlawful conduct. Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an empiJy- er to discriminate against an employee in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. An exception is provided for the enforcement of membership obligations pursuant to a valid union-security agreement, but is not relevant here in the absence of such an agreement. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, "Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organiza- tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." The quoted proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) has been held to insulate the maintenance and enforcement of bylaws similar to that involved here from the reach of Section 8(b)(1)(A).12 However, when a union involves an employer in its efforts to enforce its bylaws by causing or attempting to cause the employer to discriminate against an employee because of his failure to comply with his membership obliga- tions, the union's efforts cease to be internal and violate Section 8(b)(2). In distinguishing between lawful efforts to enforce bylaws and unlawful efforts to cause discrimina- tion the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:" However, in order for union conduct to violate Section 8(b)(2), as opposed to Section 8(b)(1)(A), there must be some direct approach to the employer, or some conduct aimed at him, for the purpose of causing the employer to discriminate by implementing the union bylaw through his hiring practices or otherwise. . . Undoubtedly, petitioners as union members have been acutely aware of the bylaw's existence and of the rigorousness of enforcement within the Federation. However, on the present record the 'Board was free to find that petitioners, have not shown any pattern of action by the Federation aimed at them as employers. Here, the evidence shows that on July 8, before Arentz appeared at the jobsite, Gurley told Strobel and Berguron that there was a problem or trouble on the job that morning When Arentz asked Gurley in the presence of the other bricklayers whether Gurley was telling him he could not work, Gurley told Arentz to be his guest and congratulated Arentz for having the longest one-man job in the country. Then, when the other bricklayers started to question Gurley, he told them that he was not there to tell whether they could or could not work, but that they knew the bylaws as well as he did. Thereafter, when Gurley again spoke to Strobel, he told Strobel that he had a delinquent man -' American Federation of Musicians, AFL-CIO (Don Glasser), 165 NLRB 798, affd sub nom Glasser et al v N L R B , 395 F 2d 401 (C A 2), Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802, A FM, AFL-CIO (Joe Carroll Orchestras), 176 NLRB No 46 11 Glasser et a! v. N.LR B., supra, 395 F 2d at 406, quoted with approval in Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802, AFM, AFL-CIO (Joe Carroll Orchestras), supra. 760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on the job and that the bricklayers would not go to work because they were union men and knew they would be fined if they worked with Arentz. In these circumstances, I cannot credit Gurley's testimony that he visited the jobsite merely as a messenger to convey to Arentz the decision of the trial board on the previous night, nor can I accept the contention that what ensued was the mere consequence of individual actions of the other bricklayers. Here there was a direct approach to Linbeck and conduct aimed at Linbeck. The time and place chosen by Gurley to communicate the results of the trial to Arentz indicate that Gurley was interested not only in informing Arentz but also in informing the other bricklayers before they could perform any further work on the job. While Gurley was careful in the language he used in the presence of the bricklayers, he left little doubt that what he sought was a work stoppage by the other bricklayers as long as Arentz remained on the job' and delinquent. Thus his statement congratulating Arentz for having the longest one-man job in the coutry was a clear signal to the other bricklayers that they were not to work. Although Gurley prefaced his statement to the other bricklayers with a disclaimer that he was there to tell them whether they could or could not work, in the next breath he made it clear that they were not to work, telling them that they knew the bylaws as well as he did. Thus, I find that Gurley induced the other bricklayers to stop work because of Arentz' refusal to comply with the decision of the trial board and that Respondent is responsible for the work stoppage. Nor did Gurley's efforts stop there. When Gurley spoke to Strobel before Arentz' arrival, Gurley stated that there was a problem or trouble on the job. However general that comment, in his later conversation with Strobel Gurley was explicit and told Strobel that because of the delinquency of Arentz the other bricklayers would not work. Thus, Gurley bolstered the refusal of the other bricklayers to work with the implied threat that the work stoppage would last as long as Arentz was on the job.14 While Gurley was never explicit in stating to Strobel what Linbeck could do to end the work stoppage, there were only two foreseeable actions which could end it One was the payment of the fine and fees by Arentz, which Arentz had already refused to make. The other was the removal of Arentz from the job. Only the latter was within Linbeck's control. While it is thus clear that Respondent attempted to cause Linbeck to discriminate against Arentz, the question remains whether Respondent caused such discrimination. The immediate consequence of the work stoppage was that Linbeck decided to suspend all bricklaying operations, and, despite Arentz' availability for work, no bricklaying was performed on July 8-11. Although it is apparent that one bricklayer could not make substantial progress on a job which had been employing 17, the record does not reveal whether the absence of the other bricklayers made the continuation of work by Arentz so inefficient or infeasible as to render his utilization on the job impossible as a practical matter.15 That Linbeck could operate with less than a full complement is indicated by the performance of work on July 15 and during the slow buildup of employ- ment thereafter In these circumstances, I find that Respond- ent caused Linbeck to deny Arentz work during the period of July 8-11 because of his failure to pay the fine and foreign dues demanded of him. As set forth, when Arentz did not appear at the jobsite on July 14, the next regular workday, work resumed with the small group of bricklayers who reported. They did not leave when Arentz arrived to work in the middle of the afternoon, and, the next morning, two of them joined Arentz at work, while two did not, and one, Respond- ent's steward, Trotter, took his tools and left the job. With this background, Arentz approached his foreman and job superintendent, Strobel, to seek an agreement under which he could leave the job and establish a right to be paid for lost work in the event that he prevailed in his dispute over the union fine and his membership rights. Thus, it appears that Arentz' departure from the job was initiated by Arentz. Yet while Strobel did not lay Arentz off, neither did Arentz quit unconditionally, and it is beyond dispute that Arentz broached the subject of his departure because of the evident impact of the work stoppage on the job. While there was bricklaying work being performed when Arentz left, there was no indication that the stoppage had ended permanently. Thus, two brick- layers who had worked with Arentz the previous day refused to work with him on July 15, and Trotter left the job indicating to both Arentz and Berguron that he was under pressure from Respondent for having not left the job when Arentz started work the previous day. The question to be decided on these facts is whether, by entering into the arrangement with Arentz which resulted in Arentz' departure from the job, Linbeck discriminated against Arentz. I find that it did. Arentz did not simply quit, but rather sought some protection as a condition of leaving. By acquiescing to Arentz' proposal, Linbeck became a party to Arentz' departure from the job with less than the complete protection against reprisal to which Arentz was entitled under the Act. It is true that the arrangement proposed by Arentz, as a practical matter, must have been virtually irresistible to Linbeck, and it may well be that if the issue were whether Linbeck should be jointly responsible with Respondent for remedying the discrimination against Arentz, the circumstances would pro- vide cause for relieving Linbeck of such liability. But in answering the question whether Respondent caused Linbeck to discriminate against Arentz, I find that Arentz' departure from the job was a consequence of a discriminatory arrange- ment with Linbeck into which he and Linbeck entered as a consequence of Respondent's unlawful pressure and that Respondent therefore caused Linbeck to discriminate against Arentz. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. As its conduct went beyond internal enforcement of its bylaws, I find further that by Gurley's conduct inducing the work stoppage by an implied ,4 Local 120, Laborers . International Union of North Amenca,AFL-, 15 Cf Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802, A FM CIO (Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation), 174 NLRB No_ 150 AFL-CIO (Joe Carroll Orchestras), 176 NLRB No 46 BRICKLAYERS , LOCAL UNION NO. 6 threat of fines to the other bricklayers Respondent restrained and coerced Arentz and the other employees in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act 16 B. Case 16-CB-492 I The facts On September 29 Lloyd Hock, brick foreman for Dee Brown Masonry, hired Arentz to work as a bricklayer on a project known as the Six Flags Mall in Arlington, Texas, within Respondent's jurisdiction When Arentz started to work, Hock asked him to check in with Eugene Thornton, Respondent's steward on the job. Arentz went to Thornton and told him he was going to work on the job " Thornton asked him if he was the man who was having trouble with Respondent. Arentz said that he was, and Thornton asked if it had been settled. Arentz replied that it was not. Thornton asked Arentz what he was going to do about paying dues to Respondent, and Arentz told him that he could not pay them while the dispute lasted Thornton told Arentz that he would not be allowed to work on the job without a permit. Arentz left Thornton and started to work, and Thornton called Hock to where he was working. Thornton told Hock that Arentz would have to pay working dues, and Hock agreed that the payment was required under Respond- ent's rules. Hock asked what the problem was, and Thornton replied that Arentz did not want to pay working dues. Thornton mentioned that Arentz had had problems at Denton and told Hock that "he might have trouble on his job over the same situation."te Hock asked what the problem was, and Thornton described to him what he knew of the two cases in Denton, with reference to Arentz' initial and later refusals to pay working dues there Although Thornton testified that he did not know whether he told Hock that there had been a shutdown on the job at Denton, he conceded that he had heard that there had been a shutdown at Denton and testified that he told Hock there had been trouble and what kind of trouble they had. Hock told Thornton that he would talk to Arentz about it. Hock then went to Arentz and asked him if he would pay working dues so that Brown would not have any problem on the job. Arentz replied that he could not do so because he was in the midst of a dispute over the transfer of his book. Hock told Arentz that he knew nothing about the dispute and was not taking sides but wanted the job done without a shutdown, so that, if Arentz did not want to pay working dues, he would have to leave the job. Arentz then left the job. Two days later, 16 Unlike N.L.R.B. v Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co, 388 US 175, here the threat of fines did not merely restrain or coerce employees to join in lawful concerted activity See also Scofield, et al v NL R B., 394 U S 423 " Unless otherwise indicated , my findings as to conversations between Arentz, Hock, and Thornton are based on a composite of their testimony which for the most part is not in conflict " Hock testified that Thornton said they would have trouble or a shutdown but could not recall which word Thornton used Thornton testified that he spoke of trouble but not a shutdown In view of Hock's uncertainty, I have credited Thornton 761 Arentz started work on another job for Brown located outside Respondent's jurisdiction. 2. Concluding findings An initial question with respect to the allegations concern- ing this incident is whether Respondent is responsible for the acts of its job steward Thornton. The evidence establishes that as a job steward, Thornton received money from members, issued receipts to members for dues collected, and signed up employees as members of the Union. Respond- ent's constitution and bylaws provide that stewards shall inspect the working cards of members and see that they are current. They provide that upon starting work on a job, a member shall locate the steward and show his dues book for inspection They provide further for reports by stewards at membership meetings on the names and membership status of those members working on the job, with an explanation of the reason any member is not paid up. Thornton's conversation with Arentz occurred in the course of the performance of the duties with which he was specifically charged While the bylaws imposed no further obligation upon him to intercede with his foreman on the basis of what he discovered, his conversation with Hock was in furtherance of Respondent's interests and within the scope of his general authority to enforce union membership obligations on the jobsite. I find that Thornton was an agent of Respondent and that Respondent is answera- ble for his conduct with respect to Arentz at the Arlington jobsite.19 There is no question that Arentz was removed from the Six Flags Mall job because of his dispute with Respond- ent following Thornton's conversation with Hock The only question is whether Respondent through Thornton caused Brown to remove Arentz within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2). I find that it did. Thornton made a direct approach to Hock, raising the issue with Hock and threatening trouble on the job because Arentz did not want to pay working dues. Although Thornton testified that he did not threaten a shutdown, he conceded that he referred to the trouble on the library job and told Hock what kind of trouble they had. Whether or not Thornton mentioned a shutdown in so many words, there can be little doubt from his testimony as a whole, as well as that of Hock, that Thornton conveyed to Hock that he would have "trouble on the job" in the form of a work stoppage, and not merely that there was an internal dispute between Respondent and Arentz I find that Thornton threatened that there would be a work stoppage if Arentz remained on the job without paying his working fees and that Hock removed Arentz from the job as a consequence of that threat.20 Accordingly, I find that Respondent attempted to and '9 International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron- workers, Local 600 (Bay City Erection Company, Inc), 134 NLRB 301, 306-307, Hampton Merchants Association, eta!, 151 NLRB 1307 30 As it appears that Arentz started work on another job for Brown 2 days later, it is not clear whether Arentz was discharged by Brown or simply transferred to another job In either case, his removal from the job amounted to discrimination 762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD did cause Brown to discriminate against Arentz in violation of Section 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.31 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activites of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with the operations of the employers described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY As I have found that Respondent caused Linbeck Con- struction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc, to discriminate against Richard A. Arentz because he was not a member of the Respondent in good standing, I shall also recommend that it be ordered to notify Linbeck Construction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry Inc., in writing, with copies to Arentz, that it has no objection to the hiring of Arentz by these employers without regard to membership in or payment of permit fees to Respondent, I shall further recommend that Respondent be ordered to make Arentz whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by payment to him of the amounts he normally would have earned as wages from July 8, 1969, to the date 5 days after Respondent serves the written notices required above, less net earnings, to which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. The General Counsel asks as a further remedy that Respondent be ordered to rescind the fine assessed against Arentz and reimburse him for moneys already paid Respond- ent as fines or working dues, and that Respondent be ordered to make whole all of its members or other employees who lost work due to its threat to fine any member who worked with Arentz. With respect to the fine levied against Arentz and the working dues, their legality was not placed in issued by the allegations of the complaint, they were imposed upon Arentz as a member of Respondent, and the authorities relied on by the General Counsel are not apposite. With respect to the loss of work by other persons, there is no allegation or showing that Respondent caused Linbeck or Brown to discriminate against any employee other than Arentz.32 Accordingly, I decline to recommend the further relief requested by the General Counsel. As Respondent engaged in similar conduct with respect to two employers, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to refrain from engaging in similar conduct with respect to the employees of any employer. 21 Local 120, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Edward J DeBartolo Corporation), supra 22 See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, et a! (Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co ), 174 NLRB No 34, American Guild of Variety Artists, AFL-CIO ( Fontainebleau Hotel), 163 NLRB 457 , 458, and cases cited therein Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Pasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Linbeck Construction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 3. By attempting to cause and causing a work stoppage because Linbeck Construction Corporation employed a sus- pended member of Respondent, by threatening Linbeck and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., with work stoppages because they employed a suspended member, by causing both employers to discriminate against Richard A. Arentz because he was a suspended member of Respondent, and by threatening other employees with fines if they continued to work with Arentz, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER23 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend that Respondent, Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents and respresentatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Causing or attempting to cause Linbeck Construction Corporation, Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., or any other employer to descriminate against Richard A. Arentz or any other employee because of failure to satisfy membership obligations to or nonmembership in Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plaster- ers' International Union of American, AFL-CIO. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Notify Linbeck Construction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., in writing, that it has no objection to the employment of Richard A. Arentz and furnish said employee with copies of such notification. (b) Make Richard A. Arentz whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." 23 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes BRICKLAYERS, LOCAL UNION NO 6 (c) In the event that Richard A Arentz is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, notify him, in writing, that it has no objection to his employment in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Univer- sal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces (d) Post at its offices, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms pro- vided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 16, signed copies of the said notice in sufficient number to be posted by Linbeck Construction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., the employers willing, in all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.29 " In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Linbeck Construction Corporation, Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., 763 or any other employer to discriminate against Richard A Arentz or any other employee because of failure to satisfy membership obligations to or nonmembership in Bricklayers and Stone Masons, Local Union No. 6, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers' International Union of America, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 or the Act. WE WILL notify Linbeck Construction Corporation and Dee Brown Masonry, Inc., in writing, that we have no objection to the employment of Richard A. Arentz and we shall furnish him with copies of such notification. WE WILL make whole Richard A. Arentz for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. Dated By BRICKLAYERS AND STONE MASONS, LOCAL UNION No. 6 BRICKLAYERS , MASONS & PLASTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICAN, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 8A24 Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.